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Manifestation of Hateful Conduct to Radical Extremism as a Threat to the Canadian Armed Forces

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JCSP 47	PCEMI 47
Master of Defence Studies	**Maîtrise en études de la défense**
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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

JCSP 47 – PCEMI 47

2020 – 2021

MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES – MAÎTRISE EN ÉTUDES DE LA DÉFENSE

PREVENTION THROUGH AWARENESS: UNDERSTANDING THE MANIFESTATION OF HATEFUL CONDUCT TO RADICAL EXTREMISM AS A THREAT TO THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

By Major A.T. Vandor

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CANFORGENS – Canadian Forces General Messages

CAF – Canadian Armed Forces

CAR – Canadian Airborne Regiment

CDS – Chief of Defence Staff

CFAO – Canadian Forces Administrative Orders

CoC – Chain of Command

CSIS –Canadian Security Intelligence Service

CTC – Combating Terrorism Center

CVE – Countering Violent Extremism

DAOD – Defence Administrative Orders and Deficiency

DND – Department of National Defence

DRDC – Defence Research and Development Canada

FLQ – Front de libération du Québec

GoC – Government of Canada

IMVE – Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremist

ISD – Institute for Strategic Dialogue

MPCIS – Military Police Criminal Intelligence Section

MND – Minister of National Defence

PME – Professional Military Education

QR&O – Queen's Regulations and Orders

RCMP – Royal Canadian Mountain Police

RVE – Radical Violent Extremism

RWE – Right Wing Extremist

SHARP – Standard for Harassment and Racism Prevention

UNAMIR – United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

WSE – White Supremacist Extremist

ABSTRACT

Hateful conduct incidents in the Canadian Armed Forces have led to the institution's renewed attention and a requirement to respond to the Canadian public regarding the CAF's commitment to the prevention of hate and discrimination. In 2018, the Canadian Military Police Criminal Intelligence Section released a report identifying numerous military members connected to radical hate groups. Trend analysis has also indicated a rise in Right-Wing Extremism in Canada. Western militaries remain susceptible to the threat from within as hate groups' value and encourage members to join their nation's armed forces. The Canadian Forces require the highest military professionalism in order to foster respect within Canadian society. Any instance of hate and radicalization within the institution discredits the military's role and, more importantly, poses a threat to national security.

As radicalization to violence is an extreme manifestation of hateful conduct, understanding the intricacies of the concept is salient to countering a member's mindset. By addressing the issue, this paper examines 'awareness' in the context of countering hateful conduct and radicalization within the Canadian Armed Forces. In particular, emphasis is placed on analyzing two distinct radicalization models and how the stages influence and modify an individual's belief system. Drawing on common factors identified in the literature, appropriate policy responses to combat hate and radicalism are further developed.

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

I am concerned for the security of our great Nation; not so much because of any threat from without, but because of the insidious forces working from within.

– General Douglas MacArthur

When analyzing current events, there appears to be a repeated theme. Media outlets releasing information on a violent attack caused by an individual or group labelled as 'radicalized.' While research in the field of radicalization has increased significantly since 9/11, extremist acts of violence continue to be both consistent and persistent. The National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence identified Canada's main threat as violent extremist inspired by Daesh and al-Qaeda.[1] However, radicalization is not exclusive to Islamist extremists, and there appears to be a resurgence with an increase in violent far-right attacks in western societies.[2] Recently, the right-wing extremist (RWE) movement has been at the forefront with visible presence and increased lethality.

Of note, the threat of RWE in western societies has been rising over the last decade, with attacks quadrupling in the United States between 2016 and 2017.[3] While President Trump has energized the RWE community through his divisiveness and hateful rhetoric, trend analysis indicates that the first notable increase in RWE attacks started in 2012, several years before Trump took office.[4] A contributing factor for the increase pertains to western governments' pro multiculturalism and immigration policies acting as a catalyst and reinvigorating RWE. The

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[1] Government of Canada. "National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence." Public Safety Canada / Sécurité publique Canada, December 11, 2018, 1. https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/ntnl-strtg-cntrng-rdclztn-vlnc/index-en.aspx.

[2] United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate. "MEMBER STATES CONCERNED BY THE GROWING AND INCREASINGLY TRANSNATIONAL THREAT OF EXTREME RIGHT-WING TERRORISM." *CTED Trends Alert April 2020*, April 1, 2020, 2.

[3] Jones, Seth G. "The Rise of Far-Right Extremism in the United States." Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 7, 2018. https://www.csis.org/analysis/rise-far-right-extremism-united-states.

[4] *Ibid.*

current narrative prompts fear-mongering concerning an influx of immigration, leading to a

negative stigma of Muslims. This mentality generates resentment for diversity and integration

and incites Islamophobic sentiments.[5] Since 2015, Europe has maintained a significant influx of

asylum seekers escaping conflicts in Syria and Northern Africa. The majority of the people

fleeing are Muslims and the significance pertains to the perceived threat of population growth of

the Muslim community in the respective European countries. Note, under the pretense that

migration halts, Muslims in Europe are predicted to increase from 4.9% to 7.4% by 2050.[6]

Germany, a nation that took in the most Muslim refugees, expects the Muslim composition to be

20% by 2050, a 14% increase from 2016.[7] European Union States, such as Belgium, France, and

Slovenia, have reported a rise in paramilitary groups that have emerged from the auspice of

defending their nations against a perceived threat from Islam and immigration.[8] In addition, these

anti-immigration peripheral ideas are becoming mainstream and are referred as "the great

replacement" amongst right-wing white nationalist.[9]

      Hatred and racism are not new phenomena. For instance, during the last century, post-

WWI, the Nazi Party's anti-Semitic platform enabled it to seize power through discriminatory

practices against Jews. This persecution escalated to the atrocities of the holocaust. When

studying the historical context of North America, racism and hatred are front and center with

slavery and the colonization by Western European societies. The systematic exploitation of

Africans and their descendants was justified through the ideology that blacks were inferior

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[5] Abbas, Tahir. "The Symbiotic Relationship between Islamophobia and Radicalisation." *Critical Studies on Terrorism 5*, no. 3 (2012): 345-358.

[6] Pew Research Center. "Muslim Population Growth in Europe." Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project, November 29, 2017. https://www.pewforum.org/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim-population/.

[7] *Ibid*.

[8] Pawella, Jeanne. *Rapport Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 23 Juin 2020* Radicalisations, 2020, 18.

[9] United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate "MEMBER STATES CONCERNED BY THE GROWING AND INCREASINGLY TRANSNATIONAL THREAT OF EXTREME RIGHT-WING TERRORISM."…, 5.

human beings. Whether it was apartheid in South Africa, segregation in the United States or Indigenous residential schools in Canada, ethnicity and race have contributed significantly to fostering hateful sentiments and conduct. With that, hatred is deep-rooted and causes divisiveness that is difficult to overcome. It is a concept that evokes distrust and prevents individuals from integrating as it targets marginalized/minority groups.

Experts have identified that the right-wing or far-right as being a complex movement. A critical element to the RWE pertains to the fact that it is not uniform. It is an ideology generated from numerous sub-currents joined through the common denominator of a rejection of diversity and minority rights.[10] With that, some RWE groups also believe in the superiority of the white race infusing violence to fight the 'race war.' Scholars define RWE as a violent entity that skirts the boundaries of hate crime and organized terrorism.[11] In general, radical extremist organizations target individuals or look at producing an output that causes high-impact results. However, the right-wing movement is concentrated on the long-term race war emphasizing both political and violent covert low-intensity warfare against their perceived enemies.[12] The hateful rhetoric is the basis of propaganda messaging, enabling recruitment of predominantly male youth to extremist groups.[13] The hateful rhetoric and content is exasperated through the power of the internet and the reach that online space plays regarding promulgating the radical messaging. According to the United Nations Security Council's Counterterrorism Committee, globally, the rise in right-wing terrorism has increased a 320% over the five years prior to 2020.[14] With that,

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[10] Pawella, Jeanne. *Rapport Terrorism Situation and Trend Report...,* 18.

[11] Koehler, Daniel. "Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe: Current Developments and Issues for the Future." *Prism (Washington, D.C.) 6*, no. 2 (2016), 98.

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] Institute for Economics & Peace. "Global Terrorism Index 2019 - Measuring The Impact of Terrorism." National Consortium For The Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, November 2019, 50.

[14] United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate. "MEMBER STATES CONCERNED BY THE GROWING AND INCREASINGLY TRANSNATIONAL THREAT OF EXTREME RIGHT-WING TERRORISM."…, 3.

militaries around the world are faced with the existential threat of radical extremists within the ranks. In particular, research in RWE has identified that hate groups value and encourage members to join the military. The military provides a venue that fosters discipline while rendering the skills and training that are highly sought after (e.g. military-grade weapon handling, strategic and tactical manoeuvres, and access to critical network/recruitment pool).[15] In 2018, the Canadian Military Police Criminal Intelligence Section (MPCIS) released a report titled *White Supremacy, Hate Groups, and Racism in The Canadian Armed Forces*. The report revealed troubling information pertaining to military members' affiliation with racist organizations, identifying 53 Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) members connected to radical hate groups or involved in hate incidents.[16] Of note, the report identified members of the CAF connected with radical groups such as the *Atomwaffen Division*, *Hammerskin Nation*, *Proud Boys*, *La Meute*, *III%*, and the *Soldiers of Odin*.[17] In 2018, during an interview with the Toronto Star on the topic of military and hate-groups, the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) at the time, General Vance, stated, "It is entirely possible that we are not sufficiently aware of the indicators or the insidious, corrosive effect of having extremism in our ranks. I think we're academically aware, like technically aware. But from a practical basis, how do you know for sure?"[18] As stipulated in the CAF's mandate, "at any given time, the Government of Canada can call upon the CAF to undertake missions for the protection of Canada and Canadians and to maintain

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[15] Koehler, Daniel. "A Threat from Within? Exploring the Link between the Extreme Right and the Military." International Centre for Counter-Terrorism Policy Brief. ISSN: 2468-0486., September 2019, p.23.

[16] Military Police Criminal Intelligence Program. "WHITE SUPREMACY, HATE GROUPS, AND RACISM IN THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES." MPCIS - National (2000-1040 (MPCIS), November 29, 2018, 6.

[17] Military Police Criminal Intelligence Program…, 7-8.

[18] Boutilier, Alex. "Right-Wing Extremism Not Welcome in Canadian Armed Forces - but 'Clearly, It's in Here,' Says Top Soldier." Toronto Star, October 8, 2018. https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2018/10/07/right-wing-extremism-not-welcome-in-canadian-armed-forces-but-clearly-its-in-here-says-top-soldier.html.

international peace and stability."[19] The CAF's military ethos incorporates the values, beliefs, and expectations that mirror Canadian society and acts as a fundamental instrument determining operational conduct and professionalism.[20] When analyzing the CAF's centre of gravity, the military ethos is the basis of an ethical framework that establishes legitimacy for the day-to-day operations that are conducted domestically and around the world.[21]

Understanding the intricacies associated with the process, including factors attached to radical violent extremism (RVE), is paramount. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) has identified that "radicalization, both offline and online, remains a significant concern to Canada and its allies."[22] This paper asserts that the Department of National Defence (DND) requires the development of a CAF-wide training program aimed at identifying signs or symptoms of hateful conduct, including effective techniques for recognizing whether a member is or becoming radicalized. Implementing a CAF training program would be predicated on the number of ideological right-wing hate groups currently in Canada, coupled with the evidence of CAF members' affiliation with radical extremist groups. With national security being the CAF's top priority, in order to protect the institution from being infiltrated by members who practice and believe in hateful rhetoric, the CAF must implement measures that enables the prevention and detection of this conduct. While the CAF has introduced new directives addressing hateful conduct through the development of education and training programs, radicalization is not a focal point and is excluded from the policies. With that, the CAF must implement measures that

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[19] Government of Canada. "Mandate of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces." Department of National Defence, September 24, 2018. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/mandate.html.

[20] Canada Dept of National Defence and Canada Ministère de la défense nationale. *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*. Ottawa: Published under the auspices of the Chief of the Defence Staff by the Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2009, 25.

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] Government of Canada. "CSIS Public Report 2019." Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, April 2019, 15.

enable military members to understand the significance, including monitoring and intervention when appropriate. Training on the radicalization process will help mitigate the threat from within.

This paper aims to examine hateful conduct leading towards radicalization within the CAF. Chapter 2 will provide background regarding the threat of ideologically motivated violent extremist (IMVE) in Canada. The section will also examine the CAF's development of the hateful conduct policy. After laying the foundation, the focus will shift towards a scholarly review of the definitions of 'radicalization' and the process towards radicalization via two models. The models in Chapter 3 will enable a conceptualization of how people progress across a continuum, developing extreme ideological beliefs that generate hateful acts of violence. An examination of predisposing factors will follow the radicalization models. Chapter 4 will focus on the research regarding common indicators and examine how an individual may be more susceptible or at risk to radicalization and hateful conduct directed at a marginalized individual or groups. With that, due to the abundance of material and ease of accessing hate content on the internet, a central focal point will be on the significance of online space. In order to analyze the gravity of the issue and understand particular signs and symptoms, Chapter 5 will present open-sourced cases of CAF personnel and their connection with radical ideologies and hate groups. Finally, the research paper will provide an overview of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) with recommendations on incorporating elements from the Public Health Model into a DND Professional Military Education (PME) program.

An inductive and qualitative method was used in this paper to examine the two-radicalization models and the factors associated with radicalization and hate. The framework

established similarities and uniqueness' across the subject to establish important and prevalent

themes regarding hateful conduct and the radicalization continuum.

CHAPTER 2 – BACKGROUND

Hate is more lasting than dislike.

‒ Adolf Hitler

Proliferation of Right-Wing Extremism in Canada

On January 6, 2021, Americans stormed their own political Capitol and the halls of congress in an attempt to block the ceremonial confirmation of President Biden. Chaos erupted with violent protesters clashing with the police and mobs breaching the Capitol buildings leaving four people dead. Following the riot, it was identified that several active military members and veterans with combat experience participated in the siege. Pentagon records indicated that a disproportionate amount of the perpetrators were in fact active military members and veterans.[23] These members aided/orchestrated the violent attacks using precision tactics used for breaching a building. Brian Harrell, former assistant secretary for infrastructure protection at the Department of Homeland Security, said, "Many have specialized training, some have seen combat, and nearly all have been fed disinformation and propaganda from illegitimate sources."[24] Reporting on the mob riots at the U.S. Capitol, Fox News, a media giant with messaging that leans to the right, declared, "What happened was tragic, but it was also understandable—maybe even inevitable."[25] Fox News was speaking to its viewers regarding the notion that the election and ballot counting was flawed causing outrage by the radical right. Also, Fox conservative

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[23] Sidner, Sara, Anna-Maja Rappard, and Marshall Cohen. "Disproportionate Number of Current and Former Military Personnel Arrested in Capitol Attack, CNN Analysis Shows." CNN. Cable News Network, February 4, 2021. https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/31/us/capitol-riot-arrests-active-military-veterans-soh/index.html.

[24] Associated Press. "Capitol Rioters Included Highly Trained Ex-Military and Cops." CityNews Ottawa. Accessed February 2, 2021. https://ottawa.citynews.ca/world-news/capitol-rioters-included-highly-trained-ex-military-and-cops-3263824.

[25] Shephard, Alex. "The Conservative Media Really Wants You to Think the Capitol Riot Is the Left's Fault." The New Republic, January 8, 2021. https://newrepublic.com/article/160845/conservative-media-really-wants-think-capitol-riot-lefts-fault.

television host and political commentator Tucker Carlson used the mob riots as an opportunity to target the Democratic leaders and portray them as an opposition that will strip Republicans of the rights and freedom as protected in the Constitution. Tucker stated, "What happened [Jan 06] will be used by the people taking power to justify stripping you of the rights you were born with as an American: Your right to speak without being censored, your right to assemble, to not be spied upon, to make a living, and to defend your family."[26] It is evident that a polarization exists regarding the 'left' and 'right' with RWE propelled by the pursuit of protecting civil liberties and the notion that opposing forces are threatening their respective' homeland.'

Of note, a key element regarding hate pertains to the concept of grievances. With that, grievances are correlated with legitimacy and are assessed from a legal interpretation that is based on the prevailing ideology.[27] The criticality pertains to how individuals perceive the formal justice system and its application. Professor of Applied Social Psychology Dr. Bert Klandermans asserts that grievances act as the fuel to a 'motivational engine.'[28] When an individual or group's interest is threatened, the greater the motivation for the individual or group to protest and defend the interest in question.[29] Grievances act as a motivational factor causing an individual or group to perceive a situation as being a legitimate inequality, creating a feeling of injustice. The perception of individuals or groups having an unfair/unjust advantage generates the individual or group's requirement to protest. With that, right-wing radicals like white supremacists view the white race as the dominant race and that non-whites are inferior. For this group, the perception of injustice and legality is already flawed. For instance, the concept of

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[26] Carlson, Tucker. "Tucker Carlson: A Death in the Capitol, and What We Must Do Now." Fox News. FOX News Network, January 7, 2021. https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/tucker-carlson-capitol-hill-riots-reaction.

