



Balancing National and Collective Security: Canada's Approach to NATO Defense Spending

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Exercise Solo Flight

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BALANCING NATIONAL AND COLLECTIVE SOCIETY: CANADA'S APPROACH TO NATO DEFENCE SPENDING

The debate over Canada's defence spending, particularly concerning NATO's 2% Gross Domestic Product (GDP), demands a nuanced understanding of the country's distinctive geopolitical, economic, and security requirements. This essay argues that while adhering to NATO's 2% GDP defence spending target is vital for collective security, Canada should prioritize its unique requirements, including border control and internal security, over meeting this arbitrary threshold. Currently, Canada spends around 1.38% of its GDP on defence, raising questions about the suitability of the 2% target for all member nations.¹ By examining Canada's historical and current defence spending, comparing it with other NATO members, and assessing its specific security needs, the analysis aims to demonstrate that a flexible, context-driven approach is more beneficial for Canada. Balancing global responsibilities with domestic needs will ensure national security and economic stability while maintaining essential social services.

BACKGROUND

Canada's current defence budget is notably below the 2% GDP target set by NATO, with recent data indicating expenditures around 1.4% of GDP.² This discrepancy raises questions about the rationale behind the 2% target and whether it is a suitable benchmark for all member countries. The 2% GDP target, established to ensure equitable contributions to NATO's collective security, has faced criticism for being overly simplistic and not reflective of actual security needs. Critics argue that this arbitrary figure does not account for the effectiveness of spending or individual member states' specific challenges.³ For Canada, with its geographic isolations and strong relationships with neighbours like the United States, a rigid adherence to the 2% target is unnecessary.

HISTORICAL CONTEXTS AND TRENDS

Understanding Canada's current defence spending and its position within NATO requires an exploration of its historical context and the trends that have shaped its military budget over the decades. This analysis will provide a comprehensive understanding of how global events and geopolitical dynamics have influenced Canada's defence policies.

In the aftermath of World War II, Canada emerged as a significant military power due to its substantial contributions to the Allied Victory. The immediate post-war period saw Canada maintaining a robust military presence partly to manage its new responsibilities on the global

¹ World Population Review, "NATO Spending by Country 2024," accessed 23 May 2024, <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/nato-spending-by-country>.

² Ibid.

³ Kathleen McInnis, "2 Percent Defense Spending Is a Bad Target for NATO," Foreign Policy, 10 June 2022, accessed 23 May 2024, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/10/2-percent-defense-spending-nato-budget-bad-target/>.

stage and partly due to the emerging Cold War tensions. During this period, defense spending was relatively high and on par with the United States. The peak of spending occurred in the early 1950s, reflecting the need to participate in NATO's collective security efforts.⁴

The Cold War era was marked by fluctuating defence budgets as Canada navigated the intense geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the early years, Canada's defence expenditure was notably high, driven by commitments to NATO and the perceived threat from the Soviet bloc. This was emphasized in the 1950s when Canada's defense spending exceeded 5% of its GDP, underscoring the urgency of the era.⁵ However, as the Cold War progressed, there were periods of defence cuts and reallocations. During the détente of the 1970s, when tensions between the superpowers decreased, Canada reduced its military spending.⁶ This period highlighted the flexibility in Canada's defence policy, adjusting to the prevailing international environment while still contributing to NATO operations.

In 1991, the Cold War came to an end, resulting in significant changes in global security dynamics. This led to a decrease in military spending as many NATO members, including Canada, redirected resources from defence to social programs and economic development. Throughout the 1990s, defence spending dropped from 1.96% of the GDP in 1990 to 1.11% of the GDP by 1999.⁷ This reflected the reduced perceived threat from the former Soviet Union and a shift towards non-military forms of international engagement.

