National Defence Défense nationale

Canadian Forces College

Collège des Forces Canadiennes

National Security Culture and Its Impact on the Canadian Armed Forces

Major James Cressall

JCSP 49

Master of Defence Studies

Disclaimer

Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do not represent Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used without written permission.

PCEMI n° 49

Maîtrise en études de la défense

Avertissement

Les opinons exprimées n'engagent que leurs auteurs et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

Canada

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE - COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

JCSP 49 - PCEMI n° 49
2022 - 2023

Master of Defence Studies – Maîtrise en études de la défense

National Security Culture and Its Impact on the Canadian Armed Forces

Major James Cressall

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CA – Canadian Army

CAF – Canadian Armed Forces

CDS – Chief of Defence Staff

CFC – Canadian Forces College

DND – Department of National Defence

GoC – Government of Canada

IR – International Relations

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PM – Prime Minister

SSE – *Strong, Secure, Engaged*: Canada's Defence Policy (2017)

U.S. – United States

ABSTRACT

The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has a culture problem. Exacerbated by severe personnel deficiencies, budgetary constraints, broken procurement practices, and an unceasingly high operational tempo, it is an organization in crisis. With the issues now compounding, and the CAF's operational readiness at significant risk, criticism from across civil society and, notably, from Canadian allies has reached a crescendo. While multiple internal initiatives have been launched to address the issues, no attempts are being made to approach the issues holistically or postulate a root cause. This research project seeks to address that gap and contends that at the heart of the CAF's issues lies another culture problem — that of Canadian national security culture.

Drawing on social constructivist theory to operationalize an existing model of national security culture, this project conducts a case study and uses process tracing to establish a causal relationship between national security culture and the prevalence of readiness-related issues in the CAF. Combined with an analysis of the contemporary Canadian security culture and challenges faced by the CAF, this study finds an inherent tension between temporally situated characteristics of Canadian national security culture and security norm salience in public opinion, government priorities, and policy decisions. When security norm salience is inadequate relative to state-level behavioural imperatives inherent in the current national security culture or relative to the security environment, pressure on the CAF builds, leading to a diverse range of issues. Following this primary analysis, an indirect comparison with Australian security culture and its armed forces is made, which helps inform strategic-level and practitioner-level recommendations.

CRIPPLED BY CULTURE: NATIONAL SECURITY CULTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

> *There is no conflict between a commitment to security and a commitment to our most deeply held values. At their heart, both speak to strengthening Canada*.
>
> – Canada, Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society:* Canada's National Security Policy

The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has a culture problem, among many others. Successive reports commissioned by the Government of Canada (GoC) and the Department of National Defence (DND) have highlighted widespread issues with sexual misconduct, toxic leadership, racism, and accountability.[1] Budgetary and procurement issues have dominated military-related public discourse for decades.[2] Numerous recent official public statements, media reports, and academic papers have highlighted concerns with operational readiness linked to severe personnel shortfalls, aging equipment, and missing critical capabilities.[3] And, in the past year, a crescendo of voices across civil society have bemoaned the ignominious state of national security and defence in Canada, with no apparent influence on government priorities.[4] The totality of these issues suggests that, barring a significant course correction, the CAF is moving rapidly towards

---

1. Louise Arbour, *Report of the Independent External Comprehensive Review of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces* (Montreal, QC: Borden Ladner Gervais, 2022), 10-11, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/report-of-the-independent-external-comprehensive-review.html.
2. Eugene Lang, "Use It or Lose It: SSE and DND's Chronic Underspending Problem," Canadian Global Affairs Institute, May, 2018, https://www.cgai.ca/use_it_or_lose_it_sse_and_dnd_s_chronic_underspending_problem.
3. Lee Berthiaume, "Military's Chief Orders Halt to Non-Essential Activities, Focus on Personnel Crisis," *CTV News*, October 6, 2022, https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/military-s-chief-orders-halt-to-non-essential-activities-focus-on-personnel-crisis-1.6099314; Christian Paas-Lang, "Facing Foreign Conflicts, Domestic Disasters, Canada's Top Soldier Worries About Readiness," *CBC News*, October 2, 2022, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/eyre-military-readiness-challenge-1.6603430.
4. CDA Institute, "Former Ministers, Generals and Senior Public Servant's Call for Action: Canada's National Security and Defence in Peril," *CDA Institute*, April 16, 2023, https://cdainstitute.ca/a-call-for-action-canadas-national-security-and-defence-in-peril/; John Gilmour, "Does Canada Need a New National Security Policy?", *Canadian Global Affairs Institute*, July, 2021, https://www.cgai.ca/does_canada_need_a_new_national_security_policy; Hugh Segal and Ann Fitz-Gerald, "Emerging Security Challenges for Canada in the Coming Decade" *Reimagining a Canadian National Security Strategy* (No. 3) (Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2021), https://www.cigionline.org/publications/emerging-security-challenges-for-canada-in-the-coming-decade/; Aaron Shull and Wesley Wark, *Reimagining a Canadian National Security Strategy* (Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation), 2021, https://www.cigionline.org/activities/reimagining-canadian-national-security-strategy/.

irrelevance or catastrophic failure, with significant implications for Canadian national security.

The CAF and DND have taken recent action to address certain issues, such as the Chief of the Defence Staff's (CDS) Reconstitution Direction that aims to address cultural issues as well as recruiting and retention.[5] While this initiative seeks to address multiple issues, it is, at best, thematically focused and inward looking. This approach reflects most of the current discourse and the many other initiatives that fail to consider a broader interconnectedness of issues or exogenous factors. In short, the root causes of the CAF's current issues have not and are not being explored, with the likely result being a failure to significantly alter the current trajectory of the CAF. The aim of this paper is thus to explore this gap. It will illustrate that rather than a series of isolated, endogenous issues, the issues facing the CAF are, in fact, symptoms of a broader cultural issue, at the heart of which lies national security.

This paper specifically contends that national security culture is the root cause of most issues that face the CAF today. Through an analysis of the theory that underlies national security culture, the specific Canadian manifestation of such a culture, and a comparison with one of Canada's allied nations, this paper seeks to explain how Canada's current national security culture has and, unless deliberately addressed, will continue to negatively impact the CAF. Specifically, linkages are drawn between current issues facing the CAF and the absence of traditional indicators of a strong national security culture. Such indicators primarily manifest as the strength of security norms or "security norm salience" across government policy, national institutions, and public discourse.[6] These may be considered relative to other attributes of the national security

---

5. Canada, Department of National Defence, *CDS/DM Directive for CAF Reconstitution* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2022), https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/dm-cds-directives/cds-dm-directive-caf-reconstitution.html.
6. The term "norm salience" is drawn from Andrew Cortell and James Davis, who suggest that it reflects the degree to which a norm is perceived to be legitimate and relevant in shaping (state) behaviour. They further suggest that evidence of a state's norm salience may be found in "domestic political discourse, national institutions (procedures and law), and national policies." The conceptualization and operationalization of "security norm salience" specifically is drawn from Alan J. Stephenson doctoral work on Canadian national security culture. See Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, "Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda," *International Studies Review* 2, no. 1 (2000), 68-71, https://doi.org/10.1111/1521-9488.00184; Theo Farrell, "Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program," *International Studies Review* 4, no. 1 (2002), 61, https://doi.org/10.1111/1521-9488.t01-1-00252; Alan J. Stephenson, "Canadian National Security Culture:

culture, such as the consequent state-level behaviour imperatives, or relative to the security environment. The intent of this analysis is to justify and present recommendations for defence practitioners and broader civil society that could enhance national security culture in Canada while preserving Canada's unique national identity. Ultimately, it further seeks to contribute to broader efforts to enhance the professionalism and relevancy of the CAF as a vital national security institution and guarantor of Canadian interests, security, and sovereignty. The analysis is divided into seven parts, which proceed as follows:

The paper begins with a literature review of the relevant theory relating to state security behaviour and national security culture. From both a general and Canadian perspective, this review examines the main approaches to understanding state behaviour according to international relations theory: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Under the constructivist approach, it further explores literature specifically relating to national security culture and its potential linkages with the armed forces. The literature review concludes by outlining key findings and gaps in the literature.

The literature review is followed by a description of the framework and approach taken to research and analyze the intersection of Canadian national security culture and the CAF. The conceptual and theoretical frameworks to be employed are described, followed by methodology and a brief summary of the research contribution.

The first chapter provides an overview of the evolution of national security culture in Canada including a summary of the main factors contributing to that evolution. As the logical progression, this chapter then discusses the way that national security culture currently manifests in Canada across government, civil society, and the broader Canadian public. It concurrently examines the strength of security norms and practices relative to the current security environment.

Having provided the theoretical and contemporary context, the second chapter links the CAF to the broader national security culture. This chapter examines one historical case study to demonstrate how Canada's security culture affects the CAF, before examining the contemporary issues facing the CAF. As described in Chapter One,

---

Explaining Post 9/11 Canadian National Security Policy Outcomes" (PhD diss., Carleton University, 2016), 22, https://curve.carleton.ca/71aa12ab-b289-4add-af70-7b2d6e0f5e91.

the temporally situated characteristics of the national security culture alongside security norm salience will be used to frame this discussion.

The third chapter provides an indirect comparison of the national security culture of Australia as it relates to and affects its armed forces. Rather than directly compare the security culture of Australia to that of Canada, which risks presenting false equivalencies, this chapter draws out key examples of positive elements of a well-developed security culture, which may hold lessons for Canada and the CAF.

The final chapter summarizes the analysis and weighs the potential option space for Canada to strengthen its national security culture across the political, military, and civil sectors. It concludes by providing both whole-of-nation and CAF-specific recommendations. This chapter is followed by a brief conclusion which includes a prognosis for Canada's security culture and the CAF.

LITERATURE REVIEW

National security culture is a complex concept that remains contested as a conceptual framework for understanding the factors that influence national security and the way that this manifests in a nation. By exploring the underlying theory, this literature review seeks to establish the contemporary relevance of this concept vis-à-vis other frameworks and relative to the problem itself. To further demonstrate that Canada's unique national security culture has a direct causal effect on the CAF, it is necessary to examine the application of this concept in a Canadian context and the relationship between national security culture and the armed forces. To guide this review, the following research questions were used: What factors influence and constrain a nation's unique security behaviours and outcomes? What impact does a national security culture have on the nation's armed forces? These questions were applied in both a general and a Canadian context.

Research Approach

Research for this review was conducted using both citation and keyword searches, with the latter conducted across four online databases and search engines: the Canadian Forces College (CFC) Summon, Google Scholar, Google, and Library and Archives Canada. Using the CFC Summon database, searches for English and French-language sources were conducted using a Boolean search method and filtered by year. Keywords used in the search comprised combinations of the following: "international relations", "theory", "realism", "liberalism", constructivism", "national security", "national security culture", "security studies", "strategic culture", "political culture", "culture", "Canada", "Canadian Forces", and "Canadian Armed Forces". Only sources published after the year 1950 were included due to the genesis of security studies in the early Cold War-era, predominantly in the Western world. Given the potential importance of public sentiment and opinion as a contributing factor to security culture and/or behaviours, quantitative survey-based sources were included, but limited to those relating to the CAF given the scope of this paper.

Defining National Security

The field of security studies, as a sub-discipline of international relations (IR), is an exceptionally wide and epistemologically diverse field. In the aftermath of the Second World War, both state actors and scholars concerned themselves with the idea of securing the state from internal and external threats, with "security" replacing "war" and "defence" as the preeminent motif of the day.[7] Thus, the concept of "national security" was initially conflated with "state security", as the state was viewed as the referent object ("the thing to be secured").[8] Against the backdrop of the early Cold War, the hitherto dominant and related field of strategic studies provided the point of departure for the evolution of security studies. While strategic studies traditionally concerned itself with the role of military power and the use of force in achieving political aims, security studies broadened the aperture beyond military power and state security.[9] The definition of security, let alone national security, thus became contentious from the outset and remains so to this day. Charles Shultze aptly wrote that "The concept of national security does not lend itself to neat and precise formulation. It deals with a wide variety of risks about whose probabilities we have little knowledge and of contingencies whose nature we can only dimly perceive."[10] While for the purposes of this paper, approaches to security are more important to consider than specifying a precise definition, some scholars offer useful theories that inform the subsequent discussion.

Arnold Wolfers, in an oft-cited 1962 essay, noted that the way that various nations perceive security went beyond their ability to defend their borders from attack. Wolfers suggested that security essentially measures "in an objective sense, the absence of threats to acquired values [and] in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that these values will be attacked".[11] This idea reflected a broader shift in the field towards redefining the referent object and, therefore, the traditional conceptions of security. Various scholars sought to

---

7. Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. CambridgeCore.
8. Alan Collins, ed., *Contemporary Security Studies* (6th Ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 2.
9. Isabelle Duyvesteyn and James E. Worrall, "Global Strategic Studies: A Manifesto," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 40, no. 3 (2017), 347, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1269228.
10. Charles L. Schultze, "The Economic Content of National Security Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 51:3 (1973): 529– 30, https://doi.org/10.2307/20037998.
11. Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), 148.

deepen and widen the field and brought forward new definitions of security across the political, military, economic, societal, and environmental sectors.[12] Towards the end of the Cold War, Richard Ullman, in noting the diversity of threats that transcend the military sphere, described the increasing challenge for policymakers in setting priorities and balancing resource allocation accordingly.[13] David Baldwin added much to this discussion in conceptualizing security with greater specificity by asking a series of questions, notably including: "security for whom?", "security for which values?", "security at what cost?" and "from what threats?".[14] His subsequent consideration of the value of security relative to competing interests and limited resources is equally important. To understand the evolution of these perspectives and explore the influences behind security behaviours and outcomes, it is necessary to examine the main approaches to security.

