



Harnessing Canada's Diversity to Leverage the Lessons of the Past

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JCSP 48

Exercise Solo Flight

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We must be the great arsenal of democracy. For us this is an emergency as serious as war itself. We must apply ourselves to our task with the same resolution, the same sense of urgency, the same spirit of patriotism and sacrifice, as we would show were we at war. – President Roosevelt, December 29, 1940.¹

INTRODUCTION

When President Franklin D. Roosevelt delivered his “Arsenal of Democracy” speech shortly after his nation’s entry into the Second World War, he was speaking of the latent industrial power of the United States. While Canada does not currently find itself during a global conflict, at some point in the future it might. Canada, when faced with such an emergency should unlock its metaphorical arsenal of diversity to grow the Canadian Armed Forces, CAF, and the Canadian Army to meet the threat. On the eve of the Second World War, however, Canada’s Army’s readiness was abysmal. Except for some planning documents, the Army was almost entirely unprepared for the most significant expansion in its history. The effects of the Great Depression, combined with a general feeling of unease toward standing armies within Canada, created nearly insurmountable challenges for the Army as it grew to meet the demands of the War. Nevertheless, it proved to do so despite an extreme reluctance to widely recruit beyond the narrow demographic of young, white men. While every conflict is different, the possibility of another major conflict today is not zero, given the recent war between Russia and Ukraine or China’s rising power in the Pacific region. Thus, while not probable, the massive growths of the First World War and the Second World War may be repeated. When considering the cycles of war and peace in the Western World, the relative peace following the Second World War is exemplary for its longevity; it is unlikely to continue in perpetuity.

¹ U.S., Department of State, Publication 1983, *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941* (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 598-607

The 1941 census reported 11,506,555 people living in Canada.² Amazingly, the nation would mobilize 730,159 soldiers into the Canadian Army with a peak strength of 495,804 in March of 1944.³ Between the other two services, Canada, combined with Newfoundland and Labrador, enrolled 1,159,000 people in uniform, or slightly over 10% of the population.⁴ Nevertheless, the Canadian Forces, CF, overwhelmingly grew this force from a pool of white men.⁵ When demographic breakdowns are further considered, the Army enrolled a staggering 20% of the 3,696,974 men aged between 15 and 49 as of the 1941 census.⁶ While enrolling 10% of the Canadian population might seem at first impossible or impracticable, the recruiters of the Second World War took active measures to limit the recruitment of non-white and women recruits. This paper will seek to answer two related questions. Firstly, assuming a threat to warrant an expansion was to manifest itself, what would be the policy implications of growing the Canadian Army to Second World War levels? Secondly, what would be the implications from a diversity and inclusion perspective to this growth.⁷ In answer to these questions, this paper will argue that the Canadian Army is better postured to grow to a wartime strength now than it was in 1939, given the reduction in systemic racism, changing population demographics, the inclusion of women in all occupations, and improved training methodologies.

² Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Eighth Census of Canada- 1941, Vol. 1*. (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1950), 7.

³ J.L. Granatstein, *Canada's Army: Waging and Keeping the Peace*, 3rd Ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2021), 307

⁴ Library and Archives Canada, "Service Files of the Second World War- War Dead, 1939, 1947," last modified 16 June 2021. <https://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/military-heritage/second-world-war/second-world-war-dead-1939-1947/Pages/files-second-war-dead.aspx>

⁵ While the term Canadian Forces is not an accurate descriptor to describe the pre-unification military services of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army, and the Royal Canadian Air Force, I will use the term for ease of understanding and clarity. The term Canadian Armed Forces will be used to describe the military branches of Canada post the adoption of the term in 2013.

⁶ Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 94

⁷ 2.4 million people are the same proportion, 6.3%, of soldiers relative to the current population, 38 million, of Canada.

