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**Major John Kim**

**Seoul Search: Canada's Future in the Indo-Pacific**

**JCSP 47**

**Exercise Solo Flight**

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## SEOUL SEARCH: CANADA'S FUTURE IN THE INDO-PACIFIC

*“The Korean War provides a clear analogy to the purpose of the deployments for the contemporary Canadian soldier. We want our troops to be able to return to a distant country 30, 40, or 50 years hence as veterans themselves, able to proudly say that they were part of making it a better place.”<sup>1</sup>*

### INTRODUCTION

When North Korea (NK) crossed the demilitarized zone (DMZ) on 25 June 1950, then Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, announced supporting the United Nations (UN) as Canada's Ambassador. At home, Prime Minister St-Laurent “announced the creation of a Canadian Army Special Force, later named the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, to serve under the UN in Korea.”<sup>2</sup> Outside of the two World Wars, the Korean War (1950-1953) remains Canada's largest military contribution with “8 Canadian warships deployed to South Korea (SK) and the Royal Canadian Air Force transported more than 13 000 personnel and 3000 tons of cargo in over 600 trans-Pacific flights.”<sup>3</sup> The Korean War exceeded any operations Canada committed to in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since its founding in 1949. In total, Canada deployed 26 791 members and sustained 516 fatalities.<sup>4</sup> Of those, 376 are buried in the UN Memorial Cemetery, 16 soldiers are listed as missing, and 5 sailors remain lost at sea under the auspice of United Nations Command (UNC).<sup>5</sup> Even after the Armistice, Canada

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<sup>1</sup> Wayne Eyre. “Security on the Korean Peninsula: Canada's Role,” in *HillNotes*. 27 July 2021.

<https://hillnotes.ca/2021/07/27/security-on-the-korean-peninsula-canadas-role/>.

<sup>2</sup> “Timeline. The Korean War,” in *The Canadian Encyclopedia. Korean War*.

<https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/timeline/korean-war>. Last accessed 11 April 2022.

<sup>3</sup> “Air and Naval Support- Canadians in Korea- Korean War- History- Veterans Affairs Canada,” in *Veterans.gc.ca*. Archived from the original on 15 June 2013.

<sup>4</sup> “The Korean War,” in *The Canadian Encyclopedia*. <https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/timeline/korean-war>. Last accessed 6 April 2022.

<sup>5</sup> *United Nations Memorial Cemetery*. Veterans Affairs Canada.

<https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/memorials/united-nations-memorial-cemetery>. Last modified 27 April 2020.

deployed more than 7000 members before the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) officially ended its military operation in 1957.<sup>6</sup> Sixty-five years since, Canada deployed hundreds of personnel to SK even assigning the first non-American UNC Deputy Commander, Gen Wayne Eyre (2018-2019), the current Chief of the Defence Staff.

In contrast, Canada's largest NATO commitment was Afghanistan (2003-2014), which saw the deployment of under 40 000 troops that sustained 158 fatalities.<sup>7</sup> Even though SK has been Canada's longest, and ongoing military involvement, Canada's defence concentrations over the last half century has not been in the Indo-Pacific, but in Europe where the heaviest concentrations of CAF members are in locations such as United Kingdom (UK), Germany, Belgium, Ukraine, and Latvia. This paper argues that Canada's defence concentrations must move beyond Europe if it wants to remain a relevant player in the future. It does not advocate for withdrawing CAF's commitments in Europe, particularly given the current crisis in Ukraine, but a more balanced distribution of personnel in Asia will enhance Canada's global engagement strategy. Compared to Europe, where there are 591 CAF members in 21 countries, including Russia, there are only 76 CAF members in the Indo-Pacific in 14 countries, including Australia and New Zealand (NZ). Within the Indo-Pacific, there are 32 CAF positions in Australia and NZ compared to 12 in SK, 10 in People's Republic of China (PRC), and 5 in Japan,<sup>8</sup> the latter which is the support hub for UNC.

