

Canadian
Forces
College

Collège
des
Forces
Canadiennes



Major Stephen Misner

2017 Primary Reserve Expedited Enrolment Trial: Pilot or Phased Implementation

JCSP 47

Exercise Solo Flight

Disclaimer

Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do not represent Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used without written permission.

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2022

PCEMI 47

Exercice Solo Flight

Avertissement

Les opinions exprimées n'engagent que leurs auteurs et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

© Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2022

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

JCSP 47 – PCEMI 47
2020 – 2022

Exercise Solo Flight – Exercice Solo Flight

Major Stephen Misner

2017 Primary Reserve Expedited Enrolment Trial: Pilot or Phased Implementation

“This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.”

“La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.”

2017 PRIMARY RESERVE EXPEDITED ENROLMENT TRIAL: PILOT OR PHASED IMPLEMENTATION

INTRODUCTION

Historically, Canada has relied on citizen soldiers to fight and win wars, especially in the age of mass armies and it was not until 1952 when the Regular force finally had greater number than the Army Reserve¹. During the height of the Cold War governments turned to rely on large standing armies to counter the Soviet threat. Canada was no different and the Regular Force became the force of choice. Relations between the Regular Force and the Army Reserve suffered and especially in times of fiscal decline the reserve allocations were an easy target². Army Reserve strength declined from 45,000 in the 1960s to a low of 11,000 in the 1990s³. Scholars, veterans, and other proponents for a strong Army Reserve cried foul suggesting the regular force was thwarting the growth of the Army Reserve at every turn⁴. They called for a minimum of 30-45,000 strong army reserve⁵ to support national mobilization in case of crises, as stated in the 1994 Defence White Paper and the 2005 Art Eggleton Policy Statement⁶.

The current situation is that Canada relies heavily on the Army Reserve. Since the end of the cold war all deployments have an average of 20% Army Reserve

¹ English, Jack. *The Role of the Militia in Today's Canadian Forces*. (Canadian International Council and Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2011), 11.

² Petrolekas, George. "Reserve Options" *2016 Policy Review Series*. Canadian Global Affairs Institute (2016), 1.

³ English, Jack. *The Role of the Militia in Today's Canadian Forces*. (Canadian International Council and Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2011), 11-12.

⁴ Ibid., 8.

⁵ English, Jack. *The Role of the Militia in Today's Canadian Forces*. (Canadian International Council and Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2011), 11-12.

Canada. Office of the Auditor General of Canada. *Spring 2016 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada: Canadian Army Reserve - National Defence*. (Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2016), 10.

⁶ Chapman, Christian. P. *Relentless Struggle: Saving the Army Reserve 1995-2019*. (Ottawa: Durnovaria, 2019), 36.

augmentation⁷. Canada cannot meet its international military obligations without Army Reserve support, let alone domestic requests for support during times of emergency and crises⁸. A strong, operational capable Army Reserve is essential. With a 30% Army Reserve attrition rate⁹, and a recruiting system that cannot keep up, the Army reserve is in decline at a 5% rate annually¹⁰. The Primary Reserve Expedited Enrolment Trial conduct from 6 December 2016 to 1 April 2017¹¹, is an attempt to test the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) answers to the calls for streamlining the recruitment process¹². This latest attempt to streamline the processing of Army Reserve recruiting files did not effectively shorten the time from application submission to enrollment and should be reviewed and adjusted. I will discuss the components of the streamlined process that was tested by the trial, and how the trial failed to adequately test the streamlined process, and what results can be salvaged from the trial. Finally, I will provide recommendations on how to move forward.

EXPEDITED PROCESS

As Canadian operations were winding down in Afghanistan the attention of senior CAF leadership was turned to reconstitution and returning the Primary Reserve to an actual part time force. Multiple reviews were commissioned to analyze the reserves to

⁷ Petrolekas, George. "Reserve Options" *2016 Policy Review Series*. (Canadian Global Affairs Institute July 2016), 2.

⁸ Canada. Office of the Auditor General of Canada. *Spring 2016 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada: Canadian Army Reserve - National Defence*. (Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2016), 2.

