National Defence / Défense nationale

Canadian Forces College

Collège des Forces Canadiennes

Commander Jennifer Waywell

War and Peace: China's Holistic Perspective

JCSP 47	PCEMI 47
Exercise Solo Flight	**Exercice Solo Flight**
Disclaimer	**Avertissement**

Canada

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

JCSP 47 – PCEMI 47
2020 – 2022

Exercise Solo Flight – Exercice Solo Flight

Commander Jennifer Waywell

War and Peace: China's Holistic Perspective

WAR AND PEACE: CHINA'S HOLISTIC PERSPECTIVE

Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet

– Rudyard Kipling, *The Ballad of East and West*

The first line of Kipling's ballad is often interpreted to mean that Eastern and Western cultures are irreconcilable. But if read in its entirety, the tale about a British officer and an Afghan horse-thief shows that characteristics such as courage and strength can transcend cultural barriers. This message still rings true today, and yet people from different cultural backgrounds do sometimes have difficulty understanding each other. This can create challenges when trying to understand military strategy, interpret military actions, and prevent conflict escalation. In particular, Chinese military concepts can be confusing and misleading for those trained in Western (European and North American) militaries. This is not only because of the complexity and ambiguity of language translation, but also because these concepts can only be properly understood in the appropriate cultural and historical contexts.[1] It has been said that China does not play by Western rules, and even appears to be playing a different game: instead of chess, or poker, China is perhaps playing a game of *go*.[2] This paper will explore some of the differences between Chinese and Western thought, military strategy, and operational concepts. It will argue that China has a divergent view of conflict and war, and that Western militaries (North American and European) should aim to better understand this view in order to defend our interests.

---

[1] Timothy Heath, "An Overview of China's National Military Strategy," in *China's Evolving Military Strategy*, ed. Joe McReynolds (Washington, D.C: Jamestown Foundation, 2016), 7.

[2] David Lai, "Learning from the Stones: A *Go* Approach to Mastering China's Strategic Concept, *Shi*" (monograph, Army War College, May 2004). The game of *go* is also called *wéiqi* or *wei chi*.

Differences in Eastern and Western thought

In his book *Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently…and Why*, Richard Nisbett explores differences in worldview between the East (China, Japan Korea) and the West (Europe and North America).[3] The Western perspective can be traced back to the culture and philosophy of ancient Greece.[4] The ancient Greeks valued individual identity, knowledge for its own sake, and intellectual debate. They viewed humans as distinct from the natural world, and developed a scientific perspective based on categorization of objects, abstraction, and modelling. Importantly, they developed a type of logic which assumed that contradiction was impossible. This type of logical reasoning dictates that if two propositions are contradictory, one of them must be wrong.[5]

Ancient Chinese thought was completely different. Humans were not distinct from the natural world, but part of it. The world was not static, but constantly changing. Rather than focusing on the individual, the culture of ancient China valued the harmony of the collective. Rather than valuing knowledge for its own sake, knowledge was valued for its practicality. Most interestingly, rather than a formal logic, the Chinese developed a type of dialectical reasoning. The world was understood in terms of polarities – dialectic pairs – which could co-exist, or exist one after the other. In ancient Chinese philosophy, contradictions are not to be resolved, but instead used as a tool to gain understanding of reality.[6]

---

[3] Richard Nisbett, *Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently…and Why* (London: Free Press, 2004).
[4] Ibid., 36.
[5] Ibid., 36.
[6] Nisbett, 35; Derek Yuen, *Deciphering Sun Tzu: How to Read the Art of War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 70.

Recent studies show that many East/West differences remain today, even though ideas have been shared between these cultures for centuries. Asians tend to view the world holistically, first considering context and relationships; North Americans tend to focus on objects and their attributes.[7] Asians are more likely to expect and accept contradiction and paradox, since the world is ever-changing and complex; North Americans and Europeans develop abstract models in order to understand the world. These differences are also evident in the study of war and military strategy.