CONTEXT

While it might be tempting to look at the Canadian Army in 1918 and assume that the Army of 1939 would be substantially better prepared for a major mobilization than in 1918, and by extension, the Army of 2022 would be better prepared given 100 years of reflection from its first significant mobilization experience. That, however, was not and is not the case. At the onset of the Second World War, the Army had atrophied dramatically from its First World War size to a Permanent Active Militia, the Regular Force of today, with an authorized strength of 4,268. The Non-Permanent Active Militia, the Reserve Force, had an authorized strength of 86,308.⁸ However, the actual state of the Canadian Army was even worse than the authorized strength might have shown. While the Permanent Force maintained its allotment of 4,261 members of all ranks at the end of July 1939, the Militia only had 51,418 members of all ranks on the last day of December 1939.⁹ Even more disturbingly, of the 51,418 members of the Militia, only 29,103 members attended training during the 1938-1939 period.¹⁰ Part of the limitation in size of the Militia during this period was the lack of equipment caused by Defence spending cuts during the Great Depression.¹¹ This total strength of 55,679 provided the nucleus around which the Army grew to 730,159 soldiers. If a pre-war full-time army of 4,261 soldiers was able to support this growth, it is reasonable to assume that the 22,123 members of the Regular Force in 2022 could support the growth of the Army to a 2.4 million soldier strong force in the same amount of time.¹² While it is true that the Army is currently unable to recruit and train soldiers to meet its

⁸ Granatstein, *Canada's Army: Waging and Keeping the Peace*, 19.

⁹ Ibid. 34

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 5th Edition. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2007), 177

¹² Department of National Defence, "Ministerial Transition Material 2021: Department of National Defence," last modified 23 February 2022, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/transition-materials/mnd-transition-material-2021-dnd.html>; the Canadian Population is approximately 38.6 million people, Statistics Canada, "Canada's Population Clock". Accessed 2 May 2022. <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/71-607-x/71-607-x2018005-eng.htm>

current authorized strength, there is a difference between recruits for a professional, peacetime army and recruits enrolled during a time of crisis.¹³ This concept will be explored later in this paper through the implications of the Special Force, the currently inactive component of the Canadian Armed Forces, CAF. To determine the actual growth required to match the Army of the Second World War, it is important to understand that the exact size of the Canadian Army is not well understood.

The question of how many soldiers served in the Canadian Army during the Second World War is not straightforward to answer. The eminent Canadian military historian J.L. Granatstein quotes the number as 730,159 in *Canada's Army* yet cited the number as “roughly 750,000 9 years earlier in an article.¹⁴ The Library and Archives of Canada place the number at 709,000. The Globe and Mail in October 1945 reported 705,000 enlistments.¹⁵ In the official history of the Canadian Army, Stacey cites the total number of enlistments between 1939 and 1945 as 604,947.¹⁶ These discrepancies are not the result of lazy research by the authors but reflect several factors both unique to the Canadian Army and common to all military history writing. One source of discrepancy can be found in the definition of what Canadian Army the author is writing about. Some sources include Newfoundlanders in their number, while the colony of Newfoundland was not yet the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador as a part of Canada. Another issue that plagues understanding of military strength to this day is how numbers are reported. The German Army in the Second World War used six different methods to

¹³ Sarah Turnbull. “‘We’ve got to grow’: Anand says CAF must recruit more troops amid heightened global uncertainty”. CTV News. Last modified: March 11, 2022,

¹⁴ Granatstein, *Canada's Army: Waging and Keeping the Peace*, 307; Granatstein, “Ethnic and Religious Enlistment in Canada During the Second World War”. *Canadian Jewish Studies*, Vol 21. (2013): 175

¹⁵ Globe and Mail, “Canadian Army Statistics”, *Globe and Mail*, 17 October 1945.

¹⁶ Library and Archives Canada; C.P. Stacey, *Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Vol. I. Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific*. (Ottawa: Queens Printer and Controller of Stationery, 1955), 526.

understand their strength, for example.¹⁷ The multiple enrollment programs into the Army, combined with the various transfers to the other branches, combat losses, and other non-combat losses, must have created multiple errors in the record keeping. Granatstein's 2021 number of 730,159 will be used for this paper, although this almost certainly must have included Newfoundlanders and Labradorians who served mainly in the British Army. Therefore, approximately 6.3% of Canada's population served in the Canadian Army during the Second World War. This number was massively over-represented by young white men from a diversity perspective.

THE CANADIAN WOMEN'S ARMY CORPS

The Army, like all branches, enrolled women into a very limited number of occupations.¹⁸ According to Veteran's Affairs Canada, "more than 50,000 women" were enrolled in the various branches during the Second World War.¹⁹ Of these 50,000, the Canadian Women's Army Corps, CWAC, was the largest, with 21,600 soldiers enrolled.²⁰ The creation of the CWAC is significant because women were authorized to serve in roles beyond nursing and other medical roles in the Canadian military for the first time.²¹ These women served in various support roles, including switchboard operators, administrative support, and the staffing of laundry facilities.²² One of the primary jobs envisioned in the public discourse for the CWAC in

¹⁷ Niklas Zetterling. *Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness*, Revised Edition. (Havertown: J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing, 2019), 2. These categories included various items including the difference between the number of soldiers who were drawing rations, the number who were detached from the unit or at the hospital or the number of soldiers available for front-line combat operations.

