



#### **Canada and NATO**

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#### **Canada and NATO**

#### Introduction

Canada is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) formed with component nations to engage on the security policy since the alliance was enacted in 1949. Canada is one of the founding members of NATO that have had significant influence since its inception after the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War. The established concepts of the organization were to form common interest under Article 2, which is referred to as the political, social, and economic cooperation among the signatories of the North Atlantic region. The statement the Canadian propensity lead to dialogue among the member states, which cause the enactment of the security policy and the internationalism commitment in Canada. Traditionally, Canada had adopted soft power systems vulnerable to other countries attacking its territory. Therefore, it had a seat to develop a powerful military alliance to enhance its security through political and economic influence.

Therefore, the endured purpose of NATO has enunciated the Washington D.C. treaty of 1949. The Treaty's mandate was to safeguard freedom and share a common heritage and civilization with the people in the community by informed laws. The protected space, common heritage, adoption of better civilization mechanism, embracing the principle of democracy and individual liberty that governed by the rule of law. During the harmonization of the Washington Treaty with NATO, the principle did not change except the scope of the political purpose changed<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> David Haglund, "The NATO of Its Dreams? Canada and the Co-operative Security Alliance," International Journal 52, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 467; Greg Donaghy, "Domesticating NATO: Canada and the North Atlantic Alliance, 1963-68," International Journal 52, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 461.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> NATO Public Diplomacy Division, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO, 2006), 371.

The history states that the existence of NATO in the first 40 years, the provision of a favorable response to the Soviet threat was guaranteed to the western civilization. The response strategy helped unite the communists and protected liberalism as a democratic value among the member states. The Treaty's adoption helped the world become united, and there were no divisible geographic borders, hence fostering globalization, which continued to unite the nationals economically and diplomatically. However, NATO has evolved dramatically over the years. The growth of the technological weapon formed nuclear weapons to threaten Soviet political entities aimed to protect the stability of the democracy beyond the NATO signatory borders. Therefore, Canada has the significant contribution of the international effort to communicate with NATO alongside the ally's collaboration, which leads to a multilateral organization such as the United Nations (U.N.). Canada's NRF needs to redefine and redraft its mandate to become a better advisor towards achieving NATO goals since Canada has played a more significant role since its inception<sup>3</sup>.

### **Analysis of Canada and NATO Relationship**

NATO was primarily formed as a military alliance with collective membership defense, which helped the signatories eliminate other wars before 1949, creating a solid cornerstone for its members. At the end of World War II, the demise of the Warsaw Pact, there had been planned alliance that was predicted alliances. Most of the international communities had no further interest in the alliances. However, the value of the NATO collaboration was realized because of the threat of the Soviet Union. There was no need to form such an alliance<sup>4</sup>. For many years now, NATO is still alive, influentially arguably to respect the security of the Euro-Atlantic

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Ellen Hallams, "NATO at 60: Going Global?" International Journal 64, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 434-435; Veronica Kitchen, The Globalization of NATO: Intervention, Security and Identity (New York: Routledge, 2010). 7

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Haglund, "The NATO of its Dreams? Canada and the Co-operative Security Alliance," 471.

region. Most leaders in the North Atlantic described NATO as relevant to the contemporary world. Therefore, Canada's NRF redefines its mandate, contributing heavily to the NATO manifesto.

NATO mandate of security variability to signatory counties needs to adopt the changing security of the world. Since Canada is one of the strongest contributors to the NATO manifesto, it is relevant for the NRF to have the advisable mandate that would help the nation's internal security<sup>5</sup>. However, there are claims of new strategic concepts that deem critical address of the shortfall among the alliance institutional and operational structure. The ability of the NRF to engage with NATO would lead to more influential information about the treaty countries hence would help enhance Canadian national security. In the same way, there are leaders in Canada that support the goal of security harmonization. The Canadian Defense Minister has highlighted that there should be reformation on the structure of NATO to help manifest modernized security capabilities following the new Strategic Concept.

It has been anticipated that Canada's internationalism to serve best in global orient NATO with maintained of the internationalism policies that help engage and form a partnership with alliance territories to pursue security stability. However, NATO is not a global alliance that engages international nations, the shared interest and values that seek to enhance beneficial stability make it necessary to share democratic rights. The support of the new strategic concepts to strengthen and promise security for allied parties counteracts the relationship beyond borders to arise with instability, which is clearly shown by the objection of other members of NATO<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Kitchen, The Globalization of NATO

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Wallace J. Thies, Why NATO Endures, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 23; Examples of Issues where Allies Were Seriously Divided Are the Suez Crisis in 1956, Support to Turkey in 2002 and the Iraq War in 2003.