⁹ Petrolekas, George. "Reserve Options" *2016 Policy Review Series*. (Canadian Global Affairs Institute July 2016), 3.

¹⁰ Canada. Office of the Auditor General of Canada. *Spring 2016 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada: Canadian Army Reserve - National Defence*. (Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2016), 9.

¹¹ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Implementation Order 36 CBG Recruiting Trial*. (Halifax: Department of National Defence, 2016), 7.

¹² Petrolekas, George. "Reserve Options" *2016 Policy Review Series*. (Canadian Global Affairs Institute July 2016), 6.

identify the current state and provide a way forward¹³. It was not until November 2015 that the Chief of Defence (CDS) staff released a strategy on the reserves for all elements of CAF. Though the CDS was initially working under the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy¹⁴, this direction was looking forward in preparation of implementing the soon to be released in the 2017 Strong Secure Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy. The CDS identified a ceiling of 28,500 Primary Reserves¹⁵ and the main effort to strengthening the reserves would be focussed on recruiting. Streamlining recruit application processing was highlighted as critical to success¹⁶; however, the target set of 60-90 days to process applicants¹⁷ were not as ambitious as those called for by critics¹⁸.

The following February 2016, the Commander Canadian Army released initial direction on the Strengthening the Army Reserve¹⁹ with various updates identifying and prioritizing Army Reserve recruiting and specifically streamlining recruit file processing. In November, 5 Canadian Division (Cdn Div), and then 36 Canadian Brigade Group (CBG), was identified as the formation to conduct the Primary Reserve Expedited Enrolment Trial. This trial would include all units that composed 36 CBG, which were located in Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, and the 2nd Battalion, Royal Newfoundland Regiment with companies located in Corner Brook, Stephenville, and

¹³ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Chief of Defence Staff Initiation Direction Reserve Strategy 2015: Strengthening the Primary Reserve*. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2016), 1.

¹⁴ Ibid., 4.

¹⁵ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Canadian Army Operation Order Strengthening the Army Reserve - Update*. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2017), 3.

¹⁶ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Chief of Defence Staff Initiation Direction Reserve Strategy 2015: Strengthening the Primary Reserve*. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2016), 6.

¹⁷ Ibid., 7.

¹⁸ English, Jack. *The Role of the Militia in Today's Canadian Forces*. (Canadian International Council and Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2011), 33.

¹⁹ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Commander Canadian Army Initiation Direction: Strengthening the Army Reserve*. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2016), 1.

Grand Falls, Newfoundland and Labrador²⁰. By selecting 36 CBG the trial was including units that were clustered in Metropolitan Halifax as well as dispersed throughout the area of operations. The Auditor General of Canada also identified 5 Cdn Div Army Reserve units with the greatest gap between actual strength and the ideal size of a Class A unit. Only two units in the Division had maintained a strength greater than 80%, the 1st Battalion, Royal Newfoundland Regiment in St. John's NL, and The West Nova Scotia Regiment in the Annapolis Valley and South Shore of Nova Scotia. All remaining units were significantly understrength²¹.

The Primary Reserve Expedited Enrolment Trial was intended to be the Canadian Army proof of concept of a streamlined process as tasked to all element commands including the Navy and the Air Force. The end state would see the Army Reserve recruiting process transferred to the Canadian Army from the Military Personnel Command²², who the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group reports to. The concept was labelled as a two-visit approach after which an applicant will be ready for enrolment. The new process was designed to be flexible, adaptable, and focus on enhancing concurrent activity and situational awareness of the status of each file at any given time²³. Once the streamlined process was validated by 36 CBG, the intent was for the Canadian Army to take active control and to roll it out to the remaining divisions across Canada²⁴.

²⁰ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Implementation Order 36 CBG Recruiting Trial*. (Halifax: Department of National Defence, 2016), 2.

²¹ Canada. Office of the Auditor General of Canada. *Spring 2016 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada: Canadian Army Reserve - National Defence*. (Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2016), 39-40.

²² Canada. Department of National Defence. *Canadian Army Primary Reserve Expedited Enrolment Trial: Operation Order 001*. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2017), 1-2.

²³ Ibid., 3.

²⁴ Ibid., 5.