[27] Lempert, Richard O. "Grievances and Legitimacy: The Beginnings and End of Dispute Settlement." *Law & Society Review* 15, no. 3-4 (1981), 713.

[28] Klandermans, P. G. "Identity Politics and Politicized Identities: Identity Processes and the Dynamics of Protest." *Political Psychology* 35, no. 1 (2014): 1-22.

[29] *Ibid*.

affirmative action is perceived as a 'leftist' policy hindering their advancement and substantiating their claim that the white race is the actual victim. Note the concept grievances leading towards radicalization and violence will be expanded upon in Chapter 3 and 4.

While domestic terrorism and RWE are at the forefront in the United States, experts also suggest that the rise of ideological right-wing hate groups should be of significant interest to Canada. Professor Barbara Perry is the director of the Centre on Hate, Bias and Extremism at Ontario Tech University. Perry stated in an interview with CBC that there are at a minimum 130 active RWE groups in Canada, a 30 percent increase from 2015.[30] The increase pertains to a radical discourse and ideology targeting Muslims, Jews, women, LGBTQ, indigenous people, and other minority groups.[31]

In order to examine the significance of RWE in Canada, data was extracted from Statistics Canada's website on police-reported hate crimes across Canada. As indicated in Table 2.1 below, the input compiled shows a significant increase from 2014 to 2017. The spike in 2017 is an increase of 778, equating to a 37.5% rise compared to the previous years. In addition, a noticeable trend in reporting pertains to the increase in sexual orientation reporting from 2014 to 2019. However, when calculating the number of sexual orientation reported against the total number per given year, it remained consistent, ranging from 10-13 percent. Finally, when analyzing the table, it is apparent that the order of hateful motivation remained consistent with ideological hate directed at race and ethnicity at the top, followed by religion. A critical element to factor into the reporting data pertains to the inclusion of the information in Perry's

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[30] Habib, Jacky. "Far-Right Extremist Groups and Hate Crime Rates Are Growing in Canada." CBCnews. CBC/Radio Canada. Accessed March 2, 2021. https://www.cbc.ca/passionateeye/features/right-wing-extremist-groups-and-hate-crimes-are-growing-in-canada.
[31] *Ibid*.

research that asserts that the vast majority (80-85%) of hate crime goes unreported, suggesting that the problem is more widespread than believed.[32]

Table 2.1 – Police-reported hate crime, by type of motivation, Canada

Canada, selected police services						
Type of motivation	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
	Number					
Total police-reported hate crime	1,295	1,362	1,409	2,073	1,817	1,946
Race or ethnicity	611	641	666	878	793	876
Religion	429	469	460	842	657	608
Sexual orientation	155	141	176	204	186	263
Language	12	18	13	23	14	27
Disability	10	8	11	10	9	5
Sex	22	12	24	32	54	53
Age	6	4	5	4	9	9
Other similar factor 6	27	44	35	48	73	58
Unknown motivation	23	25	19	32	22	47

Source: Government of Canada. Police-reported hate crime, by type of motivation, Canada (selected police services). Government of Canada, Statistics Canada, November 24, 2020. https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3510006601.

Shifting to online space, research conducted by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) identified a troubling statistic about Canadian activity on radical far-right websites. According to ISD's research, Canadians were involved in more than 6,660 RWE channels spreading radical rhetoric (e.g. white supremacy and misogyny) across Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Iron March, Fascist Forge, 4chan and Gab.[33] Of significance involves the extrapolation of data from 'estimated internet-using population.' Researchers have identified that the US dominates content volume; however, Canada was rated the highest in the world when factoring the number of

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[32] *Ibid.*

[33] Davey, Jacob, Mackenzie Hart, and Cécile Guerin. "An Online Environmental Scan of Right-Wing Extremism in Canada." *Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Powering solutions to extremism and polarisation*, 2020, 16.

internet users per capita, ranking higher than countries like the US, UK, Australia, Ireland, and Germany.[34] The ISD report identified that Papasavva *et al*. research is consistent with the trends observed on Iron March indicating that Canadians are more engaged online than nations like the UK and US regarding RWE movements/causes.[35]

Scholars assert that the propensity of the RWE as a threat has been trivialized, and the reason for the rise of RWE groups was in part due to a historically weak law enforcement response.[36] Law enforcement has taken a reactionary approach to tackle the issue of RWE activities. With that, RWE has been ever-present in the CAF and was brought to the forefront, receiving institutional attention in the 90s. Although the government now takes a hard stance, the difficulty with enforcing racist conduct during the aforementioned era pertained to the Canadian government's interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The government's interpretation viewed placing restrictions on soldiers solely based on an affiliation with white supremacist extremist (WSE) groups infringed on the member's rights under the Charter.[37] To provide context on the extent of the racist conduct and the measures implemented by the CAF, the next sections in the Chapter will provide a summary of steps taken by the institution in executing a CAF-wide racist/hate policy framework.

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[34] Papasavva, A., Zannettou, S. Cristofaro, E. de, Stringhini, G. and Blackburn, J., 'Raiders of the Lost Kek: 3.5 Year of Augmented 4chan Posts from the Politically Incorrect Board', 2020.

[35] Davey et al,. "An Online Environmental Scan of Right-Wing Extremism in Canada"…, 16.

[36] Scrivens, Ryan and Barbara Perry. "Resisting the Right: Countering Right-Wing Extremism in Canada." *Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice* 59, no. 4 (2017), 545.

[37] Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed, Robin O'Luanaigh, and David Jones. "'Like a Drop of Cyanide': A Strategic Framework for Addressing Hateful Conduct and Radicalization in the Canadian Armed Forces." Valens Global International Strategies & Securitues, September 2020., 12. https://thewarhorse.org/the-invisible-reach-of-white-supremacy/.

Historical overview of CAF policy on Racist Conduct

Over the past several decades, the CAF has been fighting radical RWE within the ranks.

A dark cloud hangs over the CAF, with the racist extremism occurring in the early nineties with

numerous members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR). During this period, CAR

members had no qualms displaying their ideologically motivated racist behaviour. For instance, a

member of the CAR was displayed in a Winnipeg newspaper with a shaved head giving the Nazi

salute.[38] Examples of the members' deplorable conduct also include displaying Nazi flags and

paraphernalia within the barrack walls of 2 Commando.[39] In a hazing ritual, Cpl Robin, the only

black member of the CAR, was tied to a tree with the letters 'kkk' written on his shoulder.[40]

Several members of the Airborne displayed tattoos with the acronym WAR, which stands for

'White Aryan Resistance.'[41] During the early nineties, reports also circulated in the media that a

former Airborne member provided military training and tactics to recruits of the neo-Nazi group

Heritage Front.[42] The Heritage Front leader even boasted to CBC that a couple of dozen

Canadian military are members of his organization.[43] Although the previous examples of the

CAR are deplorable, the catalyst of the CAR's action occurred in 1993 during the United Nations

Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). The CAF received global notoriety due to the

actions of Canadian soldiers capturing, torturing, and murdering Shidane Arone, a Somalian

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[38] *Ibid.*

[39] Dishonoured Legacy: Lessons of the Somalia Affair, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia by Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia. Publication Date: Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997. 5v.

[40] Dishonoured Legacy: Lessons of the Somalia Affair. Vol 2…, 538

[41] *Ibid.*

[42] Farnsworth, Clyde H. "Canada Investigates Reported Ties of Rightist Militants and Military." The New York Times. The New York Times, May 17, 1993. https://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/17/world/canada-investigates-reported-ties-of-rightist-militants-and-military.html.

[43] *Ibid.*

teenager.[44] During the Board of Inquiry, part of the evidence included a CAR member's testimony that stated, "I came to Somalia to shoot me a nigger."[45] The significance of this statement cannot be overlooked as it speaks to the pinnacle of hatred being converted to violent extremism. In addition, while the military and armed conflict is by nature violent, the statement/action is manipulating the core military responsibilities of defending humanity in a deliberate attempt to have carte blanche and execute heinous acts.

The aftermath of Somalia and the media scrutiny on the CAF caused it to examine and review DND's regulations, orders, and policies on racism, including CAF members' affiliation with hate groups. The institutional commitment to tackling racism resulted in releasing a new policy under the Canadian Forces Administrative Orders (CFAO). In 1994, *CFAO 19-43* titled *RACIST CONDUCT* was released with the aim of preventing racial discrimination and harassment within the CAF. *CFAO 19-43* defined racist conduct as:

> conduct that promotes, encourages or constitutes discrimination or harassment on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin, colour or religion, including participation in the activities of, or membership in, a group or organization that a CF member knows, or ought to know, promotes discrimination or harassment on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin, colour or religion.[46]

The CAF attempted to address the issue by implementing a framework that defined racism while identifying unacceptable conduct for military personnel both on and off-duty. The directive aimed to create an institutional culture that tackled biases, stereotypes, and prejudices that eliminated racism and discrimination within the military.

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[44] Granatstein. J.L., and Dean F. Oliver (2013) "The Somalia Affair The Oxford Companion to Canadian Military

[45] Dishonoured Legacy: Lessons of the Somalia Affair…, 534; Evidence of a witness to Board of Inquiry (CARBG), vol. IV, p. 887, quoting an unnamed senior NCO or officer of 2 Commando.

[46] Dishonoured Legacy: Lessons of the Somalia Affair. Vol 2…, 539.

With that, a critical area pertained to the excerpt that indicated disciplinary actions for

members who engaged in breaches of racist conduct policy.

> With regard to administrative and disciplinary actions, *CFAO 19-43* stated:
>
> CF are committed to the principle of equality of all people, and the dignity and
> worth of every human being, without regard to, among other things, race, national
> or ethnic origin, colour or religion. CF members must always be guided by this
> principle in their relationships with each other, with members of the public, and
> with all those with whom they come in contact both within and outside Canada.
> and that racist attitudes are totally incompatible with the military ethos and with
> effective military service, and any conduct that reflects such attitudes will not be
> tolerated. Racist conduct is therefore prohibited, and will result in administrative
> action, disciplinary action, or both, and may include release. An applicant for
> enrolment in the CF who is unable or unwilling to comply with the CF policy
> against racist conduct will not be enrolled.[47]

What is paramount is that the policy signified the CAF taking a stance on racist and

discriminatory conduct. The CAF generated a non-discriminatory and anti-racist policy that

identified a zero tolerance for conduct and behavior deemed incompatible with the institution.

In 1998, following the atrocities enacted by numerous members of the CAR, and in response to

an article in Maclean's titled Rape in the Military, the CAF introduced an education and

awareness program called Standard for Harassment and Racism Prevention (SHARP).[48] The

institution attempted to address the problem of hateful conduct (e.g. sexual misconduct and

racism) through incorporating a mandatory CAF-wide training endeavor. The efficacy of

SHARP training is debatable as it failed to rectify the underlying issue and was subsequently

phased out a decade after its inception. In 2015, former Supreme Court justice Marie Deschamps

released an external Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Canadian

Armed Forces. The report highlighted SHARP training and suggested a dichotomy emerged in

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[47] *Ibid*.
[48] Government of Canada. "The Operation Honour Manual," December 3, 2019.
https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/benefits-military/conflict-misconduct/operation-honour/orders-policies-directives/operation-honour-manual/overview.html.

its effectiveness as some viewed as a high point in awareness and others defined it as caricature

mocking the proverbial check-in-the-box saying, "I was SHARP-trained," which implied the

training enabled a sense of impunity.[49] A critical element to the Deschamps' report to training

pertains to the following statement, "The reality appears to be that after a few years, the

[SHARP] program lost its lustre. This seems to be related, in part, to the fact that while experts

were hired to carry out training in the early years, this did not continue over time."[50] While there

is a distinction between RWE and sexual harassment/misconduct, RWE in Canada tends to be

framed in terms of white power whereby "heterosexual males in particular assert a particular

version of hegemonic whiteness and/or masculinity."[51] The male power-dynamic also frames an

individual's perspective regarding their hierarchical structure. The CAF's sexual misconduct

policies/reporting is once again being reviewed as numerous allegations of misconduct have been

reported on several high-ranking general officers. Notwithstanding the issue with sexual

misconduct in the CAF, the intent of bringing forth the SHARP training in the discussion was

not to introduce sexual misconduct in the fold but to highlight the fact that training was delivered

over two decades ago to address and prevent racist conduct in the CAF. Although the training

was phased out, the issue of hateful conduct in the CAF did not dissipate. As previously

mentioned, the MPCIS report, coupled with the numerous open-sourced articles, exposed RWE

within the military. Subsequently, the CAF felt compelled to once again review its policy

framework on racism and hateful conduct.

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[49] Deschamps, Marie. *External Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces* National Defence and the Canadian Forces, 2015., 81.p. 81
[50] *Ibid*.
[51] Perry, Barbara and Ryan Scrivens. "A Climate for Hate? an Exploration of the Right-Wing Extremist Landscape in Canada." *Critical Criminology (Richmond, B.C.)* 26, no. 2 (2018), 173.

Recent developments and new directives – Hateful Conduct

It is important to identify that the topics of radicalism and racism within the CAF have received significant attention recently, addressed by both CAF institutional leaders and government officials alike. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau even stated in December of 2020 that the next Chief of Defence Staff was "someone who brings obviously significant operational and strategic skills, but someone who will be very much focused on the institutional transformations that are necessary."[52] The institutional change, as referred to by Trudeau, pertains to fighting systemic racism and developing an inclusive military, "where there is less of the concerning, troubling reports of extremism that continue to bounce up every now and then."[53] With that, a quintessential element to tackling the issue pertains to first admitting there is problem. During Vice-Admiral Art McDonald short stint as CDS, the commander acknowledged the issue and stated upon taking command of the CAF, "what is clear is that racism, anti-Semitism, misogyny and discrimination exist within our ranks, despite the efforts of many to combat it, and as much as it hurts to admit it."[54]

Under the leadership of General Vance, it was identified that the CAF as an institution is to place focus on tackling hateful conduct. Notwithstanding General Vance and Vice-Admiral McDonald addressing hateful conduct and attempting to rectify the issue, the allegations/probe regarding their respective inappropriate sexual behaviour muddles any dialogue they may have initiated regarding the CAF and appropriate conduct. Whether it is due to power, influence, or

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[52] Berthiaume, Lee. "Fighting Systemic Racism, Extremism Will Be Priority for next Military Chief: Trudeau." CTV News, December 16, 2020. https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/fighting-systemic-racism-extremism-will-be-priority-for-next-military-chief-trudeau-1.5234237?cache=bizixeboayvahp%3FclipI+d%3D68597.

[53] *Ibid.*

[54] Brewster, Murray. "Armed Forces Commanders Signal Hard Line against Racism and Sexual Violence in the Ranks | CBC News." CBCnews, January 12, 2021. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/mcdonald-baines-sexism-racism-armed-forces-1.5870656.

deviant behaviour, institutional/top military leaders crossing the line is problematic. While the CAF has zero-tolerance for abuse of power, analyzes of whether the construct of sexual misconduct/harassment fits within the same psychological-behavioural category as RWE requires further study and is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the consequences of systematic predation and radicalization of people in uniform against the 'other,' whether they be women, LGBTQ, blacks, Jews, or Muslims, is the underlying question that this study attempts to understand.

As previously mentioned, the criticality and visible impact of RWE in the military has forced the CAF to revisit policy guidance and directives on the topic. In July of 2020, *CFAO 19-43* was superseded with *CF MIL Pers Instruction 01/20 – Hateful Conduct* and the *Defence Administrative Orders and Deficiency (DAOD) 5019-0 Conduct and Performance*. Under *DAOD 5019-0*, 'hateful conduct' is defined as follows:

> An act or conduct, including the display or communication of words, symbols or images, by a CAF member, that they knew or ought reasonably to have known would constitute, encourage, justify or promote violence or hatred against a person or persons of an identifiable group, based on their national or ethnic origin, race, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, marital status, family status, genetic characteristics or disability.[55]

A major differentiating factor to the updated definition pertains to the inclusion of hateful conduct directed against age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, marital status, family status, genetic characteristics or disability. While the definition was updated to reflect the realities of today's society, the onus is still placed on the member with verbiage to include 'knew or ought reasonably to have known.' In addition, the only

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[55] Government of Canada. "DAOD 5019-0, Conduct and Performance Deficiencies." National Defence, November 16, 2018. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/defence-administrative-orders-directives/5000-series/5019/5019-0-conduct-and-performance-deficiencies.html.

reference about training in the DAOD refers to "appropriate learning, training or professional development" applied as a consequence of a member's non-compliance and contingent on the severity of the incident.[56]

The Minister of National Defence (MND), Harjit Sajjan, has indicated that the CAF has improved both awareness and addressing hateful conduct. Nevertheless, hateful conduct and the number of incidents have been on the rise. Sajjan stated, "I feel that things have slightly increased…But it doesn't matter if it's one or ten. When you have an incident like this, what I always question is: how could this happen inside our military?"[57] The MND highlighted a critical element to the new DAOD, emphasizing accountability and the chain of command (CoC). Deterring and preventing hateful conduct is a whole of CAF's responsibility. However, the MND specifically highlighted that "we're going to be holding leaders to account."[58] Concerning the duties and responsibilities regarding tackling hateful conduct amongst the command and leadership of the CAF, *DAOD 5019-0* states:

> The chain of command must ensure that all CAF members are made aware of this DAOD. If the chain of command suspects that a conduct or performance deficiency by a CAF member resulting from factors within their control has occurred, the chain of command must take appropriate action. Depending on the circumstances, the appropriate action may involve administrative or disciplinary action, or both.[59]

It can be construed that the policy directive helps define and frame the parameter surrounding hateful conduct within the CAF. However, retired colonel Michel Drapeau, a lawyer specializing in the military, suggests that the policy misses the mark. Drapeau asserts that directive places

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[56] *Ibid*.

