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Proposal for the Standardisation of the
Canadian Forces Provost Marshal Annual Report

Major David Dey

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PROPOSAL FOR THE STANDARDISATION OF
THE CANADIAN FORCES PROVOST MARSHAL ANNUAL REPORT

AIM

1.   In response to the report on *The First Independent Review by the Right Honourable Antonio Lamer* (Lamer Report),[1] the National Defence Act (NDA) was amended to include a requirement for the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal (CFPM) to publish an Annual Report.[2] While stating a requirement to report on "activities" of the Military Police (MP), none of the subsequent Independent Reviews of the Military Justice System (MJS), nor the amendments to the NDA articulate what form those reports should take or what information to include. This paper aims to address this gap with recommendations on standardising the CFPM Annual Report (AR). Standardisation will complement the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and Department of National Defence (DND) commitments to be more "transparent in terms of our approach, more conscious of our actions and the outcomes we are seeking"[3] in the MJS, and implement the recommendations in the *Report of the Third Independent Review Authority to the Minister of National Defence* (3IRA).[4]

INTRODUCTION

2.   NDA Section 18.6 requires the CFPM to publish an AR to the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) regarding MP activities. The Lamer report noted both the utility and transparency an annual report of the activities, statistics and trends in law enforcement, can provide.[5] Justice Fish made two recommendations in the 3IRA regarding data on length of investigations and arrest data to improve the AR.[6] However, given the current

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[1] Minister of National Defence, 'Government Bill (House of Commons) C-25 (36-1) - Royal Assent - An Act to Amend the National Defence Act and to Make Consequential Amendments to Other Acts - Parliament of Canada', Pub. L. No. C–25 (1998), 75, https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/36-1/bill/C-25/royal-assent. The Lamer Report was the first after Bill C-25, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts - Parliament of Canada, was passed in 1998, which requires an independent review of the MJS every seven years.

[2] 'Government Bill (House of Commons) C-15 (41-1) - Royal Assent - Strengthening Military Justice in the Defence of Canada Act - Parliament of Canada', Pub. L. No. C–15 (2013), https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/41-1/bill/C-15/royal-assent.

[3] Jodie Thomas 'Here's the Full Transcript of Canada's Apology for Military Sexual Misconduct - National | Globalnews.Ca', Global News, accessed 22 December 2021, https://globalnews.ca/news/8447338/canadian-forces-sexual-misconduct-apology-transcript/.

[4] Morris Fish, 'Report of the Third Independent Review Authority to the Minister of National Defence: Pursuant to Subsection 273.601(1) of the National Defence Act, RSC 1985, c N-5', 30 April 2021.

[5] Antonio Lamer, 'The First Independent Review by the Right Honourable Antonio Lamer P.C., C.C., C.D. of the Provisions and Operation of Bill C-25, An Act to Amend the National Defence Act and to Make Consequential Amendments to Other Acts, as Required under Section 96 of Statutes of Canada 1998, c.3' (Ottawa, 2003), 75.

[6] Fish, 'Report of the Third Independent Review Authority to the Minister of National Defence', 223–24.

crises of confidence regarding the MJS,[7] further transparency is required in the AR, to enhance reporting on the MJS and establish a foundation for regaining public confidence.

3.   A formalised approach to reporting on MP annual activities could aid the CAF, through the CFPM, to increase transparency. In line with other governmental standardised reporting systems,[8] a standardised consolidated report would facilitate the yearly analysis of MP support to the MJS. While this may be the goal of the current AR, experience providing analytic information without a published standard for the AR demonstrated the public scrutiny that occurs with minor deviations year to year.[9] Standardisation permits comparison, not only to previous years' MP data, but also to comparable data from other police services, enabling an understanding of the efficacy of the MP portion of the MJS. A standardized AR will also enable the CAF to articulate, with openness and transparency, the steps it takes annually to address complaints on the public accountability of the MJS.[10] Addressing such concerns will support the CAF commitments to strengthen the MJS.[11]

