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Ally for Deterrence: Canadian Defence Policy in the Indo-Pacific

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Exercise Solo Flight

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ALLY FOR DETERRENCE: CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

INTRODUCTION

A growing China and a resurgent Russia are increasingly engaging internationally in pursuit of their national interests. As they do so, they are attempting to change the world order from the liberal rules-based system into something more amenable to those interests. The result will be a reduction in overall global democracy. This is a threat to Canada's interests by disrupting trade, reducing rule of law, degrading human rights, and slowing human development.

To counter this threat, Canada should continue to pursue a foreign and defence policy that increases democracy abroad, but also protects where it is extant. This would demonstrate resolve towards autocratic leaders that liberal democratic states are not to be undermined or bullied, and would deter aggression. In the Indo-Pacific region, increased institutional resiliency among democratic states would improve deterrence for any partners to an alliance or security agreement to which Canada becomes a party.

This paper will demonstrate that, in pursuance of Canada's policy objectives in the Indo-Pacific region, it should pursue a defence agreement with other stable democracies in the region in order to provide deterrence against any malign influence or hybrid war techniques emanating from the People's Republic of China (PRC), the region's foremost autocratic regime.

CANADIAN VALUES & POLICY

Canada is fundamentally a free and democratic society, where the rule of law supports and is supported by fundamental freedoms, democratic rights, legal rights, and equality rights. These are explicitly outlined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and

Freedoms.¹ The Canadian government pursues a defence policy and a foreign policy that are designed to support and maintain freedom, democracy, rule of law, and equality at home.

To promote the safety, security, and prosperity of its citizens, Canada needs a peaceful world. The prosperity of Canadians and their economy is highly dependent on international trade. For the five years prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, Canada's gross exports of goods and services amounted to between 31% and 33% of gross domestic product (GDP).² Similarly, its imports of goods and services in the same period ranged between 33% and 34% of GDP.³ A peaceful and stable world enables trade. Canada also recognizes that the rule of law is a fundamental enabler of prosperity for societies; with it, "businesses can thrive, encouraging foreign investment, and combatting corruption."⁴

Canadians do not simply look at foreign policy in terms of business and trade opportunities. While a vast majority of Canadians believe that "pursuing jobs and economic growth in international markets is important,"⁵ they also want a foreign policy that defends human rights and democracy abroad.⁶ This includes advancing an

¹ Justice Laws Website, "The Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1982," last modified 13 May 2022, <https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/const/page-12.html>.

² World Bank, "Canada Exports of goods and services, in % of GDP 2015-2019," last accessed 27 May 2022, <https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/country/CAN/startyear/2015/endyear/2019/indicator/NE-EXP-GNFS-ZS>.

³ World Bank, "Canada Imports of goods and services, in % of GDP 2015-2019," last accessed 27 May 2022, <https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/country/CAN/startyear/2015/endyear/2019/indicator/NE-IMP-GNFS-ZS>.

⁴ Government of Canada, "Rule of Law," last modified 5 June 2017, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/human_rights-droits_homme/rule_law-primaute_droit.aspx?lang=eng.

⁵ MacDonald Laurier Institute, "Canadians support a stronger, more principled foreign policy: MLI's Annual Foreign Policy and International Affairs Survey," last accessed 23 May 2022, <https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/canadians-support-a-stronger-more-principled-foreign-policy-mlis-annual-foreign-policy-and-international-affairs-survey/>.

⁶ Ibid.

international system where rights-based legal norms and democratic expression can flourish.

Canadian Foreign Policy

Global Affaires Canada is “responsible for advancing Canada’s international relations, including: Developing and implementing foreign policy; [f]ostering the development of international law...; [and] [p]roviding international assistance...”⁷ The department outlines a number of Canada’s national interests to include poverty reduction, the promotion of a rules-based international order, international peace and security, human rights, inclusive and accountable governance, peaceful pluralism, inclusion and respect for diversity.⁸

The current Minister of Foreign Affairs Mandate Letter, dated December 2021, outlined specific policy objectives to meet Canada’s national interests.⁹ A common theme is the “promotion of democracy, human rights..., and the rule of law.”¹⁰ Specifically mentioned is a commitment to “advance support for democracy and human rights as a core priority in Canada’s international engagement.”¹¹ There are several mentions of making commitments to work with Canada’s partners to advance its interests. These include strengthening Canada’s partnership with its closest ally the United States, as well as to:

⁷ Global Affairs Canada, “Raison d’être, mandate and role: who we are and what we do,” last modified 1 March 2022, <https://www.international.gc.ca/global-affairs-affaires-mondiales/corporate-ministere/mandate-mandat/index.aspx?lang=eng>.

