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**Canadian Defence of North America as the Key Enabler to
Policy Independence in Response to the Rise of China**

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Exercise Solo Flight

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CANADIAN DEFENCE OF NORTH AMERICA AS THE KEY ENABLER TO POLICY INDEPENDENCE IN RESPONSE TO THE RISE OF CHINA

As the dominant economic, military, and diplomatic force globally since the end of the Second World War, US-style democratic free-market capitalist ideals pervade the international organizations that govern global affairs, trade, financial markets, monetary policy, and international lending. The world is US centric, but China has a Grand Strategy for global dominance and a will to upset this international order. Its multi-decade pursuit to restore its status as a great power is by all accounts proceeding as planned. China's success in achieving its strategic objectives has renewed the great power competition as they seek to reinvent the status quo in their favor. The United States stands much to lose from an ascendant China and needs allies in its effort to compete.

The advantages enjoyed by the US for the last seven decades have been extremely beneficial to Canada. At just 1/10th the US population¹ and Gross Domestic Product², Canada is not the driving influence in US policy; it is the other way around³. The United States has been the primary influence in Canadian economic, security, and international policy for much of the last century, but today, China is Canada's second largest trading

¹ Macro Trends, Canada Population 1950-2022, accessed Jun 11, 2022.

<https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/CAN/canada/population#:~:text=The%20current%20population%20of%20Canada,a%200.91%25%20increase%20from%202018.>

² North America: Gross domestic product (GDP) of Canada and the United States from 2016 to 2026, accessed Jun 11, 2022. <https://www.statista.com/statistics/527955/north-america-gross-domestic-product-forecast/#:~:text=In%202020%2C%20GDP%20of%20Canada,trillion%20international%20dollars%20that%20year.>

³ Alan Gotlieb, "The United States in Canadian Foreign Policy" Lecture transcript accessed Jul 11, 2022. https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/programmes-programmes/od_skelton/allan_gotlieb_lecture-conference.aspx?lang=eng

partner⁴⁵ and has been gaining ground in Canada while the US appears to be losing ground around the world.

Canada is at a crossroads. Our closest allies' have signaled a clear intention to aggressively counter China's rise⁶ with all the elements of national power at their disposal. Remaining in lock step with the United States may hurl us towards a confrontation with China not of our choosing. Canada has already borne the wrath of Chinese national power for supporting US efforts to counter Chinese flouting of the rules based international order⁷. While standing against China's rise may in some circumstances still prove to be the right path for Canada, without a substantial and enduring investment in severely neglected elements of our national security apparatus including defence, national procurement, intelligence, counter intelligence, border protection, cyber security, law enforcement, and diplomacy, Canada will have little choice but to tag along with old allies. Canada must rebuild its national security posture through policy that enables us to respond to China's rise on our own terms, protecting Canadian interests first, even before those of our allies. The prospect of confrontation with China is different for Canada than it is for the US and could have disproportionately

⁴ Office of the Chief Economist – Global Affairs Canada “Canada’s State of Trade 2020: The early impacts of COVID-19 on trade” accessed April 18, 2022, https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/assets/pdfs/publications/State-of-Trade-2020_eng.pdf

⁵ Global Affairs Canada. “The Canada-China Global Commerce Picture and Supply Chain Links” accessed Jul 11, 2022. <https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/economist-economiste/analysis-analyse/china-canada-2020-commerce-chine.aspx?lang=eng>

⁶ Jullienne, Marc. “AUKUS Rocks the Boat in the Indo-Pacific, And It’s Not Good News” Lettre du Centre Asie, Ifri, September 29, 2021, accessed Jun 11, 2022. [AUKUS Rocks the Boat in the Indo-Pacific, And It’s Not Good News | IFRI - Institut français des relations internationales](https://www.ifri.org/fr/publications/lettres-du-centre-asie/aukus-rocks-the-boat-in-the-indo-pacific-and-it-s-not-good-news)

⁷ Vanderklippein, Nathan. “Chinese government threatens Canada, warning its own citizens to exercise caution when travelling to the country” The Globe and Mail published Jul 6, 2020 accessed Jul 11, 2022. <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-chinese-government-threatens-canada-warning-citizens-to-exercise/>

detrimental effects on Canada's economic and diplomatic positions globally for years to come.⁸