Given the contested area of the South China Sea caused by an ambitious PRC, resumption of missile testing by NK, and Russia's reliance in oil imports in Asia as the war

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<sup>6</sup> *The Korean War*. Veterans Affairs Canada. [https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/korean-war/koreawar\\_fact](https://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/korean-war/koreawar_fact). Last modified 7 March 2022.

<sup>7</sup> *Canada and the War in Afghanistan*. Canadian War Museum. <https://www.warmuseum.ca/learn/canada-and-the-afghanistan-war/>. Last accessed 6 April 2022.

<sup>8</sup> Data retrieved from *COS VCDS OUTCAN Database*. Department of National Defence. Last modified 17 May 2022. The number of deployed personnel reflect Out-of-Canada posting positions, not operational ones.

continues in Ukraine, Canada has an interest in ensuring the economic prosperity of its Indo-Pacific partners, especially SK. If ever there was a *hot spot* that could trigger a Third World War, it is the Indo-Pacific. Canada can contribute to collective security by deploying a permanent, but scalable force to the UNC or posting rotational command officers to the headquarters (HQ); it can leverage its founding member status with Asia-Pacific Economic Co-Operation (APEC) to establish bilateral agreements with SK; and as member of American/British/Canadian/Australian/NZ (ABCANZ) Armies' Program, vie for a potential seat as a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, colloquially referred to as the Quad, comprised of the US, Australia, Japan, and India.

## **DISCUSSION**

### **Invest More Militarily**

“The deployment of the UNC was the world’s first attempt at collective security pursuant to the UN Charter,<sup>9</sup>” and for Canada, “a key chapter in the US-Canada relationship” beyond continental defence “and in the record of Canada’s engagement with multilateral and collective security institutions.”<sup>10</sup> UNC HQ is comprised of personnel from the US, Australia, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, France, NZ, and UK. Since 1978, Canada contributed an advisory group to the UNC Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC) once every two years. The responsibility of UNCMAC include “guard post inspections, reporting on cease-fire violations, repatriation,

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<sup>9</sup> “United Nations Command- History- 1950-1953: Korean War (Active Conflict),” in *www.unc.mil*. <https://www.unc.mil/History/1950-1953-korean-War-Active-Conflict/>. Last accessed 23 May 2022.

<sup>10</sup> “Canada and the Korean War: A Forgotten Ally in a Forgotten War,” in *Wilson Center*. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/canada-and-korean-war-forgotten-ally-forgotten-war>. Last modified 22 April 2021.

and ceremonial functions.”<sup>11</sup> Canada has also sent staff officers between the Maj/LCdr and Col/Capt(N) ranks to UNC HQ.

When a decision was made by UNC in 1992 to permanently assign a SK general officer to lead UNCMAC, it led the PRC and NK to boycott meetings intended to keep lines of communications open between UNC and NK. Traditionally, UNCMAC consisted of a Korean MGen and BGen, a US MGen, a Commonwealth member, and a rotational member of the UNCMAC advisory group. In order to preserve neutrality and encourage the reopening of UNCMAC meetings, Canada could offer a general/flag officer (GOFO) to replace either one of the Korean or American GOFOs. This would alleviate NK’s perception that SK and the US are colluding to occupy three of the five positions. Were this to happen, Canada would remove itself from occupying the Commonwealth and advisory group positions. In addition, rather than relying on the CAF Defence Attaché, a Col/Capt(N), to represent Canada on the rotational UNCMAC advisory group every two years, a Canadian GOFO could relieve the Attaché, truly enabling the separation of military duty from that of a diplomatic one to avoid any conflicts of interest. One cannot be enforcing the Armistice Agreement while also being the same agent to negotiate issues with allies or NK.

Even though UNC is mostly a truce supervisory organisation, it possesses a Joint Security Battalion (JSB), whose job it is to enforce the mandate of UNCMAC. This is an organization in which the CAF is well suited as it can contribute a general purpose sub-unit augmented by service support specialists.<sup>12</sup> For a small contingent the returns would be large: enhanced

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<sup>11</sup> *United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission*. Government of Canada. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/military-history/history-heritage/past-operations/asia-pacific/united-nations-command-military-armistice-commission.html>. Last modified 14 March 2019.