Approaches to Security

Realism

Realism remains the oldest and dominant approach in IR theory and within the sub-discipline of security studies. While, fundamentally, it could be stated that the realist approach to security is about power and the balance of power between states, there exist other important characteristics that are generally shared by most theorists.[15] These include: the anarchic nature of the international system with states as the central and unitary actors; the importance of state economic and military power; the relative rationality of states; and enduring competition between state actors.[16] Beyond these generally accepted characteristics, the realist approach comprises a number of different schools. The most prominent of these are classical realism, structural or neo-realism, and neo-classical realism. While classical realist thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau

12. Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 20.
13. Richard Ullman, "Redefining Security," In *Security Studies* (Vol. 8), edited by Christopher W. Hughes and Yew Meng Lai (Oxon, OX: Routledge, 2011), 12, ProQuest Ebook Central.
14. David A. Baldwin, "The Concept of Security," *Review of International Studies* 23, no. 1 (1997): 13-15, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210597000053.
15. Hans Morgenthau's 1948 book *Politics Among Nations* remains the foundational text for proponents of the "balance of power" approach to international relations theory.
16. Charles L. Glaser, "Realism," In *Contemporary Security Studies* (6th Ed.), edited by Alan Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 15.

emphasize human nature and the desire to amass power as the root cause of insecurity, the neorealist approach considers the structure of the international system as a more important factor influencing state behaviour.[17] Kenneth Waltz's seminal work, *Theory of International Politics*, laid the foundation for this school in theorizing how the so-called "ordering principle" of anarchy in the international structure "shaped and shoved" states to approach security in specific ways.[18] Two main ways that he suggested this manifests include external balancing (alliance forming, generally with the weaker collective) and internal balancing (enhancing the state's relative military and economic power).[19] The alternative option Waltz presents is bandwagoning, which sees states allying with the stronger power.[20] These two options spurred a number of scholars to extrapolate explanations for state approaches to alliances, such as Stephen M. Walt's "balance of threat" theory and Glenn Snyder's "alliance security" dilemma.[21] Whereas classical and neo-realist theory pay little attention to the domestic characteristics of states, neo-classical realism considers these "intervening variables…that mediate the international system's effect".[22] While these variables largely comprise materialistic elements such as form of government and state geography, some ideational factors are introduced such as policymaker perceptions.[23]

Liberalism

Liberalism, which traces its roots to Enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke, Thomas Paine, and Emmanuel Kent, sees cooperation and international organizations as

17. Stephen M. Walt, *Realism and Security*, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 3, https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.286.
18. Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 1979), 343-344.
19. William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and Security Studies," In *Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, edited by Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Thierry Balzacq (New York: Routledge, 2017), 19, ProQuest Ebook Central.
20. Glaser, "Realism," 19.
21. Wohlforth, "Realism and Security Studies," 14; Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801469992; Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (1984): 461-495, CambridgeCore.
22. Wohlforth, "Realism and Security Studies," 16.
23. While a more comprehensive overview of realist perspectives on security is beyond the scope of this paper, Stephen M. Walt's, *Realism and Security*, provides a fairly current and nuanced overview.

vital to global peace and security.[24] It challenges both power impetuses and the structure of the international system as the primary explanations for state behaviour and emphasizes the equal or greater importance of a state's domestic characteristics including "domestic actors' power and preferences" and the "nature of domestic political systems."[25] Andrew Moravcsik highlights the corresponding importance of state-society relations in a key article on liberalist theory, suggesting that "the configuration of state preferences matters most in world politics — not, as realists argue, the configuration of capabilities…"[26] While liberalist theory does not discount realist influences, it suggests that these are only temporally and situationally relevant.[27] Notwithstanding the importance placed on domestic characteristics, prominent contemporary IR scholar Beate Jahn suggests that liberalism is inherently international.[28] This idea is reflected in three tenets that liberal theorists believe are key contributors to peace: "(1) democracy reduces military conflict, (2) economic interdependence reduces military conflict, and (3) international institutions [and norms] reduce military conflict."[29] These tenets underlie Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry's theory of structural liberalism which, in part, suggests that "security co-binding" better explains Western states' approaches to security than the neorealist theory of balancing. Security co-binding suggest that states seek to mitigate anarchy in the international system by "mutually [constraining] one another" through commitment to international institutions.[30] Thus, while both material and ideational domestic characteristics are viewed as important factors that shape state behaviour, liberalism is predominantly outward looking. Rather than considering societal agency or seeking to explain the "how" and "why" behind domestic characteristics, liberalism takes these factors for granted.

---

24. Thomas C. Walker and David L. Rousseau, "Liberalism: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment," In *Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, edited by Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Thierry Balzacq (New York: Routledge, 2017), 23, ProQuest Ebook Central.
25. Patrick Morgan and Alan Collins, "Liberalism and Liberal Internationalism," In *Contemporary Security Studies* (6th Ed.), edited by Alan Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 31.
26. Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (1997), 513, CambridgeCore.
27. Morgan and Collins, "Liberalism and Liberal Internationalism," 31.
28. Beate Jahn, *Liberal Internationalism: Theory, History, Practice* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 14, SpringerLink.
29. Walker and Rousseau, "Liberalism: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment," 23.
30. Daniel Deudney, and G. John Ikenberry, "The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order," *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 2 (1999), 182, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210599001795.

Social Constructivism

As its eponymous name suggests, social constructivist theory considers how approaches to security and perception of threats are socially constructed. Emerging in the 1980s, it challenges the realist and liberal approaches by emphasizing the importance of norms, identity, and culture rather than the centrality of the state and its place or relative power in the international system.[31] This is not to say that constructivism ignores material factors. Rather, as first postulated in Nicholas Onuf's canonical text *World of our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations,* material factors interact with ideational factors to co-constitute societies.[32] This belief constitutes a key ontological principle of the theory and is reinforced in another foundational constructivist work, Alexander Wendt's *Social Theory of International Politics*.[33] Wendt also notably highlights the role that identity plays in shaping and changing culture over time.[34] This idea underlies two other central constructivist principles, which are the importance of identities as well as the idea that "agents and structures are mutually constituted".[35] These principles shape the constructivist approach to security and form the basis of conceptualizations of security culture. While social constructivism is divided into two main schools (conventional and critical), critical constructivism is of less relevance to this review. One final school worth noting is the *Copenhagen School* which adopted Ole Waever's theory of securitization. In essence, this theory suggests that actors can "securitize" an issue for a community through speech or political acts to achieve a specific aim.[36]

---

31. Christine Agius, "Social Constructivism," In *Contemporary Security Studies* (6th Ed.), edited by Alan Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 73.
32. Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, *World of our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), 49.
33. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511612183.
34. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 312.
35. Agius, "Social Constructivism," 74.
36. Juha A. Vuori, "Constructivism and Securitization," In *Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, edited by Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Thierry Balzacq (New York: Routledge, 2017), 65, ProQuest Ebook Central.

Constructivism and Security Culture

Notwithstanding social constructivism's rise in the 1980s, Jack Snyder pioneered the idea of a unique state "strategic culture" in 1977.[37] This drew on earlier conceptions of political culture that suggested that political behaviour is shaped by beliefs and values.[38] Thus, the idea of ideational influences on state behaviour did not begin with constructivism but was expanded by it. Most prominent of these efforts is Peter J. Katzenstein's work with a group of scholars to explore the impact of norms, identities, and interests on the formulation of unique national security cultures. In *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, Katzenstein and contributing authors propose that institutional and cultural elements (norms) of state security environments interact to shape state security interests, identity, communities, and ultimately state security policy. This is postulated to be recursive in nature in that "state policies both reproduce and reconstruct cultural and institutional structure."[39] Thus, a high level of or an increase in security norm salience across political discourse, policies, or institutions (or all three), can "strengthen" national security culture or enhance its relative importance in society.[40] Interestingly, the institutional component of this "cultural-institutional context" is drawn from neo-liberalism which contends that ongoing political processes create commonly held expectations (norms) of behaviour.[41] While Katzenstein does not completely discount material factors, they are viewed to be of less importance. Three other scholars add much to the security culture discussion.

John S. Duffield conceptualizes security in a related but distinct manner. While agreeing with the importance of shared ideas in shaping security policy, he emphasizes the importance of political elites over society. He does, however, suggest that these could

---

37. Jack L. Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations* (Vol. R-2154) (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1977).
38. Jeffrey S. Lantis, "Strategic Culture and National Security Policy," *International Studies Review* 4, no. 3 (2002), 90, https://doi.org/10.1111/1521-9488.t01-1-00266; Harry Eckstein, "A Culturalist Theory of Political Change," *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 3 (1988): 789-804, ProQuest Central.
39. Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," In *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 52-53.
40. Jeffrey Legro suggested that three criteria may be used to measure norm salience: specificity, durability, and concordance. Thus, a norm will be theoretically most influential when it is "clearly stated, firmly established, and widely endorsed." See Farrell, "Constructivist Security Studies," 61.
41. Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 19-20.

not be in conflict for long.[42] Emil Kirchner and James Sperling's collection of essays on national security culture also stands out. Along similar conceptual lines as Katzenstein, Kirchner and Sperling suggest that "national security cultures may be defined according to four criteria: the worldview of the external environment; national identity; instrumental preferences; and interaction preferences."[43] Also of value to this paper, Kirchner and Sperling's contributors draw links between national security culture and state security behaviours related to defence and the military. Mary Kaldor does the same in her contemporary book on global security cultures, though this is of less relevance due to its international focus.[44] Though not based in social constructivist theory, insights on this interaction can also be synthesized from scholarly works on civil-military relations. Two such books include Martin Edmonds' classic *Armed Services and Society* and Dale R. Herspring's *Civil-Military Relations and Shared Responsibility*.

Canadian Perspectives on Security

Realism

The literature on realist approaches to security in Canada is relatively thin, reflecting the fact that few scholars believe it to be a suitable lens through which to view Canadian state behaviour.[45] Illustratively, though Maureen Molot finds there to be a general fixation in Canadian foreign policy literature with Canada's "status within the global system" or relative power (capabilities), no scholars attempt to apply the classical realist power-centric theory to Canadian security practices.[46] In discussing the "myths of neoclassical realism in Canadian foreign policy", David G. Haglund and Tudor Onea note further the challenges associated with adopting a realist lens through which to view

42. John S. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 34.
43. Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling, eds., *National Security Cultures: Patterns of Global Governance* (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2010), 12, ProQuest Ebook Central.
44. Mary Kaldor, *Global Security Cultures* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2018), ProQuest Ebook Central.
45. A 2016 survey of Canadian, U.S. and United Kingdom IR scholars found that only 12.2 percent of Canadian academics affiliate with the realist school. An even lower number adopt a liberal approach (7.4 percent) while 25.2 percent use a constructivist approach. See Stephen M. Saideman, "Canadian Scholarship on International Relations: Unified, Divided Or Diverse?" *International Journal* 71, no. 2 (06, 2016), 200, https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702015609358.
46. Maureen Appel Molot, "Where Do We, or Should We, or Can We Sit? A Review of Canadian Foreign Policy Literature," *International Journal of Canadian Studies* 1-2 (Spring/Fall 1990), 86.

Canadian foreign and security policy. Specifically, they describe the incongruency of Canadian security behaviours and policy decisions with Glenn Snyder's abandonment-entrapment "security dilemma" (what they call the "sacrifice myth") and the realist theory of balancing (which they term the "counterweight myth).[47]

Notwithstanding these arguments, a handful of scholars do suggest that realism does (and should continue to) play a role in shaping Canadian foreign policy, most notably in its relations with the U.S. The most ardent of these is Joel J. Sokolsky who suggests that "the tradition of realism has governed Canada's approach to security relations with the [U.S.] in the past and must, in the future, underpin them still…"[48] While less emphatic, contemporary scholars Justin Massie and Jean-Christophe Boucher both argue respectively that soft bandwagoning has traditionally characterized the Canadian approach to the U.S.[49] Interestingly, while Massie suggests that Canada has adopted more of a hard bandwagoning approach post-9/11, Boucher finds that bandwagoning does not explain Canada's security and defence related-practices post-9/11.[50]

Liberalism

Somewhat counterintuitively, given Canada's widely acknowledged support for liberal values such as democracy and the rules-based international order, the literature is almost void of liberal theory relating to Canadian security behaviours. While it is employed sparsely to examine Canadian social and economic policy, almost no sources were found relating to foreign, defence, or security policy. As with realism, sources that

---

47. David G. Haglund and Tudor Onea, "Sympathy for the Devil: Myths of Neoclassical Realism in Canadian Foreign Policy," *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 14, no. 2 (2008), 61; 63, https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2008.9673463; Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," 461-495.

48. Joel J. Sokolsky, *Realism Canadian Style: National Security Policy and the Chrétien Legacy* (Vol. 5, no 2) (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2004), 10.

49. Massie describes soft bandwagoning as "modest or indirect support of a threatening or powerful state in order to optimize its security or profit from it" and hard bandwagoning as "full and open support of the most powerful state in order to profit materially or ideationally from it." See Justin Massie, "Toward Greater Opportunism: Balancing and Bandwagoning in Canada:US Relations," In *Game Changer: The Impact of 9/11 on North American Security*, edited by Patrick James and Jonathan Paquin (Vancouver, B.C: UBC Press, 2014), 51, EBSCO Host.

50. Justin Massie, "Toward Greater Opportunism: Balancing and Bandwagoning in Canada:US Relations," 59; Jean-Christophe Boucher, "The Cost of Bandwagoning: Canada-US Defence and Security Relations After 9/11," *International Journal* (Toronto) 67, no. 4 (2012), 896, https://doi.org/10.1177/002070201206700403.

were examined view behaviours relative to Canada's relations with U.S. Though not framed within any IR discipline, through what could be considered a neoliberal lens, Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane discuss the high degree of Canada-U.S. interdependence and the way in which this shapes state behaviour and relations. Significantly, however, they note points of divergence between societal interdependence and policy decisions (what they call "policy cleavages") for which a neoliberal approach does not well account.[51] One other article of note highlights the importance of shared values, which formulate as state preferences, in shaping approaches to common security issues.[52] While some other sources draw on liberal concepts, they are better explained under constructivism.

Constructivism

Though it represents the newest approach, constructivist literature on Canadian security appears to be growing. As noted, some scholars have also combined approaches while leaning heavily on constructivist theory. In what could be described as a neorealist-constructivist approach, Patrick Lennox proposes a "power-plus-ideas" model to explain Canada-U.S. relations post-9/11.[53] Two articles relating the Canadian approach to liberal internationalism and support for international institutions, hallmarks of liberal theory, emphasize the importance of national interests, values, and identity in shaping this behaviour.[54] In noting certain discrepancies between Canadian foreign policy and societal beliefs, Roland Paris suggests that this "highlights the importance of examining not only leaders' but also mass publics' understandings of national roles, and their relationship to

51. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Introduction: The Complex Politics of Canadian-American Interdependence," *International Organization* 28, no. 4 (1974), 599, CambridgeCore.
52. Stéfanie von Hlatky and Jessica N. Trisko, "Sharing the Burden of the Border: Layered Security Co-Operation and the Canada-US Frontier," Canadian Journal of Political Science 45, no. 1 (03, 2012): 63-88. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423911000928.
53. Patrick Lennox, "From Golden Straitjacket to Kevlar Vest: Canada's Transformation to a Security State" *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 40, no. 4 (12, 2007), 1018, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423907071119.
54. Stephane Roussel and Charles-Philippe David, ""Middle Power Blues": Canadian Policy and International Security After the Cold War," *The American Review of Canadian Studies* 28, no. 1 (Spring, 1998): 131-156, https://doi.org/10.1080/02722019809481566; Roland Paris, "Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists? Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in the Harper Era," International Journal 69, no. 3 (09, 2014): 274-307, https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702014540282.

each other."[55] Todd Hataley and Christian Leuprecht make a notable contribution to conceptualizing influences – "interests, institutions, identity, and ideas" – that underlie Canada-U.S. security relations.[56] Specifically, their theory of the "power of ideas to transform identity, interests and institutions" and ultimately state-level policy is of great relevance to the security culture discussion.[57] Two additional books examined are of particular value in that they specifically consider Canadian defence policy in relation to societal influences and interests.[58]

Canadian National Security Culture

Literature on Canadian national security culture specifically is much thinner. The predominance of related scholarly efforts considers strategic rather than security culture.[59] While some scholars have suggested that there is not much daylight to be found between the two, strategic culture is more commonly thought to be focused at state-level and the ideas and decisions of elites.[60] While the potential for strategic culture to thus explain state approaches to the armed forces and use of force may seem of particular relevance to this paper, its greater emphasis on historical influences as well as its failure to "account for change over time" and to consider broader ideational factors make it of

