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Rising Security and Safety Challenges in the Arctic: Canada's Approach to Change

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RISING SECURITY AND SAFETY CHALLENGES IN THE ARCTIC: CANADA'S APPROACH TO CHANGE

INTRODUCTION

Exercising sovereignty over Canada's North is a top priority for the Government of Canada (GoC) who are highly committed to protecting the Arctic and the safety and security of the Northern people.¹ Canada's Arctic covers three territories, Yukon, Northwest Territories and Nunavut, and accounts for 75 percent of the country's national coastline and 40 percent of its total land mass. With climate change effecting the melting of Arctic ice caps and diminishing arctic sea ice cover, the Northwest Passage (NWP) has become more accessible and has led to increased tourism, shipping, and exploration of natural resources. This has driven up the level of strategic and economic importance, leading to increased interests in the region by state and nonstate actors.² For many, this change is viewed as a strategic and operational opportunity, which will enhance the footprint of key actors and stakeholders in the region, namely businesses, Other Government Departments and Agencies (OGDA), the Federal government, and the military. As such, the GoC must consider the potential safety and security challenges this heightened presence will have.³

Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy identifies the need to reinforce Canada's collaboration and cooperation with governments, communities and international partners on security, safety and defence issues as a GoC's objective.⁴ Similarly, Canada's 2020 defence

¹ Highlights of Canada's Arctic and Foreign Policy Framework, "Safety, Security, and Defence Chapter," Canada, "Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy," Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, last modified 18 May 2022, <https://www.rcaanc-cirac.gc.ca/eng/1562782976772/1562783551358>

² Canada, Department of National Defence, Northern Approaches: The Army Arctic Concept 2021, Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre (Kingston, Ontario), 53.

³ Highlights of Canada's Arctic and Foreign Policy Framework, "Safety, Security, and Defence Chapter," Canada, "Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy," Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, last modified 18 May 2022, <https://www.rcaanc-cirac.gc.ca/eng/1562782976772/1562783551358>

⁴ *Ibid.*

policy Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE) highlight the importance of the Arctic to Canada's defence and security and the significant role the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) plays in its continuation. This is important to the CAF as it is an essential component to helping Canada achieve some of its northern strategic objectives such as arctic sovereignty, strong interagency and multinational partnerships, and sustaining CAF support to safety and security operations.⁵

Current soft security challenges in the Arctic include environmental protection and response, safe transportation, Search and Rescue (SAR) capabilities, and increased human activity. These concerns coupled with an increased interest and power competition by main actors and stakeholders, mean that the GoC must improve how it executes future operations throughout the region.⁶ As such, this essay will argue that Canada must adapt to rising safety and security challenges in the Arctic. To achieve this, Canada needs to adopt a Whole of Government (WoG) approach; leverage existing and innovative CAF capabilities; and partner with local Indigenous people.

ADOPT A WOG APPROACH

The Arctic is one of the top priorities to the GoC which will require strong engagements with federal agencies and territorial and Aboriginal governments and organizations to achieve its Northern Strategy. Increased interests of key stakeholders and actors in the Arctic will bring with them increased security and safety challenges. As such, one of the ways Canada could deal with these challenges in the Arctic is through an integrated WoG approach.⁷

⁵ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2017, 50.

⁶ North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network, "Understanding the Future Arctic Security Environment: Applying NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis to Canadian Arctic Defence and Security," 2020, 31, last modified 22 May 2022, <https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/NAADSN-Arctic-Strategic-Foresight-Analysis-WEB-Final-2020.pdf>

⁷ P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Heather Nicol, *Whole of Government through an Arctic Lens*, (Antigonish, NS: St. Francis Xavier University, 2017), vii.