Differences in Thought about War

In the West, the starting point for discussion on the theory of war is often the work of Karl von Clausewitz, who was an army officer in early 19th century Prussia.[8] He aimed to develop a unified theory of war based on his experiences of the Napoleonic Wars. Clausewitz' approach bears similarities to that of Sir Isaac Newton, who also lived in the Age of Enlightenment, and whose laws of motion established classical mechanics as it is still taught today. Newton's laws have elegance and symmetry, however, nonlinear factors (such as friction and turbulence) must be introduced in order to adjust for reality. Just as Newtonian physics aims to simplify the world into a few laws of motion, Clausewitz aimed to create a theory of war. He defined the "ideal" war – total war – and then considered additional factors which must be included in order to make the theory realistic. These include politics, interaction between adversaries, uncertainty, chance, genius, and friction.[9] Classical mechanics is about forces acting on objects, and to Clausewitz, war was about fighting in order to achieve political ends. The

---

[7] Nisbett, Chapter 6.
[8] Michael Howard, *Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 5.
[9] Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought* (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2000), 252.

most effective way to win wars was by concentrating a strong force where it was most needed. In

short, the best strategy "was to be very strong; first generally and then at the decisive point."[10]

Many of the principles which Clausewitz uncovered form the basis of today's Western military

doctrine.[11] However, these principles, although excellent, may be insufficient to fully understand

war.[12] To again compare with physics, much of the natural world can be explained by Newton's

laws of motion, but in some circumstances other theories are required. As an example, quantum

mechanics is constructed on completely divergent principles,[13] and provides a complementary

perspective on the natural world. War is also a very complex subject, and there may be other

modes of thought through which it can be understood. One such divergent paradigm may have

been developed in China thousands of years ago.

Discussion on Chinese strategy (military and otherwise) frequently references *The Art of

War*, a treatise attributed to Sun Tzu, a general of the state of Wu who lived towards the end of

the Spring and Autumn Period (770-476 BC).[14] Although separated in time by over two thousand

years, Sun Tzu and Clausewitz draw some similar conclusions.[15] However, many aspects of Sun

Tzu's work can easily be misunderstood without an understanding of the Taoist principles upon

which it is structured.[16] Taoism is a holistic worldview:

> One of the main ideas of Taoism is the belief in balancing forces, or yin and
> yang. These ideas represent matching pairs, such as light and dark, hot and cold,
> action and inaction, which work together toward a universal whole. Yin and

---

[10] Howard, 66.
[11] Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Clausewitz and Contemporary War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 168.
[12] Echevarria, 168.
[13] For example, the uncertainty principle, quantum superposition, and the inability to observe the state of a system without changing it.
[14] *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online*, s.v. "Sunzi," accessed 24 May 2022, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Sunzi.
[15] Handel; Echevarria.
[16] Derek Yuen, *Deciphering Sun Tzu: How to Read the Art of War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

yang show that everything in the universe is connected and that nothing makes sense by itself.[17]

One such opposing pair is the orthodox vs. the unorthodox, or the straightforward vs. the crafty.[18] In Taoist writings, strategy is defined as "governing the state by being straightforward and waging war by being crafty."[19] Politics and war are inextricably linked, and what distinguishes war is that it is *not* straightforward. War, to Sun Tzu, is inherently deceptive; it is the *Tao* (the way) of deception.[20] While Clausewitz focuses on how to win battles by concentrating forces at the decisive point, Sun Tzu proposes winning wars without battle, stating that "subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence."[21] While Clausewitz advises strength in numbers,[22] Sun Tzu focuses on how a weaker army might defeat a stronger one.[23] This requires paying great attention to the enemy's plans and perceptions,[24] and it requires deception, as the weaker army cannot rely on military might alone. To Sun Tzu, the priority is to accomplish the aim with as little military force as possible:

> the highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy's plans; next is to attack their alliances; next to attack their army; and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities.[25]

---

[17] *National Geographic Resource Library*, s.v. "Taoism," accessed 24 May 2022, https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/taoism.