---

55. Paris, "Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists?", 305.
56. Todd Hataley and Christian Leuprecht, "Canada–US Security Cooperation: Interests, Institutions, Identity and Ideas," In *Canada-US Relations: Sovereignty Or Shared Institutions?*, edited by David Carment and Christopher Sands (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05036-8.
57. Hataley and Leuprecht, "Canada–US Security Cooperation," 101-102.
58. Douglas L. Bland and Sean M. Maloney, Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 50-53; Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic, *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), https://www.doi.org/ 10.1007/978-3-030-26403-1.
59. Justin Massie, "Making Sense of Canada's "Irrational" International Security Policy: A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures," International Journal 64, no. 3 (Summer, 2009): 625-645, https://doi.org/10.1177/002070200906400303; Alan Bloomfield and Kim R Nossal, "Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture: The Cases of Australia and Canada," Contemporary Security Policy 28, no. 2 (2007): 286-307, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260701489859. Éric Tremblay and Bill Bentley, "Canada's Strategic Culture: Grand Strategy and the Utility of Force", Canadian Military Journal, 15, no. 3 (2015): 5, http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol15/no3/eng/PDF/CMJ153Ep5.pdf; Stéphane Roussel, ed., *Culture Stratégique et Politique de Défense: L'Expérience Canadienne* (Montréal: Chaire de recherche du Canada en politiques étrangère et de défense canadiennes, 2007).
60. David G. Haglund, "'Let's Call the Whole Thing Off'? Security Culture as Strategic Culture," *Contemporary Security Policy* 32, no. 3 (2011): 494-516, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2011.623053; V Anand, "Revisiting the Discourse on Strategic Culture: An Assessment of the Conceptual Debates," *Strategic Analysis* 44, no. 3 (2020): 193-207, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2020.1787684.

less value.[61] With that said, works on Canadian strategic culture undoubtedly hold insights for the implications of Canadian security culture on the CAF and will be considered. Relating specifically to national security culture, two sources were found that will provide significant insights for this paper. Drawing on Kirchner and Sperling's work as well as Duffield's theoretical frameworks, Osvaldo Croci's chapter in the former's book provides insight into how Canadian security practices have been shaped by security culture. He suggests that security cultures, including Canada's, consist of four elements: "view of the international environment, national identity, instrumental preferences, and interaction preferences."[62] Alan J. Stephenson's doctoral thesis on Canadian national security culture and policy formulation in the post-9/11 era is also of great value given his comprehensive conceptualization and defence of a unique Canadian security culture.[63]

Key Themes and Findings

Of the literature that was reviewed, constructivist theory holds the most weight with contemporary Canadian scholars relating to security behaviour. Canada's traditional approach to defence and security policy is not well explained by power politics and competition inherent to the realist approach. While the neorealist approach to balancing material and ideational factors and its consideration of domestic characteristics offered some potential, it weights material factors too heavily and does not comprehensively examine ideational factors. Nor does liberalism suitably explain the significant variations over time in Canadian defence policy, its approach to international institutions, or its engagement with other states. Significantly, the failure of realist and liberal approaches to holistically explore domestic factors prevents an in-depth exploration of any potential causal relationship with domestic outcomes. While this concept will be explored further in Chapter One, constructivism's tolerance for material factors and weighting of domestic ideational factors holds greater explanatory power for the Canadian approach to security

61. Antulio J. Echevarria, "Strategic Culture: More Problems Than Prospects," Infinity Journal 3, no. 2 (2013), 4, https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/strategic-culture-more-problems-than-prospects/.
62. Osvaldo Croci, "Canada: Facing Up to Regional Security Challenges," In *National Security Cultures: Patterns of Global Governance*, edited by Emil J. Kirchner and James Sperling (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2010), 127, ProQuest Ebook Central.
63. Stephenson, "Canadian National Security Culture", 22.

and how it evolves over time. Notably, given the existing literature on the causal relationship between national security culture and state security behaviour, security culture theory provides the necessary starting point to examine potential linkages with direct and indirect security outcomes.

Literature Gaps

Broadly speaking, while constructive literature relating to Canadian security practices is growing, literature specific to security culture theory remains sparse. Aside from Kirchner and Sperling's book, no effort has been made to compare national security cultures in their domestic context. Further, while most sources on both strategic culture and security culture discuss the relationship between these cultures and state behaviour, very few explore the idea that a security culture might be adequate (strong) or inadequate (weak). This makes it challenging for security practitioners to objectively measure security culture relative to its outcomes. The fundamental gap, though, in Canadian security literature is that which this paper seeks to explore. While the constructivist approach and security culture theory consider the ideational influences that shape security behaviour such as policy decisions and defence practices, this is generally not then taken the step further to consider outcomes. This paper seeks to explore outcomes of security culture on just one security actor — the other potential avenues of exploration are innumerable.

APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM

Conceptual Framework

Hypothesis

Given the complex underpinnings of national security culture as a concept, it is necessary to frame the approach taken to understand and analyze the problem. Canadian national security culture has developed uniquely in Canada due to a complex interplay of materialistic and ideational influences. Albeit continually evolving, its manifestation at any given time results from the confluence of Canadian norms, identity, and interests. The resulting culture shapes and constrains national security-related policies and practices, which has direct and indirect impacts across the Canadian security sector, including defence. Importantly, even when the general characteristics of such a culture remain stable over time, the security norm salience across public and political discourse, nation institutions, and government policy is more fluid. It is anticipated that this fluidity has the potential to conflict with the established values, interests, and identity that comprise Canadian security culture, thus creating tension. This tension may either change the security culture or create pressures across the security sector (in this case, the CAF). In effect, when security norm salience and national security culture are in conflict, a cognitive dissonance is created across Canadian society, from which the CAF is believed to suffer disproportionately. Thus, the hypothesis to be tested is as follows:

Canadian national security culture has a direct causal relationship with the CAF, such that in periods of incongruence between security culture and security norm salience, additional pressures are exerted on the CAF leading to diverse issues that ultimately threaten operational readiness.

Independent Variable (IV)

Contemporary Canadian national security culture will serve as the IV. This paper draws on the model of national security culture proposed by Peter Katzenstein and applied to the Canadian context by Kirchner and Sperling as well as Stephenson. While this model is further described under Theoretical Framework, Stephenson's definition of national security culture will be used for the purposes of this paper:

> The socially shared and transmitted ideas and beliefs…that influence how Canadians perceive national security, security institutions, and the importance placed on security as an acquired value in competition with other acquired values. This leads to identifiable security preferences or national predispositions towards national security.[64]

This definition will be operationalized by examining what Stephenson refers to as "security norm salience" or the degree to which Canadian society and polity prioritize security and defence-related matters in policies, practice (resource allocation), and public opinion.

Dependent Variable (DV)

The operational readiness of the CAF is the DV. The CAF defines readiness as the requirement to be "rapidly deployable to respond to threats and government assigned national security objectives".[65] To operationalize this concept, it is necessary to deconstruct this definition. In her article *Managing Military Readiness*, Dr. Laura Junor uses more specificity, describing readiness as the "result of a series of time-intensive force generation processes that ultimately combine qualified people, working equipment, and unit training to produce military capabilities suitable for executing the defense strategy".[66] As elements of readiness that are more susceptible to exogenous factors, people and equipment are most relevant to the DV and also directly affect the ability to conduct unit or collective training. This paper assumes that "qualified people" implicitly implies that these personnel are in sufficient number and fit for operations. It further expands "working equipment" to include equipment and capabilities sufficient to respond to the operational requirements or threats. Finally, the extant Defence Policy, *Strong, Secure, Engaged* (SSE), expands on the idea of readiness by listing the operations that the

64. Stephenson, "Canadian National Security Culture: Explaining Post 9/11 Canadian National Security Policy Outcomes," 49.
65. Canada, Canadian Armed Forces, *The Canadian Armed Forces Ethos: Trusted to Serve* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, 2022), 42, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/canadian-armed-forces-ethos-trusted-to-serve.html.
66. Laura J. Junor, "Managing Military Readiness," INSS Strategic Perspectives 23 (2017), 1.

CAF is expected to be able to perform concurrently.[67] Thus, personnel, equipment, and the ability to achieve the mandated concurrency of operations will be viewed as key indicators of readiness.

Mediating Variables (MedV)

Three mediating variables will be used to better conceptualize the relationship between the IV and DV: policy decisions, resource allocation, and public support. Given the scope of this paper, only the MedV that are directly or indirectly related to national defence and the CAF will be considered. Policy decisions include national security policy, formal parliamentary governance, accountability, and advisory functions, and government responses to real and perceived threats. Resource allocation will consider the defence budget holistically as well as the related defence procurement process. Public opinion and, by extension, level of support, is used as a MedV given its impact on CAF recruiting and retention, which will be further discussed below. One case study will be employed to illustrate the means by which the MedV links the IV and DV.

Moderating Variables (ModV)

Two ModV, which affect the strength of the relationship between the IV and DV, will be considered to add depth to the analysis: economic conditions and crises or high-profile events involving the CAF. Economic conditions such as periods of recession, government budgetary deficits, and high inflation can affect public and political support for resourcing discretionary sectors such as defence, regardless of the relative strength of the national security culture at that time. Similarly, crises internal to the CAF that degrade public opinion may equally serve to weaken the relationship between the IV and DV, even if the broader security culture is not impacted. These two variables will be explored across the case study and broader analysis to demonstrate the influence that isolated factors can have on the relationship.

---

67. Canada, Department of National Defence, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy* (Ottawa, ON: DND, 2017), 14.

Limitations

The national security sector in Canada (and most states) is quite broad, encompassing numerous parliamentary functions and other government departments and agencies. As the focus of this paper is the relationship between Canadian national security culture and the CAF specifically, implications for the broader security sector will not be discussed. This paper also does not set out to explore the myriad nuances, let alone every alternative or contributing influence, associated with each specific issue facing the CAF. While the complexity of each issue is recognized and will be considered, the focus of the analysis rests with the relationship between the IV and DV rather than an exhaustive study of the moderating variables and other contributing factors.

Theoretical Framework

Drawing on the works of Baldwin, Katzenstein, Kirchner and Sperling, and Stephenson, this paper takes a conventional constructivist approach to conceptualizing Canadian national security culture. Baldwin's reconceptualization of Wolfers' definition of national security, that is "the preservation of acquired values", is adopted alongside Katzenstein's causal model of national security culture comprising norms, identities, and interests (Figure 1). As noted earlier, Stephenson's definition of national security culture, which considers Katzenstein and Baldwin's works, is accepted. While noting its limitations, Croci's operationalization of Kirchner and Sperling's four core elements of national security culture in a Canadian context is broadly accepted.



1. Effects of norms (I). Cultural or institutional elements of states' environments--in this volume, most often norms--shape the national security interests or (directly) the security policies of states.
2. Effects of norms (II). Cultural or institutional elements of states' global or domestic environments--in this volume, most often norms--shape state identity.
3. Effects of identity (I). Variation in state identity, or changes in state identity, affect the national security interests or policies of states.
4. Effects of identity (II). Configurations of state identity affect interstate normative structures, such as regimes or security communities.
5. Recursivity. State policies both reproduce and reconstruct cultural and institutional structure.

Figure 1 – Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein's Causal Pathway for National Security Policy[68]

Methodology

As this paper examines theory and history, conducts a relevant case study, and uses comparative analysis, a mixed-methods research methodology was used. To prove the hypothesis, two distinct elements must be satisfied. First, it must be shown that there exists a disparity between security norm salience — measured through policy decisions, resource allocation, and public opinion — and national security culture or relative to the security environment. Second, Canadian national security culture must be shown to have a direct causal impact on the operational readiness of the CAF. To help satisfy the second element, which is to prove the hypothesis, one period-based case study has been selected to determine the nature and strength of the relationship: the CAF in the immediate post-Cold War era (1991-1996).

68. Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," 53.

This analysis will employ process tracing to empirically test the hypothesis through a systematic study of the link between the IV and DV.[69] Key to finding evidence of causal inference will be consideration of alternate explanations and counterfactual outcome.[70] Stated plainly, to prove the hypothesis, the analysis must show that national security culture was the most significant causal mechanism that affected CAF readiness during this period rather than a specific event or policy decision. Following the case study, an examination of the contemporary relationship between Canadian national security culture and the issues facing the CAF relating to readiness will be used to provide an argumentative synthesis. This comprehensive analysis will be followed by a brief indirect comparative analysis of the national security culture of Australia relative to its armed forces. The aim of this final analysis is to extract insights that can help influence and strengthen Canadian national security culture and, by extension, alleviate some of the CAF's pressing issues.

Research Contribution

While the CAF's numerous challenges have drawn significant attention from the media, civil society, and from serving members themselves, no known commentary, let alone research, has posited the interconnectedness of the majority of these issues or hypothesized national security culture as the root cause. This paper thus offers a unique perspective that draws on existing literature to problematize the outcomes of Canadian national security culture vis-à-vis the issues facing CAF. By illustrating this relationship and making recommendations drawn from the analysis, this paper will ideally help inform defence practitioners of actions that can be taken at all levels to strengthen Canadian national security culture to the benefit of the CAF and DND. Given its limited scope, this paper does not consider in depth the ramifications of the analysis across the broader Canadian national security sector and thus also offers a potential model for further, related research.

---

69. Jacob I. Ricks and Amy H. Liu, "Process-Tracing Research Designs: A Practical Guide," *PS, Political Science & Politics* 51, no. 4 (2018), 842, https://doi.org/ 10.1017/S1049096518000975.
70. Ricks and Liu, "Process-Tracing Research Designs: A Practical Guide," 844.

CHAPTER ONE: CANADIAN NATIONAL SECURITY CULTURE

> *It is neither the borders nor the men who make a nation; it is the laws, the habits, the customs, the government, the constitution, the manner of being that comes from all this.*
>
> – Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Correspondance générale

This chapter provides a brief overview of the evolution of national security culture in Canada and seeks to describe the foundation for some defining characteristics of Canadian identity, interests, and values. As constructivist theory proposes that national security culture drives security behaviour, this chapter then discusses the way that this culture currently manifests in Canada through policy, practices, and public opinion and engagement. In doing so, it examines security norm salience more generally, which will be expanded on in Chapter Two.

The Evolution of a National Security Culture

In the 1920s, the head of the Department of External Affairs, Oscar Skelton, described in a public speech his understanding of Canadian national interests in an effort to distinguish the nation from the British Empire. With sovereignty as a precondition for all interests, he suggested that these interests were "freedom", "security and stability", "establishing the conditions for prosperity", "working out of relationships…on the North American continent", and accounting for and attending to "the world beyond North America".[71] One hundred years later, these interests generally hold true. Since the end of the Second World War, Canadian security and defence policies have described variations of three key national security interests: two strategic imperatives (defend Canada and defend North America) and one strategic choice (engage in international operations, generally multilaterally).[72] While economic prosperity has traditionally not been explicitly classified as a security interest, it remains a common theme across these

---

71. Greg Donaghy and Michael K. Carroll, eds. *In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1909-2009* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2011), 12-13, ProQuest Ebook Central.
72. Daniel Gosselin and Craig Stone, "From Minister Hellyer to General Hillier: Understanding the Fundamental Differences Between the Unification of the Canadian Forces and Its Present Transformation," *Canadian Military Journal* (Winter 2005-2006), 7. http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo6/no4/doc/trans-eng.pdf.

documents. However, policy has certainly not always reflected capability or practice, and national security-related policy and behaviour aside from these interests have varied widely throughout the nation's history. What explains these variances? If identity shapes interests and behaviour, it begs the question: what has shaped Canadian identity?