¹⁸ While a comprehensive study of the role of Women within the Canadian Army is beyond the scope of this paper, a good overview can be found at Barbara Warusznki et al. "Women serving in the Canadian Armed Forces: Strengthening Military Capabilities and Operational Effectiveness" *Canadian Army Journal* Vol 19, No. 2 (Spring 2019): 24:33

¹⁹ Veteran's Affairs Canada. "Women at War," last modified 27 November 2021. <https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/classroom/fact-sheets/women>

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Warusznki et al, 27

²² Stacey, 126.

1942 overseas was “the operation of a big army laundry.”²³ In what must be one of the most underwhelming recruiting campaigns in history, it is a wonder that any women enlisted in the CWAC at all.

Nevertheless, they did enlist up to the authorized strength for the Corps. Unfortunately, beyond the CWAC's relatively small, authorized strength within the broader context of the Army, Canadian women faced other forms of discrimination during their wartime service. Notably, women enrolled in the CWAC were initially paid at 70% of the men's rate although this was raised in 1943 to 80% of the salaries for the male soldiers in the Army.²⁴ This egregious wrong has been eliminated in the modern Army by eliminating gender-based pay tables. Of these 21,600 women enrolled, the vast majority served in Canada. Although only 1,984 women served in Europe within the CWAC, and some were British citizens enrolled after marrying Canadian servicemen, their service undoubtedly was critical.²⁵

The relatively small number of women who served within the CWAC as a percentage of the total force should not be taken as a lack of contribution by women to the war effort. A significant amount of historical research in the 1970s illustrated the extensive contributions women provided “on the homefront” and within the manufacturing sector.²⁶ The CWAC, combined with the military service of women in the pre-War CWAC in nursing roles, set the conditions for a gradual expansion in the inclusion of women within the Army. This inclusion did not happen rapidly, however. At the time of the creation of the Canadian Forces in 1967, for example, the number of women was capped at 1.5% of the force.²⁷ This was nearly half the ratio

²³ New York Times, “Canada to Enlarge Women’s Army Units,” *New York Times*, 6 August 1942.

²⁴ Stacey, 126.

²⁵ Ibid. 210

²⁶ A good historiography of the Second World War “homefront” literature can be found in: Allan M. Winker, “World War II Homefront: A Historiography,” *OAH Magazine of History* 16, No. 3 (Spring, 2002): 5-6,8.

²⁷ C.D., Lamerson, “The Evolution of a Mixed-Gender Canadian Forces,” *Minerva II*, No. 3 (December 1989): 19.

of the 2.8% of the Army that the CAWC had contributed to the Army at the end of the War.²⁸ Clearly, the issue was not the willingness of women to join the Army but rather the willingness of the Army to recruit women. The Canadian Human Rights Act of 1978 was a watershed moment for the Army. It “prohibited discrimination in employment on the grounds of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion...and gender.”²⁹ This Act set off a series of events that eventually resulted in women being included in all trades within the Army.

While all occupations in the CF did not include women until 2001, from an Army perspective, 1989 was a key date in that it marked the end of the Combat Related Employment of Women, CREW, trials.³⁰ These trials demonstrated the viability of including women within the so-called combat arms occupations of infantry, armour, field artillery, and combat engineer.³¹ Thirty-three years after CREW, the idea of the contribution of women in the Army has become well enshrined in all Army occupations, with 16.5% of all Army officers and 12.8% of Non-Commissioned Members, NCMs being women in 2020.³² However, these numbers are not reflective of the overall population. They are much better, however, than the inclusion of non-white Canadians. Just as the Army of 1939 was more eager or successful in recruiting white women, it appears that the Army continues to be unable to recruit non-white applicants to a level reflective of society.

²⁸ Stacey, 127.

²⁹ Lamerson, 19.

³⁰ Warusznki et al., 28

³¹ Ibid.