DISCUSSION

4.   Public trust in police comes from understanding of the role of MP and with institutional high-level assessments of the MP (as part of the MJS).[12] Such assessments and explanations are presented in the AR.[13] Standardising the AR will improve transparency and accountability in military policing, allowing for increased scrutiny, as demonstrated in policing research.[14] Standardisation prevents "poorly evaluating the

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[7] National Defence, 'Joint Statement of the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal and the Director of Military Prosecutions', statements, 5 November 2021, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2021/11/joint-statement-of-the-canadian-forces-provost-marshal-and-the-director-of-military-prosecutions.html.

[8] 'GC InfoBase', accessed 22 December 2021, https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/ems-sgd/edb-bdd/index-eng.html#about.

[9] The author noted such issues when establishing the Military Police Analytics Program (MPAP) which supported the 2020 and 2021 AR with MP data and analytics. Multiple media inquiries questioning the definitional differences between the AR and those used by Statistics Canada were received, as well as questions on why certain data appeared to change year to year (Emails received on or about 12 Mar 21).

[10] Charlotte Duval Lantoine Published on Oct 14 and 2021 11:46am, 'The Canadian Military Needs to Re-Learn How to Regulate Itself', *IPolitics* (blog), 14 October 2021, https://ipolitics.ca/2021/10/14/the-canadian-military-needs-to-re-learn-how-to-regulate-itself/; Mark H Moore and Anthony Braga, 'The "Bottom Line" of Policing: What Citizens Should Value (and Measure!) In Police Performance' (Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, 2003), 8, https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/cnmcs-plcng/cn35473-eng.pdf.

[11] 'Here's the Full Transcript of Canada's Apology for Military Sexual Misconduct - National | Globalnews.Ca'.

[12] Ben Bradford and Jonathan Jackson, 'Trust and Confidence in the Police: A Conceptual Review', SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 29 September 2010), 2, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1684508.

[13] Canadian Forces Provost Marshal, 'Canadian Forces Provost Marshal Annual Report 2020-2021', navigation page, 12 October 2021, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/provost-marshal-report-2020-2021.html.

[14] Jacques de Maillard, 'Police Performance Regimes and Police Activity: Compstat in Paris and London Compared', *European Journal of Criminology* 15, no. 5 (2018): 589–608,

performance or police and policing policies and practices across Canada, leading to inefficient and ineffective policing and ultimately compromising the public safety of Canadians."[15] Performance indicators have been shown to change police behaviours, though care must be taken to ensure that the measures are appropriate to the community that is served.[16] Performance measurement practices in policing lead to holding policing leadership to account, with explicit objectives, and a need to demonstrate results publically.[17] While this initially may appear to be an MP-oriented approach, many of the MJS concerns focus solely on MP and the investigative phase of the MJS. [18] Justice Arbour noted a skepticism and lack of trust are due to the necessary confidentiality of police investigations, such secrecy invites skepticism in the MJS as a whole.[19] The remedy to skepticism, born of secrecy, is to be open and transparent where possible (e.g. outcomes). Standardisation promotes transparency and accountability through comparison, which should lead to increased trust. While standardising the CFPM AR is only one piece of this solution, it is a necessary one for the CAF to begin the regaining of trust with the Canadian public, CAF members, and victims.

5.   Thoroughly disclosing governmental operational information is essential for accountability,[20] and is often mandated in legislation.[21] The CFPM is required to provide an account for military policing activities.[22] Indeed, the CFPM has been responsible since 1998 to provide an account of "statistics, trend analysis and analysis of law enforcement patterns."[23] Unfortunately, this account was not always made public,

https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370817749497; Cliff Bacon, 'Beyond the Scope of Managerialism: Explaining the Organisational Invisibility of Police Work', in *Critical Perspectives on the Management and Organization of Emergency Services*, ed. Paresh Wankhade, Leo McCann, and Peter Murphy, 1st ed., Book, Section vols (Routledge, 2019), 107–21, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315104447-7; Tom Cockcroft and Iain Beattie, 'Shifting Cultures: Managerialism and the Rise of "Performance"', ed. Gorazd Meko, Gorazd Meško, and Chuck Fields, *Policing : An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management* 32, no. 3 (2009): 526–40, https://doi.org/10.1108/13639510910981644.