Ironically, much of what is required to regain Canada's policy independence from our allies vis-a-vis China is what those allies have been advising us to do for some time, invest substantially more in our own national security. Perhaps only in the face of a credible threat to the previously assumed incontestability of US deterrence will Canada make the expensive and domestically unpopular choice of preparing to defend its own interests. Fortunately, redoubling our security efforts in order to make us able to act more independently of our allies, paradoxically, makes us much better allies. Only substantial investment will provide us with the stronger voice Canada needs in both NORAD and NATO. It is when our contributions to these alliances are actually relied upon that we gain real influence in shaping the western response to a resurgent China. Sufficient targeted investment in our national security is what will provide Canada the voice needed to help prevent an unnecessary confrontation with China. Renewed influence may not appear quickly; it is a long-term sustained investment that builds strength and makes Canada both a credible ally and adversary.

This paper will examine the success of China's grand strategy and its aspirations for 2049, it will look at the indications of Great Power competition underway and its effect on the United States and its allies. It will examine Canada's US centric security policy since the end of the Second World War and how the umbrella of a strong United States

⁸ Carment, David. "Navigating the US-Canada-China Triangular Relationship" Dec 13, 2021 accessed on 11 Jul 2022. <https://peacediplomacy.org/2021/12/13/navigating-the-us-canada-china-triangular-relationship/>

military has allowed the Canadian national security apparatus to atrophy. Finally it will look at the critical enablers required to restore Canada's national security independence allowing Canada to best influence its relationships with both China and our allies, including the United States.

China's Grand Strategy for global dominance is not a closely guarded secret. It is a multi-stage action plan set to follow the successful economic reforms that modernized the Chinese economy.

The overarching end state of Beijing's grand strategy is to achieve national rejuvenation and in so doing realize the "China Dream." Realizing this dream, according to the formal resolution issued by the 3rd Plenum of the 18th CCP Central Committee, means "construct[ing] a wealthy, strong, democratic, civilized and harmonious socialist modernized country." Speaking at the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, Xi outlined a "two-stage development plan." The first stage extends out to 2035, by which date China will have become a global leader in innovation, will possess greater "soft power," and will have established "rule of law" domestically. The second stage continues to 2050, by which date China will have become "prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious and beautiful." The revised CCP Constitution includes these goals and enshrines Xi's ideological leitmotif: "socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era."⁹

Grand Strategy is not new for China although transparently broadcasting the advent of a new era may be somewhat novel.

China has had four successive grand strategies since 1949: revolution (1949–1977), recovery (1978–1989), building comprehensive national power (CNP) (1990–2003), and rejuvenation (2004–present). While these strategies are distinct, there are some enduring strategic objectives discernible across the decades.¹⁰

If past performance is the best indicator of future success then it is worth considering that in the wake of the Polish Labor disruptions of the 1980s that heralded the coming Perestroika, when faced with an existential threat to China's communist economic and

⁹ Scobell, Andrew. Burke, Edmund. Cooper, Cortez, Lilly, Sally. Ohlandt, Chad. Warner, Eric. Williams, JD "China's Grand Strategy Trends, Trajectories, and Long-Term Competition" RAND Corporation Research Report, 2020. Page 18. Accessed Jul 11, 2022. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2700/RR2798/RAND_RR2798.pdf

¹⁰ Ibid, p.11.

political system, the CCP executed economic and social reforms creating a path for Chinese communism to prosper while the USSR disintegrated under the same pressures. Not only does China have a Grand Strategy, but socialism with Chinese characteristics has a recent history of successfully adapting to achieve its long term strategic goals. It is reasonable to expect that China will become more prosperous, more powerful, and more culturally advanced over the next 30 years. Canada needs to respond to this reality to protect its interests.

