



COMMAND: A GOVERNMENT OF CANADA RESPONSE TO HYBRID WARFARE

Major Sebastien Gagnon

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Exercise Solo Flight

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Major Sebastien Gagnon

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Canadians are under attack. The enemy is unseen and unheard, but their effects are unknowingly being felt by all. Unlike the traditional notion of war, hybrid warfare is subtle and hard to detect, even more difficult to respond to. Recently during Canada's 2021 Federal election, "China employed a sophisticated strategy to disrupt Canada's democracy", which was reported via the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).¹ This is just one of the many innovative ways Canada is now under attack. For militaries, who specialize in operating in complex and uncertain environments like war, command plays a central role that enables them to thrive in those environments. This paper will demonstrate that the Government of Canada (GC) must adopt or adapt Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) command concepts to enable their Whole of Government (WoG) response to hybrid warfare. In doing so, the GC will be able to harness the lessons learned through military operations in order to direct its national security apparatus to respond precisely and decisively to these attacks on its democracy. This paper will begin by providing an in-depth overview of the origins and functions of command to demonstrate how it was adapted throughout history and its current application. Hybrid warfare will then be expanded upon, including that although it is not a new concept, why it is a significant security concern. Finally, the concepts of command and hybrid warfare will collide in the context of Canada's national security, demonstrating how the military concept of command provides a framework to address hybrid warfare threats.

COMMAND

Depending on the context, the word command can denote a variety of meanings. When dealing with computers, command is a prompt for coding, but when related to skill level, command could describe someone's mastery of something.² In hierarchical organizations like militaries, command plays a central and enduring role in how militaries operate. It describes the quintessential dynamic which has driven all military losses and victories since the beginning of warfare. The Canadian Forces Joint Publication (CFJP) on doctrine defines command as "formally delegated authority and is the authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces."³ In simple terms, command equates to the authority given to one individual to employ the forces assigned to them. Importantly, this command is formal and legal so that if a subordinate does not follow a legal order from their commander, even if that order could result in their death, that subordinate can be charged under the National

¹ Robert Fife and Steven Chase, "CSIS Documents Reveal Chinese Strategy to Influence Canada's 2021 Election," *The Globe and Mail Online*, last modified 22 February 2023, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-china-influence-2021-federal-election-csis-documents/>.

² Merriam Webster Dictionary (Online), "Command," accessed on 7 April 2023, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/command>.

³ Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-000/FP-001, *CFJP 01 Canadian Military Doctrine* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2009), 5-2.

Defence Act (NDA). Since there is no other sector, private or public in Canada, where that level of authority exists, and this is what makes military command so unique.

Today, command is a well studied subject amongst military scholars and the academic community. It can even be broken down into sub-types like full command, operational command (OPCOM), tactical command (TACOM), combatant command (COCOM), and mission command to name a few. It can also be combined with other words to form whole new meanings like command and control (C2). The current concept of command however was the outcome from advancements in warfare, necessitating changes in order to adapt to new threats. As humans developed more imaginative ways for killing each other from farther distances, so too has the commander's ability to shift their means of communication from flags, pipes and drums, and various other instruments to advanced radios and computers that can reach anywhere in the world almost instantly. To fully understand how command can adapt in order to respond to today's operating environment, it is first important to understand how it has changed in recent history to become what it is today. Through this analysis, essential context will be established to inform how command can once again adapt for GC application.

Centuries ago, land armies would face off against each other in fields standing in lines under the command of officers. Conversely, on the high-sea captains of ships would combat the elements and foes alike to bring glory to their sovereign. There was seldom a requirement for captains at sea to coordinate with the commanders on land, and even less a need to designate an overall commander. At the on-set and throughout the majority of the First World War (WWI) the command concept was service centric in reflection of this dynamic.⁴ The campaigns of WWI would only be facilitated by cooperation vice through formal command relationships.⁵ Cooperation during this time was however the exception "due to inter-service rivalry and mistrust" resulting in armies conducting their own campaigns in silos.⁶ It was not until near the end of the war in 1918 that General Haig, Commander of the British Expeditionary Force, expressed to his government the need for all the forces to be placed under a unified command to stave off imminent defeat.⁷ Although this did not result in the establishment of a unified command akin to what would be recognizable today, these events did highlight the need for unity of effort to use the "synergy obtainable from every element of the force when acting in unison to maximise the capabilities of a military force."⁸ The maturing of the unity of effort through command was seen during the Second World War (WWII) and later.

Militaries in WWII were more diverse and technologically capable than those of WWI. Air forces that were just fledgling capabilities in WWI were now fully capable services with their own commands. Technologies like radios (including cryptography) and radars enabled command from a distance with military operations spanning from

⁴ Noel Sproles, Alex Yates and Defence Science and Technology Organisation Salisbury (Australia) Info Sciences Lab, *A Historical Study of Operational Command: A Resource for Researchers*, 2005, 35.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid., 18.

