



## **A Cold War for Hire: Russia's Use of the Wagner Group for Hybrid Operations and the Implications for the West**

**Major André D. Born**

### **JCSP 49 DL Exercice Solo Flight Disclaimer**

*“This paper was written by a candidate attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.”*

© His Majesty the King in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2024.

### **PCEMI n° 49 AD Exercice Solo Flight Avertissement**

*« La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale. »*

© Sa Majesté le Roi du Chef du Canada, représenté par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2024.

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE - COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

JCSP 49 DL - PCEMI n° 49 AD  
2022 - 2024

Exercise Solo Flight – Exercice Solo Flight

**A Cold War for Hire:  
Russia's Use of the Wagner Group  
for Hybrid Operations and the Implications for the West**

**Major André D. Born**

*“This paper was written by a candidate attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.”*

*« La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale. »*

# A Cold War for Hire: Russia's Use of the Wagner Group for Hybrid Operations and the Implications for the West

## Introduction

Since Russia's escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian war in February of 2022, the collective West has been highly focused on the conventional war occurring within the boundaries of Europe. What has received less attention, has been the ongoing efforts by Russia to strategically posture itself within Africa and the Middle East, through hybrid means. To achieve this strategic insertion, Russia has relied heavily on the Wagner Group, which until recently, operated in the shadows of the Russian state apparatus. Broadly speaking, these efforts have bolstered regimes favourable to Russia and contributed to the expulsion of Western nations across Africa.<sup>1</sup> These expulsions have extended to Canadian economic interests, mainly in the Central African Republic (CAR), where Wagner has seized a Canadian owned gold mine.<sup>2</sup> This paper argues that Western inactivity, including Canada, has given Russia the space it needs to gain a foothold and increase its influence in the Middle East and Africa. The paper illustrates how Russia's hybrid activities throughout those regions, are undermining decades of intervention, enabling the circumvention of sanctions, creating strategic dilemmas for the West, and threatening NATO security. Addressing the challenges posed by the Wagner Group must be considered a strategic priority given not only its implications for the outcome of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, but the ease with which this model can be replicated by future adversaries.

## The Middle East and Africa: Same Strategic Competition, New Strategic Drivers

Under Putin, Russia has sought to re-assert its global position as a great power. Although Putin has linked his policies to those of the Soviet Union, his regime's interests differ from those of the past.<sup>3</sup> Stemming from its strategic competition with the West, the Soviet Union sought to undermine Western influence by providing alternative ideological support to foreign regimes. For instance, in Africa, the Soviet Union sought to counter the West, by promoting anti-colonialism, providing advisers to various conflicts, and fostering cultural and economic exchanges. Yet, as evidenced by the almost total departure of Russia's presence in these regions following the collapse of the Soviet Union, their interest was largely ideological.<sup>4</sup> By contrast,

---

<sup>1</sup> El-Badawy, Emman., Munasinghe, Sandun., Bulama Bukarti, Audu, and Bianchi, Beatrice. "Security, Soft Power and Regime Support: Spheres of Russian Influence in Africa." *The Tony Blair Institute For Global Change* (March 23, 2022): 21-25. [Security, Soft Power and Regime Support: Spheres of Russian Influence in Africa \(institute.global\)](#); Momani, Bessma. "Western patronizing isn't enough to counter Russia's influence in Africa: The Wagner Group now has a growing arc of influence across the Sahel region, including Mali, the Central African Republic, and Sudan." *The Globe and Mail*, accessed 10 March 2024. [Opinion: Western patronizing isn't enough to counter Russia's influence in Africa - The Globe and Mail](#); Ruth, Maclean. Schmitt, Eric. "Niger Orders American Troops to Leave Its Territory." *The New York Times* accessed 09 May 2024: [Niger Orders American Troops to Leave Its Territory - The New York Times \(nytimes.com\)](#)

<sup>2</sup> Joseph, Coppolino. "Canadian-owned mine at Ndassima seized by Russian mercenaries in Africa, is helping fund the war in Ukraine." *The Globe and Mail*, accessed 10 March 2024: [Canadian-owned mine at Ndassima seized by Russian mercenaries in Africa, is helping fund the war in Ukraine - The Globe and Mail](#)

