The Future of Migration Securitization in Canada and the Clash Between National and Human Security

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT

Securitization is the process though which issues become seen as security issues. In the context of migration, this can involve casting migration as a threat to national security, allowing states to take extraordinary measures to address migration's perceived threats, which can be presented as physical, economic, or social. This paper argues that over the upcoming decades, Canada will increasingly see securitization efforts surrounding migration, and that actions should be taken to mitigate this trend. To support this, current and recent securitization efforts in the EU, US, Australia, and Canada are examined. This examination shows that there are identifiable factors that increase the chances of securitizing efforts achieving their intended goals. Specifically, the overall volume of irregular arrivals, the coherence of the securitizing message, and the latent level of nationalist, populist, or xenophobic sentiment in the target audience all increase the likelihood of securitization efforts being successful. In the future, migration will continue and is very likely to increase, driven by factors such as economic migration, and especially climate change. These future trends will exacerbate all of the identified securitization-promoting factors, meaning that migration is likely to become increasingly subjected to securitization. A successful securitization would be damaging to Canada, both in terms of creating a dissonance in government policies, as well as creating fractures in the Canadian public. To avoid this, Canada should pursue options that are consistent with current policies, but which also minimize the factors contributing to securitization, such as increasing aid to Latin America. Following this approach would mitigate the risks of securitization in the future, preventing a clash between national security and human security concerns in Canadian society.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

> *To those fleeing persecution, terror & war, Canadians will welcome you, regardless of your faith. Diversity is our strength #WelcomeToCanada*[1]
>
> — Justin Trudeau, 28 January 2017

> *We want to make sure that when people come into Canada, we are putting the safety and security of Canadians first. That is paramount.*[2]
>
> — Andrew Scheer, 9 October 2019

Canada is a diverse nation, driven in large part by the diversity of the people that have migrated to Canada from countries worldwide. However, migration itself can be a divisive issue. Whether considering regular migration, the planned and orderly flow of people into the country, or irregular migration, migration that does not follow established norms and processes, the public reaction to migration can vary. During the 21st Century, irregular migration has become an increasingly important issue that countries have had to tackle. For the remainder of this century, irregular migration will continue to pose a challenge, and factors such as climate change will exacerbate the issue further.

Broadly, migration can be cast in two opposing frames in public discourse: humanitarianism, or security and safety.[3] More sympathetically, the humanitarian viewpoint would suggest using the preservation of human life and promotion of overall wellbeing as the objective of security. Alternatively, a harder-line security and safety focus could take a view that it is important to protect national sovereignty and integrity, taking actions to limit and manage migration flows into a state for national security

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[1] Justin Trudeau, Twitter post, 28 January 2017, 3:20 p.m., accessed 14 December 2019, https://twitter.com/JustinTrudeau/status/825438460265762816

[2] Kathleen Harris, "Scheer Vows to Stop Illegal Border Crossings, Prioritize Economic Immigration," CBC News, October 9, 2019, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/scheer-roxham-road-asylum-seekers-immigration-1.5314527. Embedded video, 0:27

[3] International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2020* (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2019), 181, https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr_2020.pdf.

reasons. In security terms, these represent differing "human security" and "national security" points of view. Both approaches have supporters, and the Canadian reaction to increasing irregular migration will depend on how the security issue is perceived. The process through which issues become seen as security issues is called securitization, and depends on several factors. If securitizing efforts succeed in casting an issue in national security terms, a range of extraordinary responses can become available to the state, which would otherwise not be. This is not a new phenomenon, and immigrants have been cast as potential security threats for centuries, such as Irish immigrants to the United States in the nineteenth century. However, the securitization process itself has received increasing academic attention since the 1990s, and the current state of migration securitization and its underlying processes are better understood now than at any point previously.

Migration has already seen successful securitization efforts in several Western countries during the 21st Century. In the United States, strict policies have been adopted "on the back of widespread anti-immigrant rhetoric," and the portrayal of migrants "as both a danger and drain" on society has created "an atmosphere of mistrust and fear."[4] In the EU, the tension between human security and national security has already been felt, where "the increasing prominence of securitized pronouncements and policies brings into relief is their contradictions with human rights and refugee obligations."[5] Australia has also experienced an increase in securitizing discourse, associated with increased maritime

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[4] International Organization for Migration, 113.

[5] Lena Karamanidou, "The Securitization of European Migration Policies: Perceptions of Threat and Management of Risk," in *The Securitisation of Migration in the EU : Debates Since 9/11*, ed. Gabriella Lazaridis and Khursheed Wadia, The European Union in International Affairs (Basingstoke Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 44, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=1091213&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

arrivals of so-called "boat people." Examples such as the MV Sun Sea incident, where irregular migrants arrived by sea in British Columbia, or the Quebec border crossings in 2017, where irregular land crossings from the United States surged, both resulted in securitizing narratives in Canada. This shows that Canada is also subject to securitizing discourse. Although it could appear that collaboration between countries could mitigate securitization, this is not necessarily the case; indeed, collaboration could also accelerate securitization by "creating enough momentum for a joint push to reinterpret international law to facilitate containment of migrants" through increased national security measures.[6] By looking at these countries as examples, it is possible to deduce common factors that have contributed to securitization, and how those factors could be applied to Canada.

In the future, migration is likely to become an increasingly important issue. There are fundamental issues with predicting the future of migration. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic is currently having an unprecedented effect on global migration and asylum systems which could not have been predicted.[7] However, there are general trends that can be identified, such as economic and demographic changes, or migration driven by climate change. These future trends will likely increase the flow of migrants, on a global scale, as well as to Canada specifically, and Canada may thus become an increasingly popular destination for irregular migration. At the same time, trends in nationalist and populist sentiments in populations, observed in the present, can also be extended into the future. Taken together, these factors could consequently provoke

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[6] Alice Szczepanikova and Tine Van Criekinge, "The Future of Migration in the European Union: Future Scenarios and Tools to Stimulate Forward Looking Discussion" (European Commission - Joint Research Centre, 2018), 30, https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC111774/kjnd29060enn.pdf.

[7] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2019* (Copenhagen: UNHCR Global Data Service, 2020), 12, https://www.unhcr.org/5ee200e37.pdf.

increasing demands for a national security-driven response, which will conflict with the human security approach seen in other Canadian policies and commitments. Canada could find itself at odds with itself, trying on one side to further human security agendas, while at the same time ignoring these imperatives in order to favour national security responses on its own borders.

However, it is possible to mitigate or minimize this potential clash between national security and human security points of view. By focusing efforts on areas that are the most likely to be sources of irregular migration to Canada, it could be possible for both human and national security demands can be satisfied. From a human security point of view, Canada would be doing its share to support human wellbeing around the world, acting in accordance with its current policies and commitments. From a national security point of view, this aid would have the potential to help stem the flow of irregular migration before it begins. By reducing the severity of the perceived threat, securitization efforts would be muted, reducing the potential tension between human and national security concerns.

Overall, therefore, Canada is likely to see increasing securitization efforts surrounding migration in the future, with potentially divisive effects on government policies and the general public. To avoid this, Canada should act in ways that remain consistent with current policies and commitments, but which seek to minimize the potential influence of securitizing efforts, in order to resolve the potential tension between human and national security views on migration.

Outline

      To support this argument, this paper is split into four main sections. In the first part, human security and national security are discussed and defined, and the securitization process is examined to explore how issues such as migration come to be seen as security issues in a nation's public. In the second section, the current statuses of migration securitization are compared across various countries, and overall reasons and factors behind the securitization of migration will be extracted. The third section will discuss future global migration trends, applying them to securitization in the future. Finally, the fourth chapter will combine the observed securitization factors and expected future trends in migration with current Canadian policies and commitments. This synthesis shows that Canada is vulnerable to increased securitization due to future migration trends, putting human and national security concerns on a potential collision course. To mitigate this possibility, the types of engagements Canada could participate in will be discussed, and options to align the conflicting points of view will be explored. Even though human security and national security concerns may appear to be on a collision course, these views can be reconciled, and human and national security concerns can be balanced.

CHAPTER 2: SECURITY AND SECURITIZATION

Before thinking about how migration and security intersect, and how responses to migration driven by national security and human security might differ, these terms must first be defined and understood. On the surface, it may seem that "security" is a straightforward concept, but if care is not taken, the word "security" can be applied imprecisely. In the context of migration, notwithstanding an "expansive literature" on the topic, "there has hitherto been little agreement on the scope or a specific definition of security."[8] This chapter will explore the meaning of security, how it applies to both nations and migrant populations, and how different situations can be framed in different ways, evoking different responses.

Applied to migration, two important concepts for discussion are national security and human security. These aspects of security stem from different schools of thought of what "security" actually means, and lead to different paradigms for viewing security issues. Alongside these notions of security, the theoretical process by which situations come to be viewed as security issues is also important. This is a more recent area of academic pursuit, where issues are not inherently seen either security issues or not; rather, issues can become security issues through the process of securitization. Ultimately, national security and human security viewpoints offer two different theoretical lenses through which migration can be viewed, with different implications for how migration security challenges might be addressed. Armed with this theoretical framework, real-life examples of the securitization of migration can subsequently be examined with a solid theoretical foundation.

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[8] Anthony M. Messina, "Securitizing Immigration in the Age of Terror," *World Politics* 66, no. 3 (2014): 533, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887114000148.

State and National Security

Perhaps the oldest conception of "security" is that where the state itself is the focal point and object of "security," acting monolithically in support of its own security priorities. This is the view often implicitly taken when actors discuss "Canada's" security needs, making the state itself the "referent object" of security.[9] In classical realism, "states are continuously engaged in a struggle to increase their capabilities," and state strategies are based on a rational cost-benefit analysis of the security situation.[10] Other strains of realism, such as neorealism, recognize that the internal makeup states will have an effect on the behaviour of the state, and that the state cannot be viewed as a single monolithic actor.[11] Similarly, neoclassical realism recognizes that "what states do depends in large part on influences located at the domestic level of analysis."[12] Realist approaches can often present a "zero-sum understanding if the interdependent nature of security – where my security relies on others insecurity," although security issues can also be framed "in win-win terms – where my security depends on others' security."[13]

Constructivist theories of international relations take this further, believing that the nature of security is in fact a social construction.[14] This also implies that conceptions

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[9] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Security : A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO, United States: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 8, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cfvlibrary-ebooks/detail.action?docID=6192060.

[10] Michael A Jensen and Colin Elman, "Realisms," in *Security Studies : An Introduction*, ed. Paul D. Williams and Matt McDonald (Milton, United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis Group, 2018), 19, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cfvlibrary-ebooks/detail.action?docID=5295090.

[11] Jensen and Elman, 21.

[12] Jensen and Elman, 27.

[13] Christopher S. Browning, "Security and Migration: A Conceptual Exploration," in *Handbook on Migration and Security*, ed. Philippe Bourbeau (Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017), 45–46, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cfvlibrary-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4848999.

[14] Matt McDonald, "Constructivisms," in *Security Studies : An Introduction*, ed. Paul D. Williams and Matt McDonald (Milton, United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis Group, 2018), 49, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cfvlibrary-ebooks/detail.action?docID=5295090.

of security are subject to change, as will be discussed in the securitization section below, and "securitization theory has a close affinity with social constructivism."[15] However, conventional constructivism can still be used to establish the way a state might act, based on a constructed national identity. State security is not limited to military security, or vice versa. Although "much of traditional theory and practice in international relations is built around the idea that the state is the only legitimate referent object for military security,"[16] it is also possible for military means to be used to address non-state security issues. Similarly, although state security has traditionally been limited to military and political sectors, it is also possible to branch security out to other sectors, such as economic, environmental, and societal.[17] This widens the notion of security, but continues to focus on the state as the referent object. For example, the overall security of the state is dependent on the continued wellbeing of the nation's economy, and the general economic wellbeing of the nation's citizens.

The distinction between security of a *state*, security of a *nation,* and security of a *society* is another subtle point requiring some discussion. Traditionally, the state has been taken as the referent object of security; however, the nation has also been included, albeit in "a more hidden way."[18] The distinction is that a state will seek to maintain sovereignty, while a nation will seek to maintain identity.[19] Alternatively, it is also possible to think of societal security, which encompasses as society's ability to retain its "essential character"

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[15] Thierry Balzacq, Sarah Léonard, and Jan Ruzicka, "'Securitization' Revisited: Theory and Cases," *International Relations* 30, no. 4 (August 5, 2015): 496, https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117815596590.
[16] Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*, 52.
[17] Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, 1.
[18] Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, 36.
[19] Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, 36.

in the face of security threats.[20] These are all interconnected ideas, but they differ on whether the exact referent object of security is the state, the nation, or the society. In this way, talking about the security of "Canada" could refer to any one of these three aspects (i.e., the Canadian state, nation, or society). For example, migration could be seen as a "state" security issue if the focus was placed on its effects on state sovereignty. Alternatively, migration could be cast as a "societal" security issue if the focus is placed on the potentially disruptive sociological effects of the arrival of culturally distinct groups to a country. Migration can be presented as a threat to "national" security in many ways, since there are many different interpretations of what national security entails.[21] As one example, migration could be cast as an economic threat to national security. Although the state, nation, and society are distinct ideas, they do share overlaps. For example, the "raison d'etre of states is seen as being that of providing for their citizens' security,"[22] and all three concepts can be used to highlight a desire to protect the referent object from unwelcome external interference. For the purposes of this paper, therefore, reactions involving the exercise of instruments of power designed to protect the state, nation, or its society from outside influence will be termed "national security" responses, to contrast these conceptions of security against the newer concept of human security.

Human Security

As an alternative to state-centric views, the human security point of view places the human being as the referent object for security. This is a newer conception of security, building on the idea that the concept of security can go beyond traditionalist

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[20] Messina, "Age of Terror," 530.

[21] Wendell Codrington Wallace, "National Security," in *The SAGE Encyclopedia of Surveillance, Security, and Privacy*, ed. Bruce Arrigo (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2018), 647–48.