The WoG approach implies the utilization of the GoC resources across many stakeholders who are responsible for implementing policies on behalf of the Federal, regional, and local governments in the North to provide solutions to a particular problem or issue.⁸ History has demonstrated the difficulties of executing effective planning and operations via WoG approach, especially if departments and agencies are siloed in their own priorities and obligations.⁹ Although efforts and official policies have been made in the WoG approach domain, the outcomes show ineffective integration and coordination between governments, agencies, and partners. Barriers such as lack of funding for initiatives, misaligned policy structures, and jurisdictional silos, all contribute to hindering collaboration. Consequently, the GoC must invest its attention and efforts on creating interagency synergies that will allow it to adequately plan, coordinate and react to future safety and security challenges in the Arctic.¹⁰

To achieve Canada's defence and safety objectives in the North, leveraging capabilities and delivering mandates to support the GoC's broader Arctic priorities requires a WoG approach and further capacity building with federal, territorial, and local partners.¹¹ This approach requires collaboration across key stakeholders to further policy-making in key areas such as education, transportation, infrastructure and security and defence.¹² Additionally, with the potential of three Northern passages all becoming accessible in the near future and the impacts of climate change, the circumpolar region will become exceedingly important from a global perspective. Hence, the growth and security of the Canadian Arctic will continue to be a part of Canada's grand

⁸ *Ibid.*, v.

⁹ Higginbotham John and Jennifer Spence, "North of 60: Toward a Renewed Canadian Arctic Agenda," (Waterloo, ON: International Governance Innovation, 2016). 44.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 45.

¹¹ Eric Tremblay and Bill Bentley, "Foreward," in P. Whitney Lackenbauer & Heather Nicol, *Whole of Government through an Arctic Lens* (Antigonish, NS: St. Francis Xavier University, 2019), 29.

¹² Whitney Lackenbauer and Suzanne Lalonde, *Breaking the ice curtain: Russia, Canada, and Arctic Security in a Changing Circumpolar World*, (Calgary, AB: Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2019), 33.

strategy.¹³ Although climate change and easier access to the Arctic lends itself to potential great power competition between other state actors such as Russia and China,¹⁴ Canada does not foresee this as an increased military threat to the region. It does, however, anticipate an increase in safety and security challenges from soft security threats in the region. These include environmental and human issues such as major environmental and transportation disasters, SAR, organized crime, and loss of essential services, all which provide opportunities to build on a WoG approach in the region.¹⁵ This integrated WoG approach to adapting to rising Arctic security and safety challenges helps deconflict human and military security requirements while allowing key stakeholders to work collaboratively on developing policies to address future risks and threats that are consistent with Canada's strategic objectives for the Arctic.

A key component for a successful WoG approach is addressing the military and public sector procedures, communication channels and chains of commands, as minimizing such frictions and gaps will help improve operational effectiveness and efficiencies. Moreover, greater emphasis on improving the WoG approach through means such as Op NANOOK and other northern exercises and leveraging OGDAs expertise and resources can help address safety and security concerns and better articulate WoG policies and procedures, while improving local capacity through building and minimizing the environmental footprint.¹⁶ Such investments will help develop the GoC adapt future dispersed operations capacity enabling a wider variety of

¹³ Eric Tremblay and Bill Bentley, "Foreward," in P. Whitney Lackenbauer & Heather Nicol, *Whole of Government through an Arctic Lens* (Antigonish, NS: St. Francis Xavier University, 2019), vi.

¹⁴ Hubert Rob, "A New Cold War in the Arctic?! The old one never ended!," In *Redefining Arctic Security: Northern Research Forum*, 2019, last accessed 25 May 2022. <https://arcticyearbook.com/arctic-yearbook/2019/2019-commentaries/325-a-new-cold-war-in-the-arctic-the-oldone-never-ended>

¹⁵ Adam Lajeunesse, *The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic: Purpose, Capabilities, and Requirements*, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, (University of Calgary, 2014), 28.

¹⁶ Adam, Lajeunesse and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, "The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic: Building Capabilities and Connections," in P. Whitney Lackenbauer & Heather Nichol, *Whole of Government through an Arctic Lens* (Antigonish, NS: St. Francis Xavier University, 2019), Executive Summary.

safety and security situations while reinforcing Canada's sovereignty through WoG contributions that will help achieve the GoC's objectives.