³² Department of National Defence. “Statistics of women in the Canadian Armed Forces,” last modified 23 September 2020. <https://www.canada.ca/en/departement-national-defence/services/women-in-the-forces/statistics.html>

BIPOC INDIVIDUALS IN THE ARMY

The experience of individuals who would today identify as Black, Indigenous, and People of Colour, BIPOC, and their inclusion in the Army during the Second World War was worse than the inclusion of women.³³ Unfortunately, the exact number of black soldiers in the Army is not definitively known but was likely “in the hundreds.”³⁴ While this number seems absurdly low given the modern demographic makeup of Canada, census data helps explain why this may have been the case. Notably, the diversity that Canada is now known for did not exist to the same extent as it did in the Second World War. The 1941 census breaks down “racial origin” in Canada along national origin lines. While this is problematic for many reasons, as are the terminologies used, the Census portrays a Canada in which 97.5% of the population identifies as either British, French, or “other European.”³⁵ The remaining 2.5% of census takers were grouped into what today might be termed BIPOC.³⁶

There has been significant scholarship around the systemic problems with census-taking caused by the impacts of colonialism, language barriers, non-compliance, or challenges caused by census wording, particularly within Indigenous populations of Canada.³⁷ As a result, these numbers are almost surely underrepresented. When the census was amended in the early 1980s to better capture Indigenous ancestry, the percentage of Indigenous people reporting Indigenous heritage in the census increased from approximately 492,465 in 1981 to 1,101,960 in 1996.³⁸

³³ The language around describing racialized people has evolved since the 1940s. For the sake of clarity, I will use the current terminology of BIPOC unless the historical terminology is required for context.

³⁴ Granatstein, “Ethnic and Religious Enlistment in Canada During the Second World War,” 177.

³⁵ Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 222.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ James Saku, “Aboriginal Census Data in Canada: A Research Note,” *The Canadian Journal of Native Studies* XIX, 2 (1999), 376. For the purposes of this paper I will rely on the definition of Colonialism provided by Canadian Heritage, *Building a Foundation for Change: Canada’s Anti-Racism strategy 2019-2022*, (Ottawa: Minister of Canadian Culture Heritage & Multiculturalism, 2019), 22

³⁸ Saku, 374

This same underrepresentation likely existed in the 1941 census as well. This underrepresentation of Indigenous people is but one element of the systemic racism that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada identified in its final report as the cultural and physical genocide against Canada's Aboriginal People.³⁹ In addition to Aboriginal people, the recruitment of visible minorities such as Black-Canadians or Canadians from East Asia within the Army was primarily left up to the discretion of individual Commanding Officers.⁴⁰ Other government policies sought to limit the involvement of non-whites within the Army as evidenced by the selective usage of immigration policy for black immigrants seeking to serve in the Canadian Army. Whereas the large number of white Americans who immigrated to Canada to join the Army was welcomed readily, the relatively small number of Black immigrants coming to Canada from the British West Indies, Barbados, and Jamaica, all British subjects, were able to join the Army but only after significant blocking on the part of the Army Headquarters.⁴¹ The problem of systemic racism was present, albeit unequally, to BIPOC individuals.

While many people of Indigenous background served within the Canadian Army, the Army in the Second World War reflected the systemic racism prevalent throughout Canada. Regardless of the under-reporting of non-European, or non-white, descendants in the 1941 census, the Army in 1941 was recruiting from a far less diverse population than the Army in 2022. The implication is that while the Army in the Second World War could meet its human resource needs by targeting white men as their primary targeting audience, the Army in 2022

³⁹ The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada. *Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada*.

⁴⁰ Mathias Joost. "Racism and Enlistment: The Second World War Policies of the Royal Canadian Air Force," *Canadian Military History*, Vol. 21, Issue 1, Article 3 (Winter 2012), 17

⁴¹ *Ibid*, 21

must leverage the diversity of Canada to scale to a similar size.⁴² In addition, and well beyond the scope of this paper, there has been extensive academic work done demonstrating the value of diversity as an operational effect.⁴³ In short, more diverse organizations produce better results. The most obvious operational example of this is the cultural and linguistic understandings that immigrants bring to the Canadian Army about their nations of birth. Within the private sector, diverse teams have been shown to make more ethical decisions, are more creative, and are less prone to groupthink.⁴⁴ While there has been significant work done to break down the systemic racism that has prevented the increase of diversity in the modern Army today, the recent analysis illustrates that this has not been wholly successful.