Canada can benefit only from the new strategic concept policy when the government is generally willing to contribute security efforts that are critically risky for the nation. The globalization of NATO would lead to a more robust and conducive feasible sound security policy that aligns with Canadian interests and values. Thus, it is not mandatory for Canada to shift its foreign and security policies though primarily remaining un fermentable to maintain the status quo.

It is difficult for Canada to fully show many contributions to NATO because of the other interest of the United States<sup>7</sup>. Further, the United States' relationship with the European members' nation marks NATO's prominent and dominant activities. The U.S. provided direction that made the power of alliance of nuclear war lead to Cold War which prowess deals that adverts subsequent conflicts. Historically, NATO efforts during the Cold War mainly focused on deterring the aggression of the military used by the Soviet Union. The collective responsibility of the nation's especially the United States, assumed military misappropriation in the United States to defend Europe. The United States supported the European with the hope of recovering the economic mandate in the nation. Therefore, the States embarked on persuading the European allies to spend more on the substantial results of financial status<sup>8</sup>

The contribution of the United States indirectly leads to the mandate of Canada to attempt disapproving defense spending. It was noticed that Canada's tendencies to spend low on military hence drawing the critics from Washington D.C. There was a debate that Canada did not support most of the burdening situation. The interest United States to control NATO is an indirect move that most of the European Union did not notice. Therefore, the Canadian bilateral relationship

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Spencer, "Triangle into Treaty: Canada and the Origins of NATO," 92.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> David Yost, NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998): 28.

with the United States came during the Cold War. The wavering nuclear weapon acceptance by the public unrest led to missile testing in Canada in the 1980s, which restructured the Canadian contribution to NATO.

The interest of nuclear commitments by the United States to the European Union is linked to burden-sharing of the economic recovery, which was not participated by Canada. Stressed Canada would probably become one of the most defatted contributors to NATO manifesto security. Therefore, Europe started to rely on the strategic response by the Americans; thus, Europe needed assurance from the United States to total retaliation, which later accused Europe of a failed partner that failed to take its responsibilities. However, the United States nuclear base situated in Europe assured the Europe of deterrence function. The political play by the United States served for an arranged alliance that cohesively caused NATO nuclear policy to evolve significantly at the end of the Cold War.

From the historical background, it is interesting that Canada had not played a significant role in the debate about the NATO nuclear policy. The intricacies of the American-Europe relationship lead to the fall of Canada's contribution during the old days. The description of the symbolic omission representing the degree of freedom to the Canadian power would not work to some extent. The sentiment of Canadian credibility to change and redefine the NRF policy to align with needs critical evaluation regarding the interest of United States in which the decision might lead to security trap for Canada. Therefore, time would eventually validate the Canadian security's credibility to relate its issues with NATO alignment<sup>9</sup>.

The clear picture of the NATO Response Force is politically threatened, and Canadian government is uncertain about maintaining the responsibilities that guide the NRF to harmonize

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> NATO, The Alliance's Strategic Concept Adopted by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington (Brussels: NATO, 1999).

with NATO. The evolution of global security needs a specific focus that the NATO response team would prevail over the security threat. Vividly, the NRF would change its policy depending on the scrutiny of the situation analyzed during the military's evolution. During the end of the cold war, viewing the global factors leading to rapprochement for the European nations. The NATO enlargement with partnership scrutiny forced many prominent allies to become stable, seeking eastwards and making most of the post-European security. There have been enlightening of human security that evolved in the 1990s because of the fight of Kosovo and Bosnia hence leading to the repercussion of human abuse.

Canada's little contribution towards military evolution, making NATO's credibility narrow. The social capture that came from the nations is little formed from Canada. Most of the NATO members have more outstanding achievements, such as European counties fighting for human security with the aid of the United States. The United Nations-led security surveillance and revolved nuclear weapon is tacked by the United States and the Russian community. Therefore, the interesting community would interfere with the Canadian redraft of the NRF to align with the NATO mandate because the redraft would give Canada a more significant opportunity over NATO<sup>10</sup>.

The NATO-based value approach makes society one of the most critical changes that make different parties deprive benefits that fit them. The Canadian perspective to the NATO new strategic concepts had positive remarks that lead to scrabble for benefits. A summit was held to reprieve the strengthened NATO mandate where all the allies emerged solid and united to embrace one goal. Allies agree that organizational reforms need to manage long-term

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Kitchen, The Globalization of NATO, 7; Roger E. Kanet, "The 'New' Members and Future Enlargement: The Impact of NATO-Russia Relations," in NATO in Search of a Vision (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2010), 158.

effectiveness, and Canada has positively advocated for the position to make reforms. The Canadian point of view arguably makes the substantial commitment to undertake Afghanistan by ISAF; however, the mandate of the comprehensive approach in operation made the NATO experience in Afghanistan.