[18] Yuen, 28.

[19] Jen Hung, *Record of Literary Works*, quoted in Derek Yuen, *Deciphering Sun Tzu: How to Read the Art of War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 18. Yuen's source is *The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China* translated by Ralph D. Sawyer, which was not available online from the Canadian Forces College Library.

[20] Yuen, 45.

[21] Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, quoted in Derek Yuen, *Deciphering Sun Tzu: How to Read the Art of War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 59. As Yuen explains on pages 10-11, he references the English translation by Ralph D. Sawyer, supplemented by the translations by Thomas Cleary and Roger Ames. The translation available online through the Canadian Forces College Library was that of Lionel Giles (completed in 1910), which diverges significantly from the translations used by Yuen. Therefore the Sun Tzu quotes included in this paper are from Yuen's analytical work.

[22] Handel, 120.

[23] Yuen, 73.

[24] Handel, 122.

[25] Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, quoted in Yuen, 50.

To Sun Tzu, war includes other instruments of national power such as diplomacy, while to Clausewitz, war begins when these other instruments have failed.[26] Therefore to Sun Tzu, war begins much earlier (or is always present to some degree), and the tools of war are much more varied. The strategy by which these tools are used also differs.

Western military strategy uses *means* in *ways* to achieve *ends*. Planners identify the desired end-state, and then devise plans for action. However, this paradigm assumes a causal relationship between means and ends,[27] which may or may not be realistic. In a truly complex system, it might not be possible to predict a course of action which will lead to the desired end-state. Sun Tzu describes war not in terms of cause-and-effect, but rather as a flow of consequences. Military leaders are to focus on *creating the conditions* which could lead to victory,[28] recognizing that the situation will be constantly changing. The focus is not on a specific plan, but rather on the situation.[29] The objective is to remain *formless*, so that the enemy cannot predict one's behaviour, and to be ready to take advantage of any circumstances which occur.[30] Yuen describes this as the *condition-consequence* approach. With the means-end approach and its focus on the plan, there is an advantage to striking first, and securing the initiative (and therefore sticking to the plan). However, with the condition-consequence approach, it can be more advantageous to wait and see if the enemy will reveal their weaknesses. So while Clausewitz favours boldness and action,[31] Sun Tzu advises military leaders "to gain

---

[26] Handel, 24.
[27] Yuen, 77-78.
[28] Ibid., 78.
[29] Ibid., 81.
[30] Ibid., 82.
[31] Handel, 211.

mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck."[32] This does not mean that one should always strike second, but rather that a good leader should know when it is best to fight and when it is best to wait.[33] Sun Tzu describes an ideal whereby the effective leader allows the situation to unfold, exploiting the situation and the enemy's weaknesses as opportunity strikes.

To Sun Tzu, war (and peace) is a system which should not be disturbed unnecessarily, since the unintended consequences can be significant and even devastating.[34] Too much action – or the wrong action at the wrong time – can create turbulence and chaos. Action in one place may have an impact somewhere else, or at a later date.[35] In contrast, even though Clausewitz does recognize that battles might not be final in the long run,[36] his theory of war focuses on winning decisive battles. His concept of war is more or less linear, in that peace can be restored by winning wars, one battle at a time. To Sun Tzu, war and peace are inextricably interlinked as part of a complex system, and "even if we have every means to attain victory, causing the least disturbance to the system should remain our main concern."[37]

By comparing some aspects of the works of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu, this section has identified several important differences in the history of military thought between the West (North America and Europe) and China. From a Western perspective, war is armed conflict to achieve political objectives, through a cause-and-effect approach. From a Chinese perspective, war is far more broadly defined, and most warfare strategies involve deception, which can enable

---

[32] Sun Tzu, *The Art of War,* quoted in Yuen, 90.
[33] Handel, 211; Yuen, 90-91.
[34] Yuen, 94.
[35] Morgan Clemens, "PLA Thinking on Military Operations Other Than War," in *China's Evolving Military Strategy*, ed. Joe McReynolds (Washington, D.C: Jamestown Foundation, 2016), 375-376.
[36] Handel, 116.
[37] Yuen, 38.

a weaker force to prevail over a stronger one. The world is viewed holistically, as a system, and

actions should be carefully considered in order to set the conditions for success. The following

section will examine how these concepts underpin current Chinese military strategy.

