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## Canadian Armed Forces Capacity Building and a Whole-of-Government Approach

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**JCSP 47**

**Master of Defence Studies**

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**PCEMI 47**

**Maîtrise en études de la défense**

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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

JCSP 47 – PCEMI 47

2020 – 2021

MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES – MAÎTRISE EN ÉTUDES DE LA DÉFENSE

## **CANADIAN ARMED FORCES CAPACITY BUILDING AND A WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH**

By Major Michael Selberg

*“This paper was written by a candidate attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.”*

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## ABSTRACT

Over the last two decades there has been a significant shift in doctrine terminology and policy by Western military and governments regarding partner nation capability development. How can the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and Government of Canada maximize our effectiveness when conducting expeditionary Capacity Building (CB) operations?

This paper looks to offer recommendations to better serve the CAF and the manner in which it conducts CB operations by doctrinal analysis and case study. It argues that while the GoC has established CB policies, we have missed opportunities for inter-departmental synergy and in doing so have taken too much time delivering capacity. Starting with an analysis of CB as a military task and examination of CB doctrines from the US, UK and Canada, the analysis leads to identifiable strengths and challenges. Finally, by conducting a case analysis of infrastructure and/or equipment donation projects, this process will illuminate best practices and opportunities for change. These projects include the Jordan/Syria northern border road, Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) female accommodations buildings project, JAF Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) radio project and the Iraq de-mining equipment proposal.

Throughout the course of this research, there was an identification for significant interoperability between civil-military and inter-departmental cooperation; this can be tied directly to emotional intelligence. It also examined the increased integration/employment of CAF reserve personnel into CB and how to grow interoperability through exposure/interaction with our other departmental partners and civilian counterparts. Through the case studies, it identified that if program mis-alignment or contradictory legal authorities are present the entire process can be de-railed, adding risk to the mission, institution and international perception of the GoC. Finally, it offers avenues to minimize inter-departmental bureaucracy during project analysis, design and approval.

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

American, British and Canadian (ABC)  
 Anti-Crime Capacity Building Program (ACCBP)

British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT)  
 British Peace Support Team (BPST)  
 Build Partner Capacity (BPC)

Canadian Armed Forces (CAF)  
 Canadian Army (CA)  
 Canadian Dollar (CAD)  
 Capacity Building (CB)  
 Canadian Defence Attaché (CDA)  
 Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)  
 Canadian Training Assistance Team – Jordan (CTAT-J)  
 Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)  
 Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE)  
 Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF)  
 Counter Terrorism Capacity Building Program (CTCBP)

Defence Research and Development Canada (DRCD)  
 Department of Defence (DoD)  
 Department for International Development (DfID)  
 Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD)  
 Department of National Defence (DND)  
 Directorate of Building Partnership Capacity (DBPC)  
 Directorate of Military Training and Cooperation (DMTC)  
 Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)

Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)

Five Eyes (FVEY)  
 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)  
 Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO)  
 Foreign Military Funding (FMF)  
 Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

Global Affairs Canada (GAC)  
 Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF)  
 Government of Canada (GoC)  
 Government Partnership International (GPI)  
 Gross Domestic Product (GDP)  
 Ground Component Commanders (GCC)

Head of Mission (HoM)  
 Host Nation (HN)

International Military Advisory Training Team (IMATT)  
International Organization for Migration (IOM)

Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC)  
Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF)

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)  
Military Training and Cooperation Programme (MTCP)  
Ministry of Defence (MoD)

National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA)  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)  
NATO Mission in Iraq (NMI)  
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO)

Other Departmental Agency (ODA)  
Office for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)  
Other Governmental Agencies (OGA)  
Other Governmental Departments (OGD)  
Overseas Development Ministry (ODM)

Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOP)

Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF)  
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)

Security Sector Reform (SSR)  
Special Operations Forces (SOF)  
Stability Operations (STABOPS)  
Stabilization Unit (SU)  
Strategic Joint Staff (SJS)  
Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE)

Whole of Government (WoG)

United Kingdom (UK)  
United Nations (UN)  
United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)  
United States (US)  
United States Code (USC)  
United States Dollar (USD)  
US Agency for International Development (USAID)

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract .....	i
List of Abbreviations .....	ii
Table of Contents .....	iv
List of Tables and Figures .....	v
Introduction .....	1
Build Partner Capacity as a Military Task .....	5
Current BPC Approaches .....	16
Canadian Doctrine .....	16
United States Doctrine .....	31
United Kingdom Doctrine .....	43
Capacity Building Challenges and Observations .....	56
Case Analysis .....	63
Jordan/Syria Northern Border Road .....	63
Jordanian Armed Forces Joint Terminal Attack Controller Program .....	68
Combined Joint Task Force Inherent Resolve/NATO Mission Iraq De-Mining Equipment .....	69
Jordanian Armed Forces Female Accommodations Buildings Projects .....	70
Recommendations .....	72
Conclusion .....	77
Bibliography .....	80

## LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1: Criteria for Judging Likely US BPC Effectiveness .....	36
Table 2: Description of Select DoD Activities That May Be Used to Build Partner Capacity .....	39
Table 3: GAC Capacity Building Programs Terms and Conditions .....	60
Figure 1 – Comprehensive Approach and Levels of Inter-Agency Integration .....	6
Figure 2 – CAF JIMP Representation .....	8
Figure 3 – Illustrative Tasks in the CB Shape-Secure-Develop Framework .....	9
Figure 4 – GAC ACCBP/CTCBP Logic Model .....	13
Figure 5 – Full Spectrum Operation and Constituent Activities and Tasks .....	20
Figure 6 – The BPC Zoo – How it Works .....	28
Figure 7 – Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction .....	34
Figure 8 – Differing Congressional and DOD Definitions of Build Partner Capacity ...	40
Figure 9 – Value for Money Illustration .....	46
Figure 10 – The Relationship Between Stabilization and Other Responses to Violent Conflict and Instability .....	47
Figure 11 – The Building Stability Framework .....	53
Figure 12 – DND Vote 10 Project Cycle .....	64

## INTRODUCTION

Over the last two decades there has been a significant shift in doctrine terminology, policy and thought process by Western military and governments regarding partner nation capability development. Shifts in the international security environment can be dramatic and consequential, driving rapid change in operational capabilities, training and equipment, thus bringing changes to defence that other government departments do not face.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, there have been increasing efforts to address these conflicts through a coordinated approach involving military, foreign policy and development actors, leading to the expansion of development into matters of conflict.<sup>2</sup> Standard military terms such as Security Sector Reform (SSR), Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), Stability Operations (STABOPS), support to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), Security Force Assistance (SFA) and/or Security Force Capacity Building (SFCB) have been amalgamized into the current North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/Five Eyes (FVEY) doctrinal term of Build Partner Capacity (BPC) or, more commonly known as Capacity Building (CB). For the purposes of this research and report, BPC and CB are interchangeable as current doctrine, given that the US has recently changed their nomenclature from CB to BPC.

How can the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and Government of Canada (GoC) maximize our effectiveness when conducting Build Partner Capacity (BPC) expeditionary operations? This is not a simple question; it is one that deserves investigation in order to provide recommendations and options to leaders and leadership within our government. Canadian

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<sup>1</sup> Fetterly, R., “Defence Business Planning in Canada” *Canadian Global Affairs Institute, Policy Perspective, October 2018, ISBN: 978-1-77397-047-9, [Defence Business Planning in Canada.pdf \(d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net\)](#)*, accessed 14 December 2020, Pg. 3

<sup>2</sup> McConnon, E., “Risk and the Security Development Nexus: The Policies of the US, the UK and Canada” *Palgrave MacMillan, Rethinking International Development Series, 2019, [Risk and the Security-Development Nexus | SpringerLink \(oclc.org\)](#)*, accessed 2 March 2021, Pg. 1



governmental policy language and departmental name change has also transitioned significantly. The latest Canadian move took place in 2015 when newly elected Prime Minister (PM) Justin Trudeau changed the 2006 amalgamation of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Department Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) into the current foreign affairs/trade/development portfolio named Global Affairs Canada (GAC).

In his 2019 mandate letter to the Minister of National Defence (MND) Harjit Sajjan, PM Trudeau outlines his priorities and expectations, including CAF deployments to Operations (Op) IMPACT, NATO Mission in Iraq (NMI), and Op UNIFIER in a non-inclusive list. He furthermore directed the MND to “expand Canadian defence cooperation and training assistance, in particular by drawing on the expertise of the Canadian Armed Forces to help other countries at greater risk.”<sup>3</sup> Op IMPACT, UNIFIER and NMI are CB missions located in contested or challenging zones; IMPACT is labelled as *Canada’s Training Mission in the Middle East*; it works directly with four nations in the area. It is part of Canada’s whole-of-government approach to the Middle East. The CAF mission is to build the military capabilities of Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, and set the conditions for their long-term success. Op IMPACT complements the work of other Canadian government agencies such as GAC and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).<sup>4</sup>

These operations can be linked to the CAF Directorate of Military Training and Cooperation (DMTC). DMTC’s is an evolving and learning institution; its modernization efforts continue to improve training delivery in line with both Canadian diplomatic and defence goals

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<sup>3</sup> Trudeau, J., “Minister of National Defence Mandate Letter” *Office of the Prime Minister, Ottawa, 13 December 2019*, [Minister of National Defence Mandate Letter | Prime Minister of Canada \(pm.gc.ca\)](https://pm.gc.ca/en/minister-of-national-defence-mandate-letter), accessed 14 January 2021

<sup>4</sup> Department of National Defence, “Operation IMPACT” *Canadian Armed Forces*, [Operation IMPACT - Canada.ca](https://www.caf.gc.ca/operation-impact), accessed 19 April 2021

and member countries' requests<sup>5</sup> and is further defined in Canada's long term defence policy *Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE)* as the CAF's core mission. Principally, it is the ability to engage in capacity building to support the security of other nations and their ability to contribute to security abroad,<sup>6</sup> and in *Canada's Future Army, Volume 1: Methodology, Perspective and Approaches* where it is clarified [that] military engagements are likely to be dominated [in the future] by other forms of military power...focused on peacebuilding (building or rebuilding state institutional capacity).<sup>7</sup>

It is important to note, that the Canadian experience while delivering CB projects has been largely positive, as is the fashion in which Global Affairs and the Department of National Defence interact conducting these operations. The team Canada approach and commitment to the objectives of our government are delivered by highly dedicated, competent and professional personnel from all parties involved.

This paper will argue that while the CAF and our other governmental departments (OGD) partners have established CB policies and procedures, we have missed opportunities for inter-departmental synergy, shared desired outcomes and in doing so have taken too much time delivering capacity to the partner nation in question. The research report starts with an analysis of CB as a military task and subsequently examines the CB doctrines of the US, UK and Canada within a whole of government (WoG) context. This analysis leads to identifiable strengths and challenges, highlighting factors that could be adopted by the CAF as a WoG undertaking.

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<sup>5</sup> Department of National Defence, "Directorate of Military Training and Cooperation (DMTC) 2018-2019 Annual Report" *Military Training and Cooperation Program, 2019*, [DGM-61119-HG2\\_DMTCAnnualReport\\_V2\\_EN.PDF \(canada.ca\)](#), accessed 11 March 2021, Pg. 3

<sup>6</sup> Government of Canada, "Strong, Secure, Engaged – Canada's Defence Policy" Department of National Defence, ISBN 978-0-660-08443-5, 2017, [Strong, Secure, Engaged. Canada's Defence Policy. \(forces.gc.ca\)](#), accessed 14 January 2021, Pg. 17

<sup>7</sup> Canadian Army, "Canada's Future Army, Volume 1: Methodology, Perspective and Approaches" *Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre, Kingston, Ontario, ISBN-978-1-100-25933-8*, 2015, Pg. 70

Finally, by conducting a case analysis of infrastructure and/or equipment donation projects that were delivered, in process or not at all, to Iraq and Kingdom of Jordan in 2019 this process will illuminate best practices and opportunities for change. Specifically, the Jordan/Syria northern border road, Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) female accommodations buildings project, JAF Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) radio project and Combined Joint Task Force Inherent Resolve/NATO Mission Iraq de-mining equipment proposal. These are concrete examples of projects, their delivery and their management by the GoC to scrutinise. By investigating the lessons learned by our CB endeavours we can offer further recommendations on BPC operations which could be immediately implemented and have strategic effect.

## BUILD PARTNER CAPACITY AS A MILITARY TASK

Amongst partner nations, America, Britain and Canada (ABC), CB is directly linked to a concept known as a WoG approach; this is common nomenclature throughout our lexicon. In Canada, this encompasses a method for stabilization and reconstruction that involves heightened cooperation between GAC and DND; each of which understand these terms slightly differently. Dr. Kim Nossal in *Security Operations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach*, describes this heightened integration as part of a Comprehensive Approach to create sustainable conditions for peace in security zones by employing multiple different resources, capabilities, and expertise in a concerted effort expanded to include issues of domestic security; this includes other Canadian governmental departments as part of the equation.<sup>8</sup> These can consist of the Privy Council Office, Immigration Canada, Transport Canada, Public Health and others.


In an expeditionary role, they include: government at all levels in the country of operation; the population of the host country; international government partners and their outlets of delivery of defence, development and diplomacy; and, the international and national non-governmental organizations are the major actors in any comprehensive approach.<sup>9</sup> Prior to our current doctrine, the CAF used a process known as Security Force Capacity Building (SFCB) as its guiding policy. It was defined as a comprehensive approach to the generation, employment, and sustainment of local, host nation (HN), or international security forces in support of a legitimate authority. [It] improves the capability and capacity of a HN or regional security

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<sup>8</sup> Rostek, M., and Gizewski, P., eds., “Security Operations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach” *Queen’s Center for International Relations, School of Policy Studies, McGill-Queen’s University Press*, 2011, Pg. 2

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, Pg. 52

organization's security forces.<sup>10</sup> Figure 1 is a representation for the integration between agencies within the comprehensive approach:



**Figure 1 – Comprehensive Approach and Levels of Inter-Agency Integration**

Source: Department of National Defence, “Canadian Army Doctrine Note (CADN) 16-01 Land Operations Doctrine – An Updated Summary” *Canadian Army, OPI: SSO Doctrine, ADC*, 2016-05-27, Pg. 8

While the WoG and comprehensive approaches in theory are similar and complimentary, not every governmental department perceives them as such. The CAF and National Defence have distinctive definitions of this approach and the groupings therein; they are known as Joint, Interagency, Multi-National, and Public (JIMP). The current Canadian Army (CA) definition of JIMP is as follows:

A domestic and foreign collaborative framework involving military elements and support organizations, other government departments and agencies (OGAs), one or more allies or coalition partners, and a variety of public elements including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), public volunteer organizations, the private sector,

<sup>10</sup> Department of National Defence, “Stability Activities and Tasks” Pg. 9-4-1

the media, commercial organizations and the citizenry, who cooperate at all levels of command to achieve shared objectives.<sup>11</sup>

Perhaps one of the easiest ways to understand the similarities and defining separation between the two would be to quantify JIMP as the tactical and operational level, whereas, the comprehensive approach as the strategic vision applied by the government.

