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International Security: Can Canada Be a Credible Participant?

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Exercise Solo Flight

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International Security: Can Canada Be a Credible Participant?

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INTRODUCTION

The rules-based world order will always generate national and international security challenges. From the moment the treaty of Westphalia was signed in 1648, security conflicts regarding states' and borders' legitimacy commenced. Like many other concepts in the field of international relations, critics have often highlighted that there was no universal definition of security.¹ There have been many cases where security challenges were initiated by or resolved through states' diplomacy. For this reason, "the field of Security Studies was traditionally dominated by academics who sought to keep the discipline narrowly focused on military threats to the state."² However, Globalization and liberal democracy hegemony has once again changed the nature of defence and security.³ From great power diplomacy and influence to intra- and inter-states challenges, how can Canada contribute to global security? Will the Nation be taken seriously in a world where major and great powers dominate the international diplomatic dialogue?

This paper will argue that, although the world is in a great power competition era, Canada as a middle power can continue to be a major exporter of international security. To do so, this essay will use three arguments. First, it will clarify the concept of middle power and how it relates to Canada. Second, it will examine Canadian foreign policy since the Cold War, and how this correlates to the middle power approach to international influence. Lastly, it will argue that today's security challenges are best tackled using a smart power middle power internationalism

¹ Hough, Peter, Andrew Moran, Bruce Pilbeam, and Wendy Stokes. *International Security Studies : Theory and Practice*. Milton: Taylor & Francis Group, 2020.

² *Ibid.*, 31

³ Greco, Sara and Stéfanie von Hlatky. "Soft Contributions are Hard Commitments: NATO and Canada's Global Security Agenda." *Canadian Foreign Policy* 24, no. 3 (2018): 273-285. p. 283

approach, which would also involve a great deal of military assistance and military training cooperation; this is a concept ingrained in Canada's defence and foreign policy.

MIDDLE POWER IS NOT A MYTH

The term "middle power" entered the international community lexicon following the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, which essentially divided the world into multiple State power competition. Much like many other international relation theories, the concept of middle power "is rarely defined, and limited explanations are never specific."⁴ Many countries, policy makers, and analysts have enjoyed this vagueness, which has become an expression of convenience since the postwar period. Nonetheless, middle power has been referred to in many ways including an ideology, a doctrine, a role, a guide, and a myth."⁵ With many terminologies rallying around the concept, many more factors were being taken into consideration, and "assigning the middle-power label remains complicated, with states eschewing or claiming the title depending on domestic factors and systemic structural parameters."⁶

With that being said, following the post-World War era, and not including the major powers encompassed in the Paris Peace Treaty, some of the "smaller powers deserved greater relative status predetermined by three criteria: relevance, contribution, and capacity."⁷ This marks the beginning of the distinct definition to distinguish between major, small, and middle powers through qualitative and quantitative means. These three criteria have now evolved in the middle power literature. The characteristics are now roughly delineated as positional, behavioral,

⁴ Chapnick, Adam. "The Canadian Middle Power Myth." *International Journal* 55, no. 2 (2000): 188., p.2

⁵ Gecelovsky, Paul. "Constructing a Middle Power: Ideas and Canadian Foreign Policy." *Canadian Foreign Policy* 15, no. 1 (2009): 77-IV., p. 77

⁶ Job, Brian L. "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Dilemmas of Middle Powers." *Issues and Studies* 56, no. 2 (2020): 1-24.,p.2

⁷ Chapnick, Adam. "The Canadian Middle Power Myth." *International Journal* 55, no. 2 (2000): 188., p.2

and identifying.⁸ "Positional" refers to the state's material capability, but also and more importantly to the state's "ranking among the 20 or so states clustered immediately below the major powers."⁹ This paper will further discuss how the "positional" characteristic will help differentiate middle powers' influence capacity, from a geo-political standpoint. Defining a state's power through its "behavior", the second characteristic, is complicated. However, most scholars agree on the importance of international relations (IR) actions and deeds in diplomatic practices, especially through "entrepreneurial multilateralism; convening, creating, and advancing multilateral institutions; serving as intermediators between major powers and their proxies; and promoting the provision of global public goods."¹⁰ The main example in this view of defining middle power behaviour comes from the Cold War, where "middle powers [...] were those who occupied positions between the extremes of the two competing power blocs [and] regarded themselves as "mediators" or "linchpins."¹¹ The third characteristic of "identifying" is either seen as self-identification through foreign policy and international involvement, or through recognition by others, particularly from major powers or key international alliances.¹²

We have now seen that through these three principle characteristics, "The "style" of state behaviour pursued by middle powers [...] combines functionalism and internationalism, or capability and willingness."¹³ And while there is no universal definition or classification of the concept of middle power, "a consensus has developed that states such as Australia, Canada,

⁸ Job, Brian L. "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Dilemmas of Middle Powers." *Issues and Studies* 56, no. 2 (2020): 1-24., p.3

⁹ *Ibid.*, p.3

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Gecelovsky, Paul. "Constructing a Middle Power: Ideas and Canadian Foreign Policy." *Canadian Foreign Policy* 15, no. 1 (2009): 77-IV., p.78

¹² Job, Brian L. "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Dilemmas of Middle Powers." *Issues and Studies* 56, no. 2 (2020): 1-24.

