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## UN Peacekeeping Revisited: Exit Strategies and Longstanding Traditional Missions

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**UN PEACEKEEPING REVISITED: EXIT STRATEGIES AND LONGSTANDING  
TRADITIONAL MISSIONS**

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## ABSTRACT

The 64,680 UN troops deployed today on 12 operations with blue helmets are the image that many individuals associate with the concept of peacekeeping. Despite the positive effect of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping on diminishing conflict, decades of experiences have confirmed that the traditional peacekeeping operations are unsuccessful at conflict resolution and termination. Many UN peacekeeping missions are facing numerous challenges, including exit strategies. On occasion, mission termination and exit strategies have been used as evidence for UN peacekeeping success or failure. These inquiries highlight that UN missions should not last forever. Exit strategies provide a vision and path for the conceivable end to a conflict. UN peacekeepers are confronted with unclear situations requiring complex solutions. Otherwise, violent confrontations will resume. This paper starts by examining the complex UN peacekeeping and exit strategies' historical realities, the UN rhetoric and the exit strategy challenges. The positive effects from UN peacekeeping missions lessen over time. For longer-lasting UN missions, new challenges add complexity and may weaken the peace gains. Even though the violence has dissipated, experts reveal that these long-lasting traditional peacekeeping operations lessen any motivation and urgency for peace solutions. Moreover, the window for conflict termination and sustainable peace is in the short term. The importance of an exit strategy, a clear and achievable mandate, and buy-in from the opposing sides are essential for a UN mission to thrive. Thus, this essay will emphasize the need for ending longstanding UN traditional peacekeeping missions because of the lack of success, the harm to UN legitimacy and credibility, and the persistent mission deficiencies. UN peacekeeping operations and their exit strategies rely on factors that support mission success, positive UN international perceptions, and

constructive improvements based on a wide-ranging holistic approach encompassing numerous vital ideals.

## UN PEACEKEEPING REVISITED: EXIT STRATEGIES AND LONGSTANDING TRADITIONAL MISSIONS

### CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

In 2019, one and half billion people relied on troops under the blue and white banner of the United Nations (UN) to ensure their safety and security.<sup>1</sup> Séverine Autesserre, a political science professor at Columbia University, signals some 50 areas throughout the planet where armed conflict is an enduring concern. She points out 103,000 UN peacekeepers, including 78,000 soldiers, are serving in 14 countries. Autesserre adds that in 2019, only the United States (US) deployed a higher number of military personnel on foreign soil than the UN.<sup>2</sup> With all these blue-helmeted troops stationed in various distant locations, varying opinions have emerged regarding the UN as an organization and an instrument for peace. In 2003, Virginia Fortna, a political science professor at Columbia University, argued that peacekeeping was “the most important innovation in conflict management in the last fifty years.”<sup>3</sup> The 64,680 UN troops deployed today on 12 operations<sup>4</sup> with blue helmets are the image that many individuals associate with the concept of peacekeeping.

The UN peacekeeping concept focuses on conserving the peace and assisting with solutions for peace. UN defines peacekeeping as follows: “Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in

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<sup>1</sup>Séverine Autesserre, “The Crisis of Peacekeeping: Why the UN can't End Wars,” *Foreign Affairs* 98, no. 1 (2019): 101.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, 101.

<sup>3</sup>Virginia Page Fortna, “Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace After Civil and Interstate Wars,” *International Studies Review* 5, no. 4 (December 2003): 97.

<sup>4</sup>United Nations Peacekeeping, “Data,” last accessed 28 March 2021. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/data>.

implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers.”<sup>5</sup> The UN also further explains the evolution of UN peacekeeping as follows: “Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing ceasefires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.”<sup>6</sup> Peacekeeping has adapted over the years to face the challenges of complex environments. Experts have disputed the relative success of these UN peacekeeping endeavours. There are those, including Fortna, contending that UN peacekeeping should be viewed as a success. Autesserre, among others, deliberate on the history of failures of UN peacekeeping missions.<sup>7</sup>

Following high profile failures by UN missions, the UN Brahimi Report in 2000 was a landmark document that promoted significant reforms.<sup>8</sup> At the time, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan requested Lakhdar Brahimi, the former Foreign Minister of Algeria, to lead a panel to conduct “a thorough review of the United Nations peace and security activities, and to present a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations to assist the United Nations in conducting such activities better in the future.”<sup>9</sup> Within this report, there are a few references to the ending of a mission. The following is a passage from the Brahimi report: “... ending a mission well accomplished, having given the people of a country the opportunity to do for themselves what they could not do before: to build and hold onto peace, to find reconciliation, to

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<sup>5</sup>Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (New York: United Nations Secretariat, 2008), 18.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, 18.

<sup>7</sup>Autesserre, “The Crisis of Peacekeeping...”, 101.

<sup>8</sup>Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “The UN Record on Peacekeeping Operations,” *International Journal* 62, no. 3 (September 2007): 496.

<sup>9</sup>UN General Assembly Security Council, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/200/809 (New York, Chairman of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations to the Secretary-General, August 2000), i.

strengthen democracy, to secure human rights.”<sup>10</sup> These ideas reflect what should occur in most peacekeeping scenarios. Unfortunately, many UN peacekeeping missions are facing numerous challenges, including exit strategies. The UN ideals are vulnerable in the modern and complex world. Deliberate and frequent reflection on a mission, its mandate and its exit strategy is required. An evaluation is necessary of the effectiveness, appropriateness, quantity and quality of the resources assigned and the next steps. Autesserre describes the recurring pattern of peacekeeping following conflict as follows: “... donor countries pledge millions of dollars in aid and ask the UN for help. Eventually, the warring parties call for ceasefires, sign agreements, and hold elections. But soon, sometimes just days later, violence flares up again... in many cases, it lasts for years.”<sup>11</sup> This pattern is open for discussion. Nonetheless, UN peacekeeping operations should be scrutinized concerning their effectiveness, timeliness and approach to mission termination. Exit strategies are to be studied throughout this document.

An exit strategy should be viewed as a requirement for a UN peacekeeping mission and the achievement of the mission’s mandate. Debates have occurred regarding the relationship between UN peacekeeping mission success and exit strategies. On occasion, mission termination and exit strategies have been used as evidence for UN peacekeeping success or failure. Richard Caplan, a professor of International Relations at Oxford University, describes exit strategies as follows: “An exit strategy is a transitional plan for the disengagement and ultimate withdrawal of external parties from a state or territory, the parties ideally having attained their principal objectives.”<sup>12</sup> Equally, mission mandates have to be fulfilled to ensure a mission withdrawal. There is a significant correlation between mission mandates and exit strategies. Over the years,

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<sup>10</sup>Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *United Nations...*, xv.

<sup>11</sup>Autesserre, “The Crisis of Peacekeeping ...”, 101.

<sup>12</sup>Richard Caplan, “Devising Exit Strategies.” *Survival* (London) 54, no. 3 (2012): 113.



the UN has shifted its use of exit strategies verbiage to transition language. This change has added peacebuilding to the process of withdrawing UN peacekeepers. Gisela Hirschmann, an assistant professor of international relations at Leiden University, notes the transition to development and sustainable peace is entrenched presently within UN documentation and personnel.<sup>13</sup> This paper will use the term “exit strategies” to encompass exit, termination, and transition language for UN peacekeeping missions.

Exit strategies merit considerable consideration. UN missions operating in longstanding conflicts need to contemplate exit strategies. In Table 1.1, the UN missions involved in longstanding conflicts are identified. The five long-lasting missions are United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), and United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). These five missions are traditional peacekeeping operations, where UN forces typically monitor a ceasefire or place themselves between warring parties.<sup>14</sup> Walter Dorn, a professor of Defence Studies at the Royal Military College and the Canadian Forces College, describes UNFICYP as the “quintessential traditional peacekeeping operation.”<sup>15</sup> The situation in Cyprus is an example of a frozen conflict. A conflict is deemed frozen when a flawed status quo remains because the core issues of tension have not been addressed.<sup>16</sup> For similar long-lasting situations, this essay will attempt to tackle important questions. When should UN Peacekeeping

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<sup>13</sup>Gisela Hirschmann, “Organizational Learning in United Nations’ Peacekeeping Exit Strategies.” *Cooperation and Conflict* 47, no. 3 (22 August 2012): 378.

<sup>14</sup>Fortna, “Inside and Out: Peacekeeping...”, 97.

<sup>15</sup>Walter A. Dorn, *Keeping Watch: Monitoring, Technology and Innovation in UN Peace Operations* (New York: United Nations University Press, 2011), 93.

<sup>16</sup>Valery Perry, “At Cross Purposes? Democratization and Peace Implementation Strategies in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Frozen Conflict,” *Human Rights Review* 10, no. 1 (2009): 36.

Operations (PKO) end? Should the indeterminate length of some UN peacekeeping missions concern the international community? What might be the best way ahead for the UN regarding PKO missions with no end in sight? These interrogations highlight that UN peacekeeping missions should not last forever. The Brahimi report acknowledged the problems with the duration and exit strategies of traditional UN peacekeeping missions.<sup>17</sup> The duration and termination of PKO remain a dilemma for the UN.

This paper starts by examining the complex UN peacekeeping and exit strategies' historical realities, the UN rhetoric and the exit strategy challenges. These actualities underpin the arguments that longstanding UN traditional PKO should be withdrawn. The main argument of this essay is that the five long-lasting UN operations should end because of the lack of success, the harm to UN legitimacy and credibility, and the persistent mission deficiencies. The upcoming five chapters reinforce this contention. Following the introduction, the second chapter surveys the historical patterns of UN peacekeeping and exit strategies. In chapter 3, the reasons for withdrawing and considerations for improving exit strategies are provided. The fourth chapter covers a case study of the prototypical traditional peacekeeping mission, which began in 1964. The divisions in Cyprus remain between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. UNFICYP remains wedged within a political stalemate.<sup>18</sup> Finally, chapter 5 is the conclusion that summarizes the key discoveries. UN peacekeeping has a long historical record with many takeaways and lessons to be learned.

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<sup>17</sup>Christine Gray, "Peacekeeping After the "Brahimi Report": Is there a Crisis of Credibility for the UN," *Journal of Conflict & Security Law* 6, no. 2 (2001): 275.

<sup>18</sup>Autesserre, "The Crisis of Peacekeeping...", 101.

**Table 1.1 – Longstanding UN Traditional Missions**

<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Mission Name</b>	<b>Start Date</b>	<b>Years</b>
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization	May 1948	73
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	January 1949	72
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	March 1964	57
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force	June 1974	47
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon	March 1978	43

Source: [https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/un\\_peacekeeping\\_operation\\_list\\_3\\_2.pdf](https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/un_peacekeeping_operation_list_3_2.pdf)

## CHAPTER 2 – HISTORY OF PEACEKEEPING AND EXIT STRATEGIES

### Introduction – Over 70 years of Peacekeeping

On 29 May 2018, the United Nations celebrated the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of UN peacekeeping. Throughout 70 years, the UN asserts that more than one million men and women deployed on no fewer than 70 UN peacekeeping operations.<sup>19</sup> Over 70 missions in 70 years translate to at least one new peacekeeping mission starting every year on average. These figures entail that there were ample instances where UN representatives contemplated exit strategies. Academics have undertaken steps to study the use cases from 70 years of UN peacekeeping practice. Before the UN can find solutions to promote sustainable peace, they should evaluate the past, which presents opportunities to learn from 70 years of experiences.

UN peacekeeping missions created today are different from the traditional missions that originated before the 1990s. The establishment of UNTSO in 1948, the first UN peacekeeping mission, was an impromptu response to a particular set of circumstances during the Cold War.<sup>20</sup> Stephen Ryan, a senior lecturer in conflict studies at the University of Ulster, suggests that the initial peacekeeping missions were concerned with two dynamics. The UN aspired to avoid regional escalations and involve the two Cold War superpowers, the US and the USSR. He explains that UNTSO, which supervised the truce in Palestine, served the interests of both superpowers. The US and the USSR welcomed these efforts as a crisis management tool.<sup>21</sup> The political situation at the time was favourable for the UN. Hence, the UN provided military

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<sup>19</sup>United Nations Peacekeeping, “UN Peacekeeping: 70 Years of Service & Sacrifice,” last accessed 17 January 2021, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/un-peacekeeping-70-years-of-service-sacrifice>.

<sup>20</sup>Stephen Ryan, “United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter of Principles?” *International Peacekeeping* 7, no. 1 (1 March 2000): 27.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, 27.

observers as an independent third party.<sup>22</sup> Since 1948, UN peacekeeping has evolved from the original monitoring and reporting responsibilities to a more multifaceted set of tasks in response to complex problems. Michael Doyle, an international affairs professor at Columbia University, and Nicholas Sambanis, a political science professor at the University of Pennsylvania, note that modern UN peacekeeping has transformed into a “multidimensional management of a complex peace operation.”<sup>23</sup> These two academics add that these transformative peace efforts differ from the character of traditional truce policing missions.<sup>24</sup> A UN peacekeeper currently operating has to rely on a broader skillset than his predecessor did. Various specialists are now integrated into missions as well. Moreover, Doyle and Sambanis highlight the importance of the two UN milestone reports, Brahimi and “No Exit without Strategy”, of the early 2000s.<sup>25</sup> The Brahimi report was discussed earlier. “No Exit without Strategy” was a report produced by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2001 on behalf of the UN Security Council (UNSC) following debates on ending PKO. Annan provided his analysis and recommendations on exit strategies.<sup>26</sup> Following notable UN missteps like Rwanda, these reports sparked deliberations on improving the UN peacebuilding capacity and shaping the future of UN peacekeeping.<sup>27</sup> Hirschmann points to the discrepancy over the number of missions started before and after 1990. 18 missions commenced before 1990, and 46 missions surfaced from 1990 to 2010. She also notes the higher complexity of missions and the lack of resources to face the challenges.<sup>28</sup> There was an urgent requirement to adapt the peacekeeping model. These realities generated critical thinking

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<sup>22</sup>Ryan, “United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter of Principles...”, 27.

<sup>23</sup>Doyle and Sambanis, “The UN Record on Peacekeeping Operations...”, 496.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., 496.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Caplan, “Devising Exit Strategies...”, 114.

<sup>27</sup>Doyle and Sambanis, “The UN Record on Peacekeeping Operations...”, 496.

<sup>28</sup>Gisela Hirschmann, “Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Exit Strategies: Organized Hypocrisy and Institutional Reform,” *International Peacekeeping* 19, no. 2 (1 April 2012): 170.

regarding peacekeeping and its future and led to different perspectives on the types of peacekeeping missions required for complex situations.

Experts have debated on the diverse types of peacekeeping operations. Lise Morjé Howard, a government professor at Georgetown University, provides a distinction between the first generation, “traditional peacekeeping”, and the second generation, “multidimensional peacekeeping”.<sup>29</sup> This explanation aligns with the UN deliberations and the evolution of peacekeeping after the Cold War. Howard builds her understanding from the well-defined responsibilities of observing ceasefires during traditional peacekeeping to the extensive effects required in complicated situations during multidimensional peacekeeping. Howard also describes the tendency for traditional peacekeeping during interstate conflicts and multidimensional peacekeeping during intrastate conflicts.<sup>30</sup> This perspective is more simplistic than the views of other academics. For instance, Bellamy identifies five types of peacekeeping: traditional peacekeeping, managing transitions, wider peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace support operations.<sup>31</sup> Dorn observes four peace operations types: observer missions, interposed forces, multidimensional operations and transitional administrations.<sup>32</sup> Conversely, Diehl, Druckman and Wall categorize twelve sorts of peacekeeping: traditional peacekeeping, observation, collective enforcement, election supervision, humanitarian assistance during conflict, state/nation building, pacification, preventive deployment, arms control verification, protective services, intervention in support of democracy, and sanctions enforcement.<sup>33</sup> Academics generally agree on traditional peacekeeping as a category of peacekeeping. Howard’s multidimensional

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<sup>29</sup>Lise M. Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 4.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>31</sup>Jacques L. Koko and Essoh J.M.C. Essis, *Determinants of Success in UN Peacekeeping Operations* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2012), 28.

<sup>32</sup>Dorn, *Keeping Watch...*, 10-14.

<sup>33</sup>Koko and Essis, *Determinants of Success...*, 30.

peacekeeping can encompass the other types of diverse activities described above. Her sorts of peacekeeping, traditional and multidimensional, support the major shift in thought within the UN. This expression is displayed within the two landmark UN reports, Brahimi and “No Exit without Strategy”. Consequently, the current version of UN peacekeeping involves an intricate balance between wide-ranging actions and capabilities. These aspects are continuing to develop in reaction to the complexity of the modern environment.<sup>34</sup> Thus, the notion of exit strategies has evolved because of the conclusions within the “No Exit without Strategy” report. “A good exit strategy results from a good entrance strategy,”<sup>35</sup> notes Annan in his report to the UNSC. The UN highlighted the importance of drafting exit strategies in tandem with mission mandates. The consideration of an exit strategy before launching a peacekeeping mission is a critical enabler.

An exit strategy provides a vision and path for the conceivable end to a conflict, and this reflection should be occurring in concert with the mission mandate. The mandate and the exit strategy are part of a comprehensive strategy for a PKO. Hirschmann points to realization within the UN ensuing from unfortunate incidents, like in Somalia in the 1990s.<sup>36</sup> By working on an exit strategy, UN peacekeeping officials are engaged in the mental exercise of understanding the mission requirements and the notion of success. The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) assessed that UN PKO diverged from the US concept of effective peacekeeping. An exit strategy and host nation consent to UN operations were two indispensable components of peacekeeping success. The 2018 GAO review discovered that six of the eleven missions studied

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<sup>34</sup>Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars...*, 5.

<sup>35</sup>UN Security Council, *No Exit without Strategy: Security Council Decision-making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, S/2001/394 (New York, Report of the Secretary-General, April 2001), 8.