The terrorist attacks in September 2001 marked a pivotal shift in global security priorities. Canada responded by increasing its defence budget to address new threats, such as terrorism and asymmetric warfare. The Afghanistan mission, part of the broader War on Terror, significantly influenced defence policies and expenditures. Under the Martin and Harper governments, Canada's defence spending steadily increased from 1996 to 2010, going from 5.5% of total government spending to just under 8%.⁸ As there was a growing recognition of the necessity for more advanced and adaptable military capabilities, spending increases led to investments in technology, intelligence, and rapid response forces. This increase in spending also aligned with the US, emphasizing counterterrorism and increased defence spending,

⁴ Bill Robinson, *Canadian military spending 2010-11*, (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2011), <https://policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National%20Office/2011/03/Canadian%20Military%20Spending%202010.pdf>.

⁵ Kim Richard Nossal, *Charlie Foxtrot: Fixing Defence Procurement in Canada*, Toronto: A.J. Patrick Boyer Book, 2016, 152, 237-238.

⁶ Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada* 5th ed., Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2007, 363-364.

⁷ Macrotrends, "Canada Military Spending/Defense Budget 1960-2024," accessed 23 May 2024, <https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/CAN/canada/military-spending-defense-budget>.

⁸ David Perry, "A Return to Realism: Canadian Defence Policy after the Great Recession," *Defence Studies*, (December 2013): 343-344, <https://www-tandfonline-com.cfc.idm.oclc.org/doi/pdf/10.1080/14702436.2013.845386>.

demonstrating Canada's commitment to fulfilling its NATO obligations and contributing to global security efforts.

In recent years, Canada's defence spending has hovered around 1.4% GDP, sparking debates about meeting NATO's 2% GDP target. The 2014 NATO summit in Wales renewed calls for all member nations to reach this benchmark, primarily driven by increasing tensions with China, Russia, and other emerging global threats.⁹ Despite these pressures, Canada has maintained that its defence contributions should be viewed through qualitative factors, such as capabilities, readiness, and specific regional needs, rather than quantitative spending metrics. The current defence strategy, outlined in "Strong, Secure Engaged", emphasizes a comprehensive approach, integrating traditional military capabilities with modern technological advancements and international cooperation.¹⁰

CANADA'S GEOPOLITICAL STANCE AND SECURITY NEEDS

Canada's geographical location significantly impacts its security strategy and defence spending priorities. Surrounded by three oceans and sharing a long, peaceful border with the United States, Canada is naturally insulated from many conventional military threats other NATO members face. This geography has significantly influenced defence spending in Canada, as it has been impacted by the United States defence budget due to their close proximity.¹¹ Canada's close alliance with the United States has enabled the country to maintain lower defence expenditures, relying on the security umbrella provided by the US. This has sparked debates about Canada's commitment to NATO obligations and its role in collective defence.¹² Canada continues to face criticism from many observers worldwide for not meeting the 2% GDP target for defence spending.

ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF MEETING THE 2% TARGET

Meeting NATO's 2% GDP defence spending target would significantly increase Canada's defence budget. This potential shift raises several economic and social considerations that must be carefully evaluated to avoid unintended consequences.

A primary concern for Canadians is the potential reduction in funding for social services such as healthcare, education, and welfare. These services are integral to maintaining Canada's

⁹ NATO, *Wales Summit Declaration*, (Brussels: NATO 2014), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.

¹⁰ Department of National Defence, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy* (Ottawa: National Defence, 2017), 4-6, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/canada-defence-policy.html>.

¹¹ Perry...341.

¹² Policy options, "The Canada-U.S. defence relationship: nostalgia ain't what it used to be," last updated 1 April 2002, accessed 23 May 2024, <https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/continental-defence/the-canada-us-defence-relationship-nostalgia-aint-what-it-used-to-be/>.

high quality of life and social stability. The recent government initiative to refocus spending by reducing funds by \$15.8 billion over five years, and almost by \$1 billion per year from the CAF, underscored the delicate balance required to manage public funds effectively without compromising essential services.¹³ Increased defence spending could result in budget reallocations, diverting funds from important areas to the military and potentially undermining the social safety net that Canadians rely on.

