



**Covid-19's Insidious Spread:
The Ramifications on U.S. and Chinese Economic Relations After the Pandemic Ends**

Major Brian Burkhart

JCSP 49 DL

Exercise Solo Flight

Disclaimer

Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do not represent Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used without written permission.

© His Majesty the King in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2024.

PCEMI n° 49 AD

Exercice Solo Flight

Avertissement

Les opinions exprimées n'engagent que leurs auteurs et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

© Sa Majesté le Roi du chef du Canada, représenté par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2024.

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE - COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

JCSP 49 DL - PCEMI n° \$9 AD
2022 - 2024

Exercise Solo Flight – Exercice Solo Flight

**Covid-19's Insidious Spread:
The Ramifications on U.S. and Chinese Economic Relations After the Pandemic Ends**

Major Brian Burkhart

“This paper was written by a candidate attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.”

« La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale. »

Covid-19's Insidious Spread: The Ramifications on U.S. and Chinese Economic Relations After the Pandemic Ends

Background

Covid-19 started as an emerging healthcare crisis in the Wuhan Province of China. Eventually Covid-19 progressed to become present throughout the world causing significant distress as nations grappled with how to best manage this new global pandemic. The last time the world had been gripped by such a life-threatening healthcare emergency was the Spanish Influenza pandemic of 1918.¹ The Spanish Influenza pandemic raged across the globe similar to the Covid-19 virus, but targeted the younger and healthier adults as opposed to children and the elderly. The Spanish Influenza pandemic would eventually kill up to 100 million people worldwide by the end of 1919.² Both Covid-19 and Spanish Influenza were rapidly spread causing very high infection rates, and both diseases had mortality rates of ~1-2% based on calculations and disease reporting statistics.³

Despite these pandemics being a century apart the same disease containment policies were used to manage both including social distancing, quarantine, use of personal protective equipment, and isolation.⁴ As numbers of infections and death tolls of Covid-19 surpassed estimates of the Spanish Influenza Pandemic panic continued to grip citizens and created lasting impacts on policy making in many aspects of the geopolitical world.⁵ These changes have persisted despite the declaration that the Covid-19 pandemic had ended in May of 2023 and has forever shaped political, economic, and medical practices globally.⁶

Introduction

The Covid-19 Pandemic had a marked effect on many aspects of the world as it ravaged the globe. Over time the pandemic has shaped every aspect of the daily life of citizens all over the world. As countries navigated ways to handle the once in a century pandemic, Covid-19 managed to touch almost every aspect of life as it changed the way businesses operated, the way healthcare was administered, and the way goods and services were delivered. These changes included everything from disease management, supply chain logistics, manufacturing practices, and information exchange.⁷

However, the most lasting impact of the Covid-19 Pandemic was the severe tension applied to the intertwined economies of the United States and China. The Covid-19 pandemic led to severe strains placed on international supply chains, increasingly aggressive Chinese

¹ Lista, Florigio, Mario Stefano Peragallo, Roberto Biselli, Riccardo De Santis, Sabrina Mariotti, Roberto Nisini, and Raffaele D'Amelio. 2023. "Have Diagnostics, Therapies, and Vaccines Made the Difference in the Pandemic Evolution of COVID-19 in Comparison with "Spanish Flu"?" *Pathogens* 12, no. 7: 868.

² IBID, 872-3

³ IBID, 868

⁴ IBID, 875-6

⁵ IBID, 873

⁶ "CDC Archives," Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, May 11, 2023, Accessed 28 Apr 2024.

<https://archive.cdc.gov/#/details?url=https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/your-health/end-of-phe.html>.

⁷ Heisbourg, François. 2020. "From Wuhan to the World: How the Pandemic Will Reshape Geopolitics." *Survival* 62 (3): 8.

diplomatic stances, mounting isolationist sentiment globally, and the emergence of regional trade agreements as opposed to global trade agreements, which have placed an undeniable stress on already tenuous U.S and China economic relations.