[15] Anton Maslov, 'Measuring the Performance of the Police: The Perspective of the Public', Research Report (Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2016), 31.

[16] Cockcroft and Beattie, 'Shifting Cultures: Managerialism and the Rise of "Performance"', 526.

[17] de Maillard, 'Police Performance Regimes and Police Activity: Compstat in Paris and London Compared', 605.

[18] Lousie Arbour, 'Interim Recommendations from Independent External Comprehensive Review Team', 20 October 2021, https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/dnd-mdn/documents/reports/2021/2021-10-20-letter-to-minister-re-interim-recommendations.pdf.

[19] Arbour.

[20] Bonnie Lysyk, 'Annual Report 2017 of the Office of the Auditor General of Ontario', 6 December 2017, 748.

[21] Lysyk, 748; Legislative Services Branch, 'Consolidated Federal Laws of Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act' (2019), https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/R-10/FullText.html; Province of Ontario, 'Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15' (2014), https://www.ontario.ca/laws/view; Province of British Columbia, 'Police Act RSBC' (2021), https://www.bclaws.gov.bc.ca/civix/document/id/complete/statreg/96367_01#section38.12; 'Police Act Revised Statutes of Alberta 2000' (2021).

[22] Legislative Services Branch, 'Consolidated Federal Laws of Canada, National Defence Act' (2019), 18.6, https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/N-5/index.html.

[23] Vice Chief of Defence Staff and Canadian Forces Provost Marshal, 'Accountability Framework-The Vice Chief Of The Defence Staff And The Canadian Forces Provost Marshal', 2 March 1998, 4,

causing Justice Lamer to later recommend transparent reporting[24] which was subsequently incorporated into the NDA in 2013.[25] However, neither the *Accountability Framework* nor Justice Lamer's Report articulated what statistics, trends or patterns were relevant for transparency. Most recently, Justice Fish recommended that data on the length of investigations and custody should be included, but remains silent on the efficacy of the AR on providing transparency otherwise. The NDA simply states "The Provost Marshal shall, within three months after the end of each fiscal year, submit to the Chief of the Defence Staff a report concerning the activities of the Provost Marshal and the military police during the year. The Chief of the Defence Staff shall submit the report to the Minister."[26] The direction is lacking the explicit metrics necessary for the MJS to display accountablility and credibility.

6.   In accordance with The Policy on Results, all government departments must develop and report on a Departmental Results Framework (DRF).[27] The results are published in the Departmental Results Report (DRR), and graphically posted on the GCInfoBase website.[28] Simply put, the DRF outlines what the government Department does, what it aims to achieve, and how progress towards those achievements is measured. Outlining the main aspects of the department's mandate, the DRF aims to improve departmental oversight and reporting, strengthen governance and facilitate resource management. The Canadian Forces Military Police Group (CF MP Gp) is primarily considered part of the "Sustainable Bases, Information Technology Systems and Infrastructure", as "Military Police Institutional Operations", and publishes one performance indicator.[29] This indicator is only for the "Clearance rates for founded reports investigated."[30] However, as noted above, a single indicator such as this is insufficient as a reporting tool for credibility, and publishing such data alone would not satisfy the need for an AR.

https://www.mpcc-cppm.gc.ca/documents/the-commission-la-commission/presentations/accountability-framework-cadre-de-reddition-de-comptes-eng.pdf Paragraph 8.

[24] Lamer, 'Lamer Report', 75.

[25] Branch, Consolidated federal laws of Canada, National Defence Act.