⁸ GAC, “Raison d’être...”

⁹ Office of the Prime Minister of Canada, “Minister of Foreign Affairs Mandate Letter,” last modified 16 December 2021, <https://pm.gc.ca/en/mandate-letters/2021/12/16/minister-foreign-affairs-mandate-letter>.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

promote peace and security, combat authoritarianism and counter foreign interference through *collective international responses*, including by *expanding [Canada's] cooperation with likeminded partners... Work with G7, NATO and likeminded partners* to develop and expand collective responses to arbitrary detention, economic coercion, cyber threats, foreign interference in democratic processes and egregious violations of human rights... *increasing Canada's diplomatic presence in regions of strategic importance*, and *working closely with democratic partners* to promote open, transparent and inclusive governance around the world... Work with the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of International Development to *expand Canada's engagement with allies, partners and international organizations* in order to promote peace and security....¹²

(Emphasis added)

Specifically mentioned in the mandate letter is the task of “expanding fast and flexible support for fragile and emerging democracies.”¹³ This has been demonstrated most recently with Canada’s support to Ukraine in its ongoing conflict with the Russian Federation.¹⁴

Another objective in the Mandate Letter is to “[d]evelop and launch a comprehensive Indo-Pacific strategy to deepen diplomatic, economic and defence partnerships and international assistance in the region”¹⁵ This strategy has yet to be

¹² PMO, “MFA Mandate Letter.”

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Government of Canada, “How Canada is helping – Russian invasion of Ukraine,” last modified 11 May 2022, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_developpement-enjeux_developpement/response_conflict-reponse_conflits/crisis-crisis/ukraine-canada-helping-aide.aspx?lang=eng.

¹⁵ PMO, “MFA Mandate Letter.”

publicly articulated. However, The Globe and Mail newspaper published an article in January 2022 that allegedly describes the strategy in rough outline.¹⁶ The article states that the strategy will have Canada establish a larger “diplomatic footprint in the Indo-Pacific and contributing to infrastructure investments in the region as part of a Western effort to counter China’s controversial Belt and Road Initiative.”¹⁷ Less clearly defined and “under consideration”¹⁸ was an increased naval presence in the Indo-Pacific, as well as a cybersecurity role possibly involving information sharing agreements with the Communications Security Establishment.¹⁹

Evidence of Canadian Government efforts to improve economic ties in the Indo-Pacific has been seen in the past five months. On 14 April 2022, the Minister of Foreign Affairs concluded a trip to Indonesia and Vietnam. The Minister discussed with Indonesian authorities plans to strengthen Canada’s bilateral relationship.²⁰ In Vietnam, discussions highlighted the bilateral relationship between Hanoi and Ottawa, “underpinned by shared commitment to multilateralism, [and] global security.”²¹ Also highlighted in Vietnam was the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, of which Canada is a member.²² The Ministerial trip also included meetings with officials from the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to

¹⁶ Robert Fife, Steven Chase, “Ottawa eyes Indo-Pacific plan to shift trade away from China,” *Globe and Mail*, 12 January 2022

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Global Affairs Canada, “Minister Joly concludes successful visits to Indonesia and Vietnam,” last modified 14 April 2022, <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2022/04/minister-joly-concludes-successful-visits-to-indonesia-and-vietnam.html>.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

discuss Canada's status as a Strategic Partner in that forum.²³ The previous November, Canada and ASEAN agreed to begin free trade negotiations.²⁴ On 1 May 2022, the Minister of International Trade, Export Promotion, Small Business and Economic Development signed a memorandum of understanding with their Philippine counterpart with the goal of strengthening ties with the Philippines.²⁵ Canada is also pursuing trade agreements with India.²⁶

Efforts to improve trade relations with receptive partners have dominated the early groundwork of Canada's expected Indo-Pacific strategy. Humanitarian and development projects have not been as prominent (development assistance for ethnic minority women and girls was a secondary part of the Foreign Minister's visit to Vietnam)²⁷. Democracy, human rights, and the rule of law have not been actively discussed. No significant announcements related to defence and security have been made.

