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CANADIAN MILITARY STRATEGY IN EASTERN EUROPE SINCE 2017: AN ASSESSMENT

Major Simon Mailloux

JCSP 46

Solo Flight

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By Major Simon Mailloux

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CANADIAN MILITARY STRATEGY IN EASTERN EUROPE SINCE 2017: AN ASSESSMENT

“There is no fear in battle equal to the fear of a commander – of whatever rank – who has the responsibility to make decisions, but is ignorant of the technical knowledge necessary to reach a sound and proper conclusion in the circumstances. I made up my mind, that if I was to be a gunner, I would endeavor to make the science of Gunnery, and all that was related to it, my own. Books and courses were available for study, and I took every available opportunity to learn all I could...Later I was to be forever grateful for the years given to me in which to learn.”

– Brigadier P.A.S. Todd who commanded Can div. and corps arty in NW Europe, 1984

“However great or small that role may be, we must play it creditably. We must act with maturity and consistency, and with a sense of responsibility... We must act as a united people. By that I mean a people who, through reflection and discussion, have arrived at a common understanding of our interests and purposes.”

– Louis St-Laurent, 1947

INTRODUCTION

This paper will assess the Canadian military strategy in Eastern Europe. From the country's inception, Canada's military has been intimately involved in Europe's armed conflicts, an important component of its *raison d'être*. That these conflicts relocated to the European mainland from North America with the dawn of the 20th century did not preclude Canada's involvement. Through World Wars, the Cold War, or even during the Balkans conflict, Canada's military contingents contributed prominently to European conflict resolutions - proving an essential component of Western, liberal-democratic alliances delineated by the “North Atlantic Triangle.”¹ This relationship had been formalised under the banner of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949

¹ David G. Haglund, “The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canadian Grand Strategy at Century's End,” *Contemporary Affairs* 4, (2000), p.3.

to build on the alliance that won the war against Germany but more importantly, to keep the North American powerhouse formally involved in supporting Western Europe's security.² As the Canadian military historian John English puts it, "Though no formal alliance existed between Britain and Canada, the forces of both nations were more closely integrated than those of the NATO allies today."³ Thus, the European imprint on Canadian military culture is significant and has oriented its development.

Over four decades following the founding of NATO, the alliance represented a significant deterrence to Soviet expansion aspirations "without firing a shot", as Jack Granatstein has stated.⁴ Defying more pessimistic contemporary assessments, NATO was able to maintain its cohesion after the Berlin Wall fell and the Warsaw Pact collapsed despite the vacuum of a concrete enemy or a looming threat. From the Canadian public perspective, however, there was significant reluctance to continue this military engagement in Europe. Robert Bothwell has observed: "The Cold War gave Canada a place that was never a mystery, though it was occasionally in question. The end of the Cold War, by contrast, forced Canada and its citizens to conceive new roles in a different world."⁵ Even if this re-conception aimed to reap the peace dividends by lowering defence costs, and the idea of ending conflicts by spreading liberal democracies across the globe to spur "the end of history" was popular, Ottawa could not imagine Canada out of

² Joe Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, "Canada and NATO: Keeping Ottawa in, expenses down, criticism out...and the country secure," *International Journal* 64, no. 2 (2009), p. 315.

³ John A. English, *The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command*, New York: Praeger, 1991, p.159.

⁴ J.L. Granatstein, "Is NATO Still Necessary for Canada," *Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute*, (March 2013), p.1.

⁵ Robert Bothwell, "The Big Chill: Canada and the Cold War," *Contemporary Affairs* 1, (2001), p.109.