⁷ Sproles, 22.

⁸ Ibid., 17.

under-sea, on the sea, on land, in the air, and in the minds of the adversary. Military operations were more complicated, requiring close coordination amongst the services to ensure unity of effort. Building on the lessons learned from WWI and early in WWII, the allied forces established a “system of Combined Chiefs of Staff and Supreme Commanders” in the early 1940s which would conduct “inter-service and inter-Allied coordination.”⁹ Combined with commanders-in-chief, who commanded “across all elements of national power” establishing military end-states, the Allied forces of WWII put into place joint and combined command structures to maximize the unity of effort of their forces.¹⁰ However, this structure was not without some issues. There were renowned conflicts, oddities, and demeanours between personalities like General Patton, General MacArthur, and Field Marshall Montgomery (to name a few) which are beyond the scope of this paper but highlight the enduring service-centric mentalities that plagued military operations during WWII. Consequently, with the Allied establishment of these senior command structures, service commanders who were used to the operating under their own prerogative now had limitations placed on them in relation to authorities and responsibilities.¹¹ Throughout the remainder of WWII these limitations would become more defined as operational authorities of various degrees while concurrently establishing an “imperative for the commanders to cooperate.”¹² Overall, the establishment of this command hierarchy at the inter-service and Allied level enabled the force from the soldiers on the ground to the general in charge to fight as necessary based on their authorities, ensuring their actions were coordinated and framed under one common vision.

Conversely, the opposite form of command structures could also be implemented where all the authority is retained by only the superior commanders, negating the flexibility and initiative of subordinate commanders to respond to crisis. One major example of this during WWII was with the Germans.¹³ Despite their early successes of the Blitzkrieg which demonstrated an advanced application of joint command structures, as the war progressed their command became “concentrated...at the political strategic level...[that] did not allow a delegation of authority.”¹⁴ Hitler held a stifling control on his forces which undercut the ability of his generals to respond against an Allied force whose command arrangements were more permissive. In more recent history, the command that Hitler demonstrated could be compared to that was exercised by Saddam Hussain during the Gulf War.¹⁵

The Allies demonstrated in WWII the need to “establish agreed levels of command authority” to contribute to the success of combined and joint forces.¹⁶ They also noted that “even when commanders speak the same language there are

⁹ Ibid., 22.

¹⁰ Ibid., 4.

¹¹ Sproles, 31.

¹² Ibid., 31 and 59.

¹³ Ibid., 26.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Sproles, 27.

¹⁶ Ibid., 29.

misunderstandings due to ...imprecise meaning of words and terminology” which would be compounded when commanders spoke different languages.¹⁷ In the years following, each Allied nation would continue to develop and standardize command authorities. The United States (US) most notably during their “renaissance in joint operations” where they created their modern-day Unified Combatant Command construct, the United Kingdom (UK) during the Falklands War, or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in their alliance standardization efforts.¹⁸ Unfortunately, despite the recognized need to have common understanding amongst allies, an analysis of US, UK, NATO, and Australian (AUS) doctrines demonstrate there is still work to be done. The doctrines of Canada and the UK are available to the public, while the doctrines of NATO, US, and AUS are not. It should be noted that some of the sub-services have accessible doctrine, which refer to the parent doctrine.¹⁹ As such due to the lack of sharing of doctrine amongst allies, there remains an extant chance that they may not know their authorities and responsibilities, or even worse, mis-interpret them. One significant difference applicable to this paper is how the US Armed Forces employ the Command-in-Chief concept through their President, similar during WWII.²⁰ Although nations like Australia and Canada still have Commanders-in-Chief through their Governor Generals, their function is more ceremonial.²¹ The Governor General of Canada explicitly states that they play “a major role in recognizing the importance of Canada’s military at home and abroad...offers support and encouragement.”²²

In all, command concepts have changed over time based on the threat and capabilities available. Service centric command models that were prolific during WWI have been replaced with Allied/coalition centric command models to account for the complexities of warfare. Although not all nations provide open access to their command models, nor do all nations share the same definitions, what remains enduring is the appreciation that all nations must ensure they understand their own command authorities. Just as prior major wars proved that command concepts are not absolute, the current hybrid warfare threat environment western nations are facing may necessitate the next shift of command to remain responsive to that threat. In order to situate the future battlespace, the impact of hybrid warfare on societies will be discussed in the following section.

HYBRID WARFARE

There are several recent examples of hybrid warfare attacks, such as the Canadian 2021 Federal election interference, but it is the Russia annexation of Crimea in 2014 that

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid, 28 and 33.