Canadian Defence Policy

Canada's latest defence policy was published in 2017. "Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy" (SSE) outlines the priorities the government has assigned to the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). These priorities have changed little since the 1994

²³ Global Affairs Canada, "Minister Joly reinforces Canada's commitment to Association of Southeast Asian Nations partners," last modified 11 April 2022, <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2022/04/minister-joly-reinforces-canadas-commitment-to-association-of-southeast-asian-nations-partners.html>.

²⁴ Government of Canada, "Canada-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement," last modified 11 March 2022, <https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/asean-anase/fta-ale/negotiations-negociations.aspx?lang=eng>.

²⁵ Global Affairs Canada, "Minister Ng establishes the Canada-Philippines Joint Economic Commission," last modified 2 May 2022, <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2022/05/minister-ng-establishes-the-canada-philippines-joint-economic-commission.html>.

²⁶ Global Affairs Canada, "Minister Ng speaks with India's Minister of Commerce and Industry, Consumer Affairs and Food and Public Distribution and Textiles," last modified 10 May 2022, <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2022/05/minister-ng-speaks-with-indias-minister-of-commerce-and-industry-consumer-affairs-and-food-and-public-distribution-and-textiles.html>.

²⁷ GAC, "Minister Joly concludes successful visits..."

White Paper on Defence was published after the end of the Cold War.²⁸ These are, first, the defence of Canadian sovereignty; second, the security of North America in cooperation with the United States of America (primarily through the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) agreement); and third, international engagement in order to contribute “to a more stable, peaceful world”.²⁹

The policy stipulates that the Canadian military will be utilized in whole-of-government efforts, “in concert with diplomatic engagement, humanitarian and development aid, and other measures.”³⁰ SSE explicitly describes core Canadian strategic interests as security and prosperity, as these conditions “support the Canadian way of life”³¹ and allow Canadians to flourish without fear.³² Additional factors of the Canadian national interest include global stability, the primacy of the rules-based international order, and the principle of collective defence.³³ The protection *and promotion* of these interests is a policy that Canada will pursue.³⁴

Canada’s Alliances

Canada’s third defence policy priority – military engagement in the world – is conducted multilaterally primarily through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and United Nations (UN) peace support operations. These are well known in Canadians’ popular memory, especially UN Peacekeeping missions.³⁵ These two formal

²⁸ H. Allan Thomas, “Change and Effect: The Evolution of Canadian Defence Policy from 1964 to 2017 and its Impact on Army Capabilities” (Master of Defence Studies paper, Canadian Forces College, 2018), 41.

²⁹ Department of National Defence, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy* (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2017), 59.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Lane Anker, “Peacekeeping and Public Opinion,” *Canadian Military Journal* (Summer 2005), 23.

alliances help meet Canada's policy objectives of protecting Canadians and their ways of life, and advancing democracy and the rule of law abroad. However, they are inadequate for meeting Canada's interests in the Indo-Pacific.

United Nations

The larger of Canada's two alliances is the UN, where the Security Council (UNSC) has "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security."³⁶ The UN is not a military alliance in the typical sense; however, the UNSC "may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."³⁷ The Korean War (1950-1953) is perhaps the most significant example of the UN acting as a military alliance.³⁸ At the time, neither South Korea nor North Korea nor the PRC was a UN member.³⁹ The Soviet Union, their ideological ally on the Security Council, boycotted the meetings where resolutions were passed allowing military intervention in the Korean conflict.⁴⁰ This was not to be repeated; the Soviets learned from their miscalculation, and eventually the PRC was given the seat as the Chinese member at the UN and its bodies.

It is unlikely the UN will act again in this manner when the permanent members of the Security Council are in disagreement. Military action is still possible with UN approval; the US and its allies were able to convince the Security Council to allow

³⁶ United Nations, "United Nations Charter (full text)," last accessed 25 May 2022, <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text>.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ United Nations Command, "History of the Korean War," last accessed 26 May 2022, <https://www.unc.mil/History/1950-1953-Korean-War-Active-Conflict/>.

³⁹ United Nations, "Member States," last accessed 26 May 2022, <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/member-states>.