[26] Branch, Sec 18.6.

[27] Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada, 'Policy on Results', 1 July 2016, https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=31300.

[28] Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 'Departmental Results Reports', departmental performance report, 25 September 2015, https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/departmental-performance-reports.html; Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada, 'GC InfoBase Infographic for National Defence', accessed 16 January 2022, https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/ems-sgd/edb-bdd/index-eng.html#infographic/dept/133/intro.

[29] Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada, 'Infographic for Military Police Institutional Operations', accessed 16 January 2022, https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/ems-sgd/edb-bdd/index-eng.html#infographic/program/ND-BUS12/intro.

[30] Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada. For a better understanding on the nature of the classification of police reports as "founded" or "unfounded" (etc.), see: The Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, 'Revising the Classification of Founded and Unfounded Criminal Incidents in the Uniform Crime Reporting Survey' (Ottawa, Ont: Statistics Canada, 12 July 2018), https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2018001/article/54973-eng.htm.

7.   Surprisingly, there are no required indicators or results in the DRR for either the MJS or MP required by the DRF.[31] Logically, this is due to the fact the DRF is designed to measure DND/CAF outcomes, rather than what are necessary internal processes (i.e. MP and MJS). To be more transparent and accountable about policing, a focussed reliable approach to performance measurement is required. The Military Police Analytics Program (MPAP) was created to better inform executive decisions with evidence-based performance data.[32] MPAP supports transparency through developing performance metrics (linked to the DRF),[33] by developing a CF MP Gp Logic Model.[34]

8.   A logic model links outcomes (short and long term) with the activities, processes, theoretical assumptions and principles of the program.[35] It is simply defined "as a picture of how an organization works in concert with the theory and assumptions underlying the program."[36] As a visual depiction of the program, it contains only enough detail to describe the program on single page.[37] Since performance measurement should be linked to outcomes,[38] the logic model provides a strong starting point for performance measurement, but is insufficient on its own to provide performance indicators, and cannot act as a report on MP activities.

9.   The CF MP Gp Logic Model identifies the activities, outputs and outcomes that contribute to achieving DND/CAF-wide policing objectives. The logic model outlines the key relationships without mapping all of the interactions. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are qualitative or quantitative means of measuring an output or result, with the intention of gauging the performance of a program or set of activities.[39] MP KPIs should come from the logic model, to provide credible and standardised information to the CAF, in support of the MJS. Analytics based on a properly selected collection of KPIs could provide assurance of a fair and effective MJS to Canadians, oversight bodies, and other stakeholders.

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[31] Department of National Defence, 'Departmental Results Report 2019-2020', 7 December 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/departmental-results-report/2019-20-index.html.

[32] Canadian Forces Provost Marshal, 'Canadian Forces Provost Marshal Report - Fiscal Year 2019-2020', navigation page, 6 November 2020, 5, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/cfpm-annual-report-2019-2020.html.

[33] Canadian Forces Provost Marshal, 'CFPM AR 2020-21', 11. The author of this paper was the founding manager for the MPAP, and has in-depth knowledge about the logic model, as he authored that and obtained its approval as well.

[34] See the graphic in Annex A: CF MP GP Logic Model for reference.

[35] W.K. Kellogg Foundation, 'W.K. Kellogg Foundation Logic Model Development Guide', W.K. Kellogg Foundation, January 2004, III, https://www.wkkf.org:443/resource-directory/resources/2004/01/logic-model-development-guide.

[36] W.K. Kellogg Foundation, III.

[37] Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada, 'Supporting Effective Evaluations: A Guide to Developing Performance Measurement Strategies', guidance, 30 August 2010, https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/audit-evaluation/centre-excellence-evaluation/guide-developing-performance-measurement-strategies.html.

[38] Lysyk, 'Annual Report 2017 of the Office of the Auditor General of Ontario', 749.