Reinvestment and reinvigoration of the WoG approach policy and framework will help distinguish between strategic threats that should be managed broadly, and the narrower regional and local challenges to determine how best to address those safety and security concerns in the Canadian Arctic. The unique challenges of the Arctic will require a WoG approach to address Canada's security and safety threats and meet its national goals. This will involve identifying clearer policy objectives, open lines of communication, streamlined decision making, and ultimately an innovative policy framework that enables a WoG approach that appropriately supports Canada's northern security and safety needs.¹⁷

LEVERAGING CAF CAPABILITIES

The GoC's Northern Strategy identifies Canada's Arctic defence as a priority for the military to support. This priority can be achieved by exercising sovereignty, demonstrating a visible presence in the region, exercising control over and defending the Arctic territory, and providing assistance to OGDAs.¹⁸ This concept is reinforced by Canada's 2020 defence policy SSE, which identifies the Arctic as a region that is critical to the security and defence of Canada and North America.

Consequently, the GoC is also working to increase the CAF presence in the north.¹⁹

Furthermore, as part of North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD), the CAF mandate is to

¹⁷] P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Heather Nicol, *Whole of Government through an Arctic Lens*, (Antigonish, NS: St. Francis Xavier University, 2017), 329.

¹⁸ Adam, Lajeunesse and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, "The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic: Building Capabilities and Connections," in P. Whitney Lackenbauer & Heather Nichol, *Whole of Government through an Arctic Lens* (Antigonish, NS: St. Francis Xavier University, 2019), 158.

¹⁹ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2017, 118.

control the Northern airspace through surveillance and security patrols. As such, the CAF experience in the North can be seen through its contributions to the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) and by Northern operations such as Op NANOOK, Op NUNALIVUT and Op NUNAKPUT which are used to exercise Canada's sovereignty.²⁰ The establishment of the Joint Task Force in Yellowknife, the detachments across the North, the supporting military bases, and the Canadian Rangers demonstrates how the CAF is essential to dispersed operations in the Arctic, and is a crucial component in Canada's ability to adapt to rising safety and security challenges in the North.²¹

Climate change and technological advancements are paving the way for a more accessible Arctic, which will bring with it more activity, struggle for power, and safety and security concerns for Canada.²² Enhancing Canada's military presence is one of the objectives in Canada's Arctic and Foreign Policy Framework that the GoC has committed to pursuing for the safety and security of the Arctic.²³ Expansion of Canada's Arctic footprint is a key component of Canada's defence policy, which intends to achieve this objective through capability investments in Arctic Offshore Patrol Vessels (AOPVs), all-terrain vehicles, and space situational awareness.²⁴ These initiatives are all aimed to improve CAF mobility, reach and footprint, and to

²⁰ Highlights of Canada's Arctic and Foreign Policy Framework, "Safety, Security, and Defence Chapter," Canada, "Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy," Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, last modified 18 May 2022, <https://www.rcaanc-cirac.gc.ca/eng/1562782976772/1562783551358>

²¹ Government of Canada. Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, Ottawa: Minister of Northern Affairs, last accessed 19 May 2022, <https://www.rcaanccirmac.gc.ca/eng/1560523306861/1560523330587>

²² North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network, "Understanding the Future Arctic Security Environment: Applying NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis to Canadian Arctic Defence and Security," 2020, last modified 22 May 2022, <https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/NAADSN-Arctic-Strategic-Foresight-Analysis-WEB-Final-2020.pdf>

²³ Government of Canada, Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework: Safety, Security, and Defence Chapter, (Ottawa: Minister of Northern Affairs), 10 Sep 2019, last accessed 20 May 2022, <https://www.rcaanccirmac.gc.ca/eng/1562939617400/1562939658000>

²⁴ Canada. Department of National Defence. Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2017, 113

defend and respond to the needs of Canada and the Arctic communities.