⁴⁰ Wilson Center, "The Lost Battle: The Soviet Union and the United Nations under Stalin, 1945-1953," last accessed 26 May 2022, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-lost-battle-the-soviet-union-and-the-united-nations-under-stalin-1945-1953>.

resolutions that led to the 1991 Gulf War and 2011 Libyan conflict. However, the forces involved were not UN-led entities in the same way as the United Nations Command in the Korean War. Russia and China are unlikely to support any Security Council resolution against their challenges to the international order, as has already been seen in the Ukraine.⁴¹

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Canada is a founding member of NATO.⁴² It is a collective security defence alliance; Article 5 of the treaty stipulates that “an armed attack against one or more of [the Parties] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all...”⁴³ Article 6 defines the geographic boundaries where allies’ territory and forces are covered by the treaty to be in Europe, North America, Turkey, the Mediterranean Sea, or islands in the Atlantic Ocean north of the Tropic of Cancer.⁴⁴

NATO was formed to deter the Soviet Union.⁴⁵ It also helped to unify Western Europe and self-deter the members and their neighbours from another self-destructive war.⁴⁶ Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has conducted military operations outside the North Atlantic region. The September 11th attacks triggered Article 5 of the treaty, and saw the alliance contribute to the war in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2021 via the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Resolute Support Mission

⁴¹ United Nations. “Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution on Ending Ukraine Crisis, as Russian Federation Wields Veto,” last accessed 26 May 2022, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2022/sc14808.doc.htm>.

⁴² North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The North Atlantic Treaty: Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949,” last updated 10 April 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm?selectedLocale=en.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Andrew Moran, “NATO and security alliance theory,” in *International security studies: Theory and practice* (Milton: Taylor & Francis Group, 2020), 337.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

(RSM).⁴⁷ Outside of Article 5, NATO has led collective security operations in the former Yugoslavia,⁴⁸ the aforementioned military campaign against Libya, and counter piracy operations off the Horn of Africa.⁴⁹

NATO has partnerships with other states not party to the treaty. Australia and New Zealand are NATO partners lying far outside the North Atlantic region but are aligned with NATO security concerns. However, the explicitly defined geographic limits of Articles 5 and 6 render them outside the collective defence of the treaty, which makes ambiguous the deterrence effect of the collective security arrangement for events in the Pacific. Similarly, the ability to act in a coordinated fashion to deter or forestall a belligerent in the Indo-Pacific is also likely to be less effective than in NATO's near abroad, as none of the NATO members other than the United States have territories in the Western Pacific area (France and the United Kingdom have island territories in the Indian Ocean and southeastern Pacific). NATO alone will not satisfy Canada's potential defence requirements in the Indo-Pacific.

The Five Eyes

The Five Eyes community is another association that has played a part in Canada's defence and security policies. It consists of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Canada shares similar values and strategic outlook with its Five Eye partners.⁵⁰ Separating them is their geography: Europe, North

⁴⁷ NATO, "NATO and Afghanistan," last modified 19 April 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm.

⁴⁸ NATO, "NATO marks 20 year anniversary of IFOR peacekeeping mission" last modified 18 December 2015, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_125737.htm?selectedLocale=en.

⁴⁹ NATO, "Counter-piracy operations," last modified 19 May 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48815.htm?selectedLocale=en

⁵⁰ J. Vitor Tossini, "The Five Eyes – The Intelligence Alliance of the Anglosphere," last modified 14 April 2020, <https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/the-five-eyes-the-intelligence-alliance-of-the-anglosphere/>.

America, and Oceania. It is not an alliance, although bilateral and multilateral alliances tie certain members together. Rather, it is a common name for a series of agreements to share intelligence and military standards.⁵¹

CANADA AND THE INDO-PACIFIC

Through NATO and the Five Eyes, Canada enjoys close security relations with New Zealand and Australia. It also has good security relations with other Asia-Pacific democracies via the American network of alliances.⁵² The US system of security arrangements in Asia is very different than in Europe. In the latter, NATO is a single broad multilateral institution with command and control of assigned forces.⁵³ It is composed of geographically small countries sharing multiple borders.

Previously in Asia, a collective security arrangement existed in the form of the US-led Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO); however, it was significantly less effective and less regionally inclusive than NATO, and dissolved in 1977.⁵⁴ Instead, US policy in Asia has relied on a hub & spoke model called the San Francisco system.⁵⁵ The US is the hub of a network of alliances, and it maintains spokes of (mostly) bilateral defence agreements. America's traditional allies in the region (i.e. Japan, South Korea,

⁵¹ Defense Intelligence Agency, "This Week in DIA History: Formation of the FVEY Partnership," last modified 30 May 2019, <https://www.dia.mil/News-Features/Articles/Article-View/Article/1861392/this-week-in-dia-history-formation-of-the-fvey-partnership/>; Defense Standardization Program, "International Standardization," last accessed 25 May 2022, <https://www.dsp.dla.mil/Programs/International-Standardization/>.