[57] Berthiaume, Lee. "Tackling Extremism within Military's Ranks Will Be Top Priority for next Commander, Sajjan Says." The Globe and Mail, December 18, 2020. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/politics/article-tackling-extremism-within-militarys-ranks-will-be-top-priority-for/.

[58] *Ibid*.

[59] Government of Canada. "DAOD 5019-0, Conduct and Performance Deficiencies."

emphasis on the commanding officer and a CoC regarding the handling of a hateful conduct incident and consequently detaches itself from the Criminal Code.[60] Drapeau believes that the policy should have provided clear direction via a statement outlining that any incident of hateful nature shall be directed for investigation by the Military Police. Drapeau states, "the policy provides the military chain of command the ability to shield offenders from criminal liability."[61] The policy, according to Drapeau, permits the CAF to deal with extremism and hateful conduct 'behind closed doors,' using either administrative and/or disciplinary mechanisms.[62] While the policy's intent entails zero tolerance, the question arises on the interpretation and consistent level of punishment equal to the offence. In the past, numerous members of the CAF that would have been categorized as violating this new definition of hateful conduct either have received warnings, been disciplined, or received counselling; however, not released from the military.[63] Section 319 of the Criminal Code of Canada identifies the following two offences regarding public incitement of hatred:

1. *A public statement directed at an identifiable group intended to incite hatred and will likely breach the peace; and*

2. *The willful promotion of hatred against an identifiable group.*[64]

According to the CAF leadership, the wording of the *DAOD 5019-0* is deliberate. It addresses racism and discrimination early where it constitutes a behavioural problem and prior to it elevating to the degree in which it constitutes a violation under the Criminal Code of hateful

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[60] Pauls, Karen. "Canadian Military Says New Hateful Conduct Policy Will Help Weed out Extremists in the Ranks." CBC news, July 17, 2020. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/canadian-military-tool-identifies-hateful-conduct-1.5652276.

[61] *Ibid.*

[62] *Ibid*.

[63] Berthiaume, Lee. "Some Military Personnel Linked to Hate Warned, Disciplined but Allowed to Stay" CBC news, November 18, 2019. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/military-hate-allowed-to-stay-1.5363991.

[64] Government of Canada. "Consolidated Federal Laws of Canada, Criminal Code." Justice Laws Website, February 18, 2021. https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-46/section-319.html.

conduct.[65] The broad definition enables the CAF leeway in taking either administrative or disciplinary action. A CAF member that has committed an offence under the Criminal Code of Canada would be charged under the National Defence Act or the civilian criminal justice system.

In recent years, the CAF has championed diversity, respect, and inclusion and has placed the responsibility on military leadership to uphold the values that are representative of Canadian society. The 2017 Defence white paper Strong Secured Engage identifies the promotion of diversity and inclusion as core institutional values.[66] Therefore, it is troubling when a report in 2018 is released regarding Canadian military cadets from the Royal Military College in Saint-Jean, Que, recruited under the auspice of being the next generation of future military Canadian leaders, desecrating a Qur'an with bacon and bodily fluids.[67] Lieutenant-General Charles Lamarre, the chief of military personnel, stated, "the behaviour demonstrated by these individuals is deplorable and runs contrary to the ethos of the Canadian Armed Forces. It will not be tolerated."[68] While disciplinary action was swift, with one cadet being released shortly thereafter, the follow-on question regarding this behaviour pertains to the CAF's screening and recruitment process of individuals exhibiting behavior that is consistent with the definition of hateful conduct.

When researching military directives on racism and hate, several sections identify vague nuances of behaviour that would be deemed incompatible for military personnel. For instance, under the *Queen's Regulations and Orders (QR&O) Volume I Chapter 19 Conduct and*

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[65] Pauls, Karen. "Canadian Military Says New Hateful Conduct Policy Will Help Weed out Extremists in the Ranks."

[66] Government of Canada. "Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy." Department of National Defence, January 7, 2021. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/canada-defence-policy.html.

[67] Berthiaume, Lee. "'Not Tolerated': Four Military Cadets Accused of Desecrating Qur'an with Bacon and 'Bodily Fluids'." National Post, May 26, 2018. https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/not-tolerated-four-military-cadets-accused-of-desecrating-quran-with-bacon-and-bodily-fluids.

[68] *Ibid*.

Discipline, an all-encompassing statement exists regarding a CAF member and appropriate demeanour and voice. It stipulates that a non-commission member or officer shall not do or say anything that "if seen or heard by the general public might reflect discredit on the Canadian Forces or on any of its members."[69] Note the emphasis of the word "shall."

Summary

The Department of National Defence (DND) and the CAF is the largest Canadian federal government department with around 68,000 Regular Force members and 27,000 Reserve Force members, and 24,000 civilians.[70] In many respects, the organization constitutes a microcosm of Canada encompassing the same concerns and problems experienced in Canadian society with discrimination, exclusion, sexual misconduct, and hateful conduct. The opening paragraph of *CANFORGEN 046/16 - Racist Conduct* echoes the assumption that the CAF is representative of a cross-section of Canadian society, stating, "Racism remains an unfortunate reality in society, and therefore the CAF is not immune from these destructive attitudes and behaviours."[71] It is evident that the institution has recognized the destructive nature of racism or hateful conduct within the CAF. For the past 30 years, the CAF has released several policy updates, yet the issue is elusive. The MPCIS report indicated that an extremely small number of CAF members are affiliated with hate groups; however, the threat and incidents are expected to linger, requiring the department's vigilance in monitoring the situation.

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[69] Government of Canada. "QR&O: Volume I - Chapter 19 Conduct And Discipline." National Defence, November 24, 2017. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/queens-regulations-orders/vol-1-administration/ch-19-conduct-discipline.html.

[70] Government of Canada. "Mandate of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces." National Defence, September 24, 2018. http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-us.page.

[71] Government of Canada. "CANFORGEN 046/16 CMO 028/16 181758Z MAR 16." Department of National Defence, March 18, 2016.

Key lessons drawn from this Chapter pertain to the data concerning RWE in Canada, indicating it to be on the rise. Of significance pertains to statistics on 'estimated internet-using population' showing that Canadian per capita contribute more to RWE and its hateful rhetoric than any other nation. In addition, despite decades of CAF leadership tackling policies and directives aimed at defining racism/hateful conduct, RWE continues to be problematic within the CAF. While military training on hateful conduct has recently been reinitiated, the policy places the onus on the Commanding Officer regarding delivering the material. The Commanding Officer also has the added responsibility of enforcing hateful conduct violations through administrative and/or disciplinary actions.

In September of 2020, the Organization of Prevention of Violence released a Strategic Framework for Addressing Hateful Conduct and Radicalization in the CAF. In the report, the authors Gartenstein-Ross *et al.* identified that RVE and hateful conduct are distinct concepts; however, the authors identified that radicalization is an extreme manifestation of hateful conduct.[72] Therefore, the next Chapter aims to understand the radicalization process to produce workable solutions for combatting hateful conduct within the military.

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[72] Gartenstein-Ross *et al*. "'Like a Drop of Cyanide': A Strategic Framework for Addressing Hateful Conduct and Radicalization in the Canadian Armed Forces."…, 6.

CHAPTER 3 – DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTUAL MODELS OF RADICALIZATION

Both the extreme left and right seek to undermine liberal democracy and the rule of law, whether through the use of violence or other means. They have differing political visions and goals, but both would result in the destruction of the liberties we value.

– Andy Ngo*, editor at large of the Post Millennial*

Radicalization as a process is not concentrated on a specific domain and transcends the entire spectrum from left to right. Of interest to researchers involves understanding why some people are more susceptible or vulnerable to the conversion process from non-radicalism towards extremism in thoughts and actions. Radicalization is not confined to a subset of individuals, rather it exists among most if not all ethnic groups, interests groups, religions, cultures and places. Understanding the commonalities in the radicalization continuum is required to deter any form of psychological or behavioural conversion. Prior to analyzing the academic research regarding the radicalization process, this Chapter will first review the definitions among the many contained in the source materials enabling a common baseline for the work that follows. The definitions include terms and characteristics used by scholars, the Government of Canada (GoC), and Canada's federal policing services. After defining radicalization, the Chapter will then review Borum's Four-Stage Model of the Terrorist Mindset and Helfstein's Radicalization Model. The intent for examining the models through a stage development is to provide information that can be used to counter the radicalization process. A critical component in understanding the radicalization process pertains to the concept of prevention. In order to 'prevent and counter' radicalization, it requires early identification/intervention on individuals deemed vulnerable to extremism. Analysis of the early stages of radicalization aims to impede the process towards the impetus of radical extremism.

Understanding Radicalization

There are several definitions of radicalization and extremism in the publications. For the

purposes of this report, the spectrum of definitions includes both scholarly and official

government definitions enabling a common understanding of the subject. This approach will

better the comprehension of the full-spectrum from non-violent radicalization to radicalization

towards violent extremism.

In order to understand the term radicalism, first it is important to examine the deplorable

acts of terror of September 11, 2001. This event in history created a domain that necessitated

social reform that included academic discussion/research. Radicalization to violence was an issue

that could now be analyzed from a perspective other than just retaliatory physical force. A 'new'

mindset recognized that by defining the root cause via a process, policy solutions might be able

to create counter definitions/measures aimed at deterring and preventing future radical attacks.

Peter Neumann, Professor of Security Studies, and served as Founding Director of the

International Centre for the Study of Radicalization, describes 9/11 as the impetus that allowed

for discussions regarding radicalization as a concept. Neumann asserts:

> Following the attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, however, it
> suddenly became very difficult to talk about the 'roots of terrorism,' which some
> commentators claimed was an effort to excuse and justify the killing of innocent
> civilians. Even so, it seemed obvious (then) that some discussion about the underlying
> factors that had given rise to this seemingly new phenomenon was urgent and necessary,
> and so experts and officials started referring to the idea of 'radicalization' whenever they
> wanted to talk about 'what goes on before the bomb goes off.' In the highly charged
> atmosphere following the September 11 attacks, it was through the notion of
> radicalization that a discussion about the political, economic, social and psychological
> forces that underpin terrorism and political violence became possible again.[73]

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[73] Neumann, Peter. "Perspectives on Radicalisation and Political Violence." The International Centre for the
Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, January 17, 2008, 4. https://www.nonviolent-
conflict.org/resource/perspectives-on-radicalisation-and-political-violence/.

With that, the definitions of radicalization have been shaped largely by the premise that there are multitudes of variables, be it political, economic, social and psychological, that can generate radical outputs.

According the Royal Canadian Mountain Police (RCMP), radicalization is defined as a process in which people re exposed to an ideology that encourages a shift from moderate, conventional beliefs to ideologies that are considered extreme.[74] Similarly, the Canadian government defines radicalization "as a process by which an individual or a group gradually adopts extreme positions or ideologies that are opposed to the status quo and challenge mainstream."[75] The interrelationship between the two definitions pertains to the concept of extremism and defiance of what is considered mainstream.

It must be noted that the Canadian Constitution under Section 2 of Charter Rights and Freedom defends the rights of Canadians to their *thoughts, beliefs, opinions and expressions* without persecution.[76] Under Canadian law, being a 'radical' and having thoughts/beliefs that are outside the 'norm' is by definition legal. It technically only becomes a national security concern if/when the individual transitions to and encourages intolerance and hatred, using mechanisms of violence. The violence and extremism are targeted against political, ideological, or religious entities within Canada. While security agencies have primarily focused on threats impacting Canadians interests coming from Islamic-based fundamentalist terrorism, the legal labelling of terrorists incorporates the full spectrum including RWE. The GoC classifies RWE under the umbrella of Ideologically Motivated Violent Extremism (IMVE). The

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[74] Canadian Association of Chief of Police. "Building Community Resilience to Violent Ideologies." A Discussion Paper — CACP Prevention of Radicalization Study Group, 5.

[75] Government of Canada. "National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence."…, 7.

[76] Government of Canada. "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms." Department of Justice, April 16, 2020. https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/rfc-dlc/ccrf-ccdl/.

subcomponents under IMVE includes racially motivated and ethno-nationalist violence (xenophobic violence), anti-government and anarchist violence (anti-authority violence), violent misogyny and anti-LGBTQ violence (gender-driven violence) and other grievance-driven ideological violence.[77] The government differentiates these groups from those who espouse religiously motivated violent extremism or politically motivated violent extremism. Of note, the term 'radicalization' is often placed in conjunction with or has become synonymous with the term 'extremism.'

Professor David Mandel is a behavioural scientist and senior defence scientist in the Intelligence Group of the Intelligence, Influence, and Collaboration Section at Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC). Mandel contends that radicalization is viewed as a precursor that drives the motivational/psychological conditions required for terrorist acts to occur; it is not the cause of terrorism.[78] In order to conceptualize this notion, similar to the explanation provided by the GoC and the Charter of Rights, it is maintained that individuals may have radical views without going forth and exhibiting radical behaviour that escalates to violence or acts defined as terrorism. Mandel further stipulates that the radicalization frameworks incorporates an ideological perspective that deviates from given societal norms (e.g. similar to opposing the status quo and challenging the mainstream). Mandel states, "To be radical is to be extreme relative to something that is defined or accepted as normative, traditional, or valued as the status quo."[79] With that, Mandel also stipulates, "Radicalization refers to an increase in and/or

[77] Government of Canada. "Threats to the Security of Canada and Canadian Interests." Canadian Security Intelligence Services, May 20, 2020. https://www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-service/corporate/publications/2019-public-report/threats-to-the-security-of-canada-and-canadian-interests.html.

[78] Mandel, D. R. (2010). Radicalization: What does it mean? In T. M. Pick, A. Speckhard, & B. Jacuch (Eds.), Home-grown terrorism: Understanding and addressing the root causes of radicalisation among groups with an immigrant heritage in Europe (pp. 101-113). Amsterdam, Netherlands: IOS Press. [In NATO Science for Peace and Security Series E: Human and Social Dynamics -- Vol. 60]…,102.

[79] Ibid.,105.

reinforcing of extremism in the thinking, sentiments behaviour of individuals and/or groups of individuals."[80] Fellow researchers from DRDC expand on Mandel's interpretation by explaining that the meaning of radicalization equates to the behaviour which could be construed as either brave or mentally deranged and is contingent on what is perceived as 'normal' within the given society.[81] For instance, ISIL and al-Qaeda suicide bombers are perceived by western civilization as unhinged radical Islamist extremists. However, the motivation of Jihadist suicide bomber is in reality subjective to the sub-culture and the views on martyrdoms and heroism within the groups' beliefs/culture. Other scholars like Wilner and Dubouloz, professors in transformative learning theory, define the term radicalization as the "process in which individuals adopt extreme political, social, and/or religious ideals and aspirations, and in which the attainment of particular goals justifies the use of indiscriminate violence."[82] It is important to note that Wilner/Dubouloz and Mandel's definition both focus on the change process that would lead to an escalation incorporating extremism. Therefore, the term radicalism is correlated with the disruptive nature an individual may pose as a threat to society's traditional way of life.[83] The differentiating factor pertains to whether society perceives the outcome as positive or negative. As a result, radicalism is dependent on the degree of transformation and threat in relation to the majority in a given society. The concept of radicalism is generated as a result of the perceived need to return society to how it is envisioned within the ideological mindset.[84] It is important to reiterate the fact that the GoC does not define radicalization on its own with violence. Radicalization to violence is

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[80] *Ibid*., 111.
[81] Adams, Barbara D, Andrea L Brown, Craig R Flear, and Michael L Thomson. "Understanding the Process of Radicalization: Review of the Empirical Literature." Defence Research and Development Canada, March 2011, 5.
[82] Wilner, Alex S. and Claire-Jehanne Dubouloz. "Transformative Radicalization: Applying Learning Theory to Islamist Radicalization." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 34, no. 5 (2011), 418.
[83] Mandel, D. R. (2010). Radicalization: What does it mean?..., 105.
[84] *Ibid*.

characterized via a process escalating to its pinnacle as extremism that justifies the use of violence.