[39] Bobbie Macdonald et al., 'Measuring the Performance and Impact of Community Indicators Systems: Insights on Frameworks and Examples of Key Performance Indicators', 2012, 1.

10.   While endeavouring to define the performance metrics for police, caution is required. Often, measurement is linked to achieving an explicit mission, to the detriment of other societal factors that police provide.[40] Policing literature notes many outputs support the success of others, though they may not contribute explicitly to the mission.[41] However, optimisation of MP is a goal that would align with such literature.[42] As such, the creation of metrics should not focus solely on controlling crime (i.e. clearance rates), as police provide much more value than that.

11.   It is important to note that there are no common metrics for measuring police performance.[43] Further, the development of metrics for MP must consider their mission which states: "The CF MP Gp provide professional policing, security, and detention services to the CAF and DND globally, across the full spectrum of military operations."[44] As such, security and custody[45] operations must be included in metric development, but should take a secondary priority to measures that would assist in re-instilling confidence in the MJS as part of the CAF/DND approach.

12.   An AR is a primary method for an entity (private or governmental) to demonstrate its accountability, by providing information about its activities and performance.[46] Using performance objectives aligns with private sector concepts regarding annual performance reporting,[47] and is a suggested norm for governments to follow (where possible).[48] Other governments have suggested that a standardised approach assists in supporting the credibility of the AR.[49] Such approaches should also focus on the performance in

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[40] Moore and Braga, 'The "Bottom Line" of Policing', 14.

[41] Moore and Braga, 15.

[42] Moore and Braga, 28–29.

[43] Benjamin Mazowita and Cristine Rotenberg, 'The Canadian Police Performance Metrics Framework: Standardized Indicators for Police Services in Canada', *Juristat*, no. Journal Article (2019): 3; John Kiedrowski, Michael Petrunik, and Todd Macdonald, *Canadian Police Board Views on the Use of Police Performance Metrics*, Book, Whole (Public Safety Canada, 2013), ii, https://go.exlibris.link/WxcfrpdQ.

[44] Canadian Forces Provost Marshal, 'CFPM AR 2020-21'.

[45] Justice Fish's recommendations on custody metrics should be continued to be developed, but should be second in priority as there has been no general concerns raised about custody lengths pre- or post-trial. Regardless of when they are developed, custody data will support the transparency and credibility in reporting about the MJS.

[46] Lysyk, 'Annual Report 2017 of the Office of the Auditor General of Ontario', 755.

[47] Lysyk, 748. Over twenty years of attempting to measure police performance in a standardised way shows this is a difficult task, and can create conflicting aims compared to the relative ease in private sector. Largely the ease in the private sector is due to the simplicity of showing profits. However, competing interests in the public sector makes using costs as the sole performance measure inadequate, but creating a "social utility measure", as Moore and Brag note, is easier said than done and is cause of much disagreement. See Moore and Braga, 'The "Bottom Line" of Policing', 28.

[48] Lysyk, 'Annual Report 2017 of the Office of the Auditor General of Ontario', 66.

[49] Lysyk, 758. In addition, while the Uniform Crime Reporting Survey (UCR) from Statistics Canada (StatCan) does have both the credibility and standardisation, it is aggregated to a degree that does not provide useful data to the CAF, which is dispersed throughout the country. Furthermore, MP are the only police that have not been regularly submitting police data to StatCan, though such reporting commenced in mid-2021.

meeting outcomes and objectives rather than simply the activities and outputs.[50] However, in developing such measures for an AR, one cannot always have all positive measures (i.e. increased performance with cost reduction), but can aim for as many improvements (i.e. positive outcomes) as possible.[51] More than a simple cost-benefit analysis, "society has long seen value in public policing that goes beyond crime control."[52] Such performance measurement (and reporting) increases police accountability and legitimacy with the government and, by extension, the public.[53]

13.   The CFPM AR does not have an explicit (or published) standard for its format. While there are similarities between reports, and the last several follow a recognisable pattern, there is nothing in place to guarantee to the public what will be reported, or why certain data is/is not included.