The JIMP framework fits purposely within the mandate and construct of the Directorate of Military Training and Cooperation (DMTC) whose directive is to support Canadian diplomatic and defence goals and member countries' requests<sup>12</sup>. Within DMTC is a sub-unit identified as the Military Training and Cooperation Programme (MTCP). It is overseen by the Military Assistance Steering Committee, which is an interdepartmental body chaired by the Director General – International Security Policy with representatives from Global Affairs Canada and other federal departments.<sup>13</sup> The MTCP's directive delivers programming in support of DND's global engagement goals:

- Enhance peace support operations interoperability among Canada's partners;
- Foster and reinforce Canadian bilateral defence relations;
- Promote Canadian democratic principles, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights in the international arena; and
- Achieve influence in areas of strategic interest to Canada / Promoting Canadian strategic partnerships through delivery of capacity-building activities as a key element of defence diplomacy.<sup>14</sup>

Figure 2 illustrates the integration and representation of the CAF JIMP structures and their interaction with public/political support:


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<sup>11</sup> Ibid, Pg. 79

<sup>12</sup> Department of National Defence, "DMTC 2018-2019 Annual Report" Pg. 3

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, Pg. 7

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, Pg. 5



**Figure 2 – CAF JIMP Representation**


Source: Rostek, M., and Gizewski, P., eds., “Security Operations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach” *Queen’s Center for International Relations, School of Policy Studies, McGill-Queen’s University Press*, 2011, Pg. 78

There is growing dialogue between security professionals and academics that the role of traditional military forces will shift over the next several decades towards a more focused CB nexus. CB operations were once mainly a special operations forces (SOF) task given the small footprint and unique nature of training and diversity of qualifications of SOF teams. Danish special operations command students at the Naval Postgraduate School in California quantified some of these characteristics as having previous military experience, [a] high degree of knowledge within their field of expertise, maturity, empathy, interaction and communication skills, cultural understanding/awareness, [an] ability to teach/instruct, [and an] ability to speak the local language.<sup>15</sup> Aside from the professional competency aspect of these criteria, there is a direct link to emotional and social intelligence factors. The Oxford dictionary defines emotional intelligence as “the ability to understand your emotions and those of other people and to behave

<sup>15</sup> Andreassen, J.D., et al., “Stabilization Operations Through Military Capacity Building – Integration Between Danish Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces” *Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California, December 2016*, [Microsoft Word - 16Dec Andreassen Boesgaard Svendsen.docx \(dtic.mil\)](#), accessed 14 December 2020, Pg. 77

appropriately in different situations”<sup>16</sup>; this definition and the command of emotional quotient are directly relevant to anyone who works within a JIMP and/or CB team. Usually, these operations are made up of a relatively small footprint that requires foreign military advisors [to] have good cultural knowledge, operate with only limited support, and have a thorough understanding of the military’s role as just one element in a comprehensive approach.<sup>17</sup>

Expeditionary responses increasingly include a WoG approach that incorporate military and civilian collaboration. Such missions are characterized as a purposeful coordination of activities within a single mission area to achieve strategic objectives;<sup>18</sup> this is illustrated within the shape-secure-develop framework depicted below in Figure 3:



**Figure 3 – Illustrative Tasks in the CB Shape-Secure-Develop Framework**

Source: Andreassen, J.D., et al., “Stabilization Operations Through Military Capacity Building – Integration Between Danish Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces” *Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California, December 2016*, [Microsoft Word – 16Dec Andreassen Boesgaard Svendsen.docx \(dtic.mil\)](#), accessed 14 December 2020, Pg. 20

<sup>16</sup> Oxford Learners Dictionary, “Emotional Intelligence” *Oxford University Press*, [emotional-intelligence noun - Definition, pictures, pronunciation and usage notes | Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary at OxfordLearnersDictionaries.com](#), accessed 8 January 2021

<sup>17</sup> Andreassen, J.D., et al., Pg. xv

<sup>18</sup> Thompson, M.M., et al., “Canada’s Civil-Military Seminar: An Approach to Narrowing the Civil-Military Gap” *Armed Forces & Society 2019, Vol. 45(3) 430-451*, [Canada’s Civil-Military Seminar: An Approach to Narrowing the Civil-Military Gap \(oclc.org\)](#), accessed 14 December 2020, Pg. 430-431



These missions and their operations will vary depending on the status or scope of the campaign and the theatre. When military forces link their operations with those of other agencies, the term integrated operation may be used, [this can be] defined as an operation involving the coordinated and complementary efforts of military and non-military organizations to achieve a common goal.<sup>19</sup>

Perhaps one of the greatest challenges in CB is associated with the combination of civil-military or non-governmental organizations collaboration on projects. People do not think the same, organizations have different *raison-d'être* and mission statements. They usually have varied projected political/operational outcomes within the same ventures; these differences can bleed into opinions and reinforce stereotypes that need to be broken. A fairly common example of bias is that military members may perceive NGO workers as “flaky do-gooders,” whereas NGO members may perceive military members as “authoritarian” or “arrogant” “boys with toys.”<sup>20</sup> World renowned anthropologist and Senior Fellow at the US Institute of Peace, Dr. Donna Winslow identifies in *Strange Bedfellows: NGOs and the Military in Humanitarian Crises* five primary sources for this strained interaction which are germane to the exploration of CB within a WoG approach:

1. Organizational structure and culture;
2. Tasks and ways of accomplishing them;
3. Definitions of success and time frames;
4. Abilities to exert influence and control information; and
5. Control of resources.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Department of National Defence, “Canadian Army Doctrine Note” Pg. 6

<sup>20</sup> Rostek, M., and Gizewski, P., eds., Pg. 33

<sup>21</sup> Winslow, D., “Strange Bedfellows: NGOs and the Military in Humanitarian Crises” *The International Journal of Peace Studies* 7(2):35-56, [Strange Bedfellows -- Dr. Donna Winslow \(gmu.edu\)](http://www.gmu.edu/~windslo), accessed 26 Mar 2021

Additionally, another reason where perceived friction can occur is that NGOs, given their non-governmental affiliations, have better access to marginalized groups; they are closer to the grassroots; they have experience not only in delivering basic services, but also in providing some protection against human rights violations...All of these capacities provide NGOs with special advantages in mobilizing self-help capacities in the people.<sup>22</sup>

Military operations, and, more specifically those involving CB can also be understood as diplomacy by other means; this is an invaluable tool for foreign affairs and international relations policies and politics. The US openly discusses how development will serve national interests, and the UK engages in extensive argumentation around the communal benefits of merging security and development.<sup>23</sup> Canadian developmental strategy is connected to its foreign policy and is therefore linked to national security and the offset of risk. National security risk is an extremely complicated calculation that does not have a single data point to generate an answer as it also includes economic considerations. If we use Canada as the example, one influencing factor blends national and human security considerations within the framework of development on the international stage; this represents a direct merging of national security and development goals using the language of human security as a driver for this commonality.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, there is a direct foreign policy and national security relationship correlation to US national and economic security; this is justified on the grounds that the US is [and will continue to be] its biggest trading partner.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Rostek, M., and Gizewski, P., eds., Pg. 4

<sup>23</sup> McConnon, E., Pg. 164

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, Pg. 164

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, Pg. 179-180

The CAF defines CB as “the process of increasing a host nation’s ability to achieve self-sufficiency, typically through improved governance, security, human capital, development, and reconstruction.”<sup>26</sup> CB can normally be measured against three main lines of effort: Security, Governance, and Development. This is an integrated and at times complicated endeavour, it requires a partnership framework involving host and donor governments, humanitarian assistance and development agencies, including NGOs together with the affected population.<sup>27</sup> DND and the CAF do not operate in isolation regarding CB, this process is generally conducted within a WoG approach with GAC.

There are several GAC subdivisions that facilitate the GoC CB foreign policy framework; they include:

1. Counter Terrorism Capacity Building Program (CTCBP);
2. Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOPs);
3. Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat Reduction Program (within the parameters of the G7 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction program); and
4. Anti-Crime Capacity Building Program (ACCBP).

While working with our OGD partners, there are several aspects that transcend inter-governmental policies. The following are political and security related examples of typical CB objectives taken from the CA publication on Stability Activities and Tasks; they work in harmony with those from GAC:

1. Robust government capable of providing essential services;
2. Legitimate political representation with indigenous participation;

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<sup>26</sup> Department of National Defence, “Operations” *Canadian Armed Forces*, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations.page>, accessed 29 March 2021

<sup>27</sup> Department of National Defence, “Stability Activities and Tasks” *B-GL-322-010/FP-001, Canadian Army, Land Forces Doctrine and Training System*, 2012, Pg. 9-1-2

3. Professional security forces capable of full-spectrum operations;
4. Sustainable economy with a mix of public and private institutions;
5. Sustainable infrastructure and educational institutions;
6. Stable security environment that can be maintained by security forces;
7. Humanitarian emergency resolved;
8. Robust communications infrastructure established; and
9. Civil service framework established.<sup>28</sup>

Project proposals, scope and approvals are based on a GAC Logic Model that considers outputs, immediate, intermediate and ultimate outcomes prior to the authorization of CB plans. Figure 4 is a graphical depiction of this Logic Model.




Figure 4 – GAC ACCBP/CTCBP Logic Model

Source: Gemmiti, A., and Ali, N., "SJS Capacity Building (CB) Briefing" *Strategic Joint Staff, Department of National Defence*, Pg. 13

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, Pg. 9A-6

Canada's Middle East Engagement Strategy currently conducts CB operations within Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon; they all can be linked to some or all of the tenants above. Although this is a DND source document, it operates within the foreign policy parameters of the GoC for CB and supports GACs mission to define, shape and advance Canada's interests and values in a complex global environment. [To] manage diplomatic relations, promote international trade and provide consular support. [To] lead international development, humanitarian, and peace and security assistance efforts. [To] also contribute to national security and the development of international law.<sup>29</sup> GAC operations within this definition and construct, as part of the Middle East Engagement CB mission strategy are outlined by country below:

Iraq:

1. Providing training to law enforcement officials to uphold the rule of law and human rights standards;
2. Supporting initiatives to facilitate the prosecution of foreign terrorist fighters; and
3. Providing support to local actors active in promoting positive alternative narratives to counter existing or emerging violent extremist messaging.

Jordan:

1. Strengthening the capacity of police, military and intelligence institutions;
2. Helping the Jordanian Armed Forces secure their border with Syria against terrorist threats;
3. Enhancing the role of women in critical incident response capacities in the Jordanian Gendarmerie;
4. Supporting initiatives to prevent and counter violent extremism; and
5. Targeted training with Jordanian mothers and community leaders to help them recognize early signs of violent extremism in their homes or communities.

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<sup>29</sup> Government of Canada, "About Global Affairs Canada" *Global Affairs Canada*, [About Global Affairs Canada \(international.gc.ca\)](https://www.international.gc.ca), accessed 2 April 2021

Lebanon:

1. Providing training and support to the Lebanese Armed Forces through the CTCBP to prevent terrorist activity;
2. Enhancing security and defensive capabilities along the Syrian-Lebanese border;
3. Working with civil society and NGOs in Lebanon in order to reduce tensions in refugee-hosting communities, and to prevent prison radicalization; and
4. Supporting initiatives to counter violent extremism by enabling local credible actors to develop narratives that offer alternatives to violent extremist messaging.<sup>30</sup>

It is obvious that CB operations have a military component that works directly by integration and training of indigenous forces through normal operations. It is also clear that there are merging and joined lines of effort and complimentary roles and/or projects within the OGD WoG Canadian approach to BPC; this is the integration and delivery of grants and contributions to our partner nations found in Canadian foreign policy doctrine.

This chapter explored the connection between the WoG and comprehensive approaches used in GoC policy, and, specific to the DND understanding of how these methods fit into the tactical (JIMP) and operational/strategic concepts. Looking at the GAC logic model, it is easily identifiable what steps outline the process and procedure for proposing and/or scoping CB projects and operations. One of the most prominent revelations from this examination is the level of civil/military and OGD interaction. It is apparent that this communication will continue and that it will trend more and more in the future. The identification for the requirement of emotional intelligence awareness and exposure to it in order to increase CAF personnel's emotional quotient can not be overstated. This should be viewed as a force enabling function increasing operational effectiveness and mission success when working within a JIMP context.

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<sup>30</sup> Government of Canada, "Canada's Middle East Engagement Strategy" *Global Affairs Canada*, [Canada's Middle East engagement strategy \(international.gc.ca\)](https://www.international.gc.ca/canada-middle-east-engagement-strategy-international.gc.ca/), accessed 2 March 2021

## CURRENT BPC APPROACHES

### Canadian BPC Doctrine

The manner in which Canadian foreign policy is created can be extremely thought-provoking. It is fashioned through the input of numerous players; these include case specific information from policy analysts, senior-level input from deputy ministers and the military elite, and assessment agencies that provide the government with analytical context. Expert consultation further helps our decision-makers better understand the granular details of the situation on the ground.<sup>31</sup> Development and aid monies within the international domain are aligned and reside with GoC funding. While outside of Canada, Global Affairs is the lead and senior governmental department; Defence is overall the largest separately funded sector within our government. Defence and Global Affairs tasks are frequently slightly different and they are intended to be, otherwise they could operate within the same departmental mandate. Both organizations have their own established policies and procedures, and arguably, within the sphere of CB operations there is redundancy for stream lining if there was political will to do so.

DND delivers CB by several methods; first, in direct support through Treasury Board Vote 1 Funding: Operating Expenditures and second, via a multi-departmental, oversight and implementation method under the Vote 10 Funding: Grants and Contributions envelope; the latter is by far the more complicated and the process my research will explore. Vote 10 Funding is used for GoC-wide initiatives, specifically, for the implementation of strategic management initiatives that cut across many departments.<sup>32</sup> The vary nature of this definition leads to and

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<sup>31</sup> Ahmad, A., “A Twenty-First century Foreign Policy for Canada in the Middle East and North Africa” *International Journal* 2017, Vol. 72(3), 413-423, DOI: 10.1177/0020702017725040, [A twenty-first century foreign policy for Canada in the Middle East and North Africa - ProQuest \(oclc.org\)](#), accessed 2 March 2021, Pg. 419

<sup>32</sup> Government of Canada, “Sources and Uses of the Budget Implementation Vote by Department and Program” *Government of Canada Budgets and Expenditures*, [Government of Canada budgets and expenditures - Canada.ca](#), accessed 14 December 2020

features inter-departmental coordination and cooperation. A grant is a transfer payment subject to pre-established eligibility and other entitlement criteria...Grants and contribution votes refer to the non-statutory expenditure vote authorities which provide for grants and contribution expenditures (a program where grants and contributions equal or exceed \$5 million CAD).<sup>33</sup> Of DND's total 2020 budget, only \$222.6 million CAD or 1% of the total funding was used/allocated for Vote 10 projects across the CAF domestically and internationally.

All projects within the government management lexicon are managed under the delegation of authorities' process. The Centre assigns authorities to the department, and therefore to the Minister and Deputy-Minister. These authorities are then passed along to the assistant Deputy-Ministers; in the case of Defence, to the uniformed level one commands – the Commander of the Canadian Joint Operations Command, the equivalent to other departmental assistant Deputy-Ministers, and subsequently to deployed level two commands – Brigadier-General task force commanders, the equivalent of Director Generals in government bureaucratic narrative.

These approvals and permissions are based on two assessment programs used by the Canadian center block as decision criteria. First, is the Organizational Project Management Capacity Assessment Tool; every three years, the center of government assesses each department and its ability to handle projects. This includes buying and equipping of goods for its own use as well as any other purposes it might have; this is based on any expenditure of large sums of crown monies. Each department gets an assessment on an overall scale of one to four based on a series of project management specific questions rated from one to five, totals are tallied and scores are

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<sup>33</sup> Government of Canada, "Grants" *Glossary*, [GC InfoBase - Glossary \(tbs-sct.gc.ca\)](https://tbs-sct.gc.ca/glossary), accessed 14 December 2020



assigned; one being the least desirable and four being the highest; DND currently sits at a level three which is expressed as Evolutionary, this rating is described therein:

The organization has the capacity to successfully deliver projects to achieve evolving strategic objectives. At this class, organizations tend to have integrated multi-project planning and control, where projects are managed as investment programs where appropriate to improve project selection, resource allocation, and project timing. Project related processes are to be integrated with corporate processes and structures; project performance analysis is advanced enough to provide input to process improvement and project planning; and standard governance structures are in place for project approval and oversight.<sup>34</sup>

Based upon this rating, the Minister and Deputy-Minister delegate to each element within the department a dollar cap so they know what they can spend and where, and, at what delegated level: the assistant deputy level or below, the deputy or Ministerial level, and/or what does it have to return to the center, i.e, Treasury Board to receive authorities to execute that program.

The second complimentary and influencing standard is called the Project Complexity and Risk Assessment Tool. A proposed government project is rated against a series of 64 questions for complexity, this is then mapped against the authorities specific to the risk and dollar value; the project is then expressed between a total value between one and four. This can be distilled and expressed as the nature of the project, its risk (or perceived risk) to fail, and number of resources both in people and monies. A project can be a known commodity, something as simple as a building, or, could be of an experimental nature which frequently happens with our major war-fighting platforms. The criteria consider a very broad range of potential project risks which stem from virtually every possible root cause relevant for just about any project...however, not every project risk will apply to every project in every instance...this process was validated in 2009, [where] it was determined that approximately 70% of the project

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<sup>34</sup> Government of Canada, "Organizational Project Management Capacity Assessment Tool" *Government of Canada Project Management*, [Organizational Project Management Capacity Assessment Tool - Canada.ca](https://www.canada.ca/en/government/publications/organizational-project-management-capacity-assessment-tool), accessed 29 April 2021

risks reflected in the assessment criteria would apply to any single project.<sup>35</sup> The deduction is that not all questions will be appropriate or applicable to every project scenario.