The Final Report of the Minister of National Defence Advisory Panel on Systemic Racism and Discrimination highlighted the systemic racism that exists both in Canadian society and specifically within the Defence Team comprising of the CAF and civilians within DND.⁴⁵ This report highlights that “with very few exceptions, the CAF (and its predecessors) recruit initially from the group identifiable as young, white, male, heterosexual, Christian and of European origin or descent.”⁴⁶ It cites a 2016 Employment and Social Development Canada report that illustrates the shift from the 97.5% white labour market in 1941 to a labour market in

⁴² The term manpower was a contemporary term and is still used today. While it is probably appropriate when describing the human resource capacity in the Second World War, this paper will use the term human resources or human resource capacity to encompass a more diverse group of people than the gendered term manpower conveys.

⁴³ See Daniel McDonald & Kizzy Parks. *Managing Diversity in the Military: The Value of Inclusion in a Culture of Uniformity*. (London: Routledge, 2012). A sub-genre of military diversity literature explores diversity in multinational operations. See Efrat Elron et al, “Why Don’t They Fight Each Other? Cultural Diversity and Operational Unity in Multinational Forces,” *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 26, No.1, (Fall 1999), pp. 73-98.

⁴⁴ Hershey Freidman et al. “Increase Diversity to Boost Creativity and Enhance Problem Solving,” *Psychosociological Issues in Human Resource Management*. Vol.4, Iss 2 (2016), 7-33

⁴⁵ Department of National Defence, *Minister of National Defence Advisory Panel on Systemic Racism and Discrimination with a focus on Anti-Indigenous and Anti-Black Racism, LGBTQ2+ Prejudice, Gender Bias, and White Supremacy: Final Report*, (Ottawa: Minister of National Defence, 2022)

⁴⁶ Ibid. 13

which 21.6% identify as visible minorities and 4% identify as Indigenous in 2016.⁴⁷ While some progress in diversifying the CAF, and by extension the Army, has been made since 1941, 71% of the CAF membership is still comprised of white males despite only representing 39% of the available workforce. ⁴⁸As previously discussed in this paper, the Army of the Second World War was likely comprised of more than 95% white males, so, in this respect, at least the Army has shown some progress. Within the DND civilian workforce, diversity numbers are somewhat better, with the percentage of white men droppings to 52.3%.⁴⁹ While 52.3% in DND is better than the CAF regarding male employment, it is still far above the average within the labour market. This breakdown indicates that white males are disproportionately represented within DND. Collectively, these two figures illustrate the challenges in developing a CAF and DND civilian force that represents Canada's diversity. An optimist might conclude that the human resource capacity of non-white men within Canada is ripe for recruitment. The pessimist that the systemic racism previously identified within the CAF has not been resolved.

POLICY CONTEXT

From a policy perspective, the National Defence Act, NDA, and the Defence Administration Orders Directives, DAODs, generally provide significant flexibility to scale up the CAF. In Part II, section 20 states that “persons shall be enrolled as officer cadets or as non-commissioned members for indefinite or fixed periods of service as may be prescribed in regulations made by the Governor in Council.”⁵⁰ The decision to place the enrollment period within regulations, in the form of several DAODs, vice it in legislation is an important one. In

⁴⁷ Employment and Social Development Canada. *2016 Employment Equity Data Report*, (Ottawa: Employment and Social Development Canada, 2016) cited in *ibid.* 14

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 15

⁴⁹ Department of National Defence, *Minister of National Defence Advisory Panel on Systemic Racism and Discrimination with a focus on Anti-Indigenous and Anti-Black Racism, LGBTQ2+ Prejudice, Gender Bias, and White Supremacy: Final Report.*, 16

⁵⁰ National Defence Act, RS., c N-5, s.20 R.S., 1985, C32 (1st Supp.), S. 60

the Canadian political system, the Governor in Council is defined in the Constitution Act of 1867 as “...referring to the Governor-General in Council shall be construed as referring to the Governor-General acting by and with the Advice of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada.”⁵¹ In practice, the Governor in Council is the government. Thus, changing the enrollment process to accommodate the enrollment of a large force in a quick time can be as quick or as slow as the Government chooses it to be. Had the Government placed the mechanisms of enrollment and service within the NDA, an Act of Parliament would be required to modify the enrollment process. For a variety of reasons beyond this paper's scope, within the Canadian parliamentary system, Acts are generally more immutable. At the same time, Regulations are used to amplify the provisions of an Act and change according to circumstances. The actual mechanism for rapid expansion of the CAF during an emergency period is the activation of Special Force.