Effect of International Supply Chains

One of the first major challenges arising from the Covid-19 pandemic was the significant amount of stress placed on logistical supply chains domestically and globally. The world economies have become more intertwined and reliant on each other for goods and services over the last fifty years.⁸ Since the end of the Cold War there has been a history of increasing globalization that requires nations to work together to prevent economic and social collapse. However, the Covid-19 pandemic fractured the world disturbing supply chains, trade agreements, and decades of multilateralism.⁹ This occurred as the Covid-19 pandemic led to economic shutdowns, loss of the labor force required to produce goods deemed non-essential, and a global decrease in travel due to quarantine and confinement mandates.¹⁰ While inextricably connected, the Covid-19 pandemic demonstrated how fragile these critical supply chains are when placed under stress creating significant shortages in the transit and supply of goods.¹¹ In spite of these global shifts due to the Covid-19 pandemic the U.S and Chinese economies remained inextricably entangled, yet both nations seem to resent their integration due to perceived political and military threats.¹²

Covid-19 showed the myriad of vulnerabilities in global trade from shortages in products to significant disruptions in supply chains that harmed small businesses, large corporations, and individual households. The initial phase of the Covid-19 crisis led to critical shortages in microprocessors and electronic chips that were essential for multiple sectors of business.¹³ This critical unavailability revealed the over-reliance of foreign supply chains further enhancing nationalistic sentiment.¹⁴ The persistent shortages of key items such as medications and personal protective equipment led to hoarding, price gouging, and panic in many nations. The supply chain shortages of these essential goods and technology created an increased U.S. sentiment for nationalism and economic decoupling from China.¹⁵

Trade between China and the U.S. benefits both countries and provide incentives for cooperation and decreased hostilities. However, growing strains between each nation continue to persist concerning many topics including the origins of Covid-19, intellectual property theft, and Chinese espionage, which continues to strain of U.S.-China supply chains and economic interactions.¹⁶ These tempestuous relationships have led to the proliferation of containment strategies since supply chain and logistical issues with Covid-19 have led to more isolationism

⁸ James, Harold. 2021. "Globalization's Coming Golden Age." *Foreign Affairs* 100 (3): 10.

⁹ James, Harold. 2021. "Globalization's Coming Golden Age." *Foreign Affairs* 100 (3): 10.

¹⁰ Heisbourg, François. 2020. "From Wuhan to the World: How the Pandemic Will Reshape Geopolitics." *Survival* 62 (3): 13.

¹¹ Farrell, Henry, and Abraham Newman. 2023. "The New Economic Security State." *Foreign Affairs* 102 (6): 107.

¹² *IBID*, 106

¹³ James, Harold. 2021. "Globalization's Coming Golden Age." *Foreign Affairs* 100 (3): 10.

¹⁴ *IBID*, 10

¹⁵ Okonjo-Iweala, Ngozi. 2023. "Why the World Still Needs Trade: The Case for Reimagining-Not Abandoning-Globalization." *Foreign Affairs* 102 (4): 100.

¹⁶ *IBID*, 102

between China and the U.S. This growing sentiment of nationalism and decoupling have led to more animosity, hostility, and confrontation between the countries.¹⁷

The U.S. had seen a rapid increase in the use of Chinese made goods and services after China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.¹⁸ Subsequently, North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) trade diminished significantly after China joined the WTO diminishing regional supply chains in North America.¹⁹ However, Covid-19 led to increased desired for more control over production and supply chains due to key resource deficiencies encountered from Covid era lockdowns. There has also been a marked increase in costs for Transpacific transportation making globalization less profitable.²⁰ Thus further demonstrates why the Covid-19 pandemic exacerbated isolationist sentiments after supply chains and logistics were crippled by the global shut downs.