From an economic perspective, reallocating funds to defence spending could have broader implications for economic growth. Public infrastructure investments, research, development, and innovation are key economic productivity and competitiveness drivers. Diverting funds from these areas to defence could stifle economic growth and innovation in the long run. According to the 2023 Budget Economic Overview, public investments are essential for fostering economic resilience and competitiveness, especially during economic uncertainty.¹⁴

Aiming to reach the 2% GDP target through tax increases could negatively impact economic activity. The rise in taxes might lower household disposable income and raise business operating costs, potentially reducing consumer spending and business investment.¹⁵ This could slow down economic growth and negatively impact employment rates. Historically, high debt levels have been associated with lower economic growth rates, as seen in several studies on fiscal policy and economic performance. For instance, a study by Reinhart and Rogoff suggests that countries with high debt-to-GDP ratios tend to experience reduced growth rates, primarily due to the burden of debt servicing.¹⁶

While defence spending is essential for national security, balancing it with economic security is crucial. A robust economy is fundamental to national security, providing the resources necessary to sustain defence capabilities over the long term. Therefore, any significant increase in defence spending should be carefully planned to avoid destabilizing the economy. As outlined by David Perry and J. Craig Stone, defence investments enhance national security and stimulate economic activity through job creation and technological advancements, which is seen in the local economies near CAF bases, which benefit from the increased economic activity and employment opportunities, further integrating national defence into community growth.¹⁷

¹³ Department of National Defence, *2024-25 Departmental Plan at a glance* (Ottawa: National Defence, 2024), <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/departmental-plans/departmental-plan-2024-25/plans-at-glance.html>.

¹⁴ Department of Finance, *Budget 2023: Economic Overview*, (Ottawa: Department of Finance Canada, 2024), 19-24, <https://www.budget.canada.ca/2023/pdf/budget-2023-en.pdf>.

¹⁵ Timothy Vermeer, *The Impact of Individual Income Tax Changes on Economic Growth*, (Washington: Tax Foundation Fiscal Fact, 2022), <https://files.taxfoundation.org/20220610142519/The-Impact-of-Individual-Income-Tax-Changes-on-Economic-Growth-2.pdf>.

¹⁶ Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, "Growth in a time of Debt," *The American Economic Review* 100, no. 2 (May 2010): 577, <https://login.cfc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/growth-time-debt/docview/856396766/se-2>.

¹⁷ David Perry and J. Craig Stone, *Economic Benefits of Defence Spending*, (Calgary: Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2021), https://www.cgai.ca/economic_benefits_of_defence_spending

Strategic financial management practices, such as phased increases in defence spending linked to specific capability milestones and conditions of economic growth, can help ensure that increases in defence spending do not destabilize the economy.

Public opinion also plays a significant role in shaping defence spending. Canada has a strong tradition of valuing social programs and a general preference for peaceful international engagement over military intervention. Significant increases in defence spending at the expense of social services could lead to public discontent and a loss of social cohesion. Public opinion in Canada generally favours a balanced approach to defence spending that does not compromise social services. Jean-Christophe Boucher, from the University of Calgary, points out Canadians prioritize healthcare and other social services but recognize the need for balanced defence spending to address emerging threats must be maintained, which was seen in various forms from 1988 to 2018.¹⁸

Canada's non-partisan stance on defence makes defence spending contentious in politics. Debates often reflect broader ideological divides, making balanced defence spending difficult to achieve. The Liberal Party prioritizes social services and diplomatic engagement, advocating for a measured approach to defence spending. However, recent Canadian polls indicate that 48% of Canadians are in favour of increased defence spending, which the Liberal government announced it plans to raise from 1.4% of GDP to 1.8%, while 59% want to reduce spending in areas like foreign aid.¹⁹ These new opinions are closely associated with the Conservative Party, which emphasizes the importance of strong defence capabilities and meeting NATO commitments.²⁰ On the other hand, the New Democratic Party (NDP) often highlights the opportunity costs of increased defence spending, arguing for investments in social and environmental programs; however, the NDP still sees the need to increase defence spending to provide more to Canadian troops slightly but the NATO 2% target seems arbitrary.²¹ These debates reflect differing views on balancing national security with other public policy priorities and how important it is to view defence spending in what is occurring in the world. With Russia and China threatening Canada, public opinion to increase defence spending is evident.