<sup>3</sup> Marek, Górka. "The Wagner Group as a Tool of Russian Hybrid Warfare." *Polish Political Science Yearbook* vol. 52 no. 2 (2023): 83-85, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15804/ppsy202324>

<sup>4</sup> In Africa, the Soviet Union provided advisers to major conflicts in Angola (1975 to 1992), Mozambique (1977 to 1992), and the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia (1977 to 1978), as well as promoting Marxist-Leninist

the ratio of US funded contractors to conventional troops was 3:1.<sup>9</sup> NATO has replicated this trend and formally considers PMSCs as part of its comprehensive approach, with a noteworthy focus on defensive tasks and attribution.<sup>10</sup> While an in-depth review of the private military industry is beyond the scope of this paper, given the scale of integration of PMSCs in Western military activities, certain characteristics of the Western industry bare mentioning to effectively contrast them with other non-state actors, including the Wagner Group.

Scholars Deborah Avant and P.W. Singer have written seminal works on the Western private military industry, their activities, as well as the challenges and legal considerations which have emerged since their resurgence. Yet, framing the Wagner Group simply in the lens of services provided, may give the false impression that they are like other PMSCs.<sup>11</sup> Accordingly, this paper employs scholar Sean McFate's framing of PMSCs, within the framework of his five characteristics which differentiate PMSCs from other non-state groups: "Among these are motivation by profit rather than politics, corporate structure that plugs them into the global financial system, expeditionary nature, use of force in a military manner, and the lethal character of their work."<sup>12</sup> Yet, this should include compliant with a legal framework, whether in the nation they are registered, or as part of international statutes.<sup>13</sup> Against these characteristics and the legal statutes, a different view of the Wagner Group emerges.

The Wagner Group, like many of its Western counterparts has provided training and security services, logistic and operational support, as well as close protection and critical infrastructure point defense.<sup>14</sup> Applied to Avant and Singer's seminal framework, the Wagner Group has an appearance of legitimacy; yet, when framed in McFate's characteristics inclusive of the legal dimension, the legitimacy of the group comes into question. First, the Wagner Group does not bid on contracts on the open market. Rather, they service the Russian state, or their partners, suggesting a proxy status, vice a commercial entity, and obscuring their motivations (i.e. profit versus ideology).<sup>15</sup> Second, the Wagner Group is not a legally registered business

---

<sup>9</sup> U.S. Congressional Research Service. *Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2007-2016* (CRS Report No. R44116) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44116.pdf> (accessed March 22, 2018): 3-8.

<sup>10</sup> Christopher, Spearin. "NATO, Russia and Private Military and Security Companies: Looking into the Dark Reflection." *The RUSI Journal* Vol. 163 No. 3 (August 2018): 66. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2018.1494676>

<sup>11</sup> Deborah D. Avant, *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005; P.W. Singer, *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Private Military Industry*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003.

<sup>12</sup> Summarized by Elena, Pokalova. "The Wagner Group in Africa: Russia's Quasi-State Agent of Influence." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*. (02 July 2023): 3. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2023.2231642>; Sean, McFate. *The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

<sup>13</sup> Much has been written of the legal ambiguity of PMSCs, though efforts have been undertaken to add a degree of control and oversight to the industry. For instance, the US passed the U.S. Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act. See U.S. *Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act* Washington: Government of the United States of America, S.2598, 113th Cong., 2014, accessed, February 22, 2017, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/2598>; Switzerland. Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, International Committee of the Red Cross. *The Montreux Document: On Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict*. Montreux: Government of Switzerland, 2008, accessed, October 22, 2016 [https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc\\_002\\_0996.pdf](https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf)

<sup>14</sup> Pokalova. "The Wagner Group in Africa: Russia's Quasi-State Agent of Influence," 3-5.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

entity. Rather it is a collection of businesses which until recently were controlled by Russian oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin. In fact, under Russian law, the group is illegal, but tolerated by the senior leaders of the state.<sup>16</sup> Further adding to its legal ambiguity, Russia is not a signatory of the Montreux Document, which clarifies the application of international laws on PMSC personnel.<sup>17</sup> As asserted by Professor Marek Górká, “since many of its leaders and soldiers, consisting of current and former Russian intelligence forces, [...]perform tasks according to the objectives of Russian foreign policy, the Wagner Group can be defined as a hidden operational force operating under Moscow’s supervision rather than a private contract armed forces.”<sup>18</sup> As will be shown below, this murky legal status has benefited Moscow greatly.