Foundations – Geography

While the constructivist approach emphasizes the importance of ideational factors, material factors are not discounted. Nor can they be when examining the foundations of Canadian national security culture. Canada's geography is of significant importance in explaining the evolution of Canadian norms, identities, and interests relating to security. From the founding of the nation, the vast size, ruggedness, and location of Canadian territory presented significant challenges for physically enforcing its sovereignty and formulating a defence policy that prioritized defence of the nation above all else. In 1936, Prime Minister (PM) William Lyon Mackenzie King complained about this challenge, stating that "if some countries have too much history, we have too much geography".[73] The hard fact of this reality has always been that for much of Canadian history, the country has been "simultaneously indefensible and uninvadable".[74] The only exception to the latter characterization is, of course, the U.S., if it had the interests to do so. Noting this, since Confederation, it has been in the Canadian interest to, at least, maintain cordial relations with its neighbour. However, as military capabilities advanced towards the outbreak of the Second World War, the traditional safety of Canada's location in the world was threatened. This forced a reorientation in Canadian defence policy, with cooperation with the US becoming the only option.[75] Thus began one of the fundamental dilemmas in the Canadian psyche and, by extension, policymaking — maintaining Canadian sovereignty and national identity while relying heavily on the U.S. security umbrella. This reality constitutes an important element of the Canadian normative environmental structure.

---

73. Juneau, Lagassé, and Vucetic, eds., *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, 11.
74. Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada* (5th ed) (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2007), xi.
75. Juneau, Lagassé and Vucetic, eds., *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, 14.

Foundations – History

If geography plays a central role in the foundations of Canadian identity, the social construct of country is of equal or greater import. A nation born of conflict between the Indigenous peoples and Catholic French and Protestant English settlers, the War of 1812 forced a "grudging but inevitable partnership" between the two latter communities.[76] This would materialize post-Confederation in the preoccupation of successive governments with unity to present day, as expressed by Skelton. However, the requirement to balance religious, cultural and lingual differences, alongside the influx of Europeans to settle Western Canada, began the Canadian tradition of pluralism and laid the groundwork for multiculturalism to emerge as a key element of Canadian identity. Concurrently, British tradition strongly shaped Canada's institutional environment, most evident in government structure and practice. Canadian society thus adopted collectivist "tory values" with social hierarchy and respect for the rule of law as key characteristics.[77]

From a security perspective, with the end of the American Civil War and Confederation, the likely threats to the new Canadian federation dissipated and the military "faded from political view".[78] As the West was settled, the subjugation and displacement of the Indigenous peoples was believed (at that time) to have been conducted with great restraint, tolerance, and less violence than in the U.S.[79] This gave rise to the myth of Canada as a "peaceable kingdom", with Canadians taking a pragmatic approach to the use of force, especially in contrast to their American neighbours.[80] Notwithstanding Canada's enthusiastic participation in the First World War, outside of French Canada, these ideas limited the formative potential of the war in shaping a militaristic identity. While Canadians were justifiably proud of their contributions, this strengthened the collective national identity rather than a military tradition. Thus, Canada's early years as a nation shaped a pluralistic, collectivist identity with unity and pragmatism as key values.

---

76. Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, ix.
77. Stephenson, "Canadian National Security Culture: Explaining Post 9/11 Canadian National Security Policy Outcomes," 49.
78. Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*, 63.
79. Wilhelm Mirow, *Strategic Culture, Securitisation and the Use of Force: Post-9/11 Security Practices of Liberal Democracies* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2016), 56, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315683584.
80. Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*, 63.

The Cold War

The Second World War and Canada's emergence as economic and military "Middle Power" saw its role in the international community increase. At the same time, the new threat of the Soviet Union pushed Canada to reformulate its approach to security in two ways: "collective defense" in the form of NATO and continentalism in the form of binational security cooperation with the U.S. through NORAD.[81] Notwithstanding the significant size and capability of its military, Canadians saw themselves as a benevolent actor on the world stage.[82] As the importance of international diplomacy grew, Foreign Minister Louis St. Laurent articulated a uniquely Canadian approach, which could equally be said to describe Canadian values: "a regard for the maintenance of the country's unity, a commitment to political liberty, respect for the rule of law, recognition of forces of good and evil, and a willingness to accept international responsibilities".[83]

Despite increased international diplomatic engagement, in lieu of a crisis, and faced with the relative, albeit uneasy, peace of the Cold War, Canadian politicians and society in general again saw little value in maintaining high military spending, relative to other priorities. Reflecting the enduring unease with American encroachment on Canadian sovereignty, the question of military spending for Canadian politicians became one of "how much is just enough?"[84] This calculation has endured to present day. The 1950s and 1960s saw new symbolic and ideational additions to the Canadian identity. The rise of peacekeeping both suited and reinforced Canada's liberal democratic values, pragmaticism, "middle power" status, and desire to contribute at low cost.[85] The following decades of peacekeeping and benign military presence in Western Europe all but buried the remnants of military tradition and entrenched peacekeeping as part of the Canadian identity. Correspondingly, this same period saw a gradual decline in military expenditure, force size, and a push to "civilianize" the defence department, ensuring the professional military could exert little influence on policymaking.[86] Unsurprisingly, until

---

81. Juneau, Lagassé and Vucetic, eds., *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, 35.
82. Mirow, *Strategic Culture, Securitisation and the Use of Force*, 57.
83 Mirow, *Strategic Culture, Securitisation and the Use of Force*, 57.
84. Sokolsky, *Realism Canadian Style*, 10.
85. Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*, 65.
86. Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 259.

the end of the Cold War, it would only be a slight exaggeration to say that the CAF and Canadian society existed in two different worlds.

The Post-Cold War Era

As the post-Cold War period is the subject of the case study, it will be examined further on. However, by the end of the Cold War, Canada's cultural-institutional environment, alongside identity and national interests, had become relatively ingrained features of Canadian national security culture. The same rang true for values. In his 2010 examination of Canadian national security culture, Osvaldo Croci's formulation of Canadian values did not stray far from Foreign Minister St. Laurent's in 1947: "an attachment to liberal democracy, respect for the rule of law, defence of human rights and civil liberties, and a belief in pluralism."[87] Stephenson reformulates this collective of interests, values, and identity into five normative values that his research suggests "form contemporary Canadian national security culture: national sovereignty, particularism, communitarianism, respect for authority, and pragmatism."[88] While the evolution of Canadian security culture was not and will never be complete, these may be considered enduring elements that are, therefore, more resistant to change.

The Post-9/11 Period

From the outset of the Second World War, the U.S.-focused sovereignty-security dilemma remained a defining and ever-present element of Canadian security culture and practice. This became increasingly true after 9/11 as Canada sought to reassure her neighbour that it could not be threatened from Canadian soil. Notwithstanding the significant shock of these events on geopolitics and on domestic and international security environments, Canadian security interests (defend North America, defend the continent, and engage internationally) remained consistent at that time and thereafter. The ensuing years saw Canada make two noteworthy choices that belie the suitability of constructivism to explain Canadian security norms. While realist and liberal theory might have predicted that Canada would join the "coalition of the willing" to invade Iraq in

87. Croci, "Canada: Facing Up to Regional Security Challenges," 127.
88. Stephenson, "Canadian National Security Culture," 352.

2003, the nation's pragmaticism and support for the rules-based international order prevented it from so doing. In 2004, the Martin government's release of the first and only national security policy is an indicator of the strong security norm salience at that time, especially relative to the security and cultural-institutional environments.

National Security Culture in Practice

As Katzenstein's model proposes, the norms, identities, and interests that interact to formulate a national security culture will, in turn, shape state security policy and practices. While these behaviours may be recursive, this occurs over time barring an extreme event. Thus, the contemporary manifestation of Canadian security culture should be relatively stable and observable in practice. The characteristics of this culture should generally be present in security and defense policy, resource allocation, and public opinion, which includes civil society engagement. The strength of these security norms and the broader cultural-institutional security environment is more challenging to measure. However, it should be at least subjectively measurable in the congruence between policy and resourcing, level of engagement and cordiality of civil-military affairs, and the presence of the CAF in Canadian society.

Policy Decisions

The first and only Canadian national security policy, *Securing an Open Society*, was released in 2004.[89] It reiterated Canada's three security interests and core values in a consistent manner with previous tradition. An unexpectedly comprehensive document, it articulated a strategic assessment of the current threats and the government's priorities and activities across multiple security sectors. In outlining Canada's approach to national and international security, the document notably stated that "the government recognizes that the Canadian Forces constitute an essential national security capability."[90] The production of this strategic policy document was a positive indicator at the time of security norm salience at the political level. However, no security policy has been

89. Canada, Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* (Ottawa: PCO, 2004), https://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/CP22-77-2004E.pdf.
90. Canada, Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society*, 49.

produced since. The absence of this strategic-level guidance has implications across the security community and Canadian society. This is somewhat mitigated for the CAF given a more contemporary defence policy statement.

In 2017, Justin Trudeau's Liberal government produced a defence policy, called *Strong, Secure, Engaged* (SSE), which eponymously reflected the Canadian security interests.[91] Preceded by a foreign policy statement in the House of Commons, the document signaled Canada's commitment to remaining "engaged" in the world in keeping with Canadian security cultural tradition. Of note, SSE outlined a long-term financial plan for the CAF and major capital procurement plans, as well as operations and tasks that the CAF must be able to perform concurrently.[92]

It further placed a greater emphasis on initiatives in support of member welfare than previous policy statements. This reflects not only a Liberal government priority but a broader emphasis in Canadian society on social matters. There is an argument to be made that certain social issues have been "securitized" and now help shape the cultural-institutional security environment.

A final point to note is that the release of SSE also corresponded with the Canadian commitment to lead the enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group in Latvia. The rhetoric and tangible efforts towards strengthening Canada's commitment towards NATO following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, indicates a shift in Canada's cultural-institutional security environment. This shift potentially sees the long-standing normative identity of the "Canadian peacekeeper" being slowly replaced with a reinvigorated commitment to collective security.

In response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the 2022 Federal Budget announced a defence policy review and update. Notably, the review intends to include measures that seek to address some of the pressing CAF issues including capability deficiencies and culture issues.[93] While it is yet to be seen what implications this review has for operational commitments, procurement plans, or the

---

91. Canada, Department of National Defence, *Strong, Secure, Engaged*.
92. Canada, Department of National Defence, *Strong, Secure, Engaged*.
93. Canada, Department of Finance, *Budget 2022: A Plan to Grow Our Economy and Make Life More Affordable* (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 2022), 123-133, https://www.budget.canada.ca/2022/home-accueil-en.html.

defense budget, it would appear indicative of a government that places an importance on the CAF's role in national security and foreign policy. However, a recent political statement undermines this belief. In response to criticism relating to military spending, Foreign Minister Melanie Joly stated, "Canada is not a nuclear power, it is not a military power…We're a middle-sized power and what we're good at is convening and making sure that diplomacy is happening, and meanwhile convincing other countries to do more."[94]

Resource Allocation

Defence budgetary programming has remained relatively in line with SSE's forecast over the past five years. While nominal defense spending has continued to increase, spending as a share of the gross domestic product (GDP) has remained flat.[95] Most of the planned spending listed in SSE is planned to occur over the next five years.[96] Despite the fact that defence spending was forecast and remains relatively on track, three pressing issues are worth noting.

Over the past few years, a growing number of North American Treaty Organization (NATO) allies have expressed consternation with Canada's failure to meet the NATO spending benchmark of two percent of a state's GDP.[97] Recent leaked intelligence documents allege that PM Trudeau privately suggested to allies that Canada would never meet this commitment.[98] Given what Sokolsky suggests is the Canadian tradition of seeking to spend "just enough" to meet operational commitments and placate allies, this may simply reflect an aspect of Canadian security culture.[99] However, given

94. Bryan Passifiume, "Joly's Comments — 'What We're Good at is Convening' — Sell Canadian Military Short, Generals Say," *National Post*, March 16, 2022, https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/jolys-what-were-good-at-is-convening-comments-sell-canadian-military-short-generals-say.
95. Canada, Parliamentary Budget Officer, *Canada's Military Expenditure and the NATO 2% Spending Target* (Ottawa: Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, 2022), https://distribution-a617274656661637473.pbo-dpb.ca/2e61c150ee17ee7fc0594b3c01632c13ffb4dcb4d848b9f259a81a318d997a3c.
96. Canada, Parliamentary Budget Officer, *Canada's Military Expenditure.*
97. Aaron D'Andrea, "Ottawa Must 'Recapitalize' the Canadian Armed Forces, Anand Says Ahead of Budget," *Global News*, March 21, 2023, https://globalnews.ca/news/9566812/ottawa-canadian-armed-forces-budget/.
98. James McCarten, "Trudeau told NATO Canada can't meet defence spending target, Washington Post reports," The Canadian Press, April 19, 2023, https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/trudeau-told-nato-canada-can-t-meet-defence-spending-target-washington-post-reports-1.6362779.
99. Sokolsky, *Realism Canadian Style*, 10.

new realities of the current security environment — characterized by a resurgent Russia, increasingly aggressive China, cyber-crime, and violent extremism — the defense policy update could change that.[100] The Minister of National Defence (MND) and CDS have both publicly suggested that an increase is required.[101] If realized, alongside the policymaker rhetoric, this would likely have a recursive effect on Canada's cultural-institutional security-environment.

Delayed capital projects and unspent budgets also represent a concern. Former Member of Parliament, Lieutenant-General (Ret.'d) Andrew Leslie, suggests that these issues lay with insufficient attention paid to the file by the Department of Finance and PM.[102] However, procurement debacles have plagued the DND/CAF for decades. As with the EH101 cancellation in the 1990s, the initial cancellation of the F35 joint striker fight and subsequent pledge by PM Trudeau never to purchase it, could well be correlated with periods of security norm salience-security culture incongruence.[103]

Finally, noting the impact of the inflationary economy, housing and pay is currently of great concern to CAF members. A recent "economic adjustment", well below the rate of inflation, accompanied by a change to the housing allowance policy, may see some members worse off.[104]

---

100. Canada, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Remarks by Director David Vigneault to the Centre for International Governance Innovation," *Speech to the Centre for International Governance*, Ottawa, ON, February 9, 2021, https://www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-service/news/2021/02/remarks-by-director-david-vigneault-to-the-centre-for-international-governance-innovation.html; Canada, Privy Council Office, "National Security Challenges in the 21st Century." *Speech by the National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister to the Centre for International Governance Innovation*, June 8, 2021, https://www.canada.ca/en/privy-council/services/national-security-intelligence-advisor-challenges.html.

101. D'Andrea, "Ottawa Must 'Recapitalize' the Canadian Armed Forces."

102. Christian Paas-Lang, "Canadian Forces in Desperate Need of New Spending, Procurement Follow-Through, Experts Say," *CBC News*, April 2, 2022, https://www.cbc.ca/radio/thehouse/military-spending-federal-budget-1.6406437.

103. Michael Lee, "Trudeau's About-Face on $19B F-35 Fighter Jet Purchase 'Severely' Impacted Air Force: Mackay," *CTV News*, January 10, 2023, https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/trudeau-s-about-face-on-19b-f-35-fighter-jet-purchase-severely-impacted-air-force-mackay-1.6224040.

104. Jake Romphf, "CFB Esquimalt Spouses Decry Families Effectively Seeing Pay Cuts with New Structure," *Victoria News*, March 24, 2023, https://www.vicnews.com/news/cfb-esquimalt-spouses-decry-families-effectively-seeing-pay-cuts-with-new-structure.