Nevertheless, the dualism with radicalization pertains to its counterpart and the definition 'de-radicalization.' Research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, Dr. Mohammed Elshimi articulates that as this is a reasonably novel research field and that the literature on the definition is generally ambiguous.[85] Programs designed to reintegrate an individual back into society or deter them from committing an act of violence drive the definition. Furthermore, Elshimi asserts that a degree of uncertainty is compounded by the use of other terms that have become synonymous with 'de-radicalization' yet convey slight variances in its meaning and policy implications (e.g. 'rehabilitation,' 're-socialization,' 'de-programming' and 'dialogue') are all in the literature with de-radicalization programs.[86] With that, the research places emphasis on the distinction between de-radicalization (cognitive) and disengagement (behavioural) change as the core strategy for counter-radicalization.[87]

According to historian and scholar Mark Sedgwick, prior to 2001 and 9/11, media outlets and academia seldom used the term radicalization.[88] As indicated by Sedgwick, using the dataset from press release articles, the term radicalization became mainstream between 2005 and 2007.[89] Figure 3.1 below was calculated using press releases using time-limited Google News searches and illustrates the popularization of the term. Analyzing global events during that period supports

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[85] Elshimi, Mohammed. "Prevent 2011 and Counter-Radicalisation: What is de-Radicalisation?" In *Counter-Radicalisation: Critical Perspectives* edited by Jarvis, Lee, Christopher Baker-Beall, and Charlotte Heath-Kelly. Taylor and Francis, 2014, 208.

[86] *Ibid*.

[87] *Ibid*., 209

[88] Sedgwick, Mark. "The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion." Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no. 4 (2010), 480.

[89] *Ibid*.

the hypothesis that the term's popularity is associated with the emergence of 'home-grown'

terrorism and the London bombing attacks of 2005.

Figure 3.1 – Press Use of "Radicalization"

Source: Sedgwick, Mark. "The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion." Terrorism
and Political Violence 22, no. 4 (2010), 480.

Although the first noticeable rise in usage of the term radicalization appears around 2001, Figure

3.1 clearly depicts a spike from 2005 through 2007. Associate Professor of Politics Dorle

Hellmuth indicates that as a result of the bombings at Madrid (2004) and London (2005),

countries started implementing 'soft' counter-radicalization programs.[90] While countries

augmented their security protocols that included monitoring, suppression, and prosecution,

nations also started developing soft de-radicalized concepts. Many European countries

implemented programs focusing on education, communication, and the psychological or social

sphere of influence. These programs included hotlines, workshops, counselling, and exit

programs to prevent radicalization. Sedgwick asserts that the establishment of the 'counter-

radicalization' programs by western nations institutionalized the term 'radicalization,' causing

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[90] Hellmuth, Dorle. "Countering Jihadi Terrorists and Radicals the French Way," Studies *in Conflict &
Terrorism* 38, no. 12 (2015), 979.

governments to increase funding geared towards research and thus solidifying the prevalence of the term and causing it to maintain its relevance and prominence.[91]

For this paper's purpose, 'radicalization' pertains to the process by which an individual shift's from a moderate to an extreme ideology. Conversely, 'de-radicalization' pertains to a reverse process that causes an individual with extreme beliefs to adopt a more moderate mainstream position. Now that the critical definitions have been established, the next section will analyze Borum's Four-Stage Model of the Terrorist Mindset and Helfstein's Radicalization Model. These conceptual radicalization models attempt to explain the process of how hatred is transformed by some individuals into extremism and a justification for violence.

Borum's Four-Stage Model

The terrorist acts inflicted on the United States during 9/11 identified a requirement by scholars and security agencies to develop frameworks in order to explain Radical Violent Extremism (RVE) as a process. Scholars tend to employ conceptual models that illustrate a procedural structure through a logical 'transformative' path. Analyzing specific incidents and various extremist groups enables scholars to examine the commonalities representative of the pathways.

Forensic psychologist and associate professor in the Department of Mental Health and Law, Professor Randy Borum, published an article in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Law Enforcement Bulletin proposing a four-stage model aimed at understanding a *terrorist mindset*. Borum's concept is derived from numerous violent extremist groups and spans across varying ideologies to pinpoint the factors that are recurrent and exist amongst the individuals/groups in the process of radicalization. Borum states that a "conceptual model

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[91] Sedgwick, Mark. "The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion."…, 80.

attempts to explain how grievances and vulnerabilities are transformed into hatred of a target group, and how hatred is transformed—for some—into a justification or impetus for violence."[92] Of note, Borum's four-stage model depicted in Figure 3.1 below was developed as a training tool for law enforcement and not as a formal social science theory.

Figure 3.2 – Borum's Four-Stage Model of the Terrorist Mindset

Source: Borum, Randy. "Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research." *Journal of Strategic Security* 4, no. 4 (2011), 39.

According to Borum, four observable stages emerge and are common in the ideological framework of radicalization pertaining to the beliefs and systems of individuals/groups. The model first focuses on an event or condition that caused the individuals/groups to experience malcontent. In order to become radicalized, the grievance or blame needs to be transferred to "a target policy, person, or nation and then vilifying often demonizing, the responsible party to facilitate justification for aggression."[93] Borum constructs the first step as the individual/group

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[92] Borum, Randy. "Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research." *Journal of Strategic Security* 4, no. 4 (2011), 39.

[93] Borum, Randy. "Understanding the Terrorist Min-Set." *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, FBI Academy. July 2003, 7.

experiencing an undesirable event or condition and mentally equating it to the fact that injustice occurred ("it's not right").[94] Examples given by Borum include economic disparity and unemployment resulting in impoverished living conditions. The dissatisfaction with the current status can also include social and government constraints that are perceived to infringe on rights and freedom. Regardless of the circumstance, the experience generates a sentiment by an individual or group modifying a belief system with the mindset that things are not how they should be.

The next stage in Borum's model consists of an individual or group having a position whereby there is a perception of an injustice ("it's not fair").[95] An example used to illustrate this stage is the notion of being one of the most skilled and efficient workers, yet not earning as much as a colleague that has more qualifications.. The disparity creates a sense of injustice and is viewed as unfairness regarding self-worth and pay inequity. The work grievance exasperates the injustice and creates a mindset that skews an individual's perceived overall financial struggles.

Once in motion, the negative energy identified as the injustice needs to be transferred to a person or group. Borum equates targeting phase with a step defined as ("it's your fault").[96] Racially charged hate towards a minority group is a representation of this stage when it fuels the divide and perceived suffering (e.g. a white male substantiating his unemployment due to affirmative action).

When applying the model to the radicals and conspiracy groups that took part in the Capitol riots, the concept depicts a systematic delineation of the progression. In this case, let us assume that the grievance pertains to simply believing that the election was rigged due to mail-in

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[94] *Ibid.*
[95] *Ibid.*, 8.
[96] *Ibid.*

voter fraud (it's not right). Secondly, the sense of injustice was caused by a lack of impartiality and integrity, and it is thought that the election was stolen, leading rioters to believe that they have been cheated (it's not fair). Next, the perpetrators must target and place the blame or fault on someone or something (e.g. Democrats, Federal and State jurisdictions, leftist, minority groups, etc.). Finally, the rioter justified and directed their violence/hate towards the Capitol in order to disrupt the proceeding and thus vilifying the institution and/or individuals that stand in their way (you're evil). Now applying the model to the opposite side of the spectrum, when President Trump challenged the court in an attempt to stop votes from being counted in battleground states, riots erupted in cities across the United States. The grievance in this circumstance pertains to the President using his position and power to stop the democratic process of letting all eligible votes to be counted (it's not right). Secondly, similar to the 'right,' the sense of injustice pertains to a lack of impartiality and integrity. The 'left' believed that if Trump were to be re-elected, the election was stolen (it's not fair). With protesters also waving 'Black Lives Matter' flags, the culmination of months of tyranny by 'oppressors,' the rioters targeted the President and his supporters (it's your fault). Lastly, the perpetrators justified violence and directed their hate towards law enforcement as they are enforcing the current institutional suppression (you're evil). Although both scenarios have a multitude of variables/factors and are deep rooted, applying a simplistic narrative against the model clearly depicts the evolution of the radical mindset's progression through Borum's four stages.

Helfstein's Model

While the radicalization process is complex, it is fundamentally understood that the triggers that make an ideology appealing for an individual may not be the same for another. The Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point released a report authored by

Scott Helfstein on a radicalization model that focuses on the individual process by dissecting the combination of pathways that lead to radicalization to violence. This framework is not concentrated on identifying the causes; rather, the Helfstein model looks at radical individuals' via a process incorporating a combination of the respective journey, the ideology itself, and the group dynamics prompting violence.[97]

Helfstein contends that there is value in recognizing/distinguishing the 'why' and 'how' in the radicalization process.[98] Scholars have formulated numerous radicalization models; however, unlike many models that portray a linear framework, Helfstein's model offers feedback loops.[99] As depicted in Figure 3.3 below, the model has pathways and feedback loops that are identified by the use of arrows.

Figure 3.3 – Helfstein's Model

Source: Helfstein, Scott and MILITARY ACADEMY WEST POINT NY COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER. *Edges of Radicalization: Ideas, Individuals and Networks in Violent Extremism* 2012, 16.

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[97] Helfstein, Scott and MILITARY ACADEMY WEST POINT NY COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER. *Edges of Radicalization: Ideas, Individuals and Networks in Violent Extremism* 2012, 15.
[98] *Ibid*., 7.
[99] *Ibid*., 17.

Helfstein asserts that there is merit in separating the concept of 'why' radical ideologies may resonate for some, and 'how' a member may come to embrace and promote radical ideas.[100] This concept is of particular importance as it provides insight regarding understanding how to stop the radicalization process. Helfstein's model is also a stage-based process that incorporates slight modifications to the number and types of stages. The model is a four-step process that entails awareness, interest, acceptance, and implementation. However, the model uses multiple paths to illustrate the radicalization process and depicts a number of combinations and permutations to achieve the implementation stage.

The first stage comprises the unveiling/manifestation of the existing radical idea itself. The awareness component can be viewed as twofold. Technically, an individual can either be aware or unaware of the radical ideology's existence. Once an individual is exposed to radical information, it is impossible to forget or delete the contents from their memory. However, Helfstein asserts that the awareness continuum can also be perceived as a gradual process that occurs over time. Individuals slide up and down the spectrum of awareness. Unequivocally, an individual cannot skip or move to the next stage without first having some form of exposure/awareness. Therefore, the criticality of the awareness stage pertains to an individual's threshold and the differing level of information required. An individual may gravitate to a radical ideology rapidly based on limited information (low threshold). In contrast, another individual requires ample information and exposure before radical ideas become appealing (higher threshold). Helfstein states, "once an individual is aware of radical ideas, he or she must decide whether these ideas are of interest to him or her or to dismiss them as noise."[101] It is understood

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[100] *Ibid.*, 7.
[101] *Ibid.,* 16.

that most individuals have some form of awareness of the various radical ideologies that exist within society. However, the majority of individuals also do not drift towards embracing this radical ideological mindset and, therefore, would not proceed to the next stage, 'Interest.'

For the small subset of individuals that gravitate to the radical ideology, the second stage in the model pertains to the concept of 'Interest.' The exposure and awareness have now laid the foundation for an individual to dig deeper and acquire a more profound understanding/curiosity of the ideology. A lack of interest will lead an individual to promptly dismiss the belief system, and the process comes to an end. For the interest stage to take effect, it requires the individual to have a readiness to embrace and change one's belief system to represent the principles attached to the radical doctrine. Helfstein identifies altering one's creed due to the radical ideology as the distinguishing factor between casual, curious on-looker and those that find something more in-depth in the radical ideas. The interest enables the progression to acceptance, the next stage in the model.

It is noted that when acceptance occurs, an individual is more susceptible to conduct acts of violence. However, as identified in the GoC definition with radicalization, not all radicals conduct acts of violence. Many will embrace the ideology without the violent component. Helfstein states, "there is a distinction between those who adopt radical doctrines, those who adopt violent radical doctrines, and those who conduct terrorist acts in accordance with radical violent doctrines."[102] Despite the distinction regarding the categories of radicalization, all three components have a common denominator. Something acting as a trigger that caused an individual's belief system to be modified.

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[102] *Ibid.,* 16-17.

As discussed earlier, this model incorporates feedback loops that illustrate the concept of moving back and forth. The purposeful design portrays how an individual can reinforce radical ideas based on new ideas or potential social interactions. The model's feedback loops also represent individuals that becomes disenfranchised by the thought of violent acts and therefore reverts to an earlier stage. Of significance and what makes countering violent extremism so difficult involves the "exceptional cases" or "outliers" in which individuals bypass a stage and proceed from awareness or interest directly to the last stage of the model 'Implementation.' For example, on 13 November 2015, radical terrorist attacked France targeting the Stade de France, the Bataclan music hall, and numerous restaurants in Paris. Many of the perpetrators were categorized as 'homegrown terrorist' born/raised in France and Belgium. Of particular interest regarding the radicalization process pertains to the analysis by political scientist Gilles Kepel. Kepel stipulates that perpetrators were radicalized at a rate that is considered "lightning-fast."[103] Reflected in Figure 3.3, the Helfstein model uses arrows to represent the various combinations or dispositions a member may take through the radicalization process. The direct path moves forward linearly from left to right and is represented by the solid arrows. The hollow arrows provide various sequences along the route to radicalization. As previously stated, with new information, an individual may become more or less enamored by an ideology. Ergo, being disenchanted by a radical ideology will ultimately influence the progression through the stages. An important aspect of the feedback loops is that it also provides an opportunity for a member to achieve a more significant opinion/conclusion deepening their moral ties with the ideology. However, it also provides a perspective on potential opportunities to disrupt the radicalization process. The model's distinguishing factor involves the understanding that an individual can

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[103] Kepel, Gilles and Antoine Jardin, *Terror in France: The Rise of Jihad in the West* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), xiv.

jump across the various stages, moving back and forth. With that, an individual may leap from awareness directly to the implementation of violence, bypassing the interest and acceptance stage. Evaluating the process through this lens enables a 'counter' perspective regarding the 'why' and 'how' which can provide valued information regarding identifying a potential opportunity to break the link and disrupt the path. Consequently, when the path jumps stages, the counter-radicalization or de-radicalization becomes problematic, and the notion of intervention becomes exceptionally challenging.

The challenges outlined previously can be illustrated by modifying Helfstein's model. Figure 3.4 depicts the progress of an individual as they move between Helfstein's stages. Note each stage impacts the number of individuals influenced. The yellow and red dots are symbolic representations of population density at each stage. Concerning the yellow dots, due to an individual's internal belief system or external preventative factors, the dots never escalate to the point of violent extremism. However, the red dots are symbolic representations of individuals that have the potential at each stage to escalate to point of RVE. Although, as one progresses from left 'Awareness' towards the right 'Implementation,' the pool of individuals at each stage decreases, the significance of Figure 3.4 pertains to the evidence that in order to prevent the number of dots from progressing, there is a requirement to break the link (e.g. represented by the red dotted line). In addition, based on the premise that an individual can jump from the general population directly to violent extremism is problematic and requires immediate intervention at the awareness/general population phase.

Figure 3.4 – Modifying Helfstein's Model to Counter Violent Extremism

    Canada's National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence identifies that the

radicalization process occurs gradually. However, scholars Helfstein and Kepel account for the

outliers and identify that it is possible for individuals to radicalize extremely fast.

Notwithstanding the various pathways, as an individual within society can jump directly to RVE,

the importance of addressing the hate and radicalism within the general population becomes

paramount in preventing any forward progression. When transferring this information to the

military context, only a small percentage of CAF members display hateful conduct and are

affiliated with hate groups. However, understanding hate and radicalization through a CAF-wide

training/awareness initiative will enable members with the framework for building resiliency to

combat hateful conduct and RVE. Note the approach to Countering-Violent-Extremism (CVE)

will be discussed and expanded upon in Chapter 6.

Summary

Radicalization to violence takes place when an individual or a group adopts extremist ideas and believes that violence can be used to promote or advance certain ideas or convictions. While hateful conduct and RWE have been the main focal point within the CAF, it is important to note that the definition of radicalization consists of the entire broad spectrum that includes religious, political, and other ideologies as well.

In order to utilize the radicalization models, it is important to inject the individual or incident and interpret why and how it progressed to violent extremism. In both models, in order for an individual or group to become radicalized, it required an activator that was identified as a grievance (it's not right) or the concept of awareness. If the activator is to progress through the radicalization continuum, it requires an acceptance of the ideology and for it to conflict against the societal status quo. Of note, the radicalization process affects people from all walks of life, regardless of their ethnicity, race, or religion. Therefore, in addition to understanding the *radicalization-to-violence* process, it is critical to explore common denominators and intersectionalities amongst ideologies that may act as key factors contributing to the process. In that, a comprehensive understanding of radicalization is built through awareness of the process in conjunction with identifying common factors. Chapter 4 will analyze various factors that affect an individual's path towards radicalization. Establishing an understanding of the factors that influence radicalization will help the CAF determine if there are indicators in military members enabling command and leadership an understanding of 'if' and 'when' to intervene.