<sup>36</sup>Hirschmann, “Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Exit Strategies...”, 170.

did not have an exit strategy.<sup>37</sup> This point is alarming, given that “No Exit without Strategy” was produced 18 years before the US GAO review. Notwithstanding, conflicts do end eventually.<sup>38</sup> They can end in military victory by one side or the other, a ceasefire, a stalemate or a negotiated settlement. The way conflicts end matters. Monica Toft, the international relations scholar, determined that intrastate conflicts ending by military victories tended to support a period of peace outlasting the ones that ended in negotiated settlements.<sup>39</sup> Military victories may shape a sustainable peace. UN peacekeeping operations have existed for 70 years. There are examples of mission terminations and exit strategies. The advancement of peacekeeping during this period can provide lessons learned. A re-evaluation of exit strategies is necessary to improve conflict management for the UN and international stakeholders. In this chapter, the historical realities of peacekeeping, the UN organizational perspectives and the exit strategy challenges highlight the urgency to re-conceptualize the problem space. These arguments will underpin withdrawing longstanding UN traditional PKO. The five missions contained in Table 1.1 cast doubt on peacekeeping success, the UN reputation and mission development. First, the peacekeeping operations have manifested positive outcomes in certain aspects, but negative consequences remain widespread. Second, the UN communications reflect that exit strategies are crucial to peacekeeping success. Third, the exit strategy challenges reinforce the importance of the exercise. Exit strategies support effective and sustainable peace efforts, UN legitimacy, credibility, and mission enhancement.

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<sup>37</sup>United States Government Accountability Office, *UN Peacekeeping Operations: State should Take Additional Steps to Work with the UN to Improve Effectiveness and Performance Information*. Congressional Publications (Washington, DC: United States Government Accountability Office, 2019), i.

<sup>38</sup>Melvin K. Korsmo, “Securing Whose Peace? the Effects of Peace-Agreement Provisions on Physical Integrity Rights After Civil War.” (University of Denver, 2017), 1.

<sup>39</sup>*Ibid.*, 1.



## PKO Historical Realities

History can provide context and understanding, and examples from years of experience deserve detailed analysis. Solutions based on lessons learned should help chart a path forward. Peacekeeping, a concept for conflict management, is a prominent UN product. Since the end of the Second World War, the UN peacekeepers have functioned in many roles to promote peace. Throughout the 70 years of peacekeeping, UN roles have encompassed peacekeeper, peacemaker, peacebuilder and peace enforcer. Doyle and Sambanis describe these four roles as follows.

The UN's role in helping settle those conflicts has been fourfold. It served as a peacemaker facilitating a peace treaty among the parties; as a peacekeeper monitoring the cantonment and demobilization of military forces, resettling refugees, and supervising transitional civilian authorities; as a peacebuilder monitoring and in some cases organizing the implementation of human rights, national democratic elections, and economic rehabilitation; and in a very limited way as peace enforcer when the agreements came unstuck.<sup>40</sup>

UN peacekeepers are guided by three basic principles: consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate.<sup>41</sup> These principles laid the foundation for the traditional peacekeeping roles. Over the years, UN missions have not always respected these principles. This situation is frequent under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Howard explains that the peace enforcement mandate involving the use of force is “incompatible with the other rules of impartiality and consent.”<sup>42</sup> Competing roles in multidimensional peacekeeping may challenge the UN peacekeeping principles. Doyle and Sambanis highlight that peacekeepers are not supposed to use military force to decide wars.<sup>43</sup> UN peacekeeping

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<sup>40</sup>Doyle and Sambanis, “The UN Record on Peacekeeping Operations...”, 503.

<sup>41</sup>United Nations Peacekeeping, “What is Peacekeeping,” last accessed 20 January 2021, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-is-peacekeeping>.

<sup>42</sup>Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars...*, 13.

<sup>43</sup>Doyle and Sambanis, “The UN Record on Peacekeeping Operations...”, 500.

principles were critical to support the legitimacy of the UN missions. As peacekeeping has evolved, this legitimacy is being challenged. The evolution from traditional to multidimensional resulted from the inaction of peacekeepers on missions like Rwanda. Hence, the UN moved towards a more robust application of military power and refocused mandates, including considering exit strategies.<sup>44</sup> Additionally, three elements were underscored within “No Exit without Strategy”: “consolidating internal and external security, strengthening political institutions and good governance and promoting economic and social rehabilitation and transformation.”<sup>45</sup> This added robustness to missions was a significant step forward for promoting peace and exit strategies. Nonetheless, the application of this three-pronged approach remains a topic of discussion today. Historical trends have emerged regarding UN peacekeeping. These patterns indicate that UN peacekeeping is effective at reducing violence but less successful at terminating conflicts.<sup>46</sup> Success and failures of mission mandates should provide indications of UN peacekeeping effectiveness and the path forward for exit strategies.

There is a direct relationship between peacekeeping success and exit strategies. The intertwined relationship between peacekeeping and peacebuilding became apparent in the Brahimi report.<sup>47</sup> Following internal debate between the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Hirschmann observes that the UN “adopted the view that the transition to sustainable peace was essential for a successful mission exit.”<sup>48</sup> Consequently, there are dependencies between exit strategies, peacebuilding and peacekeeping mission success. For instance, Howard examined the relative success of eight UN

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<sup>44</sup>Doyle and Sambanis, “The UN Record on Peacekeeping Operations...”, 506.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., 506.

<sup>46</sup>Autesserre, “The Crisis of Peacekeeping...”, 106.

<sup>47</sup>Hirschmann, “Organizational Learning...”, 375.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., 375.

multidimensional PKO in 2005. She decided to classify the missions of East Timor, Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Liberia as somewhat successful at executing their mandates. Meanwhile, she characterized the four UN missions in Kosovo, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, and Haiti as not implementing their mandates.<sup>49</sup> Howard's analysis shows that the complex missions considered successes can degenerate into conflicts over time. In contrast, the four failing missions could end up successfully fulfilling their mandates eventually. Howard provides examples where UN missions found ways to transform failures into successes, like in Sierra Leone.<sup>50</sup> The takeaway is that for peacekeeping success and failure are relative. The mandate language is critically important. The planning of an attainable transition for the UN should complement the mandate. The mandate will help classify a mission as a success or failure. There are elements supporting mandates, including exit strategies, which shape peacekeeping effectiveness.

Various opinions exist regarding the success of UN peacekeeping operations. The US GAO review identified five principles for effective peacekeeping. They include support for a political solution, host nation consent, a feasible mandate, an exit strategy and UNSC openness to amending the mandate.<sup>51</sup> These components provide the UN with guidance to affect change. Gareth Evans, a former Australian Foreign Affairs minister, recognized seven conditions for success: practical goals in the mandate, proper resources, synchronization between peacekeeping and peacemaking, impartiality, local support, external support, and a clear exit strategy.<sup>52</sup> These notions recognize three critical aspects for mission success emphasized throughout this essay. The importance of an exit strategy, a clear and achievable mandate, and buy-in from the opposing sides are essential for a mission to thrive. Despite numerous challenges, UN

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<sup>49</sup>Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars...*, 300.

<sup>50</sup>*Ibid.*, 300.

<sup>51</sup>United States Government Accountability Office, *UN Peacekeeping Operations...*, 33.

<sup>52</sup>Koko and Essis, *Determinants of Success...*, 15.

peacekeeping has areas of strength. When it comes to reducing hostilities, there is a positive trend.

UN peacekeeping operations have a positive effect on diminishing conflict by preventing major armed conflict. This reality also encourages an environment conducive to settlement. In a study by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), researchers, Hegre, Hultman and Nygard, discovered peacekeeping had a conflict reducing effect. They also found that peacekeeping helps prevent major armed conflicts.<sup>53</sup> After simulating used cases, the PRIO investigation confirmed the positive effects of sending peacekeepers to conflict zones. This conflict reducing impact is a consequence of the UN involvement. UN peacekeeping diminishes violence. For the five longstanding missions in this paper, major conflict prevention is mostly a sign of the times rather than UN peacekeepers.<sup>54</sup> The Cyprus hostilities in 1974 are an example of major conflict occurring despite the long-term presence of peacekeepers. Furthermore, another discovery of this study is the reduction of the number of fatalities. Hegre, Hultman and Nygard concluded that there would be “considerably more deadly conflicts in the world” without UN peacekeeping.<sup>55</sup> UN peacekeeping saves lives. Moreover, the PRIO study validated that “there is a discernible indirect effect since the reduction of conflict intensity also tends to increase the chances of peace in following years.”<sup>56</sup> By reducing conflict, UN missions shape an environment favourable to achieving a settlement. The deployment of UN peacekeepers remains a worthwhile option for world leaders. Jacob Kathman and Michelle Benson, from the Department of Political Science at the University at Buffalo, backed these statements. Regarding civil wars, Kathman and Benson

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<sup>53</sup>Håvard Hegre, Lisa Hultman, and Håvard Møkleiv Nygård, “Evaluating the Conflict-Reducing Effect of UN Peacekeeping Operations,” *The Journal of Politics* 81, no. 1 (2019): 231.

<sup>54</sup>Doyle and Sambanis, “The UN Record on Peacekeeping Operations...”, 501.

<sup>55</sup>Hegre, Hultman, and Nygård, “Evaluating the Conflict-Reducing Effect...”, 226.

<sup>56</sup>*Ibid.*, 231.

discovered that UN involvement increases the probability of an agreement between the opposing parties.<sup>57</sup> UN peacekeepers increase the costs for the combatants to engage in violence and support mediation between the parties.<sup>58</sup> The kinetic and non-kinetic interactions with UN troops have a physical, psychological and financial impact on the opposing parties.

The challenge a well-equipped and good-sized UN force imposes on warring factions cannot be underestimated. Kathman and Benson have shown that the more UN troops involved, the greater the effect on a positive outcome for the peacekeeping operation.<sup>59</sup> They state that “larger troop deployments have a consistent effect on these two important elements of the conflict process: more troops reduce ongoing hostilities while also shortening war duration to negotiated resolution.”<sup>60</sup> Thus, a strong military presence is valuable for a PKO. A robust UN peacekeeping force fosters fewer hostilities, a negotiated settlement, and a shorter armed conflict.<sup>61</sup> The combat power of UN peacekeepers is significant, in particular, for intrastate wars. Kathman and Benson exposed that no UN contribution gave rise to a 37% chance of a negotiated settlement in a civil war in 61 months. Conversely, when deploying 10,000 UN military peacekeepers for the same period, the probability would climb to 97% for an agreed-upon resolution.<sup>62</sup> An argument for leveraging a UN sizeable force is the improved likelihood of reaching settlements within five years. However, these assertions do not apply to longstanding traditional missions, irrespective of resources<sup>63</sup>, that operate in unresolved conflicts after numerous decades. Financially, Hegre, Hultman and Nygard demonstrate through their scenarios

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<sup>57</sup>Jacob Kathman and Michelle Benson, “Cut Short? United Nations Peacekeeping and Civil War Duration to Negotiated Settlements,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63, no. 7 (25 January 2019): 1617.

<sup>58</sup>Kathman and Benson, “Cut Short? United Nations Peacekeeping 1617.

<sup>59</sup>*Ibid.*, 1617.

<sup>60</sup>*Ibid.*, 1623.

<sup>61</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>62</sup>*Ibid.*, 1618.

<sup>63</sup>Nicholas Sambanis, “Short- and Long-Term Effects of United Nations Peace Operations.” *The World Bank Economic Review* 22, no. 1 (31 January 2008): 17.

that a large deployment of UN peacekeepers is money well spent.<sup>64</sup> Their models portrayed higher costs initially associated with deploying a robust UN force to major armed conflicts. The fallout would be lower costs over time and a significant reduction in conflicts worldwide.<sup>65</sup> Nonetheless, the UN has trouble mounting robust operations. The PRIO study highlights the importance of appropriate budgets and time sensitivity of deploying troops to maximize effects during a conflict. A well-resourced UN peacekeeping is effective at decreasing violence, reducing long-term costs, and shortening conflicts. Yet, the UN remains resource-constrained. There are other factors involved in the advancement of sustainable peace. Multidimensional peacekeeping involves peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The peacebuilding component, which is limited in traditional peacekeeping, is daunting for UN peacekeepers under the best of circumstances.

The positive effects of UN peacekeeping missions may lessen over time. Sambanis emphasizes that UN troops influence the quality of peace rather than its duration.<sup>66</sup> He recognizes a two-year window for UN peacekeeping to take advantage of the improved conditions for peacebuilding. For longer-lasting UN missions, new challenges add complexity and weaken the peace gains.<sup>67</sup> While violence has dissipated, the window for conflict termination and the establishment of sustainable peace is in the short term. The UN should understand the importance of the mission mandate and ample resources at the early stages of a UN PKO. Sambanis explains the duration enigma facing the UN. A premature exit is detrimental to the progress made. He states it takes time to reform institutions and develop indigenous

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<sup>64</sup>Hegre, Hultman, and Nygård, "Evaluating the Conflict-Reducing Effect...", 231.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., 231.

<sup>66</sup>Sambanis, "Short- and Long-Term Effects...", 9.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., 21.

capabilities.<sup>68</sup> Nonetheless, peacekeepers in long-lasting traditional operations tend to monitor a political stalemate. These missions are not difference makers in conflict resolution.<sup>69</sup> This stalemate monitoring is exemplified by the frozen conflicts in Kashmir and Cyprus. Traditional PKO may encourage deadlocks. A solution is most effective at promoting peace during the opening stages of the UN operation. Otherwise, the positive effects tend to wane over time.<sup>70</sup> Exit strategies need to consider these findings. A robust mission should be prioritized for a rapid resolution to a conflict. After an initial push, the UN should re-evaluate the mandate and the composition of the peacekeeping mission to advance peace. Otherwise, fresh circumstances develop making conflict resolution more complex.

The duration of peace is fragile in conflict zones. In 2003, Fortna's studies of armed conflicts, independent of peacekeeping, indicated that fighting recurrence is probable. "In twenty-one of the forty-eight interstate cases, or just under 44 percent, peace eventually failed with the eruption of another war. Forty-seven of the 115 civil wars, or just over 40 percent, saw another round of fighting."<sup>71</sup> She observed that the average length of the ceasefire time was six years for civil wars and eight years for interstate hostilities.<sup>72</sup> Conflict resolution becomes increasingly demanding for peacekeepers in lengthier missions. Fortna emphasized that peacekeeping reduces violence but is not the panacea for conflict resolution.<sup>73</sup> Similarly, Kyle Beardsley, a political science professor at Duke University, highlights the renewal trend of fighting. His models suggest the probability of relapse, within ten years, drops by 33% with UN

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<sup>68</sup>Sambanis, "Short- and Long-Term Effects...", 29.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., 29-30.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., 29.

<sup>71</sup>Fortna, "Inside and Out: Peacekeeping...", 103.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid., 103.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid., 111.

peacekeepers.<sup>74</sup> Without peacekeeping, UN diplomatic means may lead to conflict termination. However, the reoccurrence of violence is highly probable in the short term.<sup>75</sup> The presence of peacekeepers is vital for the assurances needed by the opposing parties.<sup>76</sup> Hence, UN diplomatic engagement and peacekeepers should be leveraged to produce effects throughout the conflict duration. UN peacekeepers can be employed at critical windows to support UN diplomatic initiatives. Thus, longstanding conflicts do not necessitate a long-term presence of UN peacekeepers. Various enablers should be utilized to aid the multifaceted difficulties afflicting the fragile peace.

Armed conflicts consist of multilayered problems requiring attention and resources above those offered by a UN mission. Typically, UN peacekeepers may neglect the set of circumstances that led to the conflict. Beardsley agrees with Sambanis and Fortna that UN peacekeeping is effective as “a short-term peacemaker”.<sup>77</sup> The underlying conditions of the conflict between the opposing parties are not affected by UN peacekeepers alone. There is a contradiction regarding the duration of UN PKO. Warring parties require the absence of violence to encourage negotiations. Conversely, over time, tensions are heightened as the underlying issues persist and other complications manifest. For example, David Cunningham, a politics professor at the University of Maryland, reveals that the UN peacekeeping in Cambodia heightened the strains amongst the warring factions prolonging the conflict.<sup>78</sup> The unresolved core conditions promote the resumption of the armed conflict. Thus, longstanding peacekeeping

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<sup>74</sup>Kyle Beardsley, “The UN at the Peacemaking–peacebuilding Nexus.” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 30, no. 4 (1 September 2013): 378.

<sup>75</sup>*Ibid.*, 378.

<sup>76</sup>*Ibid.*, 381.

<sup>77</sup>*Ibid.*, 370.

<sup>78</sup>David E. Cunningham, “Veto Players and Civil War Duration,” *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 4 (2006): 880-881.



operations delay the strife between opposing parties. Notwithstanding, the termination of conflicts and exit strategies are challenging for UN PKO, like duration.

The dichotomy regarding mission duration demonstrates the barriers to UN peacekeeping. The time it takes from the start to the end of a UN mission matters. Criticisms can arise whenever a UN peacekeeping operation appears to be markedly short or exceedingly long. UN peacekeeping missions are assessed by their ability to terminate conflicts and achieve a workable peace. UN PKO are charged with determining swift solutions to complicated socio-political environments. Consequently, the termination of conflicts is a conundrum within itself. Auriel Sari, a law lecturer from the University of Exeter, describes the modern conflict patterns as “they frequently result in unstable cease-fires, continue at lower intensity, or are frozen by an armed intervention by outside forces or by the international community.”<sup>79</sup> UN peacekeepers are interacting in a dynamic environment. Their longstanding presence may facilitate the status quo and degrade matters. Howard uses the term situational difficulty to describe the attributes that “contribute to both the fueling and the eventual ending of the war”.<sup>80</sup> The underlying conditions should be the focus of UN peacekeeping to end hostilities. Furthermore, Howard underscores that the consent of opposing parties for the UN mission ensures unified efforts.<sup>81</sup> If consent disappears over time, it has to be regained by UN peacekeeping operations.<sup>82</sup> The five longstanding missions continue to face resistance from the opposing sides. Doyle and Sambanis draw attention to eroding conditions compelling some factions to undermine the promotion of

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<sup>79</sup>Auriel Sari, “The Status of Foreign Armed Forces Deployed in Post-Conflict Environments: A Search for Basic Principles,” in *Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations*, ed. by Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday, and Jens Iverson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 484.

<sup>80</sup>Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars...*, 8-9.

<sup>81</sup>*Ibid.*, 10.