¹³ Gecelovsky, Paul. "Constructing a Middle Power: Ideas and Canadian Foreign Policy." *Canadian Foreign Policy* 15, no. 1 (2009): 77-IV., p.78

Norway and Sweden are middle powers.”¹⁴ This paper will focus on middle powers as “states that have both middling power capabilities and who adopt the behavioral traits of “middlepowermanship.””¹⁵ It will also examine states such as South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, also considered middle powers but with a distinct neighboring threat or issue forcing them to maintain such middlepowermanship.

CANADA AS A MIDDLE POWER THROUGH CAPABILITIES AND BEHAVIOUR

The term middle power:

Entered the lexicon of the Canadian foreign policy community in the early twentieth century when it was invoked to draw attention to the disproportionate capabilities of medium states relative to smaller ones and later to narrow the status gap between great and middle powers.¹⁶

During the second World War, Canada’s role grew from a small (in capacity) colonized nation to a voice that deserved to be heard in worldwide circles, following the state’s efforts in diplomacy, material and people capacity, and international influence . This war commitment also explains why, since the end of the second World War, Canada’s ”desire to be an active international actor in multilateral undertakings pulled the country in two directions simultaneously - collective security under the United Nations, and collective defence under NATO.”¹⁷ In some areas such as civil aviation, food production and atomic energy, Canada was “significantly qualified to play the equivalent of a "great power" role because of its competence and interest in those areas.”¹⁸

¹⁴ Stephen, Matthew. "The Concept and Role of Middle Powers during Global Rebalancing." *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* 14, no. 2 (2013): 36-52., p.45

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 36

¹⁶ Bernard, Prosper, Jr. "Canada and Human Security: From the Axworthy Doctrine to Middle Power Internationalism." *The American Review of Canadian Studies* 36, no. 2 (2006): 233-261, 399., p.233

¹⁷ Jockel, Joe and Joel Sokolosky. "Lloyd Axworthy's Legacy: Human Security and the Rescue of Canadian Defence Policy." *International Journal* 56, no. 1 (2001): 1., p.7

¹⁸ Bernard, Prosper, Jr. "Canada and Human Security: From the Axworthy Doctrine to Middle Power Internationalism." *The American Review of Canadian Studies* 36, no. 2 (2006): 233-261, 399., p.247

However, as described before, capability alone would not be sufficient to endorse Canada in the great power debate. The Nation, under the internationalism or willingness to shape the international dialogue is accepted “for what it is-a medium power with a limited ability to shape international outcomes.”¹⁹

Many power theorists tend to correlate capabilities with tangible or materialistically obtainable effects. However, when it comes to diplomacy and how a state can influence international behavior, “These capabilities need not be exclusively material or resource-based, but can include less tangible capabilities such as strong state structures, internal cohesion, diplomatic skill, and leadership.”²⁰ From a tangible positional perspective, Canada is not a typical middle power, and is an interesting case as “a rich and secure country, perhaps best exemplified by its status as a member of the Group of Seven (G7) and its privileged position as one of Washington’s closest allies.”²¹ Furthermore, economically, Canada has the 9th largest economy in the world (based on the 2020 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) data from the World Bank). As one of the most important world economies, and through a more selective middle-power diplomacy, Canada, an atypical middle power, now possesses a “dual status: it has international obligations through its G-7 membership and middle-power commitments in other forums.”²² Through the lens of the professor and author Prosper Bernard Jr middle power internationalism, Canada has the material capability means to cultivate international endeavors correlating to its international reputation, if so desired.²³ Conversely, in his 2000 essay *The*

¹⁹ *Ibid*

²⁰ Stephen, Matthew. "The Concept and Role of Middle Powers during Global Rebalancing." *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* 14, no. 2 (2013): 36-52., p.37

²¹ Greco, Sara and Stéfanie von Hlatky. "Soft Contributions are Hard Commitments: NATO and Canada's Global Security Agenda." *Canadian Foreign Policy* 24, no. 3 (2018): 273-285., p.274

²² Potter, Evan H. "Niche Diplomacy as Canadian Foreign Policy." *International Journal* 52, no. 1 (1997): 25., p.3

²³ Bernard, Prosper, Jr. "Canada and Human Security: From the Axworthy Doctrine to Middle Power Internationalism." *The American Review of Canadian Studies* 36, no. 2 (2006): 233-261, 399.

Canadian middle power myth, Adam Chapnick is quick to discredit Canada's global influence by stating that "The history of middlepowerhood uncovers a tradition of Canadian rhetoric crafted to justify the attainment of disproportionate influence in international affairs."²⁴

It is important to look at Canada's institutional multilateralism not only from a tangible capability point of view, but also from state's reputation and behavioral actions. First, Canada is "regarded by developing countries as having no colonial baggage and a genuine desire to lend a hand."²⁵ Other middle powers share the same desire to respect and protect the rules-based order and moderate potential escalating international conflicts. These states are collectively regarded as "potentially more wiser or virtuous" than other states, because their actions are judged to be motivated less by self-interest than by service to the international community.²⁶ Since the post-1989 era, and through middle power activism, Canada has been able to maintain its diplomatic central role and international reputation, mainly supported and "championed by proactive politicians and supportive governments."²⁷ With government involvement comes political influence, and although Canada is perceived to be driven by self-interest, the major United States (US)-Canadian connection cannot be ignored. Therefore, "Pressures on middle powers and small states to rally around US-led [...] campaigns reversed their perceived independence and capacities for diplomatic maneuvering."²⁸ One can only understand the liberal democratic norms and values biases that comes with this "cooperation".