¹⁹ A review of all mentioned doctrine was completed using sources (where available) found in the bibliography.

²⁰ Sproles, 4.

²¹ Ibid.

²² The Governor General of Canada, “Command-in-Chief,” accessed on 9 April 2023, <https://www.gg.ca/en/governor-general/role-and-responsibilities/commander-chief#:~:text=As%20commander%2Din%2Dchief%20of,military%20at%20home%20and%20abroad.>

provides concentrated snapshot what it can look like. Russia's action in 2014 were shrouded in "ambiguity and confusion through distorted reports of what was occurring in Ukraine and consistent denial of [Russia's] participation."²³ They deployed unattributable forces, working with separatist groups to take over key infrastructure in the region, all the while supported by a robust electronic and cyber attacks, reinforced by troll farms spreading disinformation on the internet.²⁴ The effect on the world was that of confusion, which for societies based on consensus, delayed their ability to respond, by which point Russia had already succeeded in its goal. Russia's application of hybrid warfare tactics demonstrated unforeseen ways to achieve its political aims, without using traditional military power the world was accustomed to.

Although the definition of hybrid warfare is still fluid this paper will use Colonel Bernd Horn's definition in his monograph *On Hybrid Warfare*. Horn defines hybrid warfare "as a methodology of achieving the political end-state without tripping the threshold of war...it creates a perfect ambiguity that paralyzes opponents since they are not even aware they are under attack."²⁵ Furthermore, it "blurs the line between peace and war and targets, if not preys on, existing economic, political and/or social vulnerabilities."²⁶ Hybrid warfare can also be interchanged with Fifth Generation Warfare or Gray Zone Conflict, noting that although each have nuanced differences, for the purpose of this discussion they represent the same concept.²⁷ These terms entail states acting below threshold of war, using any means necessary, in order to achieve their goals. China has described their concept of "three warfares" which consists of psychological, legal, and media components to cripple an opponent without violence.²⁸ Although hybrid warfare presents as a new and emerging type of conflict, it is in fact "as old as war itself."²⁹ It is only due to the impact of technology and globalization which created a more intertwined and complex world, has hybrid warfare been able to increase its effectiveness.³⁰ States are still pursuing their goals in a zero-sum game meaning that the "overall security environment is radically changing despite the nature of conflict remaining the same."³¹ Globalization has provided a better landscape to allow opponents to harness all aspects of their national powers to achieve their goals using non-kinetic means, impacting how societies overall necessitating them to adapt and respond.

²³ Bernd Horn, *On Hybrid Warfare* (Winnipeg: Canadian Special Operations Forces Command Professional Development Centre, 2016), 22, https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/mdn-dnd/D4-10-19-2016-eng.pdf.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid., 12.

²⁶ Horn, 14.

²⁷ Armin Krishnan, "Fifth Generation Warfare, Hybrid Warfare, and Gray Zone Conflict: A Comparison," *Journal of Strategic Security* 15, no. 4 (2022), 27. doi:10.5038/1944-0472.15.4.2013.

²⁸ Horn, 17.

²⁹ Bilal, accessed on 10 April 2023.

³⁰ Horn, 14 and 15.

³¹ Bilal, accessed on 10 April 2023.

Essentially, conflicts are no longer focused on traditional warfare, like that seen in WWII, but “fought in new innovative, and radically different ways.”³² Actors are seeking to exploit or create polarization, attacking a states legitimacy from the inside by eroding the “trust between state institutions and the people.”³³ This is accomplished using a variety of methods that includes “cyber tools, public and commercial corruption, weaponization of legal systems, transnational organized crime, and disinformation campaigns.”³⁴

One major shift that hybrid warfare has driven is the role of the military in response to it. In their article in the *NATO Review*, Ruhle and Roberts note that “the times when peace, crisis and conflict were three distinct phases, conflicts were fought largely with military means, and when adversaries were well known, are over.”³⁵ Due to the nature of hybrid warfare and whom it targets, the military’s typical role in the application of violence is not suited to respond.³⁶ Instead of security centric agencies responding to the attacks, the first line of defence will be the private sector who lacks access to any effective defence mechanisms nor have any obligation to the public sector.³⁷ Additionally, each individual civilian within a nation has a role to play due to social media which hybrid warfare would employ to erode their trust in the government and increase polarization, effectively hobbling their nation’s ability to function.³⁸ The US has already experienced the impacts on their public trust which dropped from “73 percent in the 1950s to 24 percent in 2021.”³⁹ Owing to globalisation and nature of western cooperation, the impacts to one nation will have second and third order impacts on other nations adding a layer in complexity to respond as a collective while respecting a nation’s sovereignty.⁴⁰

Consequently, the consensus amongst western nations is that in order to respond to and counter hybrid warfare attacks, it would necessitate not only WoG involvement, but also the Whole-of-Society (WoS).⁴¹ This has driven NATO as seeing “hybrid threats as priority for cooperation” in 2016, working not only internally amongst its military and civilian counterparts, but also with the European Union (EU) to begin moving towards

³² Arsalan Bilal, “Hybrid Warfare – New Threats, Complexity, and ‘Trust’ as the Antidote,” *NATO Review*, 30 November 2021, accessed on 10 April 2023,

³³ Bilal, accessed on 10 April 2023.