The “two-visit” process was actually four and included an initial contact, visit one, visit two, and enrollment. After the recruiter received an application, initial contact, labelled as visit 0²⁵, would be made and the recruiter would provide the applicant with the required forms and instructions on how to fill them out²⁶.

On visit one the applicant would return the completed forms and the recruiter would review the documents including steps one to seven of the reliability screening. Steps 8-9 were the criminal and credit check and are required to be completed by Director General Defence Security (DGDS)²⁷. Once steps 1-7 have been verified and entered into system of record and steps 8-9 are confirmed to be submitted for processing, the applicant may be enrolled with restrictions. The applicant will not be granted completion of the Basic Military Qualification, the foundation and prerequisite course for all other military training; nor are they to handle ammunition or exposed to sensitive information or material until the reliability status is confirmed²⁸. Visit one would also include recruiters administering the Canadian Forces Aptitude Test (CFAT) and the physical fitness test (FORCE Test)²⁹.

Visit two would include anything that was not completed in visit one, the interview, the medical, and the officer selection board if required³⁰. During the trial the Recruiting Medical Office (RMO) has released an Expedited Recruitment Process³¹,

²⁵ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Implementation Order 36 CBG Recruiting Trial*. (Halifax: Department of National Defence, 2016), A-1.

²⁶ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Canadian Army Primary Reserve Expedited Enrolment Trial: Operation Order 001*. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2017), 9.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid., 10-11.

²⁹ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Implementation Order 36 CBG Recruiting Trial*. (Halifax: Department of National Defence, 2016), A-1.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Strengthening the Army Reserves: Expedited Recruitment Medical Process*. Ottawa: (Department of National Defence, 2017).

which outlines a two-step recruiting medical process. The first step is a confidential questionnaire filled out by the applicant, which is followed by the second step, the primary reserve screening test (PRST), conducted by a supporting reserve field ambulance unit. Once both steps are completed, they are sent to the RMO by priority post, and after review the results are returned. This is the preferred method³². If a field ambulance is not able to support the recruiter has the applicant fill out the questionnaire, which is submitted to the recruiter in a sealed envelope. The recruiter then priority mails the questionnaire to the RMO, and the PRST is completed at a later time. On returning a positive result from a questionnaire only submission, commanding officers are authorized to enroll an applicant with restrictions. The risk is that the new member may be required to change occupations or to release from the Canadian Armed Forces if the PRST returned with an unfit response³³.

Upon completion of all requirements in visit zero through visit two the applicant would be deemed ready for enrollment with associated risk and restrictions, if the medical and reliability screening process were still under way³⁴. This streamlined process had great potential to significantly reduce the time from application submission to enrollment and to see the applicant enrolled within a few weeks rather than months.

PRIMARY RESERVE EXPEDITED ENROLMENT TRIAL

Results of the Primary Reserve Expedited Enrolment Trial are sourced from the Reserve Recruiting Initiative 36 CBG Trial Report³⁵, a briefing note produced by the 36

³² Canada. Department of National Defence. *Strengthening the Army Reserves: Expedited Recruitment Medical Process*. Ottawa: (Department of National Defence, 2017), 6.

³³ Ibid., 5.

³⁴ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Implementation Order 36 CBG Recruiting Trial*. (Halifax: Department of National Defence, 2016), A-1.

³⁵ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Reserve Recruiting Initiative 36 CBG Trial Report*. (Halifax: Department of National Defence, 2017).

CBG Personnel Selection Officer. No other documents were available for review. What is more, the detailed statistical data was also not available as it is housed in the Canadian Forces Recruiting Information System (CFRIMS), a database that required a lengthy process to request data, which was not possible to extract and deliver during the production of this paper. Though this is not ideal the Trial Report provides valuable information to extract and assess the results of the trial, at least from the perspective of those conducting it.

The trial conditions were not what one would expect to give commanders the confidence required confirming that this is the correct course of action and is the way forward. Instead, it generates many questions to the viability of the trial and whether any conclusions can be drawn at all. The timing and the lack of preparation time are the most significant factors in establishing the poor trial conditions.