[22] Browning, "Security and Migration," 42.

state and military points of view. The United Nations' *Human Development Report 1994* declared that "for too long, the concept of security has been shaped by the potential for conflict between states," and called for "redefining the basic concept of security."[23] This resulted in the adoption of human security, focusing on addressing the reasons for human insecurity everywhere. It stresses the universality and interdependence of human security, as well as the fact that it is people-centered.[24] This contrasts with the state security view, which places the emphasis of security on the state rather than the human. The UN separated human security into the two major components of "freedom from want" and "freedom from fear,"[25] but different human security advocates interpret these components differently. For example, narrow advocates "focus on eradicating threats of physical violence," while broader conceptions "include an emphasis on the need to tackle problems of underdevelopment," problems which are further removed from traditional security threats.[26]

Around the same time as the United Nations published its landmark report, critical security studies was also growing as a field, seeking to redefine traditional ideas of security. For example, security was linked to "emancipation," where security was "the absence of threats" and emancipation was "freeing the people from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do."[27] This line of thinking further argued that states should not be the referent object of

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[23] United Nations Development Program, "Human Development Report 1994" (United Nations, 1994), 3, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf.
[24] United Nations Development Program, 22–23.
[25] United Nations Development Program, 24.
[26] Browning, "Security and Migration," 43.
[27] Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation," *Review of International Studies* 17, no. 4 (1991): 319, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210500112033.

security, as states represent the means, and not the ends, of security.[28] In this framework, the realist position that "since it is states that act to provide security, the security of states should be given analytical primacy" is dismissed as a case of "confusing agents with referents."[29] Since the 1990's, critical security studies have continued to evolve and mature, and offer critiques of traditional and realist points of view. This is largely in line with the redefinition of security to more broadly encompass human security issues that go beyond the traditional concept of security, and if the national security paradigm is most closely linked with realist theories, then the human security paradigm finds its match with more recent critical security studies.

One potential complication with human security issues is that because the state is de-emphasized, the role of the state in the provision of security can be unclear. For example, "state leaders generally prioritize the rights and needs of their own population over others, which do not necessarily serve the interests of suffering populations abroad," and states may use human security as a veneer for pursuing other security ends.[30] This is especially relevant in the context of migration, where human security concerns encompass the wellbeing of exactly this type of "suffering population abroad."

The nature of security issues can be further complicated by the fact that there can be overlap between the national and human security arenas. As mentioned, economic security is one potential aspect of national security. However, it is also possible to talk about economic security from a human security perspective, and the United Nations

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[28] Booth, 320.

[29] Pinar Bilgin, "Critical Theory," in *Security Studies : An Introduction*, ed. Paul D. Williams and Matt McDonald (Milton, United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis Group, 2018), 65, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cfvlibrary-ebooks/detail.action?docID=5295090.

[30] Gunhild Hoogensen Gjorv, "Human Security," in *Security Studies : An Introduction*, ed. Paul D. Williams and Matt McDonald (Milton, United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis Group, 2018), 229, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cfvlibrary-ebooks/detail.action?docID=5295090.

includes "economic security" as one aspect of human security.[31] The human security view of economic security takes an individual focus, and emphasizes individuals' needs for a certain level of income. Even in rich and developed nations, where the national economic welfare is not in question, individual economic security issues can still exist, and "many people in the rich nations today feel insecure because jobs are increasingly difficult to find and keep."[32] This means that looking at worldwide economic welfare, rather than the economic welfare of a specific nation, might represent a human security point of view. Conversely, agendas focusing on the economic welfare of a specific nation and its citizens (to the exclusion or disadvantage of others) could represent a national security standpoint.

Securitization and The Copenhagen School

As discussed above, security issues can be seen in different lights using different lenses, but the notion of what constitutes a "security issue" must also be questioned. The concept of "securitization" asks the question of how issues come to be seen as *security* issues. This process of securitization thereby elevates the issue and "frames the issue either as a special kind of politics, or as above politics."[33] The roots of securitization theory lie in Buzan's *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, although the field has received much academic attention since then. Their approach has been termed the

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[31] United Nations Development Program, "Human Development Report," 24.
[32] United Nations Development Program, 25.
[33] Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*, 23.

"Copenhagen School" of security studies, based on the fact that the early scholars were all members of the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute.[34]

At its core, this securitization theory postulates that what constitutes a security issue (vice other type of issue) is not a given, and must consequently be agreed upon. In securitization theory parlance, securitization is a "speech act," and securitization is "negotiated between securitizer and audience" in order to "obtain permission to override rules that would otherwise bind it."[35] Audience acceptance is thus an important aspect of securitization, without which the securitizing act will fail. This matches the constructivist notion that "public support for or acquiescence to elite discourses" is an important factor in determining state's security policy, and that the public is not simply a "passive target of elite discourse."[36] The Copenhagen school also parallels constructivist thought since it "tries to bridge traditional and critical security studies by understanding security as a 'speech act'."[37] In particular, "securitization theory has a close affinity to social constructivism" in that it examines the role and status of language, power, and argument in the construction of politics.[38]

Securitizing actors are typically members of the elite, or representatives of the state, but they are not monolithic in their intent. Indeed, "in democracies, many voices, including pressure groups and defense intellectuals, will engage in the discourse of securitization."[39] Thus, there is not necessarily an overarching push in one direction from

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[34] Jonna Nyman, "Securitization," in *Security Studies : An Introduction*, ed. Paul D. Williams and Matt McDonald (Milton, United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis Group, 2018), 101, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cfvlibrary-ebooks/detail.action?docID=5295090.
[35] Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*, 26.
[36] McDonald, "Constructivisms," 55.
[37] Nyman, "Securitization," 101.
[38] Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka, "'Securitization' Revisited," 496.
[39] Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*, 55.

securitizing agents. One common feature of securitizing moves is that they present the potential security issue as posing an "existential threat to a referent object"[40] such as the state. However, this securitizing move does not in and of itself constitute securitization. The audience must "accept the designation of something as an existential threat to something that is valued."[41] Once an issue has been successfully securitized, a range of previously unavailable security measures become available as potential responses to the issue, since the securitizing agent "claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means."[42] These responses "tend to lead to threat, defense, and often state-centered solutions"[43] to the securitized issue.

The Copenhagen School also recognizes the opposite process, desecuritization, where an issue is taken out of the security arena. In fact, Buzan argues that "in the abstract, desecuritization is the ideal" where issues can be handled in the normal public sphere, without resorting to the language of security.[44] As a more extreme interpretation, desecuritization could also be favoured to avoid "the application of zero-sum military and/or police practices, which may not necessarily help address human insecurities."[45] However, in some cases securitization is preferable or necessary, because it offers "the possible advantages of focus, attention, and mobilization."[46]

More recent studies in securitization theory have broadened some of these definitions and concepts, although the Copenhagen School of thought remains influential. With its assertion that "security is a process designed to combat existential threats via

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[40] Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, 25.
[41] Nyman, "Securitization," 103.
[42] Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*, 26.
[43] Nyman, "Securitization," 103.
[44] Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*, 29.
[45] Bilgin, "Critical Theory," 69.
[46] Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, *Security*, 29.

exceptional measures," the Copenhagen School is an example of the "logic of exception."[47] A contrasting view is the "logic of routine," where security is portrayed as the "collection of routinized and patterned practices" of "bureaucrats and security professionals."[48] This is closer to the view espoused by the Paris school of securitization.[49] Rather than being contradictory views, however, they are complementary and both play a role in the securitization process, and "employing one logic to the exclusion of the others leads to a partial and potentially deceptive account of the securitization process."[50] This argument suggests that there is more to the securitization process than simply the imposition of exceptional measures to an existential threat.

The requirement for a threat to be "existential" in nature in order for securitization to occur can also be debated. It was originally included in the Copenhagen School of thought "to retain the focus of the traditional security studies research agenda."[51] However, as the scope of security studies has increased over time, the securitization concept has been applied more broadly to other types of security issues. For example, "regressive asylum policy has been challenged precisely on security grounds, with advocates calling for recognition of the human security of vulnerable populations escaping persecution."[52] This is an example of a non-traditional security issue being framed in security terms in order to be treated as a security issue, with the implications that entails. In fact, whereas the Copenhagen School sees desecuritization as the ideal,

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[47] Philippe Bourbeau, "Migration, Exceptionalist Security Discourses, and Practices," in *Handbook on Migration and Security*, ed. Philippe Bourbeau (Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017), 105, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cfvlibrary-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4848999.
[48] Bourbeau, 106.
[49] Nyman, "Securitization," 107.
[50] Bourbeau, "Security and Migration," 121.
[51] Nyman, "Securitization," 102.
[52] Bilgin, "Critical Theory," 70.

other schools of thought, such as the Aberystwyth School, argue for the "politicization of security" rather than desecuritization, where a broader range of issues are deliberately taken under the security umbrella "in order to consider a range of insecurities faced by an array of referent objects."[53] Although the Aberystwyth School "constitutes an alternative to securitization theory,"[54] it is still important to recognize that it pertains to framing discussions in terms of security in order to address issues. However, the existence of these "schools" does not present a complete picture of the state of securitization theory, and many scholars do not fit neatly into one of these categories.[55]

All told, securitization theory is therefore a field of ongoing research, but it is still heavily influenced by the language and ideas of the Copenhagen School. The most important concepts, however, are that issues are not inherently security issues (or not), but rather they are deliberately brought into the sphere of security through a deliberate act of securitization. This act is accomplished by securitizing actors, with the acquiescence of the public. If securitization is successful, the issue is subsequently seen and discussed as a legitimate security issue, with a range of security responses available to deal with the issue, which would otherwise not be at the securitizing agent's disposal. When issues are framed as security issues, they are more likely to be presented as urgent threats, and are therefore more likely to evoke exceptional responses, especially in the realm of national security.

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[53] Bilgin, 68.
[54] Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka, "'Securitization' Revisited," 498.
[55] Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka, 498.

Migration and Securitization

Up until now, the discussion of security and securitization has been broad and general. Focusing down, however, these concepts can be applied directly to human migration. Migration can be cast as a national security issue, or a human security issue, depending on what the referent object of security is determined to be, and what goals are pursued in the name of security. Presented as a national security issue, migration security could focus on the protection of borders from irregular migration, the protection of the economy from migrant workers, or the protection of the population from terrorist threats. Framed as a human security issue, the drivers of involuntary migration, such as failing economies and humanitarian crises, could be examined and targeted, or the wellbeing of the migrant population itself could be safeguarded to alleviate human suffering.

Over the last decade, the securitization of migration has received an increasing amount of academic attention, as migration security issues have spread to multiple regions and countries.[56] Post-9/11, attention has been devoted to the migration-terrorism nexus, and there have been securitization efforts to "conflate immigration with terrorism and deliberately exploit the public's fear of immigrants" in order to bring the issue into the security realm.[57] This forms part of the "broader question of fear and securitization of migration, where non-security issues are transformed into urgent security concerns either at the state or societal levels."[58] However, research on this is not unanimous, and others have found that "reports of immigration being securitized either before or after

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[56] Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka, 507.
[57] Messina, "Age of Terror," 552.
[58] Joanne Hopkins and R. Gerald Hughes, "Refugees, Migration and Security: States, Intelligence Agencies and the Perpetual Global Crisis," *Intelligence and National Security* 34, no. 5 (July 29, 2019): 764, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2018.1492888.

September 11 may very well be exaggerated."[59] Migration can also be seen presented as a

societal threat, "with respect to the survival of society" or its "ability to persist in its

essential character under changing conditions."[60] Migration can also be securitized in

economic terms, where the threat is portrayed as arriving migrants damaging the

employment opportunities of a nation's citizens. Taken together, these three aspects of

physical, societal, and economic security can be characterized as a "triad of intersecting

popular fears" that provide the groundwork for the securitization of migration.[61]

Alternatively, migration could be viewed through a human security lens, where

the focus would lie on the human rather than on the state. This approach would

"emphasize the multiple factors that give rise to migration flows… and would seek to

address these conditions before they lead people to migrate."[62] This approach makes

individuals' security the referent object, rather than a specific nation or state.

When fears are leveraged by securitizing actors, the result could be the

securitization of migration. Based on the perceived threat, this securitization could then

evoke a national security response, leading to exceptional measures to prevent the

"threat" from materializing or worsening. This type of securitization could then

effectively shut out discussion or consideration of human security aspects of migration, in

favour of national security measures.

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[59] Messina, "Age of Terror," 553.
[60] Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka, "'Securitization' Revisited," 508.
[61] Anthony M. Messina, "Migration as a Global Phenomenon," in *Handbook on Migration and Security*, ed. Philippe Bourbeau (Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017), 28, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cfvlibrary-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4848999.
[62] Francesca Vietti and Todd Scribner, "Human Insecurity: Understanding International Migration from A Human Security Perspective," *Journal on Migration and Human Security* 1, no. 1 (2013): 23, https://doi.org/10.1177/233150241300100102.

A Theoretical Framework for Examining Empirical Examples

This chapter has examined the concepts of security and securitization, laying a theoretical foundation and defining the terms that will be discussed further in subsequent chapters. Most importantly, the concepts of national and human security were defined and contrasted. National security reflects a view of security where the state, nation, or society is the referent object of security, while human security instead emphasizes human freedom from want and fear as the referent.

Migration is not inherently a national security or human security issue. Rather, issues are securitized in the public discourse, based on the actions of securitizing agents, the acceptance of the public, and the overall context of the securitizing move. This field of securitization studies is founded on the Copenhagen School, although it also draws from constructivist and critical international theories, and more recent scholarship has broadened the horizons of securitization theory.

Securitization theory has been applied to migration, and the world has witnessed the securitization of migration in various places at various times. The events of 9/11 had an impact on migration securitization, but the physical threat of terrorism is not the only way in which migration can be securitized; societal and economic factors are also fears that have been identified as potential motives for securitization. For example, a cultural threat can be felt "when migrants are seen as holding themselves apart and being reluctant" to integrate into society.[63]

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[63] Sita Bali, "Migration and Refugees," in *Security Studies : An Introduction*, ed. Paul D. Williams and Matt McDonald (Milton, United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis Group, 2018), 493, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cfvlibrary-ebooks/detail.action?docID=5295090.