Public Opinion

Public opinion of the CAF appears to be relatively positive at present. In a 2021 DND-sponsored public opinion survey regarding the CAF, 76 percent of respondents had a somewhat or very positive very of people who serve in the CAF. 65 percent had a positive view of the CAF overall. However, when compared with the 2018 survey, the data is concerning. In 2018, 96 percent of respondents had a positive view of those who serve.[105] The prevalence of those in 2021 who reported hearing about sexual misconduct in the CAF relative to 2018 suggest that this variable could be a key cause. When asked whether the CAF is essential, the percentage of those who believe that it is also declined from 2018 to 2021.[106] These trends are common across most measures, reflecting an evident decline in public support. Of note, the general familiarity with the CAF did not change from approximately 41 percent over this three-year period.[107]

105. Canada, Department of National Defence, "Views of the Canadian Armed Forces 2018 Tracking Study: Executive Summary," Earnscliffe Strategy Group, July 4, 2018, https://cdacanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Views-of-the-CF-Exec-Summary.pdf.
106. Canada, Department of National Defence, "Views of the Canadian Armed Forces – 2021-2022 Tracking Study: Final Report," Earnscliffe Strategy Group, March 31, 2022, https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/pwgsc-tpsgc/por-ef/national_defence/2022/084-20-e/POR084-20-Report-EN.pdf.
107. Canada, Department of National Defence, "Views of the Canadian Armed Forces 2018 Tracking Study, 4; Canada, Department of National Defence, "Views of the Canadian Armed Forces – 2021-2022 Tracking Study, 4.

CHAPTER TWO:
NATIONAL SECURITY CULTURE AND THE ARMED FORCES

> *Few spoke out publicly — that's not something the military's ethos permits. Rather, they "voted with their feet" and left the service, leaving fewer personnel with the required knowledge and experience to carry the growing burden.*
>
> – Richard Shimooka, Senior Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute

This chapter represents the heart of this study; without it there is no life to the argument. Drawing on the Katzenstein's conceptual model of national security culture, it first conducts a case study of the relationship between Canadian national security culture and the CAF in the Post-Cold War Era. The case study seeks to explore the potential disparity between security norm salience — measured through policy decisions, resource allocation, and public opinion — and national security culture or the security environment. Following this, the second section examines the contemporary CAF issues through the same lens. This analysis draws on the salient points from Chapter One and from the case study.

Case Study – The Post-Cold War Era

The end of the Cold War represented a monumental geopolitical shift in history and upended the decades-long security imperatives for Western nations. The bi-polar threat environment had disappeared with the U.S., Canada's neighbour and ally, emerging as the world's only superpower. As in the preceding post-war periods, Canadian policymakers wasted little time in capitalizing on this opportunity to address pressing domestic priorities on the back of national defence. The accumulation of a huge national debt and a recession at the turn of the decade demanded severe budget cuts.[108] While public sentiment supported this approach, certain characteristics of the Canadian national security culture — namely norms of engagement in the international community through peacekeeping — created tension. This case study will illustrate how that tension, rather than the economic conditions specifically or the infamous Somalia Affair, led to the equally infamous "decade of darkness".

---

108. Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 292.

Moderating Variables

To provide context for the discussion, it is useful to present the moderating variables of the time at the beginning. Specifically, the economic conditions of the period and the Somalia Affair served as significant factors in strengthening the causal relationship between national security culture and issues manifesting in the CAF. As noted, as Canada entered the post-Cold War period, its financial situation had unexpectedly taken a drastic turn for the worse. Leading economists demanded that the federal government take drastic action to prevent national financial ruin.[109] It is no surprise that unexpected and drastic budget cuts would inevitably have a negative effect of the CAF. This will be explored further under Resource Allocation.

The other variable was an internal crisis of great proportion. The torture and murder of 16-year-old Somalian Shidane Arone in 1993 by Canadian Airborne Regiment soldiers on operations in Somalia caused outrage across Canada.[110] The release of the video footage two years later, alongside allegations of coverup and the ultimate disbandment of the Airborne Regiment led to a significant loss of trust in the CAF and CAF leaders, both internally and externally. As horrible as this incident was, neither it nor the economic conditions explain the holistic impact on the CAF.

Policy Decisions

In 1993, in accordance with his election platform, then-PM Jean Chretien cancelled the acquisition contract for a new naval helicopter, the EH101.[111] This set the tone for subsequent policy decisions. While the 1987 Defence Policy was ambitious and foresaw investment in the CAF, the realities of the 1990s saw the Chrétien government's 1994 White Paper flip the switch on the CAF.[112] While maintaining the three national security interests and committing to "project [Canadian] interests and values abroad", the

109 . Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 292.
110. Katie Domansky, "Post-Somalia Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces: Leadership, Education, and Professional Development," PhD Diss., University of Calgary, 2018, x-xi, https://prism.ucalgary.ca/server/api/core/bitstreams/bc930440-9021-412a-ae4a-6dee134b3ae1/content.
111. Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 283.
112. Juneau, Lagassé and Vucetic, eds., *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, 335.

government committed to budget cuts.[113] Thus, it continued to send the CAF on operations without consideration of the means required. While discussion of national defence and the CAF was prevalent within government at the time, it was generally related to reducing its influence and cost even further. In effect, the degradation of security norm salience throughout the Cold War was all but completed with the end of it and was spurred along by the economy. According to Douglas Bland, "the government's unwillingness or inability to recalibrate or balance its policy ends and means, if not the ideas underlying those policies as expressed in 1994, was the chief failing of its defence policy…"[114] Ultimately, the issue was that the inexperienced government mirrored the broader weakness of the cultural-institutional security environment, which translated into lack of engagement or respect for CAF advice. However, it believed in and maintained the less mutable characteristics of the security culture.

Resource Allocation

Upon winning the election, Jean Chretien's new and inexperienced government followed the economists' advice, cutting the defense budget forecast from 1993 to 1997 by 22 percent.[115] A reduction of that significance had far-reaching implications. These included closing military bases across the country, withdrawing from Europe, a force reduction plan to reduce the size of the military, wage and salary freezes, and a reduction in long planned but costly procurement initiatives.[116] These reductions cannot be considered in isolation of the policy decisions described above that saw the CAF continue to deploy operationally. The dichotomy of seeking to continue, if not increase, international engagements in line with security interests and institutional norms while simultaneously stripping military capability represented unprecedented culture-norm salience tension. As this trend continued into the late 1990s, the stress on the CAF began to show. Morale plummeted across the CAF and especially in defence headquarters.[117]

---

113. Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*, 135.
114. Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security*, 134.
115. Jim Hanson and Susan McNish, eds., *The Canadian Strategic Forecast 1996: The Military in Modern Democratic Society* (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996), 45.
116. Hanson and McNish, eds., *The Canadian Strategic Forecast 1996*, 26-27.
117. Bernd Horn and Bill Bentley, Forced to Change: Crisis and Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2015), 73, ProQuest Ebook Central.

Worse, the salary freeze saw junior CAF members across the country living in poverty.[118] Following a 1997 Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs report that found widespread morale issues and a common "sense of abandonment", the government had to take action.[119] It did so by increasing pay.

Public Support

If the end of the Cold War provided policymakers with the rhetorical justification for policy decisions and decreased military spending, it had little immediate impact on public sentiment towards national security and the military. Though a majority of Canadians saw the international security environment in the early post-Cold War era as less peaceful than the previous decade, or merely as peaceful, domestic threats were viewed to be of greater concern than external.[120] This reflects an enduring trait of Canadian security culture in which Canadians tend to marginalize the significance of external threats. Correspondingly, most Canadians viewed the domestic role of the military more important than international.[121] The dichotomy of these beliefs with the widespread public support for international peace support operations suggest that national security culture is slow to change. The "tradition" of peacekeeping was a well-ingrained and dearly held element of Canadian identity that the end of the Cold War did little to change.

In another interesting dichotomic display, perceptions on the value of military declined in this period.[122] Given the recursive nature of policy decisions, it is of no surprise that this trend worsened over time as policymakers devalued the military through policy and budgetary decisions. While it was not-unfairly suggested that "soft" public support for the military was a "systemic, well-established national trait" (or an enduring characteristic of national security culture), it could be said that national security culture

118. Jane O'Hara, "Canada's Fight Poor are Fighting Mad," *Macleans*, April 13, 1998, https://macleans.ca/news/canada/canadas-fighting-poor-are-fighting-mad/.
119. Nancy Otis and Michelle Straver, "Review of Attrition and Retention Research for the Canadian Forces," *Defence Research and Development Canada*, October 2008, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1007895.pdf.
120. David B. Dewitt and David Leyton-Brown, *Canada's International Security Policy* (Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1995), 295-296.
121. Dewitt and Leyton-Brown, *Canada's International Security Policy*, 305.
122. Dewitt and Leyton-Brown, *Canada's International Security Policy*, 301.

was weakening given the ideational shifts.[123] By late 1993, a former CDS suggested that public support for national security and defence had collapsed, with Canadians having "virtually abandoned their armed forces."[124] This trend continued throughout the decade. This data suggests that Canadian policymakers and society were well-aligned during this period. However, the public sentiment was not lost on CAF members, and exacerbated the effects of the growing commitment-capability gap on internal military culture and morale.

Lessons

There are several lessons to be drawn from this case study. The economic conditions of the 1990s necessitated cuts to defence. Conversely, national security culture pushed policymakers to maintain international engagements. The weakness of the cultural-institutional security environment, degraded by years of neglect towards defence, blinded policymakers to the impact of such a commitment-capability gap. This was further exacerbated as the gap widened over time. The Somalia Affair had a devastating impact on the wider collective opinion of and trust in the CAF. However, this merely expedited the pre-existing trend of declining popular support. The Affair also exposed significant issues with corruption and toxic leadership in the CAF. While this appears on its face to be an internal issue, the broader cultural-institutional security environment allowed it to form, fester, and escalate. One author found that "numerous studies [demonstrate] that decisions made by successive Canadian governments had an impact on deteriorating military morale, professionalism, and capabilities."[125] In his book on the Somalia Affair, David Bercuson is less delicate in his critique, stating that "If Ottawa was serious about fixing the Canadian army, it would have to begin with a thorough examination of how the military is being choked to death by successive budget cuts…"[126] While this does not exonerate military leadership, it indicates that both internal military

123. David E. Code and Ian Cameron, eds., *Defence and Public Opinion* (Ottawa: CDA Institute, 1994), 15.
124. David E. Code and Ian Cameron, eds., *Defence and Public Opinion* (Ottawa: CDA Institute, 1994), 14.
125. Domansky, "Post-Somalia Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces," xii-xiii.
126. David Jay Bercuson, *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne and the Murder in Somalia* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1996), vi.

culture and national security culture play a role in setting conditions for positive or negative behaviours to manifest. The sum of all these factors left the CAF in a dreadful state by the turn of the millennium, with low morale and trust in the chain of command, members releasing in high numbers, significant procurement items left years behind and, ultimately, degraded operational readiness[127] It would take years into the 2000s to reverse this trend.

As a final note here, while beyond the scope of this paper, another case study of national security culture and the armed forces in the post-9/11 era would be of value. Given increased expenditures, wider support for the military, and rapid equipment purchases in the mid-2000s, it would serve as a good contrast for the post-Cold War era.

Contemporary CAF Issues

As noted in the introduction, the CAF is currently facing issues with culture, personnel deficiencies stemming from recruiting and retention, budgetary constraints, procurement challenges, and commitment-capability gaps. The sum of these issues threatens operation readiness and the CAF's ability to meet its commitments. As has been observed in the case study, there is strong evidence to suggest that weak security norm prevalence and practices relative to current security culture imperatives lay at the heart of the matter. This analysis follows the same structure as the preceding case study and draws on the previous chapter's examination of contemporary security norms and practices in Canada. In doing so, it seeks to draw causal links between national security culture and the CAF.

Moderating Variables

The moderating variables that interact with the national security culture-CAF relationship are as significant today as those in the 1990s. Though there are numerous potential variables, three must be noted to establish the context for this discussion: the sexual misconduct crisis in the CAF, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the inflationary environment.

---

127. Richard Shimooka, Here Comes that 'Decade of Darkness' Again," iPolitcs, May 2, 2017, https://www.ipolitics.ca/news/here-comes-that-decade-of-darkness-again.

The CAF's sexual misconduct crisis, which underlies the broader culture issues, was put under a microscope in 2015 when former Supreme Court Justice Marie Deschamps was assigned to investigate concerning reports of sexual harassment and assault in the CAF.[128] Since that time, successive reports have validated her findings and have forced the DND and CAF to take measures to address the issue. The concurrent stream of allegations against CAF senior leaders left CAF members and broader Canadian society reeling at the scope of the problem.[129] While this issue will also be discussed below as it is key to the primary analysis, it must be considered as a moderating variable given the recursive impact it has had on shaping policy decisions and public opinion.

The COVID-19 pandemic had direct and indirect impacts on almost every facet of the CAF and, of course, on society as a whole. Its longer-term effects are still materializing. As will be explored in the discussion below, however, many of the issues trace their roots to before the pandemic and must thus be seen as moderating variables.

Though related to the pandemic given high levels of deficit spending, the current inflationary economy must be treated separately. Higher costs of living, most significantly in housing costs, have put significant strain on serving military members especially, given their requirement to relocate frequently and, in some cases, serve in high cost of living areas.

Policy Decisions

Noting the SSE commitment to "engage" in the world, the CAF continues to be ordered to do so. In addition to minor operations being conducted around the world, the CAF has company to battalion-sized Canadian Army (CA) elements deployed in Latvia, the United Kingdom, Poland, and the Middle East, alongside no less than two Royal Canadian Navy ships and a major Royal Canadian Air Force Air Task Force deployed at

128. Arbour, *Report of the Independent External Comprehensive Review of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces*, 8.
129. Ashley Burke and Murray Brewster, "A Military in Crisis: Here Are The Senior Leaders Embroiled in Sexual Misconduct Cases," *CBC News*, October 21, 2021, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/sexual-misconduct-military-senior-leaders-dnd-caf-1.6218683.

any given time.[130] These commitments do not include the ever-increasing obligation to domestic operations.[131] Noting the personnel shortages across the CAF, the CAF is reducing the size of its contingent in the Middle East to free up personnel for other missions.[132] At first glance, this appears to be an acknowledgement of a capability-commitment gap, which would be an improvement over the 1990s. However, the cynical view would be that this suggests that forces are stretched thin. Moreover, against the backdrop of the expected concurrency of operations that the CAF is supposed to be able to achieve according to SSE, this is problematic as the CAF has nowhere near that level of committed forces.

Given the personnel crisis and the mandate to prioritize operations, in October 2022 the CDS deemed it necessary to order all elements of the CAF to cease non-essential activities domestically.[133] This, alongside the facts above, suggests that a commitment-capability gap still exists today. Though it appears there is an acknowledgement of the additional pressure that this will place on CAF members, there seems to be little appetite by the government to reduce operational commitments any more than marginally. This indicates that the renewed importance of NATO has (re)shaped the cultural-institutional security environment, which is influencing defense policies and practices. This shares commonalities with the experience of the 1990s, with the potential to exacerbate the existing problem. As more members burn out and release, those still serving will be forced to try to cover these gaps.