NATO.⁶ Canada's NATO membership remained despite calls from policy analysts and policy makers in the 1990s, not unlike the choices of Trudeau in the 1970s, that the Canadian "grand strategy [become] much less 'Eurocentric' than at any time since 1945."⁷ They advocated instead that the focus should be on Asia or the Americas, diversifying our global military links and thereby sidestepping the risk of having NATO dictate Canada's defence strategy and, by extension, its foreign policy.⁸

Two variables have shifted calculations for Canadian military strategy and forced Ottawa's involvement in Europe. First, the enlargement of NATO to its current thirty members has pushed Canada's engagement eastward beyond its traditional geostrategic sphere. This expansion also has, arguably, made "Canada more interested in Europe."⁹ Moreover, the resurgence of a bellicose Russia, ostensibly raring to use its military force to annex strategic assets like the port of Sebastopol, has challenged Ottawa to renew its commitment to the military alliance. As such, the Canadian Forces have continued in one form or another to be a part of a European collective defense, if not collective security, and has taken an active role in the recent Balkans and Baltic missions in the last decades.

⁶ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last man*, New York: Free Press, 1992, p.2 and Douglas Bland, "From Foulkes to Foulkes: Transforming the Structure of NATO." Part 1, Chap. 2 in James Fergusson and Francis Furtado, *Beyond Afghanistan: An International Security Agenda for Canada*, 25-44. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016, p. 42.

⁷ David G. Haglund, "The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canadian Grand Strategy at Century's End," *Contemporary Affairs* 4, (2000), p. xiv

⁸ Danford Middlemiss, "Afghanistan and After: The NATO Factor in Canadian Defence Decision Making," Part 1, Chap. 3 in James Fergusson, and Francis Furtado, *Beyond Afghanistan: An International Security Agenda for Canada*, 45-61. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016, p. 46 and David G. Haglund, "Alphonse Karr Version of Canada and NATO." Part 1, Chap. 4 in James Fergusson, and Francis Furtado, *Beyond Afghanistan: An International Security Agenda for Canada*, 62-79. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016, p.63.

⁹ David G. Haglund, "The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canadian Grand Strategy at Century's End," *Contemporary Affairs* 4, (2000), p.95.

With this paradigm in mind, this paper answers the following question: is the current Canadian military strategy in Eastern Europe supporting the country's national objectives? The research is divided in three parts: the first section reviews current literature, analysing Canada's grand strategy and outlining implications for the current study. The second part defines the main vectors of the Canadian military strategy in NATO in the context of the country's national objectives. Last, this paper recommends changes to Canada's military strategy in Europe to better align with these national objectives. For the purpose of this paper, Eastern Europe is defined as all former Warsaw Pact countries, including Germany, but includes Russia only as it pertains to Europe.

CANADIAN STRATEGIC LITERATURE REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

North Atlantic Triangle and Atlanticism

One of the oldest schools of thought underlying Canadian strategy formation, encompassing foreign and defence policy, is that Pax Britannica and Pax Americana are the defining influences in Canada's creation and evolution as a state.¹⁰ In this argument, these two regimes in succession have permitted Canada to grow in peace and to be selective in its engagement in foreign conflicts. As a minor power within the orbit of these two larger entities, the best survival strategy often is to use them to balance each other.¹¹ Coined by one of the greatest historians of his generation, John Bartlet Brebner,

¹⁰ Michael S. Neiberg, "A Middle Power on the World Stage: Canadian Grand Strategy in the Twentieth Century," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 14, no. 2 (2012), p.5-8.

¹¹ John Hemmings and Megan Wolf, *Is Canada Ready for the New Age of Power Politics?*, Ottawa: Macdonald-Laurier Institute, 8 October 2019. Retrieved on 15 April 2020.
<https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/canada-ready-new-age-power-politics-john-hemmings-megan-wolf-inside-policy/>

this theory of balancing and counterweights has been conceived metaphorically as the “North Atlantic Triangle.”¹² Haglund also elaborates:

This puzzle consisted in how best to manage relations with both Britain and the United States so as to be able to invoke the assistance of the former against the latter’s political (and perhaps military) pressure while at the same time ensuring that British desire for Anglo-American rapprochement would not result in any ‘sacrifice’ of Canadian interests.¹³