<sup>12</sup> Specialists can include the following: public affairs; military police; intelligence and cyber operators; maintainers; cooks; and traffic, medical, meteorological, geomatics, and information technology technicians.

reputation with the international community by offering senior leaders and a sub-unit permanently in the Indo-Pacific; military integration with the US outside of Europe that would have reciprocal benefits to North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD); professional development for junior non-commissioned members whose current opportunities are limited in Europe<sup>13</sup>; and finally, the ability to achieve greater interoperability with contributing nations from Europe that benefits NATO indirectly.

It must be stressed that Canada would be wise not to commit combat forces in SK as this can aggravate an already precarious situation where the PRC, Russia, and NK perceives US Forces Korea (USFK) and Combined Forces Command (CFC) as aggressive forces poised to wage war.<sup>14</sup> Not only would Canada's joint combat capabilities be negligible in the Indo-Pacific with no aircraft carrier, sizable submarine force, or sufficient sustainment platforms, the costs would be prohibitive. In terms of risk, while being a member of NATO offers Canada some collective security guarantees under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, no such arrangement exists for Canada in the Indo-Pacific. Becoming a Quad member could change this equation. In the absence of such a defence pact, for Canada to commit combat forces against three nuclear powered adversaries would be too risky. Furthermore, because the CAF is too small to maintain an effective fighting force simultaneously in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, it must be prepared to shift its focus.

Lacking combat power in the Indo-Pacific, Canada can compensate by permanently offering a UNC Deputy Commander. In addition to contributing GOFs to UNQ HQ and

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<sup>13</sup> Other than human resources and financial clerks, most of the Out-of-Canada positions in Europe are top-heavy, which have had adverse effects on retention. Moreover, most of the non-commissioned members in Europe are combat arms or combat support trades.

<sup>14</sup> USFK is a combat division stationed in Camp Humphreys in Pyongtaek, SK, which is the largest operational American base outside of the continental US. CFC is a high-readiness response force that reports to both Washington and Seoul akin to the bilateral defence agreement between the US and Canada in NORAD.

UNCMAC, Canada can also offer a Commanding Officer (CO), an army LCol, to the JSB on a rotational basis to align with the arrival of an incoming Canadian UNC Deputy Commander and/or UNCMAC GOFO. While it is not imperative that the CO of JSB perfectly align with the posting of Canadian GOFOs, the overlap of these three positions for at least one year would ensure a qualitative and quantitative Canadian presence in the Indo-Pacific vis-à-vis SK. Lastly, unit command of the JSB and deputy command of UNC would offer a LCol and LGen/VAdm, and their respective Sergeants-Major, contemporary relevance that would benefit the institution back home. Although not currently in practice in the CAF, the deputy command position in UNC should be treated as a Level 1 command equivalent, no different than the Commandant of the NATO Defense College or Deputy Commander Allied Joint Force Command Naples. Such succession would only increase the talent pool for executive appointments in Canada, NORAD, NATO, and the Indo-Pacific.

### **Gain More Technologically and Socio-Economically**

Canada's relations with SK since 1963 continues to improve. While younger than its relationship with Japan, which began in 1928, Canada does not have a controversial past with SK. First, Canada went to war to defend SK; Canada waged war against Japan nine years prior. Second, Canada interned Japanese-Canadians following the War Measures Act for which an apology from Canada was given by Prime Minister Mulroney on 22 September 1988.<sup>15</sup> Third, it did not help that the Japanese committed war crimes against allied soldiers where 267 Canadians died in horrific conditions. An apology from the Japanese government did not occur

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<sup>15</sup> "Government apologizes to Japanese Canadians in 1988," in *CBC Archives*. <https://www.cbc.ca/archives/government-apologizes-to-japanese-canadians-in-1988-1.4680546>. Last updated 22 September 2018.



until 8 December 2011.<sup>16</sup> Perhaps because of the collective conscience of Canada's experience with Japan, it was one of the most vocal countries to sponsor and advocate for Japan's re-entry into the international community following the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952 and its membership into the UN in 1956.<sup>17</sup> The Cold War in Korea and Canada's history with Japan may explain why SK did not initially receive equal attention from the Canadian government. Also, the US' involvement in SK freed Canada to keep its focus on Europe.

