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MINUSMA's Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians Mandate in Mali

Major J.P. Dennis Tondreau

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**MINUSMA’S RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND THE
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS MANDATE IN MALI**

By Major J.P. Dennis Tondreau

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MINUSMA's Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians Mandate in Mali.

The conflict in Mali has propelled the country onto the international stage for the past eight years and represents one of the most challenging and complex peacekeeping operations in UN history. At the time of the writing of this essay, 247 UN peacekeepers have died in Mali since 2013. Several concurrent missions are ongoing in Mali including the peacekeeping mandate of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), Operation Barkhane the French counterterrorism force, G5 Sahel Joint Force comprised of Chad, Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso operating in the tri-border region with a mandate to combat terrorism, organized crime and human trafficking and finally the European Union Training Mission in Mali who focus on training the Host Nations Security Forces (HNSF).¹

The focus of MINUSMA is on stabilization and peace enforcement through engaging the seven components of human security in an integrated and multidimensional approach. The current crises in Mali has deteriorated progressively and increasingly threatens the security of the civilian population. The Protection of Civilians (PoC) mandate has become increasingly important in achieving strategic objectives. UN Security Council resolution 2531 (2020) mandates the Protection of Civilians as the third priority task but does not consider it a strategic priority.² A recurring primary grievance of the Malian people is that International Forces are not doing enough to protect Malians from violent conflict. This essay will explore the concept of

¹ Razza, Namie. Massacre in Mali Demonstrates Need to Prioritize Protection of Civilians in MINUSMA's Mandate. International Peace Institute. 2019. 1.

² United Nations. United Nations Security Council resolution 2531 (2020).

Protection of Civilians and will propose the argument that MINUSMA is failing in its responsibility to protect. Several courses of action will be proposed that could lead to improved outcomes for the PoC at the tactical level.

Historical Context of the Conflict in Mali

The conflict in Mali is best expressed as a complex multidimensional security crisis of interlinked micro-conflicts initiated by a civil war in 2012, whose initial grievances have still not been resolved.³ The complexity of the Malian security crisis is what makes conflict resolution and the Protection of Civilians very difficult.⁴ Mali is an ethnically diverse country comprised of 10 main ethnic groups and as many languages. Mali has a distinct ethnic and cultural North-South divide. Violent conflict in Mali since its independence in 1960 and most recently in 2012 centres around the desire to establish a form of autonomy or independence of the Tuareg and Maur people in the north of the country. The desire for independence from the rest of Mali is based on its geographic isolation, economic and political neglect from the state capital of Bamako and the ethnic and cultural distinctness of the Sahel region.⁵

The conflict is further exacerbated by the Libyan conflict in 2011 and the influx of fighters and weapons into Mali across the Algerian border.⁶ Islamic radicalization, criminality, human trafficking and drug trafficking further degrade the security situation. Violent conflict in Mali has intensified over the past 8 years and is more geographically dispersed than at any time since

³ Reeve, Richard. Mali on the Brink. Insights from Local Peacebuilders on the Causes of Violent Conflict and the Prospects for Peace. Oxford Research Group. July 2018. 5.

⁴ According to Reeve, Malian peacebuilders have identified three primary causes of violent conflict in Mali. The lack of good governance has created a culture of corruption and impunity and the Malian state authorities have limited influence. This results in poor administration, a lack of security and judicial presence, and a lack of provision of basic social services. This combined with a lack of economic opportunity, pervasive poverty and underdevelopment creates an environment that is conducive to social fracturing and violent conflict.

⁵ Ibid. 16.

⁶ Boukhars, Anouar. The Paranoid Neighbor. Algeria and the Conflict in Mali. The Carnegie Papers. 2012. 11.

independence in the 1960s.⁷ There is an alarming trend towards targeted killings of civilians based on ethnicity or perceived allegiance to an armed group or political faction and there is a disturbing increase in human rights violations committed by HNSF.⁸ Non-signatory armed groups accounted for 40% of attacks on civilians in 2019.⁹ Between 2012 and 2017, no more than 600 civilians were victims of violent conflict in Mali. Starting in 2018, this number rose to over 800 annually and almost 1000 in 2020.¹⁰ The PoC priority task is becoming increasingly important and simultaneously more difficult to enforce. It is not possible for the UN to protect all people at all times however the local population perceives the credibility of MINUSMA as a function of its ability to protect the people.¹¹ The current crisis in Mali is no longer isolated to Mali but rather has extended into Burkina Faso and Niger (tri-border region).