<sup>82</sup>*Ibid.*, 10-11.

peace due to the threats to their interests by UN peacekeeping initiatives.<sup>83</sup> The UN imposing a solution on a struggle is going to encounter much resistance. Therefore, a UN peacekeeping mandate and its exit strategy have to reflect the grievances of the main factions. Dorn and Collins describe the UN requirement for special skills, including negotiation, mediation, conflict management, and resolution, to reconcile grievances.<sup>84</sup> An understanding of the situation is indispensable because conflict management is multifaceted. UN PKO have to focus on exit strategies that account for these factors, notably for longstanding missions. On the contrary, Alex De Waal, executive director of the World Peace Foundation, argues that exit strategies are not realistic and constant reassessment of the conditions is a more fruitful effort.<sup>85</sup> Nonetheless, exit strategy thinking highlights the chief role the exercise plays in mapping out a potential future. The UN agrees with the criticality of the exit strategy undertaking. Hence, exit strategies, including withdrawal for longstanding missions, have to be envisioned. Although there are valid criticisms and praises of UN peacekeeping, the UN perspectives provide context for the way forward to peacekeeping and exit strategy solutions.

### **UN Perceptions of Exit Strategies**

The UN interpretations of peacekeeping and exit strategies reveal how conflict resolution has progressed. UN official documents are aspirational and may not reflect the methodology adopted by UN peacekeeping in the past. Nevertheless, the UN written guidance demonstrates that the institution has learned from the past. An example of a UN document promoting these

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<sup>83</sup>Doyle and Sambanis, "The UN Record on Peacekeeping Operations...", 510-511.

<sup>84</sup>Walter A. Dorn and Robin Collins, "Peacekeeping Works: The UN can Help End Civil Wars," *International Journal* 75, no. 1 (2020): 102.

<sup>85</sup>Alex De Waal, "Mission without End? Peacekeeping in the African Political Marketplace," *International Affairs* (London) 85, no. 1 (January 2009): 115.

concepts is the “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines” known as the Capstone doctrine. Transitions are discussed in the Capstone doctrine. The text raises the prominence of engagement with stakeholders in planning to lessen the impact on the affected parties.<sup>86</sup> Furthermore, the necessity of an integrated approach and peacebuilding efforts are conveyed in the Capstone doctrine for peacekeeping.<sup>87</sup> The production of this guiding document in 2008 was a consequence of past failures and lessons. UN peacekeeping has grown up from traditional to multidimensional. A peacekeeper may be a peacemaker, peacebuilder and peace enforcer.<sup>88</sup>

The previously discussed Brahimi Report marked a turning point in changing the UN perspectives on peacekeeping and exit strategies. Hirschmann discloses that “the Brahimi report openly challenged the existing consensus on the role of elections as an exit strategy.”<sup>89</sup> Before the Brahimi Report, elections were the benchmark for ending UN missions. Elections served as an expedient solution to produce a level of stability, proclaim UN success and withdraw UN forces from conflict zones.<sup>90</sup> The elections facilitated a quick turnaround for UN PKO without decisively engaging in the main sources of tension. Elections as exit strategies were flawed. In weaker states, elections are temporary measures to promote a short peace before the likely return of armed conflict.<sup>91</sup> Hirschmann alludes to instances where elections “... merely ratify a tyranny of the majority or be overturned by force after a peace operation leaves.”<sup>92</sup> Elections did not promote sustainable peace as armed conflicts resumed. This situation in the 1990s resulted in

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<sup>86</sup>Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *United Nations...*, 89.

<sup>87</sup>*Ibid.*, 53.

<sup>88</sup>Doyle and Sambanis, “The UN Record on Peacekeeping Operations...”, 503.

<sup>89</sup>Hirschmann, “Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Exit Strategies...”, 178.

<sup>90</sup>Hirschmann, “Organizational Learning...”, 372.

<sup>91</sup>Astri Suhrke, “Post-War Studies: Differentiating Patterns of Peace,” in *Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations*, ed. Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday, and Jens Iverson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 272.

<sup>92</sup>Hirschmann, “Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Exit Strategies...”, 178.

reconsidering UN methods for ending peacekeeping missions.<sup>93</sup> Rwanda embodies the disastrous consequences of the UN focus on elections. Inconsistencies were evident in the UN speeches and actions regarding Rwanda. The fallout affected the perception of the UN as a legitimate and credible organization.<sup>94</sup> The UN had to modernize its exit strategy approach or lose its relevance as a peacekeeping enterprise. Steps were taken to shift global opinions and alter the organizational views on peacekeeping. UN peacekeeping had to adopt a comprehensive approach, including enhanced exit strategies, due to the imprudence of the past. Nevertheless, exit strategies remain a considerable challenge.

Inconsistencies exist within the UN regarding defining conflict management undertakings, including exit strategies. Charles Call, the associate professor at American University, explains that UN and international institutions employ contrasting terminology.

Overlapping terms and concepts include ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ (used by the World Bank), ‘reconstruction and stabilisation’ (used by the US government), ‘transitions’ (used by the UN Development Group and USAID), ‘conflict recovery’ (used by UNDP), ‘nation-building’ (used in popular US discourse), ‘state-building’ (used especially by US and European academics), and ‘civilian crisis management’ (used by the EU). Although some international institutions and scholars use these terms interchangeably, they refer to slightly different phenomena, reflecting different underlying values ranging from Western security interests to alleviating poverty in the developing world.<sup>95</sup>

The term ‘transitions’ is prevalent throughout the UN current literature. Hirschmann explains that peacekeeping exit strategies have evolved from elections to peacebuilding. The UN transition terminology institutionalizes this development.<sup>96</sup> The above terms employed interchangeably by the UN, international organizations, and academia are nuanced. Thus,

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<sup>93</sup>Hirschmann, “Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Exit Strategies...”, 170.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid., 174.

<sup>95</sup>Charles T. Call, “Knowing Peace when You See it: Setting Standards for Peacebuilding Success,” *Civil Wars* 10, no. 2 (2008): 176.

<sup>96</sup>Hirschmann, “Organizational Learning...”, 368.

defining exit strategies for UN PKO is complicated. Nonetheless, the UN perspective on exit strategies concentrates on the conditions for mission withdrawal and the cooperation with key stakeholders to avoid future UN involvement. These deliberations abate the effects of the UN withdrawal on the local community.<sup>97</sup> UN exit strategies' communications suggest that peacekeeping and peacebuilding are intertwined.

The UN acknowledges enhancing the peacebuilding role in peacekeeping to support exit strategies.<sup>98</sup> The UN PKO are responsible for building up local capabilities to support an eventual withdrawal. The Capstone doctrine clarifies several benchmarks for exit strategies. There are seven benchmarks for withdrawing a UN mission: absence of violence and human rights violations, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), state security capabilities, independent and effectual rule of law, re-establishment of state governance and basic services, reintegration of refugees and displaced persons, and legitimate political bodies based on fair and free elections for all.<sup>99</sup> These UN benchmarks are roadmaps for exit strategies but focused on multidimensional peacekeeping in intrastate conflicts. These criteria are inadequate for longstanding traditional missions that are beleaguered by territorial claims. Still, Hirschmann notes that these UN peacekeeping benchmarks are part of the enablement of longer-term peacebuilding.<sup>100</sup> Generally, these UN benchmarks provide idealistic guidance that is challenging to achieve by UN PKO. Call quotes a senior DPKO representative on the shift in UN interpretations. "The exit strategy used to be elections, but now is really the capacity of new legitimate authorities... It is linked to the establishment of credible, professional and loyal army,

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<sup>97</sup>Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *United Nations...*, 89.

<sup>98</sup>*Ibid.*, 53.

<sup>99</sup>*Ibid.*, 88-89.

<sup>100</sup>Hirschmann, "Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Exit Strategies...", 178.

police, extension of state authority throughout the country...”<sup>101</sup> This statement reinforces that the multidimensional peacekeeping model has to build capacity. UN peacekeepers are peacebuilders, while military observers do not suffice. Unfortunately, exit strategy theory for longstanding traditional peacekeeping remains nebulous. Altogether, the UN declares that exit strategies are predicated on instituting peacebuilding efforts.

The internal debates on exit strategies reveal the progression in the UN thought process. Following the peacekeeping failures in the 1990s, UN debates culminated with the previously mentioned “No Exit without Strategy” report.<sup>102</sup> The Annan report advocated a multifaceted approach. A peacebuilding role requires resources that are not inherent to UN PKO. Typically, longstanding traditional missions lack these capabilities. The subsequent arguments are from an Argentinian UN official on the complexity of exit strategies.

The decision to put an end to an operation is more complex than it appears in principle ... There are two reasons for this. First, the exit strategy must not be necessarily determined by pre-established timetables but rather by the objectives to be attained, and the latter vary according to the nature of the conflict. Secondly, the objectives may have been only partially attained. In that case, the Security Council would have to evaluate carefully the relationship between the human and financial cost of maintaining any operation and the political consequences of the pullout of such a mission for the States directly involved, as well as for the stability of the region concerned.<sup>103</sup>

The Argentinian representative stresses that exit strategies are challenging because of the competing pressures for withdrawing a UN mission. De Waal remarks that the Annan report, outlining the UN understanding, sketched out a process for exit strategies. He adds that security, good governance, economic and social transformation objectives from “No Exit without Strategy” are not easily quantifiable.<sup>104</sup> Thus, UN PKO have aspirational ideals but no tangible

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<sup>101</sup>Call, “Knowing Peace when..”, 185.

<sup>102</sup>Caplan, “Devising Exit Strategies...”, 114.

<sup>103</sup>Ibid., 115.

<sup>104</sup>De Waal, “Mission without End...”, 111.

measures of effectiveness and performance. De Waal provides the example of the complex mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).<sup>105</sup> The UN mission includes an offensively mandated combat component with adversaries to neutralize.<sup>106</sup> As explained by the US GAO, the DRC mission confronts a government that "...at times, been hostile toward and actively taken steps to undermine the mission."<sup>107</sup> A long-lasting mission will never implement a viable transition strategy when confronting such hurdles. Likewise, UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNFICYP, UNDOF, and UNIFIL are experiencing complications regarding a pullout. Hence, there is a requirement for these missions to reconsider exit strategies to end their impasses. Hirschmann promotes that the UN expand on its organizational learning. For instance, an expert panel was engaged in the Brahimi report. "The panel's report was the first attempt to systematically complement past peacekeeping experiences with academic knowledge on peace operations."<sup>108</sup> UN organizational learning has manifested in mission mandates, which are the formal expression of the UNSC decisions.<sup>109</sup> Mission mandates comprise the reasons for creating a mission and the undertakings necessary for attaining mission termination.<sup>110</sup> Mission mandates with exit strategies are prerequisites for UN mission success. Hirschmann reviewed mission mandates identifying elections as exit strategy criteria. "... UN peace operations mandates reveal that out of the 17 missions launched between 1991 and 1994 to monitor ceasefires or other agreements, eight were explicitly intended to be withdrawn after elections were held successfully." Therefore, by associating exit strategies within mission mandates, the UN

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<sup>105</sup>De Waal, "Mission without End...", 111.

<sup>106</sup>Mateja Peter, "Between Doctrine and Practice: The UN Peacekeeping Dilemma," *Global Governance* 21, no. 3 (2015): 35.

<sup>107</sup>United States Government Accountability Office, *UN Peacekeeping Operations...*, 19.

<sup>108</sup>Hirschmann, "Organizational Learning...", 373.

<sup>109</sup>Hirschmann, "Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Exit Strategies...", 173.

<sup>110</sup>*Ibid.*, 173.

peacekeepers are conferred with a vision towards transition. In addition, the formalized UN plan is expressed for stakeholders to recognize the mission goals and the conditions for the mission to end. Peacekeepers currently receive additional support from other UN bodies for peacebuilding. The UN has enacted these institutional changes throughout its structures. These improvements are evident within the Capstone doctrine released jointly by the UN DPKO and the UN Department of Field Support (DFS), denoting “peacekeepers as early peacebuilders.”<sup>111</sup> Hirschmann declares that “peacebuilding has indeed arrived in the UN peace ‘business.’”<sup>112</sup> The UN understands that there are direct linkages between peacekeeping mission success, exit strategies and peacebuilding. However, Hirschmann also describes that dysfunctionality is still prevalent in the UN application. Exit strategies and peacebuilding efforts are not aligned generally because the UN peacekeeping approach to peacebuilding is deficient.<sup>113</sup> She insinuates peacebuilding in exit strategies has been met with apprehension by affected countries concerned with mission terminations.<sup>114</sup> Longstanding conflicts exhibit these reservations of mission departures. Nonetheless, exit strategies with peacebuilding criteria have materialized from years of UN peacekeeping experience. The UN internal debate determined peacekeepers are peacebuilders and the need to articulate exit strategies along with mission mandates. These changes have been institutionalized, revealing the UN perspectives. Notwithstanding, reproaches remain towards the UN and how it approaches peacekeeping.

UN mission mandates and exit strategies are influenced by many intricate factors, such as internal UN politics. There are organizational dynamics within the UNSC and the Secretariat, which have profound sway over peacekeeping. Hylke Dijkstra, a political science associate

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<sup>111</sup>Hirschmann, “Organizational Learning...”, 369.

<sup>112</sup>Hirschmann, “Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Exit Strategies...”, 180.

<sup>113</sup>Ibid., 180.

<sup>114</sup>Ibid.



professor from Maastricht University, studied shadow bureaucracies and unilateral controls within the UN Secretariat. He uses the South Sudan mission to portray how the UN accommodates the UNSC. A UN fact-finding mission was sent to South Sudan.<sup>115</sup> The US disregarded their recommendations and drafted the UN mission mandate unilaterally in 2011 to suit their interests advocating South Sudanese independence.<sup>116</sup> The UN structures enable the SC members to shape the UN activities for their purposes. These conditions fashion UN mission mandates and exit strategies. Longstanding missions remain in stasis because the UN internal dynamics encompass influencing many players to affect change. Moreover, the UN Secretariat has become an international actor and a pivotal factor in PKO.<sup>117</sup> The concern is the Secretariat is negotiating in whose interests. David Bosco, an associate professor in international studies at Indiana University, insists that the UNSC serves as a concert for the permanent five (P5) members: the US, UK, China, Russia and France.<sup>118</sup> The UN enables the interactions between these powers to find a political consensus, administer international law, and react to security emergencies.<sup>119</sup> Long-lasting missions have not ended because of the UNSC hesitations. Furthermore, Martin Binder, a senior research fellow at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center, examined how the UNSC selects armed conflicts for intervention. The UN avoids being stationed in strong military states or ones that have powerful allies.<sup>120</sup> These tendencies indicate that the UNSC does not treat all armed conflicts equally. Likewise, the UN understands that peacekeepers need to be involved in multiple stabilization activities. UN peacekeepers have

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<sup>115</sup>Dijkstra, H. "Shadow Bureaucracies and the Unilateral Control of International Secretariats: Insights from UN Peacekeeping." *Review of International Organizations* 10, no. 1 (1 March 2015): 37.

<sup>116</sup>*Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>117</sup>Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars..., 339-340.

<sup>118</sup>David Bosco, "Assessing the UN Security Council: A Concert Perspective," *Global Governance* 20, no. 4 (2014): 557.

<sup>119</sup>*Ibid.*, 557.

<sup>120</sup>Martin Binder, "Paths to Intervention: What Explains the UN's Selective Response to Humanitarian Crises?" *Journal of Peace Research* 52, no. 6 (1 November 2015): 713.

transformed into multi-tools for conflict management. Nevertheless, Ryan summarizes criticisms of the UN perspectives. He states: “the UN has relied too heavily on the experience of past operations when coping with post-Cold War crises instead of delineating distinct new characteristics.”<sup>121</sup> The UN adaptation difficulties are plaguing longstanding peacekeeping operations. Ryan includes comments regarding how the UN is “conceptually bereft” because UN peacekeeping struggles with modern challenges and ending armed conflicts.<sup>122</sup> The evolving security environment poses a significant challenge to UN peacekeeping. By re-examining its understanding of peacekeeping and exit strategies, the UN may find solutions to conflicts and improve effectiveness for conflict management. The Capstone doctrine confirms UN is keenly aware of peacekeeping and exit strategy obstacles.<sup>123</sup>

### **Transition challenges**

There are significant impediments to exit strategies for UN peacekeeping operations. With technological advancements, the international community will continually turn to the UN to resolve conflict situations rapidly, preventing highly publicized human security violations.<sup>124</sup> Media coverage will result in considerable pressure on the UN to act. Ryan emphasized this mounting pressure will result in reimagining PKO to overcome the future security environment.<sup>125</sup> Advancement in the concepts of peacekeeping and exit strategies is mandatory to alleviate numerous pressures. Hirschmann describes the UN growth as a direct reaction to insufficient resources, budget constraints, never-ending peacekeeping deployments and arduous

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<sup>121</sup>Ryan, “United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter of Principles...”, 29.

<sup>122</sup>Ibid., 29.

<sup>123</sup>Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *United Nations...*, 62.

<sup>124</sup>Ryan, “United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter of Principles...”, 43-44.

<sup>125</sup>Ibid., 43-44.

peacebuilding initiatives.<sup>126</sup> For example, Autesserre discusses the inadequate amount of UN soldiers to conduct effective operations. “There is roughly one peacekeeper per 400 square miles in Western Sahara, one per 50 square miles in Congo, and one per 30 square miles in South Sudan. Compare that to the peak of the U.S. war in Afghanistan, when there was one foreign soldier per two square miles...”<sup>127</sup> These shortcomings pose challenges to UN peacekeeping and limit options to end missions. Exit strategies remain nebulous and are a source of UN ineffectiveness.<sup>128</sup> Longstanding traditional missions are victims of these circumstances. Thus, long-lasting PKO may never see a resolution within the UN resource-constrained environment. UN peacekeeping encounter severe roadblocks. An example is the operation in the DRC, where UN peacekeepers are stuck aiding a corrupt regime with an “artificial equilibrium.”<sup>129</sup> New norms and societal expectations have been established since the Cold War. The expectations tied to post-conflict resolution include Western liberal values, democratic state institutions and free trade.<sup>130</sup> These lofty expectations lead to disappointment. Locals initially perceive UN missions as the international cure-all for enduring problems. Meanwhile, UN missions continue to lack resources. Moreover, armed conflicts result in the collapse of society. UN peacekeepers operate where the rule of law, socio-economic institutions and social-cultural norms no longer exist.<sup>131</sup> This environment produces unintended consequences, such as sexual and gender-based violence, exploitation, abuse, severe poverty, unemployment, and family separation.<sup>132</sup> UN peacekeepers

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<sup>126</sup>Hirschmann, “Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Exit Strategies...”, 179.

<sup>127</sup>Autesserre, “The Crisis of Peacekeeping...”, 101.

<sup>128</sup>Hirschmann, “Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Exit Strategies...”, 179.

<sup>129</sup>De Waal, “Mission without End...”, 110.