¹⁸ Jean-Christophe Boucher, "Public Opinion and Canadian Defence Policy," in *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, Canada and International Affairs, Palgrave Macmillan, 167-168, https://doi.org/cfc.idm.oclc.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26403-1_10.

¹⁹ Angus Reid Institute, "Budget 2024: Majority of Canadians concerned about deficit, say federal government is spending 'too much'," updated 11 April 2024, accessed 23 May 24, <https://angusreid.org/canada-budget-deficit-spending-liberals-trudeau-poilievre-nato-health-care/>.

²⁰ Michael Chong, "Trudeau Must Meet Our NATO Commitments and Stop Neglecting Our Troops," Conservative Party of Canada, accessed 23 May 2024, <https://www.conservative.ca/trudeau-must-meet-our-nato-commitments-and-stop-neglecting-our-troops/>.

²¹ Rachel Aiello, "NDP against Canada increasing defence spending to hit 'arbitrary' NATO target," *CTV News*, last updated 27 March 2022. <https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/ndp-against-canada-increasing-defence-spending-to-hit-arbitrary-nato-target-1.5835049>.

On the other hand, there are potential long-term economic benefits associated with increased defence spending investments in defence, which can lead to advancements that have civilian applications, fostering innovation and economic growth. Technologies developed for military use, like Global Positioning System, cargo airplanes, and autonomous systems like drones, have profoundly impacted the civilian economy.²² Defence spending can stimulate job creation in the defence sector and related industries, which can also be used to boost political ratings. This was seen when Justin Trudeau honoured a \$15 billion deal with Saudi Arabia, brokered by the Harper Conservative government, to sell Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs). This deal won seats in London, Ontario, and created thousands of jobs, although it was met with harsh criticism due to the human rights violations being lobbied against Saudi Arabia.²³ Allocating funds to defence can boost employment and economic activity, but weighing benefits against potential drawbacks is fundamental. Careful budgeting and increased defence spending can help mitigate adverse effects and maintain a balance between quality of life, social stability, and international security commitments for Canadians.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH OTHER NATO MEMBERS

Understanding how other NATO members approach their defence spending provides valuable insights into the diversity of strategies within the alliance. By examining the defence budgets and strategic priorities of countries such as Germany, Estonia, Lithuania, and Norway, we can better contextualize Canada's unique approach and the rationale behind its defence expenditure.

Germany, Europe's largest economy, has historically spent below the NATO 2% GDP target, often emphasizing stability and international diplomacy over significant military expenditures. In 2020, Germany's defence spending was approximately 1.4% of its GDP, like Canada.²⁴ This approach reflects Germany's post-World War II pacifist policies and a strong emphasis on multilateral diplomacy, especially within the European Union (EU). Germany's defence strategy focuses on high-tech capabilities and participating in international missions rather than maintaining a large standing army.²⁵ However, the increased threat from Russia, particularly after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, has led to a gradual increase in Germany's defence budget. The 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Russia has further accelerated this trend, with

²² Lockheed Martin, "3 Military Technologies Benefiting People Every Day," last updated 16 June 2017, accessed 23 May 2024, <https://www.3blmedia.com/news/3-military-technologies-benefiting-people-every-day>.

²³ Jennifer Pedersen, "Selling Weapons: Saudi Arabia and the Trudeau Government's Feminist Foreign Policy," in *Middle Power in the Middle East: Canada's Foreign and Defence Policies in a Changing Region* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2022), 171-172. <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cfvlibrary-ebooks/detail.action?docID=6914848>.

²⁴ NATO, *Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2013-2020)*, (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2021), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_182242.htm.

²⁵ Thomas Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1998), 89.