Impact of Increasingly Aggressive Chinese Diplomatic Stances

Over the last ten years there has been a stark increase in the aggressive policies, statements, and interactions from Chinese Ambassadors toward the U.S. and other nations. Chinese international diplomacy has become more inflammatory over the years both before and after the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. Canadians experienced one of the primary examples of Chinese aggression when the Chinese Ambassador openly claimed that members of the Canadian government were white supremacists.²¹ This occurred after Canadian officials assisted in the detainment of Meng Wanzhou after being charged with violations of U.S. sanctions against Iran.²² France faced similar false allegations when the Chinese Ambassador accused a nursing home in that country of deserting their patients leaving them to care for themselves or starve to death early into the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic.²³ This rhetoric intensified as the Chinese diplomats and media were not able to deflect their poor initial management of the Covid-19 pandemic and as there were increasing calls for investigations of the origins of Covid-19.²⁴

Chinese extreme positions and defensive handling of Covid-19 have caused a loss of international standing and respect, which differs from their usually meticulously planned and dignified public appearances.²⁵ This has led to increasing lack of international trust in the Chinese government. This has made decoupling and reducing economic relationships with China more internationally favorable. This has also spurred on the movement for less reliance on Chinese exports by the U.S. and globally.²⁶

¹⁷ Posen, Adam S. 2023. "The End of China's Economic Miracle: How Beijing's Struggles Could Be an Opportunity for Washington." *Foreign Affairs* 102 (5): 129-30.

¹⁸ O'Neil, Shannon K. 2022. "The Myth of the Global: Why Regional Ties Win the Day." *Foreign Affairs* 101 (4): 163.

¹⁹ *IBID*, 163

²⁰ *IBID*, 164

²¹ Chang-Liao, Nien-chung. 2022. "Why Have Chinese Diplomats Become so Aggressive?" *Survival* 64 (1): 181.

²² *IBID*, 182

²³ *IBID*, 182

²⁴ *IBID*, 182-3

²⁵ *IBID*, 184

²⁶ *IBID*, 186

The Chinese government explored an approach to Covid-19 allowing for balance between economic stability as opposed to the aggressive Chinese Zero-COVID policy. However, President Xi favored the Zero-COVID policy and favored an attempt at containment of the virus rather than economic stability.²⁷ As this policy became less effective, President Xi along with Chinese leadership began a campaign that Western democracies were attempting to undermine their Zero-COVID policy that would lead China into Covid-19 outbreaks, a weakened population, and a worsening economy.²⁸ The aggressive stance of China against any Western interventions including reduced lockdowns, immunization priority for elderly over young adults, and refusal to use any vaccines not produced by China despite superior protection further created rifts with Western nations.²⁹ This open hostility and lack of collaboration regarding Covid-19 only served to perpetuate the strained economic ties between these countries and encourage economic decoupling.

The Covid-19 Pandemic Created Increasing Isolationist Sentiments

The Covid-19 pandemic highlighted significant shortfalls and disruptions in the current international economic system. This has driven many countries to look internally for stability and rely less on cooperation with other nations for economic goods and services.³⁰ Both President Joseph Biden and President Donald Trump embraced policies that have led to reduced foreign investment and capital flow into Chinese businesses. President Biden used the Emergency Powers Law of the 1970s and the Defense Production Act of 1950s to decrease Chinese investments and decrease China's accessibility to critical semiconductors.³¹ President Trump similarly used the 1949 Export Control Act to decrease semiconductor access to the Chinese military and Artificial Intelligence programs.³² Furthermore, there have been more restrictions placed on Chinese access to American companies and access to U.S. universities for Chinese nationals.³³

Chinese lockdowns during COVID-19 encouraged a fear that there would be loss of property, assets, or businesses due to severe lock down and the Zero-Covid policies. These policies raised concerns about the longevity of Chinese investments and businesses. This in turn caused a global decrease in investment in the Chinese economy leading to economic stagnation. This also created a sense of fear to invest in the Chinese economy even though generous stimulus packages were passed in China in 2022.³⁴ These concerns about the stability, profitability, and sustainability of the Chinese economy further created a sentiment of isolationism and nationalism within the U.S.