While this theory is not all encompassing, it does give some insight into Canada’s policy moves abroad. For example, following WWI, Canada had everything to gain in cultivating a rapprochement between Britain and the U.S. At the time, London had leveraged a relationship with Japan to maintain and secure lines of communications to the far reaches of its empire while the U.S. considered Japan as a competitor in the Pacific. As a neutral party, Canada succeeded in convincing London to drop its hitherto ally Japan at the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference of 1921-1922 to please the White House.¹⁴ In the longer term, this shift of the British empire foreign policy had the highest impact possible by setting the right foundations for the coalition that was to win WWII and became a bedrock of stability for Canada with its past and future hegemon cooperating instead of being dragged into conflict. It was indeed a crucial national-strategic decision and a masterstroke for Canada through Arthur Meighen.

The North Atlantic Triangle evolved following the Second World War and through the escalation of Cold War standoffs. With the U.S. emerging as the dominant

¹² John Bartlet Brebner, *North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain*, Toronto and New Haven: Ryerson and Yale University Press, 1945.

¹³ David G. Haglund, “The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canadian Grand Strategy at Century’s End,” *Contemporary Affairs* 4, (2000), p. 15. See also David G. Haglund, “The NATO of its dreams? Canada and the Co-operative Security Alliance,” *International Journal* 52, issue 3 (1997), p. 465.

¹⁴ John A. English, *The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command*, New York: Praeger, 1991, p.20.

superpower, Canada had to find more counterweight to put on the other scale beyond the shrinking British empire; even if American and Canadian had “their strategic interests overlapped almost perfectly,” Canada could not risk an unequal relationship for too long.¹⁵ Haglund argues the answer was an easy one: “invoke Canada’s NATO allies in an expanded Triangle so as to counterbalance the US politically and economically.”¹⁶

Analysis

If this theory of a balance of superpowers guiding Canada’s grand strategy is to remain relevant, it should adapt to the ebbs and flow of the power of the U.S. and the number of NATO members which are its counterweight. Moreover, if Washington attempts to place its weight against Canada, the allies that are supposed to counterbalance should have a vested interest in coming to support Canada, or at least a common interest to hold together against the United States. The U.K., France, the Benelux, the Nordic countries and West Germany feared the soviet tanks, but also feared too much intrusion from Washington and were willing to play the game. However, for the Baltic countries, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia, there is no such thing as too much U.S. Eastern European countries have a growing power in NATO that can compensate the current military frailty of western Europe, but the hegemon they fear for historical reasons is not the U.S., but Russia.

¹⁵ Michael S. Neiberg, “A Middle Power on the World Stage: Canadian Grand Strategy in the Twentieth Century,” *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 14, no. 2 (2012), p.8. See also Denis Stairs, “Way Back Then and Now: NATO and the Canadian Interest,” Part 1, Chap. 1 in James Fergusson and Francis Furtado, *Beyond Afghanistan: An International Security Agenda for Canada*, 3-24. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016, p. 10.

¹⁶ David G. Haglund, “The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canadian Grand Strategy at Century’s End,” *Contemporary Affairs* 4, (2000), p.16. See also Jockel, Joe and Sokolsky, Joel, “Canada and NATO: Keeping Ottawa in, expenses down, criticism out...and the country secure,” *International Journal* 64, no. 2 (2009), p. 317.

The issue with the practical use of the Atlanticism approach is the further East in Europe the alliance is extended, the more tenuous the link of common values becomes as a means of mobilising domestic support while “fostering a North Atlantic community.”¹⁷ According to the 2016 Canadian census, only 13.47% of Canadians claimed ethnic origins from a Eastern European country while 45.97% did so for a Western European one.¹⁸ The support given to the security of such countries then becomes more about cold geopolitics than a pure emotional bond or common roots attachment from a large segment of the Canadian population which generated support for great national sacrifices such as WWI. Another issue is the related costs of this approach, which at the height of the consequential but limited Canadian military presence in Europe in 1953, the military budget was 8% of GDP or 45% of all federal spending.¹⁹ This level of expense would be unacceptable for a peacetime budget and it was so for Ottawa which drastically reduced defence budgets over subsequent decades.