On the CAF's current misconduct and culture issue, it would be easy to place the blame solely on the CAF, as was attempted during the Somalia Affair. However, eight years on from the genesis of Operation HONOUR — which was intended to address the issue — and three former Supreme Court Justice reports later, the CAF remains seized with the issue. This would suggest a broader issue with accountability and governance that rests at government level. Given the recursiveness of security policy and practice

---

130. Department of National Defence, "Current Operations and Joint Military Exercises List," April 27, 2023, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/list.html.
131. Lee Berthiaume, "Canada's Military Pulling Back in Middle East as European, Domestic Needs Rise," Global News, January 19, 2023, https://globalnews.ca/news/9422173/canadian-military-ukraine-russia-middle-east/.
132. Berthiaume, "Canada's Military Pulling Back in Middle East as European, Domestic Needs Rise."
133. Berthiaume, "Military's Chief Orders Halt to Non-Essential Activities, Focus on Personnel Crisis."

with the cultural-institutional security environment, the CAF may require decisive intervention by policymakers to help re-shape the environment.

Resource Allocation

While the CAF is not facing nearly the same budgetary constraints today as it was in the 1990s, there are evidently still challenges. While it would be simplistic to suggest that better pay will solve recruiting and retention, the 1990s showed that there comes a point when it becomes a primary factor. If, due to changes in policy, members are effectively receiving pay cuts, this fosters the same low morale and loss of trust seen in the 1990s. However, convincing an unengaged, if not unsupportive, public — who are facing the same inflationary pressures as CAF members — that more tax dollars are required to increase pay, is a hard point to sell. If this does become a pressing issue, the government may try to securitize the issue to help shape the acceptance of policy decisions.

Continued capability gaps across all three services are worth noting, but not necessarily as a negative indicator. As an example, CAF personnel in Latvia, comprising the most sizeable, deployed CA contingent, have been ordered to be prepared to defend Latvia against foreign aggression. Lacking air defence and anti-armour weapons, the DND has submitted an "urgent operational requirement" procurement request to acquire these systems.[134] This could reasonably be taken as a positive indicator of security norm salience at the policymaker level.

While beyond the scope of this paper, if collective security as a norm and interest is increasing in importance in Canadian national security culture, this model would suggest that the Canadian government will be more inclined to increase financial commitments.

Public Opinion

134. David Pugliese, "Canadian Army Fast-Tracking Purchase of Air Defence, Anti-Tank Missiles and Counter-Drone Gear," *Northern News*, February 7, 2023, https://www.northernnews.ca/news/national/defence-watch/canadian-army-fast-tracking-purchase-of-air-defence-anti-tank-missiles-and-counter-drone-gear.

The statistics presented in the public opinion surveys do not paint a stark picture when considered in isolation by year. The decline in positive impressions of the CAF should be of concern, though, especially given the fact that the decline was more significant in impressions of the members themselves. As CAF members are, of course, not oblivious to public sentiment, this also has the potential to further degrade morale. The high prevalence of media stories relating to the CAF's sexual misconduct issue undoubtedly exacerbates these impressions. Thus, the degradation of positive impressions of the CAF, heavily influenced by the sexual misconduct moderating variable will weaken the relative importance that the public places on security norms, which in turn shapes the security culture. These impressions will make it more challenging for the government to convince the public of whatever imperatives may result from the defence policy update. Albeit consistent over time, the relative lack of familiarity that the Canadian public has with the CAF suggests that the CAF needs to increase its interactions with the public. This may also help diversify the nature of media coverage of the CAF.

The one counter-balancing element to public opinion comes from civil society. A plethora of academics and commentators across the country continue to advocate for a reinvigoration of defence capabilities and support for the forces in general. If the CAF cannot increase engagements with the public in the short term due to the sustained operational tempo, this component of society can do it on their behalf.

Lessons

Notwithstanding the seemingly stronger security norm salience today than in the 1990s, the issues facing the CAF remain critical. The capability-commitment gap, which stems from the interaction between low security norm salience and national security culture is again severely straining CAF personnel. This will continue to exacerbate the retention issue until addressed. The moderating variables have also placed additional strain on serving members are not being seriously addressed. In the same way that national security culture and low norm salience set conditions for a negative military culture to fester in the 1990s, this same pattern is repeating itself today. This can only be

addressed by strengthening the institutional-cultural environment through appropriate state-level policies that target the issue and by seeking to influence norms and values inside and outside the CAF. The ability to develop security norm salience and ensure alignment with national security culture relies to a degree on public support. More must be done to reverse the declining popular support for the CAF; the government needs to take the lead in this endeavour. In the 1990s, the Chretien government was able to reduce the size of the CAF significantly as it had the Canadian public's support. Today, as security norm salience has degraded since the end of the War in Afghanistan, so has public support and awareness. If security norm salience at the political level is increasing whether due to a recognition of security culture imperatives or of the degrading security environment, the government must recognize that it will require a deliberate effort to bring the public on board.

CHAPTER THREE:
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL SECURITY CULTURE AND THE ARMED FORCES

> *[W]hy, for example, have two states that John C. Blaxland has called strategic cousins…pursued somewhat dissimilar strategic paths? One explanation may be found in the concept of strategic culture: the idea that each political community has a particular and individual approach to security policy.*
>
> – Alan Bloomfield and Kim Richard Nossal, *Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture: The Cases of Australia and Canada*

As the epigraph suggests, to claim that Canadian and Australian security cultures are congruent or that they have evolved even in similar ways would be disingenuous at best. The intent of this brief chapter is to examine Australian security culture as it relates to their own security norm salience and corresponding practices. In doing so, the aim is to draw out lessons to inform how Canada might go about strengthening its own security norms, practices, and ultimately culture.

Formative History

Like Canada, Australia began its existence as a British colony and, even after its establishment as a self-governing dominion in 1901, held the strong belief that the best source of national security was to contribute to a strong British Empire.[135] This viewpoint remained the most significant influence in shaping the country's defense strategies until the Second World War. After the Japanese army captured Singapore from the British in December 1941, Australia realized that they needed to look to the United States as a stronger naval ally and protector.[136] While this alliance with the United States (formalized as the ANZUS [Australia-New Zealand-United States] Treaty in 1952) may have been the first sign of a shift away from Australia's reliance on Great Britain as its protector,

---

135. Bloomfield and Nossal, "Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture," 290.
136. Alex Burns and Ben Eltham, "Australia's Strategic Culture: Constraints and Opportunities in Security Policymaking", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 35:2 (2014), 187-210, https://10.1080/13523260.2014.927672; Louis W. Pauly and Christian Reus-Smith, "Negotiating Anglo-America: Australia, Canada and the United States," in *Anglo-America and Its Discontents: Civilizational Identities Beyond West and East*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Routledge, 2012), 127-151.

many Australians felt that Australia had merely traded the former dependent relationship for a similar subordination to the U.S.[137]

It was not until after the Vietnam War, in the early 1970s, that Australia actually moved forward from its traditional security culture to a new paradigm. In response to a number of cultural and economic changes within and around its nation, Australia came to recognize that it needed to become self-sufficient in terms of its own security.[138] The government's first priority was the defense of their own country against regional threats rather than deploy their troops to fight in some other area of the world.[139] By the late 1980s, Australia had developed a security strategy of looking to its own interests first and only deploying troops internationally as part of UN-sanctioned operations.[140] Moving into the new millennium, however, Australia's national security culture again took another turn. As security threats close to home and internationally increased, Australia turned back towards a closer alliance with the U.S. and a greater involvement in international conflicts once again.[141]

The 21st Century and National Security Strategy

In recent years, Australia has developed a more stable security culture that is uniquely tied to their national identity. Their national security policy, which emphasizes the prioritization of their own security first, has shaped security policy decisions relating to engaging troops in conflict.[142] This was illustrated by Australia's involvement in conflicts in East Timor, Solomon Islands, and Tonga during the early years of the 21st century.[143] To further ingrain the prioritization of Australia's domestic national security, in 2013, Australia's PM, Julia Gillard, along with her cabinet developed, and publicly released, the first ever Australian National Security Strategy; the report proposed that updates be released at approximately five-year intervals going forward.[144] In this report,

---

137. Mirow, *Strategic Culture, Securitisation and the Use of Force*, 183.
138. Bloomfield and Nossal, "Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture," 292.
139. Danielle Chubb and Ian McAllister, *Australian Public Opinion, Defence and Foreign Policy: Attitudes and Trends Since 1945* (Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2020), SpringerLink.
140. Bloomfield and Nossal, "Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture," 293.
141. Burns and Eltham, "Australia's Strategic Culture," 191,
142. Juneau, Lagassé, and Vucetic, eds., *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*.
143. Bloomfield and Nossal, "Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture," 303.
144. Australia. Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. *Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia's National Security* (Canberra, NSW, 2013).

the government identified four distinct national security objectives: "protect and strengthen Australian sovereignty, ensure a safe and resilient population, secure Australia's assets, infrastructure and institutions, and to promote a favourable international environment."[145] It further identified the following as "'key national security risks': espionage and foreign interference, instability in developing countries, malicious cyber activity, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and violent extremism, and other factors."[146]

Policy Outcomes

The fact that this report was circulated openly resounded with the Australian people. Following the public release of this document, support from the general population for Australian defence forces grew to an all-time high of 40 percent.[147] One of the key goals of the updated strategy was to combine efforts with key partners internationally and domestically.[148] Part of this approach was to continue to strengthen Australia's alliance with the U.S.; this would be accomplished through such avenues as joint training exercises, sharing intelligence, access to shared technology, and cooperating on shared security interests.[149] The financial figures released in this report indicated that 68 percent of the national security and aid expenditure was directed to national defense.[150] This commitment to defence spending has continued since that time; in 2016-2017, two percent of Australia's GDP was spent on defense.[151] The determination of how much money is spent on a country's defence budget is usually decided with input at a number of levels; public, governmental, and policy-level.[152] Because the Australian government system is structured with a elected proportional representation system in the Senate, governments are rarely able to make unilateral decisions about policy setting or

145. Australia. Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. *Strong and Secure*, 4.
146. Burns & Eltham, Australia's Strategic Culture, 187.
147. Chubb and McAllister, *Australian Public Opinion, Defence and Foreign Policy*, 22.
148. Australia, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, *Strong and Secure*, 17.
149. Australia, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, *Strong and Secure*, 22.
150. Australia, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, *Strong and Secure*, 15.
151. Juneau, Lagassé, and Vucetic, eds., *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*.
152. Chubb and McAllister, *Australian Public Opinion, Defence and Foreign Policy*, 33.

defence spending. Open dialogue is necessary for all stakeholders to come to agreements on budget proposals.[153]

From this brief examination, there are a few key takeaways to be found. The articulation of a contemporary national security policy and dissemination publicly helped inform the Australian public of the current security environment and the corresponding security imperatives. This appears to have resulted in a rise in public support for the armed forces. The collaborative approach to defence expenditures and strong parliamentary oversight are also likely contributors to public support. Finally, by formulating and releasing such a strategy, the government enabled cyclical planning horizons, stability in strategic direction, and closer ties with allies.

153. Juneau, Lagassé and Vucetic, eds., *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, 73.

CHAPTER FOUR: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

"Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?"
"That depends a good deal on where you want to get to."
– Alice in Wonderland to the Cheshire Cat

Whether acknowledged or resourced consistently, the CAF has remained a key source of national identity and a vital national security institution since Confederation. This tradition is under threat, with the risk of failure or at least temporal irrelevance growing. As the ultimate "insurance policy" for the GoC, any apparent trend towards such an eventuality must be treated as exactly what it is — a threat to national security. Approaching the end of the "decade of darkness", Douglas Bland and Sean Maloney described a dilemma that years of neglect towards both security culture and practices had caused; these words seem prescient today:

> The crisis is not simply defined by the weaknesses of…policies which atrophied military capabilities and led to the loss of hard-won capabilities and military skills. The crisis is not just the relative loss of sovereignty and position in matters of national security at home as they [relate] to Canada-United States affairs. Nor is the immediate crisis defined by the growing impotence and irrelevance of Canadian foreign policy goals which depend more or less on the hard power of national military assets. The real crisis is defined by the government's inability to prevent these effects no matter what policies it might adopt in the immediate future.[154]

While the metaphorical tide of Canadian national security culture may be turning, the speed at which this can or will occur is unknown. As has been shown, though, the evolution of security culture is not driven by impervious factors. Agency and behaviour have played, and will continue to play, a significant role in shaping Canadian identity and interests from which culture is comprised. While numerous scholars, commentators, and allies have called on the Canadian government to reinvigorate its approach to security,

---

154. Bland and Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century*, 197.

and especially national defence, such a significant reorientation as is being called for, and is objectively necessary, cannot merely be a policy choice.[155] As this paper has shown, variations between policy decisions and security culture lead to pushback and, often, course correction. Thus, policymakers must both shape and strengthen the national security culture through incremental policy decisions, rigorous analysis and justification, information-sharing and informing, and rhetoric. Civil society actors and defence practitioners share a stake in these efforts. Fortunately, as Martin W. Shadwick stated in 1994:

> Those charged with the rebuilding of the constituency for defence can draw some solace from the fact that Canadians, as a people, are indefinitely more neglectful than anti-military, and therefore still willing to entertain cogent and compelling arguments for the retention…of a general-purpose, combat-capable defence establishment.[156]

This holds true today and is applicable across the broader security sector. To help inform these arguments, a series of recommendations follow, which stem from the broader analysis of the relationship between Canadian National Security Culture and the CAF as well as the comparison with Australia. These recommendations are separated into "strategic" and "practitioner" approaches. The strategic recommendations focus on decisions and actions that can only occur at the state level. These broadly reflect many contemporary analyses but are approached from a perspective of shaping and strengthening culture rather than merely policy. The practitioner recommendations focus on realistic actions that may be taken by individuals or groups within the defence community and civil society. While these could be classified as "low(er)-impact" recommendations, Canada's security culture is incrementally shaped daily by actions, stories, and words.

155.
156. Code and Cameron, eds., *Defence and Public Opinion,* 21.

Strategic Recommendations

1. **Produce a modernized National Security Policy**. Of all the criticisms and recommendations for improving the Canadian approach to security, the pleas for a contemporary national security policy are the loudest. The public articulation of Canadian interests and a recognition of the new domestic and international threats inherent to the current security environment are vital to reinvigorating national security culture. A national security policy would mitigate ambiguity in strategic direction and intent, enabling actors across the security sector to nest subordinate policy documents within a clear framework and to formulate strategy that appropriately prioritizes scarce resources. For the DND/CAF, such a document would contextualize the extant defence policy and better situate subsequent defence policy updates. This would alleviate interdepartmental friction and siloing of efforts across the security sector.

2. **Enhance accountability for DND and the CAF**. Relative to other Western nations, the CAF has limited parliamentary oversight. Decision-making and policy approval are centralized in cabinet which has limited accountability to Parliament. While a Senate-based accountability mechanism such as Australia's would be of great value in enhancing accountability, it is highly unlikely that any government will seek to effect this change. However, the result of this is that discussions and decisions relating to defence do not often take place in view of the public. This equally applies to the House and Senate Standing Committees on National Defence as there exists limited interest in these proceedings. Thus, the GoC, DND, and the CAF must all enhance accountability by informing and engaging with the public on matters, including issues, related to national defence. This would increase public engagement and strengthen security norms in the Canadian cultural-institutional environment.

3. **Place the CAF in the Public Eye**. Public awareness of the CAF is objectively low and thus opinion is uninformed. This is most significantly reflected in the CAF's challenges with recruiting. The current DND/CAF-led public affairs approach is evidently not working and needs to be reexamined. In addition to traditional community relations events and displays, CAF members at all levels but especially the senior leaders, must be given the authority to engage with the public. This should include increasing the opportunities for senior leaders to appear before parliamentary committees and for

appropriate members (relative to the subject matter), with suitable preparation, to speak to the media. As the isolation of CAF bases and wings across Canada cannot be quickly changed, and as the Canadian population remains increasingly urbanized, the CAF must make itself more visible to strengthen security norm salience and, by extension, security culture. It can only do so with the support of the GoC.