CHAPTER 4 – FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO RADICALIZATION

A Klan member is not stamped from a standard cookie cutter. They come from all walks of life and various education levels and environmental situations which have led to their decision to join the Klan.

– Daryl Davis*, American musician, author, and activist*

Various factors contribute to an individual or group adopting radical ideologies. It is important to identify that there is no uniformity regarding radicalization. Every individual differs and can be analyzed independently, factoring information influenced by components of their personal circumstances, immediate surroundings, or a combination of variables from society as a whole.[104] Nevertheless, in every case, the reason for justifying violence is linked to some kind of radical ideology and belief system. *Canada's National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence* specifies that the factors for joining violent extremist organizations do not differ based on gender, yet in many cases, the motivations may include a need for "adventure, empowerment, belonging, purpose, and to assert a particular identity that they view as being marginalized."[105] This Chapter will review common factors that prompt an individual to proceed along the radicalization continuum. After examining factors associated with radicalization, special attention will be placed on extremist messaging and hateful content online. In an era where access to information is at our fingertips, the internet not only serves as a venue for awareness (See Chapter 3, Helfstein's Model – Stage 1), it enables individuals to connect and build social hate networks. The radicalization process is complex, and determining unequivocally that an individual has developed radical extremist views is difficult. However, researchers have identified factors/indicators that establish vital markers that can act as a potential warning signs.

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[104] Government of Canada. "National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence."…, 8.
[105] *Ibid*., 9.

Factors Contributing to Radicalization

John Horgan, Professor of Psychology, studies individuals' involvement and engagement in terrorist groups focusing on disengagement and de-radicalization. Horgan's research entails answering the question: why is one individual more predisposed to becoming involved in radicalization that leads to violence/terrorism than another? Horgan asserts that answering this question is very challenging, and it is likely impossible to identify with 100 percent certainty. Yet, the likelihood of susceptibility to becoming radicalized to the point of being a terrorist has brought to light repeated characteristics. Horgan's research has identified predisposing risk factors used for predicting an individual's potential involvement. The risk factors identified include: emotional vulnerability, dissatisfaction with the current activity, identification with the victims, a violent belief system, sense of reward with being in a movement, and kinship.

The concept of emotional vulnerability can become present when an individual experiences a sense of anger, alienation, and disenfranchisement.[106] Alienation is characteristic of an individual becoming withdrawn and isolating themselves from their current environment and the people they know, often-rejecting loved ones and society. Horgan's example includes young British Muslims distancing themselves from their Imams. The Imam's tutelage is perceived as outdated and not representative of the individual's current struggles and situation. This mindset inevitably causes the individual to seek guidance and clarity from another source. Of note, in this instance, the Imams are not acting as the source or culprit encouraging radicalization to violence. Emotional vulnerability are compounded by stressors (e.g. financial,

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[106] Horgan, John. "From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 618, no. 1 (2008), 84-85.

personal, health related, etc.) and may impact an individual's state of mind making them vulnerable to radicalization.[107]

Dissatisfaction with the current activity is a factor that entails being frustrated with the prevailing movement, be it political or social, creating a perception that the current establishment is flawed.[108] In addition, the current conventional measures for tackling the perceived issue are not yielding the desired results. In order to bring about the change that is envisioned, violence is believed to be the main mechanism. In the literature, the dissatisfaction with current activity is represented in most cases with the term grievance. Perceived or valid grievances/social injustices emerge as a preoccupation and cause an individual to join an extremist group.

Identification with the victims includes a manifestation of an individual's identification with an individual or group being persecuted.[109] Horgan parallels this factor with the recruitment of national foreign fighters sympathizing with the plight of the victims in the Middle Eastern countries caused by western society. **With regards to foreign fighters, the grievance generates feelings of injustice to a situation that is occurring abroad.** Western military involvement and actions are blamed for the suffering against the population. The identification with the victims explains in part why Muslims born, raised, and educated in their respective Western countries are emerging as radical Islamist extremists. The EU (specifically France and the UK) estimates around 40,000 foreign fighters have joined the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) since 2013.[110]

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[107] Gartenstein-Ross *et al*. "'Like a Drop of Cyanide': A Strategic Framework for Addressing Hateful Conduct and Radicalization in the Canadian Armed Forces."…, 18.

[108] *Ibid*., 85

[109] *Ibid*.

[110] European Commission. "Terrorism." Terrorism | Knowledge for policy. European Union. Accessed January 11, 2021. https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/foresight/topic/changing-security-paradigm/impact-terrorism_en.

The factor regarding adopting a violent belief system entails rationalizing the use of brutality and force as a mechanism to achieve results, thereby convincing oneself that the actions are not immoral or evil.[111] Canada's National Strategy also identifies a predisposition for violence as a factor that contributes to individuals modifying their beliefs. Character traits lure the individual to a violent belief system with the hope of furthering violent tendencies. The significance of this factor pertains to an individual's "inclination towards violence."[112] Note, the violent belief system can also influence a mindset that perceives that the actions carried out are heroic.

The sense of belonging and the impact of being attached to a movement or group is an important factor regarding radicalizing.[113] Seeking martyrdom and the power of what it symbolizes within a group is an essential instrument regarding understanding why an individual would believe that s/he achieves more through death than through life.[114] This notion is also paramount in sustaining the commitment process. Recruits' feeling of acceptance, level of status, and a longing for respect validate the social reward. On 19 December 2016, a Tunisian man deliberately drove a truck near the Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church in Berlin, Germany. This attack targeted individuals in the Christmas market and ended with 12 people killed. A'maq News media outlet portrayed the extremist as a hero, praising the attacker calling him a "soldier who carried out the attack in response to calls to target citizens of the international coalition."[115]

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[111] Horgan, John. "From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism."…, 85.

[112] Government of Canada. "National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence."…, 9.

[113] Horgan, John. "From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism."…, 85.

[114] *Ibid*.

[115] Pawella, Jeanne. *Rapport - EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Report 2017* Radicalisations, 2017, 23.

Joining a cause (directly or indirectly) and having a sense of belonging enables individuals to feel that they are not alone and part of something bigger, including a distinct group.

A critical factor consistent in the research pertains to the longing for kinship and the affiliation/connection with others regarding issues.[116] Horgan points to Marc Sageman's 2004 theory. Sageman is a forensic psychiatrist and former CIA Case Officer that extrapolated open-sourced data from Al-Qaida-related cases. Sageman's theory refers to the Islamists militants' radicalization process as a *bunch of guys*.[117] This kinship factor is twofold. The influencing factor may consist of pre-existing friendship that connects the individual with radical networks, or the longing for kinship and relationships lures the individual to radical networks. The kinship and strong social ties ultimately impact the sense of identity. In the case of global jihad, Sageman recognizes that the social identity develops a strong sense of belonging to a *clique*.[118] The *clique* begins to function through a subculture, resulting in solidarity and creating emotional bonds in the group with a shared cognitive perspective.[119]

Research indicates that common factors are not exclusive and forms a critical framework, specifically when components are linked. However, these factors act as identifiers and enable an analysis of the socialization into the realm of radicalization to violence. Of importance is that the factors listed above highlight the concept of why homogenous individuals (raised under the same conditions) will differ in how the information is processed. However, understanding various factors helps frame the cause and effects of why individuals may be more susceptible to the radicalization process. Horgan identifies that these factors represent indicators for an individual

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[116] Horgan, John. "From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism."…, 85.

[117] Sageman, Marc. *Understanding Terror Networks*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, 108 and 115.

[118] *Ibid.,* 156.

[119] *Ibid.,* 156.

prior to the moment in which a member joins a terrorist/hate group. Once committed to a group, a different series of factors emerge and exercise control as the individual starts to shift towards a sense of belonging. The different set of factors identified by Horgan include the group's power dynamics, the ideology and its content, the leaders influence, and so on.[120]

Recall Figure 3.4 – *Modifying Helfstein Model to Counter Violent Extremism*, in order to prevent a member from radicalizing, a critical element pertained to breaking the link early in the process. The first link occurs within the general population or awareness stage. The *Canadian National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence* recognizes that multiple variables will influence the process towards violent behaviour. However, a contributing factor pertains to "the presence or absence of protective factors."[121] The concept of protective factors is essentially an antithesis of the contributing factors identified by Horgan. Figure 4.1 below illustrates Canada's Public Safety radicalization paradigm. For instance, as opposed to seeking a longing for kinship, an individual has already established valued friends, family members or mentors that act as a positive influence in shaping an individual's mindset. Adopting a violent belief system contradicts an individual mindset as they have been shaped by norms and values that have molded an individual's character of what constitutes appropriate behaviour and with violence being discouraged as a means to achieve a goal. While isolation and being withdrawn enables radicalism, the opposite is true in being connected and involved in school, sports, and various other positive activities.[122]

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[120] Horgan, John. "From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism."…, 85.

[121] Government of Canada. "National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence."…, 9.

[122] *Ibid*.

Figure 4.1 Public Safety Canada's Radicalization Factors

Public Safety Canada's Radicalization Factors

Social Networks
Grievances
Vulnerabilities
Sense of Belonging
Inclination Towards Violence

Belief Systems that Reject Violence
Purpose and Social Belonging
Trusted Reporting Avenues
Trained Professionals

Increasing Likelihood of Radicalization

Decreasing Likelihood of Radicalization

Source: Gartenstein-Ross *et al*. "'Like a Drop of Cyanide': A Strategic Framework for Addressing Hateful Conduct and Radicalization in the Canadian Armed Forces."…, 18.

When analyzing the military, the significance of early education/training and targeting the 'general population' involves several components. Take for example violence and acts of hostility. Military members shall abide and respect the rules of engagement and the laws of armed conflict, and there should be zero ambiguity in their interpretation. The intricacies involve rejecting violence but setting the conditions for when reasonable force is justified to protect persons impacted by conflict. Regarding purpose and sense of belonging, the indoctrination process must enable a member to understand the term 'collective' as criteria for success. By fostering cohesion and emphasizing teamwork, kinship is strengthened decreasing vulnerabilities. A critical component in the research regarding decreasing the likelihood of radicalization pertains to incorporating trained professionals. Research indicates that in order to help break the link, it is essential to include trained professionals as they are better positioned to assess and provide proper training, and if required, a tailored intervention.[123] Finally, Canada's

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[123] *Ibid*.

National Strategy identifies the need for raising awareness about radicalization. The strategy intends to establish 'early prevention' that enables practitioners, front-line workers and the general Canadian population with the knowledge so that they are better informed and better positioned to counter radicalization. With that, the fundamentals of adopting a CAF-wide approach to countering radicalization involve awareness and identification. Awareness and identification initiatives enable members with critical thinking skills, provide leaders and members with opportunities to challenge the violent extremist narratives, and creates venues for meaningful dialogue to express complex issues/grievances.[124]

Identifying factors assists in determining the susceptibility of individuals towards radicalization to violence. However, it is evident that radicalization is extremely complex and not as simple as solely identifying distinct commonalities. When examining radicalization, researchers analyze and distinguish between both the process and factors. Focusing on the broad sociopolitical conditions is referred to as the "push" factors and are considered difficult to change as in many respects they are fixed.[125] On the other hand, counter-radical initiatives are more successful when focusing on the "pull" factors.[126] Analyzing pull factors that attract and entice an individual to radicalize are considered more readily recognizable and unique to specific populations and circumstances.[127] The next section will analyze online space and how the content/networking "pulls" individuals towards a radical extremist ideology.

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[124] *Ibid.*, 15-16.
[125] Horgan, John. "From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism."…, 90.
[126] *Ibid.*
[127] *Ibid.*

Online Space as a Factor to Radicalization

In a global environment that is largely influenced by the power of digitization and the internet, people from every corner of the world can connect and share content. In many respects, this technological development has brought people together. It has enabled individuals to connect with individuals they may otherwise have never had the possibility to meet. For example, as of 2021, the social networking giant Facebook has an average of 3 billion monthly active users, making it the most popular social media application worldwide.[128]

However, the power of the internet and social media has increasingly become an area of concern regarding contributing to the radicalization process. The danger of online space has never been more apparent, as witnessed during the events that took place by violent extremists storming the U.S. Capitol. Messaging for action through violence against Congress had been circulating on various online platforms for months.[129] Following the event, The New York Times interviewed Renee DiResta, a researcher at the Stanford Internet Observatory who studies online movements. DiResta stated, "This has been a striking repudiation of the idea that there is an online and an offline world and that what is said online is in some way kept online."[130]

According to some critics and scholars, the current literature lacks the causal relationship between the internet and radicalization. For instance, research conducted by Gill *et al.* examined 223 convicted United Kingdom-based terrorists. The research emphasized the connection between online activities, radicalization, and violent acts of terror. The findings concluded that,

> The internet is largely a facilitative tool that affords greater opportunities for
> violent radicalization and attack planning. Nevertheless, radicalization and attack

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[128] Iqbal, Mansoor. "Facebook Revenue and Usage Statistics (2021)." Business of Apps, April 6, 2021. https://www.businessofapps.com/data/facebook-statistics/.

[129] Frenkel, Sheera. "The Storming of Capitol Hill Was Organized on Social Media." The New York Times. The New York Times, January 6, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/us/politics/protesters-storm-capitol-hill-building.html.

[130] *Ibid*.

planning are not dependent on the internet and researchers need to look at behaviors, intentions, and capabilities.[131]

Many scholars assert that the internet plays an important role in supplementing the radicalization process that occurs offline, and therefore the two domains are interconnected.[132] The online space is a venue for exposure. Regardless of the topic, information can be found supporting a particular radical perspective. It also provides a mechanism for engagement with other extremists. Face-to-face encounters are made available after the online exposure through affiliations and memberships with the extremist group, potentially further deepening the radicalization process.[133]

Sageman provides another perspective whereby he refers to the online space as the *invisible hand*. Sageman states, "Face-to-face radicalization has been replaced by online radicalization."[134] Historically, the molding and rhetoric contributing to radicalization were achieved via an interpersonal link. A spiritual leader would act as a role model or 'influencer,' triggering an individual to adopt a specific ideology. For instance, Abu Hamza al-Masri was a captivating individual that uttered Islamist jihadist rhetoric at the Finsbury Park Mosque in London. With ties to al-Qaeda, he was influential in helping the Taliban radicalize youth throughout the 1990s and 2000s.[135] Under Abu Hamza's leadership, the North London Mosque became a central breeding ground for indoctrinating vulnerable young Muslims.

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[131] Gill, Paul, Emily Corner, Maura Conway, Amy Thornton, Mia Bloom, and John Horgan. "Terrorist use of the Internet by the Numbers: Quantifying Behaviors, Patterns, and Processes." *Criminology & Public Policy 16*, no. 1 (2017), 113.

[132] Behr, Ines von, Anais Reding, Charlie Edwards, and Luke Gribbon. *Radicalisation in the Digital Era: The use of the Internet in 15 Cases of Terrorism and Extremism*: RAND Corporation, 2013, 29.

[133] *Ibid.*, 21.

[134] Sageman, Marc. "The Next Generation of Terror." Foreign Policy no. 165 (2008), 41.

[135] O'Neil, Sean, and Daniel McGrory. 2006. The Suicide Facory: Abu Hanza and the Finsbury Park Mosque. London: Harper Perennial.

With technology and new innovative ways of communicating, radical ideologies can be disseminated and viewed anywhere at any time. In 2005, a Syrian-Spaniard named Abu Musab al-Suri published an online manifesto called the *Global Islamic Resistance Call*. Gilles Kepel describes the manifesto as a policy that placed "terrorism in Europe as the main vector of the battle against the West and identified the poorly integrated younger generation of Muslims as its preferred instrument."[136] Abu Musab al-Suri transformed the interactive social venue. He extended the radical extremist ideology beyond defined borders and, by posting his message online, was able to reach a greater number of impressionable individuals with the aim of generating the desired violent output.

As described in Helfstein's radicalization model, the introduction or exposure is key in the process. The internet has provided another mechanism for creating awareness and removes the requirement for face-to-face interaction. With that, the age of social interaction via an online platform poses a challenge for the security and intelligence community. As stipulated by CSIS, the sheer volume of information on the internet enables individuals to develop hateful strategies, negative support, and even forms idolization for like-minded individuals that defends an ideology through acts of violence.[137] Social media outlets are being used as a pulpit to spread an extremist ideology in order to recruit.[138] The message and propaganda are being broadcasted using methods in which an individual's identification is not required. Anonymity through encryption technology increases the challenges to the security and intelligence community.[139] Using an alias username on chat rooms hides an identity and, in the case of the CAF, allows a

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[136] Kepel, Gilles and Antoine Jardin, *Terror in France: The Rise of Jihad in the West*…, 10.