Strong at home: The Foulkes strategy

General Charles Foulkes was one of the divisional commanders in the Canadian Army that fought in Europe during WWII. After the war, he became Chief of the General Staff until 1951 and then Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff until 1960. He was a strong

¹⁷ Denis Stairs, “Way Back Then and Now: NATO and the Canadian Interest,” Part 1, Chap. 1 in James Fergusson and Francis Furtado, *Beyond Afghanistan: An International Security Agenda for Canada*, 3-24. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016, p. 14.

¹⁸ Based on the author’s calculations on readily available data at statscan.gc.ca. The original division of countries mentioned at the beginning of the paper was used for the evaluation of East Europe, including unified Germany. For West Europe, the pre-1989 NATO members of Europe were included.

¹⁹ David G. Haglund, “The NATO of its dreams? Canada and the Co-operative Security Alliance,” *International Journal* 52, issue 3 (1997), p. 468.

advocate for a sizeable Canadian defence institution, but against maintaining troops in Europe for forward defence. During the pivotal years of NATO's formation and strategy development, Foulkes's proposal on behalf of Canada deemphasised direct support for Europe in preference of providing a *guarantee* of support. Douglas Bland argues:

“The [Foulkes] plan ...intended in part to enmesh the United States in European defence planning at the central and regional levels while distancing the United States and Canada from the financial and political implications of the Brussels Treaty and to put aside any demands that either country permanently station troops in Europe.”²⁰

This plan resembled the approach that was adopted by Canada in the inter-war years of 1919 to 1938 when a strong sentiment of futility towards the losses of around 1% of Canada's population during WWI guided Canada's reluctance to commit to European conflicts.²¹ Moreover, in a further strategic distancing from Europe's issues and concerns, “Foulkes proposed that regional military planning would be done only within regions and that nations might ‘not even be required to fight outside their particular groups’.”²² This regionalization of the alliance reflected a real-world divergence of threats among member states. The U.S. was concerned by global communism, but also desired disarmament of its massive army in the late 1940s. Britain wanted to salvage its empire while France and the Benelux were looking over the Rhine.

²⁰ Douglas Bland, “From Foulkes to Foulkes: Transforming the Structure of NATO.” Part 1, Chap. 2 in James Fergusson and Francis Furtado, *Beyond Afghanistan: An International Security Agenda for Canada*, 25-44. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016, p. 35.

²¹ David G. Haglund, “The NATO of its dreams? Canada and the Co-operative Security Alliance,” *International Journal* 52, issue 3 (1997), p. 466. See also Kim Richard Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy* 3rd ed, Scarborough ON: Prentice Hall Canada, 1997, p.151-3.

²² Douglas Bland, “From Foulkes to Foulkes: Transforming the Structure of NATO.” Part 1, Chap. 2 in James Fergusson and Francis Furtado, *Beyond Afghanistan: An International Security Agenda for Canada*, 25-44. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016, p. 35.

The complementary facets of the Foulkes strategy called for Canada to focus its efforts on multilateralism on peace-sustaining efforts, either through the League of Nations in the inter-war period or later within the larger body of the UN. Canada would then maintain armies strictly for the North American security apparatus. This would keep troops out of harm's way in Europe which could potentially trigger an automatic inclusion in a conflict. Needless to say, this strategy was insufficient for some western European powers, particularly France, as it suggested a policy of North American isolationism.²³ Nonetheless, the Foulkes plan was initially adopted as the official strategy by the first NATO council in September of 1949, but was later modified in favor of forward basing massive amounts of troops in Europe following the invasion of South Korea in 1950. It is important to note that the rejection of the Foulkes strategy was largely justified by the fact that Western Europe could not muster any strength to defend more than their immediate neighborhood against the Red Army. Canada was therefore called upon to extend its defence potential, a weight which was consequential at the end of WWII.