China's Military Strategies and Operational Concepts

> *Though a country may become strong, bellicosity will lead to its ruin.*
>
> – The People's Republic of China State Council Information Office,
> *China's National Defense in the New Era*

China describes itself as a peaceful nation struggling to sustain harmony, peace, and stability.[38]

China's stated goal in this struggle is *not* to become the stronger adversary, but rather to ensure

favourable conditions for China's development by maintaining peace (and protecting China's

interests):[39]

> Since its founding 70 years ago, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has never
> started any war or conflict. . . . The development of China's national defense
> aims to meet its rightful security needs and contribute to the growth of the
> world's peaceful forces. History proves and will continue to prove that China
> will never follow the beaten track of big powers in seeking hegemony. No
> matter how it might develop, China will never threaten any other country or seek
> any sphere of influence.[40]

Understanding this viewpoint is important in order to comprehend China's military strategy and

actions. If the world is a complex system, and the aim is long-term stability, then developing the

larger military force and engaging in decisive battle is a poor solution, and could create

turbulence and chaos. China also does not aim to secure world peace; this would be extreme and

---

[38] The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, *China's National Defense in the New Era* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press Co. Ltd., 2019), 6.
[39] Ibid., 7.
[40] Ibid., 8.

unrealistic, therefore unsustainable. China's goal is to achieve a balance between the dialectic

opposites of war and peace, and thereby to ensure a stable system in which peaceful development

can occur. Two Chinese military strategies contribute to this aim: "active defense" and "effective

control" (also called "war control").

For over 70 years, the People's Republic of China has described its military strategy in

terms of the strategic concept of "active defense".[41] "Active defense" is a combination of

defensive, offensive, and pre-emptive concepts.[42] At the strategic level, it is primarily

defensive,[43] in that the goal is to defend China's interests (which include regional and worldwide

interests). Strategically, China does not intend to fire the first shot, or to start wars. However, at

the operational and tactical levels, "active defense" can include offensive and pre-emptive action,

if the opportunity presents itself.[44]

"Effective control" is a more recent concept for achieving the goals of war but with

controlled levels of violence.[45] As with "active defense", it is to be used both in peacetime and in

wartime. It has three components: creating situations, preventing and controlling crises, and

controlling and ending wars (if they do occur).[46] It is not limited to military means; it uses both

military and non-military actions to set conditions to achieve the strategic aims.[47] "Effective

control" is an implementation of the *condition-consequence* approach, where the focus is on

[41] M. Taylor Fravel, *Active Defense : China's Military Strategy Since 1949* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 61.
[42] United States of America, Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2021*, 33.
[43] M. Taylor Fravel, "*China's Changing Approach to Military Strategy*," in *China's Evolving Military Strategy*, ed. Joe McReynolds (Washington, D.C: Jamestown Foundation, 2016), 47.
[44] *Annual Report to Congress*, 33.
[45] Fravel, "*China's Changing Approach to Military Strategy*," 61.
[46] Ibid., 61-63.
[47] *Annual Report to Congress*, 155.

setting the conditions for future change, not on executing a plan to achieve a specific end. As with "active defense", the concept of "effective control" is best understood in a framework where war and peace are not separate states, but a dialectic pair which can co-exist. Strategically, "effective control" is about managing the escalation of violence by leveraging the dialectic relationship between *fighting* wars and *deterring* wars.