Canada can be reminded that even preceding the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTTP)- a free trade agreement between Canada and ten other countries in the Indo-Pacific: Australia, Brunei, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, NZ, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam- Canada established its first Indo-Pacific free trade agreement with SK, the Canada-Korea Free Trade Agreement on 11 March 2014. As Canada's seventh largest trading partner, the "Canada-Korea two-way merchandise trade is robust, reaching \$14.3 billion (CAD) in 2020. In terms of merchandise imports from SK, it is worth \$9.6 billion."<sup>18</sup> SK is the fourth largest economy in Asia and tenth largest in the world after Canada, exceeding \$2.1 trillion (CAD) in gross domestic product.<sup>19</sup>

Canada and SK also established a Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) Agreement in 2017. Whereas Canada and SK are middle powers in space, mutual cooperation between these two countries would be seen favourably by its common ally, the US. Any developments in

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<sup>16</sup> Postmedia News. "Japanese government apologizes to Canada's World War II POWs," in *National Post*. 8 December 2011. <https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/japanese-government-apologizes-to-canadas-wwii-pows>.

<sup>17</sup> "Interesting Episodes in Japan-Canada Relations," in *Foreign Ministry of Japan*. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/canada/episode.html#4>. Last accessed 15 May 2022.

<sup>18</sup> "Canada- the Republic of Korea relations." Government of Canada. [https://www.international.gc.ca/country-pays/republic\\_korea-republique\\_coree/rerelations.aspx?lang=eng](https://www.international.gc.ca/country-pays/republic_korea-republique_coree/rerelations.aspx?lang=eng). Last modified 3 February 2022.

<sup>19</sup> "Top 10 largest economies in the world," in *Business Insider India*. 13 April 2022. <https://www.businessinsider.in/top-10-largest-economies-in-the-world/articleshow/70547252.cms>.

space, whether scientific or economic, would also have a buffering effect on space rivals such as Russia and PRC. The Artemis Accord, spearheaded by the US to reinforce the UN Outer Space Treaty (1967) and set a standard for registering space-borne vehicles and commercialization, came into effect on 13 October 2020. Canada was among the first signatories to the Accord even pledging astronauts to the Lunar Gateway Mission, which would see Canada being the second nation to send humans to the moon and occupying a lunar space station in collaboration with the US and European Space Agency (ESA). SK became the tenth country to sign the Accord on 27 May 2021. In response to the Lunar Gateway Project and the Artemis Accord, Russia and PRC announced their own plans to establish the International Lunar Research Station on 16 June 2021. While some members of the ESA and UN Office for Outer Space Affairs were invited to initial consultations, discussions were closed to the public.<sup>20</sup>

Robotics, artificial intelligence, earth-surveying satellites, and astronautics are areas that Canada has been a measurable player that can contribute to assist the Korean Aeronautics and Research Institute to reach new heights. In return, the Canadian Space Agency can benefit from SK's anticipated achievement in an indigenous space-launch capability, which SK trialed in October 2021 and 30 March 2022. Once SK achieves space-launch capability, it offers Canada and the international community an alternative to Russia or PRC to deploy people and satellites into space.<sup>21</sup> India and Japan already have space-launch capability, but both Canada and SK stand to benefit from not relying on these two nations based on their own reasons. Canada's expertise in earth surveillance, given its land mass and largest coastline in the world is an area in

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<sup>20</sup> *International Lunar Research Station. ILRS. Guide for Partnership. VI.0.* June 2021. China National Space Administration and State Space Corporation "Roscosmos."  
<http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c6812150/content.html>.

<sup>21</sup> Laura Neacsu and Hendrik Pasligh. "Middle-Power Space Strategies: A Comparison of Canada and South Korea," in *Security Distillery*. 3 March 2021. <https://thesecuritydistillery.org/all-articles/middle-power-space-strategies-a-comparison-of-canada-and-south-korea>.

which SK has great interest to gain space-based intelligence on NK. Canada's satellites and membership in the ABCANZ network provide it special access to privileged information that SK can most certainly benefit; at the same time, the bilateral defence agreements the US shares independently with SK and Japan would provide Canada equally beneficial data that have defence, security, and economic implications.