Protection of Civilians Policy Framework

Following the failure of the international community to adequately respond to the human rights disasters of the 1990s (Balkans and Rwanda), the UN Security Council prioritized the protection of civilians and developed security council resolutions that reinforced the protection ability of peacekeepers. The UN published the Protection of Civilians Policy conceptual framework in

⁷ The most recent conflict began in 2012 when a group of Tuareg and Mursi united under the Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNLA), ousted the Force Armee de Mali (FAMA) and declared “the independent state of Azawad.” Simultaneous to the separatist movement in the North, a conflict between the State and radical Islamist groups was ongoing. The Algiers accord was negotiated in 2015, leading to a tentative peace between the Malian state authority and the MNLA. The accord led to an ill-defined autonomy for the Azawad within the state.

⁸ Reeve, Richard. Mali on the Brink. Insights from Local Peacebuilders on the Causes of Violent Conflict and the Prospects for Peace. Oxford Research Group. July 2018. 18.

⁹ Smith, Sean. Protecting Civilians in Mali. Why Air Assets Matter for MINUSMA. Center for Civilians in Conflict. 2020. 5.

¹⁰ Boutelis, Arthur. MINUSMA's 2021 Mandate Renewal in Uncertain Times. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. 2021. 23.

¹¹ United Nations. The Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping. Policy. UN Department of Peace Operations. 2019. 17.

2019. With this policy framework in place, the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) categorized the Protection of Civilians as a three-tier approach. These tiers are mutually reinforcing and are implemented simultaneously and in accordance with the mission mandate, the phase of operations and the reality in the field. The PoC mandate occurs at the strategic, operational and tactical levels and all components of the mission including the Force, UNPOL and the civilian pillars have a role to play in each of the tiers. The PoC tiers are comprised of protection through dialogue and engagement, provision of physical protection and establishment of a protective environment.¹²

Foundational to the concept of PoC is the UN Security Council resolution. This establishes the mission mandate and further defines the strategic and priority tasks of the mission. Since the genocides of the 1990s, over 95% of peacekeepers today are now mandated to protect civilians.¹³ In recent conflicts, the UN Security Council (UN SC) has provided clarification to rules of engagement (ROE) and the necessary strategic guidance to ensure that peacekeepers have the authority to intervene in the PoC.¹⁴ Though the UN has a responsibility to provide the legal and policy framework for PoC it is always the State that has the primary responsibility to protect the

¹² United Nations. The Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping. Policy. UN Department of Peace Operations. 2019. 9.

¹³ The concept of Protection of Civilians began in 1949 with the IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War. UN Peacekeeping missions of the 1990s were confronted with internal conflicts in which the civilian population were specifically and frequently targeted by violence. During the UN missions of UNAMIR in Rwanda and UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia, UN peacekeepers were confronted with deliberate and systematic attacks on civilians. The degree and ferocity of these attacks was un-precedented and the peacekeepers did not have the UN mandate, training, personnel, or resources to properly intervene.

¹⁴ United Nations. Protection of Civilians Mandate. 2020. 1.

people.¹⁵ PoC is a unit of measurement by which the international community and the local population assess mission success.¹⁶

Challenges to Protection of Civilians

There are numerous challenges to realizing the Protection of Civilians. A UN peacekeeping operation is often the solution of last resort in times of conflict. The conflicts are often complex and a relatively small force must exert influence in multiple domains over a vast region.

MINUSMA is comprised of 15 000 peacekeepers operating in a country of almost 20 million people and with twice the land mass of France. This equates to one peacekeeper for every 1300 people. Mali is a failing state and thus there is poor infrastructure, lack of good governance, lack of economic opportunity and limited capacity of host nation security forces.¹⁷

PoC on a peacekeeping operation requires a coordinated, comprehensive, integrated and well-planned approach. The UN Protection of Civilians Policy conceptual framework provides the guiding principles and key considerations. The policy recommends an approach which addresses the range of factors that influence threats to civilians including political, security and economic factors.¹⁸ In 2020, the UN published the PoC Handbook which provides all mission components including civilian, police and military with the tools to enforce PoC.¹⁹

¹⁵ United Nations. The Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping. Policy. UN Department of Peace Operations. 2019. 14.

Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James. Why Nations Fail. The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty. Crown Business. 2012. 9.

¹⁶ Razza, Namie. Massacre in Mali Demonstrates Need to Prioritize Protection of Civilians in MINUSMA's Mandate. International Peace Institute. 2019. 3.

¹⁷ United Nations. Protection of Civilians Mandate. 2019. 5.

¹⁸ United Nations. The Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping. Policy. UN Department of Peace Operations. 2019. 3.

¹⁹ United Nations. Protection of Civilians Handbook. 2020.

According to UN Policy on the PoC.

“The most effective and sustainable means of PoC is to facilitate stability, peace and security through inclusive political processes and sustainable solutions to conflict, and to support host states to fulfill their responsibilities to protect civilians in their territory.”²⁰

However, this requires considerable time and short-term strategies are required for the protection of civilians subjected to imminent threats. Despite the strategic direction manifested in a UNSCR, Policy framework for PoC and the guidance provided in the PoC Handbook there continues to be significant challenges to the realization of PoC at the tactical level. The difficulty in realizing PoC at the tactical level in MINUSMA is related to several factors.

A lack of clarity pertaining to concepts relating to the protection of civilians is a significant challenge. Concepts such as neutrality and impartiality are ambiguous in that it is not always clear to what extent MINUSMA troops can use deadly force to perform PoC. MINUSMA forces are not required to be neutral in respect to exercising the mandated priority of PoC and this is not always clear to troop contributors.²¹

Chapter VII authorizes MINUSMA peacekeepers to use deadly force and proactive action in the execution of their duties and the protection of civilians.²² However, the articles are interpreted differently by troop contributors who are sometimes reluctant to acknowledge that Chapter VII allows for the use of force beyond self defense.²³ This may manifest in an inconsistent enforcement of the mandate, lead to different outcomes at the tactical level and adversely affect

²⁰ United Nations. The Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping. Policy. UN Department of Peace Operations. 2019. 4.

²¹ Ibid. 5.

²² Ibid. 5.

²³ Coyle, Lisa. Protection of Civilians in UN Operations. International Association of Professionals in Humanitarian Assistance and Protection. 2.

the perceptions of the local population concerning the role of peacekeepers and nature of the PoC priority task.

Some of the misunderstanding surrounding core concepts in PoC mandates may also result from overlooking the differences between peacekeeping with peace enforcement. While soldiers involved in peace enforcement missions such as MINUSMA are still called peacekeepers, they are operating under rules of engagement that are very different from traditional peacekeeping mandates authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter that require obtaining consent from the parties involved in the conflict and exercising minimum use of force. By contrast, Chapter VII peace enforcement operations which confront challenges that exceed peacekeeping do not require consent of main parties.²⁴

There is no UN-wide definition of “Protection of Civilians.”²⁵ To mitigate this issue, UN policy requires coherence in UN support, and strategic coordination at both UN Headquarters and mission level on the protection aims of UN actors operating in the same area. The mandate of a mission may include specific tasks and approaches to PoC which will influence the implementation of the mandate and the strategic approach taken.²⁶ However, this does not resolve the core issue. Defining the term and having a common understanding is fundamental to implementation and communicating the PoC mandate. At the very least, the MINUSMA SRSG needs to provide direction and guidance by defining PoC for the mission and the limitations

²⁴ Coyle, Lisa. Protection of Civilians in UN Operations. International Association of Professionals in Humanitarian Assistance and Protection. 3.

²⁵ United Nations. The Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping. Policy. UN Department of Peace Operations. 2019. 5.

²⁶ Ibid. 5.

related to the definition (constraints/restraints). Failure to provide this basic direction results in ambiguity for the civilian pillars, UNPOL, the Force and the local population.