To address these concerns and leverage the CAF to successfully adapt to rising safety and security challenges in the Arctic, sustainment capabilities must be in place to effectively achieve the desired end state. Therefore, core support functions such as contracting, engineering, maintenance and planning must be addressed collectively. A key element to supporting Arctic operations is the ability to adequately store the necessary supplies required to support lengthy and dispersed operations in the North.²⁵ Resupply methods in the Arctic are challenging, where any increase in the CAF footprint could negatively impact the supply and demand of resources. This emphasises the need to include local and indigenous communities in the implementation of sustainment initiatives. The current lack of sustainment infrastructure and support in the North will impede Canada's ability to meet future challenges and opportunities. The concept of Northern Operations Support Hubs (NOSH) could address this impediment. The NOSH could provide operational support to the GoC's future Arctic operations through a dispersed network of logistical stations, capable of sustaining the CAF and OGDAs operations, and thus increasing the level of safety and security in the Arctic regions.²⁶

Operating in the Arctic is known to be extremely challenging from a logistics and sustainment perspective. Limited strategic airlift has follow-on effects for replenishment of critical aircraft spare parts and essential supplies. This coupled with long lines of communications (LOCs) from main supporting bases can have negative impacts on support to operations. With limited supplies and services available in Northern locations and the need for the CAF to resupply, means an increased dependency on the movement of supplies from other

²⁵ Canada, Department of National Defence, CFJP 4.0, *Support*. (Ottawa, ON: Joint Doctrine Branch, 2014), II-2.

²⁶ CJOC, Northern Operations Support Hubs (NOSH): Strategic Concept, 21 June 2021.

parts of Canada. With the NOSH operating along the strategic lines of communications (SLOCs), it would help alleviate such logistical challenges. The SLOCs would function as transition points between strategic and tactical movements while the hubs would have the ability to stock and manage prepositioned materiel and equipment and provide continuous support capability to operations in the North.²⁷

The impact of the NOSH would also be evident and extremely relevant when contracting in the North, as contracts are more complex, with fewer services available, and lengthier delivery times. These challenges have been observed during Arctic operations in the past when dealing with aviation fuel. The NOSH could provide first line support from a fuel bowser, bladder and fueling equipment perspective. The NOSH could also house sheltering systems at these locations for maintenance and protection of aircraft and ground support equipment in extremely cold climates.²⁸

The use of NOSH will allow for longer, more remote capabilities as well as improved responsiveness to operations such as Op NANOOK. Additionally, it can help address the resource and transportation challenges while improving medical, engineering and communications support. The NOSH concept supports the WoG approach with its ability to sustain not only the CAF, but OGDAs, including Transport Canada, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, and the Canadian Coast Guard. The NOSH would support these organizations in an effort to patrol and monitor Canada's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the NWP as well as dispersed SAR and sovereignty operations.²⁹

²⁷ Royal Canadian Air Force Aerospace Warfare Centre. RCAF Lessons Learned Programme Communique: Operations in the North Lessons Learned Analysis – RCAF Perspective, Trenton, ON, 2021, 20.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ CJOC, Northern Operations Support Hubs (NOSH): Strategic Concept, 21 June 2021.

Although the NOSH can help sustain the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), opportunities also exist for the RCN to support the AOPV mandate, which is to enforce sovereignty and respond to domestic emergencies in the Arctic. There is only a single refuelling facility available for the RCN as well as minimal support structures in place for the AOPV to conduct year-round patrols to the EEZ and throughout the Arctic during the navigable season. Thus, support nodes need to be a part of the sustainment plan. These nodes must be accessible throughout the region and strategically placed. As such, the Northern Lily Pad (NLP) Innovation Initiative can provide a mechanism to establish a network of semi-permanent micro containerized operational sustainment hubs at critical strategic choke points along the NWP. This initiative permits capabilities such as waste recovery, fresh food production, Command and Control, Computer, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) and energy production.³⁰

Moreover, the RCN can use the NLP innovation initiative to demonstrate social and environmental stewardship and provide meaningful impacts and partnerships with local communities. This initiative will help reduce the drain on scarce resources on the local communities as well as reduce the impact to traditional hunting grounds. Likewise, it will reduce the environmental impacts from exhaust, and improve responsible waste management practices. This initiative is centered around partnering with local Indigenous communities and contributing to a WoG approach to ensuring security and safety in the Arctic.³¹

There are challenges with the implementation of these sustainment initiatives, which include resource constraints, lengthy project timelines for procurement and infrastructure

³⁰ RCN, Northern Lily Pads Innovation Initiative, April 2022.