Closer to home, Canada's recent ban of Huawei 5G network on 20 May 2022 opens the door for friendly countries, such as SK, to be able to share and have access to the Canadian telecommunications market. Canada stands to benefit hugely by gaining access to SK's semi-conductors and electronics technology. "SK was the first country to launch commercial 5G networks in April 2019 and currently has 5G coverage across its 85 cities."<sup>22</sup> When the former North American Free Trade Agreement was founded in 1994, most of Canada's imports/exports remained within. "54.8% of Canada's total imports by value in 2021 were purchased from fellow North American nations. Asian trade partners satisfied 26.4% of imports bought by Canada while 13.8% originated from Europe."<sup>23</sup> As a founding member of APEC, Canada has economic access to member economies that "are responsible for more than 60% of global economic output accounting for 47% of world trade and covers nearly 40% of the world's population."<sup>24</sup>

In terms of people, many international students who come to Canada come from SK, which is Canada's third largest contributor after India and PRC. According to the Government

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<sup>22</sup> Juan Pedro Tomás. "South Korea ends November with 20.19 million 5G users," in *RCRWireless News. Intelligence on All things Wireless*. 3 January 2022. <https://www.rcrwireless.com/20220103/5g/south-korea-ends-november-20-million-5g-subscribers#:~:text=The%20total%20number%20of%205G,Ministry%20of%20Science%20and%20ICT>.

<sup>23</sup> Daniel Workman. "Canada's Top 10 Imports," in *World's Top Exports*. <https://www.worldstopexports.com/canadas-top-10-imports/>. Last accessed 22 May 2022.

<sup>24</sup> *Canada and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)*. Government of Canada. [https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international\\_relations-relations\\_internationales/apec/index.aspx?lang=eng](https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/apec/index.aspx?lang=eng). Last modified 22 May 2022.

of Canada, “up to 4000 Korean youth travel to Canada annually for holidays and over 200 000 Canadians identify themselves as being of Korean origin. Over 27 000 Canadians reside in SK and there are approximately 3000 Korean-born adoptees in Canada.”<sup>25</sup> In the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston, the second most spoken language is not French, it is Korean,<sup>26</sup> which stresses the close people-to-people ties between Canada and SK. In SK, military service for males is mandated for two years. This is based on the existential threat that NK poses north of Seoul. It is interesting that many first generation SK immigrants to Canada join the CAF. According to a 2019 report by the Senate Standing Committee on National Defence, visible minorities made up 8.1% of the CAF, up from 6.7% in 2016, and the intention is to increase this figure to 11.8% by 2026.<sup>27</sup> The Korean community comprises a large portion of the visible minority group in the CAF amongst those who self-identify as having originated from the Indo-Pacific region.

### **Assert Canada’s Position Politically**

With SK’s new President, Yoon Suk-Yeol, sworn in on 10 May 2022, President Biden paid his first state visit to SK and Japan (20-24 May 2022). The itinerary saw the US focus on five strategic areas in the Indo-Pacific: NK, South China Sea, Taiwan, Indo-Chinese border, and the Kurill Islands that border Russia and Japan.<sup>28</sup> Since taking office in 2015, Prime Minister Trudeau has not made a single visit to SK. An opportunity to demonstrate Canada’s resolve in the Indo-Pacific was missed when the US withdrew from the CPTTP under the Trump

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Derek Macaulay. Deputy Commander Canadian Army. Comment shared with the author in 2020 in Ottawa.

<sup>27</sup> Stephen Fuhr (Chair). *Improving Diversity and Inclusion in the CAF. Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence*. June 2019, 9, 63-65.

<https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/NDDN/Reports/RP10573700/nddnrp17/nddnrp17-e.pdf>.

<sup>28</sup> Brad Lendon. “5 Asian military hotspots and how they play into Biden’s visit,” in *CNN*.

<https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/19/asia/biden-asia-trip-military-analysis-intl-hnk-ml/index.html>. Last updated 20 May 2022.