The CoViD crisis mitigation measures to prevent the spread of the disease created direct and indirect consequences on PoC and on the ability of MINUSMA to protect.²⁷ Terrorist armed groups (TAGs) and criminal groups have exploited the vulnerabilities that the pandemic have exacerbated. These groups have increased their activities and used the health crises to gain power and continue to threaten civilians. In Mali during April of 2020, violent attacks rose by 37% and even hospitals and CoViD clinics have been attacked. TAGs have declared their intent to use the pandemic to further their agenda. There has been a constriction in economic opportunities, and MINUSMA civilian pillars have reduced their footprint on the ground. In addition, there has been a diversion of funding in order to deal with CoViD mitigation procedures. The cumulative effect of these actions is that there is a serious adverse effect on the 3-tiered approach to the Protection of Civilians.²⁸

The Information Domain is an important component of the operational environment and dominating this domain is imperative to exerting influence internally and externally on key audiences.²⁹ The Protection of Civilians requires the mission to perform specific actions, strategic guidance to communicate PoC messaging and the means to deliver this messaging. Failure to communicate and deliver PoC actions results in a Say-Do gap. That is, the difference

²⁷ Razza, Namie. UN Peacekeeping and the Protection of Civilians in the COVID 19 Era. IPI Global Observatory. 2020. 2.

²⁸ Razza, Namie. UN Peacekeeping and the Protection of Civilians in the COVID 19 Era. IPI Global Observatory. 2020. 3-4.

²⁹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Bi-SC NATO Information Operations Reference Book. 2010. 12.

between what we say will do and what we actually d. This, may compromise mission credibility amongst the local population if there is incongruency between the two.

In many conflict areas, the use of social media greatly facilitates the domination of the information domain. However, in Mali there are low literacy rates and there are serious internet connectivity issues. As a result, Malians do not rely as much on social media and depend more on word of mouth, data-based communications apps and radio broadcasting for up to date information.³⁰ MINUSMA currently has several Information Related Capabilities (IRCs) that enable the mission to exert influence within the information domain. These IRCs include Public Information Office (PIO), Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Presence Posture Profile strategies, Meeting Engagements and Community Outreach. MINUSMA does not have. the following IRCs; cyber, signals intelligence (EW) and psychological operations. The mandate limits the inclusion of these IRCs however the addition of these IRCs would greatly facilitate the PoC.

It is important to note that the Civilian PIO is the MINUSMA releasing authority for all messaging including the Force messaging. Though in principle this would facilitate synergizing MINUSMA themes and messages to create effects and achieve mission objectives, the reality is that this creates significant concerns at the tactical level for the Force. The main concern is that the civilian PIO frequently fails at providing strategic level messaging. This reduces the ability of the Force to be proactive and increases the reaction time of the Force to hostile messaging. Not only are there not enough IRCs within the mission, there is a lack of qualified personnel in Information Operations and significant amounts of time is spent by FHQ IO on training and

³⁰ Navanti Group. Western Sahel. Deep Dive - Information Environment in Gao, Mali. April 2018

supporting Sector IO staff and operations. Exacerbating this competency deficiency is the organizational structure. All the IRCs respond to a different chain of command. CIMIC reports to the S9, G9 and U9. Community Outreach reports to the Deputy Force Commander. PIO reports to the Force Commander and IO reports to the U3. These multiple report lines make coordination more difficult and often creates friction points. To alleviate this issue of organizational structure and report lines, all IRCs should report to the U3. Coordination would still be required but the activities of each IRC could be more easily synergized to achieve operational effects and objectives.

Solutions to Protection of Civilians challenges in MINUSMA

In MINUSMA there is a disconnect between the strategic framework for the Protection of Civilians and its tactical level implementation.³¹ UN security council resolutions often establish ambitious mandates for missions and have high expectations but limited resources. UN peacekeeping missions are faced with numerous constraints that may be beyond the sphere of influence of the mission.³² The challenge is to overcome the obstacles of PoC and realize the best possible outcomes with the tools available. The UN mandate is the foundation for the strategic framework of the mission and incongruencies between the mandate and the actual grievances of the population will create friction points.