³⁴ Chris Honeyman and Andrea Kupfer Schneider, “Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Back with Whole-of-Society Tactics,” *On Track*, vol. 30 (2023): 7.

³⁵ Michael Ruhle and Clare Roberts, “Enlarging NATO’s Toolbox to Counter Hybrid Threats,” *NATO Review*, 19 March 2021, accessed 10 April 2023, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/03/19/enlarging-natos-toolbox-to-counter-hybrid-threats/index.html>.

³⁶ Ibid., accessed on 10 April 2023.

³⁷ Honeyman, 8. And Calvin Chrutchie, “Mind the Hybrid Warfare Gap,” *On Track*, vol. 30 (2023): 20.

³⁸ Bilal, accessed 10 April 2023.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Axel Hagelstam, “Cooperating to Counter Hybrid Threats,” *NATO Review*, 23 November 2018, accessed on 10 April 2023, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2018/11/23/cooperating-to-counter-hybrid-threats/index.html>.

⁴¹ Ruhle and Roberts, accessed on 10 April 2023. And Horn, 40.

common understanding.⁴² The “importance of sufficient civil preparedness arrangements, a free press, an educated public and effective legal framework” are key counters to hybrid warfare, requiring both WoG and WoS involvement.⁴³ For Canada, hybrid warfare combined with long-range kinetic capabilities like hypersonic cruise missiles means that Canada no longer enjoys its relative safety enjoyed for generations. In the process of exercising its national interest Canada faces opposition in the form of hybrid warfare, which is compounded by its inclusion in alliances where opponents may inject domestic issues to distract Canada from meeting its international obligations.⁴⁴ The security implications and response for Canada to respond to hybrid threats will be explained in the next section, including how military command concepts can be adapted to meet the need.

CANADIAN NATIONAL SECURITY

The security apparatus within Canada consists of a variety of agencies with specific mandates which collectively provide security to Canada and its people.⁴⁵ Unsurprisingly, there are overlaps and seams which hybrid warfare would look to exploit, compounded with the difficulty for that many agencies to coordinate amongst each other using a common language and understanding. In Calvin Chrustie’s article in the *On Track* journal, he highlights the complexities of the Canadian security apparatus, noting that “bureaucratic rivalries are always possible.”⁴⁶ This is a seam that Horn also identifies as these organizations interactions can “create bureaucratic barriers that may fail to detect an adversary’s thrusts into a target society.”⁴⁷ Furthermore, Chrustie notes the Canadian “legal system [is] designed to protect individual rights, and relatively weak on contemporary and practical provisions to ensure the protection of democratic institutions.”⁴⁸ Considering the mechanisms of hybrid warfare, even if Canada’s security apparatus was perfectly coordinated, it would be prevented from countering any attacks due to the legal system not providing the requisite authorities. This is complicated even further when the consideration of private entities is brought in. From the viewpoint of communication infrastructure alone, without the networks provided by Canada’s major telecommunications companies like Bell, Telus, and Rogers, the Canadian security apparatus would be extremely limited in both their capabilities and capacity. These impacts could be expanded to any Canadian industry that could be considered critical infrastructure like energy production, or key resources. NATO has already recognized the susceptibility in its ability to complete its mission while dependant on civilian infrastructure vulnerable to hybrid attacks.⁴⁹ As a consequence, there will be a requirement to “deepen public-private partnerships” which Canada must mirror.⁵⁰

⁴² Hagelstam, accessed on 10 April 2023.

⁴³ Ibid., accessed on 10 April 2023.

⁴⁴ Horn, 44.

⁴⁵ See appendix for a non-exhaustive list of Canadian security with their associated mandate summaries.

⁴⁶ Chrustie, accessed on 10 April 2023.