²⁷ Zhai, Yida. 2023. "The Politics of Covid-19: The Political Logic of China's Zero-Covid Policy." *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 53 (5): 876-77.

²⁸ Zhai, Yida. 2023. "The Politics of Covid-19: The Political Logic of China's Zero-Covid Policy." *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 53 (5): 877.

²⁹ *IBID*, 877

³⁰ Maull, Hanns W. 2021. "The Coronavirus Pandemic and the Future of International Order." *Survival* 63 (1): 78.

³¹ Farrell, Henry, and Abraham Newman. 2023. "The New Economic Security State." *Foreign Affairs* 102 (6): 109.

³² *IBID*, 109

³³ Posen, Adam S. 2023. "The End of China's Economic Miracle: How Beijing's Struggles Could Be an Opportunity for Washington." *Foreign Affairs* 102 (5): 128.

³⁴ *IBID*, 129.

The passage of NAFTA and China joining the WTO led to disruptions in economic life and work within small and medium sized American cities.³⁵ NAFTA was supposed to increase trade and increase American production of goods and services. However, there was an increased movement of jobs to other nations and sluggishness in wages and promotion for those jobs that did remain in the U.S.³⁶ This occurred as well-paying manufacturing jobs that didn't require college education disappeared along with their better paying wages to foreign businesses in particular Chinese companies.³⁷ This created more distrust of Chinese intentions in the U.S. encouraging isolationism and the movement to economic decoupling.

Furthermore, China's economically advantageous imports led to loss of jobs due to lower cost of these imports and an increase in automation within the workforce.³⁸ However, China has experienced a loss of their monopoly on the market of labor-intensive goods productions, and China is gradually beginning to experience a slowing of their economy.³⁹ Additionally, the Chinese government is investing more heavily in government owned and approved enterprises that have a smaller economic return historically.⁴⁰ Covid-19 led to significant job losses and exposed the U.S. heavy reliance on Chinese goods and services created an even more contentious relationship promoting isolationism.⁴¹ All of these conditions have caused China to lose their position as a primary exporter to the world making economic relations even more untenable.

All of these aforementioned concerns fueled U.S. skepticism in the Chinese and supported a "tough on China" policy that emphasizes decoupling and reducing dependency on Chinese imports.⁴² The U.S. only relies on exports to produce 12% of its GDP vs 30% for most other nations that allows the U.S. to have a buffer from decreased exports to China. This allows the U.S. to emphasize decoupling and independence from Chinese exports.⁴³ Covid-19 led to an increase in nationalistic sentiment reducing multilateralism and pushing nationalistic and isolationist points of view, which led to a desire for decreased economic ties to China.⁴⁴ Increased protectionist measures since the 2008 economic crash also have led to a greater push to restore critical products and services (i.e., chips, microprocessors, medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, etc.) to regional or national manufacturing.⁴⁵ Finally, China's strict family planning has also led to an aging workforce coupled with an increasing minimum working wage has made their manufacturing environments less attractive than in previous years.⁴⁶

³⁵ Hanson, Gordon H. 2021. "Can Trade Work for Workers? The Right Way to Redress Harms and Redistribute Gains." *Foreign Affairs* 100 (3): 22.

³⁶ *IBID*, 22

³⁷ *IBID*, 25

³⁸ Hanson, Gordon H. 2021. "Can Trade Work for Workers? The Right Way to Redress Harms and Redistribute Gains." *Foreign Affairs* 100 (3): 27.

³⁹ *IBID*, 27

⁴⁰ *IBID*, 27

⁴¹ *IBID*, 27

⁴² Heisbourg, François. 2020. "From Wuhan to the World: How the Pandemic Will Reshape Geopolitics." *Survival* 62 (3): 14.