[137] Government of Canada. "CSIS Public Report 2019."…, 15.

[138] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. "The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes." United Nations. New York,. September 2012, 5.

[139] Government of Canada. "CSIS Public Report 2019."…, 15.

potential recruit to go undetected during open-source security screenings. Concealing the individuals' identity coupled with the material's contents, 'Darknet libraries' enable the messaging to remain inconspicuous. As noted in the CSIS public report of 2019, "attacks [were] undertaken by individuals whose radicalization is facilitated by learned tactics and online and emerging technologies [and] are the direct result of aggressive terrorist media campaigns that aim to inspire more violence."[140]Anonymity is a significant component of the internet that captivates individuals. An individual can remain anonymous while researching deviant information, including watching hate videos, reviewing and commenting on forums, and seeking out other individuals.[141] Having freedom within the online space enables an individual to explore their curiosity without inhibition and concern of their identity being revealed.[142] The internet is a source of information that is available 24/7. Through curiosity/interest, members can explore and research material of their own accord. In addition, the internet acts as a vast database enabling individuals to identify like-minded individuals within proximity and a specific geographical area. Scholars Simi and Futrell's report on the white power movement identified cyberspace as a free space that enables the movement's sustainment, facilitating collective action and coordination.[143] A SoCal Skinhead states in the report, "When you live in a world like we do, you have to find places where you don't have to hold back on being racist; where other people feel and act the same way you do."[144] The internet not only provides free space for hate dialogue but also presents a platform to organize underground meetings. Symbolic identifiers used by hate groups

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[140] *Ibid*.

[141] Quinn, James F. and Craig J. Forsyth. "Red Light Districts on Blue Screens: A Typology for Understanding the Evolution of Deviant Communities on the Internet." *Deviant Behavior 34*, no. 7 (2013), 580.

[142] Holt, Thomas J., Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven M. Chermak. "Internet-Based Radicalization as Enculturation to Violent Deviant Subcultures." *Deviant Behavior 38*, no. 8 (2017), 860.

[143] Simi, Pete and Robert Futrell. "cyberculture and the Endurance of White Power Activism." Journal of Political & Military Sociology 34, no. 1 (2006), 115.

[144] *Ibid*., 124.

are shared through online forums, such as the white supremacist using '88' or 'HH' signifying 'Heil Hitler.'[145]

Another feature of the internet exploited amongst radical groups involves applying various software that enables an individual/group to manipulate an image or video.[146] By altering the material, the content may be considered media-friendly and not censored. Also, by falsifying information/facts, it will appeal to the larger audience while maintaining the radical extremist content.[147] This selective messaging tactic is used to inject the groups-belief of being oppressed, fostering sentiments of anger and violence. News reports are continuously refuted, and a group's counter-messaging is then promulgated on online threaded discussions.

The difficulty with the internet pertains to the on-demand environment. The exposure to the RVE content is technically only confined to the individual's readiness to search and spend time online. Therefore, an individual that spends a considerable amount of time researching a radical ideology may become absorbed by the web of information that eventually transgresses to a network of RVE.[148] Davey *et al.'s* research regarding discussions on various internet platforms and RWE in Canada showed most attacks were against the Muslim community, refugees, and Justin Trudeau.[149] The research also illustrates that users of popular social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter seldom use a hateful tone. Instead, the messages and content were subtle and appealed to hateful narratives by portraying minority groups and political opposition in a derogatory light.[150] RWE are becoming aware of how to skirt the boundaries to ensure that the information is not illegal or violates a platform's terms-of-service.

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[145] *Ibid*.

[146] Holt, Thomas J., Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven M. Chermak. "Internet-Based Radicalization as Enculturation to Violent Deviant Subcultures." *Deviant Behavior 38*, no. 8 (2017), 862.

[147] *Ibid*.

[148] *Ibid*., 863

[149] *Davey et al., "An Online Environmental Scan of Right-Wing Extremism in Canada"*…, 40.

[150] *Ibid*.

Once again, it is important to reiterate that being exposed to extremist ideology does not correlate with being automatically radicalized. Only a small fraction of the population will escalate through the radicalization phases to extremism and perform acts of violence.[151] The crux pertains to the fact that the internet provides a venue for individuals to be exposed and thereafter engage with like-minded individuals. Therefore, a contributing factor to the socialization into radical or extremist mindset can begin with the online space acting as an awareness tool. The internet as a factor pertains to the reality that information is omnipresent regardless of the validity and can be obtained through websites, online videos, or forums with message boards and chat rooms. In many respects, the internet is making the world a smaller place by connecting individuals globally. However, the volume of hateful content is not confined to borders, as a violent radical ideology and the messaging can be viewed/broadcasted instantaneously and regardless of an individual's location.[152]

Summary

A single factor rarely fuels an individual's motivation for radicalizing and conducting hateful violent acts. In general, several variables combined will pull the individual towards the path to violence. Notwithstanding the factors recognized in this Chapter, research has identified distinct areas that either contribute or negate the progression of radicalization to violence pending the level of association. In addition, the causal relationship between online and offline space is unclear. However, if an individual espouses to disconnect from the real world and their social connections, the online space could fill a void enabling an individual to search for content or a connection that may cause him/her to proceed down a troubling path.

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[151] Borum, Randy. "Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research."…, 39.
[152] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. "The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes."…, 3.

In many respects, the CAF represents an institution that is founded on kinship and provides an environment conducive for strengthening relations. The military framework should, in theory, help negate hateful conduct and any form of radicalization. Unfortunately, despite being involved in an institution that entails some form of indoctrination/socialization with its own sub-culture – CAF members are still vulnerable to radicalization and are lured to various hate groups. That said, it is also difficult to quantify how many people were enrolled with predisposing beliefs that are on the spectrum of extremism and hateful conduct. With that, it is possible that the military framework of inclusion through camaraderie in conjunction with diversity through deployments may have helped to de-radicalize some individuals.[153]

The next Chapter will focus on the RWE groups and CAF affiliation. The intent is to provide background information and to make correlations with the radicalization factors identified in this Chapter. The next Chapter will also examine security and the recruiting process to understand the mechanism for pre-screening of hateful conduct and radicalism in applicants.

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[153] Gartenstein-Ross *et al.* "'Like a Drop of Cyanide': A Strategic Framework for Addressing Hateful Conduct and Radicalization in the Canadian Armed Forces."…, 15.

CHAPTER 5 – HATE GROUPS IN THE CAF & PRELIMINARY SCREENINGS

I am not afraid to speak out about the atrocities that whites and people of European descent face not only here in this country but in Western nations across the world. The war against whites, and Europeans and Western society is very real and it's time we all started talking about it and stopped worrying about political correctness and optics.

– Kyle Chapman, *Founder Fraternal Order of the Alt-Knights*

When examining instances of domestic radicalization, Canada has a history of violent extremism. The extremism spans across a diverse spectrum that includes examples like the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ), the Air India bombing, and the Ontario terrorist plot known as the "Toronto 18." In addition, there have been multiple instances of radicalized "lone-wolf" attacks. In 1989, a gunman opened fire at école Polytechnique in Montreal, targeting and killing 14 women. In 2017, Alexandre Bissonette targeted Muslims at a Quebec City Mosque, killing six. In 2018, Alek Minassian drove a van through Toronto's streets with the intent of targeting women. His carnage left ten people dead. In 2020, a Nova Scotia man with a history of violence and extremist political views went on a rampage killing 18 people. While open-sourced information provides context on RVE, it is important to note that CSIS is currently monitoring hundreds of national security threats that are deemed subjects-of-interest as they have been identified as being radicalized.[154] As indicated in the previous Chapters, quantitative and qualitative data indicate that radicalization and hate is more pervasive than the numbers show.

In the Canadian Military Police report titled *White Supremacy, Hate Groups, and Racism in The Canadian Armed Forces,* it was identified that CAF members were associated with several radical hate organizations. The report indicated that CAF affiliation with hate groups represented only 0.1 percent, a very small fraction of the military population.[155] The report also

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[154] Canadian Association of Chief of Police. "Building Community Resilience to Violent Ideologies."…, 7.
[155] Military Police Criminal Intelligence Program. "WHITE SUPREMACY, HATE GROUPS, AND RACISM IN THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES."…, 6.

deducted that "hate groups [do not] pose a significant threat against the CAF/DND."[156] Of note, since the release of the report, the GoC has added new groups to the *Criminal Code* list of terrorist entities. On February 3rd, 2021, the GoC added 13 new groups to the list of terrorist entities, including: *The Atomwaffen Division*, *The Base*, and the *Proud Boys*.[157] Of significance pertains to the fact that these three hate groups were identified in the military police report indicating CAF member representation.

Labelling an IMVE domestic group as a terrorist entity is a significant step towards countering the hate groups. Some experts contend that legislation is weak regarding hate speech and actions against hate groups in Canada. Barbara Perry argues that law enforcement historically separated/differentiated hate groups from extremist groups. Terrorist groups were predominantly identified as militant Islamist groups; however, Perry holds that alt-right groups should be classified as terrorists as well.[158] The designation of a terrorist entity illustrates the significance of a threat RWE group pose domestically.

Gartenstein-Ross *et al.'s* Strategic Framework for addressing Hateful Conduct and Radicalization in the Canadian Armed Forces calls to attention the pernicious effect of radicalism from within. The report highlights an excerpt from The New York Times in 2019 by Carter F. Smith, a professor of criminal justice with 30 years of experience as an army criminal investigator. When referring to the impact of radical extremism within the military, Carter stated in the article, "Well, the numbers might be small, but they are like a drop of cyanide in your

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[156] *Ibid*.

[157] Government of Canada. "Government of Canada Lists 13 New Groups as Terrorist Entities and Completes Review of Seven Others." Public Safety Canada, February 3, 2021. https://www.canada.ca/en/public-safety-canada/news/2021/02/government-of-canada-lists-13-new-groups-as-terrorist-entities-and-completes-review-of-seven-others.html.

[158] Habib, Jacky. "Far-Right Extremist Groups and Hate Crime Rates Are Growing in Canada."

drink. They can do a lot of damage."[159] This Chapter will provide background information on some of the hate groups identified in the military police criminal intelligence report, including CAF members affiliations. The examples will provide a correlation with the factors of radicalization as identified in the previous Chapter. After providing an overview, analysis will be presented on the Canadian Forces screening process regarding entry of recruits. The recruiting and screening process is essential in selecting the right individual with the skills necessary to satisfy a requirement within the military. Although the aforementioned percentage of CAF affiliation with hate groups is low, it should be noted that given that many members of hate groups conceal their connections, the CAF's recorded figures are most likely an underestimation. Providing specific open-source accounts of RWE within the CAF illustrates the range of how hateful conduct and radicalism can be damaging to the CAF's reputation/credibility and, most importantly, national security.

Examples of Hate Groups in the CAF

    Proud Boys: During the last few years, the *Proud Boys* have established themselves as the primary group when referring to the alt-lite. The group is open regarding its ideology and being misogynistic, Islamophobic, transphobic and anti-immigration.[160] Labeled as an extremist conservative group that oppose progressive politics, the group's beliefs and antics attracts white supremacists. The tactics of the *Proud Boys* entail confrontation and violence through public rallies and protests.[161] The group was created by the Canadian Vice Media founder and

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[159] Philipps, Dave. "White Supremacism in the U.S. Military, Explained." The New York Times, February 27, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/27/us/military-white-nationalists-extremists.html; Chrisinger, David. "White Supremacy in the Military 'Like a Drop of Cyanide in Your Drink.'" The War Horse, November 23, 2020. https://thewarhorse.org/the-invisible-reach-of-white-supremacy/; Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed, Robin O'Luanaigh, and David Jones. "'Like a Drop of Cyanide': A Strategic Framework for Addressing Hateful Conduct and Radicalization in the Canadian Armed Forces."…, 11.

[160] Anti-Defamation League. "Proud Boys." Accessed March 16, 2021. https://www.adl.org/proudboys.

[161] *Ibid*.

outspoken right-wing political pundit, Gavin McInnes. The *Proud Boys* Canadian Chapter

describe themselves as a "fraternal organization of Western Chauvinists who will no longer

apologize for creating the modern world."[162] The group's raison d'être involves attracting media

attention by disrupting events in order to protect extreme right-wing views. McInnes was even

quoted justifying the use of violence as a means to protect the perceived threat. Regarding

clashes with *Antifa*, he stated, "Violence doesn't feel good, justified violence feels great, and

fighting solves everything."[163] Of note, this group has received mainstream attention with the

President of the United States (POTUS), Donald Trump. The President was reluctant on several

occasions to denounce the *Proud Boys* ideology and the group's confrontational actions. In the

wake of the *Black Lives Matter* protest, Trump was infamously quoted directing the *Proud Boys*,

stating, "Stand back and stand by."[164] The President's statement to the *Proud Boys* can be

interpreted as a rallying cry encouraging the RWE group to use violence in achieving the desired

result.

Concerning CAF affiliation with the *Proud Boys*. An event that attracted media attention

occurred in 2017 when navy sailors disrupted an indigenous rally at the Cornwallis Statue in

downtown Halifax. The sailors claimed to be connected with the *Proud Boys*. The confrontation

in Halifax was indicative of a resurgence in xenophobic and violent extremist activity in Canada.

Following the Halifax incident, the sailors were placed on probation yet allowed to continue to

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[162] As It Happens. "Who Are the Proud Boys Who Disrupted an Indigenous Event on Canada Day? ." CBCnews. CBC/Radio Canada, July 7, 2017. https://www.cbc.ca/radio/asithappens/as-it-happens-tuesday-edition-1.4189447/who-are-the-proud-boys-who-disrupted-an-indigenous-event-on-canada-day-1.4189450.

[163] ABC News. "Proud Boys Founder Denies Inciting Violence, Responds to Whether He Feels Responsible for Group's Behavior." ABC News Network, December 12, 2018. https://abcnews.go.com/US/proud-boys-founder-denies-inciting-violence-responds-feels/story?id=59758209.

[164] Hawkins, Derek, Cleve Wootson, and Craig Timberg. "Trump's 'Stand by' Remark Puts the Proud Boys in the Spotlight." The Washington Post, October 1, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/09/30/proudboys1001/.

serve. Based on the CAF's handling of the situation, the *Proud Boys* Canadian Chapters released the following statement, "We win, our brothers the Halifax 5 are returning to active military duty with no charges, let the SJW [social justice warrior] tears pour. Proud of our boys."[165] Due to the Halifax incident, the CAF stated, "any action by a Canadian Armed Forces member (in uniform or not) that demonstrates intolerance or shows disrespect towards the people and cultures we value in Canada is completely unacceptable."[166] The *Proud Boy* Canadian Chapters had previously been viewed as a disorganized group. However, the fact that the GoC has designated this RWE group as a terrorist entity implies that the threat they pose is real and significant.

La Meute: The group's English translation is *The Pack*, and was founded by former CAF members in 2015.[167] The group originated in Quebec and has far-right political views. The group's evolution coincides with the arrival of Syrian refugees to Canada. Its anti-immigration and anti-Islamic rhetoric forms the foundation of their ideology and messaging. Eric Venne is a retired war veteran who served in Afghanistan and is a founding member of *La Meute*. He has openly stated that the organization was created to defend "our land, our values, our tenets, our freedom, our security, and our children's future from Islamic invasion."[168] The group is known for organizing anti-immigration protest and has focused its fight against illegal immigration including asylum seekers crossing the Quebec border.

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[165] McMillan , Elizabeth. "Military Personnel in Proud Boys Incident Return to Regular Duty." CBCnews, September 1, 2017. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/military-personnel-proud-boy-s-incident-jobs-1.4269952.

[166] Davey et al., "An Online Environmental Scan of Right-Wing Extremism in Canada"…, 9.

[167] Montpetit, Jonathan. "Inside Quebec's Far Right: A Secretive Online Group Steps into the Real World | CBC News." CBCnews, December 14, 2016. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/quebec-far-right-la-meute-1.3876225.

[168] Montreal Antifasciste Info. "La Meute."Accessed February 10, 2021. https://montreal-antifasciste.info/en/la-meute-2/.