⁴⁷ Horn, 36.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ruhle and Roberts, accessed on 10 April 2023.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

From the perspective of interpersonal interactions amongst organizations within the Canadian security apparatus and private entities, there would likely be some friction with the clash of cultures, priorities, and personalities. Considering the spectrum of hybrid warfare attacks, there would be a requirement for personnel to think outside the box of their respective “education, training, and experience” to approach the problem in the context of WoS.⁵¹ This would require them to challenge their bias towards their field of expertise, which the US experienced in joint operations, where services tended to prioritize their respective domains while minimizing others.⁵² The same would occur within the Canadian security apparatus as each stakeholder will use its own equities in accordance with its own mandate. For personal interactions, there would also be a clash of unique cultures and jargon that each organization (private and public) would need to overcome to reach common ground. The USAF experience similar issues internal to their organization when they were integrating their air, space, cyber organization where they experienced barriers due to “technical jargon and concepts and myopic assumptions and cultural values specific to that community.”⁵³ Despite these issues, they reflect normal shortfalls in team building, which would be resolved over time given consistent interactions, especially in response to a crisis.

To overcome these impediments NATO and the EU have taken several steps to start building a common understanding amongst its nations and partners. The EU has established the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid COE) to centralize expertise that can address all aspects of hybrid warfare, which NATO is working in close cooperation with.⁵⁴ To help NATO members recognize and prepare against hybrid warfare, NATO stood up the Joint Intelligence and Security Division in 2017 that will “monitor and analy[ze] hybrid threats” providing critical indications and warning (I&W).⁵⁵ This will also be essential in portraying hybrid scenarios as part of exercises, which NATO has already begun.⁵⁶ In recognition of the need for a WoG approach, NATO has also begun to informally work with the EU at the staff level to develop procedures for sharing detected disinformation activities.⁵⁷ These actions are setting in motion the necessary interactions to align security organizations under one understanding. In terms of government responses, the EU has implemented policy to increase “cybersecurity discipline, capability-building, and accountability through potential enforcement actions” lending to developing the WoS response to hybrid threats.⁵⁸ When it comes to the GC, they have created a parliamentary forum called the

⁵¹ Horn, 34.

⁵² Miranda Priebe et al, *Multiple Dilemmas: Challenges and Options for All-domain Command and Control* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2020), 12, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA300/RRA381-1/RAND_RRA381-1.pdf.

⁵³ Mark Reith USAF, "Forging Tomorrow's Air, Space, and Cyber War Fighters: Recommendations for Integration and Development," *Air & Space Power Journal* 30, no. 4 (2016), 88.

⁵⁴ Hagelstam, accessed on 11 April 2023.

⁵⁵ Ruhle and Roberts, access on 11 April 2023.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Anne Leslie, “How Hybrid Warfare is Redefining Contours of ‘Business as Usual’ and the Potential Role of the Military,” *On Track*, vol. 30 (2023), 31.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) which could develop the “transparency necessary to cultivating public confidence...maturing national security culture and enabling government freedom to act and defeat hybrid warfare threats.”⁵⁹ Despite the complexity of the Canada’s security apparatus, it can be likened to the Allies command models in WWI/WWII previously discussed when they were forced to adapt from services operating in parallel to the allied command models of today with appropriate delegations of authority. The difference is that instead of military organizations that were operating in parallel, hybrid warfare has implicated WoG/WoS organization, providing an opportunity for the next evolution of command.

As was seen from earlier during WWII, the Allies adapted their command models as a necessity to provide unity of effort, as it would put in place the requirement for commanders to coordinate and cooperate in accordance with the overall direction. This forced them to place aside their rivalries not only for the greater good, but also because they were ordered to by an individual vested with that authority, for which if they disobeyed, they would be charged and lose their position.⁶⁰ In Horn’s paper titled *On Hybrid Warfare*, he recognized that in order for national security entities to effectively collaborate using a common understanding, it would require “strong political leadership and a government that is credible and transparent.”⁶¹ He further noted that despite each national security organization addressed hybrid warfare within their own areas of expertise, they are not “necessarily coordinated or calibrated” under and overarching hybrid warfare umbrella, which was echoed by Honeyman and Schneider in their *Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Back with Whole-of-Society Tactics* article.⁶² Command, as defined in CFJP doctrine, but adapted for non-military use is the mechanism to solve this problem and provide the much needed “direction, coordination, and control” to respond to hybrid warfare threats.⁶³

Depending on one’s background, the application of command by the GC may appear a simple idea if you are civilian, and the opposite if you are military. That is because under the layer of the simple command definitions provided, are centuries of lessons learned in blood during combat. The application of violence on behalf of the state necessitates such unique skills and capabilities, that is why the CAF is therefore Canada’s profession of arms. The difficulty in applying command to the GC hybrid warfare response is akin to simplifying heart transplant surgery to just taking out someone’s heart and putting in a new one. Despite these complications, hybrid warfare is the catalyst necessary for the CAF to pass on their hard learned lessons of commanding troops in combat to the GC to facilitate the necessary unity of effort to protect Canadians. It is essential to highlight that this paper is not arguing for the CAF to educate the GC on command definitions, nor that the CAF act as the commander on behalf of the GC. The proposition is that the CAF would guide the GC on how an individual (civilian or

⁵⁹ Steven Desjardins, “Hybrid Warfare – Is it New, is it Real, and What are the Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Implications for Defence and the Military,” *On Track*, vol. 30 (2023), 43.