With this theoretical understanding of security and securitization, empirical examples of migration securitization can be examined, and the theoretical notions can be tested. This will allow an examination of the factors that have helped or hindered migration securitization to what degree, and how these factors apply to Canada now and in the future.

CHAPTER 3: THE SECURITIZATION OF MIGRATION IN THE WESTERN

WORLD

Securitization, as discussed, is the process through which an issue is brought into the security arena. If successful, securitizing agents gain access to a new range of responses that would otherwise have been unavailable. In broad terms, the securitization process requires a securitizing move that is accepted by the target audience. This acceptance hinges on the way the potential security issue is framed, and the external context of the situation. In terms of migration, the issue could become securitized if migration is presented as a national threat, either physical, economic, or societal, and the audience accepts it as such.

Although the theoretical framework above describes this process, it does not consider what type of external context is required for the securitizing move to be successful, or how specific examples of the securitization process might unfold, as these are case-specific aspects. Migration has experienced securitizing moves at various times in various places, and there is empirical evidence of how the securitization process has unfolded in practice. By looking at examples of securitization, the underlying factors that promote or inhibit the success of securitizing moves can be examined. In subsequent sections, these identified factors will be considered in the context of potential future migration challenges.

Canada itself has experienced securitizing moves with respect to migration, but in general they have, at least to date, been less successful than in other countries and regions. This chapter will consider how migration has been securitized in Europe, the Unites States, Australia, and Canada. There is an admitted Western bias to this selection,

and compared to the rest of the world, these countries are broadly similar to Canada in terms of demographics, economy, and culture, and the factors affecting the securitization of migration are likely to be more comparable in a similar group. However, because the intent is to apply these factors directly to Canada in subsequent sections, and the intent is not to develop a globally applicable set of criteria, the selection of these countries does not compromise the validity of the discussion.

Europe

Although not a country, the close interconnection of European nations, the borderless movement of people in the Schengen Area, and European regulations on migration such as the Dublin Convention, mean that migration issues can affect the continent as a whole, and "the European integration process is implicated in the development of a restrictive migration policy and the social construction of migration into a security question."[64] Thus, although national attitudes towards migration and its securitization may vary, it still makes sense to consider the securitization of migration in a pan-European sense in addition to looking at individual European countries.

Europe has a long history of migration, and has many previous examples of migration crises and attempts at securitization. In fact, some scholars go so far as to argue that migration was previously considered a "mainly European security issue" and that securitization studies have only relatively recently spread to "other states such as the Australia and the United States."[65] Although the events of September 11 led to discussions about terrorism, the overall "impact of 9/11 is less important than it might be

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[64] Jef Huysmans, "The European Union and the Securitization of Migration," *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 38, no. 5 (2000): 751, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00263.
[65] Balzacq, Léonard, and Ruzicka, "'Securitization' Revisited," 507.

(or have been) assumed" in terms of the securitization of migration in Europe.[66] Some

events did reference 9/11 specifically, or the threat of terrorism more generally, though.

For example, FRONTEX, the agency responsible for EU border control, was created in

2004. In the inaugural speech for FRONTEX, "the spectre of international terrorism" was

raised alongside other "sad and grave consequences of illegal immigration" into the EU.[67]

FRONTEX has since cooperated with many national security agencies, such as patrolling

the EU's southern maritime borders for irregular migrants.[68] Early on, FRONTEX dealt

with migration crises, such as in influx of irregular migrants to the Spanish Canary

Islands in 2006. During this crisis, patrol boats, helicopters, and a surveillance plane were

all requested, representing a "limited attempt at securitizing irregular migration."[69]

Spanish and EU governments did not cast the crisis in existential terms, so this does not

meet the Copenhagen School's strict definition of securitization.[70] This could explain

why there was an "overall lack of extraordinary measures taken, as would be implied by

securitization theory."[71] This is backed up by the perception of European institutions as

"archetypal embodiments of technocracy" where a rules-based and legalistic framework

governs action.[72] However, a security response was clearly elicited, and the migration

issue was dealt with as a security issue, so securitization was definitely at play. The fact

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[66] Vicki Squire, "The Securitization of Migration: An Absent Presence?," in *The Securitisation of Migration in the EU : Debates Since 9/11*, ed. Gabriella Lazaridis and Khursheed Wadia, The European Union in International Affairs (Basingstoke Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 27, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=1091213&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

[67] Karamanidou, "Perceptions of Threat," 45.

[68] Karamanidou, 48.

[69] Sarah Léonard and Christian Kaunert, *Refugees, Security and the European Union* (Florence, UNITED STATES: Taylor & Francis Group, 2019), 116, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cfvlibrary-ebooks/detail.action?docID=5785749.

[70] Léonard and Kaunert, 128.

[71] Squire, "Absent Presence," 32.

[72] Léonard and Kaunert, *Refugees, Security and the European Union*, 6.

that there were already established security processes in place could in fact mean that

previous securitization efforts had succeeded in codifying a security response to this type

of irregular migration scenario, and that the casting of migration as a security threat has

already been "well embedded in the European context."[73] Rather than showing that

migration was not a securitized issue, the recourse to existing security processes shows

that migration has been a securitized issue for some time.

In addition to physical threats, Europe has also seen migration presented as a

threat to economic and societal security. For example, the 2008 financial crisis, which

deeply affected Greece, led to increases in securitizing moves regarding migration, and

the "securitization of migration has largely affected a great portion of youth in Greece" in

consequence.[74] One example of a Greek national security response to migration after the

2008 economic crisis, but prior to the Syrian refugee crisis of 2015, is the building of the

Evros Fence, a 10.3km stretch of fence along the Greece-Turkey border, at a cost of USD

3.3 million.[75] The wall itself was also supplemented with other securitized responses,

including increased land patrols and the installation of thermal cameras.[76] Despite

Greece's ongoing financial issues at the time, the wall was constructed "as a symbolic

move enabled by the securitization of migration," led by political actors and aided by

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[73] Squire, "Absent Presence," 32.

[74] Gabriella Lazaridis and Anna-Maria Konsta, "Identarian Populism: Securitisation of Migration and the Far Right in Times of Economic Crisis in Greece and the UK," in *The Securitisation of Migration in the EU : Debates Since 9/11*, ed. Gabriella Lazaridis and Khursheed Wadia, The European Union in International Affairs (Basingstoke Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 189, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=1091213&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

[75] Ioannis N. Grigoriadis and Esra Dilek, "Securitizing Migration in the European Union: Greece and the Evros Fence," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 21, no. 2 (March 4, 2019): 175, https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2018.1506280.

[76] Grigoriadis and Dilek, 178.

"the national-level perception of migration as a security issue."[77] In the midst of an

economic crisis, the perception of migrants as a potential economic threat likely helped

these securitizing narratives take hold, contributing to their effectiveness in leading to

securitized responses. Social threats of migration have also been brought up in European

discourse, such as the narrative that "identifies multiculturalism as a cause of societal

disintegration," and therefore points to migration as an existential cultural threat.[78] All

three of the main securitization areas discussed above, namely physical, economic, and

societal, have therefore been present in European securitization discourse.

More recently, the Syrian refugee crisis again brought the securitization of

migration to the forefront in Europe. Here, terrorism and direct physical threat was once

again used in securitizing discourse surrounding migration. This process was facilitated

by the coincidence of the migration crisis with an increase in high-profile terrorist attacks

in Europe.[79] Politicians then used this to begin securitizing moves against migration by

"constructing a causal relationship between migration and Islamist terrorism."[80] Since

then, "the migration-terrorism nexus has come to occupy a prominent position in the

dominant discourse on migration and its challenges for Europe and its societies."[81] This

provides an interesting example to consider, because it shows that the intensity of

securitization efforts can vary according to the level of migration that the receiving state

(or super-state, in this case) experiences. Irregular migration seems to be especially

conducive to the physical threat portrayal because of the perception that "illegal channels

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[77] Grigoriadis and Dilek, 170–71.

[78] Huysmans, "European Union," 757.

[79] Léonard and Kaunert, *Refugees, Security and the European Union*, 147.

[80] Léonard and Kaunert, 151.

[81] Colette G Mazzucelli, Anna Visvizi, and Ronald Bee, "Secular States in a 'Security Community': The Migration-Terrorism Nexus?," *Journal of Strategic Security* 9, no. 3 (2016): 21, https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.3.1545.

were more likely to be popular with would-be terrorists given the criminal nature of their

activities." [82] After Turkey started retaining more of the Syrian refugees rather than let

them proceed to Europe, securitization efforts in Turkey increased, with opposition

parties using both economic and historical-cultural rationales.[83] It makes intuitive sense

that securitization efforts would be tied to the overall volume of migration, especially

irregular migration, and empirical evidence supports this claim.

Another important observation is that even if securitization efforts fail, they can

lead to an increased level of xenophobia in the target population.[84] Increasing levels of

xenophobia has been problematic in European politics, and now "in almost every

European democracy there are political parties who espouse xenophobic or outright racist

messages."[85] With higher levels of xenophobia, audiences may be more likely to accept

future securitizing moves, since xenophobia can contribute to an exclusionary conception

of identity. In fact, this risk was specifically acknowledged by the Copenhagen School.[86]

Tied to xenophobia, Europe has also seen an increase in far-right and populist

political parties. Framing migration as a threat to culture has "played an important role in

giving nationalistic movements and extreme right-wing parties a prominent place in the

political field," leveraging xenophobic feelings.[87] One example of this is in Italy. There,

the simultaneous pressures of large numbers of African migrants following the Arab

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[82] Léonard and Kaunert, *Refugees, Security and the European Union*, 130.
[83] Recep Gulmez, "The Securitization of the Syrian Refugee Crisis Through Political Party Discourses," *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 20, no. 3 (August 2019): 901–2, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-018-0637-2.
[84] Léonard and Kaunert, *Refugees, Security and the European Union*, 6.
[85] Seth K. Jolly and Gerald M. DiGiusto, "Xenophobia and Immigrant Contact: French Public Attitudes toward Immigration," *The Social Science Journal* 51, no. 3 (September 1, 2014): 464, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.soscij.2013.09.018.
[86] Léonard and Kaunert, *Refugees, Security and the European Union*, 20.
[87] Huysmans, "European Union," 767.

Spring, coupled with concurrent economic crises, have led to securitization efforts as well as the emergence of populist movements.[88] Similarly, Greece is another country where populist parties have developed considerable clout.[89] As discussed above, in theory, securitizing actors are not all necessarily aligned, and securitization efforts may not be coordinated between actors. However, with the emergence of multiple populist parties expounding the same message, the driving forces of securitization may become better aligned, and securitization could be more likely to succeed. As evidenced by the growth in adherents to these parties, these efforts have been successful in at least in some portions of the population.

Both Italy and Greece have seen successful securitizing moves surrounding migration, especially within the Mediterranean. For example, Italy has used FRONTEX named operations such as *Triton* and *Themis,* which puts assets in the Central Mediterranean directly under the Italian Ministry of Interior, to control irregular migration and collect intelligence, among other functions.[90] Greece provides another example of this, with FRONTEX providing approximately 600 officers to assist with border surveillance along the Greek sea borders as part of Operation *Poseidon*.[91] In another example, migrants arriving in Greece switched from being sent to the mainland to being detained on the island of Lesbos. This overnight change on 20 March 2016 has

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[88] Emanuele Toscano, "The Rise of Italian Populism and 'Fascism in the Third Millenium' in the Age of Migration and Security," in *The Securitisation of Migration in the EU : Debates Since 9/11*, ed. Gabriella Lazaridis and Khursheed Wadia, The European Union in International Affairs (Basingstoke Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 169, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=1091213&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

[89] Lazaridis and Konsta, "Identarian Populism," 184.

[90] FRONTEX, "Operation Themis (Italy)," accessed April 27, 2021, https://frontex.europa.eu/we-support/main-operations/operation-themis-italy-/.

[91] FRONTEX, "Operation Poseidon (Greece)," accessed April 27, 2021, https://frontex.europa.eu/we-support/main-operations/operation-poseidon-greece-/.

created "a tension between security and humanitarian logics [that] has been likened to an autoimmune disorder of the body," where "although border security may appear to preserve life via humanitarian practices, it also threatens that same life it is supposed to protect."[92] Here, again, the tension between national security and human security concerns can be seen, with new responses taken in the name of national security because of securitization efforts. Securitizing measures have also been introduced domestically and not just on borders, such as the Italian government's "security package" that gave local police forces greater power against irregular migration, and "provided for the conviction of landlords renting homes to irregular migrants."[93]

Overall, Europe has a long history with the securitization of migration, and different aspects of securitization have met with debatable successes at different times. However, there are some common themes. Securitization efforts have largely been in line with the theory discussed in the previous chapter, where migration is framed as a physical, economic, or societal threat to the nation. Beyond these theoretical aspects, examples of securitization of migration in Europe show specific factors that contribute to the success of securitization efforts. First, the overall volume of arrivals influences the intensity of securitization efforts, which can be further exacerbated when these arrivals line up with economic crisis. Second, the existence of xenophobia in the population can make it more receptive to securitizing moves, increasing the chances that securitizing moves achieve their intended aims. Furthermore, even if securitizing moves fail, they can nevertheless lead to an increase in xenophobia. Finally, the emergence of populist and

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[92] Evie Papada et al., "Pop-up Governance: Transforming the Management of Migrant Populations through Humanitarian and Security Practices in Lesbos, Greece, 2015–2017," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 38, no. 6 (December 8, 2019): 1035, https://doi.org/10.1177/0263775819891167.

[93] Toscano, "Rise of Italian Populism," 180.

far-right political parties in Europe has allowed a narrative of cultural threat to become more coherent. With a more coherent message, they have succeeded in securitizing migration for at least portions of the European population.