La Meute's popularity is indicative with the fact that at one point, in less than a year, it

attracted more than 43,000 people to their Facebook page.[169] An element that was unearthed with

this group involves an investigation conducted by Radio Canada that found that roughly 75

members attached to *La Meute's* Facebook page are currently serving in the CAF.[170] Some of

those serving CAF members were even wearing military uniforms in the images online. CAF

members being associated with *La Meute* does not surprise Maxime Fiset, a former neo-nazi

currently working for the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence.[171]

Fiset asserts that some members' contributing factor regarding holding Islamophobic thoughts

correlates to CAF members' deployments and experience in Afghanistan.[172] This event could act

as a motivating factor in generating anti-Islamic sentiments. Also, Fiset asserts that he is aware

of numerous military members being affiliated with the RWE groups. The members are

inconspicuous, as they do not want to display any indication of affiliation, knowing that the

leadership and Chain of Command may take a hard line with such conduct and behaviour.[173]

Therefore, members are serving in secrecy with their radical right-wing beliefs. What raises

concern for Fiset pertains to the fact that an organization like *La Meute* is acting as a radicalizing

agent.[174] Like other hate groups, *La Meute* encourages members with similar

experiences/backgrounds to join them. They also promote members to attain at a minimum

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[169] *Ibid*.
[170] *Ibid*.
[171] CBC News. "'We Have to Be Neutral': Canadian Forces Warn Members Linked to Radical Groups ." CBC/Radio Canada, October 4, 2017. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/quebec-military-warns-members-joining-groups-la-meute-1.4327085.
[172] *Ibid*.
[173] *Ibid*.
[174] *Ibid*.

reservist training so that they can bring critical military skills (e.g. weapons training) back to the movement.[175]

The Base: The Base is a radical neo-Nazi group that was formed in 2018. The group aims to create a nationwide network of citizens who feel that violence can be used to overturn the current social and political order. *The Base* believes in a race war and that non-whites are the enemy. Embracing Hitlerian ideology, members describe themselves as vigilante soldiers defending "a broken system that has been infected by Jewish values."[176] With a focus on self-defence, *The Base* functions under the pretense of imminent chaos, seeking membership application with individuals having skills in science and engineering and military experience. [177]

In January of 2020, the FBI arrested CAF reservist Patrick Matthews and three other men, all members of the neo-Nazi group *The Base*.[178] Matthews' was identified as a key recruiter for *The Base*. In videos seized by law enforcement, Matthews states, "...derail some f-cking trains, kill some people and poison some water supplies … If you want the white race to survive, you're going to have to do your f-cking part."[179] A statement from the FBI indicated that the criminal investigation contained information that quoted content within *The Base's* encrypted chat rooms that discussed, "recruitment, creating a white ethno-state, committing acts of violence against minority communities (including African-Americans and Jewish-Americans), the organization's military-style training camps, and ways to make improvised explosive devices."[180]

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[175] Davey et al., "An Online Environmental Scan of Right-Wing Extremism in Canada"…, 9.
[176] Anti-Defamation League. "The Base." Accessed March 16, 2021. https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/the-base.
[177] *Ibid*.
[178] Pauls, Karen, and Angela Johnston . "Ex-Reservist Patrik Mathews and Others Planned Violent Revolution, U.S. Prosecutors Say." CBCnews. CBC/Radio Canada, January 22, 2020. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/patrick-mathews-base-violent-revolution-1.5435323.
[179] *Ibid*.
[180] Breen, Kerri. "FBI Arrests Patrik Mathews, Missing Ex-Reservist from Manitoba Accused of Neo-Nazi Ties." Global News, January 24, 2020. https://globalnews.ca/news/6420266/patrik-mathews-neo-nazi-ties-fbi/.

The Canadian Forces National Counterintelligence Unit was investigating Matthews, and the member was later released from the forces in 2019. However, the fact that the member was employed with the CAF for numerous years and attempted to spread and recruit members to adopt this radical ideology begs the question of how the CAF is equipped to recognize and intervene members within the ranks that are radicalized.

Combat 18 / Iron March Web Forum: Isolation and longing for a connection have been identified as contributing factors to the radicalization process. In 2019, Boris Mihajlovic, a reservist in the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), was found to be a member of the neo-Nazi group Combat 18.[181] The Government of Canada has listed Combat 18 a terrorist entity.[182] Using the alias 'Moonlor' on web forum Iron March, Mihalovic "was an administrator and among the forum's most prolific contributors, with nearly 2,500 posts in two years."[183] Joining the CAF was a means of acquiring weapon and combat skills. Mihalovic stated online, "If there was an opportunity to get trained to be more effective in the race war — and get paid for it, any normal fascist would take it."[184] Mihalovic acknowledges that the web forum was also used as a mechanism to recruit fellow RWE that shared anti-Semitic ideology. Some of Mihajlovic online chatter involved attempting to orchestrate arms deal that included assault rifles and grenades to a French Iron March member through Croatia.[185] Mihalovic is said to have undergone a

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[181] Rocha, Roberto, and Jeff Yates. "Navy Investigating Calgary Reservist Who Encouraged Fellow Members of Neo-Nazi Web Forum to Enlist." CBCnews. CBC/Radio Canada, December 5, 2019. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/navy-reservist-iron-march-data-1.5382424.

[182] Government of Canada. "National Security | Currently Listed Entities." Public Safety Canada, June 21, 2019. https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/lstd-ntts/crrnt-lstd-ntts-en.aspx.

[183] Rocha, Roberto, and Jeff Yates. "Navy Investigating Calgary Reservist Who Encouraged Fellow Members of Neo-Nazi Web Forum to Enlist."

[184] *Ibid*.

[185] *Ibid*.

rehabilitation process, he suggests that entry into this path stemmed from isolation and longing

for kinship and wanting to be a part of something bigger.[186]

The next section in this Chapter examines the first line in defence in the military

recruiting process regarding screening applicants. Note, the screening process entails aptitude

and medical fitness testing that are quantifiable measures and are represented by a pass or fail.

However, as identified throughout the paper, the intricacies with hate and radicalization are

profound, and screening vulnerabilities in this domain is extremely complex.

Screening of CAF Recruits

In recent years, significant scrutiny has been placed on the intake of new recruits. During

recruitment, security background checks coupled with a preliminary screening conducted by

recruiters and military career counsellors are used to identify individuals affiliated with radical

extremist groups or support ideologies in contravention to the CAF's policies. However, privacy

laws protect individual rights and limit the extent in which detailed screening is conducted

including investigation/reporting. With regards to privacy laws in Canada, the aspect of

screening applicants is extremely delicate. Notwithstanding the delicate nature, processing

security clearances, remains an important step in what constitutes the CAF's first line of defence.

As stipulated in *DAOD 2006-0 Defence Security*, "all individuals who have access to DND and

CAF information and assets must have an appropriate security clearance or reliability status

before their duties begin."[187]

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[186] *Ibid*.

[187] Government of Canada. "DAOD 2006-0, Defence Security." National Defence, September 27, 2019. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/defence-administrative-orders-directives/2000-series/2006/2006-0-defence-security.html#int.

The criteria for security clearances are established in accordance with the policies outlined by the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat.[188] In order for recruits to attain a basic security clearance of reliability status, a 5-year background check is required. The processing requires verification of identity and background, educational and professional credentials, references, financial credit check, and a law enforcement inquiry that comprises a criminal record check.[189] The law enforcement inquiry not only confirms an individual's criminal record but also verifies outstanding warrants or prohibition and whether the individual is affiliated with organized crime.[190] However, security clearances do not necessitate a Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) assessment until the processing of a secret clearance and an international travel log upon processing a top-secret clearance.[191] As defined in section 2 of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, the security assessment provided by CSIS's database factors whether the applicant "has engaged, is engaged, or may engage in activities that constitute a threat to the security of Canada."[192] CSIS investigations under the auspice of identifying threats involving violent extremism within the CAF is only identified based on the request for processing secret and top-secret security clearances.[193] Enhanced reliability incorporates elements pertaining to security questionnaires and interviews that places focus on screening for radical ideology and online presence (e.g. loyalty to Canada); however, the onus is on the member regarding the accuracy of the information they divulge. The significance regarding the information an applicant divulges pertains to its truth and honesty. According to

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[188] Government of Canada. "Standard on Security Screening." Treasury Board of Canada, August 24, 2017. https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=28115#Threat_to_security_of_Canada.
[189] *Ibid.*
[190] *Ibid.*
[191] *Ibid*.
[192] *Ibid*.
[193] *Ibid.*

research conducted by ADP Screening and Selection Services, around 40 percent of applicants

falsify some information about their background/work history when it comes to employment.[194]

The interoperability between CSIS and the Federal Bureau of Instigation (FBI) enables

information-sharing and monitoring of individuals who pose a threat. Therefore under the

pretense that a members secret or top-secret security clearance is processed once enrolled and

serving, the transnational data sharing regarding individuals associated with organizations like

the *Proud Boys* or *The Base* is less likely to be identified during the application process.

The intricacies with privacy rights are also creating an added layer of complexities for

security agencies in gathering of information. For instance, recently, the Privacy Commissioner

of Canada, the Commission d'accès à l'information du Québec, the Information and Privacy

Commissioner for British Columbia, and the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Alberta

released a report on a joint investigation into the RCMP's contract with Clearview AI, Inc.[195] The

report asserts that the company violated federal and provincial laws regarding mass surveillance

of Canadians through "its indiscriminate scraping and processing of their facial images."[196]

Canadian privacy rights were violated as the AI technology collected billions of images by

scraping and using biometric identifiers without any consent.[197] Despite being open-sourced

data, the report indicated that the RCMP collection via Clearview's mass-surveillance tool was

inappropriate. In a digital era with platforms like Facebook and chat applications like WhatsApp,

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[194] Gusdorf, Myrna L. "Recruitment and Selection: Hiring the Right Person." Society for Human Resource Management, 2008.

[195] Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. "PIPEDA Report of Findings #2021-001: Joint Investigation of Clearview AI, Inc. by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, the Commission D'accès à L'information Du Québec, the Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia, and the Information Privacy Commissioner of Alberta," February 3, 2021. https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/investigations/investigations-into-businesses/2021/pipeda-2021-001/#fn1.

[196] *Ibid*.

[197] *Ibid*.

privacy rights are constantly being reviewed and assessed. In November of 2020, Bill C-11 was introduced to include parameters associated with collecting, using, and disclosing personal information online. In essence, the Bill is designed to protect an individual's personal information and provide the individual with control and security over the data contained online.[198]

David Hofmann is an assistant professor at the University of New Brunswick whose research interests include RWE in North America and terrorist radicalization. Hoffman asserts that the focal point to combating hateful conduct within the CAF is to educate all personnel on the critical indicators.[199] Regardless of the mechanism put in place to weed out individuals during the recruiting process, Hoffman asserts that "the only effective screening process, [has to occur] after they join."[200] Bernie Farber, chair of the Canadian Anti-Hate Network and an expert in RWE, studies the relationship between the military and RWE groups. With the degree of training and awareness in the topic of hate groups, Farber questions the level to which commanding officers and CAF military personnel are aware of hate indicators.[201] The extent of the unfamiliarity is represented in Farber's statement, "I don't know if a commanding officer can tell the difference in tattoos between a kolovrat and a sonnenrad."[202] This statement is significant

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[198] Parliament of Canada. "BILL C-11." Government Bill (House of Commons) C-11 (43-2) - First Reading - Digital Charter Implementation Act, 2020 . Accessed March 17, 2021. https://parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/43-2/bill/C-11/first-reading.

[199] Berthiaume, Lee. "Military Faces Calls to Train Soldiers to Identify Neo-Nazis, Hate-Group Members." CTV News, August 22, 2019. https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/military-faces-calls-to-train-soldiers-to-identify-neo-nazis-hate-group-members-1.4560275?cache=.

[200] *Ibid*.

[201] Berthiaume, Lee. "Military Faces Calls to Train Soldiers to Identify Neo-Nazis, Hate-Group Members." CTV News, August 22, 2019. https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/military-faces-calls-to-train-soldiers-to-identify-neo-nazis-hate-group-members-1.4560275?cache=.

[202] *Ibid*.

and demonstrates the potential lack of preparedness for identifying simple hate symbols/markers representing neo-Nazi groups.[203]

The analysis of screening during recruitment points to the fact that it is not 100 percent effective at weeding out hate and members vulnerable to radicalization. Recognizing that radicalization can manifest over time, Hoffman's statement regarding screening 'after they join' coupled with Farber's analyze of the CAF's lack of preparedness substantiates the premise that the CAF requires a program to address hateful conduct and radicalization for serving members.

Summary

The issue of radical violent extremism is not exclusive to the military. However, as identified in this Chapter, a CAF member's affiliation with RWE groups illustrates the harmful impact it could have on national security and on the institution. The examples of hateful conduct and violent extremism within the CAF demonstrates the range of challenges regarding preventing radical ideologies from within. The cross-section of individuals and groups reinforced many of the factors identified by Horgan in Chapter 4. For instance, *The Proud Boys* have been identified as a terrorist organization and are founded on an ideology whereby violence is strongly entrenched in their dogma. McInnes repeatedly states, "I cannot recommend violence enough. It's a really effective way to solve problems."[204] The factor of feeling isolated and yearning for kinship and social ties is indicative of *La Meute's* name. The 'pack' and sense of belonging is encapsulated in the following statement by one of the members, "We are so happy to have found each other and to talk about a subject that worries us. Otherwise we would be isolated." *The Base*

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[203] The author displayed the symbols to five (5) senior officers and not one was able to identify the images and the affiliation.

[204] Southern Poverty Law Center. "Proud Boys." Accessed March 16, 2021. https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/proud-boys.

and Matthew's plan clearly illustrates the factor of dissatisfaction with the current system to the extent that it requires chaos to ignite a race war. Matthew's justification of violence as a belief system is a necessity in order to collapse the current world order. *Combat 18* and the *Iron March Web Forum* shows the vulnerability of isolation and the void that the internet can provide regarding facilitating the radicalization process. Mihajlovic was a key contributor and connected with like-minded individuals online. Mihalovic states, "I really felt isolated at the time I became involved in those groups. My only friends were really in those [online] groups."[205]

Of note, each mainstream incident was followed by a CAF media address characterized by blanket statement indicating that the CAF has addressed the issue and that appropriated measures were taken against the individual(s). Yet, tolerance is in a way indicative with the level of punitive actions. In recent years, the Canadian military's counterintelligence department uncovered several reservists who were associated with far-right organizations; however, despite the evidence of their connections, the members were permitted to be employed within the military.[206] When faced with circumstances of this nature, it appears that the CAF continues to employ a reactive approach to handling the situation.

Regarding the intricacies with processing security screenings and privacy laws, security clearances remain an important step in the CAF's first line of defence. However, it is evident that it is impossible to identify all potential recruits holding hateful or radical beliefs. For instance, both the Toronto van perpetrator and the Dawson College shooter of 2006 were both enrolled in

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[205] Rocha, Roberto, and Jeff Yates. "Navy Investigating Calgary Reservist Who Encouraged Fellow Members of Neo-Nazi Web Forum to Enlist."

[206] David Pugliese, David. "Canadian Forces Push-Back against Proud Boys and Far Right Needs Action, Not Tweets, Critics Say." Ottawa Citizen, October 6, 2020. https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/canadian-forces-pushback-against-proud-boys-and-far-right-needs-action-not-tweets-critics-say.

the military. [207,208] Although, the members were released prior to completing basic training, the intricacies with screening candidates involves knowing that some may slip through the cracks. Knowing that radicalization and hateful conduct exist within the institution strengthens the argument for the requirement for reform and the implementation of a CAF-wide training program on the subject.

Finally, a question that begs to be answered is whether the CAF would have taken the same approach if any of the individuals were affiliated with terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda and ISIL vice RWE terrorist groups. Understanding that the radicalization process is not concentrated on a specific domain and transcends the entire spectrum, the final Chapter will examine CAF training through the implementation of a Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) using the Public Health Model. With that, the analyze will enable institutional recommendations for the CAF to effectively address radicalization and hate.

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[207] Brockbank, Nicole. "Toronto Van Attack Suspect Alek Minassian Was Quickly in and out of Canadian Forces Last Fall ." CBCnews. CBC/Radio Canada, April 24, 2018. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/alek-minassian-canadian-armed-forces-1.4633129

[208] CBCnews. "College Shooter Gill Obsessed with Guns | CBC News." CBC/Radio Canada, September 15, 2006. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/college-shooter-gill-obsessed-with-guns-1.589809.

CHAPTER 6 – RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

One thing is clear – if we're going to successfully combat violent extremism we'd better understand all of the factors because we can't change minds without knowing what's in them. And we have to do so mindful of the fact that understanding and acceptance are not the same.

– John Kerry, *US Politician & former Secretary of State*

The significance of Kerry's quote pertains to effecting change. While 'acceptance' refers to the concept of acquiescing to the reality of a situation without attempting to modify it, 'understanding' is more profound and pertains to the thought process and implementing concepts to deal with the situation/environment. In order to educate and train military personnel on hateful conduct, the CAF has recently released the following clarifying directive – *CF Mil Pers Instruction 01/20.* The directive stipulates that Commanding Officers or their delegates are responsible for executing an educational program addressing hateful conduct using the resources produced by the Director of the Defence Ethics Program.[209] This training is to be conducted on an annual basis. The aim and training objectives include:

a. *Increase awareness of what behaviours constitute hateful conduct and possible warning signs;*

b. *Promote discussion of any hateful conduct or conflict situations that may occur;*

c. *Promote positive behaviours that are in line with Duty with Honour: the Profession of Arms in Canada;*

d. *Instruct CAF members on their responsibilities under this instruction;*

e. *Identify ways of resolving conflicts where hateful conduct may be involved; and*

f. *How to access resources.*[210]

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[209] Government of Canada. "CF Mil Pers Instruction 01/20 – Hateful Conduct." Department of National Defence, July 10, 2020, 5.
[210] *Ibid.*, 5-6.