²⁴ Chapnick, Adam. "The Canadian Middle Power Myth." *International Journal* 55, no. 2 (2000): 188., p.2

²⁵ Kilford, Christopher R., Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. Wing, 1 7, and Canadian Defence Academy. *The Other Cold War: Canada's Military Assistance to the Developing World, 1945-1975*. Kingston, Ont: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2010., p.2

²⁶ Gecelovsky, Paul. "Constructing a Middle Power: Ideas and Canadian Foreign Policy." *Canadian Foreign Policy* 15, no. 1 (2009): 77-IV., p.78

²⁷ Job, Brian L. "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Dilemmas of Middle Powers." *Issues and Studies* 56, no. 2 (2020): 1-24., p.13

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 5

Canada definitely has a place as a top-tier middle power shareholder,²⁹ and has demonstrated its capability and behaviour towards middlepowermanship. The state has established that from an economic and political point of view, it “is not a minor international player even though modesty may often make us think so.”³⁰ However, many other middle powers have been demonstrating the same willingness to influence the international community.³¹ What separates Canada from the herd of middle power states?

CANADA IS A “DIFFERENT” MIDDLE POWER

As mentioned previously, Canada is the ninth largest economy in the world. Of the eight countries that possess larger economic figures, two of them are widely considered to be great powers, which comes with their own economic and political obligations – they are the US and China. The remaining six are either major powers or would be considered to be major regional powers, such as Japan, Germany, India, and France. From the 2020 GDP Data list, Canada possesses the best economy of the middle powers, followed closely by South Korea. The Russian Federation, considered a great power due to many categories other than GDP, including nuclear power, has the 11th largest economy in the world.³² If required and called upon, Canada would have materialistic capability to fulfill a wide array of mandates. However, while Canada is financially prosperous, it does not mean that national interests would be in line with what is on the international agenda.

²⁹ Zyla, Benjamin. "Explaining Canada's Practices of Burden-Sharing in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) through its Norm of "External Responsibility"." *International Journal* 68, no. 2 (2013): 289-304., p.295

³⁰ Kilford, Christopher R., Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. Wing, 1 7, and Canadian Defence Academy. *The Other Cold War: Canada's Military Assistance to the Developing World, 1945-1975*. Kingston, Ont: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2010., p.8

³¹ Stephen, Matthew. "The Concept and Role of Middle Powers during Global Rebalancing." *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* 14, no. 2 (2013): 36-52.

³² All Data coming from the world bank. Internet: GDP.pdf (worldbank.org) Accessed 28 April 2022

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Canada has the 13th highest level of defence expenditure in the world.³³ Of the 12 other states have spent more on defence in the recent years, many have no choice given regional factors, imminent threats, and political goals.³⁴ South Korea has been spending heavily on defence since the Korean peninsula conflict, due to the threat from North Korea. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are both dealing with internal instability and external Middle Eastern risks. Countries such as Japan and Australia are facing the ever-growing political influence and military menace of China. Canada, having the US as a neighboring military partner, is still in the top 15 of defence spenders. Therefore, Canada continues to be capable of being strong at home, secure in North America, and most importantly, engaged worldwide from a defence and foreign policy point of view.³⁵

It is important to note that “While the range of behaviour for middle powers may be circumscribed by the activities and interests of the major powers, middle powers, like Canada, can, and do, play a productive role in the international system in certain "functional" areas.”³⁶ For example, within the complex Asia-Pacific security order, middle power states such as Australia and South Korea play a vital role in preserving the rules-based order against China and North Korea, two authoritarian countries gaining regional and global influence. Furthermore, South Korea “may have arrived as an important middle power in Asia, mediating both developed and developing worlds, as well as between China and the United States in the Korean

³³ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2022 Fact Sheet (for 2021). Internet: <https://www.sipri.org/databases>. Accessed: 28 April 2022

³⁴ Kilford, Christopher R., Canada. Canada's New Defence Policy: A Huge Step in the Right Direction., Canadian Defence Academy Institute Analysis, (2017): 11., p.8

³⁵ *Ibid*

³⁶ Gecelovsky, Paul. "Constructing a Middle Power: Ideas and Canadian Foreign Policy." *Canadian Foreign Policy* 15, no. 1 (2009): 77-IV., p.78

peninsula.”³⁷ However, Canada has been a historical security actor in the Asia-Pacific through WWII and the Korean Peninsula conflict, and can continue delivering and exporting, alongside Australia and South Korea, more neutral security in the area while projecting the Nation’s foreign policy agenda.³⁸

As noted by multiple international relations academics, the end of the Cold War “afforded middle powers like Canada greater foreign policy latitude.”³⁹ Additionally, although not a foreign policy, Canada’s Strong, Secure, and Engaged (SSE) Defence Policy makes clear that Canada is a relative island of stability by virtue of our geography, our history, our diversity, and our natural wealth.⁴⁰ As author Paul Gecelovsky described in his article *Constructing a middle power: Ideas and Canadian foreign policy*, “The middle power concept is important because it has guided policy makers in formulating Canada's foreign policy in the postwar period, not because it has proven accurate as an adjective in describing that policy.”⁴¹ A foreign Policy that have forged the country’s diplomatic, military, economic and multilateral approach since the end of the Cold War.

CANADA AND FOREIGN POLICY

As previously established, Canada fits in the middle power realm and could, if required, influence the world order. To do so, Canada would require a foreign policy agenda in accordance

³⁷ Stephen, Matthew. "The Concept and Role of Middle Powers during Global Rebalancing." *Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations* 14, no. 2 (2013): 36-52., p.49

³⁸ Job, Brian L. "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Dilemmas of Middle Powers." *Issues and Studies* 56, no. 2 (2020): 1-24.