Practitioner Recommendations

1. **Engage and inform Canadians (within authorities)**. This recommendation builds and expands on Strategic Recommendation 3 above. Even given the authority to increase engagement with the Canadian public and the media, uniformed members must come to view this as an integral part of service. Keeping the public informed not only enhances trust and accountability, but it increases engagement. While an engaged public does not necessarily lead to a supportive public, improved awareness would help mitigate against the traditional tendency to marginalize the CAF's role as a vital national security institution even in times of peace. CAF members must seek the authority necessary to perform this duty and ensure that they approach it with the utmost professionalism. Aside from uniformed members, civil society actors must continue to play a key role in engaging with Canadians to provide the perspective that CAF members cannot. The importance of this is evident in the sustained pressure that these actors have placed and continue to place on successive governments when security culture and practices are misaligned with security imperatives.

2. **Provide honest assessment of capabilities and limitations**. CAF members at all levels must continue to and, in some cases, start providing honest assessments up the chain of command of the capabilities and limitations of themselves and their members and elements. The tradition of never saying "no" or "cannot", born out of pride in their members and the righteous desire to see them succeed, conversely does a disservice to the broader force. It will continue to place undue pressure on serving members, exacerbating retention, morale, and mental health issues. Honest assessments push that pressure higher and, ideally, into the public discourse and policymaker realm, forcing a reconciliation of national-level imperatives and choices with security norm salience.

3. **Provide education to Canadian Public Servants and other civilians outside of the security sector**. The CAF operates a number of professional development and

educational institutions, most notably including the Canadian Forces College in Toronto and Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston. These institutions employ numerous military personnel, academics and civilian professionals who specialize in subjects related to national defence and security. While there exists some opportunities for civilian students, including Canadian Public Servants, to attend a DND/CAF-run course or program, these opportunities are limited. Most often, civilian employees of the CAF or DND receive these opportunities. In order to strengthen security norm salience at the national level, which will ultimately help shape culture, more opportunities must be created for personnel inside and outside of the defence and security sector to attend. This wider breadth in national security-related knowledge will enable these future senior policy advisors and potentially policymakers to make those "compelling arguments" in support of the CAF and, ultimately, national security.

CONCLUSION

At its outset, this paper hypothesized that Canadian national security culture (the independent variable) has a direct causal relationship with the CAF (the dependent variable), such that in periods of incongruence between security culture and security norm salience, additional pressures are exerted on the CAF leading to diverse issues that ultimately threaten operational readiness. In order to prove this hypothesis, it was necessary to show that there exists a disparity between security norm salience and national security culture. This disparity was measured through policy decisions, resource allocation, and public opinion (the mediating variables.) The moderating variables in this research were identified as economic conditions and crises or high-profile events involving the CAF.

The methodology used to prove this hypothesis was a mixed-methodology research method. This was performed through an examination of the theory and history of Canadian national security culture, a period-based case study to determine the nature and strength of the relationship, and a limited comparative analysis with Australia's national security culture in relation to its armed forces.

The holistic research for this study found that Canadian national security culture has developed uniquely in Canada due to a complex interplay of materialistic and ideational influences. Albeit continually evolving, its manifestation at any given time results from the confluence of Canadian norms, identity, and interests. The resulting culture shapes and constrains national security-related policies and practices, which has direct and indirect impacts across the Canadian security sector, including defence. Moreover, even when the general characteristics of such a culture remain stable over time, the strength or salience of security norms in public opinion, political priorities, and policy decision-making is more fluid. It is anticipated that this fluidity has the potential to conflict with the established norms, interests, and identity that comprise Canadian security culture, thus creating tension. This tension may either change the security culture or create pressures across the security sector, and in this case, the CAF.

The case study produced a number of findings that confirmed the causal relationship between the national security culture and readiness in the CAF. In the post-

Cold War years of the early 1990s, Canadian government reacted to poor economic conditions by making drastic budgets cuts, in particular to military spending. These cuts included closing military bases, wage freezes, and a reduction in procurement plans. At the same time, national security culture pushed policymakers to maintain international engagements. It was the weakness of the cultural-institutional security environment, degraded by years of neglect towards defence, that blinded policymakers to the impact of such a commitment-capability gap. The CAF suffered significantly from that weakness with attrition climbing and morale lowering, leaving it less capable (ready) to respond to new commitments. At the same time, the Somalia Affair had a devastating impact on the wider collective opinion of and trust in the CAF. While it appears on its face to be an internal issue, the broader cultural-institutional security environment had allowed it to form, fester, and escalate. Though this does not exonerate military leadership, it indicates that both internal military culture and national security culture play a role in setting conditions for positive or negative behaviours to manifest.

The subsequent analysis also found numerous congruences between the CAF's experience in the 1990s and the current issues at play. While certain aspects of the Canadian security culture have evolved since that time — namely a shift away from Canada's long-upheld peacekeeping identity towards collective security alliances and the greater importance placed on Canadian social norms — many elements remain the same. The commitment-capability gap and internal crise are most notable. Fortunately, it appears that both policymakers and uniformed members are not as oblivious to that fact as they were in the past. The key difference lies in security norm salience across government and civil society. The continued engagement and pressure exerted across civil society relating to improving the government and Canadian approach to defence and security has fostered greater discourse and may influence broader society to demand change. Ultimately, as this appears unlikely in the short term, it will take a sustained commitment from the government, both rhetorically and financially, to reverse the current trends. While Canadian security culture has traditionally made Canadians lukewarm toward increasing defense expenditures, a powerfully made argument for that spending may garner the support needed.

In addition to the recommendations formulated out of this study, this effort lays the foundation for further research. Namely, the model used herein could be applied to other security actors, such as the RCMP, to identify the existence and strength of a potential causal relationship between security culture and internal issues. Researchers could also attempt to apply alternate ontological approaches to analyze historic and/or current issues faced by the CAF.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Agnew, Mark and Nicolas Todd. “Rethinking Canada’s Security Strategy: How Canada Can Graduate from the Kids’ Table.” *Canadian Global Affairs Institute*, December, 2021. https://www.cgai.ca/rethinking_canadas_security_strategy_how_canada_can_graduate_from_the_kids_table

Agius, Christine. “Social Constructivism.” In *Contemporary Security Studies* (6th Ed.), edited by Alan Collins, 73-89. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022.

Anand, V. "Revisiting the Discourse on Strategic Culture: An Assessment of the Conceptual Debates." *Strategic Analysis* 44, no. 3 (2020): 193-207. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2020.1787684.

Arbour, Louise. *Report of the Independent External Comprehensive Review of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces*. Montreal, QC: Borden Ladner Gervais (2022). https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/report-of-the-independent-external-comprehensive-review.html

Australia. Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. *Strong and secure: a strategy for Australia’s national security*. Canberra, NSW 2013. http://www.dpmc.gov.au/national_security/docs/national_security_strategy.pdf

Baldwin, David A. "The Concept of Security." *Review of International Studies* 23, no. 1 (1997): 5-26. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210597000053.

Bercuson, David Jay. *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne and the Murder in Somalia*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1996.

Berger, Thomas U. “Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan.” In *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, 317-356. New York: Colombia University Press, 1996.

Berthiaume, Lee. “Canada’s Military Pulling Back in Middle East as European, Domestic Needs Rise.” *Global News*, January 19, 2023. https://globalnews.ca/news/9422173/canadian-military-ukraine-russia-middle-east/.

Berthiaume, Lee. “Military's Chief Orders Halt to Non-Essential Activities, Focus on Personnel Crisis.” CTV News, October 6, 2022. https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/military-s-chief-orders-halt-to-non-essential-activities-focus-on-personnel-crisis-1.6099314.

Bland, Douglas L., and Roy Rempel. *A Vigilant Parliament: Building Competence for Effective Parliamentary Oversight of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces* (Vol. 5, no. 1). Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2004.

Bland, Douglas L., and Sean M. Maloney. *Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004.

Bloomfield, Alan and Kim Richard Nossal. "Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture: The Cases of Australia and Canada." *Contemporary Security Policy* 28, no. 2 (2007): 286-307. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260701489859.

Boucher, Jean-Christophe. "The Cost of Bandwagoning: Canada-US Defence and Security Relations After 9/11." *International Journal* (Toronto) 67, no. 4 (2012): 895-914. https://doi.org/10.1177/002070201206700403.

Brewin, Andrew. *Stand on Guard: The Search for a Canadian Defence Policy*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965.

Burke, Ashley and Murray Brewster. "A Military in Crisis: Here are the Senior Leaders Embroiled in Sexual Misconduct Cases." *CBC News*, October 21, 2021. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/sexual-misconduct-military-senior-leaders-dnd-caf-1.6218683.

Burns, Alex and Ben Eltham. "Australia's Strategic Culture: Constraints and Opportunities in Security Policymaking." *Contemporary Security Policy* 35, no. 2 (2014): 187-210. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2014.927672.

Buzan, Barry. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.

Buzan, Barry and Lene Hansen. *The Evolution of International Security Studies*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. CambridgeCore.

Canada. Canadian Security Intelligence Service. "Remarks by Director David Vigneault to the Centre for International Governance Innovation." Speech to the Centre for International Governance, Ottawa, ON, February 9, 2021. https://www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-service/news/2021/02/remarks-by-director-david-vigneault-to-the-centre-for-international-governance-innovation.html.

Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. *The Canadian Armed Forces Ethos: Trusted to Serve*. Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, 2022. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/canadian-armed-forces-ethos-trusted-to-serve.html.

Canada. Department of Finance. *Budget 2022: A Plan to Grow Our Economy and Make Life More Affordable*. Ottawa: Department of Finance, 2022. https://www.budget.canada.ca/2022/home-accueil-en.html.

Canada. Department of National Defence. *CDS/DM Directive for CAF Reconstitution*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2022. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/dm-cds-directives/cds-dm-directive-caf-reconstitution.html.

———. *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2017. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/canada-defence-policy.html

———. "Current Operations and Joint Military Exercises List." *Department of National Defence*, April 27, 2023, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/list.html.

———. *Views of the Canadian Armed Forces – 2021-2022 Tracking Study: Final Report*. Earnscliffe Strategy Group. March 31, 2022. https://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/pwgsc-tpsgc/por-ef/national_defence/2022/084-20-e/POR084-20-Report-EN.pdf.

———. *Views of the Canadian Armed Forces 2018 Tracking Study: Executive Summary*. Earnscliffe Strategy Group. July 4, 2018. https://cdacanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Views-of-the-CF-Exec-Summary.pdf.

Canada. Parliamentary Budget Officer. *Canada's Military Expenditure and the NATO 2% Spending Target*. Ottawa: Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, 2022. https://distribution-a617274656661637473.pbo-dpb.ca/2e61c150ee17ee7fc0594b3c01632c13ffb4dcb4d848b9f259a81a318d997a3c.

Canada. Privy Council Office. *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*. Ottawa: PCO, 2004. https://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/CP22-77-2004E.pdf

———. "National Security Challenges in the 21st Century." Speech by the National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister to the Centre for International Governance Innovation, June 8, 2021. https://www.canada.ca/en/privy-council/services/national-security-intelligence-advisor-challenges.html.

Canada. Public Safety Canada. *Our Security, Our Rights: National Security Green Paper, 2016*. Ottawa: Public Safety, 2016. https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/ntnl-scrt-grn-ppr-2016/index-en.aspx.

CDA Institute. “Former Ministers, Generals and Senior Public Servant’s Call for Action: Canada’s National Security and Defence in Peril.” CDA Institute, April 16, 2023. https://cdainstitute.ca/a-call-for-action-canadas-national-security-and-defence-in-peril/.

Carvin, Stephanie. *Stand on Guard: Reassessing Threats to Canada's National Security*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2021.

Caudle, Sharon L. "National Security Strategies: Security from what, for Whom, and by what Means." *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management* 6, no. 1 (2009): 22. https://doi.org/10.2202/1547-7355.1526.

Chapman, Bert. "The Geopolitics of Canadian Defense White Papers: Lofty Rhetoric and Limited Results." *Geopolitics, History and International Relations* 11, no. 1 (2019): 7-40. https://www.doi.org/10.22381/GHIR11120191

Charters, David Anderson, J. Brent Wilson, eds. *The Soldier and the Canadian State: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations?*. Fredericton, NB: Centre for Conflict Studies, University of New Brunswick, 1996.

Chubb, Danielle and Ian McAllister. *Australian Public Opinion, Defence and Foreign Policy: Attitudes and Trends since 1945*. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2020. SpringerLink.

Code, David E. and Ian Cameron, eds. *Defence and Public Opinion*. Ottawa: CDA Institute, 1994.

Collins, Alan, ed. *Contemporary Security Studies* (6th Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022.

Collins, John M. *Military Strategy: Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives*. Dulles, VA: Brassey's Inc., 2002.

Conference of Defence Associations Institute. *Canada's National Security and Defence Policy in the 21st Century: La Sécurité Nationale Du Canada Et Une Politique De Défense Au 21ième Siècle*. Ottawa: Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 2004.

Cortell, Andrew P. and James W. Davis Jr. "Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda." *International Studies Review* 2, no. 1 (2000): 65-87. https://doi.org/10.1111/1521-9488.00184.

Croci, Osvaldo. “Canada: Facing Up to Regional Security Challenges,” In *National Security Cultures: Patterns of Global Governance*, edited by Emil J. Kirchner and

James Sperling (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2010), 146, ProQuest Ebook Central.

D'Andrea, Aaron. "Ottawa Must 'Recapitalize' the Canadian Armed Forces, Anand Says Ahead of Budget." Global News, March 21, 2023. https://globalnews.ca/news/9566812/ottawa-canadian-armed-forces-budget/.

Dewitt, David B., and David Leyton-Brown. *Canada's International Security Policy*. Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1995.

Deudney, Daniel and G. John Ikenberry. "The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order." *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 2 (1999): 179-196. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210599001795.

Domansky, Katie. "Post-Somalia Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces: Leadership, Education, and Professional Development." PhD Diss., University of Calgary, 2018. https://prism.ucalgary.ca/server/api/core/bitstreams/bc930440-9021-412a-ae4a-6dee134b3ae1/content.

Donaghy, Greg, and Carroll, Michael K., eds. *In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1909-2009*. Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2011. ProQuest Ebook Central.

Drew, Dennis M., and Donald M. Snow. *Making Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems*. Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific, 2002.

Duffield, John S. *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998.

Duyvesteyn, Isabelle and James E. Worrall. "Global Strategic Studies: A Manifesto." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 40, no. 3 (2017): 347-357. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1269228.

Echevarria, Antulio J. "Strategic Culture: More Problems Than Prospects." *Infinity Journal* 3, no. 2 (2013): 4-7. https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/strategic-culture-more-problems-than-prospects/.

Eckstein, Harry. "A Culturalist Theory of Political Change." *The American Political Science Review* 82, no. 3 (1988): 789-804. ProQuest Central.

Edmonds, Martin. *Armed Services and Society*. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988.

Eichler, Maya and Karen Breeck. “Canada’s Problematic Military Culture Warrants an Oversight Agency.” *Policy Options*, March 12, 2021. https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/march-2021/canadas-problematic-military-culture-warrants-an-oversight-agency/.