⁵² Marius Grinius, "Canada's Security Role in Asia-Pacific," 2016 Policy Review Series (Calgary: Canadian Global Affairs Institute, July 2016), 1.

⁵³ NATO, "Supreme Allied Commander Europe," last accessed 27 May 2022, <https://shape.nato.int/saceur>.

⁵⁴ Leszek Buszynski, "SEATO: Why It Survived until 1977 and Why It Was Abolished," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 12, no. 2 (September 1981): 296, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20070432>.

⁵⁵ Camille Morel, Friederike Richter, "Introduction. Legitimate or effective: the dilemma of all defence cooperation in the 21st century?" trans. Edouard Hargrove, *Les Champs de Mars* 32, no. 1 (January 2019): 11.

Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand)⁵⁶ are spread out geographically and don't share any mutual borders. American military might and careful diplomacy has made up the difference.⁵⁷ The bilateral approach of the US has allowed it more diplomatic latitude in dealing with the security threats in the region.⁵⁸

China

The PRC has grown to become a leading regional power that pursues its national interests. Its growth in economic, diplomatic, and military power has come with a number of security issues for the West. Underlying these issues is the PRC's rapid militarization, lack of transparency, disregard for human rights, and its revisionist approach to international rule of law.⁵⁹

China's engagement in "foreign interference, disinformation, espionage, hostage diplomacy, and cyber-attacks"⁶⁰ poses a threat to Canadian security. It is also a threat to other democracies – at least any in conflict with China's interests. The erosion of institutions in other democratic states poses an indirect threat to Canada's interest by undermining the international rules-based order and eroding democratic transparency and freedom of expression. Should Canada choose to standby and do nothing while other nascent and established democracies are undermined and destabilized then the world will

⁵⁶ Jae Jeok Park, "The US-Led Alliances in the Asia-Pacific: Hedge against Potential Threats or an Undesirable Multilateral Security Order?" *The Pacific Review* 24, no. 2 (2011): 137.

⁵⁷ Haruka Matsumoto, "The First Taiwan Strait Crisis and China's "Border" Dispute Around Taiwan," *Eurasia Border Review Special Issue on China's Post-Revolutionary Borders, 1940s-1960s* (Spring 2012): 91.

⁵⁸ Victor D. Cha, "Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia," *International Security* 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/2010): 163, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40389236>.

⁵⁹ Jonathan Berkshire Miller, *Canada and the Indo-Pacific: A Need for a Strategic Course* (Calgary: Canadian Global Affairs Institute, March 2021), 2.

⁶⁰ Task Force on National Security of the GSPIA, *A National Security Strategy for the 2020s: How Canada Can Adapt to a Deteriorating Security Environment* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa, May 2022), 4.

become less prosperous and more corrupt, negatively affecting Canadians' prosperity and freedom.

Deterrence through Resiliency

There is evidence that non-democracies allied with democracies tend to become more democratic.⁶¹ However, the presence of contiguous borders plays a strong role in this research.⁶² Since many Western-orientated states in the Asia-Pacific are island nations, it is unlikely that the democratizing effect of an alliance would take hold as strongly. Nascent and fragile democracies inherently have weaker democratic institutions and would be less resilient, and therefore offer less deterrence for an alliance, all while not benefiting from the potential democratic self-improvement that an alliance could offer. They could possibly pose a vulnerability to the cohesion of an alliance.

NATO survived the Cold War intact, but is now being tested again with Russian aggression against its neighbours and against the West in general. The mix of Russia's aggressive actions short of conventional war against its neighbours and rivals has been described as hybrid war. These have included electoral, cyber and other forms of interference in other countries, up to and including the annexation of Crimea in 2014.⁶³ NATO has taken collective defensive measures to deter hybrid war techniques.⁶⁴ This includes cooperating on "strengthening member states' domestic security and societal and institutional resilience."⁶⁵ The coordinated improvements to resiliency are meant to