The United States

Like Europe, the United States has also been a forum for the securitization of migration. Here, the same themes are seen as in Europe, where physical, economic, and social factors all play roles. In Europe, the direct impact of 9/11 on securitization was unclear. However, securitizing moves have been found to be more pronounced in nations that have directly experienced terrorist attack,[94] and therefore the effects of 9/11 on migration security discourse could be expected to be more pronounced. The "War on Terror" has certainly shaped American policy and attitudes, and has contributed to negative stereotypes of foreign populations, especially from the Middle East. However, in terms of securitization efforts, the "disposition of Americans to acquiesce to the will of securitizing political authorities in the aftermath of September 11 was ephemeral."[95] As time passed, the importance of terrorism as a motive for migration securitization has waned, and the element that has persisted is a negative cultural bias, rather than the direct threat of terrorism in migration securitization discourse.

This effect can be seen in the Trump government's so-called "Muslim Travel Ban," which was motivated more by nationalist or xenophobic sentiment than specific

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[94] Nazli Avdan, "Do Asylum Recognition Rates in Europe Respond to Transnational Terrorism? The Migration-Security Nexus Revisited," *European Union Politics* 15, no. 4 (June 16, 2014): 465, https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116514534908.

[95] Messina, "Age of Terror," 540.

fear of terrorism.[96] Another exceptional measure seen during the Trump administration

was the "border wall." It is important to note that the concept of a border wall as a

security response to migration dates to the 1950s, with construction of some parts already

underway by 1993.[97] However, Trump's approach, both in terms of securitizing language

and "expansion of enforcement mechanisms," was "considerably more aggressive" than

the Obama administration.[98] Here, the actual volume of irregular migration across the

border does not correlate to the securitizing moves; although 2019 saw a spike in border

apprehensions, the years prior, during which Trump advanced a securitizing agenda with

respect to the border wall, were relatively steady (see Figure 3.1). Rather than being due

to an increase in migration, the increase in securitizing moves lines up with the Trump

administration, and its ability to harness and direct nationalist sentiment. It is still

important to note that the country was not unified in accepting the securitizing moves,

and internal division between Democrats and Republicans was a recurring theme during

the Trump presidency, and the securitization of migration created rifts in the population.

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[96] Wesley S. McCann and Francis D. Boateng, *National Security and Policy in America: Immigrants, Crime, and the Securitization of the Border* (Milton, UNITED KINGDOM: Taylor & Francis Group, 2019), 157, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cfvlibrary-ebooks/detail.action?docID=5986906.

[97] McCann and Boateng, 196.

[98] Hugh Hutchison, "Continuity and Change: Comparing the Securitization of Migration under the Obama and Trump Administrations," *Perceptions* 25, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2020): 94, https://search.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/continuity-change-comparing-securitization/docview/2437460223/se-2?accountid=9867.

Figure 3.1: US Southern Border: Total Apprehensions/Inadmissible, FY2015-FY2020

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "Southwest Border Migration FY 2020," U.S. Customs and Border Protection, November 19, 2020, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration-fy2020

Another contentious reform under Trump was the "deterrence policy of family separation, incarcerating migrant parents and treating their children as unaccompanied minors."[99] This is another example of a securitized response that was only possible because of the increased securitization of migration. Again, however, support for these reactions was very much split, and the policy was discontinued after "considerable backlash," although family separation did not stop entirely.[100] Rather than being framed as a physical security issue (i.e. terrorism), "the rallying cry" to support these policies "has been centered on the same rhetoric – religious and national identity."[101] This means that the securitizing move is being framed as a societal rather than physical threat.

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[99] Hutchison, 84.

[100] Hutchison, 84.

[101] McCann and Boateng, *National Security Policy*, 164.

Economic threats have also been used when presenting migration as a security issue. For example, in more distant history, labor provided by Mexican migrants was viewed as an economic boon, but it has since come to be seen as an economic and social threat to Americans.[102]

Overall, the media plays an important role in shaping the securitization narrative in the US, and a "negative perceptions of immigrants and minority groups" is often presented "based on a variety of economic, social, and cultural concerns."[103] The way the media chooses to frame the discussion is important. Presentations of migration can frame the issue as "illegal immigration" and propose border security as the appropriate remedy. Alternatively, irregular migrants can be framed instead as "undocumented," and the corresponding remedy is to provide "pathways to legal status."[104] However, the "illegal" frame dwarfs the "undocumented" frame in American media by a factor of over ten to one, and dominates 99% of the time in conservative media outlets such as Fox News.[105] This leads to a negative moral judgement on irregular migrants and increases the chances of securitizing moves succeeding. The importance of media and public perception to securitization efforts in the US is supported by the fact that objective measures (such as proximity to the border) had minimal effects on willingness to accept securitization; rather, subjective measures (such as economic anxiety and group bias) were stronger

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[102] James M. Garrett, "The Securitization of Migration: An Analysis of United States Border Security and Migration Policy Toward Mexico" (Thesis, Monterey, California, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), 31, (2411597988), https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a580156.pdf.

[103] Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia, *Migrant Mobilization and Securitization in the US and Europe: How Does It Feel to Be a Threat?* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2015), 8, https://link-springer-com.cfc.idm.oclc.org/book/10.1057%2F9781137388056.

[104] Syed Nasser Qadri, "Framing Terrorism and Migration in the USA: The Role of the Media in Securitization Processes" (Ph.D. Thesis, Glasgow, University of Glasgow (United Kingdom), 2020), 208, (2411597988), http://theses.gla.ac.uk/77872/1/2020QadriPhD.pdf.

[105] Qadri, 209.

predictors of support for exceptional measures.[106] Securitizing moves in the US can also reinforce and promote xenophobic views, such as by offering a "restrictionist agenda that emphasizes border security" while advancing "the metaphor of unauthorized immigrants as criminal 'Others'."[107] This view of the migrant as the 'Other' plays on and reinforces xenophobic views, and increases the chances of securitizing moves achieving their aims.

In the United States, examples such as the travel ban, border wall, and the Trump policy of family separation, show that migration has been successfully securitized, although with significant divisions in popular support. Similar to Europe, and as theory predicts, physical, economic, and societal factors all play roles in the securitization discourse. Unlike Europe, however, there is not a clear linkage between the volume of migration to the United States and the frequency or intensity of securitizing moves. Instead, US securitization efforts are more closely linked with negative or xenophobic sentiment in the public and portrayal in the media, and the power of populist elements to control the securitization narrative.

Australia

Discounting its origin as a British penal colony, post-colonial Australia does not have as long or varied a history with the securitization of migration as either Europe or the United States. However, it has experienced a migration crisis of its own in the last decade, and has in consequence seen its own securitizing moves. Australian Muslims were "stigmatized as a culturally problematic and socially marginalized immigrant

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[106] Qadri, 252.
[107] Qadri, 175.

community" even prior to 9/11.[108] Afterwards, this marginalization progressed further as

the Australian government passed sweeping terrorism-inspired reforms, which included

some with a migration nexus, such as the ability to rapidly deport non-citizen residents

deemed to pose a security threat.[109]

Notwithstanding some previous securitizing moves, the prime Australian example

of extraordinary measures enabled by securitization is the offshore detention of irregular

migrants, from 2013 onwards. Critics have compared these complexes to the "gulags,"

where migrants are incarcerated rather than being given due process, [110] and Australia

has passed laws that "punish whistleblowers who report on the state of detainees" in these

camps.[111] Another example of extraordinary measures being taken is "Operation

Fortitude," where paramilitary security personnel were perceived to be engaged in

"random policing, scrutiny, and interrogation" to forcefully check identification

paperwork near one of Melbourne's busiest train stations.[112] Senior military commanders

have also been used to directly address those who could be considering an "illegal" boat

journey to Australia. For example, in a recent video from the Commander of *Operation*

Sovereign Borders (republished in over a dozen languages), Rear Admiral Mark Hill,

threateningly says:

> Australia's borders are patrolled all day, every day. Our borders are
> stronger than ever. If you attempt an illegal boat journey to Australia, you

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[108] Michael Humphrey, "Securitization of Migration: an Australian Case Study of Global Trends," *Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios Sobre Cuerpos, Emociones y Sociedad* 6, no. 15 (August 2014): 86, https://search.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/securitization-migration-australian-case-study/docview/1688080636/se-2?accountid=9867.

[109] Humphrey, 87.

[110] Binoy Kampmark, "Securitization, Refugees, and Australia's Turn Back the Boats Policy, 2013–2015," *Antipodes* 31, no. 1 (June 2017): 67, https://search.proquest.com/docview/2126787598?accountid=9867.

[111] Kampmark, 62.

[112] Kampmark, 66.

will be intercepted, returned, and you will face the consequences. Don't waste your money and don't risk your life on a pointless journey. You will not make it here, and you will be banned for life. You have zero chance.[113]

Here, the increasing securitization associated with the "turn back the boats" policy can be clearly linked to an increase in maritime arrivals. In 2007 and 2008, total boat arrivals were in the low twenties. This increased significantly over time, with over seven thousand arrivals in 2012, and over eighteen thousand arrivals in 2013, before the measures discussed above came into effect.[114] The growth of racism and xenophobia in the local population has been highlighted as a contributing factor to the securitization process.[115] Although it started with the Abbott government, the opposition Labor party also lent its support, making migration securitization a bipartisan issue in Australia.[116] This suggests a more complete success of the securitization process through the population, rather than just in a segment of it.

The Australian example of securitizing irregular maritime arrivals is a clear example of the securitization process at work, with direct extraordinary measures taken in response to a perceived threat. Similar to the other cases examined, volume of irregular arrivals, nationalist or xenophobic sentiment, and common messaging in the securitization discourse all played roles in the success of the securitization process.

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[113] "You Have Zero Chance," Youtube video, 0:30, posted by "ABF TV," February 11, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3k6eb1TsNTE.

[114] Janet Philips, "Asylum Seekers and Refugees: What Are the Facts?" (Parliament of Australia, March 2, 2015), 7, http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/library/prspub/HGNW6/upload_binary/HGNW6.pdf;fileType=application/pdf#search=%22asylum%20seekers%20and%20refugees%22.

[115] Kampmark, "Australia's Turn Back the Boats Policy," 65.

[116] Kampmark, 71.

Canada

Canada has not experienced the prolonged and successful securitization efforts seen in other countries, but there have nevertheless been repeated securitizing moves on the part of the government and media. The effect of American media consumption on Canadian audiences is also a possible source of spillover of securitization narratives into the Canadian arena, and Canada can also indirectly become an audience of securitizing moves made in American discourse. As seen in other cases, Canadian securitization moves have presented migrants as physical, economic, or societal threats to Canada.

In popular sentiment, Canada may be thought of as a welcoming nation, and the securitization of migration may seem to be fundamentally at odds with "Canadian Identity." There is some truth to this viewpoint, but it lacks rigour and glosses over what "Canadian Identity" and multiculturalism in Canada actually mean. Overall, Canadians are less worried about irregular immigration than other Western countries,[117] and Canada has typically had a very high level of popular support for accepting refugees.[118] Since World War II, Canada has been "relatively generous" in accepting offshore refugees. Because of Canada's relatively secure geography, securitizing narratives on border protection are "not nearly intense [in Canada] as in many other Western nations."[119] Furthermore, higher immigrant populations are associated with a decrease in xenophobic

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[117] Alessandra Casarico, Giovanni Facchini, and Tommaso Frattini, "Illegal Immigration: Policy Perspectives and Challenges," *CESifo Economic Studies* 61, no. 3–4 (September 2015): 681, http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=eoh&AN=1538804&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

[118] Brad Blitz, "Another Story: What Public Opinion Data Tell Us About Refugee and Humanitarian Policy," *Journal on Migration and Human Security* 5, no. 2 (2017): 387, https://search.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/another-story-what-public-opinion-data-tell-us/docview/1931569212/se-2?accountid=9867.

[119] Michael Trebilcock, "The Puzzle of Canadian Exceptionalism in Contemporary Immigration Policy," *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 20, no. 3 (August 2019): 835, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-018-0633-6.

attitudes,[120] which may insulate the audience from securitizing moves. All of these factors mean that Canada and Canadians may be less susceptible to securitizing efforts than seen in other countries.

This is not to say that Canada is immune from the effects of securitization, though, or that there is not some level of latent xenophobia still present in Canadian society. Canada in fact has a long history of casting migrants as economic threats, such as the arrival of Irish migrants in the mid-nineteenth century.[121] Despite the multiculturalization of Canadian society in the twentieth century, some public discourse still presented migrants as direct economic threats to Canadians in the 1980s, such as the concept of the "bogus refugee" intent on abusing the generosity of Canadians.[122] Multiculturalism in Canada has been supported by government "proactive policies to assist newcomers in integrating into the mainstream of Canadian society,"[123] but a majority of Canadians remain concerned "with the issue of whether too many immigrants do not adopt Canadian values (however ill-defined)."[124] Societal trepidation at immigration is also present in example such as the foundation of the right-wing People's Party of Canada in 2018.[125] Notwithstanding a generally welcoming attitude, Canada still faces challenges of economic and societal acceptance of migrants.

Similar to other countries, the events of 9/11 had an impact on the securitization of migration in the early twenty-first century. However, as also seen in other cases, there

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[120] Jolly and DiGiusto, "Xenophobia and Immigrant Contact: French Public Attitudes toward Immigration," 471.

[121] Alejandro Hernandez-Ramirez, "The Political Economy of Immigration Securitization: Nation-Building and Racialization in Canada," *Studies in Political Economy* 100, no. 2 (May 4, 2019): 111, https://doi.org/10.1080/07078552.2019.1646452.

[122] Hernandez-Ramirez, 123.

[123] Trebilcock, "Canadian Exceptionalism," 841.

[124] Trebilcock, 842.