⁶⁰ Sproles, 18.

⁶¹ Horn, 41.

⁶² Horn, 45. and Honeyman 6.

⁶³ CFJP, 5-2.

military) vested with the legal authority to coordinate, direct, and control Canada's national security apparatus, as it pertains to hybrid threats, to provide unity of effort across the WoG. Furthermore, since the term command within a military setting contains a Pandora's Box of advanced topics related to leading troops in combat, complicated even further with military jargon, it is not even necessary to use the word command. Instead, the importance is what the application of command provides. Otherwise recalling the heart surgery example, anytime a civilian would speak about command with a senior CAF member, it would be like a normal person trying to talk about heart surgery with a cardiac surgeon. The ultimate goal is that the concepts of command either be adopted or adapted for use by the GC. A key requirement for this approach to be successful is to legitimize all requisite authorities through policy and law.

Any approach in responding to hybrid warfare must be considered with the utmost caution and care. Since hybrid warfare blurs the lines "between war and peace [it] questions established norms of civil-military relations and the boundaries of acceptable military action."⁶⁴ A key tenet of western democracies is the strict civilian oversight of their militaries to minimize the potential for their militaries of using their capability and power to overthrow the democratically elected government.⁶⁵ In responding to hybrid warfare, politicians must be mindful not to conflate the political, below threshold competition with being at war as they could risk "militarizing not only foreign policy, but potentially [their] whole society," undermining the democracy they are charged to lead.⁶⁶ For Canada, the hybrid warfare policy and legal frameworks must respect the "sacrosanct" status of personal freedoms, while remaining within the bounds of the *Canadian Constitution* and the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*.⁶⁷ For the CAF, its command concepts are established in law by the *National Defence Act* and expanded upon in the *Queen's Regulations and Orders* (QR&Os) section 4.02 on the general responsibilities of officers and 4.20 on the general responsibilities of a commanding officer.⁶⁸ Command concepts are then defined and explained in-depth in CAF doctrine like *CFJP-01* which have been described earlier which are employed and reinforced via follow-on directions, training, professional development, and the CAF culture. For the adoption or adaptation of these command concepts by the GC, the existing CAF legal chain provides an example which the GC would mirror in the development of a new legal framework. Of note is that the doctrine "provides military strategic guidance" meaning that it is not binding.⁶⁹ The essential requirement would be

⁶⁴ Ilmari Kähkö, "The Evolution of Hybrid Warfare: Implications for Strategy and the Military Profession," *Parameters* (Carlisle, Pa.) 51, no. 3 (2021), 125.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 123.

⁶⁶ Kähkö, 125.

⁶⁷ Horn, 35.

⁶⁸ National Defence Act, R.S., 1985, c. N-5, s. 19R.S., 1985, c. 31 (1st Supp.), s. 60, "The authority and powers of command of officers and non-commissioned members shall be as prescribed in regulations." R.S., 1985, c. N-5, s. 60R.S., 1985, c. 31 (1st Supp.), s. 60; 1998, c. 35, s. 19 then subjects members of the CAF to the Code of Service Discipline, providing a mechanism to enforce command. And Department of National Defence, "QR&O: Volume 1 – Chapter 4 Duties and Responsibility of Officers," last modified 1 August 2015, 4.02 and 4.20, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/queens-regulations-orders/vol-1-administration/ch-4-duties-responsibilities-officers.html>.

⁶⁹ CFJP, 1-1.

that the command authorities which are being described to enable the GC to respond to hybrid warfare threats be legally established and reinforced by policy.

The policy aspect of countering hybrid warfare for the GC is a significant challenge. In Sean Monaghan's paper *Countering Hybrid Warfare* he describes hybrid warfare as dilemma from two perspectives. The first issue is that policy makers need to establish a framework that addresses warfare "that does not conform to the rules, while responding in a way that will reinforce those rules."⁷⁰ The second issue would be that despite the GC wishes to have sufficient evidence prior to making decisions, "hybrid threats are designed to prevent decisive response" which would impede the informed decision-making process.⁷¹ As such, the implemented policy must enable decisive action by the GC commander, as established by law, to direct, coordinate, and control the WoG strategy in cooperation with the entire national security apparatus. This will also require messaging from the GC to securitize hybrid warfare to justify the necessary measures, authorities, and prioritization to not only respond and counter hybrid threats, but also be able to detect them in the first place from the WoS perspective. Although beyond the scope of this paper, the final WoG response to hybrid warfare could be the establishment of task force, not much different than the one used for the response to COVID-19. With either a military or civilian commander, who is supported by all players in national security, enabling them to employ "levers of power across of government...[offering] more options that fall below the threshold of armed conflict" providing unity of effort within the WoG.⁷² However, the options and organization of the WoG response is limitless and a subject worthy of further research.