THE SPECIAL FORCE

To allow for the rapid scaling for emergency purposes, the NDA provides for the creation of the Special Force to complement the Regular and Reserve Force.⁵² The Special Force is envisioned within the NDA for usage specifically for emergencies or “if considered desirable in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada...”⁵³ During the Second World War, members were enrolled in the Canadian Army (Active), which served as a forebearer to the Special Force.⁵⁴ It allows for any member of the Regular Force or the Reserve Force to be transferred to the Special Force and for enrollment of officers or non-commissioned members directly into the Special Force.⁵⁵ At the level of Regulation, however, while the Special Force is referenced

⁵¹ Constitution Act, 1867 (UK) 30&31 Vict, C 3, S 13, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 5

⁵² National Defence Act, RS., 1985, c. N-5, s. 16 R.S., 1985, c. 31 (1st Supp.), s. 60 2004, c. 15, s. 75

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Geoffrey Hayes, *Crerar's Lieutenants: Inventing the Canadian Junior Army Officer, 1939- 1945*, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2017), 41

⁵⁵ National Defence Act, s. 75

within the DAODs dealing with enrollment, 5002-1, it is not under DAOD 5002-3, Component Transfer, nor do the enrollment plans found within 5002 specify the requirements to join the Special Force exists.⁵⁶ Thus, while the NDA provides for the creation of the Special Force, the Regulations governing how this force would be constituted are not in force. DAOD 2020 defines the Reserve Force, the Primary Reserve, the Canadian Rangers, the Cadets, the Supplementary Reserve, and the Reserve Forces Foreign Service Arrangements. However, it does not have a DAOD for the Special Force. This omission is because there is no Regulation prescribing precisely what the Special Force is beyond the NDA definition. These DAODs are examples of missing detail on the management of the Special Force; however, many would need revision if the Special Force were to be activated. While the necessary changes may exist in draft form within the Department of National Defence, DND, if they do not, it would require significant regulatory crafting to harmonize the 310 existing and in-force DAODs.

From a diversity and scaling perspective, the existence of the Special Force would allow the Government to grow beyond normal groups recruited into the CAF. One of the major barriers to increasing participation in the Army in 1939 and today is the medical standards required for enrollment. Today, this is represented through DAOD 5023-0 and the related DAOD 5023-1, which prescribes the minimum standards required to meet the Universality of Service.⁵⁷ The Universality of Service, UoS, ensures that “CAF members are liable to perform general military duties and common defence and security duties...”⁵⁸ UoS imply that a significant portion of the Canadian population is not available to the Army for recruiting due to their inability to meet UoS. While this makes sense for members of the Regular Force and the Reserve Force, the

⁵⁶ Defence Administration Orders and Directives, 5002-1 & Defence Administration Orders and Directives 5003-1

⁵⁷ Defence Administration Orders and Directives 5023-0 and 5023-1.

⁵⁸ Defence Administration Orders and Directives 5023-0

Special Force could recruit from 9.1% of the current labour market persons with disabilities.⁵⁹

The stipulations within the UoS that require service in operational and adverse conditions presumably preclude much of this 9.1% of the population from enrolling in the Regular or Reserve Forces. However, in an emergency that requires the scaling of the Army, these individuals could be enrolled directly into the Special Force by a revised regulation governing UoS to be utilized in non-combat roles in Canada. There are a vast number of positions that would be required in a 2.4 million soldier force that do not require deployment to an operational area or the performance of “common defence and security duties” that could be accomplished by people who currently do not meet UoS. In addition to the increased recruitment of women and BIPOC, the recruitment of people with disabilities would be a source of human capital not available to the Army during the Second World War.

TESTING FOR SUITABILITY

In the Second World War, applicants were expected to not only pass medical and physical fitness checks but, in the case of officers, for the first time, standardized testing. This requirement replaced an earlier selection system that revolved around interviews and approval by unit Commanding Officers.⁶⁰ The previous system had its roots firmly in the militia system but was not dissimilar to the selection mechanisms used for officers in other countries with the Regimental system. Canada’s post-Confederation military readiness philosophy centred around the Militia.⁶¹ The Militia within this system was more focused on promoting political and social institutions than on building a viable Army for Canada.⁶² While the class system in Canada was

⁵⁹ Department of National Defence, *Minister of National Defence Advisory Panel on Systemic Racism and Discrimination with a focus on Anti-Indigenous and Anti-Black Racism, LGBTQ2+ Prejudice, Gender Bias, and White Supremacy: Final Report.*, 14

⁶⁰ Hayes, 64

⁶¹ Morton, 94-95.