SSE is the most recent benchmark Canadian defence policy document and within sits CAF parameters. The scope of capacity building is determined on a mission-by-mission basis and can include training, advice, and assistance for partner forces including lethal and nonlethal aid. [Furthermore, it directs] the Canadian Armed Forces [to] work with Global Affairs Canada to ensure capacity building efforts are always focused on trusted bilateral partners that have demonstrated a clear commitment to human rights and regional and global stability.<sup>36</sup> One of the most sought-after tenants of a modern military is its ability to remain agile, scalable and responsive to its political leadership. The CA is one example of this flexibility and adaptability. SSE highlights that the CAF is able to deploy one member to an area, a small team or complete training organization as it did under Op ATTENTION in Afghanistan, the Middle East in Op IMPACT or Op UNIFIER in the Ukraine. It is only at this level that it is possible to execute integrated joint operations with the rest of the Canadian Armed Forces, other government departments, NATO and other allies and partner forces, and non-governmental organizations.<sup>37</sup>

The current Canadian Army (CA) CB definition is identified as “the process of increasing a host nation’s ability to achieve self-sufficiency, typically through improved governance, security, human capital, development, and reconstruction.” As such, it is logical to recognize that CB can be conducted across the full spectrum of operations and conflict, and includes peacetime military engagement, peace operations, and irregular warfare.<sup>38</sup>

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
<sup>35</sup> Government of Canada, “Project Complexity and Risk Assessment Tool” *Government of Canada Project Management*, [Project Complexity and Risk Assessment Tool - Canada.ca](https://www.canada.ca/en/government/department/departmental-services/project-management/project-complexity-and-risk-assessment-tool.html), accessed 29 April 2021

<sup>36</sup> Government of Canada, “Strong, Secure, Engaged – Canada’s Defence Policy” Pg. 86

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, Pg. 36

<sup>38</sup> Department of National Defence, “Stability Activities and Tasks” Pg. 9-4-1/9-4-2

# FULL-SPECTRUM OPERATIONS ACROSS CAMPAIGN THEMES



**Figure 5 – Full Spectrum Operation and Constituent Activities and Tasks**

Source: Department of National Defence, “Canadian Army Doctrine Note (CADN) 16-01 Land Operations Doctrine – An Updated Summary” *Canadian Army, OPI: SSO Doctrine, ADC*, 2016-05-27, Pg. 24

Outlined in Figure 5 are the breadth of terms, acronyms and tasks associated across full-spectrum campaign themes. Germane to this research are those included in Stability Operations, “tactical operations conducted by military forces in conjunction with other agencies to maintain, restore and establish a climate of order within which responsible government can function effectively and progress can be achieved.” Furthermore, “they [can] include security of populations, development of indigenous security forces, reconstruction of essential civil services

and assistance in civil governance and development.”<sup>39</sup> These are often completed in combination with OGD and NGO teams; they consist of the following tactical activities:

- a. Security and Control. The provision of general security and control allows the civilian populace and other elements of the JIMP framework the freedom and safety to conduct normal civic activities and to build institutions that support a lasting stability.
- b. Support to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). DDR involves the standing down of former combat forces and their reintegration to civil society or their move to create a newly structured and government sanctioned military force. It requires the involvement of a range of agencies and ideally will include programmes to avoid the creation of a large mass of unemployed, possibly embittered, former soldiers.
- c. Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR). SSR is a key element leading towards long-term stability and development of a nation. It is the reformation of the various elements of a nation’s security sector and, like DDR, will involve a multi-agency approach with other governmental and international agencies dealing with the judiciary and police forces.
- d. Support to Civilian Infrastructure and Governance. Ideally, the reconstruction of essential services and the provision of governance will fall to JIMP agencies other than the military.
- e. Assistance to Other Agencies. At times, military forces may choose, or be required, to provide assistance to other agencies. These are likely to be public elements of the JIMP framework, to include NGOs, public volunteer organizations and international commercial organization.<sup>40</sup>

The CA’s techniques for STABOPs are customarily merged within a cohesive WoG programme as part of a greater GoC strategy. This policy attempts to ensure that all elements of national and coalition power, as well as regional organizations, multilateral bodies, international institutions, and NGOs are working within a unifying theme to consider and to address the full range of influences and factors in a destabilized environment.<sup>41</sup> The strategic direction and

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<sup>39</sup> Department of National Defence, “Battle Group in Operations” *B-GL-321-005/FP-001*, Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre, 2012, Pg. 8-1

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, Pg. 8-3

<sup>41</sup> Department of National Defence, “Canadian Forces Joint Publication – CFJP 01 Canadian Military Doctrine” *B-GL-005/FP-001*, Joint Doctrine Branch, Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre, ISBN: 978-1-100-

guidance should be focused on the creation of enduring stability and tasks that reflect the analytics of factors relating to a nonstable environment. Conventional regular military forces are created and trained for combat operations related to security; they have very limited capabilities to analyse human security and governmental policy considerations. As such, the right non-military agencies (e.g., NGOs) will be required. Their objectives and actions will have to be closely integrated with those of military forces to ensure complementary approaches.<sup>42</sup> This is known as the inclusive approach; its guiding principles are as follows:

1. Proactive approach;
2. Shared understanding;
3. Outcome or end state-based thinking (see below for effects-based approach to operations); and
4. Collaborative working.<sup>43</sup>

Further thought should be given to the employment of CAF Reserves Forces in CB future roles. In the American political science literature *American Empire – the Reality and Consequences of US Diplomacy*, the author, West Point, Johns Hopkins and current Boston University professor Dr. Andrew Bacevich reacts to a thesis proposed by Dr.'s Benjamin Freidman and Harvey Sapolsky, professors at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology regarding US nation building, specifically, they express that neither the US nor the military are suited to this task [nation or capacity building].<sup>44</sup> Dr. Bacevich theorizes that if in entering into

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12731-6 (paper), 978-1-100-12735-4 (electronic), 2009, [Microsoft Word - CFJP 01 Master Pre Pub e Mar 09.doc \(publications.gc.ca\)](http://publications.gc.ca), accessed 2 March 2021, Pg. 6-12,13

<sup>42</sup> Department of National Defence, “Canadian Army Doctrine Note”, Pg. 7

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, Pg. 7

<sup>44</sup> Bacevich, A. J., “American Empire – The Reality & Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy,” *Cambridge, Massachusetts / London, England: Harvard University Press, March 2004*, <http://site.ebrary.com.library.norwich.edu/lib/norwich/reader.action?docID=10328809>, accessed 1 Jan 17, Pg. 237

CB scenarios, the US should consider the use of Reserves, and National Guard units given their unique skill sets:

The US military, especially the reserve units, bring to the task of nation building enormous assets that can help to rebuild countries. The reserves include individuals who in their civilian life has specialties, such as city managers, lawyers, medical expertise and non-military government service, which can be of great assistance.<sup>45</sup>

SSE calls for the increased employment of the Reserve Force to deliver select expeditionary missions in a primary role such as Canadian Armed Forces capacity building.<sup>46</sup> Although a proposal for our neighbours to the south, I believe this observation transcends the international boundary and articulates that the CAF must continue to explore and promote this very tenant, taking advantage of non-traditional military skills of our part time soldiers.

Working groups and exposure to other organizations will benefit all parties while operating in a CB function. A legacy defense department based in Kingston, Ontario, known as the Formation Operations Centre of Excellence developed seminars and work shops where the CAF and OGD personnel explored integration and optimization exercises/conferences with representatives from various NGOs. This helped to bridge the gap between NGO and governmental departments while integrated examination of problems and solutions within a CB scenario. Not surprisingly, the study showed that NGOs had less prior contact with and therefore less familiarity for the other group and less understanding regarding the comprehensive approach than did the military:

Specifically, the NGO group was significantly more likely than the military group to feel that the seminar contributed to their understanding of the other group, that their attendance at the seminar would affect how they interact with the other group on future deployments, and that their perceptions of the military changed as a result of the seminar. Although both NGO and military groups had a consistently high level of trust

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid, Pg. 237

<sup>46</sup> Government of Canada, “Strong, Secure, Engaged – Canada’s Defence Policy” Pg. 69

in the other group across the course of the seminar, the military group's trust in NGOs increased significantly over the seminar.<sup>47</sup>

I believe these working groups can be directly linked to the comprehensive approach and its belief that overarching plans and activities leverage the strengths and capabilities of diverse mission players [and] will result in both immediate and more enduring success in complex missions.<sup>48</sup> Ultimately, this method sets the conditions for a unified command or hierarchical structure grounded in group objectives and joint end state. Who will command the mission has several variables that will impact the decision; depending on where the mission falls within the spectrum of conflict and what levels of permissiveness are present in the area of operations based on their associated security considerations will ultimately shape the leadership choice? This does not automatically mean that the troops involved are armed or lack some form of integral force protection. As is the case with any military mission, a thorough threat assessment will need to be made in order to determine the level of force protection.<sup>49</sup> In the earliest stages, [the] single commander may be a military authority. [However,] as civilian authorities arrive and assume responsibilities, overall command may be passed to a civilian agency lead, and then ideally to an indigenous lead.<sup>50</sup>

The previously identified branch of the DMTC, the Military Training and Cooperation Programme is part of our comprehensive approach. This is Canada's marquee program that involves SOF, regular and reserve forces, whom can be augmented with security and defence

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<sup>47</sup> Thompson, M.M., et al., Pg. 442

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, Pg. 431

<sup>49</sup> Col. Williams, P.J., "Being 'Left of Bang' or Proactive: The Future Place of Capacity Building in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces" *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 15, No. 2, Pg. 16, [Canadian Military Journal Vol. 15, No. 2 \(forces.gc.ca\)](https://www.forces.gc.ca), accessed 14 January 2021

<sup>50</sup> Department of National Defence, "Land Operations" B-GL-300-001/FP-001, *Chief of the Land Staff, Army Publishing Office*, 2008, Pg. 7-106

contractors to teach and train international forces. This educational process takes part both in Canada and in an expeditionary fashion; and is comprised of conventional forces that conduct this routine training, with additional specialized forces/advisory teams being sent overseas. Canada focuses heavily on “training the trainers” by training mid- to senior-level officers, with the idea that these leaders will educate their own forces.<sup>51</sup> I took part in one of these small mission CB elements while deployed as the Commanding Officer of the Canadian Training Assistance Team – Jordan (CTAT-J) in Amman from June 2019 to June 2020. Several times throughout this deployment I worked directly with or had interactions with DMTC and the Director General – International Security Policy Major-General Jocelyn Paul. These conversations revolved around how to deliver the right training, equipment and infrastructure to the Kingdom of Jordan and the JAF in a timely fashion in accordance with the GoC foreign and defence policies.

Op IMPACT in some ways is not unlike other missions and in other respects is a completely different construct. It operates in five countries encompassing an operational support sub, head quarters, air task force, land component and CTATs; it is the largest deployed training mission that the CAF currently operates. Op IMPACT faces challenges in its delivery of CB in the Middle East given its geographical dispersion, command and control structure, coalition partnerships with the NATO mission and Combined Joint Task Force INHERENT RESOLVE, and support to the military defeat of Daesh. Its mission is that “in collaboration with partners, JTF-I will build capacity in the Joint Operations Area in order to enhance regional stability and demonstrate Government of Canada commitment to peace and security.” JTF-IMPACT is

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<sup>51</sup> Marquis, J.P., et al., “Developing an Army Strategy for Building Partner Capacity for Stability Operations” *Rand Corporation*, ISBN 978-0-8330-4954-4 (paper), U167.5.S68D48 2010 355.4—dc22, 2010, [Developing an Army Strategy for Building Partner Capacity for Stability Operations \(rand.org\)](https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P10355.html), accessed 14 December 2020, Pg. 64-65



comprised of up to 850 Canadians, as part of Op IMPACT who synchronize military training efforts with regional partners and Coalition and NATO allies at a cost of \$50M/year. Thus, setting the conditions necessary for regional security forces to successfully eradicate and prevent the resurgence of violent extremist groups.”<sup>52</sup>

Generally speaking, military CB missions are influenced by divergent political agendas/objectives, differences in organizational structures/procedures, and their culture and/or values.<sup>53</sup> Some other significant challenges include differences in time-horizon focus, a lack of guidance concerning division of labor, incompatible communication systems and equipment, and a basic lack of familiarity between the two communities.<sup>54</sup> One commonality crossing all departments and arguably all governments relate to funding and resources. I learned that business planning, capital project management and infrastructure management are not solely the realm of my civilian counterparts and/or OGD personnel; the premises of best resources and value for money became part of my normal lexicon while employed in that mission.

Colonel (Ret’d) Ross Fetterly a former Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) military personnel command comptroller within the DND Assistant Deputy Minister (Finance) office and a Senior Fellow for the Centre for Security Governance articulates how resource demands in defence are distinct and present challenging factors that need to be managed through business planning...[and that] in today’s ambiguous international security environment, money is like

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<sup>52</sup> Canadian Training Assistance Team – Jordan (CTAT-J), “CTAT-J 101 Brief to the Commander TF-PROTEUS, BGen P.K. Scott” Major M.E. Selberg, *Commanding Officer CTAT-J, Joint Task Force IMPACT, Department of National Defence, 12 December 2019*, Pg. 2

<sup>53</sup> Thompson, M.M., et al., Pg. 431

<sup>54</sup> Ibid, Pg. 431

ammunition, it must be targeted to be used effectively.<sup>55</sup> Factors inherent in resource demands can be summarized as the following:

1. Sensitivity to economic conditions – a decline in economic activity and government revenue could put pressure on the federal government to reduce defence expenditure;
2. Operational tempo – planned military activity levels can change unexpectedly due to rapid shifts in the international strategic environment;
3. Expenditure is non-linear – military training cycles, un-forecasted activities in support of Canadians such as aiding provinces in fighting forest fires and payments for capital equipment programs that could be delayed present challenges to defence leadership during a fiscal year;
4. There are multiple stakeholders – with different resource demands and perspectives – some with divergent goals or objectives. This can include army, navy or air force leadership, departmental officials, central agencies, Public Service Procurement Canada, Global Affairs Canada and Canadian industry;
5. Multi-layered systems (financial, supply system, operational) – that function in a security environment which can demonstrate unpredictable behaviours. The most prominent of these is the capital equipment procurement system;
6. Structural complexity – this is driven by strategic, operational and tactical activities and the considerable variety of tasks DND/CAF undertakes;
7. Expenditures occur in a pluralist environment – circumstances where there are often no quick fixes, and where one solution does not generally fully resolve the problem;
8. Multiple institutional perspectives – stakeholder management by central staffs in DND/CAF is an ongoing and challenging activity;
9. A high turbulence threat environment – where speed to deploy is critical; and
10. Competition for new military personnel – is increasing within the private and public sectors for shrinking numbers of Canadians entering the workforce.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Fetterly, R., Pg. 4

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, Pg. 4-5

Due to the COVID 19 pandemic and several other security considerations I can attest that during my expeditionary deployment as part of Op IMPACT we experienced many of the considerations Fetterly describes as challenges within a resource constrained reality.

The interplay between the CAF, GAC CTCBP Ottawa/Jordan, NGOs, JAF and the Jordanian government is an intricate process that involves all the key players. At times, there were very real questions as to who was doing what, who was responsible for what part, and when it should be delivered; this was especially present during project inception or initial envisioning tying it to guiding principles and the WoG mandate. Figure 6 is a depiction of the CB operating environment in Jordan. It also serves as an example of the complexity of CB operations while deployed in a JIMP capacity.




Figure 6 - The BPC Zoo – How it Works

Source: Canadian Training Assistance Team – Jordan (CTAT-J), "CTAT-J 101 Brief to the Commander TF-PROTEUS, BGen P.K. Scott" Major M.E. Selberg, Commanding Officer CTAT-J, Joint Task Force IMPACT, Department of National Defence, 12 December 2019, Pg. 5

While in Jordan I had a conversation with Brigadier-General Scott, the Commander of Task Force PROTEUS (at the time) during his geographic area circulation; we discussed CB operations and challenges in our respective countries. At some point throughout we were deliberating funding and the associated learning curve for project proposal and management based on the GAC logic model found at Figure Four. He articulated how GAC funding normally aligns with the Government's feminist strategy for its foreign policy decisions (as is captured within the GAC logic model); and, how in a strictly defence context, this does not always align with our security sector needs, as DND and Global Affairs have different tasks and requirements. The scope and reasoning of the project must capture certain criteria in its original conception; or be modified to make it work, adding in an aspect to the project that better aligns with GACs priorities [in order to gain traction and support].<sup>57</sup> This presented its own challenges when working within his mission mandate.