<sup>130</sup>Suhrke, “Post-War Studies...”, 271.

<sup>131</sup>Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric De Coning, and Ramesh Chandra Thakur, *Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations* (New York: United Nations University Press, 2007), 269.

<sup>132</sup>*Ibid.*, 269-270.

are confronting an exceedingly demanding situation difficulty. Exit strategies are unworkable when facing this opposition.

Exit strategies have to address peacebuilding deficiencies present in the operating environment, disclosing the plan for ending missions successfully. UN peacekeepers are trained to be interim third party security guarantors for the local peace process. In total, the five longstanding PKO afforded 292 years of debatable assurances. To bridge the peacebuilding gaps, non-military capacity building activities to support societal deficiencies are being integrated into UN peacekeeping.<sup>133</sup> Hirschmann details how five out of ten missions between 2000 and 2007 explicitly acknowledge peacebuilding as one of its aims.<sup>134</sup> Exit strategies have to consist of integrated peacebuilding solutions to avoid conflict resumption. Although, UN operations cannot compensate for numerous inadequacies in host nations. There are instances where UN formal trusteeship provides makeshift state institutions for failed states.<sup>135</sup> These approaches promote long-lasting conflicts by placing authority and responsibility with the UN. Capacity building guarantees locals chart the future. Exit strategies have to be vocalized, ensuring that nations can assume control of their destinies. Likewise, De Waal corroborates the misnomer concerning peace agreements and their ability to settle the root causes of armed conflict. He describes that in weak states, the warring factions will agree to UN impositions in peace agreements with no intention to abide by them.<sup>136</sup> De Waal also remarks that UN demands may not be feasible and burden the peacekeeping mission. Unachievable objectives within the peace agreements increase the local reliance on UN peacekeepers.<sup>137</sup> Therefore, the UN negotiated settlements can also be

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<sup>133</sup>Hirschmann, "Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Exit Strategies...", 176.

<sup>134</sup>Ibid., 176.

<sup>135</sup>Roland Paris, "Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture," *European Journal of International Relations* 9, no. 3 (2003): 453.

<sup>136</sup>De Waal, "Mission without End...", 112.

<sup>137</sup>Ibid., 112.

counter-productive to peacebuilding. Exit strategies have to be a collaborative endeavour with key stakeholders tackling grievances.

Another challenge to exit strategies is tied to the UN inner workings. A complication is the intergovernmental establishment's state-centric mentality. The UN Charter recognizes the importance of the state.<sup>138</sup> Transnational threats are not tackled with old-fashioned state-centric standpoints. In addition, Howard concedes that UN peace enforcement operations diverge from the UN peacekeeping principles of consent and impartiality.<sup>139</sup> Armed groups in combat with UN peacekeepers may present opposition to the UN transition plans. Moreover, the UNSC's level of interest in UN missions is imperative for tangible effects. Howard notes that high or low interest from the P5 nations is disadvantageous to UN peacekeeping success.<sup>140</sup> Exit strategies need alignment from the UNSC to enable peace. A lone P5 member may hinder PKO and exit strategies. The P5 decisions regarding the capacity of a UN peacekeeping force are instrumental. Thorin Wright from the University of Illinois and Michael Greig from the University of North Texas discovered that UN missions with a superior force capacity backed by the UNSC are more likely to terminate armed conflicts and produce successful outcomes.<sup>141</sup> The UN leaders, including the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and the Force Commander (FC) in theatre, have to champion the UNSC for robust mission resources. Govinda Clayton, a senior researcher with ETH Zurich, led a team that examined 38 UN missions from 1989 to 2015. The average duration of a UN mission was 70 months.<sup>142</sup> In comparison, UNTSO

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<sup>138</sup>Damien Deltenre and Michel Liégeois, "Filling a Leaking Bathtub? Peacekeeping in Africa and the Challenge of Transnational Armed Rebellions," *African Security* 9, no. 1 (2016): 13.

<sup>139</sup>Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars...*, 13.

<sup>140</sup>*Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>141</sup>Thorn M. Wright and J. Michael Greig, "Staying the Course: Assessing the Durability of Peacekeeping Operations," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 29, no. 2 (2012): d. 145.

<sup>142</sup>Govinda Clayton, J. Kathman, K. Beardsley, T.I. Gizelis, L. Olsson, V. Bove, A. Ruggeri, et al, "The Known Knowns and Known Unknowns of Peacekeeping Data," *International Peacekeeping* 24, no. 1 (28 September 2016): 19.

and UNMOGIP have already surpassed 70 years. Clayton also exposes the mission leadership challenges. “On the military side, the average time in office of a FC is 19 months... In terms of civilian leadership, SRSGs serve slightly longer than FCs on average (23 months).”<sup>143</sup> The short tenure of mission leaders is disturbing because it thwarts continuity. The SRSG is the UN principal for supporting the peace discussions. Exit strategies will be impacted because human relationships and trust need time to be formed. Likewise, peacekeepers are ill-equipped to accomplish their mandates, notes Caplan. He adds competing interests outside the scope of security issues are widespread in the post-conflict environment.<sup>144</sup> UN peacekeepers are untrained to alleviate the complexities regarding local politics, peace and power disputes.<sup>145</sup> Specialized training is underprovided for UN peacekeepers. Hirschmann notices that peacebuilding tasks like DDR and SSR have added complexity to UN peacekeepers, reducing their operational effectiveness in security matters.<sup>146</sup> UN peacekeepers are facing complicated problems that are outside of their comfort and competence levels. Hirschmann declares this paradigm as organized hypocrisy where the UN language and activities are incongruent.<sup>147</sup> The UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) II exemplified organized hypocrisy where UN speeches did not match its actions. The situation worsened with peacekeepers, which occasioned a renewal of violence following the 1992 elections.<sup>148</sup> This dysfunctional behaviour is manifested in exit strategies. “In the case of peacekeeping exit strategies, where the UN is caught between the normative demand to ensure peace and the pressure for a timely withdrawal of

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<sup>143</sup>Clayton, et al, “The Known Knowns...”, 19.

<sup>144</sup>Richard Caplan, “Measuring Peace Consolidation,” Chap. 5, In *Measuring Peace* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 112.

<sup>145</sup>*Ibid.*, 112.

<sup>146</sup>Hirschmann, “Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Exit Strategies...”, 181.

<sup>147</sup>*Ibid.*, 171.

<sup>148</sup>*Ibid.*, 174.

peacekeeping resources, inconsistent rhetoric and actions become a question of legitimacy for the organization.”<sup>149</sup> Thus, the addition of peacebuilding in exit strategies may hamper the situation. The UN and its peacekeepers are trying to overcome competing demands for conflict management. Enabling solutions to these exit strategy challenges may be an impossible task. These challenging dynamics suggest the withdrawal of the five longstanding operations.

### **Conclusion – Exit strategies Re-examined**

In sum, the examination of UN peacekeeping story, the UN rhetoric and the obstacles to exit strategies are essential for enhancement. Seventy years of UN experience provide examples of achievements and missteps. Longstanding traditional operations are curbed by stalemates outside of their influence, demanding an end. First, UN peacekeeping operations have contrasting impacts on societies. Most importantly, UN peacekeepers save lives by reducing violence and improve human security. However, PKO are challenged to solve the complex causes of conflict that generate the resumption of hostilities. As well, there is a short window to negotiate a workable peace after the dissipation of violence. The five longstanding missions are at impasses not resolvable by extending the missions further. Second, UN verbal and written communications highlight the importance of exit strategies and peacebuilding tasks for UN PKO. Organized hypocrisy is signalled throughout UN language and products regarding PKO and exit strategies. Exit strategies for missions in Angola and Cambodia were examples.<sup>150</sup> UN has grown to understand the usefulness of multidimensional peacekeeping, consisting of peacebuilding and articulating exit strategies. Traditional peacekeeping missions have lacked multidimensional elements for conflict resolution. Third, internal and external challenges have to be surmounted

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<sup>149</sup>Hirschmann, “Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Exit Strategies...”, 174.

<sup>150</sup>Ibid., 173-174.

for the creation and implementation of exit strategies. Impediments to UN peacekeeping and exit strategies include the lack of UN resources, situational difficulties, peacebuilding gaps, and UN internal dynamics. Thus, exit strategies need to be re-examined to end longstanding conflicts successfully, support UN legitimacy and credibility, and yield peacekeeping improvements for sustainable peace. Otherwise, UN missions will sustain contrived power balances where peacekeepers risk being entangled indefinitely.<sup>151</sup> The five traditional peacekeeping operations command to consider changes.

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<sup>151</sup>De Waal, "Mission without End...", 110.



## CHAPTER 3 – CONSIDERATIONS FOR EXIT STRATEGIES AND WITHDRAWAL

### Introduction – Principles for Exit Strategies

The three basic principles of UN peacekeeping should guide the way forward for exit strategies. First, consent of the main parties ensures buy-in on the vision of the end state. A RAND Corporation study on peace operations observed that peacekeeping operations should not deploy to locations “where there is no (real) consent by the state”.<sup>152</sup> The longstanding traditional missions in Table 1.1 are stonewalled by this lack of real buy-in for conflict resolution. Consent confirms that the central participants are consigned to a path towards peace through an exit strategy. As well, consent ensures that opposing groups are engaged in unified efforts towards conflict resolution.<sup>153</sup> Ideally, UN peacekeeping facilitates a solution agreed upon by the warring parties. Second, impartiality reinforces that the UN supporting the design of an exit strategy is serving as an unbiased guarantor. Melvin Korsmo, a graduate of the University of Denver, emphasizes that sustainable peace is attainable with stout third party provisions.<sup>154</sup> The UN as an impartial body strengthens its position as a legitimate and credible organization supporting peace, security and cooperation. UN peacekeepers are a symbol of international assistance, as illustrated by Sambanis. “The mere presence of a UN mission might help build peace by signalling to the factions that the international community is watching or that more help is available.”<sup>155</sup> Third, the non-use of force certifies that the UN is not engaged in decisive military

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<sup>152</sup>James Dobbins, James Pumzile Machakaire, Andrew Radin, Stephanie Pezard, Jonathan S. Blake, Laura Bosco, Nathan Chandler, Wandile Langa, Charles Nyuykonge, and Kitenge Fabrice Tunda, RAND Corporation, *Africa's Role in Nation-Building: An Examination of African-Led Peace Operations*. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), 124.

<sup>153</sup>Ibid., 124.

<sup>154</sup>Korsmo, “Securing Whose Peace...”, 372.

<sup>155</sup>Sambanis, “Short- and Long-Term Effects...”, 14.

actions against the opposing parties. Under Chapter VII, peacekeepers serving as combatants may undermine the UN basic principles. UN peace enforcement may constrain collaboration with warring groups towards a feasible peace. Interestingly, the five traditional peacekeeping operations generally respect the three principles but appear to be interminable. These longstanding UN traditional deployments are not difference makers in conflict resolution and purely observe stalemates.<sup>156</sup> Nonetheless, the UN peacekeeping principles are ideals that should be integrated into exit strategies shaping conditions for the successful fulfilment of long-term peace. The UN peacekeeping mission mandates and exit strategies command deliberate planning and cyclical assessments. Otherwise, UN PKO will continue to defer conflicts rather than resolve them, like in Cyprus.<sup>157</sup>

This chapter will consider exit strategies, including withdrawal, for UN peacekeeping by examining peacekeeping success findings, international perceptions and areas for improvement. These arguments will substantiate that the UN should terminate longstanding missions because of the lack of success, the strong linkage between UN legitimacy, credibility and mission performances, and the mission deficiencies. First, the beliefs regarding UN peacekeeping success should shape exit strategies. After numerous decades, UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNFICYP, UNDOF and UNIFIL have been ineffective at conflict resolution and termination. Second, effective exit strategies influence the international support of UN legitimacy and credibility as a conflict management body. Withdrawal is the best viable option for these five longstanding traditional PKO to avoid further negative impacts. Third, there are opportunities for improvement with positive implications for the UN that should be fused into exit strategies. The five traditional missions have numerous shortcomings affecting their exit strategies. Frankly, the evolution of

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<sup>156</sup>Sambanis, "Short- and Long-Term Effects...", 30.

<sup>157</sup>Doyle and Sambanis, "The UN Record on Peacekeeping Operations...", 501.

exit strategies consists of adopting a truly integrated approach. An understanding of peacekeeping success should influence the planning of this critical requirement.

### **UN Peacekeeping Success**

Exit strategies should correspond with the ideas supporting UN peacekeeping mission success. US GAO explains that there are five principles for successful peacekeeping operations. They include PKO supporting political solutions to conflict, host nation consent for PKO, convincing and realizable mandates, a detailed exit strategy pronouncing UNSC agreement, and the UNSC supporting adjustments of mandates.<sup>158</sup> The US stresses the importance of an exit strategy. A plan for withdrawal supported by UN leadership charts a path to an acceptable end state. Longstanding traditional missions crave this type of plan. The subsequent text will discuss factors for peacekeeping success that should be incorporated into exit strategies. The US principles can be harnessed. Thus, exit strategies should include political concessions, consent from the local stakeholders, realistic and achievable objectives, the vision of the end state, and the approach to achieving the end state. Lastly, a recurrent reassessment of the exit strategy should occur. Correspondingly, the Chr. Michelsen Institute's study recommends six focus areas for post-conflict peacebuilding success: security, governance and administration, justice, economic recovery and reform, political representation and post-war integration.<sup>159</sup> These elements should be encompassed in exit strategies. UN peacekeeping should be leveraging UN instruments to support the restoration of these six empowering activities. Economic growth should be a focal point, asserts Sambanis for peacekeeping success. "The international

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<sup>158</sup>United States Government Accountability Office, *UN Peacekeeping Operations...*, 10-11.

<sup>159</sup>Astri Suhrke, Torunn Wimpelmann, and Marcia Dawes, *Peace Processes and Statebuilding: Economic and Institutional Provisions of Peace Agreements* (Bergen, Norway: Prepared by Chr. Michelsen Institute for World Bank and UNDP, 2007), 19.

community would benefit from an evolution that uses economic reforms to plug the gap between peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance on the one hand and development on the other.”<sup>160</sup> Increasing wealth ought to diminish the will of communities to engage in conflicts. Exit strategies would be wise to include activities to shape economic development. Sambanis also underlines drawing on international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, to assist with peacebuilding.<sup>161</sup> Moreover, De Waal emphasizes that three constituents of success are a prescriptive settlement, human security enhancements and an accord with the elite.<sup>162</sup> A detailed settlement of grievances and an elite bargain emphasize getting consent from the community leaders. Exit strategies should be based on UN negotiations with the local influencers. Following an analysis of ten UN missions, Howard describes three components for effective mandate execution. Peacekeeping requires consent from opposition sides, mutual UNSC benefits, and organizational learning from the UN mission.<sup>163</sup> Hence, transition negotiations should involve the P5 and build upon situational awareness and lessons learned. The UN mission experiencing the situation difficulty should reevaluate exit strategies regularly. Individuals embroiled in UN longstanding missions have valuable knowledge that could be leveraged. Furthermore, Jacques Koko, an assistant professor of conflict at Salisbury University, and Essoh Essis, the Côte d’Ivoire diplomat, conducted a quantitative study of the determinants of success in UN PKO. After investigating 46 UN operations, they concluded that four factors accounted for 70% of the variability in peacekeeping success.<sup>164</sup> In order of precedence, the four determinants are the resources invested, the duration and intensity of conflict and preparation time for intervention,

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<sup>160</sup>Sambanis, “Short- and Long-Term Effects...”, 9.

<sup>161</sup>Ibid., 9.

<sup>162</sup>De Waal, “Mission without End...”, 113.

<sup>163</sup>Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars...*, 327.

<sup>164</sup>Koko and Essis, *Determinants of Success...*, 73.

the UNSC political support and the type of conflict.”<sup>165</sup> Koko and Essis accentuate the preeminence of the UN PKO planning and execution in deciding success. Therefore, the UN deliberate design and well-timed PKO actions are crucial for implementing mandates and exit strategies. Three of the four measured variables are within the purview of the UN.<sup>166</sup> The UN mission mandates and exit strategies necessitate sufficient resources, timely and appropriate UN peacekeeping responses and UNSC support. A UN mission and its exit strategy may be destined to fail when there is an inadequacy in any of these critical factors for success, which is the case for the five longstanding PKO.

There are diverse views on peacekeeping success, depending on specific dynamics aligning for exit strategies. Suhrke stresses that long-term peace is unfeasible without political agreement and national ownership within the conflict zone. She also adds that these sentiments fluctuate over time.<sup>167</sup> Consent from the affected parties is problematic as it is challenging to attain and maintain. Nonetheless, a consensus is a prerequisite for a future vision supporting an exit strategy. Suhrke discusses the correct balance for trade-offs between opposing factions by “‘forward looking’ provisions to sustain the peace, and ‘backward looking’ provisions to secure an end to the violence.”<sup>168</sup> Successful agreements have to address the root causes of conflict and table a tolerable future concept with mediated solutions.<sup>169</sup> Compromise is essential from the main parties for exit strategies. The lack of concessions is the reason longstanding PKO are hopeless. Moreover, Mateja Peter, an international relations lecturer at the University of St. Andrews, describes the challenges to modify political realities in armed conflicts.<sup>170</sup> When facing

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<sup>165</sup>Koko and Essis, *Determinants of Success...*, 73.

<sup>166</sup>*Ibid.*, 73.

<sup>167</sup>Suhrke, Wimpelmann, and Dawes, *Peace Processes and Statebuilding...*, 58.

<sup>168</sup>*Ibid.*, 59.

<sup>169</sup>*Ibid.*, 59-60.