⁶² Ibid.

not nearly as defined as in Britain, Officers were, by and large, promoted based on their standing as gentlemen rather than any perceived military prowess.⁶³ The Regular Force, such as it existed, was mainly designed to train the Militia. By 1942, the First World War had exposed the failures of the class-based recruitment system for officers. In most of the Allied countries, social scientists had developed standardized testing. In Canada, by 1943, standardized testing took the form of two Officer Selection and Appraisal Centers (OSACs). These included the standardized tests of the “M-Test,” the “O-Test,” the Rorschach test, and a Basic Military Knowledge Test.⁶⁴ This battery of tests was combined with a health questionnaire and a questionnaire seeking to answer the motivations and attitudes of potential officers.⁶⁵ Potential officers were assessed in various situations to gather insight into their leadership potential and personal qualities.⁶⁶ While the actual tests administered have changed, conceptually, this is the same method used today to select Army officers through the CAF-wide Basic Military Officer Qualification and the Basic Military Officer Qualification- Land courses. However, there was significant work done in the 1950s and 1960s through the development of the “Select A” test followed by the “Select R” test.⁶⁷ These tests were designed to eliminate cultural biases with significant validation of the tests showing that the results between ethnic groups “...display a discriminatory bias against the non-white Forces applicant population from the North-West Territories...”.⁶⁸

As with the UoS, different standards could be applied in the selection of Army Special Force officers than apply to Regular or Reserve Force Officers. For these standards to make

⁶³ Ibid 121.

⁶⁴ Hayes, 66

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ G.W. Small. “The Usefulness of Canadian Army Selection Tests in a Culturally Restricted Population,” *Canadian Psychologist*, Vol. 10, No. 1. (February, 1969), 13

⁶⁸ Ibid., 18. The Select-A test did not rely on linguistic skill-sets thus it showed less bias. The CFAT currently in usage by the CAF does test for linguistic ability in either English or French.

sense, they would have to align with the officer's occupation. While the selection for combat arms officers might need to closely align with the current selection system, given the high degree of risk associated with poor selections, different qualities might be selected for non-combat or combat-related positions. For example, the qualities of decisiveness under pressure, physical courage or physical conditioning might be very important for a combat arms officer but of lesser importance for an officer employed in Cyber operations. A one-size-fits-all selection system for officers would not be required, as junior officers in a modern Army would be employed in a far wider range of positions than the officers in the Second World War Army.

MODERNIZING TRAINING

The training of the Army in the Second World War required an extensive network of training centers reaching into every province. Including the Royal Military College in Kingston, Ontario, four officer training centers were established.⁶⁹ The Army required 26 Basic Training Centres, 2 Canadian Women's Army Corps Training Centers, and 52 Advanced Training Centers to deliver training to the various occupations and individual skill sets such as parachuting, driving, and machine-gun usage.⁷⁰ While many of these training centers were established in areas that are no longer bases, the Army in 2022 could reduce the number of bases required by transitioning some skill sets to virtual learning. While this would have been seen as highly optimistic before the COVID-19 pandemic, the CAF has started to embrace work from home and remote work options. Canadian Forces General Order, or CANFORGEN, 038/22 released in May of 2022, allowed Regular Force members to avoid physical moves in some circumstances while changing jobs to a position that would typically require a geographic move is an example of evolving attitudes within the CAF relating to telework.⁷¹ While the benefits of remote work and virtual training would be less helpful in teaching hard skills, many of the soft skills and almost all of the theoretical lessons required could be delivered virtually. The usage of an initial period of virtual learning would allow the Army to reduce the time in which the physical presence of students is required, allowing for greater throughput of recruits at training.

The civilian post-secondary education system is another resource that the modern Army could leverage. In the Second World War, the Army created the Canadian Officers Training

⁶⁹ Stacey, 528

⁷⁰ Ibid., 528 – 535.