The NATO new Strategic Concept is a Canadian security concern that makes a significant mandate to the changes in Canada's position. The relative strategic concepts create robust partnerships with international organizations such as the U.N. and the E.U. Consulting political allies such as Russia makes Canada more interested in the new deal. Canada is interested in the recent strength of the international organization, especially the European that would take the opportunity to become under Canada. NATO's relationship and essential play to maintain and construct European nations would optimize partnership with international operations<sup>11</sup>.

The recent contribution of Canada to ISAF's mission to Afghanistan served Canadians to strengthen its mandate with NATO though after supporting its NRF, there will be continued trends to missions. Therefore, the continuous commitment by the Canadian NRF would not be possible when there is a consistent mission. The level of the Canadian to offer humanitarian mission needs more political support that would lead to relevance at the mission. For example, in Haiti, Afghanistan, and other parts of the world. Therefore, redrafting and realigning the NRF with a mandate would not strengthen Canada's participation because the mission needs financial resources and support from allies where Canada had influence. Recommendable, Canada would improve its security service by working abroad within the international scope without realigning its security policy to NATO<sup>12</sup>.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Ibid

Canada's dependency on multilateral relationships provides a better opportunity to pursue the interests rather than realigning the security policy. Realigning the approach to the NATO response force strategy would make the Canadian spend and budget for themselves. It is evident that NATO's penchant for collaboration from the focused European security is approved that the combined allies would reach the global mandate without amending the NRF policy. Therefore, Canada's significance would come from NATO by keeping a seat with the multilateral mandate worldwide focus and mission. With these regards, it is clear that NRF will still purposely overarch in providing solid military support and rapid response. The collective defense purpose within an emergent crisis would strengthen the operation without redrafting the policies. Further, it viewed that changing the policies to fit the NATO response to become stronger would draw much attention from the NATO global allies hence might cause a struggle for power over the NATO leadership.

Internationalism has been the integral component of Canadian NFR policy and foreign response strategy as the nation seeks to strengthen its security with the mandated allies. In addition, that is why the Canadian relationship with the European nation is primarily maintained. Multilateral relationships and the promotion of shared values significantly lead to Canadians gaining strength. The existence of NATO as a critical driver to the transatlantic community sharing values and interests has long characteristics that make Canada influential in making the society a better place for all. The collective action nature of NATO might allow strengthening of the Canadian NRF than other countries. However, it might work with a consultative approach to all allies about Canada redrafting NRF policy. NATO comprehensive advocacy for strengthening the partnership and embracing the dialogue would lead to total confusion when Canada amends its policy, leaving the other nations behind. Further, redrafting the Canadian NRF policies will

intensify the ally's disagreements about the military scope action hence demonstrating fragile political cohesion in the future and the ability of NATO to perform as a collective responsibility in the future. <sup>13</sup>

#### **Conclusion**

The approval of the new strategic concept for the transatlantic partnership does not provide any needs for the NRF contribution for the amendment of the policy. The political of the allies work under collective systems, which needs consultative for any amendment by the allies. Further, the Alliance mandate is strategizing by military approach for the allies. The Canadian foreign policy assures the NATO allies to maintain global focus and maintain international policies. The partnership and the engagement priority of the partners within the territory pursuit to provide better stable security among the members state. With this regard, Canada has played a critical role in enabling internationalism security that directly benefits Canada for security purposes.

The new Strategic Concept has ultimately brought the alliance to the current world, leading to measurable impacts when working as collective partners. It has increased spending towards the NATO mandate. Further, Canada has been contributing to the extensive mission by NATO, and the nation has maintained a critical seat at the table with allies. Therefore, nurturing multilateral relationships with global partners has put Canada in a better position for security interest; hence, there is no need to change the NRF policy.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Christopher Davis, "NATO's Next Strategic Concept: How the Alliance's New Strategy Will Reshape Global Security," Strategic Studies Quarterly (Winter 2010): 42.

#### Recommendations

- 1. It is critically recommendable for the Canadian NRF to keep its position in the collective purpose of achieving the NATO mandate to help maximize the security benefits. Canadian continuing aiding the global missions would better add its strength to the NATO security.
- 2. Canadian force needs to put clear reforms and partnerships with common terms for security rather than a defense mechanism, thus allowing the Alliance to scrutinize the dependent contingency of the Canadian NRF, hence depriving capabilities of each NATO ally's response.
- 3. It is also recommendable that if Canadian NRF were to change its policies, the policy censuses must be grounded on strategic determination of all NATO Allies. However, when policies are changed and aligned with NATO's policies, all allies should be aware and recommend the same so that Canadian NRF works smoothly without tension from allies.

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