Administration (2017-2021). Following the US' statement that it would intervene militarily if the PRC threatened Taiwan or Japan,<sup>29</sup> it would be an ideal time for Canada to also demonstrate its commitment to SK by scheduling a visit, or at the very least, inviting the new SK President to Ottawa. This would make up for another missed opportunity when Canada visited Japan at the G7 Tokyo Summit in 2016, a mere two-hours flight from Seoul.

Concerning NK, it appears that Russian activities in Eastern Europe has changed the situation. In response to unprecedented Western sanctions intended to cripple the Kremlin, Russia's move to export oils at friendly prices to its allies means that NK has been able to restart its petroleum industry, traditionally dependent on the PRC to supply it after the UN imposed sanctions in 2006. While the biggest importer of Russian oil and other goods are the PRC and India, NK's resumption of trade with Russia reinforces the notion that NK can repel the effects of sanctions.<sup>30</sup> This change in situation was solidified on 27 May 2022 after Russia and PRC vetoed Washington's proposal for further sanctions on NK. Both Russia and PRC could have abstained in the Security Council, but their synchronicity sent a clear message to NK that it is being tacitly endorsed.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Pamela Kennedy, Yun Sun, Yuki Tatsumi, and Jenny Town. *4 Top Takeaways from Biden's Asia Trip*. Stimson Center. 25 May 2022. [https://www.stimson.org/2022/4-top-takeaways-from-bidens-asia-trip/?utm\\_source=Stimson+Center&utm\\_campaign=7cb133d7cf-RA%2FComms%2FAsia-USFP+Biden%27s+Asia+Trip&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_term=0\\_15c3e20f70-7cb133d7cf-438309585](https://www.stimson.org/2022/4-top-takeaways-from-bidens-asia-trip/?utm_source=Stimson+Center&utm_campaign=7cb133d7cf-RA%2FComms%2FAsia-USFP+Biden%27s+Asia+Trip&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_15c3e20f70-7cb133d7cf-438309585).

<sup>30</sup> Ruediger, Frank. "North Korea as a beneficiary of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine," in *38 North*. 16 March 2022. [https://www.38north.org/2022/03/north-korea-as-a-beneficiary-of-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine/?utm\\_source=Stimson+Center&utm\\_campaign=5fe6bca2e9-RA%2FComms%2FUkraine+One+Month&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_term=0\\_15c3e20f70-5fe6bca2e9-438309585](https://www.38north.org/2022/03/north-korea-as-a-beneficiary-of-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine/?utm_source=Stimson+Center&utm_campaign=5fe6bca2e9-RA%2FComms%2FUkraine+One+Month&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_15c3e20f70-5fe6bca2e9-438309585).

<sup>31</sup> Josh Smith. "Analysis-Security Council split spells end of an era for U.S.-led sanctions on N. Korea," in *Reuters*. 27 May 2022. <https://www.reuters.com/world/security-council-split-spells-end-an-era-us-led-sanctions-nkorea-2022-05-27/>.

Since 2006, Canada supported UN sanctions on NK. Canada imposed its own set of sanctions through the Special Economic Measures Act on 11 August 2016,<sup>32</sup> the precursor to the current Government's sanctions on Russia. On 23 April 2021, Ottawa announced the renewal of Op *NEON*, which sees incremental increase in capabilities in the Indo-Pacific to impose UN sanctions as well as to project Canada's resolve to keep the South/East China Seas open. "The CAF participates in this operation alongside countries including Australia, France, Germany, Japan, NZ, the UK, and the US."<sup>33</sup> There is an opportunity to expand this coalition if SK can be added to this list. It is interesting that through Op *NEON*, Canada is essentially supporting the mandate of the Quad alliance without being a member. The subtlety lies in the fact that the Quad was founded in 2007 to counter the growing threat of the PRC whereas Op *NEON*, initially intended to focus on NK, has now extended its mandate to the entire Indo-Pacific area.