⁷¹ CANFORGEN 038/22

Corps, COTC.⁷² Twenty-two units comprised the COTC at various universities across Canada.⁷³ The COTC and the Militia were the primary means the earliest contingents of officers for the Army were selected.⁷⁴ These two institutions had the benefit of relying upon existing infrastructure and organizational systems. In the case of the Militia there were units, and armouries. In the case of COTC, the university grounds and the leadership of the COTC units provided the infrastructure. During the post-war period, the ratio of people attending post-secondary education grew massively. This growth would allow the Army in 2022 to draw from a deep pool of not only university educated recruits but also non-university, post-secondary educated recruits with specific technical skills.

In 1940 only 0.5% of the population was enrolled in university for a total of 26,386.⁷⁵ According to *Universities Canada*, the “voice of Canadian universities”, approximately 1,090,000 full-time students attended Canadian universities in 2019.⁷⁶ This number represents an increase of 2.9% of the total population of Canada attending university full-time in 2019, an increase of 412%. The reasons for this increase are varied, but this paper illustrates the opportunity present for a revised COTC should the Army anticipate a need to grow dramatically. In addition to the university campuses that are now more present across Canada than they were in the 1940s, many universities now deliver undergraduate and post-graduate education virtually.⁷⁷ The university system could not only be leveraged to deliver general undergraduate and post-graduate education. However, it could also be contracted to develop the military

⁷² Hayes, 41

⁷³ Ibid. 42

⁷⁴ Ibid. 56

⁷⁵ Statistics Canada. *Post-Secondary Education (Series W-307-532)*. Last modified: July 7 2014. <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-516-x/sectionw/4147445-eng.htm#3>

⁷⁶ Universities Canada. *Facts and Stats*. Accessed: May 2 2022. <https://www.univcan.ca/universities/facts-and-stats/>

⁷⁷ While there are only a few truly “virtual only” accredited universities in Canada, almost every university offers online or virtual courses or programs. Athabasca University is an example of a primarily virtual university and is likely the largest in Canada. <https://www.athabascau.ca/how-au-works/index.html>.

training as part of the pre-basic training program outlined earlier. Unlike the CAF, these institutions routinely deliver high-quality training focused on adults from diverse backgrounds in a virtual environment. While much of the courseware would require the input of CAF subject matter experts, the pedagogical approaches employed by these institutions, along with their software and courseware, could be leveraged by the CAF. The usage of civilian university developed courseware would likely create an easy transition for students who are already attending civilian universities to transition to military training as the “look and feel” of the course material would seem familiar even if the content was novel.

CONCLUSION

While it is unlikely that Canada will face a threat comparable to that which caused the large-scale growth of the Army in the Second World War in the short term, it is not impossible. The ability of the Army to grow to include 6.3% of Canada’s population in a few short years is remarkable. This remarkability is doubly so given that the Army only recruited from a very narrow band of Canadian society. Given the demographic shifts in ethnicity and inclusion of women in the labour market since the Second World War, leveraging Canada's gender and ethnic diversity would be key in any future large-scale growth. In this context, the recent work the CAF has been undertaking to evolve and improve its culture is not only an issue for equity. It is also an operational imperative.

Fortunately for Canada, while the Army still has not overcome the systemic racism that has produced a non-representative force, significant work has been done to diversify the force in the last 75 years. This postures the Army to take advantage of the changing demographics since the Second World War while continuing the change process associated with the various culture change initiatives with the CAF. The changing nature of warfare with its increased reliance on

cyber operations and remote work allows the Army to recruit from populations, with some policy changes that were previously unavailable to the Army due to the UoS policy. This paper has shown that the Army is better postured today to recruit a force of comparable relative size as the Army of the Second World War. While the force's composition would be dramatically different, so too is the percentage of the total population that the Army could potentially recruit from.

FURTHER RESEARCH

While conducting the research for this paper, it has become apparent that there exists an opportunity for additional exploration into the impacts of remote work on people with disabilities within the defence sector. A potential research question could be, “are persons with disabilities able to leverage remote work opportunities as members of the Army?” Another potential research area is the role of military history as a potential disincentive to the recruitment of historically non-included groups. Given that only 2.8% of women served in the Army in the Second World War, the popular idea of a grandfather sitting around the fire and telling his grandkids about his time in the war likely reinforces the gender stereotype that the Army is trying to counter. If the Army’s history stories are mainly about white men, it may be harder to envision a future where other identities play an equal or leading role.

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