³⁹ Bernard, Prosper, Jr. "Canada and Human Security: From the Axworthy Doctrine to Middle Power Internationalism." *The American Review of Canadian Studies* 36, no. 2 (2006): 233-261, 399., p. 235

⁴⁰ Kilford, Christopher R., Canada. Canada's New Defence Policy: A Huge Step in the Right Direction., Canadian Defence Academy Institute Analysis, (2017): 11., p.6

⁴¹ Gecelovsky, Paul. "Constructing a Middle Power: Ideas and Canadian Foreign Policy." *Canadian Foreign Policy* 15, no. 1 (2009): 77-IV., p.80

with the country's national interest and in line with the nation's international capabilities and willingness. For example, before 1989, what was "of particular concern to Canadian officials during the Cold War was the prevention of conflict escalation, which could culminate in a deadly nuclear exchange between the two superpowers."⁴² Canada's foreign policy during the Cold War supported the American approach of the rules-based order and deterrence, but already the country's view on security "tended [...] to regard poverty, inequality, and tyranny as the root causes of revolution, not an international communist conspiracy."⁴³

Following the Cold War, a new foreign policy era emerged. This policy was best described by Prosper Bernard Jr in his paper *Canada and Human security: from Axworthy doctrine to middle power internationalism* as:

[The] 1990s has been the result of changes in the international system as well as in Canada's economic condition. The end of the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union and the anticipation of a more multipolar system created new opportunities for middle powers to shape international affairs.⁴⁴

AXWORTHY'S INFLUENCE ON CANADA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Lloyd Axworthy, Canada's Foreign Affairs Minister from January 1996 to October 2000, influenced Canada's foreign policy tendencies, "championed human security and believed that Canada could play a central role in promoting it worldwide."⁴⁵ He shaped the country's willingness to participate in a multilateral security method, following years of bilateral

⁴² Bernard, Prosper, Jr. "Canada and Human Security: From the Axworthy Doctrine to Middle Power Internationalism." *The American Review of Canadian Studies* 36, no. 2 (2006): 233-261, 399., p. 247

⁴³ Jockel, Joe and Joel Sokolosky. "Lloyd Axworthy's Legacy: Human Security and the Rescue of Canadian Defence Policy." *International Journal* 56, no. 1 (2001): 1., p.9

⁴⁴ Bernard, Prosper, Jr. "Canada and Human Security: From the Axworthy Doctrine to Middle Power Internationalism." *The American Review of Canadian Studies* 36, no. 2 (2006): 233-261, 399., p. 256

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 233

international behaviour. As foreign affairs minister, he safeguarded the human security agenda which “served as a template for a new perspective on Canada’s relations with the outside world that placed the rights, safety, and lives of people first.”⁴⁶ One key ingredient of Axworthy’s new foreign policy on human security was its soft power approach emphasizing “networking and coalition-building among civil society groups.”⁴⁷ Joseph Nye, the “father” of the soft power ideology, explained that “others’ behavior can be affected in three main ways: threats of coercion; inducements and payments; and attraction that makes others want what you want.”⁴⁸ He therefore coined the concept of soft power as “the ability of affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment.”⁴⁹ The Axworthy Doctrine, although relying heavily on soft power, also depended on “like-minded nations and non-governmental organizations [as the] primary instruments.”⁵⁰ Through governmental networking, multilateral non-governmental engagements and soft power strategies, Canada played a pivotal role in the Ottawa Convention to ban antipersonnel landmines, as well as the Rome Statute to establish a permanent international criminal court.⁵¹ Those two examples are a small sample of what the Axworthy foreign policy Doctrine made Canada, as a middle power, achieved through cooperation of like-minded participants’ cooperation. As Prosper Bernard Jr

⁴⁶ Cheung-Gertler, Jasmin H. "A Model Power for a Troubled World?" *International Journal* 62, no. 3 (2007): 589-607., p.590

⁴⁷ Moens, Alexander. "Afghanistan and the Revolution in Canadian Foreign Policy." *International Journal* 63, no. 3 (2008): 569-586., p.569

⁴⁸ Nye, Joseph S. "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, no. 1 (2008): 94-109., P.94

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 96

⁵⁰ Bernard, Prosper, Jr. "Canada and Human Security: From the Axworthy Doctrine to Middle Power Internationalism." *The American Review of Canadian Studies* 36, no. 2 (2006): 233-261,399., p. 233

⁵¹ Cheung-Gertler, Jasmin H. "A Model Power for a Troubled World?" *International Journal* 62, no. 3 (2007): 589-607., p.590

summarized, “the Axworthy doctrine contends that Canada's ability to achieve progress in the human security agenda depends more on its possession of soft power than hard power assets.”⁵²

Many academics and diplomatic analysts have argued the overall value and interest of the Axworthy style of foreign policy.⁵³ Canada, from a liberal democratic middle power point of view, and through the nation’s commitment to the rule of law and human security, does possess a fair amount of soft power influence. It is questionable, however, whether Canada has exercised the level of soft power Axworthy has claimed it possesses.⁵⁴ In the late 1990’s, the Canadian Forces was going through a period of darkness where budget and troops were significantly diminished, thus greatly reducing the country’s hard power capabilities, only allowing foreign policy to be influenced via soft power means. The major consequences of “overplaying soft power and underfunding hard power resources was that projecting Canadian values abroad became the primary goal of Canadian foreign policy.”⁵⁵ It is important to mention that during this period, the Minister of Foreign Affairs did not completely abandoned the idea of hard power. In Kosovo, for example, Axworthy understood the explicit need to execute foreign policy and security through hard power capabilities, while also influencing the international scale using Canadian’s value as the soft power strategy.⁵⁶ The Kosovo example, though a niche diplomatic point of view, best illustrates why “Axworthy especially deserves credit for recognizing the potential relationship between the military and other agents, both governmental and non-

⁵² Bernard, Prosper, Jr. "Canada and Human Security: From the Axworthy Doctrine to Middle Power Internationalism." *The American Review of Canadian Studies* 36, no. 2 (2006): 233-261, 399., p. 234

⁵³ Cheung-Gertler, Jasmin H. "A Model Power for a Troubled World?" *International Journal* 62, no. 3 (2007): 589-607.