Germany committing to meeting the 2% target and investing in modernizing its armed forces and capabilities.²⁶

Estonia provides a contrasting example with its robust commitment to the 2% GDP target, consistently meeting and often exceeding this benchmark due to its geographic proximity to Russia and historical experiences under Soviet occupation.²⁷ Estonia's defence strategy is heavily influenced by the need to deter Russian aggression, leading to significant investments in conventional military capabilities and modern technologies such as cyber defence.²⁸ Estonia has also focused on building strong defence partnerships within NATO and with neighbouring countries and other Baltic states. Its participation in NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence, with multinational battlegroups stationed in the Baltic region, exemplified its commitment to collective security.²⁹

Like Estonia, Lithuania has prioritized meeting and exceeding the 2% GDP target, driven by the perceived threat from Russia. Lithuania's defence spending reflects its strategic need to ensure rapid response capabilities and maintain a strong deterrent posture.³⁰ Since joining NATO in 2004, Lithuania has steadily increased its defence budget, focusing on modernizing its military equipment and enhancing interoperability with other NATO forces.³¹ Lithuania's strategic investments include purchasing advanced military hardware and strengthening its cyber defence capabilities. Additionally, Lithuania has been active in international military exercises and cooperative defence initiatives, reinforcing its commitment to NATO's collective defence.³²

Norway, an Arctic state like Canada, provides an interesting comparison due to its strategic focus on maritime and Arctic Defence. Norway plans to spend 2% of its GDP in 2024 on defence and significantly invest in modernizing its naval capabilities and integrating advanced technologies into its defence spending.³³ Norway's approach underscores the importance of the Arctic region, emphasizing the need for robust surveillance and rapid response capabilities to secure its interest in this increasingly contested area. Norway also actively participates in

²⁶ Maria Sheahan and Sarah Marsh, "Germany to increase defence spending in response to 'Putin's War' – Scholz," Reuters, 27 February 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/germany-hike-defense-spending-scholz-says-further-policy-shift-2022-02-27/>.

²⁷ Ministry of Defence, *Defence Budget*, (Estonia: Ministry of Defence, January 12, 2024), <https://kaitseministeerium.ee/en/objectives-activities/defence-budget>.

²⁸ Ministry of Defence, *Estonian Defence Forces Annual Report*, (Estonia: Ministry of Defence, 2021), https://mil.ee/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/KV_aastaraamat-2021_ENG.pdf.

²⁹ NATO, *NATO's military presence in the east of the Alliance*, (Brussels: NATO, 2023), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm.

³⁰ Ministry of Defence, *Lithuania's membership in NATO*, (Vilnius: Ministry of Defence, April 13, 2022), <https://kam.lt/en/lithuanias-membership-in-nato/>.

³¹ NATO, "Defence Expenditure...", 9.

³² Ministry of Defence, *International operations and training missions*, (Vilnius: Ministry of Defence, April 2, 2022), <https://kam.lt/en/international-operations-and-training-missions/>.

³³ Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *The Norwegian Defence Pledge: Long-Term Defence Plan 2025-2036*, Norway: Ministry of Defence, April 5, 2024), 2, <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/the-norwegian-defence-pledge/id3032809/>.

NATO's collective defence initiatives and maintains strong defence relationships with five other maritime countries in the north and European nations.³⁴

These comparisons highlight that each member's distinctive geopolitical circumstances, historical experiences, and perceived threats deeply influence defence strategies and spending levels within NATO. Canada's approach to defence spending, focusing on specific capabilities rather than meeting an arbitrary spending target, aligns with its unique security environment and priorities. While Germany emphasizes economic stability and international diplomacy, Estonia and Lithuania prioritize rapid response and deterrence due to their proximity to Russia. Norway's focus on Arctic and maritime security resonates with Canada's own strategic interests in the Arctic region. These diverse strategies underscore the necessity for a flexible and context-driven approach to defence spending within NATO, allowing each member to contribute effectively based on its strengths and needs. Canada's investment in surveillance technology, cybersecurity, and rapid response capabilities reflects a tailored approach to national security priorities. This strategic flexibility ensures Canada can meet its domestic security needs and international obligations without compromising its economic stability and social services.