[125] Trebilcock, 843.

is "little empirical evidence to support the claim of a lasting effect of the 9/11 attacks on the securitization of immigration" in Canada.[126] In the aftermath of the attacks, Prime Minister Chretien "did not hesitate to establish the linkage" between migration and security; however, he also emphasized that Canada would not create a "security curtain."[127] Tellingly, the linkage between migration and physical security decreased sharply from 2002 onwards.[128] Figure 3.2 shows the number of securitizing moves made by the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs (in speeches) and the media (in editorials) spiked after 9/11, showing this trend.


Figure 3.2 – Securitizing moves made in Speeches (Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs) and Editorials (Globe and Mail and La Presse), 1995-2005.
Source: Bourbeau, *Securitization of Migration*, 54, 57, 83, 86.

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[126] Elsa Vigneau, "Securitization Theory and the Relationship between Discourse and Context: A Study of Securitized Migration in the Canadian Press, 1998-2015," *Revue européenne des migrations internationales* 35, no. 1–2 (2019): 195, https://doi.org/10.4000/remi.12995.

[127] Philippe Bourbeau, *The Securitization of Migration: A Study of Movement and Order*, ed. Fiona B. Adamson, Roland Paris, and Stefan Wolff, Security and Governance (New York: Routledge, 2011), 55, https://www.routledge.com/The-Securitization-of-Migration-A-Study-of-Movement-and-Order/Bourbeau/p/book/9780415731485.

[128] Bourbeau, 22.

It is important to note that this data only captures explicit calls for security measures in response to migration, and editorials did call for repressive political measures against migrants in the wake of the 1999 "Chinese Summer."[129] Here, the arrival of 599 migrants from Fujian province, dubbed "Chinese Boat People,"[130] in the summer of 1999 was associated with an increase in securitizing discourse.[131] Subsequent maritime arrivals of the MV Ocean Lady and MV Sun Sea were also associated with an increase in securitizing discourse in Canadian media.[132] These were specifically presented as a physical security threat due to the suspected presence members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a terrorist organization.[133] As seen in other cases, an increase in irregular migrant flows led to an increase in securitizing discourse.

An increase in irregular arrivals by land was also a driving factor behind the more recent attention to land crossings at Quebec's Roxham Road. There, migrant arrivals surged by 230% between 2016 and 2017.[134] This increase resulted in media attention to the issue, with similar securitizing narratives. Potential extraordinary measures were also proposed in reaction to this surge, such as modifying or suspending the Safe Third Country Agreement to which Canada is a party.[135] In Canada, there has therefore been a clear relation between increased levels of irregular migrant arrivals, and securitizing

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[129] Bourbeau, 82.

[130] Kampmark, "Australia's Turn Back the Boats Policy," 61.

[131] Vigneau, "Securitization Theory," 202.

[132] Vigneau, 203.

[133] Lobat Sadrehashemi, "The MV Sun Sea: A Case Study on the Need for Greater Accountability Mechanisms at Canada Border Services Agency," *Dalhousie Law Journal* 42, no. 1 (2019): 215, https://search.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/mv-sun-sea-case-study-on-need-greater/docview/2423570828/se-2?accountid=9867.

[134] Christian Leuprecht, "The End of the (Roxham) Road: Seeking Coherence on Canada's Border-Migration Compact" (McDonald-Laurier Institute, 2019), 4, https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/files/pdf/20191108_MLI_ROXHAM_ROAD_Leuprecht_PAPER_FWeb.pdf.

[135] Leuprecht, 5.

moves, made primarily by the media and by opposition government parties. However, these trends have been relatively transitory, and temporarily elevated securitizing discourses have not led to the same level of long-term securitized responses seen in other regions.

Overall, the factors affecting the securitization of migration in Canada are similar to the other cases, if more muted. Physical, economic, and societal themes have all been used in securitizing discourse, similar to other countries. Despite its image as friendly to immigration, Canada still has a history of skepticism of immigrants, and this can be leveraged in securitizing discourses to promote audience acceptance. Similar to other countries, this has also led to the formation of right-wing nationalist parties, such as the People's Party of Canada. Although this new party has not done well in elections, it may still be able to generate a more coherent securitizing narrative around migration in the future. Finally, the overall volume of arrivals also plays an important role in the strength of securitizing efforts in Canada, as has been repeatedly seen during instances of increased migratory arrivals.

Common Themes and Factors

The cases above share common themes, and in large part match with the theoretical discussion in Chapter 1. Securitizing moves were seen that leveraged physical, economic, and societal threats in all areas. Going beyond the theoretical aspects, though, these cases shone light on factors that may make securitization efforts more or less likely to succeed in Western nations. Specifically, the overall volume of irregular migrant arrivals, the level of nationalist or xenophobic sentiment in the audience, and the

presence of unified messages from political parties or media outlets were repeatedly seen as factors that could aid the success securitizing moves.

Some, though not all, of the cases showed a link between the volume of migration, particularly irregular migration, and the frequency or intensity of securitizing efforts. In general, increased hostility towards migrants "tends to happen when large numbers arrive in a short period of time,"[136] and this also means that securitizing moves are more likely to effective if a large volume of irregular migrants have recently arrived. However, an increase in securitizing moves is still possible even if there is no change in migration patterns, depending on other factors, as seen in the case of the United States.

Another theme common throughout these cases is that the effects of 9/11 on migration securitization were not as pronounced as might have been expected. Although 9/11 had significant impacts on foreign and domestic policies, its direct applicability to migration securitization was not clear, and not long-lasting. In 2008, "a majority of respondents in the US and six European countries rejected the premise that immigration increases the likelihood of a terrorist attack in their country, "[137] and "if elites made deliberate securitization moves after September 11, these appear to have had little influence on public opinion over time."[138] The effects of 9/11 on foreign policy and the "War on Terror" did have initial implications for migration securitization, but as time passed, 9/11 was decreasingly likely to be invoked in securitizing discourse. Rather, it led to longer-term negative views of migrants from other points of view, not as a direct

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[136] Bali, "Securitization," 493.
[137] Messina, "Age of Terror," 541.
[138] Messina, 541.

physical threat. Linkages with other physical threats, however, have still been made, and terrorism or criminality is still used as an appeal in securitizing discourse.

Increasing levels of xenophobic views were observed in the case studies above, as evidenced by the rise in populist and nationalist sentiments, with a corresponding increase in political parties espousing these views. It is possible that this could then sensitize the population to future securitization efforts. Effectively, even if a securitizing move fails to achieve its immediate objective, it may lead to the population being more susceptible to future securitization efforts. Long-term, this increases the chances of securitizing moves becoming successful and having lasting effects. Thus, even in failure, securitizing moves could indirectly lead to securitization on a longer time scale.

However, these examples also showed that the theoretical idea of audience acceptance of a securitizing move can be complicated by the fact that the audience is not monolithic. If only portions of the public accept a securitizing move, it is still possible that some extraordinary measures could be taken, with some level of public support. Alternatively, segments of the population could call for extraordinary measures that the government in power is unwilling or unable to implement. In either case, the result is a division in the population and dissatisfaction with any action that is or is not taken. As seen in the United States, this creates the potential for deep divides in the population based on their espoused views and beliefs.

Just like the population is not monolithic in its acceptance of securitization narratives, national governments, political parties, and the media are also not a single actor. Although most studies that examine securitizing actors treat "the media" as a

unitary actor,[139] this is not necessarily true in practice. However, where the media or political parties do present a united narrative, securitizing narratives seem to be more likely to gain traction, such as US media and political actors aligning to enact securitizing agendas, or bipartisan government support in Australia for securitized measures.

Overall, therefore, these case studies supported the theory that physical, economic, and societal themes are all used when presenting threats posed by migration in securitizing discourse. Furthermore, these examples showed that the volume of migrant arrivals, xenophobic and populist sentiments in the population, and unified messaging from securitizing actors all promote the success of securitizing moves. Referring back to theory, these three factors line up well with the three notional roles in the securitization process (securitizing actors, audience, and external factors). When securitizing actors are able to present a coherent securitizing narrative, the messaging is stronger and likelier to succeed. When the audience, or portions of it, have underlying xenophobic or populist mentalities, securitizing narratives are more likely to be accepted. Furthermore, securitizing narratives themselves may increase these sentiments and make future securitizing moves more likely to succeed. Finally, in an external context of increased irregular migration, the issue is seen as more salient and securitizing moves have more power. Armed with these theoretical and empirical factors, the next section of this paper will examine likely future migration challenges, in order to assess to what degree they could lead to future securitizing moves in Canada and how likely those moves might be to succeed.

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[139] Bourbeau, *Securitization of Migration*, 78.

CHAPTER 4: 21ST CENTURY MIGRATION CHALLENGES

Although it is impossible to tell what the future holds, general trends and themes of future migration challenges can be predicted and discussed. Different possible future scenarios can be investigated to consider the potential environment they could create, favourable or unfavourable, for the securitization of migration. Within the context of the previous chapters, these future trends provide a way of qualitatively assessing the frequency or successfulness of migration securitization efforts in Canada. Based on common themes in future migration forecasting, this chapter will examine future economic and demographic challenges, climate change, and public discourse as they pertain to migration. These factors can then be weighed using the framework developed in previous chapters, in order to assess the likely impact of these trends on securitization efforts.

Like past and current securitization efforts, future securitization could be based on physical, economic, or social perceived threats. Based on securitization theory, the success of these efforts will depend once again on the audience, the securitizing actors, and the external context of the situation. As seen, each of these dimensions have factors that increase the likelihood of securitizing efforts being successful. Within an audience, higher nationalist or xenophobic sentiments make them more receptive to securitizing moves. When securitizing actors present a coherent and unified message, the securitizing effort is more likely to succeed. Finally, in an overall context of increased irregular arrivals, potential threats are seen as more salient and securitizing efforts are once again more likely to succeed.

Unfortunately, there are some intrinsic limitations to attempting to forecast migration in the future, and "models are not able to capture the multitude of social, political, demographic, economic, environmental and technological drivers that underpin migration processes."[140] Rather, many attempts to model future migration trends rely on developing different scenarios, and then assessing how migration trends could be influenced by the factors in the scenario. For example, scenarios could be based on a two-by-two matrix that combines low versus high economic growth, and low vs high socio-political fragmentation[141] or social inequality or progress.[142]

In these scenarios, the goal may not be to quantify how likely each scenario is, especially over longer terms. Scenarios could range from "inclusive growth" where global collaboration leads to orderly migration flows and increasingly diverse societies, to "inequality and control," where minimal international cooperation drives increasing social inequality and a crisis of forced migration.[143] This approach offers a two-dimensional spectrum that covers the gamut of potential outcomes given the factors being analyzed. However, there are common themes in the factors being analyzed, such as examining economic or demographic factors against social and political environments. Additionally, there are some factors that are likely to be true in any scenario; for example, economic and demographic factors will certainly contribute to the future landscape in some way. Similarly, although it may not be possible to predict the exact location of timing of natural disasters, it is increasingly certain that climate change will

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[140] Szczepanikova and Van Criekinge, "European Union," 10.
[141] The Government Office for Science, *Foresight: Migration and Global Environmental Change. Future Challenges and Opportunities, Future Scenarios* (London: United Kingdom Government Office for Science, 2011), 5, http://library.unccd.int/Details/fullCatalogue/677.
[142] Szczepanikova and Van Criekinge, "European Union," 25.
[143] Szczepanikova and Van Criekinge, 25.

play an important role in the future. Although the future of migration cannot be known with certainty, these factors provide a basis for examining future potential migration trends, and how they might be securitized in the Western world and specifically in Canada.

Economic and Demographic Challenges

Economic and demographic factors have been used as key elements forecasting future migration. This makes intuitive sense, and is supported by evidence. As economic prosperity increases in poor countries, emigration pressure is generally weakened, and irregular migration especially is reduced.[144] This is also true in relative terms, where the income differential between two countries is an important factor in labour migration.[145] When potential migrants can meet their needs in their home country, the pressure to migrate away is naturally lower. If economic growth stagnates, however, or does not keep up with demographic change, then migration pressure will increase.

It might be expected that overall global demographic changes, such as increasing world population, will therefore lead to increased migration, and increased irregular migration in particular. In the 1994 UNDP report that highlighted human security, overpopulation was specifically identified as a risk area driving international migration. At the time of the report, overpopulation risk was summed up by pointing out that "it took one million years to reach a population of one billion, but that it will now take only ten years to add the next billion to today's 5.5. billion." [146] With the global population now approaching eight billion, it might be supposed that this situation has only worsened.

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[144] Bimal Ghosh, *The Global Economic Crisis and the Future of Migration: Issues and Prospects* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 241, https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9780230303560.
[145] Ghosh, 243.
[146] United Nations Development Program, "Human Development Report," 34.

However, in the time since the 1994 report, the growth in global population and its impact on migration has become more unclear. Although world population will still increase in the short and medium terms, long-term population could stabilize. In fact, in some migration scenarios examined, world population could even be slightly lower in 2060 than it is currently; however, it could also be as high as nearly ten billion.[147] Furthermore, the changing demographic composition of the world could also impact migration specifically. For example, there is a link between migration rates and young adult population, who are the most likely demographic to migrate.[148] In countries with declining youth cohorts, such as China, there is therefore a reduced push towards migration. Although the 1994 UNDP believed that a growth in international migration was "one of the clearest consequences of population growth,"[149] this may not be entirely true, and global population growth itself may not necessarily be tied to an increase in international migration. However, in situations of economic decline, or where population increases more significantly, migration pressures can be expected to increase.

A further economic element is the overall development of the receiving nation. Migrant workers, whether permanent or temporary, can contribute meaningfully to destination countries' economies. For example, in highly developed countries, low-skilled migrant workers can complement "the skills of natives by occupying jobs in sectors where citizens are in short supply" or "that native workers consider unattractive."[150] The total demand for labour migration is a function of the economy of the receiving nation, and a higher economic demand could lead to higher amounts of

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[147] The Government Office for Science, *Foresight*, 15.
[148] Szczepanikova and Van Criekinge, "European Union," 16.
[149] United Nations Development Program, "Human Development Report," 35.
[150] International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2020*, 176.

regular migration. On the other hand, technological developments such as automation could also reduce requirement for labour, especially low-skilled labour, and consequently reduce the demand on labour migration.[151] Overall, however, it remains true that an increased differential between countries will act as a driver of migration, either regular or irregular, and economic migration will remain an important factor in the future.