One other small example of the complexity of Canadian CB operations resides solely within GAC; in 2016 GAC re-structured itself and created its current departments of PSOPs, CTCBP, ACCBP and Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat Reduction Program. PSOPs was the last department created and is the successor to the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), replacing both START and the Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF). PSOPs built on more than a decade of experience and achievements by START by drawing on lessons learned by Canada and the wider international community on how best to promote peace, security and stability.<sup>58</sup> Interestingly, while Op IMPACT worked exclusively with CTCBP in Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq, in virtually the same geographic location, Op PROTEUS as part of

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<sup>57</sup> BGen Scott, P.K., *Commander Task Force PROTEUS/Deputy Coordinator Police Primacy and Sustainment, United States Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority*, Telephone Conversation with Author, 28 May 2020

<sup>58</sup> Government of Canada, "Peace and Stabilization Operations Program" *Global Affairs Canada*, [Peace and Stabilization Operations Program \(international.gc.ca\)](https://www.international.gc.ca/peace-and-stabilization-operations-program), accessed 2 March 2021

Task Force JERUSALEM and its mandate, worked solely with the PSOPs team and portfolio. This difference was grounded on separate mission Memorandum of Understanding to Cabinet; for Op IMPACT, the memorandum was with GAC CTCBP, whereas, with PROTEUS it was with PSOPs. In a follow-on section of research during the second set of case studies, I will provide a specific example of how these Memorandums of Understanding effected CB efforts in Iraq due to program alignment.

This section focused on Canadian CB doctrine. Specifically, its transition from Security Force Capacity Building and Stabilization Operations into our current Capacity Building policy; and thereby illustrating the differences in Global Affairs and Defence related tasks and purposes. It highlighted the commonality of resource management, restraint, funding and associated their demands across all departments both in domestic and expeditionary roles. The fashion in which DND delivers CB by way of Vote 1 and 10 initiatives is illuminating. The Delegation of Authorities process and the manner in which the approval and permissions are passed to departments and their people weighed against the Organizational Project Management Capacity and Project Complexity and Risk Assessment Tools are invaluable requirements to understand how projects are conceived, approved and funded. Furthermore, this research has shown two distinct friction points in DND CB operations regarding Legal Authorities and Project Alignment which will have specific examples during the case studies.

Referenced in SSE and by Dr. Bacevich in *American Empire*, the use of Reserve Forces in CB operations must continue to be explored and if possible expanded; these part-time soldiers bring a wealth of civilian skills that are directly transferrable to the CB environment in expeditionary operations. Finally, the expansion of DND/OGD interaction and exposure will help to break down barriers and stereotypes for all GoC personnel. CAF members who deploy into a JIMP environment should have first exposure to their OGD counterparts before trying to

implement policy and projects in a HN on behalf of the GoC. It is recommended that during the mandated pre-deployment training that all CAF members undergo prior operations, specific vignettes with JIMP exercises take place with our inter-departmental colleagues.

## United States BPC Doctrine

*From our strongest allies to our newest relationships, strengthening partner engagement increases stability and security around the world, and these engagements are specifically constructed to enable a range of results from developing trust and furthering partnerships to strengthening coordination, interoperability, and mature allies.*

*Lieutenant-General Terry Wolff*

*Director Strategic Plans and Policy (J5),  
Joint Staff, US Department of Defense,  
to the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives  
One-Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session,  
14 February 2013*

The United States (US) government has by far the most comprehensive and encompassing CB doctrine of the NATO partners; and, although it has specific CB doctrine, there are still references to other military terms that encompass CB operations. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff define MOOTW as the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war...[they] focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises...All military operations are driven by political consideration...In MOOTW, political considerations permeate all levels and the military may not be the primary player.<sup>59</sup> Furthermore, much like in Canadian doctrine, the US Department of Defense (DoD) defines another CB like term STABOPs as military missions, tasks, or activities conducted in foreign countries and in coordination with other instruments of

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<sup>59</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War" *Joint Pub 3-07, 16 June 1995*, [JP 3-07 Joint Doctrine For Military Operations Other Than War \(bits.de\)](https://www.bits.de/joint-doctrine-for-military-operations-other-than-war), accessed 2 March 2021, Pg. I-1

national power to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, reconstruct emergency infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian relief.<sup>60</sup>

US foreign policy has a much more aggressive output that has specific WoG and security related aspects which are significantly different than those of Canada and other allies. There is an increasing US governmental emphasis on BPC operations as a method to realise strategic goals. In an interview with the US Army Journal, Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Dubik discusses CB and some direct strategic benefits to the American government. He states “there is an access to airspace, logistics bases, air and sea ports of entry, and logistical lines of communication - all necessary for global operations. Thus, they increase US strategic options. US forces that are too small to execute the activities necessary for ‘alliance maintenance’ put all this at risk.”<sup>61</sup> His closing statement underlines the importance of CB operations as one of the major reasons why the US puts so much effort, personnel and investment into this aspect of foreign policy. Much like building a coalition for military intervention, there are definite advantages to operating within a group of like-minded countries/militaries. It is a way to maintain interoperability, share tactics and uphold international credibility based on the concept of American Exceptionalism without autonomous involvement.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 2015 National Military Strategy of the United States of America reinforces this strategic outlook in formal policy for the US Forces:

As we look to the future, the US military and its allies and partners will continue to protect and promote shared interests. We will preserve our alliances, expand partnerships, maintain a global stabilizing presence, and conduct training, exercises, security cooperation activities, and military to military engagement. Such activities

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<sup>60</sup> Marquis, J.P., et al., Pg. 6

<sup>61</sup> Lieutenant-General Dubik, J.M. (Ret'd), “A Closer Look at the Build Partner Capacity Mission” *US Army Journal, Arlington, Vol. 62, Iss. 1., Jan 2012: 14-16*, [A Closer Look at the 'Build Partner Capacity' Mission - ProQuest \(oclc.org\)](#), accessed 3 March 2021, Pg. 14

increase the capabilities and capacity of partners, thereby enhancing our collective ability to deter aggression and defeat extremists.<sup>62</sup>

The Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives statements amplify this very notion in open session, the Defense Strategic Guidance states that building partner capacity remains important for sharing costs and responsibilities for global leadership. Furthermore, by looking ahead, the Department and the military will remain globally engaged providing a stabilizing presence through a network of alliances and presence through partnerships and cooperative approaches to address common security problems.<sup>63</sup> Building partner capacity is a complex interwoven system consisting of multiple lines of effort throughout the Department and certainly across the interagency.<sup>64</sup> There are several US governmental departments that comprise its foreign policy CB efforts, they include:

1. Department of Defense;
2. Department of State;
3. US Agency for International Development (USAID);
4. Department of Homeland Security;
5. Department of Justice;
6. Department of Energy;
7. Department of Agriculture;
8. Department of Commerce; and
9. Department of Transportation.

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<sup>62</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015: The United States Military’s Contribution to National Security” [2015 National Military Strategy.pdf \(jcs.mil\)](https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/0/PDFs/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf), accessed 8 April 2021, Pg. 9

<sup>63</sup> Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, “Framework for Building Partnership Capacity Programs and Authorities to Meet 21<sup>st</sup> Century Challenges” *H.A.S.C. No. 113-5, One-Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, 14 February 2013*, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=750858>, accessed 13 January 2021, Pg. 6

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid*, Pg. 7



The interconnectedness of these organizations is illustrated in a comprehensive holistic concept for stabilization and reconstruction provided by the US Institute of Peace as guiding principles:




Figure 7 – Strategic Framework for Stabilization and Reconstruction

Source: The United States Institute of Peace and the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, "Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction" *United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C. 1 November 2009*, [Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction | United States Institute of Peace \(usip.org\)](https://www.usip.org/publications/guiding-principles-for-stabilization-and-reconstruction), accessed 22 March 2021, Pg. 2-8

Each department plays a different yet complimentary role within the CB framework. Depending on the state of conflict, the principal organization would vary: The State Department and USAID would be the lead organizations in conflict prevention, DoD and State would lead conflict management, and lastly, State and DoD would manage post-conflict reconstruction; each plays a vital and interconnected role with US CB policy. Although USAID is the primary delivery agency for developmental aid, it is not the only organization and does not typically work autonomously in this capacity. Research conducted in the 2016 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development: Development Assistance Committee peer review found that US foreign aid was controlled by 21 different entities. [And that] this proliferation of agencies

distributing US foreign aid accelerated following 9/11 with new agencies established by the Bush administration...[often] delivering significant amounts of aid and bypassing USAID completely.<sup>65</sup> It is therefore logical that security and foreign policy considerations influence development spending considerably, and [that] US national security is prioritised in this relationship. This is evident in the way that USAID is expected to offset risks to US national security, by the rest of government, at a broad level, but at the micro level of addressing security concerns of individuals in developing countries, its programmes to prevent conflict are uneven.<sup>66</sup>

The establishment of additional entities and/or Other Departmental Agency (ODA) each with its associated risks and strengths can lead to unrecognized and/or unrealized responsibilities and, that these roles/responsibilities directly influence the coherence and focus of developmental policy. Conversely there is a well understood military counter-equation to these ODA creations and their individual security, funding and staffing requirements. In deployed expeditionary settings where the level of permissiveness does not afford a large non-military footprint, soldiers can be expected to operate under or in unconventional roles, including tasks such as establishment and mentoring indigenous forces, restoring public services, rebuilding infrastructure, and promoting overall good governance. Colonel Wuestner, the Chief of Operational Integration for the (US) Army's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute calls these "non-traditional capabilities" and edifies how these competences are now persistent streams of dialogue which have moved into the mainstream of military thinking, planning and strategy where they must stay.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> McConnon, E., Pg. 79

<sup>66</sup> Ibid, Pg. 80

<sup>67</sup> Wuestner, S.G., "Building Partner Capacity/Security Force Assistance: A New Structural Paradigm" *Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College* (2009), ISBN 1-58487-376-0, [BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY/SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE: \(jstor.org\)](#), accessed 13 January 2021, Pg. 1

**Table 1: Criteria for Judging Likely US BPC Effectiveness**

Factors Within U.S. Control	What does the United States want to achieve? Is there a demonstrable record of U.S. strategic-level success in accomplishing those objectives?
	Are U.S. objectives clear and consistent across U.S. government (USG) agencies (e.g., State, USAID, DOD)?
	Are U.S. programs across USG agencies organized, designed, managed and executed in a coherent and consistent manner?
	Are U.S. programs designed in a manner that will actually benefit the partner in the short, medium and long term?
	Are U.S. programs executed consistently over time (measured in years rather than months)?
	Is the United States prepared to conduct the BPC effort over longer durations (measured in years rather than months)?
	Are U.S. programs designed and implemented in a manner that is coherent with international community efforts?
Factors Outside U.S. Control	Are U.S. and partner interests aligned in the short, medium, and long term? If not, can the United States mitigate risks associated with diverging interests? If so, how?
	Does the partner have legitimate institutions of governance and effective political structures?
	Has the partner invested its own funds or other resources to build its security capacity? In other words, has it demonstrated it has "skin in the game?"
	Does the partner have sufficient systems and processes in place to translate U.S. assistance into durable capabilities?
	Do key actors in the international community support U.S. strategy? Are their efforts reinforcing those of the United States?

Source: Congressional Research Service, "What is 'Building Partner Capacity?' Issues for Congress" 7-57000, R44313, 18 December 2015, [What Is "Building Partner Capacity?" Issues for Congress \(fas.org\)](https://fas.org/irp/congress/issue/7-57000/7-57000-18Dec2015.pdf), accessed 13 January 2021, Pg. 4

The Directorate of Building Partnership Capacity (DBPC) is responsible for managing the execution of a wide array of Title 10 and Title 22 programs, and integrating those programs into solutions that contribute to the accomplishment of national security objectives.<sup>68</sup> Title 22 funding is allotted to the State Department, whom on a case-by-case basis can transfer them to DoD. It is in turn DoD who manages and executes most security assistance programs, including the Foreign Military Sales programs. Title 22 is less flexible in some ways mainly because

<sup>68</sup> Defence Security Cooperation Agency, "Directorate of Building Partnership Capacity (BPC)" *US Department of Defence*, [Directorate of Building Partnership Capacity \(BPC\) | Defense Security Cooperation Agency \(dscsa.mil\)](https://dscsa.mil/), accessed 13 January 2021

Congress authorizes and appropriates these funds on a by-country and by-program basis, and requires congressional notification and permission to move funds from one effort to another.<sup>69</sup>

Alternatively, Title 10 resources are appropriated to DoD and are intended for operations and maintenance of the US military. These funds are often used to fund international participation in US joint exercises, military personnel exchanges, or military-to-military contacts as a way to enhance the relationships between partner militaries and US forces.<sup>70</sup> This authority is grounded in Section 333 of Title 10 permissions (Title 10 United States Code (USC), Chapter 16, § 333).

Its specific purpose is to conduct or support programs providing training and equipment to national security forces of foreign countries for the purpose of building capacity of Partner Nations to conduct one or more of the following activities:

1. Counterterrorism operations;
2. Counter-weapons of mass destruction operations;
3. Counter-illicit drug trafficking operations;
4. Counter-transnational organized crime operations;
5. Maritime and border security operations;
6. Military intelligence operations; and
7. Operations or activities that contribute to an international coalition operation that is determined by the Secretary to be in the national interest of the United States.<sup>71</sup>

Within these Title authorizations, DoD has additional established funding within the National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA) through Sections 1206 and 1207 programs.

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<sup>69</sup> Kelly, T.K., et al., “Security Cooperation Organizations in the Country Team – Options for Success” *Rand Corporation, ISBN 978-0-8330-4911-7 (pbk.:alk. Paper), 2010, [Security Cooperation Organizations in the Country Team: Options for Success \(rand.org\)](https://www.rand.org/pubs/other/2010/01/Security_Cooperation_Organizations_in_the_Country_Team_Options_for_Success_rand.org)*, accessed 10 April 2021, Pg. xii

<sup>70</sup> Ibid, Pg. xii

<sup>71</sup> Defence Security Cooperation Agency, “Directorate of Building Partnership Capacity (BPC)” accessed 13 January 2021

Section 1206, the Global Train and Equip agreement incorporates two distinct yet complimentary programs. First, through Section 3 of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) under the Arms Export Control Act states that the US may sell defense articles and services to foreign countries and international organizations when the President formally finds that to do so will strengthen the security of the US and promote world peace.<sup>72</sup> Secondly, through the Foreign Military Funding (FMF) envelope, which enables eligible partner nations to purchase US defense articles, services, and training through either FMS or, for a limited number of countries, through the foreign military financing (FMF) of direct commercial contracts program.<sup>73</sup>

Under Section 1207, the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) has three applicable regulations for DoD when conducting CB activities:

Section 1207 (b)(1)(A) authorizes the use of the GSCF “to enhance the capabilities of military forces and other security forces responsible for conducting border and maritime security, internal security, and counterterrorism operations, as well as the government agencies responsible for such forces.”

Section 1207 (b)(1)(B) permits GSCF assistance to national military forces and other specified security forces to enable them to “participate in or support military, stability, or peace support operations consistent with United States foreign policy and national security interests.”

Section 1207(b)(2) authorizes using the GSCF to assist the justice sector (including law enforcement and prisons), and to conduct rule of law programs and stabilization efforts “where the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, determines that conflict or instability in a region challenges the existing capability of civilian providers to deliver such assistance.”<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Defence Security Cooperation Agency, “Foreign Military Sales (FMS)” *US Department of Defence*, [Foreign Military Sales \(FMS\) | Defense Security Cooperation Agency \(dscu.mil\)](https://dscu.mil/Foreign-Military-Sales-FMS/), accessed 9 April 2021

<sup>73</sup> Defence Security Cooperation Agency, “Foreign Military Financing (FMF)” *US Department of Defence*, [Foreign Military Financing \(FMF\) | Defense Security Cooperation Agency \(dscu.mil\)](https://dscu.mil/Foreign-Military-Financing-FMF/), accessed 9 April 2021

<sup>74</sup> Serafino, N.M., “Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF): Summary and Issue Review” *Congressional Research Service*, 7-5700, R42641, August 2012, [untitled \(dscu.mil\)](https://dscu.mil/Global-Security-Contingency-Fund-GSCF/), accessed 9 April 2021, Pg. 4-5



By examining and understanding this model, it becomes clearer that CB operations are conducted through a variety of divisions consisting of DoD, GSCF, FMF and FMS funded persons. Table 2 describes these programs as authorized by Congress for the conduct of CB DoD funded and sanctioned operations.