⁵⁴ Bernard, Prosper, Jr. "Canada and Human Security: From the Axworthy Doctrine to Middle Power Internationalism." *The American Review of Canadian Studies* 36, no. 2 (2006): 233-261, 399

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 242

⁵⁶ Jockel, Joe and Joel Sokolosky. "Lloyd Axworthy's Legacy: Human Security and the Rescue of Canadian Defence Policy." *International Journal* 56, no. 1 (2001): 1.

governmental, of overseas intervention in support of human security.”⁵⁷ By doing so, he introduced the idea of foreign policy smart power influence on international security; smart power a combination of hard alongside soft power strategy is described as a “tailored approach that is calibrated based on a careful assessment of political and security objectives.”⁵⁸ This is an idea that is still serving Canada’s view on international influence today.

PAUL MARTIN’S FOREIGN POLICY: TRANSITION TO HARD POWER APPROACH

As mentioned earlier, during the Axworthy foreign policy period, “while it was cheaper to maintain this form of international activism, Canada's hard power assets were left to atrophy.”⁵⁹ Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on US soil, an immediate and required shift to global foreign policy occurred. Human security had been at the forefront of Canada’s foreign policy for four years under Axworthy; post 11 September 2001 there was a change to international policy making, which adapted “to a combination of fear and threat that privileged public security, counterterrorism and defence expenditures over human rights, foreign aid, and international development.”⁶⁰ Canada and other middle power nations had to adjust and align their foreign policy and international security priorities to address this new international situation and promote multilateralism.⁶¹ The US led this new world order, and promoted a liberal democratic rules-based order. Anyone involved in the war on terror post 11 September 2001 would therefore be encouraging this ideology. For the public policy maker, “liberal

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 5

⁵⁸ Greco, Sara and Stéfanie von Hlatky. "Soft Contributions are Hard Commitments: NATO and Canada's Global Security Agenda." *Canadian Foreign Policy* 24, no. 3 (2018): 273-285., p.279

⁵⁹ Bernard, Prosper, Jr. "Canada and Human Security: From the Axworthy Doctrine to Middle Power Internationalism." *The American Review of Canadian Studies* 36, no. 2 (2006): 233-261,399., p. 235

⁶⁰ Cheung-Gertler, Jasmin H. "A Model Power for a Troubled World?" *International Journal* 62, no. 3 (2007): 589-607., p.590

⁶¹ Bernard, Prosper, Jr. "Canada and Human Security: From the Axworthy Doctrine to Middle Power Internationalism." *The American Review of Canadian Studies* 36, no. 2 (2006): 233-261,399

internationalism (of which human security is a constituent part) had been assimilated into the language of interventionism and the use of force.”⁶²

Paul Martin, Canada’s Prime Minister from 2003 until 2006, followed suit with his approach to Canada’s tactic to foreign policy and global security. Under his mandate, the Canadian government “moved closer to middle power internationalism, an alternative foreign policy model [...] which in turn changed the manner Ottawa promoted human security.”⁶³ Middle power internationalism holds its roots in the understanding that though “non-state actors and weaker states command greater influence today, great power participation is instrumental”⁶⁴ to the success of the international security agenda. One of the main reasons why a shift towards middle power internationalism was needed is best exemplified with the Mine Ban Treaty. Although the Treaty had been signed successfully “by more than 140 countries, the world’s principal military powers the United States, Russia, China, and India have remained outside the treaty”⁶⁵; their absence delineates a clear impediment, not only to the Mine Ban itself, but to the Axworthy approach to foreign policy. Martin’s goal was to ensure Canada’s foreign policy would be heard by the international community by maintaining and increasing the Canadian – US cooperation through a multitude of avenues. The collaboration already existed through the North American Aerospace Defence Command since the 1950s, the signing of the smart border agreement in 2001, and the publication of Canada’s first national security policy in 2004; Martin bolstered the alliance and ensured public security and defence of North America were at the

⁶² Cheung-Gertler, Jasmin H. "A Model Power for a Troubled World?" *International Journal* 62, no. 3 (2007): 589-607., p.596

⁶³ Bernard, Prosper, Jr. "Canada and Human Security: From the Axworthy Doctrine to Middle Power Internationalism." *The American Review of Canadian Studies* 36, no. 2 (2006): 233-261, 399., p. 233

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 234

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 244

forefront of governmental talks.⁶⁶ Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which transformed the rules-based world order and catapulted the requirement for hard power conflict resolution, “human security perspectives were supplanted by a focus on interoperable and combat-capable military forces, stabilization in failed and failing states, the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the war on terror.”⁶⁷

2008 AND BEYOND: DEFENCE STRATEGY AS FOREIGN POLICY

Following Paul Martin’s time as Prime Minister, Canada’s foreign policy experienced a succession of policy trials centering either around the Axworthy doctrine or on a more traditional hard power projection of ideologies. Under Stephen Harper’s government, Canada continued to strengthen its relationship with the US through the participation in the War on Terror, while also promoting the United Nations, peacekeeping, and multilateralism. Sometimes seen as incoherent and ideological, little was done to drastically change the foreign policy efforts that commenced post-Cold War.