⁴³ *IBID*, 16

⁴⁴ James, Harold. 2021. "Globalization's Coming Golden Age." *Foreign Affairs* 100 (3): 11.

⁴⁵ O'Neil, Shannon K. 2022. "The Myth of the Global: Why Regional Ties Win the Day." *Foreign Affairs* 101 (4): 166.

⁴⁶ *IBID*, 165

Recently, the new concept of de-risking has emerged as a way to maintain economic security, reduce economic shocks, and limit the use of economic interdependence as a weapon.⁴⁷ During the 1990s the government was encouraged to largely stay out of the economy. This was seen as a way to send out an economic olive branch to promote unification and collaboration as the USSR and communism collapsed.⁴⁸ This allowed economic entanglements to grow unfettered leading to more reliance on foreign nations for goods and services. Stress from the COVID-19 pandemic stressed the enmeshed U.S. and Chinese economies leading to an exacerbation of the power struggle between the nations.⁴⁹ The U.S. may consider an economic security council to protect against economic shocks and better forecast planning for future crises.⁵⁰ Tariffs between the U.S. and China have increased steadily since 2008 and tariff increases were amplified by the COVID-19 pandemic.⁵¹ All of these conditions have promoted more regional investment and a growing desire to limit ties to the Chinese economy with isolationist policies.

The Emergence of Regional Trade Agreements

International trade has increased to 20 trillion USD with roughly a 10 fold increase since 1980.⁵² Additionally, five times as many people travel internationally today as compared to 1980.⁵³ However, one-half of the movement of all money, international goods, people, and information occur between three major regional centers: Asia, Europe, and North America.⁵⁴ Furthermore, one-half of trade occurs between countries with a similar language as different languages may lead to various cultures, customs, laws, and business practices that make trade difficult.⁵⁵

For instance, from 1993 to 2007 Mexico doubled its economy due to NAFTA and trade between Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. increased four-fold after NAFTA was passed.⁵⁶ This is similarly seen in the European Union (EU) where two-thirds of EU trade remains within the nations belonging to the union.⁵⁷ Creation of the Asian Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) allowed for lower tariffs to Asian nations making U.S. products more expensive to import.⁵⁸ RCEP also made these markets less attractive for trade agreements from other nations. For instance, cars assembled in South Korea and Japan face no tariffs for trade within RCEP while cars imported from the U.S. face double digit tariffs.⁵⁹

⁴⁷ Farrell, Henry, and Abraham Newman. 2023. "The New Economic Security State." *Foreign Affairs* 102 (6): 107.

⁴⁸ IBID, 110

⁴⁹ IBID, 111

⁵⁰ IBID, 122

⁵¹ Okonjo-Iweala, Ngozi. 2023. "Why the World Still Needs Trade: The Case for Reimagining-Not Abandoning-Globalization." *Foreign Affairs* 102 (4): 95.

⁵² O'Neil, Shannon K. 2022. "The Myth of the Global: Why Regional Ties Win the Day." *Foreign Affairs* 101 (4): 158.

⁵³ O'Neil, Shannon K. 2022. "The Myth of the Global: Why Regional Ties Win the Day." *Foreign Affairs* 101 (4): 158.

⁵⁴ IBID, 158

⁵⁵ IBID, 161

⁵⁶ IBID, 162-3

⁵⁷ IBID, 162-3

⁵⁸ IBID, 167

⁵⁹ IBID, 167

Over the last 20 years there has been a steady rise in regional trade agreements versus historic global trade agreements. This is the result of a change in attitudes away from distant supply chains (i.e., China to the U.S.) to more regional approaches. Having regional supply chains allows for multiple resources for supplies, allows for redundancy of delivery systems, and less single point of failure occurrences.⁶⁰ This is already seen in North America with the United States Mexico Canada (USMCA) agreement, but it is also seen Asia's RCEP in 2020.⁶¹