FUTURE-ORIENTED SECURITY ASSESSMENT

While the 2% GDP target for NATO defence spending has been a long-standing benchmark, it may no longer be the most relevant measure of a nation's commitment to collective defence. The evolving nature of global threats suggests a shift in focus from conventional military expenditures to investments in technology and computing. Cybersecurity, AI, and other advanced technologies are now at the forefront of defence strategies, requiring substantial investment.

Canada's future security planning must address emerging threats such as cyberattacks, information warfare, climate change, AI in Warfare, and territorial disputes. As cyber threats grow in sophistication and frequency, protecting critical digital infrastructure requires significant investment in advanced cyber defence technologies, training cybersecurity professionals, and establishing strong public-private partnerships.³⁵ Information warfare, including disinformation campaigns and cyber espionage, poses substantial risks and is used by adversarial militaries to target critical infrastructure, interfere in elections, disrupt governments and create financial chaos.³⁶ Developing robust countermeasures and promoting digital literacy are essential to mitigating these threats.

³⁴ Ibid...8-11.

³⁵ Eugenia Lostri, James Andrew Lewis, and Georgia Wood, "A Shared Responsibility: Public-Private Cooperation for Cybersecurity," (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 22, 2022), 4-9, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/shared-responsibility-public-private-cooperation-cybersecurity>.

³⁶Canadian Service Intelligence Service, *The Evolution of Disinformation: A Deepfake Future*, (Ottawa: Canadian Security Intelligence Service), 47-52, <https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/csis->

Climate change presents a multifaceted security challenge, impacting infrastructure and migration patterns. Investing in climate-resilient infrastructure and disaster response systems is essential, as was shown when the United Nations Environment Programme introduced the Strata Data platform to identify, map and monitor environmental stresses that will threaten peace and security.³⁷ Integrating AI into military operations offers opportunities and challenges, necessitating investment in AI research and development alongside comprehensive ethical guidelines. With its vast resources and geopolitical significance in the Arctic region, Canada's new defence policy has declared the Arctic pivotal and indicated it will increase spending to enhance its capabilities, including communications, surveillance, and specialized military units.³⁸

Defence spending is crucial to address these challenges and invest in advanced technologies and capabilities that will safeguard Canada's national security in the future. By allocating resources to cybersecurity, AI research, climate-resilient infrastructure, and Arctic defence, Canada can effectively prepare for the evolving security landscape and protect its interests at home and abroad; however, this does not mean they must push defence spending to the 2% GDP Target set by NATO.

CONCLUSION

Canada's defence spending should reflect its unique geopolitical, economic, and security needs rather than adhering rigidly to NATO's 2% GDP guideline. While contributing to collective security is essential, Canada's strategic priorities, including maritime and Arctic Sovereignty, cybersecurity, and border security, require a more nuanced approach. Historical and comparative analyses show that defence spending must be context-driven, aligning with national interests and regional stability. Balancing international commitments with domestic priorities ensures that Canada remains a committed NATO ally while addressing its specific security challenges. Strategic investments in technology, intelligence, and rapid-response capabilities will enhance national security without compromising essential social services. By adopting a flexible, context-driven approach to defence spending, Canada can maintain economic stability and social well-being while fulfilling its international obligations. This balanced strategy will enable Canada to effectively navigate future security challenges and contribute meaningfully to global security.

[scrs/documents/publications/2023/The%20Evolution%20of%20Disinformation%20-%20Deepfake%20Report_EN_DIGITAL.pdf](https://www.unep.org/documents/publications/2023/The%20Evolution%20of%20Disinformation%20-%20Deepfake%20Report_EN_DIGITAL.pdf)

³⁷ United Nations Environmental Programme, Climate Change and security risks, (Kenya: UN Environmental Programme, 2024), <https://www.unep.org/topics/fresh-water/disasters-and-climate-change/climate-change-and-security-risks>.

³⁸ Wesley, Wark, "Canada's New Defence Policy Marks a Shift in Strategic Thinking," (Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, April 24, 2024),), <https://www.cigionline.org/articles/canadas-new-defence-policy-marks-a-shift-in-strategic-thinking/>

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