Though many defence policies or defence sections have been written since Paul Martin’s time, no official written foreign policy has been produced by the Canadian government in many years. However, many argue that policy or norms can be delivered through official government speeches as well as written form.⁶⁸ Therefore, speeches such as the 2017 address by Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland on Canada’s foreign policy could be considered Canadian official policy.⁶⁹ The address was eloquently delivered only one day before the release

⁶⁶ Cheung-Gertler, Jasmin H. "A Model Power for a Troubled World?" *International Journal* 62, no. 3 (2007): 589-607.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 591

⁶⁸ Zyla, Benjamin. "Explaining Canada's Practices of Burden-Sharing in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) through its Norm of "External Responsibility"." *International Journal* 68, no. 2 (2013): 289-304.

⁶⁹ Internet: Address by Minister Freeland on Canada’s foreign policy priorities - Canada.ca Accessed: 30 April 2022

of the 2017 SSE, Canada's Defence Policy which "intentionally or not, [was] very much a broad statement of Canada's foreign policy."⁷⁰ The 2017 defence policy follows a succession of previously approved defence strategies, and represents a "synthesis of Bill Graham's 2005 defence section of the short-lived, International Policy Statement and Peter Mackay's 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy."⁷¹ The end of the Cold War represented a major turning point in global rules-based order and international required state's behaviour. However, excluding the 2014 Russian's annexation of Crimea and the current conflict in Ukraine, given the global security situation of the mid 2010s, "it [was] hard to imagine why any future Canadian government would seriously consider departing from it [defence policy]."⁷² It is also arguable, given Russia's indicators that the current Ukrainian conflict was or could have been predicted.

The foreign policy themes contained in SSE are: Canada's traditional allies, Asia-Pacific, Middle East, Africa, International organizations and treaties, Climate change, and Terrorism. Moreover, the country's national and strategic interests, norms, and values are clearly defining that Canada ought to endorse "global stability, the primacy of the rules-based international order, and the principle of collective defence."⁷³ To promote such a large national and international agenda, Canada would have to resort to already discussed themes such as middle power internationalism, multilateralism focusing on both collective security and collective defence through established alliances, and international relations.

⁷⁰ Kilford, Christopher R., Canada. Canada's New Defence Policy: A Huge Step in the Right Direction., Canadian Defence Academy Institute Analysis, (2017): 11., p.3

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 2

⁷² *Ibid.*, 2

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 6

CANADA IN TODAY'S SECURITY CHALLENGES: A SMART POWER APPROACH

Today, like only a few other times in recent history, the world can understand the gravity of threats without borders – namely the novel Coronavirus which propelled the world into the current COVID-19 pandemic. The author of *A model power for a trouble world?*, Jasmin Cheung-Gertler, best described this reality by stating that “like environmental degradation and disease epidemics, this was exactly the kind of “new threat”—transnational, non-territorial, non-political, and indiscriminate—that had been heralded as the primary challenge to international security and stability in a post-Westphalian world.”⁷⁴ The author explained the correlation between non-governmental and non-territorial threats and human security:

Many of the Millennium Development Goals, such as the halving of extreme poverty by 2015, universal access to primary education, gender equality, combating HIV/AIDs, promoting environmental sustainability, and a global partnership for sustainable development, reflected a distinctly human security perspective on the relationship between security, development, and human rights.⁷⁵

Human security, for the first time since the establishment of States and borders in 1648, was forcing public policy makers to examine international security issues from a “people point of reference rather than focusing on the security of territory or governments.”⁷⁶ This concept⁷⁷ was already understood and somewhat applied throughout the Axworthy period. He understood that like economic security and food security (now water security), human security was about

⁷⁴ Cheung-Gertler, Jasmin H. "A Model Power for a Troubled World?" *International Journal* 62, no. 3 (2007): 589-607., p.589

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 590

⁷⁶ Jockel, Joe and Joel Sokolosky. "Lloyd Axworthy's Legacy: Human Security and the Rescue of Canadian Defence Policy." *International Journal* 56, no. 1 (2001): 1., p.2

⁷⁷ For the purpose of this paper Human security is described by Prosper Bernard Jr and Joe Jockel as: “a term popularized by the United Nations Development Program, refers to the physical safety and material welfare of people.”

protection. However, policy leaders including Axworthy agreed that Canada's human security agenda was vulnerable by only using a soft power approach, and moved to "adapt the human security framework to address the negative consequences of inaction in situations of dire humanitarian emergency."⁷⁸

In the late 1990's there was significant evidence that though Canada possessed the abundance of soft power required for the human security agenda, the security problems had outgrown this approach; this gap led to a "rethinking of humanitarian policies and perspectives in Canada and abroad."⁷⁹ Canada then focused on promoting human security through its already well-informed middle power internationalism and multilateralism. To do so, Bernard Jr explained:

On the other hand, the human security approach guided by middle power internationalism attempted to narrow its focus, prioritizing among human security's various components. Moreover, the approach placed greater emphasis on hard power, and Ottawa seemed more inclined to engaging and coordinating with great powers as a means of advancing its human security goals.⁸⁰

As discussed earlier, in the 1990's Canada was going through a military re-adjustment; although the Canadian government was inclined engage with great powers to advance the human security agenda, the state did not have "ability to decisively influence either political or military outcomes based on its material capabilities alone."⁸¹ Canada had to rely on both hard and soft power to have a successful human security system.