China's success in achieving its strategic objectives has renewed the great power competition. The Chinese economy now rivals the United States for global supremacy¹¹. Internationally, the United States, Russia, Europe and the Asia-Pacific have all begun to feel the pressure of a zero-sum global power shift. As influence shifts away from those accustomed to leading either regionally or globally, a strategic competition not seen since the Cold War is unfolding. The largest economies, militaries, corporations and diplomatic machines around the world recognize that the balance of power is shifting from West to East.¹² State and non-state actors alike are posturing to protect their interests in light of these new realities.

While some scholars argue over whether a new great power competition is really new, or is really underway, the fact that they are taking the time to study and write about it implicitly acknowledges what those pundits are saying:

As a description, great-power competition is accurate; competition among the great powers is a defining feature of the international environment. Whether one is talking about 16th-century rivalries among empires, the imperialist scramble for Africa, or the Cold War struggle between the capitalist

¹¹ Allison, Graham. Kiersznowski, Nathalie, Fitzek, Charlotte. "The Great Economic Rivalry: China vs the U.S." Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. Mar 23, 2022 accessed Jul 11, 2022. <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/great-economic-rivalry-china-vs-us>

¹² Nye, Joseph S. "The Other Global Power Shift" China/US Focus Aug 13,2020 accessed Jul 11, 2022. <https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-other-global-power-shift>

and communist blocs, states have always jockeyed for power and influence. But the notion that it is new—or that it is returning as if history were taking its revenge—is somewhat absurd. As the Georgetown University professor Daniel Nexon recently put it, “competition among great powers cannot return, because it never really went away.”

Instead, the “return of great-power competition” is essentially an easier way of admitting that the United States is in relative decline. The unipolar moment—the three-decade period of U.S. global predominance that started with the collapse of the Soviet Union—is ending. In the parlance of political science, other states are beginning to balance against the United States. In layman’s terms, this means that with the United States in relative decline, other states are increasingly willing to take actions they would not have during the 1990s, whether it’s Russian intervention in Syria, Chinese claims to the South China Sea, or European steps to circumvent U.S. sanctions legislation.¹³

The relative position of the United States as the single global superpower is being successfully contested by China who is not prepared to play by the rules based international order set up to favor 20th Century western powers¹⁴. China is challenging the status quo and whether this great power competition is new, renewed, or just the US in decline changes little for Canada. The unipolar superpower to our south, upon whom we have relied to provide us nuclear deterrence, North American air defence, international economic leadership, access to space, orbital systems and the most advanced weaponry available is losing its economic edge to a country where the human capital dwarfs the United States to the same scale that the US dwarfs Canada. It would be foolish for the US to stand by and do nothing to protect its relative position but the population mismatch and economic growth trends suggest that America cannot thwart

¹³ Ashford, Emma. “Great-Power Competition Is a Recipe for Disaster: The latest poorly defined buzzword in Washington is leading pundits and policymakers down a dangerous path” Apr 1, 2021 Foreign Policy accessed Jul 11, 2022. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/01/china-usa-great-power-competition-recipe-for-disaster/>

¹⁴ Grace, Abigale. “China Doesn’t Want to Play by the World’s Rules: Beijing’s plans are much bigger than the trade war.” Foreign Policy. Aug8, 2018 accessed Jul 11, 2022. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/08/china-doesnt-want-to-play-by-the-worlds-rules/>

China's Grand Strategy on its own. The United States stands the most to lose from an ascendant China and needs allies in its efforts to compete for dominance.¹⁵

Overwhelming wealth and sustained economic prosperity has allowed the United States to maintain a military arsenal with the global power needed to protect its diplomatic and economic interests abroad. It has also allowed the US to retain a competitive advantage in science and technology investing in bleeding edge development to help retain its position.¹⁶ As the dominant military, government, and economy in the world since the end of the Second World War, US-Style democratic capitalist free market ideals underpin the international organizations that govern global affairs, trade, financial markets, monetary policy, and international lending. Now, a powerful China seeks to reinvent the status quo in their favor.¹⁷ The US has become China's primary adversary, economically in terms of GDP and national economic output, diplomatically in terms of cultivating bilateral relationships¹⁸, militarily in terms of size if not tactical superiority¹⁹, and informationally in terms of manipulating the China/US narrative and China's pursuit of total information dominance domestically for its internal audience²⁰. To further