As was discussed the trial start date was 6 December³⁶. The staff required to facilitate the trial were 36 CBG class B Army Reserve staff. In a reserve brigade headquarters the December block leave period starts mid-December and they do not return until the end of the first week in January. Class A units cease training early December and begin training again the second week of January. Initiating a four-month trial for the Army Reserves at the beginning of December does not set the conditions for momentum to build from the start of the trial period, which was identified by trial participants³⁷.

³⁶ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Implementation Order 36 CBG Recruiting Trial*. (Halifax: Department of National Defence, 2016), 7.

³⁷ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Reserve Recruiting Initiative 36 CBG Trial Report*. (Halifax: Department of National Defence, 2017), 2.

The lack of preparation time had a significant effect on the trial. This had the most influence on units, who were to provide office space and two class A recruiting staff each. It was not until November 2016 that the CDS issued orders to conduct a trial on the expedited enrolment process³⁸, which did not filter down in an actual order to participating units until the Implementation Order 36 CBG Recruiting Trial was signed and issued on 25 November by the Commander of 36 CBG³⁹. This only afforded Commanding Officers one training night, before the start of the trial, to identify participating staff, which is not sufficient in the Class A operating environment. The staffing results speak volumes where units were only able to fill 50% of Recruiting Officer positions and 44% of File Manager positions⁴⁰.

Allocating office space was not identified as a significant issue; however, office equipment setup, software access and training, and training staff on recruitment policy and procedures were⁴¹. Front end preparation time would have been valuable in planning and implementation. CFRIMS is critical to recruit file management and providing situational awareness of files once they leave the recruiters hands for medical or reliability screening. Access to CFRIMS was a day-to-day challenge and technical support was in high demand. What is more, due to the organizational and now geographical separation of the Army Reserve recruiters, permissions were drastically restricted and had to be negotiated⁴².

³⁸ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Expedited Reserve Enrolment Trial*. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2016), 1.

³⁹ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Implementation Order 36 CBG Recruiting Trial*. (Halifax: Department of National Defence, 2016), 1.

⁴⁰ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Reserve Recruiting Initiative 36 CBG Trial Report*. (Halifax: Department of National Defence, 2017), 2.

⁴¹ Ibid., 3.

⁴² Ibid.

All recruiting staff requires an understanding of the policies procedures and tools used within the recruiting system. As most class B, if not all, staff were in place prior to the trial the focus of training was on the class A part time Recruiting Officers and File Managers. The training consisted of lectures and practical assessments. Though necessary, the practical assessments were labour intensive. The standard required assessment of staff processing or interacting with actual applicants and applications submitted. Due to the lack of qualified assessors, training of the initial staff allocated by units was not completed until the end of the trial period⁴³.

The lessons to be taken from the trial implementation is that of preparation. Trial participants were required to spend a significant amount of time on planning, preparation, and training that should have been started if not completed before the trial was initiated. It is highly likely that the results would have been different if the staff and tools required were in place prior to commencement. Whether this would accent a positive or negative result is difficult to determine because the conditions had such a drastic effect. The trial report indicates that performance measurements collected during the trial are not trustworthy as initial operating capability was only achieved at the end of the trial⁴⁴. Commanders who are making decisions based on trial results must be aware of the inconsistencies of the trial process that affected the results.

Having addressed initial conditions, the assessment of the results in themselves does have some value. Though attraction is not the focus on recruiting process assessment, it is noted that the application intake rate is slightly greater than that from the

⁴³ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Reserve Recruiting Initiative 36 CBG Trial Report*. (Halifax: Department of National Defence, 2017), 2.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 5.

same time period of the previous year. This is mostly due to work done prior to the trial because the staff focus during the trial was on processing files and not attraction activities. Application count is therefore expected to drop in the subsequent quarter⁴⁵. Of these 191 applications initiated during the trial, only three files had progressed to enrolment. Seven files progressed to enrolment that had been initiated prior to the trial. That is 10 enrolments over a 13-week trial period. If only the post December weeks where work was done were considered, then that would be 9 weeks and a 1.1 applicant enrolment rate per week and 57 per year. With 11 class A reserve units participating in the trial this would project 5 members per unit being enrolled per year. If we were to consider an average unit strength of 100 members and an attrition rate of 30%, this would result in a 25% decline, which is much larger than the 5% identified by the Auditor General in 2016⁴⁶. As indicated above the trial results are not perfect, but this does represent a trend that must be taken seriously. In the same time period, the CFRG processed 70 applications, and at the end of the trial the Army Reserve recruiters had 145 files still open of those received during the trial. The question is begging to be asked, why the discrepancy between the CFRG and the 36 CBG processed files? How far along the process were the remaining files?