### **More than a traditional PMSC – Russia’s Strategic Multitool**

Unlike most PMSCs, the Wagner Group is a loosely affiliated group of shell companies, which allows them to pursue Russian interest through a variety of hybrid means. Beyond the fighters it employs, Yevgeny Prigozhin’s (when he was still alive) Wagner Group also controlled a ‘Troll Farm’, transportation companies and had linkages to Russia’s fossil fuel, mining, and arms companies.<sup>19</sup> Through these economic subsidiaries, Wagner has been able to finance many of its own activities and outwardly resembles the Executive Outcomes business model (i.e. services in exchange for resource extraction).<sup>20</sup> This approach has been most pronounced in the Central African Republic (CAR), where the Wagner Group has inserted itself into the local resource industries (timber, diamonds, gold) and joined the *Forces armées centrafricaines* (FACA) in operations to secure resource rich areas.<sup>21</sup> These operations have also served to expropriate Western backed companies. For instance, in 2020, Wagner forces seized a gold mine owned by the Canadian company Axmin Inc., in CAR, and placed it under the control of one of their affiliates.<sup>22</sup> This model has been replicated throughout the Middle East and Africa, with Wagner Group Operatives deploying to at least 21 countries since 2014.<sup>23</sup> These deployments have often come on the heels of the expulsion of Western forces and highlight the political dimension of their activities, which facilitate their military and economic operations.

In addition to military forces, Wagner Group operatives have also provided political strategists to support regimes and undertaken extensive information operation campaigns across the continent. The extent of this information campaign goes well beyond traditional corporate advertising and has included financing beauty contests, promotional material aimed at children, the production of a film promoting Wagner’s actions on the continent, as well as messaging in

---

<sup>16</sup> Górká. “The Wagner Group as a Tool of Russian Hybrid Warfare,” 86.

<sup>17</sup> Switzerland. Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, International Committee of the Red Cross. *The Montreux Document: On Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict*. Montreux: Government of Switzerland, 2008.

<sup>18</sup> Górká. “The Wagner Group as a Tool of Russian Hybrid Warfare,” 86.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 86-87.

<sup>20</sup> Pokalova. “The Wagner Group in Africa: Russia’s Quasi-State Agent of Influence,” 4-5.

<sup>21</sup> Katja, Lindskov Jacobsen. and Karen Philippa Larsen. “Wagner Group Flows: A Two-Fold Challenge to Liberal Intervention and Liberal Order.” *Politics and Governance*. Vol 12. (14 February 2024): 7-8.  
<https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.7367>,

<sup>22</sup> Coppolino. “Canadian-owned mine at Ndassima seized by Russian mercenaries in Africa, is helping fund the war in Ukraine.”

<sup>23</sup> El-Badawy et al. “Security, Soft Power and Regime Support: Spheres of Russian Influence in Africa,” 8.

traditional media forums.<sup>24</sup> Prigozhin has also been known to finance Russian political scientists through various projects and foundations, which have released polls and findings leading into foreign national elections, that promote both Russia and the countries ruling parties.<sup>25</sup> The effectiveness of this campaign, which is synchronised with Moscow's own messaging, is increasingly evidenced by the use of Russian flags as an anti-colonial, anti-French, and anti-western symbol.<sup>26</sup> This campaign has further served to diminish narratives of human rights violations conducted by the Wagner Group, including instances of torture, abuse, extra-judicial killings and the suppression of pro-democracy groups.<sup>27</sup> The synchronisation of Wagner messaging with Moscow, as well as the appearance of Prigozhin at the Russia-Africa Summit in St. Petersburg weeks after the groups mutiny in Russia, all demonstrate its value to Putin's regime as a strategic 'multitool,' and foreign policy instrument.<sup>28</sup> As asserted by Dr. Elena Pokalova, "instead of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Kremlin has relied on Wagner to spread authoritarianism and illiberalism."<sup>29</sup> The combination of these military, economic and political agents, has been leveraged by Moscow to exert an increased level of influence across the Middle East and Africa and increasingly to shift the political status quo in the affected nation to their ends.