⁷⁸ Cheung-Gertler, Jasmin H. "A Model Power for a Troubled World?" *International Journal* 62, no. 3 (2007): 589-607., p.593

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 593

⁸⁰ Bernard, Prosper, Jr. "Canada and Human Security: From the Axworthy Doctrine to Middle Power Internationalism." *The American Review of Canadian Studies* 36, no. 2 (2006): 233-261, 399. p.233

⁸¹ Greco, Sara and Stéfanie von Hlatky. "Soft Contributions are Hard Commitments: NATO and Canada's Global Security Agenda." *Canadian Foreign Policy* 24, no. 3 (2018): 273-285., p.278

Other international organizations and alliances have adapted to the smart power concept to use the military in a non-coercive manner. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was once the stronghold of conventional and nuclear deterrence, had to transform into an international alliance responsible for conflict management and security cooperation.⁸² NATO rallied around the human security agenda, making other countries within the alliance responsible and accountable for “peace in disintegrating states outside of its traditional theatre of jurisdiction”⁸³ and to look beyond collective defence. Canada’s first response to the new NATO mandate was the peacekeeping intervention in Kosovo. Although an armed conflict which differentiated from other peacekeeping missions, Ottawa justified sending Canadian Forces explicitly or implicitly in support of human security.⁸⁴ Another example of Canadian participation in smart power armed conflict was the Canadian Forces commitment to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. This was initially considered a hard power commitment, but during the campaign the armed forces used the 3D⁸⁵ approach “in which diplomacy, development, and defence form a single team helped the population in failed states such as [...] Afghanistan.”⁸⁶ And by late 2006, “some 2,500 members of the Canadian forces had been deployed to Afghanistan.”⁸⁷ While Canada and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) had been deployed to many peacekeeping missions before the War on Terror, the

⁸² *Ibid*

⁸³ Cheung-Gertler, Jasmin H. "A Model Power for a Troubled World?" *International Journal* 62, no. 3 (2007): 589-607., p.593

⁸⁴ Jockel, Joe and Joel Sokolosky. "Lloyd Axworthy's Legacy: Human Security and the Rescue of Canadian Defence Policy." *International Journal* 56, no. 1 (2001): 1.

⁸⁵ Three-block operational approach developed by the US Marine Corps is also defined by Moens whereby soldiers are trained to move quickly from peace enforcement to stabilization to humanitarian assistance and civil reconstruction operations.

⁸⁶ Moens, Alexander. "Afghanistan and the Revolution in Canadian Foreign Policy." *International Journal* 63, no. 3 (2008): 569-586., p.570

⁸⁷ Cheung-Gertler, Jasmin H. "A Model Power for a Troubled World?" *International Journal* 62, no. 3 (2007): 589-607., p.592

commitment to ISAF marked the first used on the 3D approach, establishing the beginning of the smart power international military training assistance practice for the nation.

MILITARY TRAINING AND COOPERATION: A DIPLOMATIC INSTRUMENT

Providing military assistance is not new to Canada's foreign and defence policy agendas. In effect, "the provision of equipment, advice or training to the armed forces of a recipient country, was an area in which Canada and the Canadian Forces became significantly, if somewhat haphazardly, involved after 1945."⁸⁸ Originally, the term military assistance or military training assistance described a "long-standing practice involv[ing] stronger or more developed states using their armed forces to assist and train allied armed forces for synergistic effect."⁸⁹ In 1997, the diplomatic author Evan Potter explained that:

It is expensive and highly inefficient to use soldiers as peace-builders. When Canada responds to intra-state conflict, there must be more discipline in the division of labour among Canada's non-governmental organizations, the military, and other governmental agencies and departments.⁹⁰

In other words, modifying the defence policy approach to a more calibrated and responsive 3D approach would better serve Canada's national and international interests. Building this new defence policy created an instrument of foreign policy through military training and cooperation acting as a "strategic Canadian diplomatic door-opener [and] a combat force multiplier for Canada's defence partners."⁹¹

Canada was among the first nations to commit troops to ISAF. There were many reasons for the country to be rapidly involved in the War on Terror, including because "offering military

⁸⁸ Kilford, Christopher R., Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. Wing, 1 7, and Canadian Defence Academy. *The Other Cold War: Canada's Military Assistance to the Developing World, 1945-1975*. Kingston, Ont: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2010., p.1

⁸⁹ Rasiulis, Andrew. *Military Training and Co-Operation* Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2018., p.1

⁹⁰ Potter, Evan H. "Niche Diplomacy as Canadian Foreign Policy." *International Journal* 52, no. 1 (1997): 25., p. 4

⁹¹ Rasiulis, Andrew. *Military Training and Co-Operation* Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2018., p.1

assistance [...] served Canada's domestic and foreign policy interests."⁹² Most importantly, Canada was also among the first states to provide "civilian advisers, and reconstruction aid to Afghanistan after US forces toppled the Taliban in late 2001."⁹³ Shortly after the early CAF commitment in Afghanistan, Canada took on a leadership role in Kandahar where "The most visible showcase for 3D had been Canada's provincial reconstruction team (PRT), which, since mid-2005, has worked [...] to provide clean water and build new roads as well to provide the security needed to rebuild a stable political order."⁹⁴ Canada's main focus through its ISAF participation and PRT involvement and leadership was directly in line with a military assistance training mission which, among other things, involved re-construction, training the Afghan military and police forces, and hopefully rebuilding the civil society. During that period, "even the Canadian government websites that address Canada's involvement in ISAF, the normative themes of development and stability, and education and training, [were] visible."⁹⁵