**Table 2: Description of Select DoD Activities That May Be Used to Build Partner Capacity**

Program	Description
Counterdrug Programs	DOD counterdrug programs may provide support to foreign security forces to stop the flow of illegal drugs. It provides support for counterdrug activities of federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies. DOD requested approximately \$1 billion for its counterdrug programs in its fiscal year 2013 budget request.
National Guard State Partnership Program	A DOD security cooperation program that pairs state National Guards with foreign countries to promote national objectives, stability, partner capacity, and a better understanding and trust between the United States and foreign countries. As of May 2012, there were 63 active partnerships. This program began in 1993. For fiscal year 2013, the department requested \$10 million for the program. <sup>6</sup>
Peacetime Humanitarian Assistance Programs	DOD's two key programs are the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid-funded humanitarian assistance program and the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance program. Activities, which are typically performed outside of war or disaster environments, include renovating schools and hospitals, drilling wells, providing basic health care, and providing training to prepare for natural disasters. DOD requested approximately \$109 million for the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid program in its fiscal year 2013 budget request.
Global Train and Equip Program (also known as Section 1206 Program)	Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 created this program, which is used to build the capacity of foreign military forces through provision of training, equipment, and small-scale military construction activities. It is to be used to build foreign military capacity to conduct counterterrorist operations or participate in, or support, military and stabilization operations in which U.S. forces are participating. Section 1206, as amended, authorizes the Secretary of Defense to use up to \$350 million each year, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, through fiscal year 2014. DOD requested \$365 million for the Section 1206 program in its fiscal year 2013 budget request.
Global Security Contingency Fund	Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, enacted in December 2011, established the Global Security Contingency Fund. This fund provides resources for emergent challenges such as training and other support to enhance the capabilities of foreign military and security forces to conduct security and counterterrorism operations and participate in or support military, stability, or peace support operations consistent with United States foreign policy and national security interests. It also provides resources to assist with rule of law programs and stabilization efforts in certain cases. The fund is jointly administered and funded by the State Department and DOD, with the State Department in the lead. The legislation also included transitional authorities for DOD-led assistance to Africa and Yemen. The fiscal year 2012 consolidated appropriations act does not appropriate new monies to the fund, but permits DOD and the State Department to transfer up to \$250 million to the fund from other accounts.

Source: Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, "Framework for Building Partnership Capacity Programs and Authorities to Meet 21<sup>st</sup> Century Challenges" *H.A.S.C. No. 113-5, One-Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, 14 February 2013*, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=750858>, accessed 13 January 2021, Pg. 69

DoD is often subordinate or supports OGD within the CB relationship; a simple example would be during Humanitarian Operations where DoD would work for the State Department. Given this organizational structure, it is vital that military personnel should understand the political objectives and the potential impact of inappropriate actions [when they do so].....commanders should remain aware of changes not only in the operational situation, but

also to changes in political objectives that may warrant a change in military operations.<sup>75</sup> Figure 8 clearly delineates the differences within the Department of Defense (DoD) for programming and who is responsible for both implementation and conception of the programs.



**Figure 8 – Differing Congressional and DOD Definitions of Build Partner Capacity**

Source: Congressional Research Service, “What is ‘Building Partner Capacity?’ Issues for Congress” 7-57000, R44313, 18 December 2015, [What Is "Building Partner Capacity?" Issues for Congress \(fas.org\)](https://fas.org/what-is-building-partner-capacity/), accessed 13 January 2021, Pg. 13

Political goals and their associated objectives drive CB at every military level of engagement from strategic to tactical. This is a key trend and/or finding from the examination of US policy; US military forces are much more exposed, have direct linkages and experience at all levels of CB operations.

Conventional military forces and government personnel are delivering more and more CB to their partners; in March 2013 during a confirming statement to Congress, the US Army Chief of Staff, General Odierno, announced that Army Brigades will be realigned for a variety of

<sup>75</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War” Pg. I-2

purposes, including training and mentoring partnered nation security forces.<sup>76</sup> It should not be surprising that one of the primary and oldest methods for CB delivery is grounded in SOF operations. Their training, regional orientation, and language skills make their operators very well prepared to do this type of activity;<sup>77</sup> activities include: Military Engagement, Security Cooperation and Deterrence. Enduring actions such as these establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other nations. SOF conduct engagement activities that support the Ground Component Commanders (GCC), country teams, and other interagency partners.<sup>78</sup> Furthermore, these activities shape the operational environment to keep day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict and also serve to develop and build HN capabilities and capacities that can be leveraged in crises and war.<sup>79</sup> This can be directly tied to Institutional Capacity Building which is defined by the Joint Chiefs as projects that enhance the capacity of partner nations to exercise responsible civilian control of its national security forces, contribute to collective security, and absorb, apply, and sustain national security capabilities.<sup>80</sup>

Understanding now, how the Title and Section authorities by the USC grant permissions and guidelines on how the US provides CB, it is important to examine some internal assumptions that DoD and the US military use as a base to deliver security CB operations. There are six identifiable assumption criteria that have been delivered by the Rand Corporation to Congress that are used as benchmark framework:

Assumption 1: The US Army has two major reasons for building partner capabilities and capacity. The first is to integrate partners into ongoing and future U.S.-led coalition

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<sup>76</sup> Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, Pg. 5

<sup>77</sup> Ibid, Pg. 5

<sup>78</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Special Operations” *Joint Publication 3-05, 16 July 2013*, [JP 3-05, Special Operations \(nps.edu\)](https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Joint%20Publications/Joint%20Publication%203-05.pdf), accessed 2 March 2021, Pg. I-8

<sup>79</sup> Ibid, Pg. I-8

<sup>80</sup> Ibid, Pg. I-9



operations around the world. The second is to enable partners to address domestic and regional problems without US military participation.

Assumption 2: The US Army has two primary ways to fill capability gaps using partner armies. The first is to focus on partner armies that already have the required capabilities. The second is to build these capabilities from a basic level or to significantly improve nascent capabilities, over a longer period.

Assumption 3: The US Army can fill some of its capability gaps with partner armies using security cooperation programs.

Assumption 4: The strength of a partner's support for US operations around the world indicates the extent to which that partner's international views and interests overlap those of the United States. A similar stance on issues deemed "important" by the US Department of State (DOS) might serve as a signal of shared political interests.

Assumption 5: Security cooperation activities that aim to build partner capabilities are more likely to succeed and potentially develop into capacity if the capability is of interest to both the partner and the US Army.

Assumption 6: A partner will probably be more interested in developing capabilities that have domestic application, increases its international prestige, and support its military transformation or modernization efforts.<sup>81</sup>

While US CB doctrine is well-established and has definable guidelines, it is in some ways complicated by the number of avenues that the multiple departments have in order to deliver CB throughout the world.

In his statement to the US Army Journal, Lieutenant-General (Ret'd) Dubik intimates that aid and security funding are not without strategic guidance and these allowances are granted because of funding. Access to airspace, logistics bases, air and sea ports of entry, and logistical lines of communication, all [of which are] necessary for global operations<sup>82</sup>; these are part of American foreign policy and its international military and strategic footprint. Understanding the underlying references to funding and/or aid in this statement, it is logical to recognise that US

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<sup>81</sup> Moroney, J.D.P., et al., "Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations" *Rand Corporation*, ISBN 978-0-8330-4211-8 (pbk.:alk. paper), 2007041452, [a473915.pdf \(dtic.mil\)](#), accessed 13 January 2021, Pg. 9-10

<sup>82</sup> Lieutenant-General Dubik, J.M. (Ret'd), Pg. 14

CB priorities and funding are generally given to those nations that are willing to invest their own funds to support or sustain capacity, have sufficient absorptive capacity, have high governance indicators, have strong and healthy economies, and with whose broad strategic interests predominantly align with US interests in the region.<sup>83</sup>

This chapter has studied US CB doctrine and operations; it is clear that building partner capacity is conducted for a variety of security reasons and by a variety of people/organizations. The US is overt in its assumptions, requirements, and expectations for foreign aid and/or development; these are arms of US foreign policy and a means of projecting power and influence on the partner nations. Title Codes, and Sections within a WoG approach to US CB operations open numerous streamlined avenues that when understood and applied correctly facilitate significant results to the chosen partner nation. FMF and FMS funding through the Department of State are directly tied to the Defence Attaché's resident in the partner nation Embassy and, in turn, to the Ambassador, as a means to influence and exert national power and authority while gaining significant strategic advantage to a geographic area.

### **United Kingdom BPC Doctrine**

United Kingdom's (UK) CB operational approach, system and procedure for delivering aid and assistance is a multi-layered multi-departmental WoG method that includes the use of NGOs and contracted specialists to deliver the foreign policy needs and goals of the government. In a 2015 National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review, the UK laid plain its intentions to continue as a world leader in CB as a method of foreign policy and furthering its governmental agenda:

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<sup>83</sup> Paul, C., et al., "What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?" *Rand Corporation, 2013, ISBN: 978-0-8330-7850-6, [What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?](#) | RAND*, accessed 3 March 2021, Pg. xix

The Government will use our global influence to protect and promote our interests and values, supporting our security and prosperity. We will use our diplomats, development assistance, Armed Forces, security and intelligence agencies, law enforcement and soft power. We will invest more in our relationships with our traditional allies and partners and build stronger partnerships around the world, to multiply what we can achieve alone. We will work with our allies and partners to strengthen, adapt and extend the rules-based international order and its institutions, enabling further participation of growing powers. We will be more ambitious in tackling conflict and building stability overseas, and we will help others to develop their resilience and preparedness, including for the global challenges of climate and health security.<sup>84</sup>

Most of this research has included the Department for International Development (DfID) and its predecessor the Overseas Development Ministry (ODM) which was a sub-department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). However, in September 2020 DfID and the FCO were amalgamated in a governmental departmental re-alignment; now known as the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). As this new department is not even a year old at this point, this directed research project will pass the next section on an examination of UK BPC operations as conducted by the Ministry of Defence (MoD), DfID, and the FCO.

DfID and USAID are similar in that they are a delivery system for the government to deliver aid and increase capacity via non military means; they are at the same time structured, lead and funded in completely different manner. DfID was an independent ministry with its own independent cabinet-level minister to lead it and who had his/her own budget to operate. As an independent department, it was free of direct oversight and control by the FCO to operate within the governments foreign policy framework; this created some tension between the two ministries. Conversely, if we stop to re-consider USAID, it is opposite in that it has little political independence and no authority for discretionary spending beyond its budget.<sup>85</sup> Given

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<sup>84</sup> The United Kingdom, “National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom” *CM 9161, November 2015*, [National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 \(publishing.service.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/494222/national-security-strategy-and-strategic-defence-and-security-review-2015.pdf), accessed 19 March 2021, Pg. 47

<sup>85</sup> McConnon, E., Pg. 65

the scope and scale of responsibilities within DfID an ODA with specific duties related to Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) was created to address conflict and poverty in fragile states and to ensure DfID's compliance with UK government national security policies.<sup>86</sup> Furthermore, demonstrating the interconnectedness between foreign and security policies the Minister in charge of DfID sits on the National Security Council. In this capacity the Minister advises other departments on its own nuanced national security concerns and/or issues as well as receives counsel from these OGD.


The Office for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is an international organization designed to shape policies with a view to increase prosperity, equality and opportunity throughout the world. It is a 37-nation body which Canada, the UK and US are member states; its core goals include accelerating development, combating international tax avoidance, promoting local and regional development, promoting health and security and protecting consumer health and safety. The OECD is an expert organization with history and precedent in human security and state-building; it is so well established and respected that it is referenced several times within UK source policy documents such as *the UK Government's Approach to Stabilisation: A Guide for Policy Makers and Practitioners*. State-building is defined by the OECD as "action to develop the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state in relation to effective political processes for negotiating the mutual demands between state and societal groups"<sup>87</sup>; this is a key statement that resonates within UK CB policy and operating procedures.

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid, Pg. 118

<sup>87</sup> The United Kingdom, "The UK Government's Approach to Stabilisation: A Guide for Policy Makers and Practitioners" *The Stabilisation Unit*, 7 March 2019, [The UK Government's approach to Stabilisation: A guide for policy makers and practitioners - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/792222/The_UK_Government's_approach_to_Stabilisation_A_guide_for_policy_makers_and_practitioners_-_GOV.UK_(www.gov.uk).pdf), accessed 14 January 2021 , Pg. 16

According to UK public policy documentation (its 2015 National Security Strategy Review) it is the second largest bilateral aid donor in the world after the US, and the only G7 nation to meet the United Nations (UN)/OECD target of spending 0.7% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for official development assistance. They have committed this contribution to law. It has grounded these policies in international development leadership, [it] influences research [and] innovation and the tenants of human rights, the protection of civilians and good governance around the globe.<sup>88</sup> Figure 9 is the most fundamental depiction of the Value for Money proposition that the UK employs in its decision-making process:




**Figure 9 - Value for Money Illustration**

Source: The United Kingdom, “Multilateral Aid Review: Ensuring Maximum Value for Money for UK Aid Through Multilateral organizations” *Department for International Development, March 2011*, [Multilateral Aid Review: Ensuring maximum value for money for UK aid through multilateral organisations \(who.int\)](#), accessed 19 March 2021, Pg. 8

Given that official development assistance is written into law as a percentage of the GDP, there are significant and established guidelines and metrics associated with this policy. Further heightened by the government’s 2% defence commitment and world-class diplomatic service, the aid budget is a crucial part of the UK’s place in the world. It makes the UK the

<sup>88</sup> United Kingdom, “National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015” Pg. 14

fastest in the world to react to global crises.<sup>89</sup> The UK believes that by taking part in CB operations and foreign aid policies it has direct benefits to the capacity of weakened states and regional organizations to prevent and resolve conflicts, building international capacity for peacekeeping and security sector reform, strengthening British and international ability to deploy civilians, and in increasing civilian-military integration.<sup>90</sup> It is also therefore logical that the UK's engagement in stabilisation may take place alongside local military actors possibly augmented by UK and/or allied forces.<sup>91</sup>



**Figure 10 - The Relationship Between Stabilization and Other Responses to Violent Conflict and Instability**

Source: The United Kingdom, “The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation: A Guide for Policy Makers and Practitioners” *The Stabilisation Unit*, 7 March 2019, [The UK Government's approach to Stabilisation: A guide for policy makers and practitioners - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/794441/UK-Government-approach-to-stabilisation-a-guide-for-policy-makers-and-practitioners.pdf), accessed 14 January 2021, Pg. 17

Figure 10 illustrates that stabilization is a distinct concept from peacekeeping, state-building and counter-terrorism; and, at the same time illustrates how all of these tasks can be

<sup>89</sup> The United Kingdom, “UK Aid: Tackling Global Challenges in the National Interest” *Department for International Development, HM Treasury, CM 9163, November 2015*, [UK aid: tackling global challenges in the national interest \(publishing.service.gov.uk\)](https://www.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/524441/UK-aid-tackling-global-challenges-in-the-national-interest.pdf), accessed 19 March 2021, Pg. 5

<sup>90</sup> United Kingdom, “National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015” Pg. 41

<sup>91</sup> The United Kingdom, “UK Aid: Tackling Global Challenges in the National Interest” Pg. 3-4

pursued in parallel within a specific area. This is a graphical depiction of how they overlap and express an interconnected relationship. Stabilisation is not simply about the primacy of politics or the need for political deals. It is both these things, but it is much more ... in stabilisation contexts, all aspects of any action have political ramifications, regardless of what is involved.<sup>92</sup> Given this depiction and the interwoven aspects of violence, instability and building long term stability in complex environments, it is not difficult to see the link towards UK military forces within a CB portfolio.