The development of regional rather than global trade agreements have many benefits including easier transport of goods, similar business laws, similar social norms and customs, and these agreements help prevent trade from outside competitors that could damage regional economics.⁶² This will result in an overlapping and mutually compatible networks of resources to and from each region. In having this redundancy system there is a path to allow mitigation of sustainability and security challenges that were presented during the Covid-19 pandemic.⁶³

The Covid-19 Pandemic intensified the argument for regional versus global trade. This occurred as the pandemic led to an increase in costs due to inflation, supply chain disruptions, and shortages of goods and services as the pandemic shut down businesses and the economy.⁶⁴ For instance, trade involving moving goods across the Atlantic Ocean adds one week to transport time and trade across the Pacific Ocean adds one month.⁶⁵ These increased transportation times add significant additional costs to goods transported from geographically separated countries (i.e., China and the U.S.). This explains why regional trade agreements reduce costs and are more advantageous to manage than global trade agreements.⁶⁶

While the pandemic had many negative aspects, the pressure placed on nations did drive some innovation to deal with the limitations created. Covid-19 inspired innovation in technology promoting more automation capabilities, less need for large specialized factories, reduced need for large work forces, and increased utilization small-batch production versus mass production.⁶⁷ These changes allowed promotion of regional production and supply chains decreasing the need for trade with China.⁶⁸

The concept of Friend Shoring has also emerged as an ideology that promotes investing and creating economic ties with countries that tend to have share U.S. values, which Chinese views are often the antithesis.⁶⁹ Friend shoring also emphasizes that the import and export of goods and services should not occur through supply chains with nations that oppose core U.S. values. For instance, during the Covid-19 pandemic China produced three times more masks than the

⁶⁰ Maull, Hanns W. 2021. "The Coronavirus Pandemic and the Future of International Order." *Survival* 63 (1): 80.

⁶¹ *IBID*, 81

⁶² *IBID*, 81

⁶³ Maull, Hanns W. 2021. "The Coronavirus Pandemic and the Future of International Order." *Survival* 63 (1): 80.

⁶⁴ *IBID*, 81

⁶⁵ O'Neil, Shannon K. 2022. "The Myth of the Global: Why Regional Ties Win the Day." *Foreign Affairs* 101 (4): 161.

⁶⁶ *IBID*, 161

⁶⁷ O'Neil, Shannon K. 2022. "The Myth of the Global: Why Regional Ties Win the Day." *Foreign Affairs* 101 (4): 165.

⁶⁸ *IBID*, 165

⁶⁹ Rajan, Raghuram G. 2023. "The Gospel of Deglobalization: What's the Cost of a Fractured World Economy?" *Foreign Affairs* 102 (1): 156.

rest of the world did in 2020.⁷⁰ However, the U.S. was able to repurpose existing factories with help from similar-valued nations (i.e., Taiwan and EU nations) to rapidly increase production of masks domestically.⁷¹ This example emphasized the ideal of utilizing friend shoring to ensure production stability and security in the U.S. rather than reliance on Chinese products.

Friend shoring demonstrates a significant problem with the increasing reliance on rare earth metals and minerals for batteries, solar panels, etc. This is due to the fact these metals are frequently mined in areas without U.S. democratically-minded values such as the Democratic Republic of Congo.⁷² In order for the concept of Friend Shoring to be effective each nation must take a serious look at local and distant supply chains to ensure the same systems of democracy, ethos, and humane work policies are followed. However, friend shoring again demonstrates a shift in U.S. policy to emphasize relationships with nations that have similar values and promote economic decoupling from China.