OTHER MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION EXAMPLES

Canada and the CAF have been deployed on multiple military interventions, from peacekeeping to combat operations. Involvement in these military interventions was mainly driven from Canadian values and liberal democratic perspectives. During the Cold War, "it was frequently argued that Canadian military intervention abroad served the national interest by helping to

⁹² Kilford, Christopher R., Canada. Canadian Armed Forces. Wing, 1 7, and Canadian Defence Academy. *The Other Cold War: Canada's Military Assistance to the Developing World, 1945-1975*. Kingston, Ont: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2010., p.1

⁹³ Moens, Alexander. "Afghanistan and the Revolution in Canadian Foreign Policy." *International Journal* 63, no. 3 (2008): 569-586., p.571

⁹⁴ Cheung-Gertler, Jasmin H. "A Model Power for a Troubled World?" *International Journal* 62, no. 3 (2007): 589-607., p. 592

⁹⁵ Greco, Sara and Stéfanie von Hlatky. "Soft Contributions are Hard Commitments: NATO and Canada's Global Security Agenda." *Canadian Foreign Policy* 24, no. 3 (2018): 273-285., p.281

strengthen the national identity.”⁹⁶ Missions in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, East Timor, and Kosovo, to name a few, also proved imperative against Soviet expansionism.⁹⁷ In the 1990’s, Canada displayed a smart power approach in a NATO mission in the Balkans by sending troops, diplomats, and monies to help restore civil wars, prevent genocide and humanitarian disaster.⁹⁸ In 1996, Canada was also involved in UN-sanctioned mission in Zaire where the nation’s leadership in the humanitarian relief mission and the display of diplomacy in service to the rule of law was praised by the international community.⁹⁹

More recently, new global threat considerations have emerged in the Asia-Pacific with China, and in Eurasia with Russia. To deal with the latter risk, NATO used the 3D approach through military assistance operations “to deter Russia and reassure allies, and how to appear “not dominant” yet “not irrelevant” at same time.”¹⁰⁰ Therefore, NATO stood up Operation REASSURANCE, which has a sea and air element ready to intervene in Europe and a land component in Latvia. Alongside nations such as the US, Germany, and the UK, Canada has taken a leadership role in the area. Although there are debates over the CAF objectives and effectiveness in the operation, as well as overall deterrence success, there is a broad agreement that troops should remain in Latvia to continue conducting training and exercises to help maintain a more secure and stable Europe.¹⁰¹ Within Operation IMPACT, the Canadian whole-of-government approach to the Middle East, the CAF has been using the train-the-trainer

⁹⁶ Jockel, Joe and Joel Sokolosky. "Lloyd Axworthy's Legacy: Human Security and the Rescue of Canadian Defence Policy." *International Journal* 56, no. 1 (2001): 1., p.3

⁹⁷ Cheung-Gertler, Jasmin H. "A Model Power for a Troubled World?" *International Journal* 62, no. 3 (2007): 589-607.

⁹⁸ Zyla, Benjamin. "Explaining Canada's Practices of Burden-Sharing in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) through its Norm of "External Responsibility"." *International Journal* 68, no. 2 (2013): 289-304.

⁹⁹ Potter, Evan H. "Niche Diplomacy as Canadian Foreign Policy." *International Journal* 52, no. 1 (1997): 25.

¹⁰⁰ Jackson, Nicole J. "Canada, NATO, and Global Russia." *International Journal* 73, no. 2 (2018): 317-325., p.322

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*

approach with partners such as the Iraqi Security Forces to build their capacity to prevent the spread of violent extremism.”¹⁰² The mission to build military capability also extended to Jordan and Lebanon. Finally and more pressingly, the world is currently seeing the positive consequences of the CAF involvement to support the Security Forces of Ukraine under Operation UNIFIER. Operation UNIFIER was created to enhance the capacity and reform the Ukrainian Armed Forces; the current conflict is too recent to be analyzed properly and without bias. Although military training assistance has known limitations, most of the critical literature neglects to analyze the approach from a smart power perspectives, often using and citing examples where either soft or hard power were used, but not both. A deeper look into the consequences of the Afghanistan situation and the Ukrainian conflict will be required in order to further the discussion.

CONCLUSION

This paper argued that, although the world is in a great power competition era, Canada as a middle power, can continue to be a major exporter of international security. The essay first conveyed the reality of the middle power notion and how states qualifying under this concept differ from great power and smaller countries. It then explained how Canada, as a middle power, forged its international identity, since the World Wars through middle power internationalism. Using multilateralism as a corner stone, Canada has been building its global influence through its capabilities and state’s behavior towards international security challenges. Finally, it reasoned that Canada’s influence in response of security risk would be best served using a smart power approach to military training assistance and cooperation. The CAF and Canadian non-governmental

¹⁰² Rasiulis, Andrew. *Military Training and Co-Operation* Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2018., p.3

organizations using the diplomacy, development and defence or 3D method, has proven to be the most efficient way to tackle international security conflicts.

Although there are multiple mixed reviews regarding the CAF participation in military assistance missions, a deeper analyses on the use of smart power alongside military assistance and cooperation should be conducted to advance the field of research.

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