¹⁵ McCann, Scott. "America Has Already Lost the Strategic Competition with China" the National Interest, Nov 4, 2021 accessed Jul 11, 2022. <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/america-has-already-lost-strategic-competition-china-195803>

¹⁶ Darby, Christopher. Sewall, Sarah. "The Innovation Wars America's Eroding Technological Advantage" Foreign Affairs, March/April 2021 accessed Jul 11, 2022. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-02-10/technology-innovation-wars>

¹⁷ Parmar, Inderjeet. "The US-led liberal order: imperialism by another name?" Chatham House accessed Jul 11, 2022. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/images/ia/INTA94_1_9_240_Parmar.pdf

¹⁸ BBC News, "China now has more diplomatic posts than any other country" accessed Jul 11, 2022. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-50569237>

¹⁹ RAND Corporation, "An Interactive Look at the U.S.-China Military Scorecard" accessed 11 Jul 2022. <https://www.rand.org/paf/projects/us-china-scorecard.html>

²⁰ Cronin, Patrick. "China's Gambit for Total Information Dominance: A US-Australia Response" Hudson Institute, Jul 2021. Accessed Jul 11, 2022.

complicate matters China's push is not just against the US but against the western hegemony that Canada is a small part of.

Economically China's new found strength and willingness to provide sovereign debt solutions outside the governance of the Bretton Woods institutional guidance is buying China strong diplomatic influence amongst those with strained relationships with the west.²¹ While the US has for some time used economics with some success to promote democracy and human rights around their sphere of influence, China is actively undermining this influence by providing funding without different strings attached. Their new found economic power as lender/investor is buying the needed diplomatic clout to be an international powerhouse but with vastly different ideas about interference in national or regional affairs where its interests are not directly threatened.

China appears to understand that threatening American economic and diplomatic interests will not go unnoticed. Their heavy investment in modernizing defence capabilities in area denial that specifically undermines US Navy power projection abroad highlights their tacit understanding that they may one day soon be required to protect their interests militarily.²² The US seems to have acknowledged this as well. They have buttressed their military alliance with Australia and the United Kingdom (UK) to protect western interests in the Asia-Pacific. Australia holds key geography for competing with or countering China. The UK is another powerful bastion of western wealth greatly

²¹ "HGelpert, Anna. Horn, Sebastien. Morris, Scott. Parks, Brad. Trebesch, Christopher. "How China Lends: A Rare Look into 100 Debt Contracts with Foreign Governments" March 2021 accessed Jul 11, 2022. <https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/how-china-lends-rare-look-100-debt-contracts-foreign-governments.pdf>

²² Yeo, Mike. "China's missile and space tech is creating a defensive bubble difficult to penetrate" Defence News, Jun 1, 2020 accessed Jun 11, 2022. <https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2020/06/01/chinas-missile-and-space-tech-is-creating-a-defensive-bubble-difficult-to-penetrate/>

threatened by China's upset to the international status quo. These partners appear to be the nations most capable and reliable to back the US should competition turn to containment and the prospects of armed conflict escalate.

The newly minted AUKUS agreement including a new fleet of US built and maintained nuclear submarines for Australia clearly demonstrates that these great powers understand that they require a credible military response in the Western Pacific in order to back up their diplomatic and economic goals. For the next 30 years it seems that Chinese and AUKUS warships, aircraft, and submarines will stand ready to react if diplomacy fails. This certainly sounds reminiscent of the last great power competition, if you accept that that competition ever really ended.

The advantages enjoyed by the US for the last seven decades have been extremely beneficial to Canada. Since the Second World War the United States diplomatic, economic, and military machine has created a quiet bubble for Canada to rest within. Canada has enjoyed a southern focused export economy²³ as we provided goods and materials to meet US industrial and consumer demands capitalizing our geographic proximity as a competitive advantage in the US imports markets. In return Canada has enjoyed a "special relationship" including access to advanced US defence contractors and even participated in advanced defence technology development such as in aerospace and automotive production.