Analysis

A modern Foulkes strategy for Canada, distancing the country from direct military involvement in Europe, would be workable in the geopolitical environment of the 21st century, especially considering the considerable European defence strength and the growing "America First" policy taking root in the U.S. However, it also would create a

²³ David Pratt, *The 2007 Ross Ellis Memorial Lectures in Military and Strategic Studies: is there a grand strategy in Canadian foreign policy?*, Calgary: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2008, p.17, 22.

disparity for the country with the U.S. that could only be compensated with a strong pivot to Asian and South American military alliances.²⁴ This approach would build on foundations laid over the last two centuries but the institutional structures for easy implementation are lacking, particularly given that Canada has not even gained membership to the “ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus”. Furthermore, while Canada is a member of many South American “defence engagement fora”, the balance of power gained by creating a formal alliance would hardly be worth the effort.²⁵ Highlighting this significant power imbalance are the defence resources in consideration: Central and South Americans armed forces have a combined defence budget of only USD 61.5 billion, compared with USD 251.0 billion just for Western Europe as of 2019.²⁶ While many successive Canadian governments have tried to open economic, let alone defence, relationships with Asia and the Americas, these efforts have mainly left the reliance on the U.S. too obvious.²⁷ Finally, it is important to underline that the Foulkes strategy of the inter-war years did not prevent a conflict in Europe and it was rejected by NATO after the opening of the Korean War.

Cooperative security

Cooperative security as a strategy takes its roots in the understanding of the madness of a WWII and the willingness to reduce the tension of the Cold War. Later, it

²⁴ David G. Haglund, “The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canadian Grand Strategy at Century’s End,” *Contemporary Affairs* 4, (2000), p.95.

²⁵ Government of Canada. Department of National Defence. *Guidance on International Priorities for Defence Engagement*, Ottawa, 2020, p. 4,7.

²⁶ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Military Expenditure Database: Data for World Regions 1988-2019*. Retrieved on 1 May 2020. <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>.

²⁷ Denis Stairs, “Way Back Then and Now: NATO and the Canadian Interest,” Part 1, Chap. 1 in James Fergusson and Francis Furtado, *Beyond Afghanistan: An International Security Agenda for Canada*, 3-24. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016, p. 21.

evolved to save NATO from the lack of a clear enemy. “Cooperative security, construed as a ‘realistic’ alternative to collective security, is Pearsonian internationalism...and can be said to be today’s iteration of that [Canadian] grand strategy.”²⁸ Haglund conceives cooperative security as a strategy where states “define their interests with at least partial, and non-negligible, regard to the community within which they see themselves situated.”²⁹ In other words, cooperative security is as a balance between state interests and the security of the region in which they reside which is a relaxation of the pure realist approach to international relations. This strategy can be seen to result in a gradual shift in the balance of power calculations towards institutionalization and even consider the human security concepts that are core values for and promoted by Canadian officials.³⁰ Indeed, Haglund considers this strategy as state-defining: “For lack of a better concept, ‘cooperative security’ best encapsulates the regnant strategic doctrine in Ottawa [in the 1990s]. This doctrine I argue to be logically descendant from an earlier foreign-policy dispensation, ‘Pearsonian internationalism’.”³¹ Its appeal lies in that it does not negate state self-interest for the pure promotion of the common good, but that some common regional goals are shared upon which cooperation can be forged.

²⁸ David G. Haglund, “The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canadian Grand Strategy at Century’s End,” *Contemporary Affairs* 4, (2000), p.94.

²⁹ Ibid, p.92. For a discussion on the new strategy during the Cold War that “recalibrate[d] Canada’s focus away from traditional military missions like defence and deterrence” see Alexander Lanoszka, “From Ottawa to Riga: Three tensions in Canadian defence policy,” *International Journal* 72, no. 4 (2017), p. 526.