The MoD is the third method and governmental department that delivers BPC to UK partners in a coalition and bi-lateral fashions. The UK provides military experts from all branches of its military; this includes the use of contracted professionals to deliver effect and ensure that CB is conducted with its foreign policy needs. Much like the GoC and CAF, the UK and MoD BPC focuses on training, exercises and institutional/operational capacities. Furthermore, both Canada and the UK generally do not force capacity or programs onto their partners. Whereas Canada looks for and waits for dialogue regarding the partner needs and bases training and infrastructure accordingly, the UK stance revolves around the question “what do you need and how best can we deliver this training?”<sup>93</sup> As such, the United Kingdom has three major expeditionary CB training programs:

1. British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) involves permanently stationed conventional forces with long-term objectives of protecting and training indigenous forces in peacekeeping methods, particularly in West Africa (Ghana) as well as Central and Eastern Europe.
2. British Peace Support Team (BPST) is made up of specialized forces that have a short-term focus of teaching indigenous forces specific peacekeeping skills, mainly in East Africa and the Caribbean region.

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<sup>92</sup> The United Kingdom, “The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation” Pg. 38

<sup>93</sup> Marquis, J.P., et al., Pg. 68

3. International Military Advisory Training Team (IMATT), made up of both military and civilians, safeguards and develops the armed services as well as focuses on securing essential services, restoring vital infrastructure, and providing public order. This program is working in Sierra Leone under the auspices of Exercise Green Eagle.<sup>94</sup>

Generally speaking, this includes the deployment of specialists as part of various regional and bilateral capacity-building programmes, including in Kenya (BPST East Africa, and British Army Training Unit Kenya), South Africa (BPST South Africa), Sierra Leone, and the Czech Republic (IMATT).<sup>95</sup>

The MoD uses one additional method for BPC that is not as well known: the British Loan Service Team program. While deployed with Operation IMPACT in Amman, I had multiple opportunities to work with the UK Loan Service Officers stationed in Jordan. These were extremely professional, small team orientated and independent soldiers and officers. In 2015, during a question-and-answer session in Parliament, the Ministry of Defence confirmed that there [were] some 200 personnel in Loan Service teams in seven countries: Brunei, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. These Loan Service personnel are embedded in a wide variety of training, educational and staff posts in the host nations' armed forces.<sup>96</sup> This confirming statement is the most recent data I could find answering questions to and/or detailing this expeditionary program. What is interesting is how these personnel include ranks as high as Brigadier-General (as is the case in Jordan) to that of various enlisted rank

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<sup>94</sup> Ibid, Pg. 68-69

<sup>95</sup> Curran, D., and Williams, P.W., "The UK and UN Peace Operations: A Case for Greater Engagement" *Oxford Research Group*, 26 May 2017, [The UK and UN Peace Operations: A Case for Greater Engagement | Oxford Research Group](#), accessed 2 March 2021, Pg. 7

<sup>96</sup> United Kingdom Parliament, "Armed Forces: Training – Questions for the Ministry of Defence" *UIN 4646*, tabled 29 June 2015, *Written Questions, Answers and Statements*, [Written questions and answers - Written questions, answers and statements - UK Parliament](#), accessed 14 April 2021



levels. The UK embassy, its ambassador and foreign service, therefore, have an additional process when to develop capacity, deliver training and/or infrastructure to the host nation.

In 2007, after several years of conflict in both Afghanistan and Iraq, including its normal capacity enhancement efforts throughout the world, the government re-evaluated its policies and procedures for CB within permissive and non-permissive environments and how the various UK departments conducted these tasks. They found that there were unrealized opportunities regarding unity of purpose, continuity and results that could not be overlooked; in completing this review they found a requirement to create a multi-departmental organization that spanned across the three major portfolios. It established a new £269 [\$371 USD] million Stabilisation Aid Fund and the Stabilisation Unit, jointly owned by DfID, the FCO and the MoD.<sup>97</sup>

The Right Honourable Alister Burt MP (UK), the Minister of State for International Development and the Foreign Office's Middle Eastern division explained the official position of the government and his thoughts on the genesis and *raison d'être* for the Stabilization Unit (SU) within the governments' cornerstone document *The UK Government's Approach to Stabilisation: A Guide for Policy Makers and Practitioners*:

The UK government's goal in conflict-affected contexts is to support the development of lasting peace and stability, which is built with the consent of the population, is resilient and flexible in the face of shocks, and can evolve over time. This goal runs through our National Security Strategy and our Foreign Office priorities, and it guides how the Department for International Development spends fifty per cent of its aid budget in conflict affected countries. It also explains why we have led international efforts to build peace by empowering women through our National Action Plan.

The UK is a world leader in helping tackle the root causes of conflict and instability. The National Security Council sets priorities and ensures there is an integrated policy response using the capabilities and expertise across HMG. We back this up with funding from departments and the cross-government Conflict, Stability and Security

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<sup>97</sup> The United Kingdom, "The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom" Pg. 39

Fund. These efforts have helped support political processes and conflict de-escalation across the world.<sup>98</sup>

According to its government website, the SU is an agile, cross-government unit providing expertise to build stability, prevent conflict and meet security challenges internationally. It is a WoG, civil-military-police unit based in London; this includes Government Partnership International (GPI). The GPI is a purpose-built component (formerly the National School of Government International) within the SU that specializes in providing peer-to-peer support to partner governments overseas, to help them deliver better public services to citizens. This work supports UK government objectives in fragile and developing countries by increasing the impact of aid interventions and helping to build effective institutions.<sup>99</sup> Specific functions assigned to the SU include:

1. Providing the link between civil, military and police efforts to build stability overseas;
2. Facilitating cross-government working and lesson-learning in planning for, and responding to, conflict;
3. Capturing and sharing lessons and examples of best practice on stabilisation work; and
4. Responding to requests from UK government departments, embassies and country offices for support to fragile and conflict-affected states.<sup>100</sup>

The SU is funded through the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund [CSSF] which is governed through the National Security Council. [It] consists of core civil servant staff members

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<sup>98</sup> The United Kingdom, “The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation” Pg. 5

<sup>99</sup> The United Kingdom, “Stabilisation Unit – About Us” *The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations*, [About us - Stabilisation Unit - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/about-us-stabilisation-unit), accessed 15 April 2021

<sup>100</sup> Ibid, accessed 14 January 2021

from 12 government departments, as well as serving military and police officers.<sup>101</sup> The CSSF itself is part of the distinct driving force to the UK government's Fusion Doctrine (as is referenced in the National Security Capability Review). Its purpose is to improve the way cross-government capability is brought together. The National Security Council includes the Secretaries of State and is chaired by the Prime Minister, sets the CSSF's strategic direction.<sup>102</sup> This is the natural focal point of innovation, defence, security and foreign development policies for the UK government.

The UK government defines stabilisation activities as the initial response to violence or the immediate threat of violence, where the capacity of local political structures and processes to manage conflict have broken down.<sup>103</sup> It further states that its objective in undertaking stabilisation interventions is to support local and regional partners in conflict-affected countries to reduce violence, ensure basic security and facilitate peaceful political deal-making, all of which should aim to provide a foundation for building long-term stability.<sup>104</sup> In supporting stabilisation, the UK adheres to three central stabilisation principles:

1. Protecting the means of survival: Address any immediate security deficit to build space for peaceful political processes and – in time – support the restoration of long-term security, the rule of law and access to justice. The direct provision of security by external actors alone will not in itself achieve stabilisation.
2. Promoting and supporting a political process to reduce violence: Stabilisation must work to support and foster political deals and bargains among key conflict elites and actors. These are vital to securing reductions in violent conflict, building support for more formal peace agreements and facilitating stable

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<sup>101</sup> The United Kingdom, "Stabilisation Unit" *The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, Stabilisation Unit - GOV.UK* ([www.gov.uk](http://www.gov.uk)), accessed 14 January 2021

<sup>102</sup> The United Kingdom, "Conflict, Stability and Security Fund – About Us" *About us - Conflict, Stability and Security Fund - GOV.UK* ([www.gov.uk](http://www.gov.uk)), accessed 15 April 2021


<sup>103</sup> The United Kingdom, "The UK Government's Approach to Stabilisation" Pg. 11

<sup>104</sup> Ibid, Pg. 11

transitions out of conflict. Stabilisation activity must always be locally owned and requires the buy-in of local elites to be effective.

3. Preparing a foundation for longer term stability: There is no set period for stabilisation...it is always a transitory activity contributing to the wider goal of creating the conditions for long-term stability. Shorter-term stabilisation interventions and other activities to build longer-term stability will often run simultaneously and overlap with other approaches.<sup>105</sup>

These three principles are demonstrated in Figure 11 as building blocks for stability framework; they incorporate people, global actors and states with a view to create long-term stability:



**Figure 11 - The Building Stability Framework**

Source: The United Kingdom, "The UK Government's Approach to Stabilisation: A Guide for Policy Makers and Practitioners" *The Stabilisation Unit*, 7 March 2019, [The UK Government's approach to Stabilisation: A guide for policy makers and practitioners - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/792419/UK-Government-Approach-to-Stabilisation-A-Guide-for-Policy-Makers-and-Practitioners.pdf), accessed 14 January 2021, Pg. 22

<sup>105</sup> Ibid, Pg. 11

Furthermore, the UK intends to build and expand upon existing foreign policy lines of effort with a view to increase intelligence and assessments capabilities, diplomacy to include the United Nations Security Council, development, defence engagement, trade and economics and build upon the current Stabilization Unit capacity for holistic CB. The desired end state is to reinforce its integrated approach, while maximizing the contribution of UK capabilities to tackling instability and conflict. This will help [it] draw more effectively on the skills and capacities across government, and internationally, and to tailor [its] approach to each situation.<sup>106</sup> In all source and/or policy documents I examined throughout the course of this research, it is apparent that DfID (or its successor) will be the UK's primary department with its agencies to deliver aid.

In this chapter UK CB doctrine has been examined and several distinctions from the US and Canadian perspective and procedure are prevalent throughout. DfID was largely an autonomous department free to operate within its strategic guidelines and conduct operations with its integral funding. USAID has the opposite considerations, it has little to no political freedom and has no authority regarding flexible expenditure outside the parameters of its direct budget. The UK system fully recognizes that stabilization is a distinct concept from peacekeeping, which is different from state-building and therefore counter-terrorism. Moreover, at the same time recognizes that all these tasks can be pursued or take place in parallel within a specific area. It bases its CB endeavours on enduring policy and long-term strategic goals. The embedded Loan Service Personnel of approximately 200 personnel operating in seven countries throughout the world is a prime example of its lasting strategic vision.

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<sup>106</sup> The United Kingdom, "Building Stability Overseas Strategy" *Department for International Development, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence, July 2011*, [Building Stability Overseas Strategy \(publishing.service.gov.uk\)](https://publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/252221/Building-Stability-Overseas-Strategy.pdf), accessed 19 March 2021, Pg. 19

Similar to Canada, the UK and MoD BPC focus on training, exercises and institutional and/or operational capacities. Outside of the defence and security nexus of CB operations, it looks to provide development aid and financing based on three specifically identified government principles: protecting the means of survival, promoting and supporting a political process to reduce violence and finally, by preparing a foundation for longer term stability.<sup>107</sup> The UK is the only G7 nation that has met the Office for Economic Cooperation and Development recommended 0.7% GDP allotment for official development assistance. There is a WoG approach that entails its diplomatic corps, intelligence apparatus, NGO, OGD, defence and contracted specialists to deliver capacity and champion its strategic vision for UK foreign policy. The creation of the Stabilization Unit and establishment of its task to provide expertise to build stability, prevent conflict and meet security challenges internationally thereby supporting the integrated co-ordination of UK government activities in fragile and conflict-affected states by being a centre of expertise on conflict, stabilisation, security and justice<sup>108</sup>, are important factors in UK CB doctrine and policy.

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<sup>107</sup> The United Kingdom, “The UK Government’s Approach to Stabilisation: A Guide for Policy Makers and Practitioners” Pg. 11

<sup>108</sup> The United Kingdom, “Stabilisation Unit – About Us” accessed 15 April 2021

## CB CHALLENGES AND OBSERVATIONS

Perhaps one of the most prominent similarities among the three nations CB operations is the incorporated use of Defence Engagement Activities and Defence Diplomacy throughout.

Internationally renowned political science policy institute Brookings defines Defence Diplomacy as a function that:

Allows the military to on foreign policy through other means. Although not diplomacy in the traditional sense of a State Department mission, military relationships between countries build a foundation on which further connections between nations are developed. Military interoperability enhances regions economically, directly through commercial contracting and the resulting employment, servicemember contributions through commerce, and in some cases, contributions of military gear and equipment through foreign military sales or otherwise.<sup>109</sup>

In light of this explanation, it is increasingly easy to draw parallels and similarities in the American, British and Canadian (ABC) Defence Diplomacy policies which I will examine in the following section.

The US Defence Department describes this practice as decisions that tie into those of the State Department foreign policy. Military advisors and diplomats share the same mission, they have very different perspectives and skill sets.... that's where the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office of State-Defense Integration comes in.<sup>110</sup> Furthermore, it creates a link between DoD and State by supplying State with military advisors and DoD with foreign policy advisors, much like they're exchange students. It better prepares America to respond to emerging threats and advance U.S. national security interests more effectively.<sup>111</sup> The UK definition of Defence Diplomacy is that is part of [its] broader bilateral relations, defence

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<sup>109</sup> Ebitz, E., "The Use of Military Diplomacy in Great Power Competition: Lessons Learned from the Marshall Plan" *Brookings, Order from Chaos, 12 February 2019*, [The use of military diplomacy in great power competition \(brookings.edu\)](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-use-of-military-diplomacy-in-great-power-competition/), accessed 16 April 2021

<sup>110</sup> Lange, K., "Tying Defence with Diplomacy" *US Department of Defence, 13 March 2019*, [Tying Defense with Diplomacy > U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE > Story](https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Story.aspx?StoryID=2019031301), accessed 16 April 2021

<sup>111</sup> Ibid, accessed 16 April 2021

diplomacy builds and maintains our alliances and partnerships, secures influence and helps [it] to understand the environment in which we operate. It is delivered by [its] global network of Defence Attachés, loan service, liaison and exchange officers, supported by a targeted programme of international visits and staff talks.<sup>112</sup>

The Canadian program is by far the most definable and publicly released programme among the three; it incorporates portions of both the US and UK policies and practices modified to fit Canadian needs and foreign policy requirements; Canada defines this as:

The Military Diplomacy component of the Global Engagement Program [that] falls under the authority of the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff. It represents the contribution of the Canadian Defence Attaché's (CDA) reporting to the Director of Foreign Liaison; the Canadian Defence Liaison Staff (London) and the Canadian Defence Liaison Staff (Washington), reporting to VCDS; the Permanent Resident Mission in New York reporting to Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy); and various Liaison/Exchange Officers.

CDAs are responsible to the Chief of the Defence Staff through DFL for the provision of military advice and appropriate support and assistance to the Canadian Ambassador/High Commissioner or designated Head of Mission (HoM). Specifically, CDAs provide advice and support to achieve greater interoperability and enhanced delivery of Defence capabilities for on-going, contingency and potential operations. CDAs collect, analyze and provide intelligence to support strategic and operational decision making.<sup>113</sup>

There is a strong and justified reliance on CDAs as the Department's eyes and ears within their partner nation portfolios. They are the direct link to the HoM and GAC within the countries they reside. This is a distinct quality to effectiveness within the ABC and other like-minded nations expeditionary interests.