But over time, Canada has transitioned from a post-war middle-power with the international clout to broker a peaceful conclusion to the Suez Crisis and garnering a

²³ Statistics Canada. "Canada's exports over time: Resources and manufactured goods" Accessed Jul 11, 2022. <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-630-x/11-630-x2017005-eng.htm>

Nobel Peace prize for Prime Minister Pearson, to one of the most criticized members of NATO for failing to meet even half of NATO's basic defence investment benchmark of 2% GDP. From an international reputation as peacemaker and strong voice in the UN's peacekeeping paradigm to a less than stellar partner in NORAD, failing to field a force capable of simultaneously supporting NATO in Europe while also meeting its day to day self-defence commitments in North America. In spite of being one of the wealthiest nations per capita on the planet, Canada's international power and influences have been significantly diminished by our unwillingness to invest in the typical elements of national power and Canada now finds itself relegated to minor power status.

In the relative security bubble of the United States, the Canadian national security apparatus has atrophied. The perceived reliability of the US national security machine has provided successive Canadian governments the relative freedom to neglect our security requirements, correctly understanding that the United States was ready and capable of defending North America single-handedly. For the overwhelming majority of Canadians who live within 150km of the US border security apathy may be the silent acknowledgment that southern Canada is vital ground for US defence posture. It provides the setback needed to push the fight against any northern aggressor (which we are clearly not) beyond its territorial borders. Even northern Canada for many years has been the forward position required to detect and deter advancing airborne threats, thus keeping them beyond the danger zone. The United States needs Canadian geography to defend its borders because Canada exists up-threat.

It is in this geo-political context that Canada has whittled away its national security capacity neglecting and delaying the investment required across capabilities that

safeguard Canadian interests. Only when a crisis presents do Canadian governments of any stripe follow through on platforms and promises to address the security shortfall of the moment. Sea King replacements became an embarrassment, used Leopard tanks were purchased to fill an urgent capability gap in Afghanistan that the Canadian post-cold war mentality said we surely no longer needed. Used F/A-18s from Australia have recently allowed us to push new fighter procurement off a few more years, and embarrassment over the crippling industrial failure of NORTEL due to Chinese espionage finally led to some limited reinvestment in the Communications Security Establishment to expand its role to include the Canadian Center for Cyber Security.

There are more examples, a crippling fire on an outdated naval tanker in 2014 that had to be towed home from Hawaii while our destroyers were being declared unfit for service finally led to real prioritization of capability delivery in the National Shipbuilding Program (NSP). Unfortunately, by the time this happened the Canadian Coast Guard was also facing a capability crisis. The NSP may be the rare glimmer of proactive investment in national security but one has to consider, given the track record, that that decision had less to do with choosing national security capacity and more to do with ensuring that the several hundred billion that must eventually be spent to recapitalize the maritime security fleets be spent in Canada at virtually any cost.

Canada's principal national security investment since the end of the Cold War has been triaging its defence relationship with the United States. In March of 2003, the Chrétien government refused to support the US invasion of Iraq. Then in August of that year, Canada provided 1900 troops and senior leaders just as NATO assumed control of ISAF in Kabul, relieving the US of that heavy troop contribution leadership responsibility

at a time it was stretched in Iraq. In February of 2005, after much discussion of homeland defence, Canada opted not to partner with the United States on ballistic missile defence, forcing the US to establish its missile defence agency outside of its existing aerospace defence enterprise in the NORAD Bi-national Command. Almost simultaneously we signed up for a greater commitment to support the US led Operation Inherent Resolve in Kandahar, posturing diligently to mitigate the US perception of Canada as a lackluster ally.

Earnest response to a moment of crisis cannot replace reasoned and rational investment in national security. By the time Canada withdrew from combat operations in Afghanistan the force was in need of reconstitution and investment but had acquired a collection of operational capabilities pressed urgently into service but not supportable domestically on an ongoing basis. Canadian capabilities in Afghanistan included Unmanned Aerial Systems for Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance not suitable to meet domestic defence needs, Special Operations utility helicopters not suitable for domestic use, and leased medium altitude manned ISR aircraft that Canada has been working to replace for more than 10 years and is only now coming to fruition. The nature of defence capability is that you must posture to have it before you need it or be forced into a compromise solution based on what is immediately available. As Canada looks for more ways to support Ukraine with donations of equipment and ordinance it is clear that when you need it, it will be too late. Additionally adhering to this crisis and response cycle prevents establishment of sound domestic production strategy like the NSP where investment in domestic industry creates the capacity to spend defence development dollars at home.