Though the validity of the trial has been questioned, there are lessons learned that can be addressed immediately without a follow-on trial. The RMO and DGDS both have applicant screening responsibilities that have processes identified as time consuming and are targets for streamlining, which will be required in order to reach the goal of reducing

⁴⁵ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Reserve Recruiting Initiative 36 CBG Trial Report*. (Halifax: Department of National Defence, 2017), 1.

⁴⁶ Canada. Office of the Auditor General of Canada. *Spring 2016 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada: Canadian Army Reserve - National Defence*. (Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2016), 9.

the application processing time from months to weeks⁴⁷. Both RMO and DGDS have set a targets of processing recruit files within five days each. Unfortunately, this was not realized during the trial. Reliability statuses were received on an average 16 days after submission. The shortest turnaround was four days, which was positive; however, the longest was received 42 days during the trial period. Medical file status was returned after an average of 18 days⁴⁸. There is no indication of why these processes did not meet target timelines, but assuming the files were submitted at the same time to the RMO and DGDS then we can assume that two weeks are to be added on to the length of the recruiting file processing. This will extend the one-to-two-week timeline to over a month.

POST TRIAL RECOMMENDATIONS

As the trial came to a close it was clear prior to the release of the results on 11 April 2017⁴⁹ that the Canadian Army was to assume responsibility for the Army Reserve recruiting process no matter the recommendations submitted⁵⁰. This leads one to believe that the handover of authority was not dependant on the trial but rather a plan being put in effect. The leads to the question of whether the Primary Reserve Expedited Enrollment Trial was a trial at all or phase one of an implementation plan.

There is evidence that processing time has been slightly reduced, however there is still room and need for improvement⁵¹. The analysis conducted here is solely performed on limited quantitative results available, however a 2021 survey conducted in Ontario, of

⁴⁷ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Canadian Army Primary Reserve Expedited Enrolment Trial: Operation Order 001*. (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2017), 2.

⁴⁸ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Reserve Recruiting Initiative 36 CBG Trial Report*. (Halifax: Department of National Defence, 2017). 2.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 1.

⁵⁰ Canada. Department of National Defence. *5th Canadian Division Primary Reserve Recruitment Operation Order 001*. (Halifax: Department of National Defence, 2017), 2.

⁵¹ Imre-Millei, Bibora. "Recruitment & Retention Trends in Ontario Primary Reserve." *Centre for International and Defence Policy Brief* 7, no. 1 (2021): 2.

recent recruits identifies qualitative aspects that should be further investigated.

Experiences include the need for applicants to follow up for recruiting files to progress through the process, the system is difficult to navigate and needs to be simplified or requires better communication, and accurate information is not readily available⁵².

Further analysis is required to develop real solutions that need to be properly tested and implemented to realize a goal of enrolment after two weeks of application submission. Critics suggest that only through the use of outside resources and forcing CAF to implement recommendations will real results be seen and for the Canadian defence establishment to seriously consider and implement other courses of action⁵³.

Perhaps a civilian agency is contracted to process recruiting files or providing a generous cash sum for time and costs incurred by recruits like in the United Kingdom⁵⁴. The US Marine Corps has found success in identifying their strongest leaders, assigning them to recruiting, and giving them the responsibility to attract, mentor, and guide applicants from the start to the end of the process right up to the point they attend their first course⁵⁵.

Critics suggest that current processes such as medicals and reliability screening, that CAF has been protective of, can be done by local civilian agencies and do not require every file to be reviewed by high level CAF officials. An example are flight medicals for the

⁵² Imre-Millei, Bibora. "Recruitment & Retention Trends in Ontario Primary Reserve." *Centre for International and Defence Policy Brief* 7, no. 1 (2021): 2.