³⁰ John G. H. Halstead, “Canada’s security in the 1980: Options and pitfalls,” *Behind the Headlines* 41, no. 1 (1983), p. 12.

³¹ David G. Haglund, “The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canadian Grand Strategy at Century’s End,” *Contemporary Affairs* 4, (2000), p. 80.

Analysis

Assessment of 21st century tensions existing between Eastern Europe and Russia since the annexation of Crimea and the unrest in the Baltic benefits from a comparison with the high tensions of the Cold War. In particular, the deviation of the perceived conflict trajectory during that period contains important lessons on how détente was accomplished. “No one at the time had developed the labels 'common' or 'co-operative' security, but it is clear that Canada was in the vanguard in trying to commit NATO to détente.”³² Rather than using the Russian hostility to close ranks inside NATO and support a rearmament, cooperative security would point towards an opening of dialogue channels by Canadian officials. However, this approach likely is complicated by some NATO members more inclined to push confrontation with Russia while former Warsaw Pact members present an opposition group given their antipathy to their former occupier. Nevertheless, the cooperative security approach improves the chances for long-term stability and reassurance. Haglund similarly concludes, “Thus, through its emphasis upon inclusiveness...and the stress it places on conflict management, cooperative security can be linked to...” a definite Canadian domestic preference and a Pearsonian influence which would achieve both national objectives of stability and promoting détente.³³

³² David G. Haglund, “The NATO of its dreams? Canada and the Co-operative Security Alliance,” *International Journal* 52, issue 3 (1997), p. 469.

³³ David G. Haglund, “The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canadian Grand Strategy at Century’s End,” *Contemporary Affairs* 4, (2000), p. 94. On the role of peacekeeping in maintaining the NATO cohesion, see Joe Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, “Lloyd Axworthy’s Legacy: Human Security and the Rescue of Canadian Defence Policy,” *International Journal* 56, no. 1 (2001), p. 7-12 and Michael S. Neiberg, “A Middle Power on the World Stage: Canadian Grand Strategy in the Twentieth Century,” *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 14, no. 2 (2012), p. 11-12.

Synthesis

For the purpose of this study, grand strategy will be used as defined by Paul Kennedy:

To begin with, a true grand strategy [is] now concerned with peace as much as (perhaps even more than) with war. It [is] about the evolution and integration of policies that should operate for decades, or even for centuries. It [does] not cease at a war's end, nor commence at its beginning...The crux of grand strategy lies therefore in policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation's leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and non military, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's long term (that is in wartime and peacetime) best interests.³⁴

In support of the need for Canada to identify a grand strategy, the former minister of Defence, David Pratt, mentions that “not only is it possible for a middle or smaller power to possess a grand strategy, it is essential.”³⁵ Canadian grand strategy has shifted over the last century between Atlanticism, Foulkes and cooperative. The next part will identify which one is currently being used in Canada and what military resources are available to support it.

NATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND RESOURCES

Official documents

Two key documents can provide evidence of Canada's shifting policies in defining a grand strategy for Canada: *Strong, Secure and Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy* (SSE); and the current foreign policy: *Address by Minister Freeland to Parliament* on 6 June 2017.³⁶ Together, these two documents chart a slightly different course than the

³⁴ Kennedy, Paul, *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991, p. 5.

³⁵ David Pratt, *The 2007 Ross Ellis Memorial Lectures in Military and Strategic Studies: is there a grand strategy in Canadian foreign policy?*, Calgary: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2008, p.9.