<sup>170</sup>Peter, “Between Doctrine and Practice...”, 364.

unrelenting hostilities, UN PKO encounter considerable opposition to their practices. Hence, the need to attend to the root causes of conflict during negotiations. Longstanding UN peacekeeping operations unable to resolve conflicts warrant deliberations concerning their mandates and future. Withdrawal is the only option when local opposition is persistent for transitions. Likewise, there are cases where aspects of sovereignty are conceded to UN PKO, and exit strategies become unrealistic.<sup>171</sup> The UN is committing to a possible enduring obligation.<sup>172</sup> UN PKO should ensure that national proprietorship rests with the locals to enable an eventual withdrawal. This assertion applies to longstanding missions that are ceaselessly providing security. Conversely, the UN has the responsibility to resource missions with the necessary tools. Cooperating with opposing sides and committing sufficient capabilities enables UN PKO success. Generally, the UN has satisfied these requirements with its commitment to the five traditional missions. Besides, the UN financial and operational capability restraints remain impediments to effective peacekeeping.<sup>173</sup> Marco Odello, a conflict researcher from the University of Nottingham, affirms that the UN is incapable of preventing the threats encountered in PKO. He also mentions that peacekeepers will have to combat some resistance to international interventions.<sup>174</sup> Ongoing resistance plagues the longstanding traditional missions. Equally, there are a few cases where adequate funding does not translate to effective PKO. Howard uses Somalia and Bosnia as examples of well-financed missions that failed due to conflicting UN strategies undermining PKO.<sup>175</sup> Nevertheless, appropriate funds are critical for UN mandate and exit strategy realization. Lastly, UN PKO need an ending to be viewed as successful. An ongoing

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<sup>171</sup>John D. Ciorciari, "Sharing Sovereignty in the Streets: International Policing in Fragile States," *International Peacekeeping* 27, no. 5 (2020): 755.

<sup>172</sup>*Ibid.*, 755.

<sup>173</sup>Marco Odello, "Commentary on the United Nations' High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change," *Journal of Conflict & Security Law* 10, no. 2 (1 July 2005): 245.

<sup>174</sup>*Ibid.*, 245.

<sup>175</sup>Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars...*, 329.

mission will always face scrutiny, even when conditions improve dramatically. The missions in Table 1.1 exemplify this situation.

UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNFICYP, UNDOF and UNIFIL are not successful missions because of conflict resolution and termination failures. Israel and its regional quarrels are at the centre of UNTSO in Jerusalem, UNDOF in Syria and UNIFIL in Lebanon. Dennis Jett, the former US diplomat, stated: “Israeli politicians across the ideological spectrum have made clear they have no intention of ever returning the Golan Heights to Syrian control, and since Syria is not going to surrender its claim to the area, the peacekeepers may never be able to leave.”<sup>176</sup> This stance applies to the other Israeli disputes as well. Jett adds that these three missions’ contributions are negligible. In particular, UNDOF has withdrawn forces from the Syrian side. UNIFIL is unable to impede Hezbollah actions. UNTSO military observers are insufficient to substantiate its existence and usefulness.<sup>177</sup> As for UNMOGIP, a US Congressional hearing on the absence of accountability in UN PKO in 2016 questioned what the mission was accomplishing. The US officials referred to Kashmir as a frozen conflict, with no end in sight.<sup>178</sup> UNFICYP will be examined in the next chapter. Notwithstanding, Jett mentions that a resolution in Cyprus is improbable.<sup>179</sup> Worst of all, the underlying conditions and tensions for the five missions are fundamentally indistinguishable from the circumstances before the launch of these PKO.<sup>180</sup> These longstanding traditional missions’ current worth and influence are debatable. “When it comes to classical peacekeeping, therefore, the six missions currently in operation are making little contribution to peace. At the same time, they show no likelihood of being

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<sup>176</sup>Dennis Jett, “Why Peacekeeping Fails,” *Middle East Policy* 26, no. 1 (2019): 90.

<sup>177</sup>*Ibid.*, 90.

<sup>178</sup>US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Peacekeepers: Allegations of Abuse and Absence of Accountability at the United Nations*, Congressional Hearing, Serial No. 114-200, 13 April 2016, 72.

<sup>179</sup>Jett, “Why Peacekeeping Fails...”, 90.

<sup>180</sup>US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Peacekeepers...*, 72.

terminated....” asserts Jett.<sup>181</sup> These five traditional missions are involved in conflicts that have lasted for centuries. Supporters contend that these missions ensure the situation does not deteriorate and may eventually lead to conflict resolution. However, there are no indications that these conflicts may be terminated, with or without UN peacekeepers.<sup>182</sup> Decades have confirmed that these traditional PKO are unsuccessful at conflict resolution and termination. Jett acknowledges that there have been hardly any notable actions to resolve the grievances or mend relations in these territorial disputes.<sup>183</sup> No evidence suggests extending these missions for further decades would change anything. The UN has to withdraw because they are prolonging five failed missions with no probability of success. Ideally, the expected outcome for every UN mission would include peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding followed by a withdrawal. Successful peacekeeping involves UNSC and local support to a definitive multifaceted solution enabled by proper UN resources and timely and effective responses. The international community generating critical perceptions of the UN is surveying PKO. The UN legitimacy and credibility are at stake every time peacekeepers deploy to a conflict zone. The five never-ending traditional missions are unflattering to the UN.

### **International Perceptions**

International opinions and UN symbolism are of critical importance to the organization. A UN peacekeeping mission should have an emblematic effect on a conflict area. The UN declares how locals should perceive UN peacekeepers. “UN Peacekeepers have long been the best chance for peace for some of the world’s most vulnerable people. Their service and sacrifice

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<sup>181</sup>Jett, “Why Peacekeeping Fails....”, 91.

<sup>182</sup>Ibid., 90.

<sup>183</sup>Ibid.



– frequently under harsh and dangerous conditions– has made the Blue Helmet a symbol of hope to millions of people.”<sup>184</sup> Peacekeepers as symbols of a better future are what the UN wants to convey. Sambanis explains that the involvement of UN PKO represents international attention. He describes the mandates as the formalized international guarantee of support.<sup>185</sup> A UN PKO manifests the commitment to solving the conflict. Yet, the reality is more complex. In “A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping”, the UN discloses the disparities between the conflict realities and the expectations of UN peacekeepers.

The diversity of peacebuilding needs and the gaps in international and national capacity to meet them pose real challenges for the successful exit of complex peacekeeping missions. Peacekeepers are often the largest and most visible international presence on the ground and face unrealistic expectations as to what they can reasonably achieve. At times, peacekeepers try to fill gaps in the provision of international support in areas where they have little capacity or resources and, in so doing, risk being stretched or ineffectual. Peacekeepers cannot anticipate all the tasks critical to a country’s transition, and approaches will differ in each situation.<sup>186</sup>

The passage highlights the farfetched expectancies confronted by peacekeepers to settle effectively conflicts with inadequate resources. Host nations expect international aid will resolve the root causes of conflict. However, they are obtaining a limited and makeshift global response. Under these conditions, the transition from armed conflict to a workable peace is daunting. Achieving the expectations of the inhabitants is practically impossible for ill-equipped UN peacekeepers. An exit strategy is formidable when improperly resourced. High expectations inevitably lead to disappointment when UN peacekeepers do not deliver the anticipated outcomes. Hence, the UN reputation is stained locally and internationally.

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<sup>184</sup>UN Peacekeeping, “UN Peacekeeping: 70 Years of Service & Sacrifice,” last accessed 17 January 2021, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/un-peacekeeping-70-years-of-service-sacrifice>.

<sup>185</sup>Sambanis, “Short- and Long-Term Effects...”, 13-14.

<sup>186</sup>Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support. *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping* (New York: United Nations Secretariat, 2009), 22.

There are apparent manifestations of the negative international perceptions. Hirschmann reveals that dysfunctional behaviour persists in the UN,<sup>187</sup> impairing perceptions. The absence of sizeable US troop contributions to UN PKO is an outcome. In the 2016 US Congressional hearing, a US representative remarked that the US troop contribution to UN peacekeeping dropped from 700 to 70 in a span of 20 years. Meanwhile, the EU's commitment plummeted from 40 to six percent in the same period.<sup>188</sup> The alleged dysfunction has impacts on UN contributions. Jett corroborates that wealthier states' willingness to contribute soldiers has vanished.<sup>189</sup> He proclaims that the US and affluent nations are funding the UN to divert responsibility.

Peacekeeping has become a way for rich countries to send the soldiers of poor countries to deal with conflicts the rich countries do not care about. It provides the rich countries a way to claim they have done something about a humanitarian disaster — and provides the opportunity to shift the blame for the result to the UN and the peacekeepers.<sup>190</sup>

Thus, some nations with the best-equipped militaries are shunning peacekeeping. A motive is the negative perceptions of wealthier nations' residents towards PKO and their outcomes. Jett highlights that many affluent countries' refusal to contribute to the UN is tied to political risks.<sup>191</sup> National audiences are apprehensive of UN PKO commitments and risks. The US abstention is symbolic. The country with the largest amount of troops deployed on expeditionary operations is unwilling to commit more than 70 soldiers to UN peacekeeping operations. Despite substantial subsidies to the UN, the US is conveying a lack of faith in UN peacekeeping effectiveness by not exploiting its vast military resources. The US is contributing financially to shift blame, as

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<sup>187</sup>Hirschmann, "Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Exit Strategies...", 171.

<sup>188</sup>US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Peacekeepers...*, 67.

<sup>189</sup>Jett, "Why Peacekeeping Fails...", 94.

<sup>190</sup>*Ibid.*, 95.

<sup>191</sup>*Ibid.*, 94.

explained by Jett.<sup>192</sup> US is not supplying a single military member<sup>193</sup> to the five longstanding PKO, indicating its poor opinion of these efforts. Similarly, John Ciorciari, the University of Michigan associate professor of public policy, pronounces that international fatigue exists for UN PKO. He states that global political support fades with time as UN PKO endure.<sup>194</sup> Negativity and frustration rise the longer PKO last. Longstanding traditional missions are afflicted by international fatigue because of the inability to solve conflicts. A withdrawal of these traditional PKO should improve UN perceptions, given that extending these missions exasperates international fatigue.<sup>195</sup> The five longstanding missions weaken the esteem of UN peacekeeping. Consequently, UN PKO require end states and need to be finite for positive international perceptions. T.S. Tirumurti, India's UN representative, declared: "UN peacekeeping missions should not operate in perpetuity and there is urgent need for time-bound exit strategies." He added that missions underperforming in terms of their mandate affect the UN credibility.<sup>196</sup> The time a UN mission takes to transition matters. In addition, international fatigue and negative perceptions have led to the emergence of other regional actors. In 2005, Odello underscored that these other entities dealing in security affairs are weakening UN legitimacy and their endeavours. "In fact, the emerging number of international organisations, and the expanding role they are assuming in the area of security, seems to bypass the prominent role of the UN, including the central issue regarding authorisation of the use of force."<sup>197</sup> This scenario draws parallels to the

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<sup>192</sup>Jett, "Why Peacekeeping Fails...", 95.

<sup>193</sup>United Nations Peacekeeping, "Troop and Police Contributors," last accessed 25 April 2021. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>.

<sup>194</sup>Ciorciari, "Sharing Sovereignty in the Streets...", 754.

<sup>195</sup>Geraint Hughes, "The United Kingdom and International Peacekeeping: 1960-2014," *Round Table* 106, no. 4 (2017): 474.

<sup>196</sup>The Economic Times, "UN peacekeeping missions should not operate in perpetuity: India," last modified 17 February 2021. <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/un-peacekeeping-missions-should-not-operate-in-perpetuity-india/articleshow/81055526.cms>.

<sup>197</sup>Odello, "Commentary on the United Nations...", 245.

League of Nations. A similar loss of relevance may foreshadow the potential demise of the UN. The US preference for coalitions of the willing implies the forfeiture of support for the UN and PKO. Hirschmann shares this understanding, citing the UN mission termination problems in Rwanda, Angola and Cambodia. In 2012, she attested to the pressure on the UN:

The organization came under pressure from member states, its legitimacy was linked to ‘effective’ peacekeeping, and fewer states were willing to contribute to peacekeeping resources. The discrepancy between the UN’s rhetoric and the consequences of its actions needed to be reconciled for the UN to remain a legitimate peacekeeping body.<sup>198</sup>

The multi-layered activities conducted by peacekeepers are synonymous with UN legitimacy and credibility. The successes of the mission mandate and exit strategy are obligatory. Failures in any respect, including exit strategies, undermine global perceptions and support of the UN. If the UN is deemed ineffective at conflict management and no longer a symbol of peace and hope, then existential questions will mount regarding the UN’s usefulness.

The UN’s poor choices and actions threaten its legitimacy and credibility. Binder talks about the irregular practices for UN involvement, damaging its legitimacy and credibility.<sup>199</sup> The decision to intervene or not in conflict areas is an ongoing UN condemnation. Binder investigated 31 humanitarian emergencies and discovered that the UNSC decided to support 13 of them with robust means.<sup>200</sup> The UN peacekeeping selective application does not bode well for UN support from those ignored. The UNSC, a political assembly of states, occasion inconsistent peacekeeping responses.<sup>201</sup> Some armed conflicts will be overlooked, harming the UN brand. In 11 out of the 13 humanitarian crises, Binder remarks that the UN applied coercive actions, multidimensional peacekeeping mandates, and economic sanctions. He also observes the role of

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<sup>198</sup>Hirschmann, “Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Exit Strategies...”, 174.

<sup>199</sup>Binder, “Paths to Intervention...”, 724.

<sup>200</sup>Ibid., 724.

<sup>201</sup>Ibid.

media in influencing the UN involvement process. “Unlike the cases of strong SC action, the role of media attention here is clear. Little media attention is consistently associated with a limited SC response to a humanitarian crisis.”<sup>202</sup> Media coverage affects global opinions. When a conflict draws worldwide attention, they are pushed to act, maintaining the UN legitimacy and credibility. Additionally, Howard emphasizes that peace enforcement undertakings involving the use of force on UN PKO hurt the UN legitimacy in international affairs.<sup>203</sup> UN peacekeepers engaged in combat may be contravening two of three founding principles of peacekeeping, underpinning UN credibility as an impartial broker. The UN decision to evolve to multidimensional peacekeeping and defined exit strategies was predicated on preventing humanitarian crises and maintaining UN pertinence.<sup>204</sup> These peacekeeping adjustments, including transition plans, were focused on the international perceptions of UN actions. Hirschmann confirms that this realization caused increased UN transparency. This openness mitigates the mounting negative perspectives on the UN and its PKO.<sup>205</sup> Pressures for effective peacekeeping will persist and threaten the UN. Consequently, longstanding traditional missions have become strategic risks to the UN and exit strategies need to be considered. The five traditional PKO do not align with the UN evolution towards multidimensional peacekeeping. The UN should be transparent and advise the international and local audiences of the withdrawal intention for the five long-lasting traditional PKO. This shift would uphold the UN traditional peacekeeping concept within the Capstone doctrine as “an interim measure.”<sup>206</sup> As discussed in chapter 2, the alignment of UN rhetoric and its actions will improve UN legitimacy and

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<sup>202</sup>Binder, “Paths to Intervention...”, 722.

<sup>203</sup>Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars...*, 14.

<sup>204</sup>Hirschmann, “Organizational Learning...”, 374.

<sup>205</sup>*Ibid.*, 374.

<sup>206</sup>Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *United Nations...*, 21.

credibility internationally. UN peacekeepers' ethical behaviour also sways the public perception of the UN.

UN peacekeepers operate in conflict zones where there are societal breakdowns. The socio-economic bodies, socio-culture rules, and law and order are deficient.<sup>207</sup> This situation occasions unintended consequences for UN PKO that undercut the UN and its missions. Chiyuki Aoi, an associate professor of international politics at Aoyama Gakuin University, Cedric De Coning, a research professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, and Ramesh Thakur, a professor of political science at the University of Waterloo, conducted extensive research. They expose the “vulnerability of women and girls to sexual violence, exploitation and abuse in post-conflict societies, not only by local people but also by international peacekeepers. This would explain, for instance, why human trafficking seems to thrive in post-conflict societies.”<sup>208</sup> Several UN peacekeepers have injured the UN credibility by their criminal actions. Autesserre proclaims that some UN peacekeepers are hurting those they are supposed to shield. She cites the acts of torture in Congo, Somalia and the Central African Republic (CAR), the sex trafficking in Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, and the 1,000 accusations of sexual violence by UN peacekeepers.<sup>209</sup> These unintended consequences destroy the UN reputation. Aoi, De Coning and Thakur reveal the financial opportunities yielded to the UN troop-contributing countries and their personnel.<sup>210</sup> These circumstances have led to instances of corruption and doubt in the motives of troop contributors. The heinous activities of some UN peacekeepers hamper the ability to enact PKO and exit strategies. The longer UN peacekeepers remain the more opportunities for unintended consequences. Ending longstanding missions protects the UN reputation against

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<sup>207</sup>Aoi, De Coning, and Thakur, *Unintended Consequences...*, 269.

<sup>208</sup>*Ibid.*, 269-270.

<sup>209</sup>Autesserre, “The Crisis of Peacekeeping...”, 101.

<sup>210</sup>Aoi, De Coning, and Thakur, *Unintended Consequences...*, 272.

further negativity. Ethically and morally intolerable behaviour remains a danger to the UN, its missions and its mandates.<sup>211</sup> Adverse perceptions jeopardize the UN's legitimacy and credibility. Thus, UN PKO need to detect, restrain, and administer these unintended consequences. This concern is one of many areas for improvement for UN peacekeeping and exit strategies.

### **Opportunities for Improvement**

There are fundamental problems with UN peacekeeping operations that require improvements for success, including enhancing exit strategies. The subsequent paragraphs will outline several proposed methods for improving the weaknesses contained in PKO, especially the five traditional missions, which have suffered from decades of deficiencies. The tinkering of these ineffectual missions is futile in resolving the conflicts.<sup>212</sup> A withdrawal allows the UN to execute an effective exit strategy and to avoid compounding these deficiencies. Koko and Essis suggest that UN peacekeeping policymaking is central to improving operational effectiveness. They highlight that the intricacies of the actual PKO are more influential than the conflict features.<sup>213</sup> The UN has to focus on developing tailored responses with ample resources. The five longstanding missions were makeshift responses as previously discussed. Before a UN intervention, Koko and Essis espouse deliberate thought, preparation and time for the UN response, supported by an in-depth assessment of the conflict. "A long preparation time allows the UN to become familiar with the issues, the parties (or stakeholders), and dynamics of the conflict in order to gather adequate means and design the right strategies to intervene

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<sup>211</sup>Aoi, De Coning, and Thakur, *Unintended Consequences...*, 278.

<sup>212</sup>Sambanis, "Short- and Long-Term Effects...", 30.