³¹ *Ibid.*

requirements, and a heavy reliance on OGDAs and Indigenous communities for support.³²

However, through cross-departmental teams working together to refine the logistical plans and requirements, support efficiencies are better able to be identified. The NOSH and NLP initiative can assist with the sustainment of monitoring and patrolling the NWP and EEZ by the CAF and OGDAs, while increasing northern resiliency by projecting these sustained effects into the communities. Furthermore, engagement and open dialogue on these concepts with local Indigenous communities will help strengthen Canada's partnerships with them. Notably, the Indigenous communities are essential in creating the hub network and key to the actual selection and approval process for the NOSH sites. This approach focuses on identifying common infrastructure and facility requirements which can be used as an opportunity and shared between OGDAs and the Northern communities. These sustainment initiatives epitomize the WoG strategy by coordinating and synergizing with all levels of governments, agencies, and Indigenous communities throughout the North.³³

PARTNERING WITH LOCAL INDIGENOUS PEOPLE

Equally important to adapting to rising safety and security challenges in the Arctic by adopting a WoG approach and leveraging CAF capabilities is the need to partner with local Indigenous people. Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy recognizes the need for Canada to bolster its WoG approach to safety and security concerns, noting the requirement to strengthen its ties with the local Indigenous people as a key GoC objective.³⁴ Canada has made efforts in the

³² CJOC and ADM(IE), *Defence of Canada: Final Costing Ground Rules & Assumptions*, "Northern Operational Support Hubs (NOSH)," 17 June 21.

³³ CJOC *Continental Defence Initiative: Overview, Considerations and Implications*, The Northern Operational Support HUBS (NOSH), 2021.

³⁴ Highlights of Canada's Arctic and Foreign Policy Framework, "Safety, Security, and Defence Chapter," Canada, "Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy," Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, last modified 18 May 2022, <https://www.rcaanc-cirac.gc.ca/eng/1562782976772/1562783551358>

shared Arctic leadership realm seen in their actions on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, where they lifted the qualifications to its endorsement, and moved to include Indigenous people in the policy production and priority setting.³⁵ Indigenous people are key participants in the security and defence of the North due to their tremendous skills and extensive knowledge of the North where their experience has proven essential. As such, partnerships with the local communities are vital to ensuring successful safety and security operations in the area.

Notwithstanding, there is a lot of work to do and the GoC must improve its relationship with Indigenous people, not only for bolstering partnership and cooperation, but to ensure the proper respect and rights recognition is given. This requires frequent consultation with the Northern Indigenous communities to recognize and ensure their priorities are known and considered, as well as understanding how the duty to accommodate Aboriginal peoples apply in the safety and security sectors. The need to strengthen partnerships has been outlined in the GoC's plan to grow the Canadian Rangers to be a force multiplier for Northern defence and security. However, Canada must be cautious as this planned growth could be problematic as it has the potential to strain the local community's resources and max out support capacity.³⁶

Local Indigenous communities are crucial in supporting Canada's sovereignty and the GoC must recognize the economic, cultural, and social importance of those communities. Moreover, their land claims and self-government agreements allow provisions for regional and local rights, land ownership, and protection of traditional ways of life which are key to securing

³⁵ John Higginbotham and Jennifer Spence, *Canada's Arctic Agenda: Into the Vortex*. Centre for International Governance Innovation, (Waterloo: On, 2019), 68.

³⁶ Higginbotham John and Jennifer Spence, "North of 60: Toward a Renewed Canadian Arctic Agenda," (Waterloo, ON: International Governance Innovation, 2016), 45.

land and support for military exercises.³⁷ The GoC must commit to implementing land claim agreements and work to support the Arctic communities and strengthen their resilience by identifying new methods and means of exchanging best practices, respecting territorial rights and remaining dedicated to their wellbeing.³⁸

Lastly, partnering with the local Indigenous communities is vital for addressing emergency response and managing and protecting waterways in the Arctic. Canada's coastline requires protection, preservation, and restoration and the GoC is dependent on the vast knowledge and expertise of local Indigenous people and communities to achieve this in the most efficient manner. Such partnerships could unite plans and proposals of federal and territorial partners to enhance shipping, economic development, and overall Arctic safety and security capabilities.³⁹

Strengthened relationships between Indigenous people, collective communities and the GoC will ensure information is shared, and that cooperation across government agencies and departments is occurring, and that they are engaged in the planning and stand up of policies and activities in the area. It is through a shared vision where safety and security will be most successful, and ultimately allow for the best economic and efficient use of scarce resources allowing stakeholders to address future emerging challenges.⁴⁰

CONCLUSION

³⁷ P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Heather Nicol, *Whole of Government through an Arctic Lens*, (Antigonish, NS: St. Francis Xavier University, 2017), 20.