⁶¹ Douglas M. Gibler and Scott Wolford, "Alliances, Then Democracy: An Examination of the Relationship Between Regime Type and Alliance Formation," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 1 (February 2006): 150.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Nicole J. Jackson, "Deterrence, Resilience and Hybrid Wars: The Case of Canada and NATO," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 19, no. 4 (2019): 107.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 117.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 106

address vulnerabilities and building “strong and adaptive infrastructure, ensure social cohesion and sustain trust in government.”⁶⁶ The strategy may be working; NATO has not seen any of its members directly violated by Russia in the same manner as in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine since 2014. This is despite incidents in Latvia and Estonia that have shown Russian provocations to be a threat.⁶⁷

For this reason, Canada should pursue a network of alliances or security agreements in the Indo-Pacific that is similar to the collective security approach to NATO, and Canada should begin its diplomatic outreach with stable democracies in the region. The Economist Intelligence 2021 Democracy Index rates New Zealand, Taiwan, Australia, South Korea, and Japan as full democracies.⁶⁸ Similarly, the Fund For Peace 2021 Failed States Index rates New Zealand, Australia, Singapore, Japan, and South Korea as sustainable or very stable (Taiwan is not listed).⁶⁹ With the exception of Taiwan, these states would be logical countries for Canada to engage with on closer security arrangements.

Where to Start

AUKUS

In September of 2021, Australia, the UK, and the US announced the creation of the AUKUS security partnership. This was not a mutual defence treaty, but an agreement to transfer defence technology for nuclear submarines and share advanced or emerging capabilities. The latter include artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, advanced

⁶⁶ Ibid., 112.

⁶⁷ Mike Winnerstig, “Introduction,” in *Tools of Destabilization: Russian Soft Power and Non-Military Influence in the Baltic States* (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency [FOI], 2014), 14-15.

⁶⁸ Economist Intelligence, *Democracy Index 2021: The China challenge* (London: Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd., 2022), 40.

⁶⁹ The Fund for Peace, *Fragile States Index Annual Report 2021* (Washington: The Fund for Peace, 2021), 6.

cyber, hypersonic capabilities, and electronic warfare.⁷⁰ The US and Australia have a long defence relationship based on the 1951 ANZUS Treaty. The treaty is still active between the two; however, the status of New Zealand is ambiguous.⁷¹ The AUKUS partnership may be a good starting point for deepening Canadian defence engagement in the Pacific region. The technology transfer and cooperation aspects of the agreement could provide a model to facilitate the building of resilience structures to counter Chinese hybrid influence attempts. However it is not a mutual defence treaty and it does not include other Pacific-based democracies.

The Quad

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) is a framework for US, Australian, Japanese, and Indian diplomatic consultation on defence and security in the Indo-Pacific. Joint military exercises have been conducted by the four Quad members, giving it the appearance of a defence arrangement. The Quad could also act as a starting point for closer Canadian defence ties in the region. However, mutual defence obligations with India may undermine deterrence resilience. India's democratic institutions and resiliency are in question, as it elicits an 'elevated warning' in the Failed States Index.⁷²

If Canada wishes to engage with partners in the Asia-Pacific region to enhance its security and promote resiliency against potential Chinese malign influence, it may need to pursue a mix of multilateral and bilateral engagements at first, until it can establish a network similar to that of the US. This would allow it to avoid entering into security

⁷⁰ White House, "FACT SHEET: Implementation of the Australia – United Kingdom – United States Partnership (AUKUS)," last accessed 27 May 2022, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-australia-united-kingdom-united-states-partnership-aukus/>.

⁷¹ New Zealand History, "ANZUS treaty comes into force," last modified 5 Oct 2021, <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/anzus-comes-into-force>.

⁷² Fund for Peace, 7.

arrangements with states whose democratic institutions and resilience present an unacceptable risk. Eventually, the network of relations could become a driver of reform in other countries wishing to benefit from the same security relationships.

CONCLUSION

Canada's foreign and defence policies goals are aligned to ensure that Canadians are secure, can prosper, and can live in a rules-based world where freedom and democratic rights are the norm. Part of its defence policy is engaging multilaterally with formal and informal defence agreements such as NATO. Canadian policy is also directing us towards the Indo-Pacific region, where the diplomatic, political, military power of the PRC poses a risk to Canada's interests. In response to the potential for hybrid warfare techniques being pursued by the PRC, it behoves Canada to pursue defence agreements with strong, functional democracies. Doing so will better protect the interests of Canada and its democratic partners by demonstrating deterrence through resilience. Current multilateral defence agreements that include the USA and Australia may be good starting points, but they ought to include as many stable democracies in the region as possible and avoid involving states where the lack of institutional resiliency poses too great a risk.

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