Currently, there are seven UN missions that mandate the Protection of Civilians including Mali.³³ However, each of these UN missions was created for specific circumstances and the

³¹ The Protection of Civilians in armed conflict is an emerging field over the past 22 years and there remains ambiguities and challenges especially in practice. The UN has explored how best to enforce the Protection of Civilians however in recent years there has been repeated failures to prevent atrocities.

³² United Nations. Protection of Civilians Handbook. 2020. 17.

³³ The 6 other UN missions are in the DRC, Lebanon, CAR, South Sudan, Darfur and Abyei

mandate for the PoC has a different priority. UN Security Council Resolution 2531 para 19 states the following:

*“Decides that the **primary strategic priority of MINUSMA remains to support the implementation of the Agreement by the Malian parties**, as well as by other relevant Malian stakeholders, and *further decides* that the **second strategic priority of MINUSMA is to facilitate the implementation by Malian actors of the *Stratégie de stabilisation du centre du Mali***, in a comprehensive and politically-led manner, with a view to protect civilians, reduce intercommunal violence, and re-establish State authority, State presence and basic social services in Central Mali, through the implementation of its mandated tasks; “*

According to UNSCR 2531, the Protection of Civilians is discussed as a subset of the second strategic priority and is considered the third priority task. In contrast, UNSCR 2556 concerning MONUSCO and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Protection of Civilians is the first strategic priority and the first priority task.³⁴ The prioritization of PoC allows for the allocation of resources, funding and personnel dedicated to applying the UN 3-tiered approach to PoC without prejudice. In 2013, MONUSCO was authorized by UN Security Council resolution 2098 to form the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) which allowed for an offensive response to physical violence against the civilian population. As well, this concept of “Protection by Projection” is used in order to facilitate a rapid response. In this construct, skilled airmobile forces are deployed rapidly to remote regions where the UN can not maintain a permanent physical presence in the interest of protecting civilians. Air assets are an invaluable resource required to facilitate this approach and the Mission wide Adaptation Plan (2020-21) does require

³⁴ United Nations. United Nations Security Council resolution 2556 (2020).

the deployment of additional attack and utility helicopters and ISR assets to enhance the Mission's ability to protect civilians.³⁵

The operating environment in Mali has changed significantly since UN involvement began in 2013 however the mandate has not adequately adapted to the changing situation and the evolving grievances. In June 2021, the UN Security Council will convene to discuss the MINUSMA mandate. Recent massacres in Ogossagou and Bouklessi have demonstrated that the Protection of Civilians must be a strategic priority. The credibility of the mission is directly related to MINUSMA's ability to protect the Malian people and the ability to protect is directly related to the resources the mandate allocates to the PoC priority task. A higher prioritization of PoC in the MINUSMA mandate is required in order to influence the tactical level outcomes.

If PoC is not prioritized higher when the UNSC convenes in June 2021, then the mission will have to choose an alternate course of action to improve PoC. Protection of Civilians is better realized by establishing a permanent security presence in a region and not a transient presence, however this is not possible with the limited resources available to MINUSMA. Assuming there is no change in the mandate and no change to the budget or resources allocated to the mission then the MINUSMA Force leadership could redistribute certain assets to create a flexible and reactive force, similar to the FIB in MONSUCO and would focus on the concept of "Protection by Projection." The Mobile Task Force (MTF) was created by the current MINUSMA Force Commander several years ago however it has had limited success due to a lack of aviation assets

³⁵ Smith, Sean. Protecting Civilians in Mali. Why Air Assets Matter for MINUSMA. Center for Civilians in Conflict. 2020. 2.

and national caveats. Restructuring the MTF and allocating it the required resources (aviation support) would enable it to be more effective in the performance of the PoC mandate.

The concept of Protection of Civilians means different things to different people. The UN does not have a universal PoC definition and for each UN mission the term is defined and applied differently.³⁶ The mission Strategic Communications and Public Information Division (SCPID) and MINUSMA Community Outreach Units profess to protect civilians but the term PoC is elusive and ambiguous because it has not been defined by mission senior leadership. The lack of strategic guidance leads to a failure in a common understanding and undermines the credibility of the mission.³⁷ On 2 April 2021, TAG forces attacked the UN Chadian SOF company at the temporary operating base (TOB) in Aguelohok. Though the TAGs experienced a crushing defeat, the accidental deaths of several civilians created the perception amongst the local population that MINUSMA is failing at protecting civilians. This is a recurring theme and the TAGs exploit this vulnerability to attack MINUSMA in the information domain. Regardless of what the mission believes, it is what the local population is influenced to believe that matters the most.