The CAF has acknowledged its institutional failures regarding hateful conduct. Although policies/directives have been updated, the institution must continue to be proactive regarding tackling the issue(s). In order to promote the desired behaviour/conduct, cultural change must be in line with an organization's mission and core intent, which entails inclusivity and diversity. These critical practices are essential and are clearly articulated regarding the representation of the CAF's future to achieve the desired effective change.[211] In order to help prevent/detect hateful conduct that is incompatible with the military ethos, the CAF must enable members with the tools to tackle the problem. CAF leaders and members should be able to routinely say 'YES' to the following two questions:

1. Do CAF members and Commanding Officers have adequate training in recognizing behaviour, symbols, rhetoric, and other indicators associated with the manifestation of hateful conduct to radical extremism?

2. Are CAF members provided with training on prohibited conduct and the process for reporting and seeking help?

Understanding that the CAF has implemented a 'new' training program on hateful conduct, the following Chapter will highlight aspects of the Countering Violent Extremist (CVE) Public Health Model. The intent is to identify areas in which the CAF can leverage and improve in order to combat radicalism and hateful conduct within the institution. The CVE analysis will be followed by recommendations designed to increase the effectiveness of the system currently in place.

Countering Violent Extremism

In 2014, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) under resolution 2178 highlighted the necessity for countries to act regarding preventing violent extremisms and advocated for the

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[211] Government of Canada. "Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy."…, 12.

implementation of CVE as a mechanism.[212] The CVE concept is centered on consolidated

government programs, education, and community involvement, with a focal point placed on

resiliency and intervention.[213] The CVE model employs various measures aimed at prevention by

developing individuals' resilience by raising awareness through training, therefore discrediting

the radical extremist narrative.[214]

Primary CVE Public Health Model

The 'primary' CVE public health model is centered on awareness and training and is the

level that the CAF needs to allocate resources in order to ensure proper education fostering

resiliency. By implementing prevention training, the CAF will educate its members on violent

extremism and hateful conduct and thus create an environment aimed at eliminating conditions

that encourage or promotes attitudes and behaviours that lead to an escalation in hatred and

radicalism. It should be noted that a key element supplementing training and awareness pertains

to CAF initiating dialogue and cooperation with multi-agency intervention programs. As part of

Canada's National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence, "multi-agency

intervention programs bring together a multitude of sectors including police, health and social

services and education, to assess an individual's needs and determine the form of intervention

required."[215] As indicated in the strategy, the partnership of the combined entities provides for a

better-equipped system addressing the vulnerabilities that cause an individual to gravitate

towards hate and transition to violent extremism. Therefore, the key to success regarding the

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[212] United Nations. "Countering Violent Extremism." Security Council Counter Terrorism Committee, Accessed November 20, 2021. https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/focus-areas/countering-violent-extremism/.

[213] *Ibid*.

[214] European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU's Response (Brussels, Belgium: European Commission, January 15, 2014).

[215] Government of Canada. "National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence."…, 33.

multi-agency domain pertains to collaboration in order to create a robust program that is capable of "addressing a given individual's range of needs, vulnerabilities and risks [...] redirect them away from violent extremism before it occurs."[216] In addition, to achieve success, community involvement and input are critical in order to isolate circumstances and thereafter facilitate the development of a curriculum and training program tailored towards open-dialogue and discussing what may constitute legitimate and illegitimate grievances.

Secondary CVE Public Health Model

The secondary level is designed for members on the fringe expressing or displaying extreme views, which may escalate to violent behaviour.[217] In this stage, intervention is required as the member are identified as being on the periphery of a hate group or potentially contemplating joining or have joined yet have not fully engaged in the ideological construct.[218] Early intervention places focus on the members deemed 'at risk' to facilitate disengagement from an extremist ideological path. It is important to note that the secondary programs are more tailored for specialists through an intervention that may be voluntary or planned without the member's knowledge.[219] Harris-Hogan et al. identify Norway's Action Plan against Radicalization and Violent Extremism, and the 'Empowerment Conversation' has achieved notable success amongst right-wing extremist youth.[220] It is important to note that a key element in the empowerment conversation model pertains to open dialogue, understanding, and trust.[221]

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[216] *Ibid.*, 34.

[217] Harris-Hogan, Shandon, Kate Barrelle, and Andrew Zammit. "What is Countering Violent Extremism? Exploring CVE Policy and Practice in Australia." Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 8, no. 1 (2016), 10.

[218] *Ibid.*, 10-11.

[219] *Ibid.*

[220] *Ibid.*

[221] European Commission. "A Guide to Police Empowerment Conversations (in Norwegian: Bekymringssamtale)." Migration and Home Affairs - Radicalization Awareness Network, December 11, 2018. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/node/7418_en.

Therefore, creating a venue to understand the grievance or problem is essential to changing the aspects such as intolerance and hatred. The conversation consists of active listening, providing clarifications and summaries. Proper training enables the 'preventative officers' to engage in a semi-scripted dialogue with structured procedures that discuss the member's behaviour and future consequences.[222] The purpose is not punitive but designed to identify and re-orient the member. Bjørgo and Carlsson's research on 'Early Intervention with Violent and Racist Youth Groups' indicates that the training on empowerment conversations should be expanded to include other professionals.[223] Law enforcement agencies are even suggesting that the techniques be applied more generally.[224]

Conceptual Application of the Training

Analyzing *Canada's National Strategy on Countering Radicalization to Violence,* for the CAF to adequately deal with hateful conduct and its manifestation to radical extremism, the application of the CVE's public health model's primary and secondary levels are necessary. As illustrated in Figure 6.1 below, the pyramid indicates the stages requiring interventions and preventative programs. In general, the 'Tier 1' base programs' is devised to inform and confront the topic at large. The main mechanism in countering the hateful ideologies would pertain to awareness campaigns aimed at a general audience with the foundation focusing on prevention. The secondary level encompasses early intervention through detection and is concentrated on a specific individual or group exhibiting problematic behaviour. To be subjected to the secondary level of interventions, the member(s) must present signs or symptoms. Finally, tertiary entails a

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[222] Harris-Hogan et al., "What is Countering Violent Extremism? Exploring CVE Policy and Practice in Australia."…, 11.

[223] Bjørgo, Tore, and Yngve Carlsson. "Early Intervention with Violent and Racist Youth Groups." Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. No. 677 – 2005, 70.

[224] *Ibid*.

member indoctrinated to radicalization and extremism and requiring physical intervention escalation towards the pinnacle to include the criminal justice system.

Figure 6.1 – The Intervention Pyramid

Source: Canadian Association of Chief of Police. "Building Community Resilience to Violent Ideologies."…, 7.

Table 6.1 below is a synthesis of the CAF's current intervention framework with Annex A – Escalation of Conduct and Escalation of Response. The framework mirrors in many respects the aforementioned CVE model and is separated into three (3) levels or categories: *Prevent, Detect, and Respond*. The significance in the analysis of the CVE *Public Health Model*, the CAF *Intervention Framework,* and the *Intervention Pyramid* pertains to the premise that prevention is first concentrated on the broader community. Throughout the paper, this notion of 'targeting' the general population has been consistent. Helfstein's model and the pathways

emphasized that awareness was required in order to radicalize. In order to counter an individual

belief system, an awareness campaign is required to combat that narrative. In order to illustrate

the effect of the radicalization continuum, Helfstein's model was further modified, depicting the

significance of the pathways and their impact on a given population. With that, to 'prevent' an

individual from progressing along the continuum, a link requires to be broken. Breaking the link

early on and in the general population prevents and diminishes the total number of individuals

who will require secondary and tertiary intervention. The criticality of early intervention through

training and awareness campaigns will counter the possibility of an escalation of radicalization to

its pinnacle of violent extremism.

Table 6.1 – Intervention Framework

Primary Intervention	Secondary Intervention	Tertiary Intervention
Prevent	Detect	Respond
Delivering a CAF-wide education and training program on hateful conduct	Identify vulnerable individuals and provide the required support (e.g. counselling, administrative and disciplinary measure)	Identify and proceed with appropriate actions against individuals that display or conduct alarming behaviour. Actions include referrals to security services, law enforcement, investigation, administrative action, professional counselling and social reintegration efforts

Source: Government of Canada. "CF Mil Pers Instruction 01/20 – Hateful Conduct."…, 3 &14.

Based on trend analysis and the evidence provided in the paper, hate and radicalism are

prevalent within Canadian society. The rise in RWE groups in Canada coupled with the research

on Canadian's being a principal contributor to RWE content online requires the CAF to be

proactive in implementing effective prevention efforts. The next section in this Chapter will

provide recommendations regarding augmenting the current policies to counter hateful conduct.

The recommendations were generated based on the systematic analysis of the information contained in the research.

RECOMMENDATION

The information contained in *CF Mil Pers Instruction 01/20* provides a coherent and logical framework. The directive clearly defines hateful conduct, education and training, incident reporting, guiding actions, tracking, and delineates various levels of responsibilities. Based on the information contained in this research paper, in order to improve the efficacy in combatting hateful conduct and radicalization within the institution, the following elements are highly recommended:

1. *CF Mil Pers Instruction 01/20* stipulates that hateful conduct training must be delivered annually. However, it should emphasize that education and dialogue on hateful conduct are continuous and not limited to a scheduled training. Conversations on the topic should incorporate up-to-date events/ grievances and are to be discussed routinely by command and leadership and not just during a yearly training session (e.g. proverbial check-in-the-box).

2. The efficacy regarding the responsibility of primary training falling on the Commanding Officer should be further examined. For instance, the *Mental Fitness and Suicide Awareness Training* is a critical course that focuses on a CAF member's mental state, work/life stressors, techniques for dealing and recognizing depression/thoughts of suicide, and includes Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Operational Stress Injuries (OSI). The course provides proper techniques for copping and identifying indicators observed within and in others. Another course, *Respect in The CAF Workshop*, creates a venue conducive for open-dialogue

regarding what constitutes appropriate and inappropriate behaviour and was introduced as means to discuss sexual misconduct/harassment in and outside the workplace. The course also provides information and accountability regarding the concept of bystander intervention. The two (2) courses and their delivery fall under the responsibility of the Canadian Forces Morale and Welfare Services (CFMWS). The course content is well designed and lead by trained professionals (e.g. social workers). The intricacies regarding these topics, coupled with sensitive nature, necessitate a certified professional. Due to the complexity of radicalization and hateful conduct, the training should fall under the same classification. Commanding Officers play a key role in setting the example, maintaining open-dialogue, and creating an environment based on cohesion and respect. The Commanding Officer's primary responsibility should not be identified as the delivery of the training in question. The Commanding Officer primary responsibility is to ensure that the Unit/Squadron has received the training and understands the significance of its content. In that, the Commanding Officer's primary responsibility is to ensure that personnel under their command adhere to the dignity of human rights and the creed of the Canadian Military ethos.

3. Experts in the field should provide regular assistance with relevant information regarding identifying the signs and symbols and strategies for dealing with hate and radicalization. The incorporation of 'Empowerment Conversation' should be included as part of the training. Scholars Harris-Hogan et al. also identify the significance of delivering the messaging from former extremists enabling an increase in

credibility.[225] By incorporating former radical extremists in training programs, the

content becomes legitimized as the critical lens is amplified with personal accounts

and experience identifying first-person fallacies in the extremist ideologies. Using

former violent extremists and family members to deliver messaging illustrates the

significance of hate groups and enables an understanding of the possibilities of

exiting and embracing tolerance. As indicated by Gartenstein-Ross *et al*., the training

should incorporate consultation and execution by specialists in the field, such as

Quebec's Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence, Life After

Hate, the Organization for the Prevention of Violence (OPV).[226]

4. Based on the lessons learned from SHARP training, in order to achieve the desired

effect/outcome, the messaging and delivery must not be patronizing. It must maintain

a high level of significance regarding institutional expectations while avoiding one-

sided tutorial/lecture formats. At no point should the training be perceived as

burdensome or deemed irrelevant by CAF members. Any negative stigma with the

training would create an adverse effect signifying the institution's dismissiveness and,

by default, tolerance for the hateful conduct.

The recommendations above are based on an analysis of the historical context of

racism/hate in the CAF, research on radicalization as a process, and the common factors

contributing to radicalization. Note, within the current policy framework of *CF Mil Pers

Instruction 01/20,* there is not a single part of the instruction where radicalization is mentioned.

Recall scholars have identified that hateful conduct and radicalization are distinct; however,

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[225] Harris-Hogan *et al*. "What is Countering Violent Extremism? Exploring CVE Policy and Practice in Australia."…, 12.

[226] Gartenstein-Ross *et al*. "'Like a Drop of Cyanide': A Strategic Framework for Addressing Hateful Conduct and Radicalization in the Canadian Armed Forces."…, 18.

radicalization is an extreme manifestation of hateful conduct. These recommendations enable the institution with a process of prevention of hateful conduct along the radicalization continuum. Finally, this framework emphasizes 'awareness' through training using a CAF-wide approach with messaging delivered by experts, enabling members with tools to combat hate and extremism.

CONCLUSION

The numerous research studies and reports indicated that there has been a significant increase in hateful conduct centered on ideologies that are xenophobic, Islamophobic, anti-Semitic, misogynistic, homophobic, sexist, to name a few. The individuals and hate groups' rhetoric is cultivating radicalization to violence, and it is considered a real threat to western societies. Furthermore, the military is an institution that these radical hate groups explicitly seek. The lethality of radical extremists joining the military pertains to the impact of having a threat from within and the potential for individuals to undermine Canada's national security. In addition, hateful conduct discredits the institution, ultimately affecting morale, disciple, and cohesion.[227]

This paper provided context on why the CAF has updated its definition and is committed in tackling hateful conduct, as well as recommendations that could assist the CAF in achieving its aims regarding reducing radicalization inside the organization. Institutional leaders have admitted that there is a problem, Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) Vice Admiral Baines stated,

> …in the 21st century, it is mind-boggling that we are still having to deal with unacceptable sexual misconduct, still having to deal with hateful conduct, still having to deal with systemic racism and misogyny, still having to educate people

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[227] Government of Canada. "CF Mil Pers Instruction 01/20 – Hateful Conduct."…, 2.

on the requirements for respectful conduct — it is the world in which we find ourselves.[228]

The level of complexity regarding understanding radicalization and hate is profound. The paper included research on hate focusing on the radicalization process to understand grievances using two separate models. Using Borum's "it's not right" process or Helfstein's "awareness" framework help conceptualize how hate can smolder and ignite into extreme violence. Certain common factors emerged through an assessment and application of the escalation of the radicalization to the violence continuum. The intent regarding identifying these factors was to contextualizes and understand the key areas that influence individuals towards hate groups. Information/knowledge is power, and the internet is shifting in some cases, the narrative contributing to the radicalization process and hateful conduct.

Finally, it is important that the CAF prevent and detect the threat of hateful conduct within the institution. Although the numbers regarding hate group affiliation appear to be insignificant within the CAF, the gravity of their effect is immense. The military cannot afford to be complacent with dealing with the issue. In order to accomplish this task, the CAF must routinely engage in dialogue and denounce any/all hateful conduct. Leadership must set a precedent and effectively counteract any/all acts that are counterintuitive to the good order and discipline that is representative of military professionalism.

While *CF Mil Pers Instruction 01/20* provides a proper framework, it is recommended that CAF collaborate and engage in a multi-agency domain that encompasses the greater community-increasing resiliency. Education and training are the foundation (Tier 1) and should

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[228] Brewster, Murray. "Armed Forces Commanders Signal Hard Line against Racism and Sexual Violence in the Ranks | CBC News." CBC/Radio Canada, January 12, 2021. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/mcdonald-baines-sexism-racism-armed-forces-1.5870656.

be implemented through a continual process/discussions incorporating delivery by experts in the field of study.

The lens placed on a military member has significant consequences on the institution. Vice-Admiral Haydn Edmundson, commander of Military Personnel Command, stated, "Any instance of misconduct by a member diminishes our authority as a force for good in Canadian society, and around the world."[229] This statement personifies the impact that hateful conduct and radicalism within the ranks has on the CAF. Hateful conduct and RWE discredits the institution and is incompatible with the CAF's military ethos as described in *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada.*

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[229] Russell, Andrew. "Canadian Armed Forces Creates 'Hateful Conduct' Policy to Combat Extremism in Its Ranks." Global News, July 15, 2020. https://globalnews.ca/news/7180617/canadian-armed-forces-hateful-conduct-policy-extremism/.

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APPENDIX – Escalation of Conduct and Escalation of Response