<sup>213</sup>Koko and Essis, *Determinants of Success...*, 74.

successfully.”<sup>214</sup> Thus, to upgrade its PKO and exit strategies, the UN should be committing the necessary financial and human resources for the correct length of time at the right prescribed moment. The five traditional missions have been provided several decades to influence results. UNFICYP and UNIFIL disappointed with a considerable UN military presence.<sup>215</sup>

Unfortunately, the five traditional missions have failed and are continuing to be ineffective at solving the issues. Ending these traditional peacekeeping missions is inevitable and taking action sooner is better than later. Furthermore, UN diplomatic engagement, including sanctions, could be utilized to buy preparation time for a sufficiently resourced and task-tailored PKO. Thus, during the withdrawal of these five longstanding missions, UN negotiations may assist the concerned nations in expanding on the current equilibriums. Beardsley explains that UN diplomacy endorses interim solutions.<sup>216</sup> For future crises, the UN could adopt a phased approach, consisting of an initial phase of UN diplomacy and preparation, a second phase of a time-bound UN PKO and a final phase of mission termination. At present, the longstanding traditional missions are desperate for an exit strategy to end the status quo. Doyle and Sambanis accentuate the magnitude of local concurrence and engagement. “In the right circumstances, consent-based peacekeeping operations with civilian functions (multidimensional PKOs) are, by contrast, good not only in ending the violence, but also in assisting with the institutional and political reform that helps secure longer term peace.”<sup>217</sup> The problem with the five longstanding missions is that there is little local interest in concessions and settlement. These traditional missions were constructed to monitor. This classical construct should adopt multidimensional aspects for the attainment of conflict resolution. Doyle and Sambanis propose a logical

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<sup>214</sup>Koko and Essis, *Determinants of Success...*, 74.

<sup>215</sup>Sambanis, “Short- and Long-Term Effects...”, 17.

<sup>216</sup>Beardsley, “The UN at the Peacemaking–peacebuilding...”, 383.

<sup>217</sup>Doyle and Sambanis, “The UN Record on Peacekeeping Operations...”, 518.



sequencing of multidimensional peacekeeping tasks, including peacemaking, peace enforcement and revitalization, for settling future long-lasting conflicts.<sup>218</sup> This synchronization materializes with properly planned transitions, including exit strategies. These transitions are fated to collapse without local support for a resolution. This fact has doomed the five longstanding operations. Similarly, Koko and Essis confirm that UNSC should endorse the articulation of comprehensive mandates and exit strategies.<sup>219</sup> Hence, longstanding traditional peacekeeping deficiencies are linked to gaps in peacebuilding endeavours. Hereafter, exit strategies should comprise wide-ranging consensual activities. Conflict management necessitates involving various players. Central to future success is adopting a comprehensive approach for UN PKO, which confronts the complex problems associated with armed conflicts.

The multidimensional facets of conflicts entail a unified effort across multiple disciplines. The five longstanding missions were designed to focus primarily on security, leading to impasses.<sup>220</sup> A withdrawal corrects these deficiencies and forces the opposing factions to take ownership of the solution. The UNSC members “shape the conversation of what is and is not unacceptable international behavior.”<sup>221</sup> For the five longstanding conflicts, the UNSC has to demonstrate the lack of progress made by the affected countries is indefensible. A withdrawal conveys that the opposing parties are also accountable and responsible for the conflict resolution failures. Beardsley describes UN peacekeeping as a global investment.<sup>222</sup> This investment should synchronize civilian and military works to change the conflict narrative. Concerning the five traditional missions, the UN should move away from these investments, as the UN credibility

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<sup>218</sup>Doyle and Sambanis, “The UN Record on Peacekeeping Operations...”, 518.

<sup>219</sup>Koko and Essis, *Determinants of Success...*, 74.

<sup>220</sup>Sambanis, “Short- and Long-Term Effects...”, 30.

<sup>221</sup>Beardsley, “The UN at the Peacemaking–peacebuilding...”, 383.

<sup>222</sup>*Ibid.*, 383.

and legitimacy losses are mounting. Doyle and Sambanis discuss “matching means to ends.”<sup>223</sup> An exit strategy formulates the ends, while an integrated approach provides the means to achieve the ends. Doyle and Sambanis propose the following holistic approach to deal with the root causes of conflict. “Successful exercises of authority require a coordinated approach that draws in elements of ‘peacemaking’ (negotiations), peacekeeping (monitoring), peacebuilding reconstruction, and discrete acts of enforcement, when needed, to create a holistic strategy of reconciliation.”<sup>224</sup> Peacemaking and peacebuilding insufficiencies of traditional peacekeeping have restrained the five longstanding missions. Understanding the environment is necessary to affect responses for change. Sambanis and Doyle recommend focusing transition efforts on the main grievances, the national capacities and the provisional authority.<sup>225</sup> The comprehensive approach has to be nuanced to overcome the distinctive traits of each armed conflict. Collaboration difficulties present a significant challenge. The five traditional PKO are confronting such roadblocks making resolution unfeasible. Doyle and Sambanis encourage transformative solutions. “Transformative peacekeeping through multidimensional operations can increase the costs of non-cooperation for the parties and provide positive inducements by helping rebuild the country and restructure institutions so that they can support the peace.”<sup>226</sup> The five long-lasting missions are stuck in stalemates. A transformative approach to withdrawals is an opportunity to promote positive outcomes by stimulating costs to the non-cooperative opposing factions.

The concept of hybridity should enhance the comprehensive approach to UN peacekeeping. Thierry Tardy, a research director at the NATO Defence College, describes the

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<sup>223</sup>Doyle and Sambanis, “The UN Record on Peacekeeping Operations...”, 512.

<sup>224</sup>Ibid., 513.

<sup>225</sup>Ibid.

<sup>226</sup>Ibid., 509.

benefits of hybridity to UN PKO. “More specifically, hybrid operations allow institutions that are short of some key capabilities to benefit from the support of others while Western actors may see in hybridity a way to contribute to conflict management without being on the forefront, particularly in Africa.<sup>227</sup> Hybrid PKO would allow UN missions to leverage diverse groups, such as the private sector. Niche specialists could enable PKO.<sup>228</sup> For instance, social media corporations could offer insights that fashion an exit strategy. Data analytics on local populations should shape the withdrawal of the five longstanding missions. In truth, UN DPKO recognizes integrated peacebuilding as part of exit planning.<sup>229</sup> Hirschmann stresses that the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) creation in 2005 institutionalized the integrated approach within the UN. She also describes the PBC’s role in facilitating exit strategies.<sup>230</sup> Hence, the PBC should become the UN centre of excellence supporting UN PKO transitions. The PBC should be leveraged to assist with the withdrawal of the five longstanding missions. Ultimately, UN PKO are striving to make conflict resolution the most appealing option, settle any accord issues and clarify understandings and expectations between warring factions.<sup>231</sup> The underlying conditions faced in the five longstanding missions dictate a withdrawal due to decades of minimal progress. UN PKO and exit strategies, using a hybrid and comprehensive approach, provide a fundamental improvement opportunity. Reinvigorating national contributions to UN peacekeeping operations is another.

The origins of UN peacekeeping contributions are indications of shortcomings. The waning troop contributions of wealthier nations were addressed previously. There are prospects

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<sup>227</sup>Thierry Tardy, “Hybrid Peace Operations: Rationale and Challenges,” *Global Governance* 20, no. 1 (August 2014): 113.

<sup>228</sup>*Ibid.*, 114.

<sup>229</sup>Hirschmann, “Organizational Learning...”, 376.

<sup>230</sup>*Ibid.*, 378.

<sup>231</sup>Kathman and Benson, “Cut Short? United Nations Peacekeeping...”, 1605-1606.

of strengthening UN PKO by re-engaging these countries. Howard describes the disturbing trends in troop contributions to UN peacekeeping. She points to a troubling shift following UN mission calamities. “Today, however, in the wake of the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica, the most powerful states, along with the middle powers, have shied away from sending their troops for UN peacekeeping duty.”<sup>232</sup> This situation is alarming given that these nations are equipped with capabilities to enhance PKO. These wealthier states are armed with resources to enable exit strategies. Howard professes the consequences of developing countries supplying most UN peacekeepers. “The result is that there is a disturbing new racial and economic divide between those who do the peacekeeping and the ‘peacekept’ on the one hand, and those who fund and control the operations on the other.”<sup>233</sup> There is an unfair burden sharing for conflict management. As Howard correctly demonstrates, UN PKO are now perpetuating societal and financial inequalities.<sup>234</sup> There is an opportunity for the UN to devise strategies to target middle powers for peacekeepers. Middle powers like Canada provide specialized capabilities to missions but avoid sizeable troop contributions.<sup>235</sup> The UN approaches for middle power engagement should invoke messaging to support their national security priorities. The withdrawal from the five longstanding traditional operations would signify that the UN is committed to time-bound deployments and successful outcomes.

The UN movement away from never-ending deployments will appeal to middle power national audiences. The UN and these middle powers can find synergies for the benefit of both parties. Similarly, Joshua Libben, a University of Ottawa graduate in political studies, affirms

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<sup>232</sup>Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars...*, 332.

<sup>233</sup>*Ibid.*, 333.

<sup>234</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>235</sup>*Ibid.*, 332.

that national subcultures influence UN peacekeeping participation.<sup>236</sup> He explains below the challenges with subcultures regarding peacekeeping involvement. “These subcultures compete with one another among elites and the public, vying for their unique perspectives about why a country has a military to become dominant.”<sup>237</sup> For instance, Libben enlightens on how Canada neglected UN peacekeeping operations as their elites’ perceptions of their military changed.<sup>238</sup> The UN has to develop diplomatic approaches to entice middle powers in supporting peacekeeping based on a situational understanding of their cultures. The five longstanding missions provide examples for wealthier nations to avoid PKO. Wealthier countries prefer time-bound commitments to UN PKO.<sup>239</sup> Longstanding missions drive Canada and like-minded countries to shy away from UN peacekeeping.<sup>240</sup> The UN withdrawal punctuates peacekeeping success. The five longstanding missions require a significant transformation. Withdrawal from these interminable situations is a viable option for UNSC to disrupt decade-long stasis. Exit strategies are a way to affect change in these countries and influence others.

The US preconditions for UN involvement reveal that PKO have numerous faults. The US has expanded on its initial 17 preconditions from 1994 for UN peacekeeping participation, which consisted of well-defined objectives and an exit strategy.<sup>241</sup> Effectively implementing exit strategies in the five traditional peacekeeping operations may also support a renewed interest in PKO from the US. The UN banner legitimizes US actions. This international legitimacy is of critical importance to the US in the current security environment. Another significant component

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<sup>236</sup>Joshua Libben, “Am I My Brother’s Peacekeeper? Strategic Cultures and Change among Major Troop Contributors to United Nations Peacekeeping,” *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 23, no. 3 (2017): 337.

<sup>237</sup>*Ibid.*, 337.

<sup>238</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>239</sup>Lee Berthiaume, “Peacekeeping Mission must Start with Exit Strategy, Military Officials Warn,” *The Canadian Press*, May 11, 2017.

<sup>240</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>241</sup>Ryan, “United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter of Principles...”, 31.

influencing major powers' offerings to UN activities is economic interests.<sup>242</sup> The UN organization should use economic trade relationships to convince strong states to partake in peace operations.<sup>243</sup> Detailed transition plans, a noticeable PKO gap, are favourable in enticing wealthier countries like the US to contribute to UN PKO. Ultimately, ending the five traditional missions sends a powerful message to the world and frees up limited UN resources. As well, UN missions should exploit cross-cultural competencies from member nations.

Socio-cultural factors of the conflict zone should take precedence in UN PKO, including exit strategies. Caplan underscores the adoption of an ethnographic approach to UN peacekeeping. "It has stressed the value and importance of an 'ethnographic approach' that seeks to gain an enhanced understanding of the quality of the peace through knowledge of the local culture, the local history, and especially, the particular conflict dynamics at work in a given conflict."<sup>244</sup> Situational understanding of the cultural characteristics enriches the formulation of mandates and exit strategies. Crucial knowledge is gained from an examination of the social behaviours and norms feeding the conflict. This cultural understanding of the five traditional missions suggests that these PKO should have terminated years ago. A third party is unlikely to find a solution when deep-seated tensions have existed for generations.<sup>245</sup> Moreover, Koko and Essis endorse the merits of cultural sensitivities for UN peacekeeping success. They highlight that language or culture inadequacies hinder PKO.<sup>246</sup> UN peacekeepers armed with cross-cultural competencies are in a better position for effective results. Paolo Foradori, an associate professor of political science at the University of Trento, recommends the concept of cultural

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<sup>242</sup>Juan C. Duque, Michael Jetter, and Santiago Sosa, "UN Interventions: The Role of Geography," *The Review of International Organizations* 10, no. 1 (2015): 85.

<sup>243</sup>Ibid., 85.

<sup>244</sup>Caplan, "Measuring Peace Consolidation...", 122.

<sup>245</sup>Jett, "Why Peacekeeping Fails...", 90.

<sup>246</sup>Koko and Essis, *Determinants of Success...*, 77.

peacekeeping. Cultural peacekeeping focuses on cultural diversity and heritage protection initiatives.<sup>247</sup> Employing cultural peacekeeping is undertaking multiple activities, including combat, law enforcement, crime prevention, and cultural protection.<sup>248</sup> These efforts assist in gaining public trust for UN PKO and exit strategies. Koko and Essis identify that experts suggest UN peacekeepers improve their cultural affinity: “ability to understand and speak the language of local populations and the mission language.”<sup>249</sup> These skills would have been beneficial in the five traditional missions to improve engagement with locals and cohesion internally.

Cultural differences exist between UN personnel. Koko and Essis specify: “The impact of these cultural differences translates into differences in goals between military and civilian, which result in civilians disliking or distrusting soldiers.”<sup>250</sup> Longstanding missions have also suffered from these internal tensions. Measures should be in place to strengthen positive interactions within the UN team. Cohesion initiatives and training are options to improve civilian and military cooperation. Withdrawal from the five missions demands that UN personnel are on the same page to set the conditions for success.

UN PKO have to comprehend their cultural effects on the local communities. Roland Paris describes peacekeepers as “the products, the promulgators and the prisoners of global culture.”<sup>251</sup> UN PKO have to include these cultural planning factors in every respect of the mission. The transition plan has to ensure that local apprehensions are addressed. The withdrawal plan for the five traditional operations has to be communicated and explained to local stakeholders while respecting cultural sensitivities. Additionally, gender empowerment has to be

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<sup>247</sup>Paolo Foradori, “Protecting Cultural Heritage during Armed Conflict: The Italian Contribution to ‘cultural Peacekeeping’.” *Modern Italy: Journal of the Association for the Study of Modern Italy* 22, no. 1 (February 2017): 12.

<sup>248</sup>*Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>249</sup>Koko and Essis, *Determinants of Success...*, 78.

<sup>250</sup>*Ibid.*, 78.

<sup>251</sup>Paris, “Peacekeeping and the Constraints of Global Culture..”, 463.

at the forefront of UN peacekeeping activities. Theodora-Ismen Gizelis, a professor in government at the University of Essex, asserts that the possibilities of UN peacekeeping success are improved when local women have higher status.<sup>252</sup> Gender-based considerations, including empowerment, should be incorporated in the exit strategies of the five UN missions. Gizelis also states that the native women are inclined to establish grassroots deeds for diminishing violence and initiating restoration activities.<sup>253</sup> Hence, the five UN missions should actively engage the female community leaders to support their withdrawal efforts. UN peacekeeping efforts bettering the socio-cultural factors provide significant payoffs. Hence, the UN ethnographic approach should focus on enhancing human rights within the troubled areas. Human rights improvement is essential for UN peacekeepers to overcome socio-cultural problems. Targeted humanitarian activities are indispensable for UN forces to gain victories in conflict zones.<sup>254</sup> Ethnographic planning considerations should be part of exit strategies for the five traditional missions, in particular, at the ground level.

UN missions can improve their capacities by concentrating on specific facets. Tactically, the mission leadership directs UN PKO. Koko and Essis emphasize capable leadership, such as a head of mission with the necessary skills for conflict management.<sup>255</sup> UN mission leaders are those championing exit strategies. They should have the courage to provide the ground truth to the UNSC. The ineffectiveness of the five longstanding missions demonstrates mission leadership deficiencies. In many cases, Sambanis observes agency slack where mission leaders incorrectly apply the mission mandate with little oversight.<sup>256</sup> Leaders have to develop

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<sup>252</sup>Theodora-Ismen Gizelis, "Gender Empowerment and United Nations Peacebuilding," *Journal of Peace Research* 46, no. 4 (1 July 2009): 505.

<sup>253</sup>*Ibid.*, 508.

<sup>254</sup>Ryan, "United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter of Principles...", 37.

<sup>255</sup>Koko and Essis, *Determinants of Success...*, 78.

<sup>256</sup>Sambanis, "Short- and Long-Term Effects...", 20.



situational understanding of the big picture and find ways to implement the applicable mandate with limited resources. UN PKO have “received clear marching orders from member states to do more with less.”<sup>257</sup> Therefore, the five traditional missions, which have failed at conflict resolution for decades, are unlikely to get further resources. Extending these operations means endorsing the same ineffectual actions that have repeatedly promoted the stalemates. There is no reason to expect any different result. The five longstanding missions will fail every year, be withdrawn one day and be classified as failures.

The withdrawal of these missions is a solution to stop the repetitive and counter-productive pattern of deficiencies. Financial pressures continue to hamper UN peacekeeping. John Karlsrud, a research professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, advocates leveraging technologies and innovation to overcome the financial pressures and find efficiencies in UN PKO.<sup>258</sup> The onus is on the UN mission leadership to ascertain notions for improving the mission mandate and exit strategy execution. Technologies lowering mission costs can be force multipliers. In the DRC, drones have upgraded the surveillance capability of the UN mission.<sup>259</sup> Technologies should be exploited for mission proficiencies. Caplan discusses the UN attempts to examine advanced technologies such as machine learning for enhanced data analysis and intelligence assessments.<sup>260</sup> These products could enhance exit strategies by establishing measurable benchmarks based on concrete data. The US GAO also advances refining exit strategies with clear benchmarks.<sup>261</sup> Benchmarks are important targets for peacekeepers. Caplan pinpoints that concrete, appropriate and measurable benchmarks hold UN peacekeepers and host

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<sup>257</sup>John Karlsrud, “New technologies and UN peacekeeping operations.” In *UN Peacekeeping Doctrine in a New Era: Adapting to Stabilisation, Protection and New Threats*, edited by de Coning, Cedric, Chiyuki Aoi and John Karlsrud (New York: Routledge, 2017), 283.

<sup>258</sup>Karlsrud, “New technologies and UN peacekeeping operations...”, 283.