There could be several critiques to the adoption or adaptation of military command concepts to counter hybrid threats by the GC. The first of which might center on how is this any different from what Canada saw in Afghanistan where several government departments worked together, in kinetic warfare, towards a common goal. The distinction lies in that the hybrid response is a domestic responsibility. For Afghanistan, agencies were committed by the GC with established authorities to fight as part of a coalition in kinetic warfare. Whereas for hybrid warfare, the breadth responsibility for each national security agency is significantly larger as it spans the spectrum of possibilities, each agency with their own unique responsibilities. Instead of being a contributor to the war in Afghanistan, when it comes to hybrid warfare, we are the Afghans. The entirety of the response rests with GC strategy and direction, vice just providing forces to NATO to help with their strategy. Another critique could result from the military doctrine purists who would declare that command is a concept that can only apply to militaries. The idea that a civilian could be placed in command of troops in combat operations would not only result in significant casualties, but quite likely mission failure. This would only be compounded by the inequity of an individual without unlimited liability exercise that responsibility. Conversely, how can a civilian working

⁷⁰ Sean Monaghan, "Countering Hybrid Warfare: So what for the Future Joint Force?" *Prism* (Washington, D.C.) 8, no. 2 (2019), 89.

⁷¹ Monaghan., 90.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 95.

under a military commander follow orders during combat operations, when they would not have unlimited liability? In response, one would not need to look far to see examples of civilians in command of military forces. One example already described would be the Commanders-in-Chief as applied in WWII or today by the US. Another example would be the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the US which is responsible for keeping America safe from any threat and is also civilian ran.⁷³ In terms of a civilians under the command of the military, the NDA provides an example of how this could be legally established in Canada. In this case, it states that merchant ships participating in a military convoy must follow the orders from the commander, where “that commanding officer may compel obedience by forces of arms.”⁷⁴ Thus, there is precedence to support either command dynamic, and furthermore, hybrid warfare by its very design is meant to occur below the threshold of war, meaning during peacetime. The command concepts being discussed are non-kinetic in nature, and not the combat operations usually associated with militaries and so it could make perfect sense that a civilian be the GC commander for hybrid warfare response. Although this paper has been primarily focused on this peacetime strategic aspect of the argument, it is important to note that should kinetic operations ever occur in Canada, hybrid warfare would undoubtedly continue. One key difference could be that the military could become the commander. Finally, in modern kinetic operations, it is expected that strategic communications will become unusable, necessitating a more tactical/local response.⁷⁵ In these cases, local military commanders would be enabled by policy and legal frameworks to work with local WoG/WoS entities to respond to the spectrum of attacks.

CONCLUSION

Command is a central military concept that is not immune to change. Just as it progressed from a service centric approach to a whole of military approach during the World Wars, it can be adopted or adapted by the GC to address its response to hybrid warfare threats to Canada. Hybrid warfare by its very own design is meant to exploit the seams and gaps that exist in societies, subtly attacking nations to achieve political goals without firing a single shot, driving a need for a centralized response. Command has been combat tested and refined in the fog of war to ensure superiority over an enemy. In today’s globalized world, command is the response to hybrid warfare threats hiding within the bustle of societies. A key requirement for the application of command within Canada would be that it be based on sound policy and legal frameworks to ensure that the rights of Canadian citizens are respected, including the maintenance of civil oversight of militaries. By empowering the Canadian security apparatus with command authorities to respond and prevent hybrid warfare threats, the GC can not only increase the resiliency of the WoG, but the WoS. It has been demonstrated time and again that in response to adversity, societies can rally to fight a common cause, which GC command can cultivate,

⁷³ Department of Homeland Security, “About DHS,” *Homeland Security Online*, last updated 28 February 2023, <https://www.dhs.gov/about-dhs#:~:text=The%20Department%20of%20Homeland%20Security,analyst%20to%20chemical%20facility%20inspector>.

⁷⁴ NDA, R.S., c. N-4, s. 222.

⁷⁵ Priebe et al., 12.

develop, and direct thereby hardening Canadian society from outside influences.⁷⁶ In time, hybrid warfare can be relegated to an inconvenience to society vice the threat it is now.

⁷⁶Sanda Kaufman, “How Should the Whole-of-Society Respond to Hybrid Warfare,” *On Track*, vol. 30 (2023), 49.