Regardless of the future outcome, one area that has gained increasing importance over the last decade, and that will persist into the future, is the importance of remittances to origin countries. Remittances are the transfer of money from migrants in destination countries, to family or community members in the country of origin. Remittances have become an extremely important part of regular and irregular economic migration, and what was once "an arcane issue for many policymakers" has become "a global financial governance issue close to the heart of the geopolitical moment" in which "nearly every major international development organization has shown some form of interest."[152] Remittances to low- and middle-income countries have increased substantially since the mid-2000s, and now outpace official development assistance by a factor of three to one (excluding China, see Figure 4.1).[153] As long as economic disparity remains, and technology and communications continue to enable the transfer of remittances, they will

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[151] Ghosh, *Global Economic Crisis*, 241.
[152] Anna Lindley, "Remittances," in *Global Migration Governance*, ed. Alexander Betts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 255–58, https://www.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199600458.003.0011.
[153] International Organization for Migration, "Global Migration Data Indicators 2018" (Global Migration Data Analysis Centre, 2018), 26–27, https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/global_migration_indicators_2018.pdf; World Bank, "Money Sent Home by Workers Now Largest Source of External Financing in Low- and Middle-Income Countries (Excluding China)," World Bank Blogs, July 2, 2019, https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/money-sent-home-workers-now-largest-source-external-financing-low-and-middle-income.

continue to be important factors driving economic migration, and shaping the perception

of migration.

Figure 4.1: Remittances and Official Development Assistance to Low- and Middle-Income Countries (excluding China), 1990-2019.

Source: World Bank, "Money Sent Home by Workers Now Largest Source of External Financing in Low- and Middle-Income Countries (Excluding China)," World Bank Blogs, July 2, 2019, https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/money-sent-home-workers-now-largest-source-external-financing-low-and-middle-income.

The increasing importance of remittances can exert securitizing pressure in

different ways, covering all three of the physical, economic, and social aspects discussed

previously. First, there can be a fear that remittances can contribute to crime, terrorism, or

other nefarious purposes. This has resulted in complex national and global regulation

aimed at preventing the flow of money to criminal or terrorist organizations.[154] However,

like many other terrorism-linked aspects of migration discussed above, "the central,

much-vaunted association between alternative remittance systems and terrorism is rather

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[154] Lindley, "Remittances," 242–43.

dubious."[155] Nevertheless, it still offers a potential way for economic migration, and remittances in particular, to be cast as a physical threat. More directly, migration can also be seen as an economic threat to a nation's population, and remittances represent a transfer of wealth out of the country. From a social point of view, temporary or irregular economic migrants may be perceived as not integrating into society, potentially exacerbating xenophobic sentiments.

Overall, therefore, even though there is uncertainty in terms of future global economic development and demographics, economic migration and remittances will remain important in the future as long as some level of economic or developmental disparity remains between sending and receiving nations. Depending on the future scenario that is realized, the degree to which this is securitized may vary. For example, in a future where economic disparity is minimized and countries exist harmoniously, securitizing efforts would be less severe than in a future where tight controls and fragmented governance lead to a high disparity between countries. However, because the underlying factors are common to all of the different migration scenarios, and economic disparity is unlikely to completely disappear, it is more a question of to what extent, rather than if, future economic development and challenges will impact migration. Therefore, looking to the future, economic migration and remittances are likely to have a continuing and important impact on the securitization of migration.

Climate Change

Alongside economic migration and remittances, another area that may become a potential key driver of migration in the future is climate change. Climate-induced

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[155] Lindley, 247.

migration "has happened for millennia, of course," but the role of human-induced climate change is increasing its importance; even if climate change remains at current levels, it is an important concern for the future.[156] If some of the more dire predictions come true, climate change could become an overwhelming factor driving migration. Currently, most forced displacement due to natural disasters stays within the country of origin and does not result in international migration.[157] However, as climate change worsens, its international effects will increase. Consequently, the possibility of "people moving due to sea-level rise, increased drought, and flooding, has been presented as one of the main security risks of global warming."[158] Even as nations continue to tackle the challenge of climate change, it appears all but certain that climate change will play an important role in the global future.

Like economic migration, though, it is impossible to accurately predict the future of climate change, and predictions vary. Furthermore, even if the effects of climate change could be predicted accurately, its effects on migration would still be uncertain since the relationship between climate change and migration is complex and "it has become accepted that links between the environment and migration are rarely linear."[159] This has led some to conclude that '"it is simply not clear whether or not climate change will induce significant amounts of forced displacement."[160] However, there are several

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[156] Gregory White, *Climate Change and Migration: Security and Borders in a Warming World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 56, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794829.003.0003.

[157] International Organization for Migration, "Indicators," 44.

[158] Ingrid Boas, *Climate Migration and Security: Securitisation As a Strategy in Climate Change Politics* (London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2015), 1, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cfvlibrary-ebooks/detail.action?docID=2038984.

[159] International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2020*, 253.

[160] Gregory White, "Environmental Refugees," in *Handbook on Migration and Security*, ed. Philippe Bourbeau (Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2017), 186, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cfvlibrary-ebooks/detail.action?docID=4848999.

different estimates that put the scale of the potential problem in context, with predictions

that "hundreds of millions (and by some accounts more than a billion)," could be

"forcibly displaced by the effects of climate change in the decades to come."[161] Other

estimates bound the figure more tightly, but still predict that "between 200 and 250

million people will be displaced by environmental causes before 2050."[162] Even if only a

fraction of these people are forcibly displaced and become international migrants, this

represents a huge potential source of regular and irregular migrants in the decades to

come.

      Although climate migration is not a new phenomenon, these predictions show that

it is likely to vastly increase in both scope and scale in the future. This means that a key

difference for the future is that climate change will lead to more frequent or more

sustained migrant flows, and the overall volume of migrants will consequently increase.

Furthermore, climate migrants are likelier to have to travel farther for safety, unlike

climate migration in current times that largely remains within national borders. For

countries that are poised to be less affected by climate change, such as Canada, this could

translate to increased volume in migration flows, both regular and irregular, as well as to

more sustained migrant flows.

      The potential securitizing effects of climate migration, based on these estimates,

is clear, especially in terms of increased volume of migrant flows. In fact, the

International Organization for Migration specifically frames climate migrants in a

"securitization vs protection" dichotomy, and suggests that there are a "spectrum of

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[161] White, 176.

[162] Jane McAdam, "Environmental Migration," in *Global Migration Governance*, ed. Alexander Betts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 153, https://www.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199600458.003.0007.

responses" available to deal with increasing migration, ranging from tightly controlling national borders, to ensuring "dignified, safe conditions within protection frameworks."[163] This fits in neatly with the discussion around national security versus human security, and shows that forced climate migration faces the same challenges as other types of migration. In a pure human security context, the response would focus on the wellbeing and safety of individual climate migrants, and the population of the receiving country would not be given special consideration. In a national security response, securitization efforts would emphasize tight border controls and interruption of irregular migrant flows. Within North America, a securitized response could also involve enhancing national security responses within transit states, "even if it means enhancing their authoritarian character."[164] This would have the effect of dealing with the perceived threat in transit states, for example in Central America, before migrants were able to reach North American borders.

The potential threats that could be leveraged in securitizing discourse are also relatively clear. Because it is more difficult to link to terrorism or criminality, climate migration may not be faced with securitizing moves focusing on physical threats. However, there are economic and social threat arguments that could be made towards climate migrants. From an economic point of view, climate migrants could require resources to re-establish themselves in their new country, and they could offer competition for employment. From a social point of view, climate migrants could be cast as an influx of disruptive foreign culture in securitizing discourse.

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[163] International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2020*, 254.
[164] White, *Climate Change and Migration*, 57.

In terms of factors that increase the likelihood of securitizing moves succeeding, climate migration also offers a clear theme for securitizing actors to unify around, and means that it is likely that a coherent message of stopping climate migration could be injected into public discourse. As discussed, this increased coherence improves the odds of securitizing actors achieving their objectives. The potential scale of migrant flows from climate migration, and its more sustained nature, mean that the external context of securitizing moves would be conducive to success. If securitization efforts are sustained, this could have the dual effect of increasing the chances of securitizing moves achieving their aims, while also potentially increasing the nationalist or xenophobic sentiment in the population. This in turn could then improve the chances of future securitizing moves being successful, even if securitizing actors fail to meet their goals in earlier efforts. Climate migration, therefore, presents a significant risk in the future of leading to increased securitization of migration.

Public Sentiment

Economic development and climate change have both been examined in terms of their effects on migrant populations. However, the future outlook of the population in destination countries is also an important factor that will determine the likelihood of securitizing efforts on migration in the future. In broad, multicultural societies, there would be lower levels of latent xenophobia, although it would likely not be entirely absent. In countries with significant nationalist sentiment and populist political parties, levels of nationalist sentiment would naturally be higher, resistance to migration would be higher, and securitizing efforts would be more likely to succeed.

Recent history has shown a marked increase in nationalist and populist sentiments across Western societies. For example, President Trump specifically raised the spectre of climate migration as a security risk, which would have been "unthinkable" for a President a decade prior.[165] Climate refugees have also been specifically cast as a "lurking threat" by securitizing agents across the political spectrum, from "leftwing environmentalists" to "rightwing nativists."[166] Over the last decade, the trend has accelerated, which has led to increased fear and division in discussions, and consequently "public discourse on migration has increasingly become polarized with the space for balanced, rigorous, and evidence-based analyses having diminished over time."[167] Far-right leaning political parties have been identified repeatedly in studies as a source of this type of polarization, most apparent in Western democracies.[168] Furthermore, when populist views are co-opted by mainstream parties, this does not reduce the power of the populist party; instead, it can have the result of legitimizing the populist view with more of the public, and can reinforce the power of the populist party.[169]

As discussed previously, this polarization has already led to securitizing moves, and the trend is likely to continue into the future, especially given the potential for climate migration. Although this trend could be reversed in the long term, it is likely to continue to play a role in the foreseeable future. Climate refugees can be cast as an "easily invoked specter that ties into a citizenry's deepest fears about climate change," [170]

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[165] White, "Environmental Refugees," 184.
[166] White, 186.
[167] International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2020*, 161.
[168] International Organization for Migration, 179–80.
[169] International Organization for Migration, 180.
[170] White, *Climate Change and Migration*, 59.

or as "barbarians at the gate – a representation that accentuates a threatening 'other'" [171] which focuses the narrative on security. It is precisely this type of "alarmist security language" that can be used to "direct the course of a securitization process, and make it focused on promoting particular forms of action."[172] Climate change in particular can provide a tangible rallying point for discourse, increasing the unity of the message and the securitization effort's strength. This has in fact already shown to be the case; public opinion towards migration in both the US and Europe has grown increasingly negative; for example, in 2016, only 22% of Europeans believed that having greater diversity in race and nationality made their country a better place.[173] As discourse has become more securitizing, it is securitized responses, such as strict border enforcement, that receive the most support from electorates because they perceive a "tough on immigration" position as providing a sense of safety.[174] This electoral support for measures could then have the effect of amplifying the securitizing message even further in the political arena.

Overall, these trends mean that it is difficult to prevent populist views, and they are likely to continue to be a significant factor in future debates about migration. Because latent nationalist or populist feelings in the population has been identified as a factor influencing the success of securitizing efforts, national public sentiment within potential destination countries will remain an important consideration for future migration challenges.

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[171] White, "Environmental Refugees," 184.
[172] Boas, *Climate Migration and Security*, 181.
[173] International Organization for Migration, "Indicators," 48.
[174] White, *Climate Change and Migration*, 57-58.

Overall Potential Effects on Securitization

Because the future is uncertain, it is impossible to know exactly what migration will look like in the coming years. There will surely be ebbs and flows of migration, and securitizing efforts may surge and wane in response to changing external factors. On the whole, however, looking at future economic and demographic trends, climate change, and overall public sentiment show the general direction in which future trends will likely progress.

Economic migration is likely to remain important, although depending on the future scenario that comes to pass, its relative importance may vary. However, in any case, remittances are likely to remain important, and economic migration will in all likelihood continue to play a role in regular and irregular migration. This provides avenues for securitizing migration in terms of all three aspects of physical, economic, and social threats. Climate migration will also become increasingly important in the future, and the number of both regular and irregular climate migrants can be expected to climb in the future. Unlike most other crises, climate change will not be an event tightly defined in time. This means that securitization efforts could be more likely to endure for longer periods of time. As observed, even if early securitization efforts fail, they may have the effect of increasing xenophobia, and sensitizing the target population to future securitization efforts. At the same time, climate migration provides an easily identifiable common theme for securitizing actors, who will be able to unify their messaging around it. Finally, the role of the public in destination nations will also be important in the future. Here, at least in the near to medium term, populist and nationalist sentiments that have developed in Western democracies are likely to continue in at least portions of the

population. This could then provide an increasingly receptive audience for securitizing

discourse. These trends therefore hit on all three of the identified factors that could

increase the likelihood of securitizing efforts achieving their aims. This means that

although the future cannot be divined, it is still possible to predict that future trends will

be conducive to securitizing efforts.

CHAPTER 5: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF MIGRATION

SECURITIZATION IN CANADA

This chapter will build on the exploration of the previous chapters, which have shown that Canada is not immune to the securitization of migration. Previously, this paper has presented the difference between human security and national security responses to migration, and examined the ways in which migration can be cast as a security concern, leading to national security reactions. Examining potential future trends in migration, especially climate migration, showed that future trends are likely to be conducive to securitizing efforts achieving their aims. For example, longer-duration securitization efforts are likely to occur, because trends such as climate change could generate perceived threats with extended durations, rather than time-bounded external shocks such as 9/11. This could consequently lead to more sustained securitizing efforts. These longer-term securitization efforts are more likely to lead to the implementation of longer-term national security responses, completing the securitization process.