### **A Threat to NATO security – Counter-Interventionism and Strategic Dilemmas**

Wagner's activities in the grey zone have enabled them to foster partnerships with a disperse array of state and non-state actors. These partnerships have been known to include Syrian and Sudanese Rapid Support Force (RSF) rebels operating in Libya, as well as suspicions they also trained Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT) militiamen. This partnership with the FACT is of note given the group assassinated Chad's President Idriss Deby, a year after allegedly receiving training from the Wagner Group.<sup>30</sup> Further, they have been quick to form ties with the various military juntas, which have spread throughout Africa. The appeal of Wagner to autocratic regimes has been their willingness to provide support, including arms, to regimes which have been sanctioned, or who have had deals withheld, by the West because of failures to meet human rights obligations, or achieve a desired level of democratic progress.<sup>31</sup> For instance, Wagner operatives have occupied UN bases in Mali following the expulsion of both the French counter-terrorism operation and UN Multidimensional-Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, and Russian forces have occupied part of the same airbase in Niger the US has been asked to vacate.<sup>32</sup> Beyond the immediate threat Wagner has posed to national and regional security by

---

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

<sup>25</sup> Lindskov Jacobsen and Larsen. "Wagner Group Flows: A Two-Fold Challenge to Liberal Intervention and Liberal Order," 7-8.

<sup>26</sup> Elian, Peltier. "The Hottest New Accessory in Niger? A Russian Flag." *The New York Times*. accessed 09 May 2024. [The Hottest New Accessory in Niger? A Russian Flag. - The New York Times \(nytimes.com\)](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/09/world/africa/wagner-niger-russian-flag.html)

<sup>27</sup> El-Badawy et al. "Security, Soft Power and Regime Support: Spheres of Russian Influence in Africa," 19.

<sup>28</sup> Bessma. "Western patronizing isn't enough to counter Russia's influence in Africa: The Wagner Group now has a growing arc of influence across the Sahel region, including Mali, the Central African Republic, and Sudan."

<sup>29</sup> Pokalova. "The Wagner Group in Africa: Russia's Quasi-State Agent of Influence," 16.

<sup>30</sup> El-Badawy et al. "Security, Soft Power and Regime Support: Spheres of Russian Influence in Africa," 9.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 6-10.

<sup>32</sup> Pokalova. "The Wagner Group in Africa: Russia's Quasi-State Agent of Influence," 1; Bessma. "Western patronizing isn't enough to counter Russia's influence in Africa: The Wagner Group now has a growing arc of influence across the Sahel region, including Mali, the Central African Republic, and Sudan."; Paulin, Kola.

reversing years of Security Force Assistance (SFA) missions and creating conditions favourable to regional insecurity, their growing influence poses strategic dilemmas for Europe, NATO and the West.<sup>33</sup>

Wagner's operations across the Middle East and Africa have not only positioned Moscow to exert significant influence across the region, as well as international governance bodies, but allowed them to gain strategic footholds. In the countries they have intervened and created alliances, Russia has gained access to seaports, airports and brokered deals to establish Russian military and logistics bases. The dispersal of these bases around the Southern coast of the Mediterranean and the promise of a Naval base on the Red Sea by the Sudanese Government, pose several strategic dilemmas for the West.<sup>34</sup> First, should Russia establish a Naval Base on the Red Sea, it will be well postured to threaten international commerce. Second, these bases, when combined with Wagner's business practices, have created a network of illicit economic activity, through which natural resources and arms can flow, circumvent Western sanctions, and provide funding to support Russia's war on Ukraine.<sup>35</sup> Third, access to the Mediterranean has provided Russia with a pathway to drive refugees towards Europe.<sup>36</sup> Although two views have emerged to explain Russia's renewed interest in Africa and the Middle East, this paper asserts both are relevant. Put differently, Russia's presence represents a means to maintain economic opportunity, allies and "...a so-called second frontier, after Eastern Europe, for encircling Western Europe."<sup>37</sup>