³⁸ Whitney Lackenbauer and Suzanne Lalonde, *Breaking the ice curtain: Russia, Canada, and Arctic Security in a Changing Circumpolar World*, (Calgary, AB: Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2019), 18.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁴⁰ P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Heather Nicol, *Whole of Government through an Arctic Lens*, (Antigonish, NS: St. Francis Xavier University, 2017), 13.

With the expected increase in traffic through the Northern passages, the circumpolar region will become exceedingly important from a global perspective, resulting in the need for growth and security of the Canadian Arctic as a priority to the GoC. However, the resource constraints, coupled with the economic and strategic competition in the area will greatly challenge the ability to achieve such strategic objectives. As such, Canada must adapt to these rising safety and security challenges in the Arctic and will require the implementation of a WoG approach, leveraging the CAF capabilities and expanding their sustainment footprint, and partnerships with Indigenous people to adequately address these concerns.⁴¹

Defence of the Arctic comes with vast requirements such as infrastructure and support and is all encompassing. This necessitates the need to adapt to the WoG approach relying on multiple departments and agencies to successfully plan and execute a wide array of tasks. This will demand a multi-perspective understanding on legal, environmental, operational, and developmental topics that then informs the GoC on how best to deal with overarching concerns in the Arctic.⁴² With the expected increase in maritime and economic activities in the Arctic, regulations must be enforced, and risk must be minimized, driving the need for international cooperation from the Arctic governments and stakeholders to be strengthened and deepened.⁴³

Local Indigenous people and their culture are essential to institutional and service concerns, and they will need to have the capacity to address and manage these issues. Clear communication,

⁴¹ Whitney Lackenbauer and Suzanne Lalonde, *Breaking the ice curtain: Russia, Canada, and Arctic Security in a Changing Circumpolar World*, (Calgary, AB: Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2019), 18.

⁴² Eric Tremblay and Bill Bentley, "Foreward," in P. Whitney Lackenbauer & Heather Nicol, *Whole of Government through an Arctic Lens* (Antigonish, NS: St. Francis Xavier University, 2019), vi.

⁴³ North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network, "Understanding the Future Arctic Security Environment: Applying NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis to Canadian Arctic Defence and Security," 2020, last modified 22 May 2022, <https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/NAADSN-Arctic-Strategic-Foresight-Analysis-WEB-Final-2020.pdf>

engagement and collaboration with the local communities will lead to greater policy formation and close the knowledge gaps in addressing the needs of the people and OGDAs. This requires prioritizing the importance of this partnership and ensuring strong involvement in the process which is vital to maintaining a strong Arctic and Northern communities.⁴⁴

The unique challenges of the Arctic necessitate the need for utilization of resources across government departments and agencies to meet Canada's national objectives.⁴⁵ Furthermore, the CAF cannot overcome the logistical and organizational challenges for the GoC on its own, but instead needs to work in conjunction with organizations. For example, while the CAF focuses on providing resources to support such things as disaster relief, fisheries protection, and pollution response, OGDAs are able to provide information sharing and cooperation with Indigenous communities which is essential to understanding the ever-changing safety and security issues. This collaboration of the GoC with OGDAs, Indigenous communities and the CAF will only strengthen relationships while heightening Canada's commitment to Arctic defence and security by each of their unique contributions.⁴⁶

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⁴⁵] P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Heather Nicol, *Whole of Government through an Arctic Lens*, (Antigonish, NS: St. Francis Xavier University, 2017), 3.

⁴⁶ Highlights of Canada's Arctic and Foreign Policy Framework, "Safety, Security, and Defence Chapter," Canada, "Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy," Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, last modified 18 May 2022, <https://www.rcaanc-cirac.gc.ca/eng/1562782976772/1562783551358>

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