A "successful" migration securitization campaign, where long-term security measures are introduced in response to a perceived migration threat, would pose a significant challenge for Canada. Currently, and historically, Canada has adopted and developed human security-based international policies, such as the Responsibility to Protect, and is party to agreements such as the *Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration* (GCM) and the *Global Compact on Refugees* (GCR). Foreign and defence policies are similarly shaped by human security elements. As opposed to political proclamations in public discourse, which can and have shifted as governments have changed, Canadian human security-focused policies have been long-lasting positions that

have shaped decades of Canadian involvement. If migration becomes a securitized issue in Canada, and Canada consequently adopts strict national security measures domestically, such as the harsh treatment of irregular arrivals, there are several possible negative consequences. First, Canada risks appearing hypocritical on the international stage, undermining its international human security efforts by prioritizing national security concerns at home. Second, Canadian society could develop deep and lasting fractures between two competing camps. Preventing this type of rift should therefore be a priority for Canada.

This is a challenging proposition, though, since there is already a division in the population, and these different segments will place different priorities on human and national security concerns. However, if Canada developed ways to act that are consistent with current policies and human security concerns, while simultaneously minimizing the risk factors for securitization that were identified above, then the risk of a divisive security discourse taking root would be minimized. To this end, it is possible to extrapolate from observed and predicted trends, and to offer some ideas that would remain consistent with human security values, while at the same time minimizing the identified factors that would favour securitization efforts. Specifically, Canadian engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean could promote Canada's current human security agenda, while minimizing the identified risks that could lead to the securitization of migration.

Canada's Current Commitments and Policies

Canadian policy contains many elements protecting and promoting human security, which could be undermined if harsh national security measures were deployed

in response to migration being effectively securitized in Canada. For example, Canada is committed to the global *Women, Peace, and Security* agenda, which is "at the heart of Canada's Feminist Foreign Policy," including the *Feminist International Assistance Policy* and *Defence Policy*.[175] Abroad, Canada "promotes and protects human rights and reflects Canadian values on the international stage."[176] Even if it is a nebulous concept, the government has deliberately attached protection of human rights, and human security, to the idea of "Canadian values," and the position would be undermined if exceptional national security measures were introduced at home. The *Feminist International Assistance Policy* proclaims that "peace and prosperity are every person's birthright," and that the importance of human dignity is paramount.[177] Canada's Defence Policy similarly shows elements of human security. Migration is cast in a positive light, as a force "for diversity, for economic growth, and vitality," and Canada is called on to help those who "flee their homes in a desperate search for a better life."[178] This once again shows the human security underpinnings of Canadian policy.

At the international level, Canada has made human security commitments in various forms. For example, in 2018, Canada, alongside 163 other nations, adopted the *Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration* (GCM) at the UN. Five

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[175] Global Affairs Canada, "Women, Peace and Security," Government of Canada, August 18, 2020, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/gender_equality-egalite_des_genres/women_peace_security-femmes_paix_securite.aspx?lang=eng.

[176] Global Affairs Canada, "International Human Rights," Government of Canada, February 15, 2021, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/human_rights-droits_homme/rights-droits.aspx?lang=eng.

[177] Global Affairs Canada, *Canada's Feminist International Assistance Policy* (Ottawa: Global Affairs Canada, 2017), i-ii, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/assets/pdfs/iap2-eng.pdf.

[178] Department of National Defence, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2017), 49, http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/docs/canada-defence-policy-report.pdf.

nations, including the United States, voted against it.[179] The GCM has a heavy focus on promoting human security, but it does remain sensitive to national security concerns. Its eleventh objective is to "manage borders in an integrated, secure, and coordinated manner," and its thirteenth objective recognizes that detention is still possible, even if only "as a last resort" while seeking alternative measures.[180] However, the objectives, when examined overall, emphasize human security considerations over national security concerns. They promote evidenced-based policy development to eliminate discrimination and reduce vulnerability, and call for cooperation and collaboration between nations to ensure safe and dignified treatment of migrants.[181] Despite the GCM being a recent compact, its policies were not new to Canada. The government has stressed that despite the compact being non-binding, "the majority of the almost 200 action items listed under the Compact's objectives reflect current Canadian practices."[182] This shows once again that Canada has had a long history of policies friendly to human security, which could be undermined if rigid national security measures are taken in response to the securitization of migration.

The *Global Compact on Refugees* (GCR) is a similar compact, and also emphasizes the importance of human security. Like the GCM, it also takes some national

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[179] Madalina Chesoi and Brendan Naef, *Primer on the Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (Background Paper)* (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2019), 3, https://lop.parl.ca/staticfiles/PublicWebsite/Home/ResearchPublications/BackgroundPapers/PDF/2019-21-e.pdf.

[180] United Nations General Assembly, *Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Effective Migration Resolution A/RES/73/195*, 2018, 20–21, https://undocs.org/A/RES/73/195.

[181] Chesoi and Naef, *Primer on the Global Compact for Refugees*, 6.

[182] Canada. House of Commons, "Government Response to the Report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration Entitled 'New Tools for the 21st Century - The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the Global Compact for Refugees: An Interim Report.,'" 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, 5 Apr 19, https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/CIMM/report-23/response-8512-421-492.

security concerns into account, and one of its objectives is to ease the pressure on host countries.[183] However, the GCR opens by pointing out that "the predicament of refugees is a common concern of humankind," and the compact is underpinned by human security concerns. Canada has traditionally been receptive to refugees. For example, in 2019, Canada admitted 28,000 of the total 92,400 refugees permanently resettled worldwide (with or without UNHCR assistance), outpacing the United States for the first time.[184] This trend continued in 2019, where Canada accepted 30,100 of 107,800 refugees resettled worldwide, compared to 27,500 in the US.[185] In fact, over the last decade, Canada has accepted approximately 20% of all permanently resettled refugees worldwide (see Figure 5.1).


Figure 5.1: Total Refugees Permanently Resettled (UNHCR and non-UNHCR facilitation), 2010-2019

Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2019* (Copenhagen: UNHCR Global Data Service, 2020), 52, https://www.unhcr.org/5ee200e37.pdf.

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[183] United Nations, *Global Compact on Refugees* (New York: United Nations, 2018), 4, https://www.unhcr.org/5c658aed4.pdf.
[184] International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2020*, 112.
[185] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Global Trends*, 52.

Internationally, Canada has also had a lead role in developing and promoting the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P), a doctrine that builds on the framework of human security.[186] Adopted by the United Nations in 2005, the R2P doctrine is based on international response to genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.[187] It does not include migration, per se. However, these identified crimes go hand-in-hand with displacement and migration, either as a result of the crimes, or as an early indicator that these crimes are happening. Consequently, providing protection to displaced persons "can be seen as an expression of R2P."[188] If national security concerns are given priority, though, it could become challenging to garner support for human-security based interventions. Indeed, the original R2P report from 2001 identified that in an "inward-looking political culture," political actors would be rewarded for focusing on domestic issues, to the detriment of human security issues.[189] The report also points out the importance of the sentiment of the domestic audience, and of domestic media, to shaping the space in which politicians can act.[190] Although this is not put in the language of securitization, the link is clear, and in fact several of the same securitizing factors discussed above play direct roles. Even though R2P does not deal with migration directly, there is still a link between the two. Therefore, a national security response to migration

[186] Gjorv, "Human Security," 222.

[187] United Nations General Assembly, "A/RES/60/1 - Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 16 September 2005" (United Nations, 2005), 30, https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf.

[188] Elizabeth Ferris, "International Responsibility, Protection and Displacement: Exploring the Connections between R2p, Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons," *Global Responsibility to Protect* 8, no. 4 (October 26, 2016): 394–95, https://doi.org/10.1163/1875984X-00804005.

[189] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), 71, https://www.idrc.ca/en/book/responsibility-protect-report-international-commission-intervention-and-state-sovereignty.

[190] International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 71.

at home could undermine international responses under the R2P framework, and risks hypocrisy if Canada calls on other nations to adopt a sympathetic human security standpoint, while a hardline national security response prevails in Canada.

Here, an illustrative example of a potential future scenario can demonstrate this tension. Securitizing moves seen in both Europe and Australia have involved the maritime interception of irregular migrants. Canada already has a maritime operation in the Caribbean, Operation *Caribbe*, which focuses on drug interdiction in cooperation with the United States. This operation is a securitized response to an issue, albeit not migration. However, if irregular migration were to increase, for example because of climate pressures, *Caribbe* could be modified to include migration in its scope. In cooperation with the United States, this could turn into an operation that sees irregular migrants intercepted and incarcerated (e.g. at Guantanamo Bay, in a parallel to Australia's offshore detention facilities), paralleling securitized responses seen in other countries. Canada could then conceivably be put in a situation where it is a world leader for settling refugees, while simultaneously advancing a securitized national security agenda that incarcerates and punishes vulnerable migrants.

The maritime environment is not the only arena that could see securitization taking hold. Domestically, the *Safe Third Country Agreement* (STCA) has become an important policy issue regarding migration on the Canada-US border that highlights the clash between human security and national security concerns. The agreement, which came into effect in 2004, designates the USA as a "safe third country," the only country to have this status to date, and prevents arrivals from the USA from seeking refugee

status in Canada.[191] This designation allows Canada to deny entry to claimants without violating the principle of non-refoulement, embedded in treaty and customary international law, which prevents nations from repatriating claimants to countries where they may be at risk of harm.[192] However, for land crossings, it only applies at official ports of entry, and irregular arrivals are not covered under the agreement. This provided the basis for the surge of irregular arrivals seen over the last few years, such as the 1400% year-over-year increase in irregular arrivals seen in December 2016 after President Trump's election.[193] As mentioned above, this surge in irregular arrivals led to securitizing narratives in Canadian media. However, the Canadian government has resisted enacting any extraordinary security measures and the securitization process has not been completed. Rather, the government has sought to find a political or diplomatic solution to the issue. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic has been "channeled by the Canadian government to persuade the United States to block irregular border crossings," which has allowed Canada to secure its border without recourse to the anti-immigrant narrative used in the United States.[194] However, a political solution is not readily apparent, and the issue has been complicated by legal challenges, such as the STCA being unconstitutional. In July 2020, the Federal Court of Canada found that it was not

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[191] Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, "Canada-U.S. Safe Third Country Agreement," not available, Government of Canada, July 23, 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/mandate/policies-operational-instructions-agreements/agreements/safe-third-country-agreement.html.

[192] Aramide Odutayo, "Human Security and the International Refugee Crisis," *Journal of Global Ethics* 12, no. 3 (September 1, 2016): 366–67, https://doi.org/10.1080/17449626.2016.1251484.

[193] Sean Rehaag, Janet Song, and Alexander Toope, "Never Letting a Good Crisis Go to Waste: Canadian Interdiction of Asylum Seekers," *Frontiers in Human Dynamics* 2, no. 588961 (2020): 3, https://doi.org/10.3389/fhumd.2020.588961.

[194] Rehaag, Song, and Toope, 3.

guaranteed to be safe to return irregular arrivals to the USA.[195] The government is in the process of appealing, and the future of the STCA is currently uncertain. Even in its statement declaring its intention to appeal, the government continued to maintain that "Canada has a long and proud tradition of providing protection to those who need it most,"[196] and it continues to try to find a political solution, rather than enacting an overt security response. Had the flow of irregular arrivals at Roxham Road not decreased, though, securitizing narratives would likely have continued, and patience for finding a political solution could easily have waned. In the future, if political solutions cannot be found and securitizing forces do not relent, overt securitizing measures, such as those seen in other countries, could come to Canada. For example, national security agencies such as the Canadian Border Services Agency, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, or the military could be called on to implement national security responses on the border in response to this type of situation. This would again highlight the tension between human security and national security between Canada's international and domestic policies.

Easing the Tension Between National and Human Security

Even when disputing rulings on migration-related policies, Canada stresses its commitment to human security and overall human wellbeing. Though some governments may emphasize this more than others, there has been a long-standing commitment to these ideals that has transcended the politics of the day. This is visible across the spectrum of current and past Canadian policies. However, this is partly due to Canada's

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[195] Rehaag, Song, and Toope, 4–5.

[196] Public Safety Canada, "Government of Canada to Appeal the Federal Court Decision on the Safe Third Country Agreement," statements, Government of Canada, August 21, 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/public-safety-canada/news/2020/08/government-of-canada-to-appeal-the-federal-court-decision-on-the-safe-third-country-agreement.html.

favourable geography, with only one land border across which migrants might flow. As seen, when irregular migration surges, Canada is not immune to securitizing narratives.

Previous chapters have highlighted how securitization can be framed, and what factors can contribute to increasing securitizing narratives. Together, these factors mean that Canada may not be able to rely on its favourable geography for much longer. If climate change or economic pressures force migrants farther afield, or if the United States remains an unwelcoming destination, then migration to Canada is likely to increase. Although regular migration can be controlled through policy, increasing migration pressures would also increase the amount of attempted irregular migration. Because increasing amounts of irregular migration has been linked to increasing securitization efforts, Canada is therefore likely to face mounting securitizing narratives in the future.

As discussed, this would have negative influences on the Canadian population as a whole, resulting in fractures and internal division. However, securitizing efforts would also undermine Canadian policies. For these reasons, it is in Canada's best interests – for the unity of both its people and its government policies and standpoints – if securitizing narratives could be prevented from taking hold.

Fortunately, the framework developed in previous chapters allows for an examination of courses of action that could potentially reconcile the opposing viewpoints. This could be done by developing options that still adhere to current policies and that forward human security ideals. At the same time, though, these options could also aim to reduce the identified risk factors that can lead to the increased frequency of securitizing efforts, or the likelihood of these efforts achieving their aims. By doing this, calls for

harsh national security responses to issues could be mitigated, and the tension between human and national security could be alleviated before reaching a breaking point.