China does not publicly release its operational doctrine, but Western studies provide some insight. A RAND study published in 2020 proposes three key operational concepts: war control through information dominance; expanding war space; and, target-centric warfare.[48] From a technological perspective, these all rely on integrated information systems which exploit big data, artificial intelligence, and other recent technologies. But these operational concepts also echo many of the teachings of Sun Tzu, and have uniquely Chinese characteristics.

At the operational level, "effective control" is to be enabled through information dominance, with the aim of degrading the enemy's decision-making abilities while enhancing one's own.[49] Information dominance aims to improve the quality and speed of one's own decision-making processes, while degrading those of the enemy. Information systems can reveal the enemy's plans and vulnerabilities, and these can be used to disrupt the enemy's feedback loops, and thereby attack their plans.[50] This recalls Sun Tzu's guidance that "the highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy's plans."[51]

---

[48] E.J. Burke, K. Gunness, C.A. Cooper III, and M. Cozad, "Peoples' Liberation Army Operational Concepts" (RAND Corporation, 2020).
[49] Burke et al., 9.
[50] Yuen, 121.
[51] Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, quoted in Yuen, 50.

The information domain is only one example of how the Chinese "war space" has increased. Chinese military writings state that the physical "combat space" in which wars occur has shrunk. Rather than fighting total war across large regions, today's wars are more local, limited and controlled.[52] By contrast, the "war space," or strategic space, has expanded, due to new technologies.[53] It now includes not only land, air and sea, but also space and cyber warfare.[54] War space also encompasses the political, economic, diplomatic and informational domains, and the cognitive domain, where the "three warfares" (public opinion, psychological, and legal)[55] come into play. China's "war space" is defined much more broadly than in Western doctrine,[56] which confirms that China has a more holistic definition of war.

The third operational concept is "target-centred warfare." This is based on a systems-of-systems approach, in which conflict is viewed as a confrontation between the adversary's operational systems.[57] Target-centred warfare aims to destabilize or destroy the adversary's operational system.[58] By incorporating improved intelligence and reconnaissance with improved decision-making and precise weapons, the enemy's systems can be precisely and accurately targeted to achieve campaign goals. While all militaries aim to improve their operational systems and reduce collateral damage, the concept of system destruction warfare is about using technology to *minimize disruption* to the system which is China and its adversaries. It can be

---

[52] Burke et al., 13.
[53] Ibid., 12.
[54] Fravel, "*China's Changing Approach to Military Strategy*," 56.
[55] Burke et al., 15.
[56] For example: "War. When other instruments of national power, i.e. diplomatic, informational, and economic, are unable or considered inappropriate means for achieving national security objectives or protecting national interests, nations may opt to conduct sustained combat operations to achieve strategic aims." Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Joint Publication CFJP 01 Canadian Military Doctrine*, 2-12.
[57] Burke et al., 8.
[58] Ibid., 15.

understood as a way to avoid turbulence and chaos, and to maintain "effective control."[59]

Through targeted attacks on the enemy's operational systems, China could achieve its aims at the

operational and tactical levels, while maintaining its strategic posture of "active defense", and

avoiding all-out war.

Although China describes its strategy as a defensive one, from a North American

perspective China displays a strategy of coercive expansion.[60] China continues to increase its

military capabilities and its ability to project military power regionally and globally.[61] For

example, in the maritime domain, China aims to protect from attack from the sea,[62] ensure

Chinese sovereignty, and maintain critical sea lines of communication.[63] The South China Sea is

critical to all of these endeavours; it is an important shipping route, it is claimed by China,[64] and

historically, it is a direction from which China has suffered naval attack (for instance, the First

Opium War).[65] However, China's claims to the South China Sea are disputed by several other

nations. Therefore, in alignment with the strategy of "active defense," China has built up its navy

into the largest maritime force in Asia,[66] supplemented it with an armed coast guard and a

maritime militia, and built fortified islands.[67] In keeping with the "effective control" concept,

China has thus far managed to avoid outright war, despite many tactical and operational

situations where military force has been applied in a way which could be considered

---

[59] Burke et al., 8.
[60] Heath, 23.
[61] *Annual Report to Congress*, 81.
[62] Michael A. McDevitt, *China as a Twenty First Century Naval Power* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2020), 22.
[63] McDevitt, 11, 30.
[64] Ibid., 151.
[65] Ibid., 128.
[66] Ibid., 92.
[67] Ibid., 139.

aggressive.[68] It can be argued that China has been successful in increasing its regional control

and protecting its interests in the South China Sea, and that the differences in perception of war

between East and West make it challenging for Western nations to develop counter-strategies.