Defence Research and Development Canada (DRCD) conducted a scientific report on WoG trust and the implications for a comprehensive approach to GoC interoperability and

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<sup>112</sup> The United Kingdom, "UK's International Defence Engagement Strategy" *Ministry of Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2017*, [UK's International Defence Engagement Strategy 2017 \(publishing.service.gov.uk\)](https://publishing.service.gov.uk), accessed 16 April 2021, Pg. 11

<sup>113</sup> Government of Canada, "Evaluation of Global Engagement/Military Diplomacy" *Department of National Defence, May 2018*, [Evaluation of Global Engagement/Military Diplomacy - Canada.ca](https://www.canada.ca/en/department-of-national-defence/evaluation-of-global-engagement-military-diplomacy), accessed 16 April 2021



effectiveness. There were several key deductions present in the Canadian example; furthermore, DRDC found that these observations also crossed national boundaries to some of our closest allies. These included misunderstandings between military and OGD regarding roles and responsibilities from the contributing organisations. They found that especially early on, personnel were unaware of the skill sets of the members of other agencies, did not believe that the other personnel possessed the requisite level of competence in the required skills, or did not recognize that the various skill sets were important to achieving success.<sup>114</sup>

Furthermore, there were negative initial stereotypes associated with many of interagency organizations, with at least some civilians being unaware of the background and education level of military officers and military personnel being taken aback at the young age.<sup>115</sup> This led to inferring that there was a lack of competence and expertise of their civilian OGD counterparts.<sup>116</sup> Another persistent observation within the similar context revolved around work and its associated timelines to achieve deliverables. The military is notorious for identifying problems and working their people until the problem is solved; it will do so by throwing a maximum amount people and effort at it for resolution:

Interviewees recounted how they sometimes had to work quite hard to overcome these initial stereotypes. In particular, the civilian members noted that they felt that they had to work incredibly hard and long hours, feeling that little consideration was given to the fact that there were so few civilians to complete the OGD portion of tasks, relative to military personnel. They also felt that they had to demonstrate their expertise and competence before they felt that their military counterparts would begin to pay attention to or trust their input.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> Thompson, M.M., “Swift Trust: Implications for Whole of Government/Comprehensive Approach (WoG/CA) Missions” *Defence Research and Development Canada, Scientific Report, DRDC-RDCC-2014-R79, September 2014*, [Microsoft Word - R14-0617-1126\\_final.docx \(dtic.mil\)](#), accessed 14 December 2020, Pg. 9-10

<sup>115</sup> Ibid, Pg. 9

<sup>116</sup> Ibid, Pg. 9

<sup>117</sup> Ibid, Pg. 10

Without a moments hesitation I can say that I have experienced all of these observations while deployed within a JIMP environment. The intergovernmental departmental politics associated with OGD work requires relationships, patience, time and trust to overcome. In some circles in Ottawa there is a stereotype associated with military members, especially with Army personnel. It is based on the perception that we are blunt force objects and historically inflexible to outside organizational input and/or people. I have heard it spoken from other Canadian governmental employees that some supervisors feel that the realm of development and aid should be left exclusively to Global Affairs; therefore, there can be no risk to the de-synchronization or coordination of foreign and defence policies by defence.

Within the three DRDC examined countries there was also an obvious and distinct challenge associated with funding and/or competing organisational/departamental goals. Defence analyst Dr. Ross Fetterly illustrates this challenge, by explaining that defence “does not produce a single homogenous and generalized product called defence capability. It produces many different products with many different production processes.” This highlights the broad scope and challenges inherent in defence institutions. Internal dynamics and changing global security issues tend to drive evolution in defence business plans.<sup>118</sup> Moreover, the decision-making process in defence is a “complex process with elements of rationality interspersed with competition for scarce resources and negotiations that result in solutions, that while not always based on logic can be accepted by the major stakeholders”.<sup>119</sup>

Table 3 lays out terms and conditions (as of December 2020) for financial authorities regarding DND CB Vote 10 programs. The highest level of approval for DND projects rests with the Minister of International Affairs (MINA) who can approve projects up to total cost of

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<sup>118</sup> Fetterly, R., Pg. 2

<sup>119</sup> Ibid, Pg. 2

\$15 million CAD. Consider a separate departmental Minister as the approving authority for DND projects; this dynamic could face significant challenges for those plans if the two Ministers or their corresponding staffs have a difference in opinions, do not fully support the project scope or its justification.

**Table 3: GAC Capacity Building Programs Terms and Conditions**

	March 2015 <u>Ts</u> and Cs (current)	2018 <u>Ts</u> and Cs (once approved)
<b>MINA</b>	Up to \$10M	Up to \$15M
<b>USS</b>	Up to \$7M	Up to \$10M
<b>ADM</b>	Up to \$5	Up to \$5M
<b>DG</b>	Up to \$3M	Up to \$2M
<b>Director</b>	Up to \$250K	Up to \$250K
<b>DD</b>		Up to 50K

Source: Gemmiti, A., and Ali, N., “SJS Capacity Building (CB) Briefing” *Strategic Joint Staff, Department of National Defence*, Pg. 7

In the Canadian example, although DND has monies allocated under Vote 10 Grants and Contribution authorities, the projects and funds are managed by GAC. In these cases, this policy is used to transfer funds to other organizations, individuals and governments to fulfill the federal governments objectives.<sup>120</sup> This means that in some cases there must be special Ministerial approval from the Minister of Foreign Affairs with endorsement from National Defence for large capital projects depending on the scope and scale as was the case for the Jordanian-Syria Northern Border Road project which will be examined in the case study. Most Canadian literature and analytics revolve around an unfocused development policy and the need

<sup>120</sup> Smith, A., “Background Paper: The Parliamentary Financial Cycle” *Library of Parliament, No. 2015-41-E, Economics, Resources and International Affairs Division, Parliamentary Information and Research Service, 21 July 2015, [The Parliamentary Financial Cycle](#)*, accessed 14 December 2020, Pg. 14

for reform. Until the most recent change to GAC in 2015, Canadian aid had several different faces for delivery, CIDA, DFAIT and DFATD were all predecessors to Global Affairs. Similar to DfID, CIDA had a cabinet-level Minister for International Cooperation who oversaw development policy. Unlike DfID, however, CIDA had weak ministerial powers at the government level, with decision-making on development policy centralised in the office of the Prime Minister.<sup>121</sup>

There were also linkages to US programming throughout this entire period; much like with USAID this led to various levels of confusion and misunderstanding regarding the chain of command and who reports to who? The Rand Corporation, specifically, its National Defence Research Institute identified two additional complimentary narratives regarding dual levels of authorities and their associated challenges for US forces operating under the Unified Combatant Commands in various theater of operation for CB. First, some, but not all, security cooperation programs have accompanying directives or operating instructions that specify the program's objectives, how resources are allotted and expended, and the various stakeholder responsibilities...[Second,] some security cooperation programs have included so-called dual-key legislative provisions that require the Secretary of State's concurrence on military training and equipping programs approved by DoD.<sup>122</sup>

Tied Aid is a term defined as “money that a rich country lends to poor country, on condition that the poor country spends the money on goods from the rich country”<sup>123</sup>; the OECD

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<sup>121</sup> McConnon, E., Pg. 26

<sup>122</sup> Paul, C., et al., “What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?” *Rand Corporation, 2013, ISBN: 978-0-8330-7850-6, [What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances? | RAND](#)*, accessed 3 March 2021, Pg. 12

<sup>123</sup> Cambridge Dictionary, “Tied Aid” [TIED AID | meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary](#), accessed 16 April 2021

research and analysis department reasoned that this practice can affect the value of the grant given these caveats by up to 15-30%.<sup>124</sup> Up until 2013 Canada still used Tied Aid as a caveat for assistance to donor recipients; in accordance with the OECD Development Assistance Committee proposal, Canada “un-tied” 98.5% of its aid requirements in 2015. While Canada no longer employs this economic practice, it does still promote the use of Canada first options for equipment and corporate involvement through GAC, the Canadian embassies and the Canadian Trade Commission and personnel.

The US also uses Tied Aid for foreign support donations; according to the Congressional Research Service in 2016 approximately 32% of all US aid was tied, and in 2017 almost 67% of U.S. foreign assistance funds were obligated to U.S.-based entities.<sup>125</sup> Finally the UK un-tied all of its aid in 2002 in accordance with a 2000 White Paper based on recommendations from the OECD.<sup>126</sup> Given this unrestricted aid policy, the UK’s guiding principle that the security of the world’s poorest and most vulnerable is of utmost importance and should be prioritised...and that closer relationship between security and development has led UK security policy to have a greater focus on development issues, stemming from a realisation of the limits of military power for ensuring global security.<sup>127</sup> This is a valuable trend towards the delivery of aid and assistance without overt pre-determined qualifiers.

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<sup>124</sup> Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Untied Aid” *Development Finance Standards*, [Untied aid - OECD](#), accessed 16 April 2021

<sup>125</sup> Congressional Research Service, “Foreign Aid: An introduction to US Programs and Policy” *R40213*, 16 April 2019, [Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy \(fas.org\)](#), accessed 19 April 2021, Pg. 23

<sup>126</sup> Library of Congress, “Regulation of Foreign Aid: United Kingdom” *United States Government, Regulation of Foreign Aid: United Kingdom | Law Library of Congress (loc.gov)*, accessed 19 April 2021


<sup>127</sup> McConnon E., Pg. 25

## CASE STUDIES

### **Jordan/Syria Northern Border Road**

The Border Road Rehabilitation Project was Canada's signature Middle Eastern Vote 10 CB project in partnership between the GoC and the Kingdom of Jordan; specifically, GAC CTCBP and DND delivered infrastructure through United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) to the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF). Project planning and execution was coordinated through the CTAT-J; its mission was to enable the JAF through infrastructure, acquisition and training delivery in order to BPC, enhance regional stability and support Canada's Middle East Engagement Strategy. This project cost \$18.4 million CAD, including the construction of nearly 63kms of (pre-extension) road remediation between border towers 41 and 52 as well as three access roads that intersected with the main border road. Construction commenced in March 2019 and was expected to be completed within 12 months. The conceptual plan was based on the scope to enhance JAF Border Guard Force operations, improve JAF mobility along the northern border with Syria and enable a quicker response time to border incursions, smuggling activity and/or other security threats.

The process for any Vote 10 Project endorsed through GAC follows the "Results-Based Management" process. It's a massive multi-step bureaucracy that academically provides the desired output and best results for the Canadian tax payers. The optimal planning process criteria used by the Strategic Joint Staff (SJS) for DND Vote 10 Project Implementation Project timeline. This process can be streamlined in some cases to 13 weeks with Commander Canadian Joint Operations Command involvement; without it and through normal processes/timelines it typically takes two-three months to achieve.



**Figure 12 – DND Vote 10 Project Cycle**

Source: Gemmiti, A., and Ali, N., “SJS Capacity Building (CB) Briefing” *Strategic Joint Staff, Department of National Defence*, Pg. 9

In November 2017, the GoC approved \$60 million [CAD] in defence funding to support [the] CAF’s efforts to defeat Daesh in the ME. One of the most significant projects financed by these funds [was] the Jordan Border Road Rehabilitation project...announced 17 December 2017.<sup>128</sup> Identified previously during the challenges and observations paragraph found under Table 3: GAC Capacity Building Programs Terms and Conditions, one of the key timeline issues associated DND Vote 10 authorities revolves around who is allowed to authorize projects. The Northern Border Road Rehabilitation Project was no exception and pushed the boundaries of these approvals given the initial and closing costs to the project. Primary estimates came in a \$25 Million CAD; eventual closing costs including the road extension finalized at \$18.4 million CAD. These two expenses alone superseded spending authorities laid out by the Treasury Board and required additional authorities to commence project realization. It took a special one-time approval to grant MINA permission to sign the Jordan Border Road Rehabilitation project. It is

<sup>128</sup> Department of National Defence, “Border Road Rehabilitation Project Ground Breaking Ceremony in Jordan” *News Release – Quick Facts*, Ottawa, On, CAF, 8 April 2019, [Border Road Rehabilitation Project Ground Breaking Ceremony in Jordan - Canada.ca](#), accessed 21 April 21

generally understood within CB circles that the current management of the “Contribution Agreement” structure is largely inflexible. It does not allow for the inevitable changes to the situation that happen on the ground, even the simple ones. These may require Ministerial and Deputy Ministerial approval to facilitate the change.

UNOPS documentation regarding the Northern Border Road Project found in Annex A to the Project Description/Reporting, describes criteria and commencement details for the initial project scope and design. Specifically, the border road design period was carried on behalf of the Canadian Government between 1 January to 31 May 2018. During this time, they conducted technical assessments to define the statement of requirements, designed the detailed road strategy and undertook Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) and programme monitoring. Between the announcement of the project in December 2017 and the design phase in May 2018, a period of five months had elapsed. There was an additional eight months of time before the Contribution Agreement was signed; and finally, another fourteen months until the construction was complete and the official hand-over ceremony took place, formally giving the road to the JAF. A brief condensed project timeline from Contribution Agreement to completion.

1. 30 January 2019: Contribution Agreement is signed;
2. 12 March 2019: Construction of Road Begins;
3. 8 April 2019: Border Road Ground Breaking Ceremony;
4. 24 November 2019: Paving Complete on original scope, approval for extension granted with unused funds;
5. 2 December 2019: Joint Task Force-IMPACT Engineers inspect project, determine scope had not been delivered;
6. January 2020: Construction of Border Road Extension Commences; and
7. 31 Mar 2020: Completion of all Border Road Project Activities.<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>129</sup> CTAT-J, “CTAT-J 101 Brief to the Commander TF-PROTEUS, BGen P.K. Scott”



From the GoC project announcement in 2017 until its conclusion in 2020 it took 27 months to have a fully operational capacity donated to Jordan. This is an extremely long time to promise, fabricate and deliver a road construction project to a strategic partner. The need for consistent high-level approval, modification and the confusion by the implementing partners, simply created confusion and additional exertion rather than promoting accountability from the contractor and third party.

In our current construct, GAC contracts the design, build and quality assurance and quality control to a third-party agency such as UNOPS or IOM; this process can yield great results when the implementing partner does what it is contracted to do; when it does not, there are significant challenges to the process. This was primarily evident in the December 2019 inspection by JTF – IMPACT civil engineers, who determined the scope of the project had not been delivered in accordance with the terms and conditions. Immediately upon examination while all personnel were still on the project site, they informed the GAC staff of the deficiencies. Although there was no formal requirement for the CAF to conduct the quality assurance and/or control aspect of this project given the contract conditions to UNOPS, it was completed as an act of stewardship given the size, scope and cost of the road project. These faults required the road extension project to be delayed, repaired and in some locations undergo major re-construction before finally being re-inspected prior to the donation ceremony.

Key lessons learned from the Border Road Rehabilitation Project consist of several findings based on length of time for delivery based on multi-departmental bureaucracy. First, there was often a duplication of efforts and/or responsibilities. The CTAT worked closely with GAC's CTCBP First Secretary to deliver projects, responsibilities were divided along military and non-military lines. GAC owned the relationship with the implementing partners International Organization for Migration (IOM/UNOPS) and the CAF owned the relationship

with the JAF; with all parties reporting back through SJS, CJOC and Global Affairs Ottawa as the final direction and guidance through the Regional Manager. This sometimes caused confusion and problems for the various stakeholders; it increased the need for communication and added no visible tangible benefit.

Second, when quality control and quality assurance are built into third party contracts, we are left to their timelines and expertise, greatly depending on the skill and standing of the third-party organization. Not all groups have the same business models, scruples or good practices. If we are going to pay an organization to do something, it must be held accountable to do so or lose its contracts and eligibility to bid on GoC projects. The issue at hand is that with most of these organizations there are varying levels of competence and corruption. The GoC uses the best option available to it, but in an expeditionary capacity the field is limited to who is accessible in the affected nation. Another huge consideration regarding implementation partners is their high overhead and administrative costs. In Jordan it was approximately 25%, but in the West Bank it was up to a 30% administrative cost right off the top. Bureaucracy means longer time lines, the loss of opportunities to address urgent, un-forecasted capacity building requirements.<sup>130</sup>

The next two case examples of CB initiatives by the GoC in the Middle East revolve around two specific challenges, Legal Authorities and Program Alignment and their impact on these projects.

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<sup>130</sup> BGen Scott, P.K., *Commander Task Force PROTEUS/Deputy Coordinator Police Primacy and Sustainment, United States Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority*, Telephone Conversation with Author, 28 May 2020

## **JAF Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) Material Support Radio Project**

As part of a combined mentorship and equipment support project between the CAF and JAF, the GoC committed to embedded mentorship/instruction as well as a \$5 million CAD Vote 10 project to deliver language labs, computers and a JTAC dome type simulator to the newly established JTAC training centre of excellence at the JAF army base in Zarqa, Jordan. Due to external circumstances, needs of the JAF and other allied nation donations considerations, the project was re-scoped and re-rolled to the delivery of JTAC equipment suitable for instruction and operational use. This included personal protective equipment, JTAC specific kit and the delivery of Harris 117G radios, the international standard used by western nation JTACs to the Jordanian military.