14.   It should not be expected that the first iteration of a standardized approach will automatically result in increased trust from the public. Necessarily, public feedback will inform future iterations, and future Independent Review Authorities will have input as well. While minor changes will improve the standard over time, standardisation demonstrates a CAF commitment to transparency.

CONCLUSION

15.   As a focal point for concerns and mistrust in the MJS, MP performance is scrutinised and affects the perception of the CAF as a whole. As the CFPM is legally required to produce an AR on the activities of MP, such a report should be structured around the performance of MP relative to their desired outcomes, as expressed in their own logic model. Such reporting provides transparency, accountability and comparable data to the public on MP performance which can be used as part of building public trust and confidence in the MJS, and DND/CAF, as a whole.

RECOMMENDATIONS

16.   The standard for the AR should be formatted around the MP Logic Model, with emphasis on the KPI development for immediate outcomes. There should be a standardised explanation of the performance metrics, and then the results. Not all metrics are currently available, and some will require resources to develop, in conjunction with expert advice.[54]

17.   The standard should resemble:

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[50] Lysyk, 749.
[51] Moore and Braga, 'The "Bottom Line" of Policing', 29.
[52] Moore and Braga, 13.
[53] Moore and Braga, 11.
[54] Mazowita and Rotenberg, 'The Canadian Police Performance Metrics Framework: Standardized Indicators for Police Services in Canada'.

a. Opening Message from the CFPM;
b. Mission, Vision, MP Values and Core Functions;
c. Structure and Jurisdiction;
d. Vignettes (to illustrate what numerical data cannot);
e. Military Police Strategic Plan;
f. Introduction to performance; and
g. Performance by outcome.

18.   The performance by outcome and introduction should include the same elements annually, an explanation for changes year to year, and the desired (immediate) outcomes.

19.   The first MP outcome of the logic model concerns the incidence of crime and victimization, including commonly reported traditional metrics (crime rates, crime severity, and clearance rates). These indicators reveal how effective MP are at reducing criminal victimization, and bringing offenders to account for their crimes.[55] Such metrics are in the current AR, and should be retained, with the addition of a victimisation survey that speaks to unreported crimes. Victimisation surveys speak to satisfaction with police response.[56] Additionally, metrics on the length of investigation, arrest data (including nature of offence, length of custody, and self-identification data of the arrested) will respond to the 3IRA recommendations.

20.   The second outcome of the logic model covers measures of MP activities and processes that contribute to DND/CAF security (and public safety more broadly). Specifically, it includes protecting military personnel and assets, maintaining military discipline and order (calls for service, patrol deployment, activity reporting, and MP function and resource allocation). This outcome includes indicators for calls for MP service such as:

a. Percent emergency vs non-emergency calls;
b. Number of calls by type (i.e. criminal incidents, security, traffic, public safety etc.);
c. Percent of calls by type; and
d. Time spent on scene/length of time to clear a call (including details about emergency vs non-emergency calls, calls by type (criminal incidents, security, traffic, public safety etc.).[57]

21.   The third outcome of the logic model relates to the degree MP are properly equipped, trained, and efficiently utilise its resources. This outcome is important to demonstrate human resource issues and training which speak to the quality of MP

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[55] Mazowita and Rotenberg.

[56] Lynn Langton, Michael Planty, and James P. Lynch, 'Second Major Redesign of the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS)', *Criminology & Public Policy* 16, no. 4 (2017): 1051, https://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12335.

[57] Mazowita and Rotenberg, 'The Canadian Police Performance Metrics Framework: Standardized Indicators for Police Services in Canada'.

response.[58] This outcome includes activities (e.g. individual and collective training, personnel readiness) that prepare and sustain combat effective MP, able to respond to a spectrum of tasks. Such data would include:

a. Proportion of civilian staff and rank distribution;
b. Representation (percent) of women and visible minorities among MP members;
c. Calls (number) for service requiring a MP presence (per member);
d. Reported crimes per member;
e. Number of departures of members for reasons other than retirement;
f. Number of training hours per member;
g. Expenditures on training as a proportion of overall expenditures; and
h. Investment in technological resources.