The Spectrum of Conflict: Differing Perspectives

The spectrum of conflict is a model which can be used to discuss the levels of conflict

between peace and war. A Canadian example is shown in Figure 1. "War" is when armed force

is used to achieve national objectives when the other instruments of power (diplomatic,

economic, and informational) have failed. "Operations other than war" (OOTW) is everything

else, although such operations may involve some combat. Deterrence of war is included in

OOTW.

Figure 1: Canada: Categories of Military Operations

Source: Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Joint Publication CFJP 01 Canadian Military Doctrine*, 2-12.

A Chinese diagram is shown in Figure 2. It should be noted that the Chinese definition of war

includes all instruments of national power, but that this diagram considers only military

---

[68] McDevitt, Chapter 6.

operations. It can be assumed that diplomatic, economic, and informational actions are

concurrent (as there is no requirement to have exhausted them prior to resorting to armed force).

There are some parallels between the Canadian and the Chinese diagrams. "Wartime military

operations" corresponds to "war," and "non-war military operations" to "operations other than

war." But the state of "quasi-war" is new. In a state of non-war, the objective is deterrence (to

prevent the outbreak of war). In a state of war, the objective is to win the war. However, in the

state of quasi-war, *both objectives are valid:* the goal is to *both* prevent a war and prepare to win

a war.[69]

Figure 2: China: States of war, quasi-war, and non-war

Source: Kaufman and Hartnett, 26. Adapted from a People's Liberation Army text.

---

[69] Alison Kaufman and Daniel Hartnett, *Managing Conflict: Examining Recent PLA Writings on Escalation Control*, CNA China Studies, February 2016, 27-29.

It should be noted that from the Chinese perspective, war and non-war are not separate:

> Despite the differences between the two, the PLA [People's Liberation Army] recognizes that MOOTW [Military Operations Other Than War] and war operations are fundamentally connected, and in particular that each can transition into the other based on changing circumstances and requirements. Likewise, non-traditional security problems in one place can trigger a war somewhere else, while active wars in one country, region, or area can cause non-traditional threats to affect other countries, regions, and areas.[70]

Deterring wars and winning wars are dialectical opposites, and therefore should not be considered separately. This is what is meant by the Chinese "holistic approach to national security."[71] There is no requirement to operate strictly in one part of the spectrum at any given time; the appropriate strategy or tactic will depend on the situation. The objective, through an "active defense" strategy and through "effective control," is to keep the system in equilibrium, while ensuring that China's security and development goals are met. This raises concerns about how Western militaries might interpret Chinese actions, and whether misunderstanding might lead to unintended escalation of violence.[72]

Table 1 summarizes these key differences in thought about war between Western militaries and China, showing that these are in effect two completely different paradigms. If Western nations are to protect their own interests, they will need to understand the viewpoints of their major competitors, and consider multiple paradigms of thought in order to develop effective counter-strategies. This may entail improvements to the whole-of-government approach, so that

---

[70] Clemens, 375-376.

[71] The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, *China's National Defense in the New Era* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press Co. Ltd., 2019), 8; Dennis J. Blasko, "*China's Evolving Approach to Strategic Deterrence*," in *China's Evolving Military Strategy*, ed. Joe McReynolds (Washington, D.C: Jamestown Foundation, 2016), 343.

[72] Kaufman and Hartnett, 29.

connections can be made between apparently disparate events, and developing new military strategies and operational concepts.