Personnel from the CTAT did a needs assessment, worked with our CB allies in Jordan and found that the best option for the JTAC program was the Harris 117G communications equipment. The project ultimately failed and needed to be changed yet again; the legal authorities for US export rules did not allow for third party organizations to purchase military equipment. These types of military equipment purchases must be done state to state, only after authorized purchases can this equipment then be donated. Even though the project was a DND/CAF initiative because of our current rules for Vote 10 monies, GAC had to contract the entire process to an implementing partner, UNOPS. Irrespective of the CAF aspect, the simple fact that UNOPS was the proposed purchasing organization, the project was stopped by the US government. DND and the CAF have national autonomy for military spec equipment purchases; we already have purchased this type of radio and it is currently in service but because of our existing methods this initiative did not proceed. This is one example of how legal authorities and procedural considerations can impede CB operations and ultimately can affect our standing with our hosts in partner nations.

## **Combined Joint Task Force Inherent Resolve/NATO Mission Iraq De-Mining Equipment**

This CB project example did not proceed due to Program Alignment issues and departmental authorizations. In the end, it came down to what program directorates within GAC were authorized to conduct what type of CB operations and tasks. There are two separate missions in Iraq aside from Op IMPACT. First is the US Central Command led Op INHERENT RESOLVE; and the second is the NATO Mission in Iraq. The removal of explosive residue of war and de-mining are two widely supported initiatives in Iraq. Until 2020 the CAF had combat engineers instructing and mentoring Iraqi engineers at their military engineering school as part of our commitment to defeating ISIS and creating regional stability. Both INHERENT RESOLVE and the NATO mission supported the de-mining and explosive residue removal efforts by the CAF and hoped that our commitment would expand.

On the surface any additional Canadian support to de-mining seemed extremely sound given our leadership as the design nation and our cooperation with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines resulting in creation of the Ottawa Treaty; an accord that prohibits the use, stockpiling and transfer of anti-personnel landmines and their eventual destruction. The Op IMPACT CB branch developed a specific de-mining and engineer equipment donation proposal to support our activities in Iraq. The project had endorsement from the CAF, both allied missions and the Canadian embassy/ambassador in Iraq; in light of this overwhelming support the proposal went forward to GAC. Because the memorandum of understanding for CAF CB operations in Iraq was solely drafted to represent support and coordination from GAC CTCBP and de-mining was the domain of GAC PSOPs the project did not proceed. Even though the CB department had the funding available, there was wide endorsement that helped champion every aspect of the Ottawa Treaty and directly supported the training and CAF mentors already doing the job in Iraq, there was an insurmountable problem.

In summary, given the program mis-alignment between program directorates the project did not proceed. The Op IMPACT CB team scoped and confirmed the project funding and made an offer to transfer to entire project to GAC PSOPs; unfortunately, PSOPs was not staffed or capable at that time to take on the project and the initiative stopped. This is a prime example of project mis-alignment that adversely affect CB and operations.

### **JAF Female Accommodation Buildings Project**

The CAF has standing relationship with the JAF that supports its endeavours for gender integration and inclusion within their military. The Canadian Female Engagement Team embedded mentorship program started in 2018 and is only a portion of our commitment to help with this initiative in Jordan. The first rotation of female CAF soldiers to Amman to help train their female recruits commenced with an officer and NCO, the commitment has now grown to a total of three CAF mentors: an officer, senior NCO and NCM. In addition to the Female Engagement Team mentoring project, the CTAT also facilitates a gender integration seminar and workshop for the JAF. There is also a female accommodation building project based on Vote 10 grants totalling \$6 million CAD that has been in-progress since December 2018.

The project is based on several criteria with a view to build four company sized barrack blocks in Jordan. It is linked to the JAF recruiting model and projections set forth by the Directorate of Military Women's Affairs National Action Plan which calls for female integration into each of its four regional commands, the Military Women's Training Centre training output capacity and the Strategic Plans Directorate for its definitive commitment and recruitment, for its training and employment roadmap. The current status of the proposal is on hold; it is awaiting funding allocation based on the confirmation of these requirements by the JAF and verification of them by the CAF. As this project is on-going, the completion of the proposal cannot be

analyzed. However, one key take-away from this example, is while committed in every way but officially allocating funding to the project, the Canadian and Jordanian governments remain dedicated to seeing this project develop.

There are two main complications as to why the project has not progressed. The first is that the JAF does not have the infrastructure to increase its recruitment and lodging of its female soldiers; there is still segregation of women into separate accommodations in training and in operations. The second, is based on the verification of the identified requirements for furtherance by the CAF; these two issues are completely related and from the Jordanian perspective hard to meet given their largest impediment to recruitment and meeting the criteria is the lack of infrastructure we are offering to build. When I left Jordan in June 2020 this project had serious interest by the Canadian MND, the Canadian Ambassador to Jordan and the chain of command from Op IMPACT. This assessment is based on the data I had available while deployed as the Commanding Officer of the CTAT in Jordan; it is possible that the project has progressed in a manner I am not aware of.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

Throughout the conduct of this research and writing of this paper, several observations based on doctrinal analysis and, suitable areas for development have been identified. The following are the key recommendations that were discovered and expanded upon during the evaluation. Many have been expressed by our partner nations or by defence scientists that will act as enabling functions supporting this assessment. We cannot overlook the importance of emotional intelligence influencing CAF personnel's emotional quotient. I believe this has a direct link into the synergy of inter-governmental operations and increasing interoperability will only enhance the ability of Canadian governmental departments to deliver the best possible product.

A prominent example of leadership, emotional intelligence, inclusion and a WoG Canadian example took place in Kandahar, Afghanistan; and one that can be re-visited as proof of interoperable success:

The senior CAF military commander [in this case] had a previous posting in the [same] OGD with whom he would be working most closely [while deployed]. This knowledge of the capabilities, skills, expertise and the potential contributions of the OGD to the overall mission objectives would have been invaluable. Moreover, he moved the Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK), the senior civilian on the ground to the office next to his to further facilitate interaction, cooperation and collaboration...these actions and the quality of the ongoing interactions between these two Canadian WoG leaders would have sent a clear signal concerning the level of interaction they were expecting to be the norm between the civilian and military WoG team members.<sup>131</sup>

Institutions [are] defined broadly as the rules of the game and the organizations that frame and enforce them, providing the incentives and constraints that shape political, economic and social interaction.<sup>132</sup> If change is necessary or the requirement for synergy, a method to rise above

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<sup>131</sup> Thompson, M.M., "Swift Trust" Pg. 9

<sup>132</sup> Smith, L., "Institution-Building as a Bridge Between Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Connecting the Security and Peace Nexus" *International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, United Nations Policy Brief 2016:1*, [PolicyBrief2016\\_1\\_Institution\\_building\\_Leanne\\_Smith.pdf \(un.org\)](#), accessed 2 March 2021, Pg. 4

structural and personal boundaries realising effective cooperation must be found; understanding that for achieving this cultural change this includes knowledge that:

1. Few organizations can successfully provide all the required resources, authority, and expertise on their own;
2. Matrixed, networked organizations are the goal;
3. Cultural change should precede systemic reform; and
4. Changing people (and the way they think) is the key to changing organizations.<sup>133</sup>

Practical and academic training and education regarding how emotional intelligence can influence military CB operations should be added to the training system; this includes at a minimum pre-deployment exposure for both officers and NCOs. A CAF member's first WoG exposure should not be experienced in a deployed scenario. Danish special forces command students at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey California, identified several key conclusions that compliment this first recommendation:

1. Joint seminars and courses on military capacity building should be offered frequently to disseminate knowledge and ensure common understanding of doctrine and procedures.
2. Joint military capacity building training exercises...should be conducted on a regular basis to ensure a common understanding of settings, doctrine, and planning according to the shape secure-develop doctrine.
3. A joint center of excellence in military capacity building should be created. This center should collect and maintain experiences, coordinate efforts between the services and commands, and provide military guidance on military capacity building to senior military and political decision makers.
4. Personnel for military capacity building should be individually selected based on criteria that relate to their advisory role.
5. A dedicated joint unit to conduct military capacity building should be created.

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<sup>133</sup> Keagle, J.M., "A Special Relationship: U.S. and NATO Engagement with the Partnership for Peace to Build Partner Capacity Through Education" *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, Vol. 11, Iss 4., Fall 2012: 59-73, [A Special Relationship: U.S. and NATO Engagement with the Partnership for Peace to Build Partner Capacity Through Education - ProQuest \(oclc.org\)](#), accessed 3 March 2021, Pg. 63



6. A database of personnel with capacity building qualifications should be created. On request and demand, personnel with the right qualifications can be designated for stabilization and capacity building missions.<sup>134</sup>

Canada had a legacy defense department known as the Formation Operations Centre of Excellence. Part of its mandate was to develop seminars and work shops where CAF and OGD personnel explored integration and optimization exercises/conferences including representation from various NGOs. This helped to bridge the gap between NGO and governmental departments while integrated examination of problems and solutions remained within a CB scenario. This should be re-explored as a viable solution to compliment the recommendation for additional training and exposure. Training for Canadian CB operations is suggested to include the following skills and characteristics; they need to be able to:

1. Think strategically (not just operationally or tactically), critically, and creatively;
2. Lead interagency teams;
3. Collaborate and persuade, not just “command”;
4. Plan and manage interagency operations;
5. Possess global and cultural acuity; and
6. Communicate (not just issue orders).<sup>135</sup>

By the exposure to CB, JIMP and emotional intelligence CAF members will have significant advantages to the current status quo.

It is recommended that DND and the CAF re-visit the employment model for reservists; their tasks and specialized civilian skills can be put to use in the CB environment to significant strategic effect. Policing, law, municipal affairs, medicine, transport and infrastructure management are but a few skills that our part-time soldiers, sailors, aviators and leaders execute

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<sup>134</sup> Andreassen, J.D., et. al., Pg. xvi

<sup>135</sup> Keagle, J.M., Pg. 64

on a daily basis. One specific trade solely within the domain of the reserves that transcends the civil military gap is of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) personnel. As a force enabling component for the mission and commander, their utility is explained in *Security Operations in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach*, wherein given the nature of their task and close relationship with their civilian counterparts, they have an established capacity to build trust, manage relationships and maintain optics among other areas of expertise.<sup>136</sup> CIMIC is a recognized NATO task and/or trade that has significant strategic effect if used accordingly. However, in the case of the Canadian experience it has been indicated by our operators that it [the trade] would benefit greatly from a proper selection process, from training that reflects the flexibility required of their role, and from a sustainable career path that would allow them to develop the role to its full potential.<sup>137</sup>

When quality control and quality assurance are built into third party contracts, we must enforce this part of the contract. Moreover, these high overhead and administrative costs of between 25 and 30% do not necessarily represent best value for money if the CAF must verify or complete these tasks, that others are paid to do so. This research has shown two distinct friction points in DND CB operations regarding Legal Authorities and Project Alignment which either re-shaped equipment donation requirements from what was requested and/or stopped a project completely as were the cases in Jordan and Iraq. In addition, the length of time associated with multi-departmental approval and bureaucracy can take enormous amounts of time; 27 months in the case of the border road.

Now that we understand how the Delegation of Authorities process and the manner in which permissions are passed to departments from the Treasury Board and authorized using the

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<sup>136</sup> Rostek, M., and Gizewski, P., eds., Pg. 223

<sup>137</sup> Ibid, Pg. 223

project assessment tools, and also, that DND already has established processes for contracting, defence infrastructure procurement, quality assurance and quality control expertise based on resident CAF specialists, it is logical to re-visit how Vote 10 Grants and Contributions are assigned to it. Should a decision be made to change the procedure from a multi-departmental process to a single stream, it must be in line with a WoG approach and fulfill foreign and defence requirements in a holistic manner. Moreover, it is extremely important to understand that DND and the CAF cannot and should not be the only department to deliver all CB operations in countries where it has a small footprint without a significant capability. Deployed missions to the Ukraine and the Middle East have large capabilities and CAF personnel to support this autonomous option. In the case of Op IMPACT in the Middle East there is a deployed CB cell resident in the head-quarters supported by a full continental staff component.

If the GoC was to explore independent DND CB Vote 10 projects in expeditionary operations, it is suggested that DND investigate in accompanied postings to the areas, much like the CDA personnel stationed in Canadian Embassies. CB is a long-term endeavour, continuity and relationships are key factors in ensuring partner successes and that the GoC strategic goals are achieved. Long-term postings would not only be beneficial to Vote 10 initiatives but also Vote 1 under training and operations. DND and the CAF should continue with its current policies and procedures for embedded mentorship and training with allies, partners and CB seeking nations.

## CONCLUSION

This paper focused on CB operations within a WoG approach and lessons learned from that study; it has furthermore examined the doctrines of Canada's two strongest allies, the US and UK. From it, the research has shown similarities and differences in the manner in which CB is delivered. In an opening statement to the National Defence Committee in March of 2020 Major-General Jocelyn Paul, Director General International Security Policy, the commander of the Directorate of Military Training and Cooperation and its department, the Military Training and Cooperation Programme, are in large part responsible for managing defence and international security relationships and providing advice on international defence relations. Its tasks and purpose are similar in nature to the UK Stabilization Unit and the US Bureau of Political-Military Affairs' Office of State-Defense Integration; we must continue to remain interoperable through this defence department work with our OGD counterparts.

Political jurisdiction, funding models and authorities all impact each nation differently. Canada should draw on the hard learned vignettes from our allies' experiences in BPC and capitalize on them. As is identified in the recommendations, Canada should explore the increased use of CB specific skill sets from CAF reservists in CB operational domains. We cannot overlook the importance and value of CIMIC and civilian related qualifications for military application. The significance of emotional intelligence and interaction by CAF members with our JIMP partners cannot be understated as criteria for mission success; as the old adage goes "you only get one chance to make a first impression". That first impression can have lasting effects for not only that current relationship but all future ones with the CAF.

Careful examination of Canadian policy, procedure and case studies have shown the following options for synchronization. First, there is a distinct and logical distinction between GAC and DND tasks and purposes, and while complimentary, do not always reflect the unique

needs of the other. Second, regardless of who has authorities to do what on behalf of the GoC, there must be a holistic approach where defence, diplomacy and aid are complimentary but not mirrored to one department's needs or mandate, thereby creating a coherent outward face for defence and foreign policy. The current multi-departmental procedures work when the ideal scenario for Vote 10 projects is present. However, as the case studies have shown, when program mis-alignment or contradictory legal authorities are present the entire process can be derailed; thus, adding risk to the mission, institution and international perception of the GoC.

Given that GAC contracts to a third-party entity which then hires an independent company to deliver the services or goods, there is the potential for little quality assurance and/or control as was the case in the Syria/Jordan border road project. CAF civil engineers deployed with Op IMPACT did this function as a principle of ensuring that Canadian tax dollars were being spent and used appropriately. Considering the specific function delivered by the CAF, it is questionable if the 25-30% management and control fee that organizations like UNOPS and IOM imposed should be re-visited, should this be a common occurrence elsewhere.

DND and the CAF have established policies and procedures for expeditionary operations relating to real life support, contracting of goods and services and defense specific infrastructure. Op IMPACT for example had a FY 2019/2020 operational budget of over \$44 million CAD which included all of the costs associated with operations, management, contracting and procurement. The continental staff system which is employed on nearly every mission is a recognised process that could be an opportunity for the CAF to use in CB operations in a deployed context. In some circumstances where DND has a large presence, defence can provide a better direct oversight of monies being spent in a deployed context. The calculating factor is that DND must have significant amounts of people and resources in order to accomplish this. In

small mission areas with minor footprints, DND management of projects would likely not be adequate given the lack of personnel and staff to facilitate this.

In Ottawa, the SJS has procedures that mimic all of GACs; in fact, a large number of the policy advisors previously worked for GAC and were hired by DND to expedite and facilitate the inter-departmental bureaucracy and ensure these projects happen. Both departments use the results-based management process dictated by the GoC; GAC approves proposals based on a Project Management Committee after a DND project has gone through a similar internal process known as the Project Management Board. The board is co-chaired by the Chief of Program, and the CFO which includes Ministerial or Deputy-Ministerial input if project scope is above the established Delegation of Authorities to our Level 1 commanders.

GAC and DND do fantastic work abroad on behalf of the GoC; the synchronization and teamwork that is experienced on a daily basis in deployed operations is truly remarkable as are the results that are generated. The analysis and recommendations contained herein are captured with a view to reduce friction points with human interaction and associated processes, minimize overhead and redundancy and help to reduce GAC stressors in a deployed capacity when working with DND CB projects and proposals. While some changes could be immediately implemented such as JIMP pre-deployment training, emotional intelligence education and investigation into CIMIC use augmentation; others, such as Vote 10 authorities and permissions delegated from the Treasury Board to the various departments would take substantial review, investigation, research and the political will to do so.

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