³⁶ David G. Haglund, “The NATO of its dreams? Canada and the Co-operative Security Alliance,” *International Journal* 52, issue 3 (1997), p. 464.

usual foreign and defence White Papers. They are not revolutionary in that the usual triumvirate of priorities for Canada: “two strategic imperatives (the defence of Canada and North America) and one strategic choice (the deployment of the CAF in response to international contingencies)” are present.³⁷ However, in a significant shift from the Harper, Martin or Chrétien’s foreign policies, the mention of NATO is much more predominant than the UN or at all in the case of the former:

“A cornerstone of our multilateral agenda is our steadfast commitment to the Transatlantic Alliance. Our bond is manifest in CETA...and in our military deployment this summer to Latvia. There can be no clearer sign that NATO and Article 5 are at the heart of Canada’s national security policy.”³⁸

About Eastern Europe, Minister Freeland mentions specifically the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the illegal move of Russia in Crimea as: “not something we can accept or ignore.”³⁹ In an even greater break with traditionally balanced diplomatic speak that avoids absolutes and ally confrontation, the speech goes on to explain that if the United States wants to “shrug off the burden of world leadership”, Canada must acknowledge that “Canadian diplomacy and development sometimes require the backing of hard power.” This indicates an about-turn from Haglund’s “cooperative security” strategy,

³⁷ Maj. Thomas Allan H., *Change and Effect: The Evolution of Canadian Defence Policy from 1964 to 2017 and its Impact on Army Capabilities*, Directed research paper presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master in Defence Studies, Canadian Forces College, (2018), p. 7.

³⁸ Government of Canada. Global Affairs Canada. *Address by Minister Freeland on Canada’s Foreign Policy Priorities*, Ottawa, 6 June 2017. Retrieved on 20 April 2020. https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2017/06/address_by_ministerfreelandoncanadasforeignpolicypriorities.html.

³⁹ This statement is expected as a Canadian foreign policy. In a repudiation of Raoul Dandurand’s memorable quote that Canada “lives in a fireproof house”, Sokolsky and Jockel write “[t]he problem with Dandurand’s formulation at the time was that it failed to reflect Canada’s fundamental interest in preventing any hostile power from dominating the Eurasian land mass, thereby threatening global stability directly and Canadian security indirectly.” Joe Jockel, and Joel Sokolsky, “Dandurand revisited: rethinking Canada’s defence policy in an unstable world,” *International Journal* 48 no. 2 (1993), p.381. This North Atlantic security perception from a strictly North American one goes at least as far back as August 7, 1943 in a memo on postwar international organization by Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Hume Wrong as quoted in Denis Stairs, “Way Back Then and Now: NATO and the Canadian Interest,” Part 1, Chap. 1 in James Fergusson and Francis Furtado, *Beyond Afghanistan: An International Security Agenda for Canada*, 3-24. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016, p. 5.

dominant from the 1990s to the mid-2000s, to the Atlanticism strategy of the early Cold War years where maintaining the balance of power between the U.S. and Europe was of foremost importance for Canada's political and diplomatic leadership. As a crucial national objective, this turn must be supported by the Canadian military strategy.

As such, if an about-turn has taken place, it should also be reflected in the latest defence policy white paper. This is best reflected in the SSE's consideration of Europe and Canada's role in NATO. SSE shifts the priority from a focus in prior defence policies on security in North America to the European context:

As a founding member of NATO, Canada has enduring obligations to support and defend Allies who are threatened by any potential adversary and to contribute to continued security, while preserving stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. The Canadian Armed Forces will contribute actively to collective defence. In 2016, Canada embarked on a leadership role in the name of deterrence, acting as framework nation as part of NATO's enhanced Forward Presence in Central and Eastern Europe.⁴⁰

This is not only a policy statement but underlines what steps have been taken in Latvia to assume the burden of leadership and by going against the initial temptation of NATO, in 2014, to maintain only a "first-responder" force outside of the Baltic as noted by the American NATO strategist Julian Lindley-French.⁴¹ Moreover, if repetition is any indication of an intention to make a message stick, it is clear that SSE intends on pushing multilateralism, and specifically NATO, to the forefront. The document mentions NATO sixty-one times and it is present in almost every section of the document, except for NORAD and the North American defense. The commitment to Latvia is also significant

⁴⁰ Government of Canada. Department of National Defence. *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*, Ottawa, 2017, p.83, 91.