Table 1 - Summary of key differences in thought about war

	Western	China	Difference in Strategic Thought
Definition of war with respect to other instruments of national power	Use of armed force to achieve political objectives	War involves all instruments of national power; its distinguishing characteristic is deception	War as a distinct activity vs. holistic systems-based perception of world
Definition of war with respect to peace	War and peace are at opposite ends of the spectrum of conflict	War and peace are inseparable, equilibrium is sought between deterring wars and fighting wars	War as a time-limited activity in order to achieve peace vs. war and peace as ever-present and changing
Approach to planning	Develop plans to meet strategic objectives	Develop plans to be ready to take advantage of changing circumstances	Static vs. dynamic; object-based vs. relationship-based; cause-effect vs. condition-consequence

Conclusion

If Western nations prepare for an overt war through which to defend their national interests, we might be waiting for something that never comes. If we continue to operate purely within the Western paradigm of conflict, against an adversary applying a subtler, more deceptive type of war, we may lose the war before it even begins. As can be seen with China's strategy in the South China Sea, this divergence in perspective can create a situation which is neither war nor peace, but rather the grey zone in between. If such a divergent worldview exists, then we need to learn more about it. Just as physicists learn about both classical mechanics and quantum mechanics, and must remain open to new paradigms in order to explain the inexplicable, military strategists and planners should learn about both the Western model and the Eastern model of strategic thought. Otherwise, while Western nations plan for a game of chess, we will already have been encircled – and have lost – in a game of *go.*

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Blasko, Dennis J. "China's Evolving Approach to Strategic Deterrence." In *China's Evolving Military Strategy*, edited by Joe McReynolds, 335-355. Washington, D.C: Jamestown Foundation, 2016.

Burke, E.J., K. Gunness, C.A. Cooper III, and M. Cozad. "Peoples' Liberation Army Operational Concepts." RAND Corporation, 2020. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1110216.pdf

Canada. Department of National Defence. *Canadian Forces Joint Publication CFJP 01 Canadian Military Doctrine.* September 2011.

Clemens, Morgan. "PLA Thinking on Military Operations Other Than War." In *China's Evolving Military Strategy*, edited by Joe McReynolds, 356-396. Washington, D.C: Jamestown Foundation, 2016.

Echevarria, Antulio J. *Clausewitz and Contemporary War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199231911.001.0001

Fravel, M. Taylor. "China's Changing Approach to Military Strategy." In *China's Evolving Military Strategy*, edited by Joe McReynolds, 40-74. Washington, D.C: Jamestown Foundation, 2016.

Fravel, M. Taylor. *Active Defense : China's Military Strategy Since 1949*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019.

Handel, Michael I. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2000.

Heath, Timothy. "An Overview of China's National Military Strategy." In *China's Evolving Military Strategy*, edited by Joe McReynolds, 1-39. Washington, D.C: Jamestown Foundation, 2016.

Howard, Michael. *Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. https://doi-org.cfc.idm.oclc.org/10.1093/actrade/9780192802576.003.0005

Kaufman, Alison and Daniel Hartnett. "Managing Conflict: Examining Recent PLA Writings on Escalation Control." *CNA China Studies*, February 2016. https://www.cna.org/archive/CNA_Files/pdf/drm-2015-u-009963-final3.pdf

Lai, David. "Learning from the Stones: A *Go* Approach to Mastering China's Strategic Concept, *Shi*." United States Army War College, May 2004. https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/771/

McDevitt, Michael A. *China as a Twenty First Century Naval Power*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2020.

Nisbett, Richard. *Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently…and Why*. London: Free Press, 2004.

People's Republic of China. The State Council Information Office. *China's National Defense in the New Era*. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press Co. Ltd., 2019. https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

United States of America. Office of the Secretary of Defense. *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2021*. https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF

Yuen, Derek. *Deciphering Sun Tzu: How to Read the Art of War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.