<sup>259</sup>*Ibid.*, 283.

<sup>260</sup>Caplan, “Measuring Peace Consolidation...”, 113.

<sup>261</sup>United States Government Accountability Office, *UN Peacekeeping Operations...*, 23.

nations accountable for mission mandate and exit strategy successes.<sup>262</sup> Exit strategies with indicators offer milestones for the UN mission leadership for public consumption. Thus, the longstanding missions should incorporate benchmarks to initiate and execute their exit strategies. These benchmarks have to consider the conflict tensions and local outlooks.<sup>263</sup> The sources of grievances have to be managed in support of an exit strategy. For instance, natural resource issues should be central to any exit strategy proposed by UN mission leaders. Vally Koubi, a political scientist at ETH Zurich, investigated the significant linkage between natural resources and conflict. Her research discovered that resource abundance, rather than scarcity, was correlated to conflict.<sup>264</sup> The five longstanding missions should propose power-sharing options to the opposing parties before implementing their withdrawal. As conditions evolve, mission mandates and exit strategies have to be re-examined. The US GAO review concluded that nine of 11 UN missions necessitated mandate changes, including the UNFICYP mandate that is not addressing the halted political process.<sup>265</sup> UNFICYP reflects the recurring deficiencies that are prevalent in the five traditional missions. Therefore, UN PKO demand multilayered mandates to achieve mission success and transition to a workable peace. US Army (Retired) Lieutenant Colonel David Cavaleri highlights nine transition planning themes: legitimacy, security, commitment, situational understanding, unity of effort, infrastructure, economic status, planning effort and media.<sup>266</sup> These elements should be reviewed when devising the exit strategies of the five longstanding missions. US Army (Retired) Colonel William Flavin advocates that the

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<sup>262</sup>Caplan, “Devising Exit Strategies...”, 120.

<sup>263</sup>Caplan, “Measuring Peace Consolidation...”, 117.

<sup>264</sup>Vally Koubi, Gabriele Spilker, Tobias Böhmelt, and Thomas Bernauer, “Do Natural Resources Matter for Interstate and Intrastate Armed Conflict?” *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 2 (21 August 2013): 239.

<sup>265</sup>United States Government Accountability Office, *UN Peacekeeping Operations...*, 19.

<sup>266</sup>David P. Cavaleri, *Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between Combat Operations and Stability Operations* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005), 13-15.

combined civilian and military exit strategy comprise ample specifics to empower the various supporting plans.<sup>267</sup> Several factors and planning considerations have to be integrated into UN missions to improve PKO and exit strategies. Comprehensive approaches are obligatory. Exit strategies remain complex but significant undertakings for enhancing UN missions. In particular, the five longstanding missions are in dire need of an exit strategy to end their failings at conflict resolution and termination.

### **Conclusion – An Art not a Science**

Overall, this third chapter explored UN peacekeeping operations and their exit strategies by examining successful peacekeeping tendencies, global UN views, and improvement proposals for peacekeeping difficulties. This evidence underscores ending longstanding traditional PKO. First, successful UN peacekeeping outcomes, including exit strategies, are products of correctly resourced and tailored missions backed by the UNSC. Moreover, success is unachievable without local consent, active engagement on a future vision and concerted efforts on the root causes of tension. The five longstanding missions have failed at conflict resolution and termination for decades. History shows that these missions will never succeed. Second, UN legitimacy and credibility are damaged by international perceptions of adverse peacekeeping outcomes. Effective transitions from never-ending operations promoting dysfunction, international fatigue, and unintended consequences can strengthen the UN public image. Withdrawing from the five longstanding conflicts can positively alter the UN narrative. Third, there are several UN peacekeeping and exit strategy components demanding enhancements for positive impacts. UN PKO should stress detailed planning, preparation, situational

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<sup>267</sup>William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success." *Parameters* 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 111.

understanding, and local engagement and concurrence before deploying peacekeepers and taking decisive actions. Mission mandates and exit strategies should contain comprehensive approaches leveraging hybridity, technologies and ethnographic aspects such as gender empowerment and human rights developments. In addition, UN PKO should bolster troop contributions from key nations, mission leadership, and transition benchmarks. These improvements require meaningful investment. The UN encountering resource constraints will find implementing these recommendations challenging. UNTSO, UNMOGIP, UNFICYP, UNDOF and UNIFIL will certainly not receive the necessary resources to move the needle in the deadlocks. Longstanding traditional missions should be terminated due to the lack of success, the damage to UN legitimacy and credibility, and the mounting opportunities for additional UN peacekeeping breakdowns. Finally, exit strategy elaboration is more of an art than a science.<sup>268</sup> The crucial mental exercise promotes the operational design required for attaining a workable peace. Exit strategies also need to be revised continually as the situation evolves. Once the conditions are set for a suitable peace, the effective withdrawal of UN PKO is the definitive symbol of success. Exit strategies should be shaped by what activities are required to end the conflict rather than what the local stakeholders are prepared to accept.<sup>269</sup> Otherwise, UN symbolic failures like Rwanda, Somalia, and the Balkans and everlasting deployments in Kashmir, Cyprus, and the DRC will incessantly plague the UN organization.<sup>270</sup> UN PKO remain the best existing conflict management tool. By moving forward with the proposed recommendations and focusing on terminating missions successfully, UN peacekeeping operations should recapture their original lustre and encourage the international communities' heightened involvement.

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<sup>268</sup>Caplan, "Devising Exit Strategies...", 120.

<sup>269</sup>Deltenre and Liégeois, "Filling a Leaking Bathtub...", 13.

<sup>270</sup>Ibid., 13.

## CHAPTER 4 – CASE STUDY: UNFICYP

### Introduction - UNFICYP

The UNFICYP mission commenced in 1964 to prevent fighting between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot populations living in Cyprus, an island in the eastern Mediterranean.<sup>271</sup> An initial 6,411 UN member peacekeeping force deployed into seven sectors throughout the island to subdue ethnic violence.<sup>272</sup> In 1974, elements favouring a union with Greece attempted a coup d'état. These actions resulted in the military involvement of Turkey in the northern part of Cyprus. These actions divided the island into two: Turkish Cypriots in the north supported by Turkey and Greek Cypriots in the south backed by Greece.<sup>273</sup> Since the formal ceasefire agreement, the traditional peacekeeping mission has been monitoring the ceasefire lines, which extend over 180 kilometres across Cyprus.<sup>274</sup> The “Green Line”, denoting the ceasefire lines, was coined from the line colour used by a British general on a map.<sup>275</sup> Since 1974, UN peacekeepers have been supervising and monitoring the Green Line, a buffer zone between opposing forces in the north and south of Cyprus. The buffer zone distances fluctuate between 7 kilometres and a couple of meters in Nicosia.<sup>276</sup> Today, there is 1,100 personnel working within four components of the UN mission: the military, police, civil affairs and administration.<sup>277</sup> These UN folks are partaking in a traditional peacekeeping mission that has lasted 57 years and counting. “Attempts to solve the Cyprus conflict and reunify the island have

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<sup>271</sup>UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, “About,” last accessed on 4 April 2021. <https://unficy.unmissions.org/about>.

<sup>272</sup>Dorn, *Keeping Watch...*, 93-94.

<sup>273</sup>UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus..., <https://unficy.unmissions.org/about>.

<sup>274</sup>Ibid.

<sup>275</sup>Dorn, *Keeping Watch...*, 94.

<sup>276</sup>Ibid., 94.

<sup>277</sup>UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus..., <https://unficy.unmissions.org/about>.

so far been without result...”<sup>278</sup> is outlined on the UNFICYP website. “The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem”, known as the 2004 Annan Plan, offered a detailed solution to the conflict but was vetoed overwhelmingly by Greek Cypriots.<sup>279</sup> This document is a manifestation of an exit strategy for the mission. The island remains constrained by an unrelenting political stalemate. This situation is exemplified by the portion of the Green Line in Nicosia, which provides an undeniable impression of the 1974 fighting frozen in time.<sup>280</sup>

The Cyprus problem is the epitome of a frozen conflict. The UNFICYP mission is the prototypical traditional peacekeeping example, consisting of an independent third party positioned between opposing forces. This chapter will provide a case study of UNFICYP, one of the longest lasting UN PKO. After decades, UNFICYP has not impinged the 1974 deadlock. Hence, the UN should end the mission because of the lack of success and the associated negative perceptions, and the positive indications of a cost-benefit analysis. First, the shortage of UN mission successes is noticeable after 57 years. Several disparaging views of UNFICYP also threaten UN peacekeeping. Second, a cost-benefit analysis supports the withdrawal of the UNFICYP. The local ownership of the Cyprus problem and the expansion of the current partition are the way ahead. Even though UNFICYP assists in maintaining the peace, the mission has failed at conflict termination and resolution and has promoted a ceaseless status quo.

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<sup>278</sup>UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus..., <https://unficyp.unmissions.org/about>.

<sup>279</sup>Magdalena Dembinska, “Turkish Cyprus: The Dynamics of a Frozen Conflict.” In *Encyclopedia of Modern Ethnic Conflicts*, edited by Joseph R. Jr. Rudolph (ABC-CLIO, 2015), 121-122.

<sup>280</sup>Based on personal experience of the author while serving as a Staff Officer within the Ops Information cell of UNFICYP Headquarters from July 2014 to July 2015.

## Unresolved Conflict and Negative Perceptions

UNFICYP has been unsuccessful in conflict resolution and termination since 1964, hurting the UN brand. Perry highlights that UNFICYP has aided in sustaining the peace without assertively attempting to resolve the underlying issues. She notes that the mission is facilitating the frozen conflict.<sup>281</sup> The fundamental grievances remain in place and are unaddressed by UNFICYP. The ill-equipped mission is focused primarily on the buffer zone, disregarding the root causes of tensions.<sup>282</sup> Dorn underscores that UNFICYP may be exacerbating the Cyprus problem. “The Cyprus case gave rise to the criticism that peacekeeping can freeze a conflict but it does not necessarily lead to conflict resolution, or more harshly, that peacekeeping does not solve problems, it perpetuates them.”<sup>283</sup> This reality is the case for UNFICYP and its inertia regarding the promotion of a resolution.<sup>284</sup> Interestingly, some individuals describe UNFICYP as a traditional peacekeeping success story because the mission has reduced the probability of an armed conflict in Cyprus between Greece and Turkey.<sup>285</sup> Conversely, Autesserre argues that the island remains divided, and reunification is as elusive as it was over 50 years ago.<sup>286</sup> Various UNFICYP members from the four components share Autesserre’s sentiments as well. A common perspective is that a change to the political stalemate is implausible.<sup>287</sup> The overwhelming rejection of the Annan plan in 2004 by the Greek Cypriots is definitive proof of the dearth of local consent for an agreement.<sup>288</sup> Greek Cypriots will solely endorse the reunification of the island under Greek Cypriot rule. Sambanis reinforces the improbability of

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<sup>281</sup>Perry, “At Cross Purposes? Democratization and Peace...”, 40.

<sup>282</sup>Based on personal experience of the author...

<sup>283</sup>Walter A. Dorn, “Canadian Peacekeeping: Proud Tradition, Strong Future?” *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 12, no. 2 (2005): 11.

<sup>284</sup>Based on personal experience of the author...

<sup>285</sup>Ryan, “United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter of Principles...”, 27.

<sup>286</sup>Autesserre, “The Crisis of Peacekeeping...”, 101.

<sup>287</sup>Based on personal experience of the author...

<sup>288</sup>Dembinska, “Turkish Cyprus...”, 121-122.

success by exposing that longstanding traditional missions like UNFICYP are not transformative and eternalize stalemates.<sup>289</sup> 57 years of UNFICYP ineffectiveness at conflict resolution supports this statement. Likewise, Doyle and Sambanis expose the ramifications of the inability to settle the conflict. “The price of first-generation peacekeeping, as in the long Cyprus operation, was sometimes paid in conflicts delayed rather than resolved.”<sup>290</sup> UNFICYP has merely deferred the conflict. Thus, the tensions between the opposing communities persist, upholding an uneasy equilibrium. Notwithstanding, there has been limited progress. For instance, the inter-communal “Home for Cooperation” (H4C) initiative within the buffer zone provides a structure for cooperation in peacebuilding between Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and non-governmental organizations.<sup>291</sup> Yet, evidence suggests that the UNFICYP humanitarian activities since 1964 have mostly benefitted a certain small elite in Cyprus.<sup>292</sup> The US GAO review declared that UNFICYP resolution efforts continue to be slow, despite numerous decades in place.<sup>293</sup> UNFICYP yearly reports are mirror images often of the previous years, indicating minimal headway towards a workable solution.<sup>294</sup> UNFICYP and the conflict are frozen. The continuing adverse mission outcomes damage public perceptions of the UN and its conflict management efforts.

The UNFICYP mission is struggling to find a path to exit permanently, which shapes international opinions. This situation is detrimental to the global perspectives of UN PKO. As discussed in the previous chapter, UN longstanding missions, such as UNFICYP, are maiming

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<sup>289</sup>Sambanis, “Short- and Long-Term Effects...”, 30.

<sup>290</sup>Doyle and Sambanis, “The UN Record on Peacekeeping Operations...”, 501.

<sup>291</sup>Gianfabrizio Ladini, “Peacebuilding, United Nations and Civil Society: The Case of Cyprus,” *The Cyprus Review* 21, no. 2 (Fall 2009): 39.

<sup>292</sup>*Ibid.*, 56.

<sup>293</sup>United States Government Accountability Office, *UN Peacekeeping Operations...*, 19.

<sup>294</sup>Based on personal experience of the author...



peacekeeping because of notions of widespread organizational dysfunction, international fatigue, and unintended consequences. UNFICYP is contributing to the negative perceptions because the mission is considered never-ending. These undesirable perspectives were demonstrated during the US Congressional hearing on UN PKO in 2016. UNFICYP and the other four traditional missions in Table 1.1 were denounced as incessantly unproductive missions. “But after two, three, four, five or six decades of stasis, it is beyond time to re-examine these missions to determine what can be done to make them spur resolution of their respective situations.”<sup>295</sup> The US concerns are shared internationally, affecting the UN reputation. Moreover, UNFICYP has removed any urgency for Greek and Turkish Cypriots to reconcile their grievances.<sup>296</sup> The Republic of Cyprus (RoC), consisting of the Greek Cypriots in the south, was granted the desired European Union (EU) status in 2004.<sup>297</sup> The main incentive for the other side, the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), is international recognition.<sup>298</sup> There is no forcing function on both sides for a timely settlement.

This lack of urgency for resolution applies to the UNFICYP personnel as well. UNFICYP personnel are comfortable with the status quo.<sup>299</sup> The UN military and police forces are stationed on a tourist destination with minimal threats. The international civilian staff enjoy a tropical island with a superior quality of life compared to other UN assignments. Meanwhile, the local UNFICYP employees have some of the most coveted positions in Cyprus. These factors may account for a shortage of resolve in aggressively advancing a solution. Similarly, Sambanis highlights the issues with the UNFICYP mandate interpretation by the mission leadership. He

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<sup>295</sup>US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Peacekeepers...*, 15.

<sup>296</sup>Fortna, “Inside and Out: Peacekeeping...”, 99.

<sup>297</sup>Dembinska, “Turkish Cyprus...”, 121-122.

<sup>298</sup>Zinovia Foka, “Exploring the 'in-between' in Nicosia's Buffer Zone: Local Practices of De-Bordering,” *Mediterranean Politics* 25, no. 3 (2020): 317.

<sup>299</sup>Based on personal experience of the author...

notes that several UNFICYP leaders have interpreted the mandate loosely. Sambanis adds that the UNFICYP leadership used poor tactical strategies.<sup>300</sup> In 1999, Sambanis pronounced his viewpoint on the UNFICYP deficiencies. “Given its mandate and capabilities, UNFICYP could have been more effective if it had interpreted its mandate less conservatively, used stronger strategies, and maintained an impartial yet non-neutral position.”<sup>301</sup> He reveals that the mission used a flawed approach and refused to use the necessary means available. UNFICYP’s utility needs to be questioned, including in actually maintaining the peace. Sambanis also explains that UNFICYP set the conditions that made a settlement unattractive for both parties.<sup>302</sup> Therefore, UNFICYP is incapable of resolving the conflict and should be withdrawn. The prospect of a renewal of fighting is unlikely because of the existing stable circumstances on the island.<sup>303</sup> Likewise, UNFICYP’s lack of success is a direct result of the vague mission mandate.

The UNSC has arranged the mission for failure. Eşref Aksu, a lecturer in international relations, condemns the nebulous mandate, consisting of terms such as normalization and law and order. Greece, Turkey, the UK and the Soviet Union influenced the ambiguous mandate. He describes the mandate as “resolution by ambiguity.”<sup>304</sup> Under these circumstances, UNFICYP was inevitably going to disappoint as the UN attempted to appease the three guarantors: the UK, Greece and Turkey. Over the years, the minimal adaptation to changing conditions of the mandate is concerning. The US GAO review pointed to UNFICYP as the example of a mission that required significant modifications to its mandate to overcome the stalled political

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<sup>300</sup>Sambanis, “Short- and Long-Term Effects...”, 20.

<sup>301</sup>Nicholas Sambanis, “The United Nations Operation in Cyprus: A new look at the peacekeeping-peacemaking relationship,” *International Peacekeeping* 6, no. 1(1999), 102.

<sup>302</sup>*Ibid.*, 103.

<sup>303</sup>Based on personal experience of the author...

<sup>304</sup>Eşref Aksu, *The United Nations, Intra-State Peacekeeping and Normative Change* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 149.

discussions.<sup>305</sup> This declaration reinforces terminating the mission with a faulty mandate. A distressing observation is that after 57 years of UNFICYP presence, the conditions in Cyprus remain almost indistinguishable from when the mission began.<sup>306</sup> This situation is unlikely to change by extending UNFICYP for another 50 years. Thus, UNFICYP has failed and will struggle continually in resolving the grievances of the opposing parties. The UN presence in Cyprus should end because the benefits of withdrawing are better than sustaining a failing longstanding mission that damages the UN image.