Conclusion

The aftermath of the Covid-19 Pandemic created lasting, pervasive consequences for the world. The most significant effect of the Covid-19 Pandemic is the tension placed on the economic relationship between the U.S. and China. This is demonstrated with the splintering of supply chains between the U.S. and China due to Covid-19. These interruptions have strained the U.S. economy and caused the American public and the U.S. political arena to lose faith in the U.S.'s ability to thrive independently. The growing prevalence of aggressive Chinese diplomacy worldwide continues to sour trade relations between the U.S. and other nations reinforcing the resistance to the strong U.S. economic ties to China. The emphatic push to isolationism versus multilateralism by American politicians and the American people have led to divestment in Chinese industries and a reduction in U.S.-China economic agreements. Finally, the increasing emergence of regional trade agreements among neighboring nations has further weakened U.S. and China economic policies. Regional trade agreements have made importing and exporting goods between the U.S. and China less economically favorable. Regional trade agreements also promote stronger logistical supply chains and reduce the risk of critical shortages of key goods and services.

The growing pressure of these dynamics on the U.S. and Chinese economic relationship will likely continue to promote decoupling, isolation, and divestment between the two countries. The strengthening of regional trade agreements such as the US-MCA, the EU, and the RCEP will continue to diminish the previous advantages of global trade agreements. Additionally, increasing calls to decrease investments and trade agreements with Chinese businesses continue to push economic decoupling between the U.S and China. Time will only tell if these trends will continue to pervade the U.S.-China economic relationship, or if something new will shift current economic sentiments between these countries.

⁷⁰ IBID, 161

⁷¹ IBID, 160

⁷² IBID, 160

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- “CDC Archives.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, May 11, 2023.
<https://archive.cdc.gov/#/details?url=https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/your-health/end-of-phe.html>.
- Chang-Liao, Nien-chung. 2022. “Why Have Chinese Diplomats Become so Aggressive?” *Survival* 64 (1): 179–90. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2032997>.
- Farrell, Henry, and Abraham Newman. 2023. “The New Economic Security State.” *Foreign Affairs* 102 (6): 106–22.
- Hanson, Gordon H. 2021. “Can Trade Work for Workers? The Right Way to Redress Harms and Redistribute Gains.” *Foreign Affairs* 100 (3): 20–27.
- Heisbourg, François. 2020. “From Wuhan to the World: How the Pandemic Will Reshape Geopolitics.” *Survival* 62 (3): 7–24. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2020.1763608>.
- James, Harold. 2021. “Globalization’s Coming Golden Age.” *Foreign Affairs* 100 (3): 10–19.
- Lista, Florigio, Mario Stefano Peragallo, Roberto Biselli, Riccardo De Santis, Sabrina Mariotti, Roberto Nisini, and Raffaele D’Amelio. 2023. “Have Diagnostics, Therapies, and Vaccines Made the Difference in the Pandemic Evolution of COVID-19 in Comparison with “Spanish Flu”?” *Pathogens* 12, no. 7: 868.
<https://doi.org/10.3390/pathogens12070868>
- Mauil, Hanns W. 2021. “The Coronavirus Pandemic and the Future of International Order.” *Survival* 63 (1): 77–100. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2021.1881255>.
- Okonjo-Iweala, Ngozi. 2023. “Why the World Still Needs Trade: The Case for Reimagining-Not Abandoning-Globalization.” *Foreign Affairs* 102 (4): 94–103.
- O’Neil, Shannon K. 2022. “The Myth of the Global: Why Regional Ties Win the Day.” *Foreign Affairs* 101 (4): 158–69.
- Posen, Adam S. 2023. “The End of China’s Economic Miracle: How Beijing’s Struggles Could Be an Opportunity for Washington.” *Foreign Affairs* 102 (5): 120–30.
- Rajan, Raghuram G. 2023. “The Gospel of Deglobalization: What’s the Cost of a Fractured World Economy?” *Foreign Affairs* 102 (1): 155–62.
- Zhai, Yida. 2023. “The Politics of Covid-19: The Political Logic of China’s Zero-Covid Policy.” *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 53 (5): 869–86.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2023.2194322>.