MINUSMA can approach this in one of three ways. The first course of action would be to continue the current strategy resulting in the same outcomes. The second would be for the SRSG to define “Protection of Civilians” in order to develop a common understanding of all stakeholders and for the SCPID to communicate this to key audiences.³⁸ All Information Related Capabilities including the TCCs would be required to communicate this at every opportunity.

³⁶ Mamiya, Ralph. Taking Stock of Protecting Civilians in Peacekeeping. IPI Global Observatory. 2019. 2.

³⁷ Ibid. 3.

³⁸ Razza, Namie. Massacre in Mali Demonstrates Need to Prioritize Protection of Civilians in MINUSMA’s Mandate. International Peace Institute. 2019. 6.

This strategy would ensure a common understanding and assist in managing LP expectations. The third course of action would be to continue PoC activities according to the 3-tiered approach, avoid the use of the term PoC and emphasize the tactical successes of the mission. The advantage of this strategy is that it minimizes the Say-Do Gap and minimizes the risk of being criticized for the impossible task of protecting all people at all times.

Conclusion

There has been an increase and spreading of violent conflict in Mali since military intervention in 2013. Even more alarming is the increased targeting of civilians by TAGs and the human rights violations committed against the local population. Human security has become the dominant theme in Mali and there is a requirement to reorientate the mandate to meet the evolving priorities of the Malian people. Realizing greater success in the mandated priority task of Protection of Civilians is essential to maintain MINUSMA credibility and continue the path towards peace, security and stability. The challenges of promoting PoC vary from inadequacies of the mandate, to a lack of air/ISR assets and personnel, to a lack of IRCs to a lack of strategic guidance to difficulties in tactical implementation. Though the UN PoC policy framework provides the foundational 3-tiered framework, the challenges discussed in this essay diminish tactical level implementation of PoC.

Resolving the Protection of Civilians challenges with in MINUSMA requires several concurrent strategies. The most important issue to resolve is the priority of PoC in the mandate.³⁹ A

³⁹ Boutelis, Arthur. MINUSMA's 2021 Mandate Renewal in Uncertain Times. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. 2021. 33-34.

Recommends: keeping the Mandate at two strategic priorities, that the Peace Accord should remain the main effort, an increase to troop ceiling, greater focus on Human Rights (especially for the MDSF), and "People-Center" as opposed to "State-Centered" approach

reorientation of the mandate from a “State” centred to a “People” centred approach is essential.⁴⁰ With PoC as the primary mission priority, the mission would be reorientated to address the human security situation and an improved communications strategy would be required to communicate PoC to all stakeholders.⁴¹ This would require strategic guidance in defining PoC and assigning tasks to organizations for tactical level implementation. Information Related capabilities must be expanded to include other information activities such as cyber, signals intelligence and psychological operations. The addition of these IRCs would greatly improve MINUSMA domination of the information environment and facilitate PoC. Finally, an agile and flexible force is required to expand the area of influence. The MTF is the ideal foundation for this force and should be empowered with the resources and framework for “Protection through Projection.” MINUSMA is struggling with its responsibility to protect. However, the first step to mission success is a strategic reorientation of the MINUSMA mandate, otherwise the conflict will continue to deteriorate and the primary grievances of the Malian people will go unheard.

⁴⁰ Boutelis defines A “People-Centered” Approach as: *A shift to people-centered peace operations implies moving away from a narrow focus on state-building, institutional capacity, and the extension of state authority. It implies complementing efforts to strengthen the state with initiatives that engage people, communities, and societies and that support them in their ownership of sustaining peace. This approach invests in social capital, social cohesion, and resilient local and national social institutions, which will in theory help local communities and society at large strengthen their own capacities to prevent conflict and sustain peace.*

⁴¹ Razza, Namie. Massacre in Mali Demonstrates Need to Prioritize Protection of Civilians in MINUSMA’s Mandate. International Peace Institute. 2019. 6.

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