Although Canada was excluded from becoming a member of the Australia-UK-US trilateral defence pact on 15 September 2021 due to its lack of nuclear submarine capabilities, Canada can still be a valuable member in a Quad+. An *Ace of Spades* would be for Canada to replace Russia as an energy supplier to India and SK, but it must partake in stakeholder engagements, both on and off official channels. As announced by Deputy Minister of Global Affairs Canada, the Government was mandated to develop a formal Indo-Pacific Strategy announced in the last Speech from the Throne on 23 November 2021.<sup>34</sup> The timing is *now* for Canada to present its position. Canada's acquisition of 15 advanced combat surface combatants

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<sup>32</sup> *Canadian Sanctions Related to North Korea*. Government of Canada. [https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international\\_relations-relations\\_internationales/sanctions/korea-coree.aspx?lang=eng](https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/sanctions/korea-coree.aspx?lang=eng). Last modified 2 July 2020.

<sup>33</sup> *Operation Neon*. Government of Canada. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-neon.html>. Last modified 25 April 2022.

<sup>34</sup> Marta Morgan. Speech, *The State of Canadian National Security*, Ottawa, Canada, 10 March 2022.

(CSC) is expected to begin arriving in 2030.<sup>35</sup> “The CSC project is the largest and most complex shipbuilding initiative in Canada since World War II,”<sup>36</sup> and it opens the possibility that Canada may one day reverse the Cabinet decision to reject nuclear submarines that was first recommended in the *White Paper on Defence* (1964).<sup>37</sup> SK having been the number one shipbuilding country in the world (2018-2021), a future Canada-SK shipbuilding collaboration could offset the PRC’s recent overtake of this industry.

## CONCLUSION

Canada’s cultural ties to Europe is why it decided to engage in two World Wars to keep Europe liberal and secure. At the conclusion of the two World Wars, however, Canada emerged as an independent country that embraced the idea of being North American first. Nevertheless, using Europe as a means to project power and to keep threats as far geographically as possible from home was a general concept readily accepted by Canada’s elected leaders and policymakers. Impacted by the global fallout of the two World Wars, Canada realized it had to act when communist forces crossed the DMZ or risk its status as a leader under the newly-formed UN. This was a critical factor that led to Canada committing large resources in SK.

SK and Japan are economic powers in Asia and both are aligned closely with Canada in terms of defence and national security frameworks. Despite their commonality with Canada, however, it is not the same between them. Regardless of mutual economic interests between Canada and its APEC allies, most are geographically closer to the PRC than they are to the West. This means that the Indo-Pacific is just as much a hot spot for conflict as it is for opportunities. Canada has a role to ensure that APEC allies choose to be more politically aligned

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<sup>35</sup> *Canadian Surface Combatant*. Government of Canada. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/procurement/canadian-surface-combatant.html>. Last modified 18 February 2022.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> Canada. *White Paper on Defence*. Department of National Defence. Ottawa: March 1964, 23.

with the West than PRC or Russia. For neutral players like India, how they decide to align themselves can make all the difference. Canada must leverage its cross-cultural ties to keep India on its side. This alone could be the sales pitch to enter the Quad and carry greater weight in APEC.

Organizations such as UNC, ABCANZ, or Quad that appear on the surface to be cohesive, remain divided on one, or several contentious issues with respect to the Indo-Pacific. These alliances cannot afford to permit disjointed approaches to be exploited by NK, PRC, or Russia. Acknowledging this, Canada needs to remain committed to perpetually strengthening its bonds and be perceived as a dependable and effective partner. Militarily, this can be achieved by contributing a permanent contingent to the UNC HQ and UNCMAC. Technologically and socio-economically, Canada must fully utilize its APEC and CPTTP networks to keep adversaries and neutrals as friendly forces in the pursuit of economic interests; it must not permit rivals such as Russia or the PRC from monopolizing global supply chains. Politically, Canada can improve its strategic communications by adopting firm positions on matters of strategic interest, such as joining the Quad. All of the above begins by first promulgating an official Indo-Pacific Strategy. To this end, it can better leverage its ABCANZ partners to collaborate on future capabilities; deny adversaries the same; and entice others to collaborate on joint ventures with Canada- even outside of ABCANZ- on common goals.



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