⁵³ Petrolekas, George. "Reserve Options" *2016 Policy Review Series*. (Canadian Global Affairs Institute July 2016), 6.

⁵⁴ Edmunds, Timothy, Antonia Dawes, Paul Higate, K. Neil Jenkins, and Rachel Woodard. "Reserve Forces and the Transformation of British Military Organisation: Soldiers, Citizens and Society" *Defence Studies* 16 no. 2 (2015): 125.

⁵⁵ Griesmer, David M, "Understanding Marine Corps Recruiting Process." *Marine Corps Gazette* 90, no. 4 (2006): 47.

Transport Canada are conducted by outside doctors⁵⁶. No matter what policies are put into place a meaningful trial is required to prove the concept.

CONCLUSION

This latest attempt to streamline the processing of Army Reserve recruiting files did not effectively shorten the time from application submission to enrollment and should be reviewed and adjusted. The process as directed by CAF and Canadian Army senior leadership has strong potential to reduce recruiting file processing times; however, the Primary Reserve Expedited Enrolment Trial fell short of essential trial conditions required to produce useable results to confirm and prove theories. The trial is not without lessons learned and should be considered along with academic, and the Army Reserve community recommendations as the process is further reviewed and adjusted. If senior leadership are serious about a successful recruiting system, then real change must be considered and applied to the processing of recruiting files and all other aspects of Army Reserve recruitment.

⁵⁶ Petrolekas, George. "Reserve Options" *2016 Policy Review Series*. (Canadian Global Affairs Institute July 2016), 6.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Canada. Department of National Defence. *5th Canadian Division Primary Reserve Recruitment Operation Order 001*. Halifax: Department of National Defence, 30 March, 2017.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Canadian Army Operation Order Strengthening the Army Reserve - Update*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2017.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Canadian Army Primary Reserve Expedited Enrolment Trial: Operation Order 001*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2017.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *CANLANDGEN 007: Army Reserve (ARes) Recruiting Trial*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, November, 2001.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *CANLANDGEN 033: Expedited Enrolment Process for Reserve Force Applications – Devolution of Authority*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, November, 2004.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Chief of Defence Staff Initiation Direction Reserve Strategy 2015: Strengthening the Primary Reserve*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, November 2016.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Commander Canadian Army Initiation Direction: Strengthening the Army Reserve*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, November 2016.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Expedited Reserve Enrolment Trial*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, November 2016.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Implementation Order 36 CBG Recruiting Trial*. Halifax: Department of National Defence, 25 November 2016.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Reserve Recruiting Initiative 36 CBG Trial Report*. Halifax: Department of National Defence, April, 2017.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Strengthening the Army Reserves: Expedited Recruitment Medical Process*. Ottawa: Department of National Defence, November, 2017.
- Canada. Office of the Auditor General of Canada. *Spring 2016 Reports of the Auditor General of Canada: Canadian Army Reserve - National Defence*. Ottawa: Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2016.

- Chapman, Christian. P. *Relentless Struggle: Saving the Army Reserve 1995-2019*. Ottawa: Durnovaria, 2019.
- Edmunds, Timothy, Antonia Dawes, Paul Higate, K. Neil Jenkins, and Rachel Woodard. "Reserve Forces and the Transformation of British Military Organisation: Soldiers, Citizens and Society" *Defence Studies* 16 no. 2 (2015): 118-136.
- English, Jack. *The Role of the Militia in Today's Canadian Forces*. Canadian International Council and Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute September, 2011.
- Griesmer, David M, "Understanding Marine Corps Recruiting Process." *Marine Corps Gazette* 90, no. 4 (2006): 47-48.
- Imre-Millei, Bibora. "Recruitment & Retention Trends in Ontario Primary Reserve." *Centre for International and Defence Policy Brief* 7, no. 1 (2021): 1-4.
- Leskys, Vylius. "Optimizing Army Recruiting." *War Room - US Army War College* July 22, 2019.
- Petrolekas, George. "Reserve Options" *2016 Policy Review Series*. Canadian Global Affairs Institute July 2016.