## Conclusion

The West, including Canada, have acknowledged the adversarial nature of current relations with Russia, yet, Putin's regime has been given the space it needs to counter years of stabilization efforts across the Middle East and Africa.<sup>38</sup> This paper has argued that the Wagner Group is a quasi-state entity unlike any other, which benefits from a murky legal standing and shadowy operations to advance Moscow's foreign policy agenda. Addressing the threat posed to peace and security by the Wagner Group is of critical importance, given the central role the group is playing in circumventing Western sanctions, destabilizing regional dynamics, and creating strategic dilemmas for the collective West. Consequently, there are several avenues which must be explored from a Canadian perspective to counter Russia's strategic competition. First, an Interdepartmental Task Force, like that which was created for Afghanistan, should be convened to coordinate a comprehensive approach to countering the Wagner Group. Although Canada has sanctioned certain elements of the group, it is a complex entity, and efforts should be

---

"Russians sent to Niger airbase occupied by US troops." *The British Broadcasting Corporation*. accessed 09 May 2024 [Russians sent to Niger airbase occupied by US troops \(bbc.com\)](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-62444444)

<sup>33</sup> Christopher, Spearin. "The Wagner Group and U.S. Security Force Assistance in Africa: Changed and Challenging Dynamics." *Military Review* (July-August 2023): 47-58. [The Wagner Group and U.S. Security Force Assistance in Africa: Changed and Challenging Dynamics - ProQuest](#)

<sup>34</sup> Górka. "The Wagner Group as a Tool of Russian Hybrid Warfare," 94-95.

<sup>35</sup> Pokalova. "The Wagner Group in Africa: Russia's Quasi-State Agent of Influence," 16-17.

<sup>36</sup> Bessma. "Western patronizing isn't enough to counter Russia's influence in Africa: The Wagner Group now has a growing arc of influence across the Sahel region, including Mali, the Central African Republic, and Sudan."

<sup>37</sup> El-Badawy et al. "Security, Soft Power and Regime Support: Spheres of Russian Influence in Africa," 4.

<sup>38</sup> Canada. Department of National Defence. *Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada's Defence*. Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 2024.

undertaken to identify and target all its subsidiaries.<sup>39</sup> Second, Canada is home to a wide array of members of diverse diasporas. These should be leveraged to recruit individuals as part of a campaign to counter Russia's information operations in the region, with a focus on exposing their crimes against humanity and resource extractive practices. Third, Canada should push for the formation of a coalition of states, including regional actors, to counter Wagner's disruptive influence in the Middle East and Africa. Canada is well postured to counter the anti-colonial messaging stemming from Russia, given it was both a colony and has never had an empire. Finally, Canada should explore where it can develop a strong partnership, including the provision of military trainers, to maintain its own foothold on the continent. While the state of the CAF puts this into question, reframing this as a NATO and European security threat could encourage likeminded nations to contribute. Further, Canada should acknowledge and take action to prevent further Canadian companies from falling victim to Wagner's strong-arm business practices. If nothing else, countering this threat is important, because the Wagner model could easily be replicated by other adversaries.

---

<sup>39</sup> Canada. Global Affairs Canada. *Canadian Sanctions Related to Russia*. Accessed 02 May 2024. [Canadian Sanctions Related to Russia \(international.gc.ca\)](https://www.international.gc.ca/sanctions-sanctions/related-to-russia-russie.aspx)