APPENDIX

Public Safety Canada (PSC) ⁷⁷	<p><u>Mandate</u>: keep Canadians safe from a range of risks such as natural disasters, crime, and terrorism.</p> <p><u>Mission</u>: build a safe and resilient Canada.</p> <p><u>Vision</u>: through outstanding leadership, achieve a safe and secure Canada and strong and resilient communities.</p>
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) ⁷⁸	1) Prevent crime 2) Enforce the law 3) Investigate offences 4) Keep Canadians, and their interests, safe and secure 5) Assist Canadian in emergency situations.
Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) ⁷⁹	To ensure the security and prosperity of Canada by managing the access of people and goods to and from Canada.
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) ⁸⁰	Investigate activities suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada and to report these to the Government of Canada...Key threats include terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, espionage, foreign interference and cyber-tampering affecting critical infrastructure.
National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) ⁸¹	1) Providing advice and support to the Minister of National Defence 2) Implementing Government decisions regarding the defence of Canadian interests at home and abroad. 3) At any given time, the Government of Canada can call upon the CAF to undertake missions for the protection of Canada and Canadians and to maintain international peace and stability .
Communication Security	Canada's agency responsible for foreign signals intelligence, cyber operations, and cyber security . Gathers foreign signals intelligence to defend Canada's national security . They keep the

⁷⁷ Public Safety Canada, "About Public Safety Canada," *Government of Canada*, last modified 10 August 2022, <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/bt/index-en.aspx>.

⁷⁸ Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "About the RCMP," *Government of Canada RCMP*, last modified 12 November 2021, <https://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/about-rcmp>.

⁷⁹ Government of Canada, "Who we are," *Government of Canada CBSA*, last modified 22 December 2021, <https://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/agency-agence/who-qui-eng.html#s1>.

⁸⁰ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Mandate," *Government of Canada*, last modified 25 January 2021, <https://www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-service/corporate/mandate.html>.

⁸¹ National Defence, "Mandate of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces," *Government of Canada*, last modified 24 September 2018, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/mandate.html>.

Establishment (CSE)⁸²	Government of Canada's information <u>secure</u> . They work with industry and academia to <u>protect Canadians from cyber threats</u> .
Canadian Coast Guard (CCG)⁸³	Support government priorities and economic prosperity and contribute to the <u>safety</u> , accessibility and <u>security of Canadian waters</u> .
Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre (FINTRAC)⁸⁴	Canada's financial intelligence unit and anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing regulator, helps to combat money laundering, terrorist activity financing <u>and threats to the security of Canada</u> , while ensuring the <u>protection of personal information under its control</u> .
Global Affairs Canada (GAC)⁸⁵	<p>Responsible for advancing Canada's international relations, including 1) developing and implementing foreign policy 2) fostering the development of international law, international trade and commerce 3) providing international assistance 4) providing consular services for Canadians 5) overseeing the Government of Canada's global network of mission abroad.</p> <p>Manages Canada's diplomatic and consular relations with foreign governments and international organizations, engaging and influencing international players to advance Canada's political, legal and economic interests, including poverty reduction, the empowerment of women and girls, the promotion of a <u>rules-based international order</u>, international <u>peace and security</u>, human rights, inclusive and accountable governance, peaceful pluralism, inclusion and respect for diversity, and environmental sustainability.</p>
Public Health Agency of	Promote and <u>protect</u> the health of Canadians through leadership, partnership, innovation and action in public health. 1) Promote health 2) prevent and control chronic diseases and injuries 3) prevent and control infectious diseases 4) prepare for and respond to public health emergencies 5) serve as a central point for sharing Canada's expertise with the rest of the world 6) apply international

⁸² Communications Security Establishment, "Mission," *Government of Canada*, last modified 6 April 2023, <https://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/mission>.

⁸³ Canadian Coast Guard, "Our Mandate," *Government of Canada*, last modified 13 March 2023, <https://www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/corporation-information-organisation/mandate-mandat-eng.html>.

⁸⁴ Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre, "Mandate," *Government of Canada*, last modified 12 March 2022, <https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/fintrac-canafe/1-eng>.

⁸⁵ Global Affairs Canada, "Raison d'être, Mandate and Role: Who we Are and What we do," *Government of Canada*, last modified 27 February 2023, <https://www.international.gc.ca/global-affaires-affaires-mondiales/corporate-ministere/mandate-mandat/index.aspx?lang=eng>.

Canada (PHAC) ⁸⁶	research and development to Canada's public health programs 7) strengthen intergovernmental collaboration on public health and facilitate national approaches to public health and planning.
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⁸⁶ Public Health Agency of Canada, "About the Public Health Agency of Canada," *Government of Canada*, last modified 1 March 2023, <https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/corporate/mandate/about-agency.html>.

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