Farrell, Theo. "Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program." *International Studies Review* 4, no. 1 (2002): 49-72. https://doi.org/10.1111/1521-9488.t01-1-00252.

Federation of Military and United Services Institute of Canada. *Canada's Strategic Security XXI: A National Strategic Appraisal into the 21st Century*. Kingston, ON: The Federation, 2001.

Fergusson, James G., and Francis Joseph Furtado. *Beyond Afghanistan: An International Security Agenda for Canada*. Vancouver; Toronto: UBC Press, 2016.

Fergusson, Jim, Frank Harvey, and Rob Huebert. *To Secure a Nation: The Case for a New Defence White Paper*. Calgary: Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, 2001.

Geertz, Clifford. *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* (3rd Ed.). New York: Basic Books, 2017.

Gilmour, John. “Does Canada Need a New National Security Policy?” *Canadian Global Affairs Institute*. July, 2021. https://www.cgai.ca/does_canada_need_a_new_national_security_policy.

Glaser, Charles L. “Realism,” In *Contemporary Security Studies* (6th Ed.), edited by Alan Collins, 13-27. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022.

Glenn, John. "Realism Versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration?" *International Studies Review* 11, no. 3 (2009): 523-551. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2009.00872.x.

Gosselin, Daniel and Craig Stone. “From Minister Hellyer to General Hillier: Understanding the Fundamental Differences Between the Unification of the Canadian Forces and Its Present Transformation.” *Canadian Military Journal* (Winter 2005-2006): 5-15. http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo6/no4/doc/trans-eng.pdf.

Haglund, David G. "'Let's Call the Whole Thing Off'? Security Culture as Strategic Culture." *Contemporary Security Policy* 32, no. 3 (2011): 494-516. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2011.623053.

Haglund, David G. and Tudor Onea. "Sympathy for the Devil: Myths of Neoclassical Realism in Canadian Foreign Policy." *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 14, no. 2 (2008): 53-66. https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2008.9673463.

Hanson, Jim and Susan McNish, eds. *The Canadian Strategic Forecast 1996: The Military in Modern Democratic Society*. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996.

Hartfiel, Robert Michael. "Planning without Guidance: Canadian Defence Policy and Planning, 1993-2004." Canadian Public Administration 53, no. 3 (2010): 323-349. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-7121.2010.00139.x.

Hataley, Todd and Christian Leuprecht, "Canada–US Security Cooperation: Interests, Institutions, Identity and Ideas," In *Canada-US Relations: Sovereignty Or Shared Institutions?*, edited by David Carment and Christopher Sands, 87-104. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05036-8.

Herspring, Dale R. *Civil-Military Relations and Shared Responsibility: A Four-Nation Study*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013.

Horn, Bernd. *The Canadian Way of War: Serving the National Interest*. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2006. ProQuest Ebook Central.

Horn, Bernd and Bill Bentley. *Forced to Change: Crisis and Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces*. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2015. ProQuest Ebook Central.

Hughes, Christopher W. and Yew Meng Lai, eds. *Security Studies: A Reader*. New York: Routledge, 2011. ProQuest Ebook Central.

Jahn, Beate. *Liberal Internationalism: Theory, History, Practice*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. SpringerLink.

Jepperson, Ronald L., Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein. "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security." In *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, 33-75. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

Johnson, Jeannie L., Kerry M. Kartchner, and Jeffrey Arthur Larsen. *Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National Security Policymaking*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Juneau, Thomas and Stephanie Carvin. "Appendix: A Guide to the Canadian Government and to the National Security and Intelligence Community." In *Intelligence Analysis and Policy Making: The Canadian Experience*, 181-192. United States: Stanford University Press, 2021. ProQuest Ebook Central.

Juneau, Thomas, Philippe Lagassé and Srdjan Vucetic. *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. https://www.doi.org/ 10.1007/978-3-030-26403-1

Junor, Laura J. "Managing Military Readiness." INSS Strategic Perspectives 23 (2017): 1-55.

Kaldor, Mary. *Global Security Cultures*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2018. ProQuest Ebook Central.

Katzenstein, Peter J., ed. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.

Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. "Introduction: The Complex Politics of Canadian-American Interdependence." *International Organization* 28, no. 4 (1974): 595-607. CambridgeCore.

Khan, Khurshid and Fouzia Amin. "Understanding the Dynamics of National Security Culture of Pakistan." Strategic Studies 36, no. 4 (2016): 17-37. ProQuest.

Kirchner, Emil J., and James Sperling, eds. *National Security Cultures: Patterns of Global Governance*. London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central.

Lantis, Jeffrey S. "Strategic Culture and National Security Policy." *International Studies Review* 4, no. 3 (2002): 87-113. https://doi.org/10.1111/1521-9488.t01-1-00266.

Lantis, Jeffrey S. and Brian Fonseca. “Culture and the Formation of National Security.” In *Culture and National Security in the Americas* edited by Brian Fonseca and Eduardo A. Gamarra. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central.

Lang, Eugene. “Use It or Lose It: SSE and DND’s Chronic Underspending Problem.” *Canadian Global Affairs Institute*, May, 2018. https://www.cgai.ca/use_it_or_lose_it_sse_and_dnd_s_chronic_underspending_problem.

Lennox, Patrick. "From Golden Straitjacket to Kevlar Vest: Canada's Transformation to a Security State." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 40, no. 4 (12, 2007): 1017-1038. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423907071119.

Macdonald-Laurier Institute. “Canadians Support a Stronger, More Principled Foreign Policy.” *Macdonald-Laurier Institute*, January 14, 2022. https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/canadians-support-a-stronger-more-principled-foreign-policy-mlis-annual-foreign-policy-and-international-affairs-survey/.

Maloney, Sean M. “Are We Really Just Peacekeepers? The Perception Versus the Reality of Canadian Military Involvement in the Iraq War.” *Institute for Research on Public Policy*, November 12, 2003. https://irpp.org/research-studies/working-paper-no2003-02/.

Maloney, Sean M. “Towards A New National Security Policy For Canada.” *Defense & Security Analysis* 32:2 (2016), 199-206, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2016.1161363.

Massie, Justin. "Making Sense of Canada's "Irrational" International Security Policy: A Tale of Three Strategic Cultures." *International Journal* 64, no. 3 (Summer, 2009): 625-645. https://doi.org/10.1177/002070200906400303.

Massie, Justin. “Toward Greater Opportunism: Balancing and Bandwagoning in Canada:US Relations.” In *Game Changer: The Impact of 9/11 on North American Security*, edited by Patrick James and Jonathan Paquin, 49-64. Vancouver, B.C: UBC Press, 2014. EBSCO Host.

McCarten, James. “Trudeau Told NATO Canada Can't Meet Defence Spending Target, Washington Post Reports.” *The Canadian Press*, April 19, 2023. https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/trudeau-told-nato-canada-can-t-meet-defence-spending-target-washington-post-reports-1.6362779.

McDonough, David S. *Canada's National Security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategy, Interests, and Threats*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012

Meyer, Christopher O. *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on Security and Defence in the European Union*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Mirow, Wilhelm. *Strategic Culture, Securitisation and the Use of Force: Post-9/11 Security Practices of Liberal Democracies*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2016. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315683584.

Molot, Maureen Appel. "Where Do We, or Should We, or Can We Sit? A Review of Canadian Foreign Policy Literature." *International Journal of Canadian Studies* 1-2 (Spring/Fall 1990): 77-96.

Moravcsik, Andrew. "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics." *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (1997): 513-553. CambridgeCore.

Morgan, Patrick and Alan Collins. “Liberalism and Liberal Internationalism.” In *Contemporary Security Studies* (6th Ed.), edited by Alan Collins, 30-46. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022.

Morgenthau, Hans J. and Kenneth W. Thompson. *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (6th ed). New York: Knopf, 1985.

Morton, Desmond. *A Military History of Canada* (5th ed). Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2007.

Morton, Desmond. "Defending the Indefensible: Some Historical Perspectives on Canadian Defence 1867-1967." *International Journal* (Toronto) 42, no. 4 (1987): 627-627. Periodicals Archive Online.

O'Hara, Jane. "Canada's Fight Poor are Fighting Mad," *Macleans*, April 13, 1998, https://macleans.ca/news/canada/canadas-fighting-poor-are-fighting-mad/.

O'Neill, Paul, ed. *Securing the State and Its Citizens: National Security Councils from Around the World*. London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2022. ProQuest Ebook Central.

Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood. *World of our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989.

Otis, Nancy and Michelle Straver. *Review of Attrition and Retention Research for the Canadian Forces*. Defence Research and Development Canada. October 2008. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1007895.pdf

Paas-Lang, Christian. "Canadian Forces in Desperate Need of New Spending, Procurement Follow-Through, Experts Say." *CBC News*, April 2, 2022. https://www.cbc.ca/radio/thehouse/military-spending-federal-budget-1.6406437.

Paas-Lang, Christian. "Facing Foreign Conflicts, Domestic Disasters, Canada's Top Soldier Worries About Readiness." *CBC News*, October 2, 2022. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/eyre-military-readiness-challenge-1.6603430.

Paris, Roland. "Are Canadians Still Liberal Internationalists? Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in the Harper Era." International Journal 69, no. 3 (09, 2014): 274-307. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702014540282.

Passifiume, Bryan. "Joly's Comments — 'What We're Good at is Convening' — Sell Canadian Military Short, Generals Say." *National Post*, March 16, 2022. https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/jolys-what-were-good-at-is-convening-comments-sell-canadian-military-short-generals-say.

Pauly, Louis W., and Christian Reus-Smit. "Negotiating Anglo-America: Australia, Canada and the United States." In *Anglo-America and Its Discontents: Civilizational Identities Beyond West and East*, edited by Peter J. Katzenstein, 127-151. New York: Routledge, 2012.

Pugliese, David. “Canadian Army Fast-Tracking Purchase of Air Defence, Anti-Tank Missiles and Counter-Drone Gear.” *Northern News*, February 7, 2023. https://www.northernnews.ca/news/national/defence-watch/canadian-army-fast-tracking-purchase-of-air-defence-anti-tank-missiles-and-counter-drone-gear.

Ricks, Jacob I. and Amy H. Liu. "Process-Tracing Research Designs: A Practical Guide." *PS, Political Science & Politics* 51, no. 4 (2018): 842-846. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096518000975.

Rigby, Vincent and Thomas Juneau. *A National Security Strategy for the 2020s: A Report by the Task Force on National Security of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (GSPIA) at the University of Ottawa*. Ottawa: University of Ottawa, 2022. https://www2.uottawa.ca/faculty-social-sciences/sites/g/files/bhrskd371/files/2022-09/natsec_report_gspia_may2022.pdf.

Rigby, Vincent and Thomas Juneau. “Canada Urgently Needs to Rethink Its National Security Strategy.” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, May 24, 2022. https://www.csis.org/analysis/canada-urgently-needs-rethink-its-national-security-strategy.

Romphf, Jake. “CFB Esquimalt Spouses Decry Families Effectively Seeing Pay Cuts with New Structure.” *Victoria News*, March 24, 2023. https://www.vicnews.com/news/cfb-esquimalt-spouses-decry-families-effectively-seeing-pay-cuts-with-new-structure.

Roussel, Stéphane, ed. *Culture Stratégique et Politique de Défense: L'Expérience Canadienne*. Montréal: Chaire de recherche du Canada en politiques étrangère et de défense canadiennes, 2007.

Roussel, Stephane and Charles-Philippe David. ""Middle Power Blues": Canadian Policy and International Security After the Cold War." *The American Review of Canadian Studies* 28, no. 1 (Spring, 1998): 131-156. https://doi.org/10.1080/02722019809481566.

Saideman, Stephen M. "Canadian Scholarship on International Relations: Unified, Divided Or Diverse?" *International Journal* 71, no. 2 (06, 2016): 193-213. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702015609358.

Schultze, Charles L. "The Economic Content of National Security Policy." *Foreign Affairs* 51, no. 3 (1973): 522-540. https://doi.org/10.2307/20037998.

Segal, Hugh and Ann Fitz-Gerald. *Emerging Security Challenges for Canada in the Coming Decade*. Reimagining a Canadian National Security Strategy (No. 3). Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2021. https://www.cigionline.org/publications/emerging-security-challenges-for-canada-in-the-coming-decade/.

Shimooka, Richard. “Here Comes that ‘Decade of Darkness’ Again.” *iPolitcs*, May 2, 2017. https://www.ipolitics.ca/news/here-comes-that-decade-of-darkness-again.

Shull, Aaron and Wesley Wark. *Reimagining a Canadian National Security Strategy*. Waterloo: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2021. https://www.cigionline.org/activities/reimagining-canadian-national-security-strategy/.

Snyder, Glenn H. "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics." *World Politics* 36, no. 4 (1984): 461-495. CambridgeCore.

Snyder, Jack L. *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations* (Vol. R-2154). Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1977.

Sokolsky, Joel J. *Realism Canadian Style: National Security Policy and the Chrétien Legacy*. (Vol. 5, no 2). Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2004.

Stephenson, Alan, J. “Canadian National Security Culture: Explaining Post 9/11 Canadian National Security Policy Outcomes.” PhD diss., Carleton University, 2016. https://curve.carleton.ca/71aa12ab-b289-4add-af70-7b2d6e0f5e91.

Strickland, Tod. *From the Boers to the Taliban: How Canadian Attitudes Towards War Have Changed*. The Canadian Army Occasional Papers Series. Kingston, ON: Department of National Defence, 2011. https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/dn-nd/D4-9-3-2011-eng.pdf.

Studin, Irvin. “Five Post-Pandemic Pivots in Canadian Security And Intelligence.” Policy Options, May 25, 2020. https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/may-2020/five-post-pandemic-pivots-in-canadian-security-and-intelligence/.

Tremblay, Éric and Bill Bentley. "Canada's Strategic Culture: Grand Strategy and the Utility of Force." *Canadian Military Journal* 15, no. 3 (2015): 5. http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol15/no3/eng/PDF/CMJ153Ep5.pdf.

Ullman, Richard. “Redefining Security.” In *Security Studies* (Vol. 8), edited by Christopher W. Hughes and Yew Meng Lai, 11-17. Oxon, OX: Routledge, 2011. ProQuest Ebook Central.

von Hlatky, Stéfanie and Jessica N. Trisko. "Sharing the Burden of the Border: Layered Security Co-Operation and the Canada-US Frontier." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 1 (03, 2012): 63-88. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423911000928.

Vuori, Juha A. "Constructivism and Securitization." In Routledge Handbook of Security Studies, edited by Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Thierry Balzacq, 64-74. New York: Routledge, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central.

Walker, Thomas C., and David L. Rousseau. “Liberalism: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment.” In *Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, edited by Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Thierry Balzacq, 22-31. New York: Routledge, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central.

Walt, Stephen M. *Realism and Security*. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.286.

Walt, Stephen M. *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013. https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801469992.

Waltz, Kenneth Neal. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 1979.

Wark, Wesley. “A Case for Better Governance of Canadian National Security”. *Centre for International Governance Innovation*, March 29, 2021. https://www.cigionline.org/articles/case-better-governance-canadian-national-security/.

Wendt, Alexander. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511612183.

Wohlforth, William C. "Realism and Security Studies." In *Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, edited by Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Thierry Balzacq, 25-35. New York: Routledge, 2017. ProQuest Ebook Central.

Wolfers, Arnold. *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962.