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Avant, Deborah D. *The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada's Defence*. Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 2024.
- Canada. Global Affairs Canada. *Canadian Sanctions Related to Russia*. Accessed 02 May 2024. [Canadian Sanctions Related to Russia \(international.gc.ca\)](https://international.gc.ca/)
- Coppolino, Joseph. "Canadian-owned mine at Ndassima seized by Russian mercenaries in Africa, is helping fund the war in Ukraine." *The Globe and Mail*, accessed 10 March 2024. [Canadian-owned mine at Ndassima seized by Russian mercenaries in Africa, is helping fund the war in Ukraine - The Globe and Mail](#)
- Bessma, Momani. "Western patronizing isn't enough to counter Russia's influence in Africa: The Wagner Group now has a growing arc of influence across the Sahel region, including Mali, the Central African Republic, and Sudan." *The Globe and Mail*, accessed 10 March 2024 [Opinion: Western patronizing isn't enough to counter Russia's influence in Africa - The Globe and Mail](#)
- Dunigan, Molly and Ulrich Peterson ed. *The Markets For Force: Privatization of Security Across World Regions*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015.
- El-Badawy, Emman. Munasinghe, Sandun. Bulama Bukarti, Audu. Bianchi, Beatrice. "Security, Soft Power and Regime Support: Spheres of Russian Influence in Africa." *The Tony Blair Institute For Global Change* (March 23, 2022): [Security, Soft Power and Regime Support: Spheres of Russian Influence in Africa \(institute.global\)](#)
- Górka, Marek. "The Wagner Group as a Tool of Russian Hybrid Warfare." *Polish Political Science Yearbook* vol. 52 no. 2 (2023): 83–98. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.15804/ppsy202324>
- Kinsey, Christopher and Malcolm Hugh Patterson, eds. *Contractors and War: The Transformation of US Expeditionary Operations*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012.
- Kinsey, Christopher. *Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies*. New York: Routledge, 2006.
- Kola, Paulin. "Russians sent to Niger airbase occupied by US troops." *The British Broadcasting Corporation*. accessed 03 May 2024. [Russians sent to Niger airbase occupied by US troops \(bbc.com\)](#)
- Lindskov Jacobsen, Katja and Karen Philippa Larsen. "Wagner Group Flows: A Two-Fold Challenge to Liberal Intervention and Liberal Order." *Politics and Governance*. Vol 12. (14 February 2024): 1-16. <https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.7367>
- Maclean, Ruth. Schmitt, Eric. "Niger Orders American Troops to Leave Its Territory." *The New York Times*. accessed 09 May 2024, [Niger Orders American Troops to Leave Its Territory - The New York Times \(nytimes.com\)](#)

- Marten, Kimberly. "Russia's Back in Africa: Is the Cold War Returning?" *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 42 no. 4 (20 December 2019): 155-170.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1693105>
- McFate, Sean *The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Peltier, Elian. "The Hottest New Accessory in Niger? A Russian Flag." *The New York Times*. accessed 09 May 2024, [The Hottest New Accessory in Niger? A Russian Flag. - The New York Times \(nytimes.com\)](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/09/world/africa/niger-russia-flag.html)
- Pokalova, Elena. "The Wagner Group in Africa: Russia's Quasi-State Agent of Influence." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*. (02 July 2023): 1-23.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2023.2231642>
- Singer, P.W. *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Private Military Industry*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003.
- Spearin, Christopher. "NATO, Russia and Private Military and Security Companies: Looking into the Dark Reflection." *The RUSI Journal* Vol. 163 No. 3 (August 2018): 66-72.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2018.1494676>
- Spearin, Christopher. "Russia's Military and Security Privatization." *The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters* vol. 48 no. 2 (Summer, 2018): 39-49.  
<https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters>
- Spearin, Christopher. "The Wagner Group and U.S. Security Force Assistance in Africa: Changed and Challenging Dynamics." *Military Review* (July-August 2023): 47-58. [The Wagner Group and U.S. Security Force Assistance in Africa: Changed and Challenging Dynamics - ProQuest](https://www.proquest.com/military-review/article-abstract/the-wagner-group-and-u-s-security-force-assistance-in-africa-changed-and-challenging-dynamics/118111111)
- Switzerland. Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, International Committee of the Red Cross. *The Montreux Document: On Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict*. Montreux: Government of Switzerland, 2008.  
[https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc\\_002\\_0996.pdf](https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf) (accessed, October 22, 2016)
- U.S. *Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act*. Washington: Government of the United States of America, S.2598, 113th Cong., 2014. [https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/2598](https://www.congress.gov/bills/113/congress/113th-congress/senate-bill/2598) (accessed, February 22, 2017)
- U.S. Congressional Budget Office. *Contractors' Support of US Operations in Iraq*, by Frisk, Daniel, and R. Derek Trunkey. Washington, DC, 2008.  
<http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/110th-congress-2007-2008/reports/08-12-iraqcontractors.pdf> (accessed, April 22, 2017)
- U.S. Congressional Research Service. *Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Iraq and Afghanistan: 2007-2016* (CRS Report No. R44116) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016), <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44116.pdf> (accessed March 22, 2018)