22.   Finally, trust and confidence in any police force is essential for legitimacy, and MP are no different. Canadians must have trust and confidence in their perceptions and engagements with police. Current perceptions of competing interests between investigative and military interests means MP need to rebuild trust and confidence in their performance of all their functions. This requires examining how force and authority are used by Military Police, in both quantitative and qualitative terms, such as:

a. Use of force:

i. Number of use of force encounters;
ii. Percent of use of force encounters using intermediate or higher level weapons;

b. Use of Authority:

i. Professional Standards (PS) Complaints (number) received/reviews of MP misconduct;
ii. Percent of PS complaints at least partially substantiated;
iii. Number, by type, of incidents that spark a PS complaint (e.g. does the complaint come from sexual assault investigations, military offence investigations, conduct during non-investigative activity, etc.); and
iv. Number and percent of Military Police Complaints Commission recommendations reviewed and/or implemented.

ANNEXES: Annex A-CF MP GP Logic Model

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[58] Mazowita and Rotenberg.

CF MP GP LOGIC MODEL

ACTIVITIES	6.12.5 Policies, Governance and Engagements	6.12.1 Police Operations		6.12.3 Security Services	6.12.2 Military Corrections Services	6.12.4/2.9.2 Selection Training and Readiness	6.12.6 Force Development
	Governance	Police (Emergency) Response	Victim Services	Protective Services	Detention Services	Police Selection	Capability requirements Planning/ Development
	Monitoring and Reporting	Criminal Intelligence production	Community Crime Prevention	Crime Prevention via Security Services	Imprisonment Services	Police Training	
	Professional Standards	Law Enforcement/ Investigations	Operational Support	Physical Security/ Facility Assessments	OPCOM Tasks	Readiness Training	Equipment Requirements
	Policy			Embassy Security Services			
				OPCOM Tasks			

OUTPUTS	Governance -Designated officials -Assigned Accountabilities, Responsibilities and Authorities -Policy/Directives -Governance mechanisms -Material readiness	Police Services -Police Response & Reports -Arrests/Tickets -Community engagements -Victim Services -Trained police	Crime Prevention/Security Services -Physical Security recommendations -Protection of PDSS/Aircraft/Code 1 VIP/airframes -Mobility Support -Security support at embassies -Crime prevention material	Custody Services -Safe Detentions/ Imprisonments -UDR certifications -Rehabilitation -SME guidance -PW/Detainee handling	Monitoring & Reporting -Monitoring strategies/reports -performance measurement -Professional Standards Investigations -Internal audit reports -CFPM Annual report

OUTCOMES

IMMEDIATE	Crime Reduction and Victim Support Reducing criminal victimisation, improving CAF/public safety, and bringing offenders to account for their crimes and supporting victims	Security and Military Discipline contribute to security/safety, protecting military personnel and assets, maintaining military discipline and order	Operational Readiness Use resources efficiently to prepare effective MP that are able to respond to a spectrum of tasks	Trust and Confidence in MP Use authority and force legitimately, fairly, and effectively

MEDIUM-TERM	The Military Police project **the correct effect at the right time and place** in support of DND/CAF	The Defence Community (DND/CAF and their families) **trusts that policing and security actions** will be professional, fair, and transparent	**Secure and safe** Defence establishments (workplaces and military housing)

LONG-TERM	CF MP Gp provision of policing, security, and service custody services to DND/CAF in an increasingly complex and ever-changing environment.

DEPARTMENTAL OUTCOMES	DND/CAF can provide assurance of a sound, fair, and effective military justice system to Canadians, partners, oversight bodies, and other stakeholders.