One possible criticism of this approach is that it could be seen as "co-opting the human security agenda for state security ends,"[197] or that it could lead to policies that "disingenuously tries to equate the security of the individual with the security of the state." [198] Effectively, policies could be seen as veiled attempts to forward a national security agenda in the guise of human security concerns. This could then open the nation up to accusations of hypocrisy, as discussed. This is a potentially valid criticisms, depending on how courses of action are developed. If human security is indeed simply used as an excuse to forward a national security agenda, then it will not reduce the tension between the two views, and actions undertaken would instead just be seen as a national security response, driven by securitization efforts.

Fortunately, this criticism can be addressed. If options are developed with legitimate human security concerns in mind, in line with current policies and international commitments, then the human security aspect would not simply be a veil for advancing a national security agenda. If these measures had the additional effect of reducing the securitizing factors identified in previous chapters, that does not mean that the policies are not centered on human security. For example, reducing the pressures in origin nations that lead to forced migration is a valid human security concern, in line with current international human security principles. Doing this would also reduce the flow of forced migrants, leading to a decrease in irregular migration, and consequently alleviating securitizing pressures. Here, the criticism that human security is being used to advance

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[197] Gjorv, "Human Security," 232.
[198] Odutayo, "Human Security," 375.

national security could just as easily be reversed, claiming that national security concerns about migration are being co-opted to provide for human security in origin nations.

This type of approach offers a way that Canada could take meaningful actions in line with current policies, which could also reduce the chances of securitizing narratives taking hold in Canada. Even if the military or other security agencies are involved in these actions, their involvement would be under current policies, and not because securitizing efforts had drawn them into a new national security arena and given them new powers. This would then alleviate securitizing pressure, and minimize the chances of extraordinary national security measures being enacted in response to securitizing narratives. In consequence, the risks of a clash between human and national security concerns would be mitigated.

Potential Options for Future Canadian Engagement

Adopting this type of approach, Latin America and the Caribbean emerge as potential areas for Canadian engagement that would meet the aims of current international commitments, assist the regions, and simultaneously minimize the risk factors associated with increased securitization. Migration from these regions can be and has been characterized under all three areas of physical, economic, and social threat. For example, criminal threats have been brought up, with fears of gangs like MS-13 finding their way into public discourse through politicians.[199] Economically and socially, the US, spilling over into Canada, has a long history of associating economic migration from these regions, with perceived threats both in terms of taking away livelihoods from citizens, as well as requiring economic support from government programs. Currently,

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[199] Harris, "Illegal Border Crossings."

Venezuela alone is a significant source of economic displacement – the second highest in the world after Syria.[200] Because migration from Latin America has been characterized in all of these threat areas, its potential for securitization is high. Beyond this, the risk factors for securitization, such as coherent and sustained messaging, are also present. The US media (to which Canadians are exposed) has presented consistent messaging about threats of northbound migrants from Latin America, with periodic reports of "caravans" moving northwards. Furthermore, as securitizing moves gain traction in the United States and it becomes a less desirable or feasible destination for migrants, the flow of migrants to Canada can increase, as was seen during the Trump administration.

Over the last three decades, total migration from Latin America and the Caribbean has tripled, with the overwhelming majority settling in North America.[201] In the future, this is likely to increase, and the area is likely to be heavily affected by climate change. In the worst case, up to 246 million in Central America, 272 million in South America, and 73 million in the Caribbean (a total of 591 million) could be at risk of water stress by 2085 due to a global temperature increase of 2-3 degrees.[202] Even in the best case, over 75 million people are expected to be put at risk. Beyond these numbers, an additional 5-85 million in the same area could be at risk of hunger by the 2080s.[203] This means that in the future, both regular and irregular migration are likely to increase, and as discussed above, the frequency and success of securitizing efforts is therefore also likely to increase.

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[200] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Global Trends*, 8.

[201] International Organization for Migration, *World Migration Report 2020*, 95–96.

[202] Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas, "Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees," *Global Environmental Politics* 10, no. 1 (February 1, 2010): 71, https://doi.org/10.1162/glep.2010.10.1.60.

[203] Biermann and Boas, 71.

By providing developmental assistance to the region before the conditions lead to increases in forced migration, Canada could minimize the securitizing influence likely to occur in the future. This could avoid provoking national security reactions, with the associated negative consequences on the government and population that were discussed above. This would be in line with current policies. For example, Global Affairs Canada has already expressed a desire to "support climate change mitigation and adaptation" in the region.[204] This type of support to the region would also fall in line with the second GCM objective of minimizing the drivers and factors that compel migration.[205]

Currently, Latin America and the Caribbean receive some international assistance from Canada, but significantly less than other areas, and Canada's foreign aid disbursements to the Americas totals only between 10-14% of total aid.[206] The Canadian Armed Forces could also contribute in capacity building in the region. Although the Canadian military does complete some visits and exchanges in the region, there is only one ongoing named operation in the region, Operation *Caribbe*.[207] This operation is based on interdicting the flow of drugs to North America,[208] and does not address human security concerns in the region. In the past, there have been operations to support natural disasters, such as Operation *Hestia* in Haiti, which have addressed human security issues.

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[204] Global Affairs Canada, "Canada and Latin America and the Caribbean," Government of Canada, February 10, 2020, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/latin_america-amerique_latine/index.aspx?lang=eng.

[205] United Nations General Assembly, *Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Effective Migration*, 9.

[206] Canadian International Development Platform, "Canada's Foreign Aid," CIDP | Canadian International Development Platform, 2019, http://cidpnsi.ca/canadas-foreign-aid-2012-2/.

[207] Department of National Defence, "Current Operations List," Government of Canada, February 25, 2021, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/list.html.

[208] Department of National Defence, "Operation CARIBBE," Government of Canada, March 12, 2021, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-caribbe.html.

This type of operation is likely to become more common as climate change develops, and assistance could also be rendered to improve readiness in these regions before disasters strike. This would increase resilience in the region, simultaneously addressing future human security concerns, while minimizing the factors likely to lead to forced migration. Although military forces might be used in capacity-building or readiness-enhancing operations, this would not be in response to securitizing acts, and it would not involve any new extraordinary measures taken as a result of securitizing pressure. Further, it would not be a veiled co-opting of human security concerns for national security goals. This could therefore be an effective way of addressing the potential tension between human and national security as discussed above.

Certainly, Latin America and the Caribbean is not the only region that could be targeted for this type of engagement, but it is perhaps the most straightforward area to see how current policies and commitments could be applied with the aim of reducing the potential for divisive or damaging securitization narratives developing in Canada. As the trends discussed in this paper (as well as other, as-yet unpredicted trends) develop, other potential areas for engagement will continue to emerge. Other possible areas of engagement could therefore be a fruitful area for future thought. In any case, by keeping the potential factors that promote securitizing narratives in mind, and seeking to mitigate the risks associated with future trends, Canada would be able to follow consistent government policies, minimize the potential for divides within the Canadian population, and avoid a clash between human and national security concerns.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

Looking into the future will always involve some uncertainty. However, there will be identifiable trends that show the direction the future is likely to head. This is the case with migration, where the future is likely to lead to increasing securitization efforts in Canada. These efforts will be damaging to the Canadian government, as well as to the Canadian people, and should therefore be avoided.

To support this argument, a theoretical framework for defining and examining securitization is required. Here, the notions of human security and national security must also be contrasted, being the two principal frames in which migration can be viewed. In the human security viewpoint, human beings are the referent objects of security, while in the national security view, the nation itself is the referent object that must be secured. According to the Copenhagen School, securitization is the process through which issues are cast as security issues, enabling actors to take extraordinary measures to deal with them. The securitization process involves securitizing actors, who push a narrative that casts the issue in a security context. However, these securitizing actors are only one part of the process. The audience itself plays a key role in securitization, and audience acceptance is a key necessity if the issue is to be successfully recast as a security issue. Additionally, the external environment is also an important factor that helps to determine if securitizing efforts will be a success.

In the context of migration, securitization efforts can involve the portrayal of migrants as a threat. Specifically, migration can be cast as physical, economic, or social threat to a nation or its people, essentially making migration a national security concern. Although other views of securitization are possible, the Copenhagen School's definition

matches closely with the humanitarian and national security frames that dominate the migration discussion, providing a clear concept of how migration issues can become national security issues.

This has indeed happened across the world. Focusing on Western democracies, the securitization of migration has been seen in the EU, the USA, Australia, and in Canada. In some places and times, securitization narratives have achieved their aims of establishing new security measures, while in other places securitizing discourse and pressure has waned before extraordinary measures were put in place. Canada, for example, has seen securitizing narratives tied to specific events, such as the arrival of the MV Sun Sea on the West Coast, the arrivals of irregular migrants at Quebec land border crossings in the wake of Trump's election in the USA, or the events of 9/11. However, these narratives have come as responses to specific shocks, and have receded before significant securitized national security responses have been implemented. Conversely, other countries have seen longer-term extraordinary security measures enacted in response to migration, such as American security efforts on its southern border, and Australian and European maritime interception efforts.

In examining these cases, clear factors emerged that influence the likelihood of securitizing efforts achieving their goals. First, the overall number of irregular arrivals has been an important factor that increases the perceived threat posed by migration. In terms of the theoretical framework, this increases the power behind securitizing narratives by providing a strong external context for the threat. In addition to external context, the securitizing actors and the audience are also key theoretical factors. In practice, the ability of securitizing actors to present a coherent and unified picture has

helped securitization efforts. Although there can be a tendency to present media as monolithic, this is not the case, and it cannot be assumed that securitizing narratives will be aligned between actors. However, when they are, this allows them to be mutually reinforcing, and aids securitization. As an example of this, American securitizing narratives surrounding the southern border were more successful in achieving their aims when the Trump administration and media were able to present migration as a growing security issue, notwithstanding the fact that actual arrivals were relatively steady. Finally, audience acceptance is key to securitization's success, and the increase in nationalist and populist sentiments seen in various cases, such as European and American right-wing political groups, has contributed to greater securitization efforts. Furthermore, even if securitizing efforts are not successful, they can serve to increase the levels of xenophobia and populist sentiment, potentially making audience acceptance easier in future securitizing moves. Overall, these three factors, taken together, can be used to look at likely future migration trends, to assess the potential securitization risk in the future.

Looking ahead, migration will undoubtedly continue, and is it very likely to increase. Economic and demographic changes, including the importance of remittances, are likely to lead to both increased regular and irregular migration. Economic migrants, whether regular or irregular, can be cast as physical, economic, or social threats, and offer potential avenues for securitization. Climate change is also likely to be an important factor driving migration in the future, and potentially hundreds of millions of people could be forcibly displaced. Although some will migrate through regular means, irregular flows will also increase. Again, climate migrants can easily be cast as either social or economic threats, although it is more difficult to create direct physical threats from

climate migrants, such as crime or terrorism. Climate migration also offers a very clear theme for securitizing discourse, and securitizing actors will be able to provide coherent message surrounding the specific issue. Climate migration is also likely to be a protracted problem, rather than an acute crisis. As seen, this means that though initial securitization efforts may fail, they are nevertheless likely to make the audience more receptive to future securitization arguments. This means that future migration trends can be presented in all of the identified risk areas, and they are exacerbated by all of the identified risk factors. As such, even though the future is uncertain, migration will likely become an increasingly securitized issue.

In Canada, the securitization of migration would create problems for both the government and the Canadian people. This is not a value judgement on securitization, or an appeal to nebulous "Canadian Values." Rather, it is a consequence of securitization efforts creating fractures in Canadian policy and society. Canada has a history of promoting human security-centered policies, as is evident by looking at the nature of current foreign and international assistance policies, as well as policies from decades past. Based largely on favourable geography, Canada has simply not had to address large-scale national security concerns associated with migration, and this is reflected in Canada's policies and viewpoints. However, this could change as future migration challenges emerge, such as in response to climate change. If Canada adopts strict national security policies in response to securitization of some issues, it could either create dissonance in policies, risking Canada being branded a hypocrite, unless it also abandons decades of policy direction and commitments. For example, a securitizing move that resulted in Operation *Caribbe* increasing scope to include interception and incarceration

of irregular migrants would clash with human security-focused engagements, such as the

deliberate and extensive resettling of refugees in Canada. Furthermore, the Canadian

population is not monolithic, and securitizing efforts could be damaging to national unity,

as some segments of the population accepted the securitizing message, while others

rejected it. This has been seen worldwide with the growth of populist and nationalist

parties in Europe and America, with deep divisions that can be centered on migration,

such as differences in American Democratic and Republican views. This has also been

seen in Canada, with parties such as the People's Party of Canada emerging, though not

with the same success as elsewhere. However, if securitizing narratives are allowed to

take hold, divisions within the population could be expected to deepen in a similar way. It

is therefore in Canada's interests to minimize future securitizing narratives, and to

prevent these potential divisions before they emerge.

To accomplish this, current policies and commitments could be harnessed to

address the potential factors that could contribute to future securitizing moves achieving

their aims. For example, increasing support to the Latin American region in the face of

increased threats from climate change could alleviate economic hardship, and reduce

potential driving factors of climate-driven migration. This area specifically aligns with

current Canadian policy, and would also address key factors that could promote

securitizing narratives in the future. By taking this approach, the chances of damaging or

divisive securitizing discourse leading to harsh national security responses could be

mitigated, without compromising current human security-focused agendas. Undoubtedly,

some securitizing acts will still take place, and it will always be possible to present

migration as a physical, economic, or social threat to national security. Left unchecked,

the factors that influence whether these securitizing efforts result in extraordinary national security-driven responses are likely to increase. However, Canada can take action to mitigate these factors, and minimize the chances of divisive securitizing narratives taking hold.

Overall, the securitization of migration presents a real risk for Canada, and future migration challenges are likely to increase securitizing pressures within Canadian society. However, by targeting policies to mitigate the factors that could lead to migration securitization, Canada can remain consistent with its current policies and commitments, while preventing a clash between human and national security.

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