### **Benefits of Withdrawal**

A cost-benefit analysis highlights ending the UNFICYP mission sooner rather than later because of the underlying conflict tensions. UNFICYP has been unskilled at tackling the root causes of the conflict over the last five decades. Nothing suggests this situation will change over time. UNFICYP cannot solve the ethnic grievances. The perpetual extension or the withdrawal of UNFICYP will not change the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot accounts of the Cyprus problem. The Turkish Cypriot view is related to an intrastate conflict due to Greek Cypriot “oppression and atrocities”.<sup>307</sup> Turkish Cypriots are distrustful of living harmoniously as a minority within a Greek Cypriot majority. Partition is a matter of Turkish Cypriot survival.<sup>308</sup> The designation and celebration of the “Happy Peace Operation” for the 1974 Turkish intervention reveals these attitudes.<sup>309</sup> Turkish Cypriots are pursuing their own state under Turkish Cypriot authority. Conversely, the Greek Cypriot understanding of the Cyprus problem

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<sup>305</sup>United States Government Accountability Office, *UN Peacekeeping Operations...*, 19.

<sup>306</sup>US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Peacekeepers...*, 15.

<sup>307</sup>Foka, “Exploring the ‘in-between’...”, 317.

<sup>308</sup>*Ibid.*, 317.

<sup>309</sup>*Ibid.*

is centred on an interstate conflict caused by the Turkish invasion in 1974.<sup>310</sup> Greek Cypriots imagine the end of the conflict with the withdrawal of Turkish forces of occupied lands.<sup>311</sup> Greek Cypriots expect a reunification of the island and a return to the two communities inhabiting peacefully together under a Greek Cypriot majority in power. Furthermore, they are adamant that the TRNC is an illegal state and refute Turkish Cypriot claims for separate states.<sup>312</sup> Thus, the Cyprus problem still consists of the same political undertones, which existed in 1964. The underlying tensions are underpinned by “enosis”, the Greek Cypriot movement towards the unification of Cyprus to Greece, and “taksim”, the Turkish Cypriot demand for two sovereign states.<sup>313</sup> UNFICYP has not taken any actions to address these perspectives.

The UN mission will not reconcile the ingrained grievances. Kivanç Ulusoy, a political scientist at Istanbul University, describes the deep divisions between the two Cypriot communities. He writes: “...the Cyprus conflict shows that the parties do not trust each other in case strategic interests are at stake and are sceptical towards the positive discourse of expanding peace and security...”<sup>314</sup> The closing of the crossings between the communities at the beginning of the pandemic is an illustration. A withdrawal to save UN face is a logical next step. Ulusoy highlights that the Cyprus problem is a zero-sum game.<sup>315</sup> Hence, the probability of a positive shift in resolution is minimal for the UN. Moreover, the US may exert additional pressure on the UNSC to end longstanding missions. This notion was discussed at the previously mentioned 2016 US Congressional hearing.<sup>316</sup> UN DPKO would be wise to recommend withdrawing

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<sup>310</sup>Foka, “Exploring the 'in-between'..., 318.

<sup>311</sup>Ibid., 318

<sup>312</sup>Ibid.

<sup>313</sup>Kivanç Ulusoy, “The Cyprus Conflict: Turkey's Strategic Dilemma,” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 18, no. 4 (2016): 396.

<sup>314</sup>Ibid., 396.

<sup>315</sup>Ibid.

<sup>316</sup>US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Peacekeepers...*, 20.

UNFICYP forces before UNSC deliberations possibly force their hand. Moreover, there has been discrimination by the UN and the EU against the Turkish Cypriot minority. The UN and EU marginalized the TRNC by legitimizing the Republic of Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot majority.<sup>317</sup> Ultimately, the UN and its mission share the blame for the Greek Cypriot rejection of the 2004 Annan plan.<sup>318</sup> The UN was not able to set the proper conditions for settlement. Thus, UNFICYP mismanaged its lone opportunity to implement an exit strategy. The Turkish Cypriots had agreed to a solution. The 2004 referendum disaster signified the end of any potential settlement. The Greek Cypriots confirmed to the Turkish Cypriots that they would never accept a power-sharing solution. Additionally, Jett mentions that the TRNC no longer wants a resolution to the Cyprus problem. The TRNC political leaders' preference to be national rather than provincial authorities will trump any reunification movement.<sup>319</sup> He also contends that there is no prospect for peace without Turkey. The consent of the authoritarian leader of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is required.<sup>320</sup> In 2018, Erdogan visited the island and proclaimed the following: "We will never allow the Turkish Cypriots to become minorities in a Greek Cypriot state. Cyprus is our national cause. Our goal is to find a just and lasting solution on Cyprus."<sup>321</sup> The actuality is that the Cyprus problem provides a bargaining tool for Turkey. Ulusoy illustrates that Turkey considers Cyprus of strategic importance for EU inclusion negotiations and regional leverage. He also sees little hope in resolving the conflict.<sup>322</sup> In 2004, Turkey was open to a solution. Following a political shift in 2005, the Turkish position

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<sup>317</sup>George Kyris, "Sovereignty and Engagement without Recognition: Explaining the Failure of Conflict Resolution in Cyprus," *Ethnopolitics* 17, no. 4 (2018): 438.

<sup>318</sup>*Ibid.*, 439.

<sup>319</sup>Jett, "Why Peacekeeping Fails...", 91.

<sup>320</sup>*Ibid.*, 91.

<sup>321</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>322</sup>Ulusoy, "The Cyprus Conflict: Turkey's Strategic Dilemma...", 394.

concerning Cyprus changed. Maintaining the status quo for Turkey imparts a geopolitical advantage.<sup>323</sup> The discovery of hydrocarbons offshore adds further complexity to the Cyprus problem.<sup>324</sup> Hence, the impasse is not going away.

Several dynamics are supporting preserving the existing state of affairs. Ulusoy emphasizes that the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities do not share a common future and interests.<sup>325</sup> The two Cypriot communities want different things. Therefore, with the impossibility of achieving the principle of consent, the UNFICYP mission is chasing fool's gold. The mission must end for the sake of the UN reputation because a withdrawal avoids another 57 years of perceived ineptness at conflict resolution. Hence, the path forward is the UN departing and allowing the current partition to evolve. The partition has played a significant role in reducing the violence between the two communities.<sup>326</sup> The present laydown of the inhabitants on the island is very different than it was in 1974. The two ethnic communities are separated on two sides of the island. These conditions make violence less likely than in the past. In addition, Dan Lindley, an assistant professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame, highlights that the opening of border crossings in 2003 between the TRNC and RoC was a key moment for cooperation. Nonetheless, he articulates that the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots favour their communal ties over their mutual island identity.<sup>327</sup> These sentiments disclose that the partition is the only viable solution. Otherwise, tensions will arise from reunification initiatives that promote one side over the other. Lindley accentuates that

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<sup>323</sup>Ulusoy, "The Cyprus Conflict: Turkey's Strategic Dilemma...", 403.

<sup>324</sup>Ibid., 403.

<sup>325</sup>Ibid.

<sup>326</sup>Dan Lindley, "Historical, Tactical, and Strategic Lessons from the Partition of Cyprus," *International Studies Perspectives* 8, no. 2 (2007): 239.

<sup>327</sup>Ibid., 239.

abandoning the partition may result in a resumption of fighting.<sup>328</sup> The development of the partition provides the most plausible answer for solving the Cyprus problem. The Cypriots should decide their fate. The international community has fallen short at assisting with reunification. The UNFICYP mission withdrawal would be advantageous in instigating an eventual homegrown and peaceful resolution.

The following passage describes the details of a cost-benefit analysis of a UNFICYP withdrawal. Notionally, the UNFICYP departure would force both community leaders to work together to uphold the partition and police the buffer zone. As mentioned earlier, the local politicians require the current conditions to remain in place to exert their national authorities. Jett explains how this is particularly applicable for the TRNC leaders wanting to avoid becoming heads of a Turkish province.<sup>329</sup> Lindley asserts that recognition and EU ascension are possibilities for the TRNC with time.<sup>330</sup> This possibility is not dependent on the presence of UNFICYP, but on maintaining peace on the island. As well, the RoC's economy relies heavily on tourism and foreign investment.<sup>331</sup> These reasons compel both sides to cooperate willingly to avert escalations in the buffer zone. The 2004 Kofi Annan plan provides the framework for handling the buffer zone without the UNFICYP presence. Lindley pronounces that both sides agreeing to compromises would provide excessive rewards for both communities. He summarizes undertaking conflict resolution in Cyprus as follows: "With substantial return of land, and recognition and accession for the North, the Cyprus problem would essentially be

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<sup>328</sup>Lindley, "Historical, Tactical, and Strategic Lessons...", 239.

<sup>329</sup>Jett, "Why Peacekeeping Fails...", 91.

<sup>330</sup>Lindley, "Historical, Tactical, and Strategic Lessons...", 239-240.

<sup>331</sup>Antonis Antoniou, "The Pandemic is No Longer An Issue For Cyprus, The Economy is," Forbes, last modified on 16 September 2020. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/antonisantoniou/2020/09/16/the-pandemic-is-no-longer-an-issue-for-cyprus-the-economy-is/?sh=33d600c271dd>.

solved.”<sup>332</sup> Hence, the TRNC would have to agree to forfeit their claims on territory, including buffer zone lands, to the RoC as outlined in the Annan plan. Additionally, a compensation program will have to be negotiated for those Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots losing property due to the partition.<sup>333</sup> Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriot side will have to accept the international community supporting TRNC recognition and EU ascension. Lindley stresses that both sides would have to concede, tolerate substantial losses and promote the two-state solution.<sup>334</sup> These concessions will also enhance many aspects of Cypriot lives, in particular, trade. The increase of Turkish Cypriot wealth would be favourable for the RoC economy as well.<sup>335</sup> Further engagement between the two communities, enabled by additional border crossings, will benefit local acquiescence of the partition over time.

The current partition is responsible for the relative peace Cypriots enjoy. Nonetheless, there will be concerns of an escalation of tensions in the buffer zone without a third party guarantor. The UN, EU and NATO would also have to employ diplomatic means to influence Greece and Turkey to demilitarize the island and accept the partition. The UK military presence in Dhekelia and Akrotiri, two sovereign bases in Cyprus, could be utilized to administer the buffer zone until the land concessions, compensation, recognition and EU ascension are achieved. Cyprus remains of strategic importance to the UK for supporting its military and intelligence activities in the region.<sup>336</sup> The 2,600 UK personnel stationed in Dhekelia and Akrotiri and the 286 UK soldiers participating in Operation TOSCA, UK’s UNFICYP contribution,<sup>337</sup> offer a transitory answer to prevent any hostilities in the buffer. Moreover, even

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<sup>332</sup>Lindley, “Historical, Tactical, and Strategic Lessons...”, 239.

<sup>333</sup>Ibid., 239.

<sup>334</sup>Ibid., 240.

<sup>335</sup>Ibid., 239.

<sup>336</sup>Hughes, “The United Kingdom and International Peacekeeping...”, 468.

<sup>337</sup>Ibid., 470-471.



without UK involvement, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot authorities can leverage technologies used by UNFICYP. The closed-circuit television (CCTV) system, monitoring parts of the Green line,<sup>338</sup> could be employed by police on both sides to ensure the partition continues to be respected by locals. Dorn highlights that the CCTV system provides a substitute by allowing mobility throughout the buffer zone without the requirement for a static presence.<sup>339</sup> By reinforcing these capabilities for observing the buffer zone, the two sides could provide confidence-building measures that their citizens are respecting the partition while awaiting concessions. Other technological innovations, including drones, could also limit the footprint required to sustain peace in the disputed areas. Therefore, UNFICYP could be replaced easily by other available elements. A withdrawal is the best option for the UN.

The key benefit of the UNFICYP withdrawal for the Cyprus problem is forcing both sides to accept the current partition. Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot authorities need an agreement for legitimacy and credibility. Without UNFICYP's presence, the pressure is on both sides to act. The Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots will have to own the solution and stop blaming others for their issues. Following UNFICYP's withdrawal, the Cyprus problem will necessitate a rapid solution. The Annan plan provides answers for both communities following years of negotiations involving the two sides. The Greek Cypriots get the majority of the disputed territories. The Turkish Cypriot state is internationally recognized. As well, the UN alters the narrative by shifting the perspective on longstanding missions. Thus, the ending of a longstanding mission improves UN peacekeeping's reputation by demonstrating that peacekeeping is a temporary measure to the global community. The responsibility to resolve

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<sup>338</sup>Dorn, *Keeping Watch...*, 41.

<sup>339</sup>*Ibid.*, 41.

conflicts is not on the UN but the opposing parties themselves. UNFICYP has to withdraw for the legitimacy, credibility and benefit of the UN, the RoC and the TRNC.

### **Conclusion - UNFICYP**

The case study of UNFICYP reveals the advantages of a withdrawal from the frozen conflict. Conflict resolution ineffectiveness and undesirable public perspectives of UN peacekeeping mar the longstanding mission. A cost-benefit analysis indicates that the root causes of tensions are not resolvable. The current partition provides a future solution. The UN and the island of Cyprus would gain tremendously from the end of the UNFICYP mission. The Cyprus problem can be solved through diplomacy rather than the never-ending extension of the UN PKO. Land restoration and international recognition are the centrepieces for ending the Cyprus problem. The UN can alter international perspectives with a withdrawal. UNFICYP can serve as a warning and symbol to other longstanding missions. Once UN peacekeepers have reduced the armed conflict, the onus for conflict resolution is on the opposing parties. These factions need to engage actively, develop a homegrown solution and alleviate grievances. UN PKO are interim measures to promote sustainable peace. The 2016 US Congressional hearing focused on peacekeepers amplifies the view that UN peacekeeping is not a permanent venture: "... but rather a temporary endeavor focused on addressing critical problems, bolstering domestic capacity rather than substituting for it, and exiting as soon as practical to allow finite resources to be shifted to more urgent or emerging crises."<sup>340</sup> The UN narrative will change with the UNFICYP withdrawal. The UN 57 year commitment in Cyprus demonstrates that the international community attempted to support a solution, but the opposing factions were

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<sup>340</sup>US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Peacekeepers...*, 15.

unwilling to help themselves. A withdrawal forces the two sides to leverage a brokered solution in support of their interests. The case study of UNFICYP proves that longstanding missions should be withdrawn.

## CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSION

In closing, peacekeeping began as an ad hoc UN response to specific issues at a particular time.<sup>341</sup> Today, the UN peacekeeping endeavours are understood as a deliberate synchronization of diverse effects. These unified efforts need to be guided by an articulated and detailed end state. Consequently, exit strategies are vital to the future of UN peacekeeping operations. They are essential to support the UN as a conflict management organization. Nevertheless, UN longstanding missions are a hindrance to the perception of UN and peacekeeping. Examples like the divided island of Cyprus validate accusations that UN PKO freeze conflicts and exacerbate problems instead of resolving them.<sup>342</sup> Even though the violence has dissipated effectively in the affected regions, experts reveal that these long-lasting traditional operations lessen any motivation and urgency for peace solutions.<sup>343</sup> In addition, some maintain that UN PKO complicate matters and generate fresh conflicts.<sup>344</sup> These rampant notions jeopardize the UN reputation, its peacekeepers and the existing world order. This essay argued in favour of terminating longstanding UN peacekeeping operations because of the lack of success, the adverse costs to UN legitimacy and credibility, and the prevailing peacekeeping deficiencies. The paper commenced by investigating historical UN peacekeeping and exit strategies' patterns, the UN perspectives and the multifaceted ordeals facing exit strategies. There are contrasting effects from UN PKO. Positive results include the enhancement of human security and the reduction in violence. In contrast, peacekeeping operations labor to settle the root causes of

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<sup>341</sup>Ryan, "United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter of Principles...", 27.

<sup>342</sup>Walter A. Dorn, "Canadian Peacekeeping: Proud Tradition, Strong Future?" *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 12, no. 2 (2005): 11.

<sup>343</sup>Fortna, "Inside and Out: Peacekeeping...", 99.

<sup>344</sup>Ryan, "United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter of Principles...", 43.

violence and eventually, hostilities are renewed. Therefore, the UN rhetoric now underscores multidimensional peacekeeping, involving exit strategies and peacebuilding tasks. UN PKO and exit strategies face numerous internal and external obstructions, including resource-constrained missions, complex situational difficulties and outdated organizational views. Next, considerations were outlined for improving exit strategies.

UN PKO and their exit strategies rely on peacekeeping factors that support mission success, positive UN international perceptions, and constructive improvements based on a wide-ranging holistic approach encompassing numerous vital ideals. The reality is that UN peacekeeping operations will intercede in the most taxing of circumstances, such as in the DRC where a solution for transition remains elusive and implausible.<sup>345</sup> Similar quagmires will necessitate re-examining peacekeeping and exit strategies. Armed conflicts consist of complex problems that oblige a significant commitment, including a sizeable financial investment. In 2005, the US expended five to ten billion US dollars a month in Iraq, while the UN mission expenses were 23 million a month.<sup>346</sup> The UN peacekeeping apparatus is the most cost-effective solution humanity has to provoke conflict resolution and termination. Exit strategies are critical components of the detailed plans supporting the desired outcomes. If the UN continues to be stained by ineffectual results, the risks to the human population are grave. The numbers suggest that almost half of interstate and intrastate conflicts revert to violence within the five years of a perceived peace.<sup>347</sup> Perry certifies that the troubling security trends are forging the normalization of frozen conflicts. “If predatory states continue to thwart liberal reforms, and if the much-hoped for democratic surge declines under a sea of sectarianism and fragmentation, both frozen and

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<sup>345</sup>Sambanis, “Short- and Long-Term Effects...”, 20.

<sup>346</sup>Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars...*, 345.

<sup>347</sup>Caplan, “Devising Exit Strategies...”, 120.

fully violent conflicts will be the norm in this century, as they were in the last...”<sup>348</sup> Hence, UN PKO have to adopt the enhancement recommendations made in the essay. PKO are interim global measures to support opposing parties’ mediation and peace implementation. Longstanding traditional peacekeeping missions are injurious to conflict management by placing responsibility on the UN instead of the opposing factions. Mission termination is a worthwhile decision when cooperation is not attainable. Finally, UN PKO will be judged on their successes. The international community will view an ongoing mission as incomplete despite positive effects.<sup>349</sup> All PKO, enabled by exit strategies, have to be terminated eventually. UN peacekeeping operations entail peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peace enforcing, conflict resolution and termination. When confronted by an endless stalemate, mission withdrawal is the best exit strategy.

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<sup>348</sup>Perry, “At Cross Purposes? Democratization and Peace...”, 52.

<sup>349</sup>Autesserre, “The Crisis of Peacekeeping...”, 101.

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