While AUKUS postures for a possible confrontation with China some voices in the United States have begun calling for Chinese containment²⁴. An aggressive Cold-War style containment policy could escalate tensions with China from fierce competition towards conflict and set the stage for possible crisis as US ships and aircraft continue challenge Chinese territorial sea claims. An overly aggressive containment policy may cause a significant shift in US defence resources toward the South China Sea in order to deter hostile acts against US interests. One of the best ways that Canada can be a good ally in NORAD is to be prepared to carry more than our share in North American defence. Specifically, Canada must invest heavily in independent capabilities that support the NORAD missions of aerospace and maritime warning and control.

The Canadian government has recently announced its intention to participate in the modernization of the North Warning System (NWS) and this is a great first step. Domain awareness is a key enabler for defending North America from attack. Persistent over-the-horizon RADAR technology is one piece of building that domain awareness. Another piece that Canada can address is Airborne Early Warning and Control. A platform like SAABs GlobalEye based on the Bombardier Global business jet could be a built in Canada solution and based in a northern community for enduring northern economic development spinoff. Domestic development of a robust AEW platform also equipped to meet future electronic intelligence gathering capability will provide Canada the tools to develop a comprehensive picture of North American security and specifically addresses capabilities where the US frequently experiences pressures as its fleets are

²⁴ Larson, Deborah. "The Return of Containment" Foreign Policy, Jan 15, 2021. Accessed 11 Jun 2022. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/15/containment-russia-china-kennan-today/>

simultaneously in demand in Europe, the Middle-East, and increasingly the Western Pacific.

Additionally, persistent subsurface domain awareness is also required to detect submarine threats to North America. This is another area where Canada can help relieve US responsibilities. Fixed subsurface acoustic infrastructure can provide persistent acoustic monitoring of the approaches to North America. This is the type of technology that can help Canada assert its claim to the Northwest Passage giving us the capacity to detect submarine traffic either below the surface or below the winter sea ice. As defence against ballistic missiles and hypersonic weapons improves, subsurface approach to close firing positions within our air defence detection horizon eliminates the warning time needed to mount successful air defence. If we don't take on this responsibility it will become another area where the US is the exclusive provider of our security.

These are simply a few examples of the underlying theme and there are many more available such as aerial refuelling, domestic boarder surveillance, and aggressive counter intelligence investigation. When Canada does enough to protect ourselves in North America the US gains freedom of action to defend western interest around the globe. Canada needs a national security apparatus that complements and supports the US. In doing so, US forces will be more available to address western interests in the western Pacific and wherever else they may be challenged.

The United States remains Canada's closest ally, trading partner, and international influence. The United States is signaling that they intend to compete with China to prevent them from achieving the type of dominant position that threatens American interests. While competition does not necessarily lead to confrontation the US has a well-

documented record of confrontation where democratic values and individual liberty are threatened. The US is better postured than Canada to contest China's pressure on the rules based international order. The more diversified US economy can better weather the storms that will result from provoking China. Simultaneously, Canada can work to rebuild our diplomatic reputation with China in hopes of cultivating the relationship needed to keep healthy western competition from turning into another cold war.

Balancing our shift away from a US centric foreign policy on China while also upholding the free and democratic ideals that Canada shares with our neighbor requires the clarity of understanding Canadian interest as separate and distinct from American or Western interests. Canada must rebuild its national security posture through policy that enables us to respond to China's rise on our own terms, protecting Canadian interests first, even before those of our allies while also continuing to be strong partners in NORAD and NATO defence.

This requires Canada to be postured to protect itself somewhat independently in spite of knowing that we will not have to. The freedom to choose a different path with China comes from the deliberate dismantling of the structure of reliance built on the premise that the United States' interests will always largely equate to Canada's interests. In respect of China our interests are no longer the same as the United States. The moral authority to say no to US pressures, in respect of Canadian decisions on China that may harm Canada, comes from taking responsibility as outstanding partners in North American defence.

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