⁴¹ Julian Lindley-French, "NATO: Countering Strategic Maskirovka," Calgary: *Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute*, (2015), p.3.

as it contradicts some of the key tenets of the Foulkes and cooperative security strategy, namely that participating in NATO should “holds out the prospect of imposing low[er] costs, and few[er] risks, upon Canada” than it did during the Cold War.⁴² What Canadian diplomat Escott Reid wrote in 1977 when Atlanticism was the grand strategy, albeit weakened by Trudeau, seems to remain true to this day:

This link across the North Atlantic seems to me to be such a providential solution to so many of our problems that I feel we should go to great length and even incur considerable risk in order to consolidate our good fortune and ensure our proper place in this new partnership.⁴³

In this policy double punch, and in response to an assertive America, the Canadian government has dusted the traditional Atlanticism grand strategy and heralds it as the Canadian national objective.

Resources and vectors of Canadian military efforts

If Atlanticism is indeed Canada’s goal, then understanding first what military capabilities Canada can muster in Eastern Europe is important since interests and objectives must stay within the capabilities of a nation to be viable. What are Canada’s military capabilities and resources and what are the best forums or conditions in which to wield them? What are the cost-effective means for Canada to deliver power and influence in Eastern Europe?

⁴² David G. Haglund, “The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canadian Grand Strategy at Century’s End,” *Contemporary Affairs* 4, (2000), p.90.

⁴³ Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty, 1947-1949*, Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1977, 312.

International military exercises are typically considered an effective demonstration of hard power and capabilities in foreign lands. Committing troops and financial resources to these efforts is reflective of a national desire to strengthen international visibility, influence, and relationships. Between 2015 and 2017, the CAF have conducted thirteen exercises in Europe out of a total of thirty-eight international exercises or 34%. Of the total, six were comprised of more than one hundred personnel and one involved more than a thousand troops; five were conducted in Eastern Europe. A tentpole of these efforts has been exercise TRIDENT JUNCTURE which, since 2015, has been the NATO go-to response to the Russian aggression in Crimea. Matthew Fisher reports that “Lt.-Gen. Steve Bowes, who commands all Canadian troops on operations at home and abroad, agreed that the exercise [TRIDENT JUNCTURE 2015], on which Ottawa has spent \$34 million, was meant to make Russia take notice.”⁴⁴ However, the ability of Canada to support these exercises is directly linked with the troops that are available and not deployed.

SSE lays out what troops it expects the CAF to be able to deploy, one of the strongest demonstrations of military commitment, and what is available, with force sustainment and training, at any given moment short of full mobilization for war:

2 x sustained deployments in two different theatres of operation	~500-1500 personnel
1 x time-limited deployment (6-9 months)	~500-1500 personnel
2 x sustained deployments	~100-500 personnel

⁴⁴ Matthew Fisher, “Canadian-led NATO exercise with more than 36,000 soldiers a 'dramatic show of force' aimed at Putin,” *National Post*, 3 November 2015, Retrieved on 2 May 2020.
<https://nationalpost.com/news/world/canadian-led-nato-exercise-with-more-than-36000-soldiers-a-dramatic-show-of-force-aimed-at-putin>

2 x time-limited deployments (6-9 months)	~100-500 personnel
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Source: Department of National Defence. *Strong, ...* p.81.

We can see, that the current troops commitments in Latvia and Ukraine already are allocated an important portion of these scarce resources with a sustained deployment of 450-915 and 200 personnel respectively, or half of the sustained deployment capabilities.⁴⁵ With another sustained deployment of up to 850 personnel assigned to the Middle East and other minor efforts across the globe, the remaining capacity of deployed troops is thin.

The CAF's strategic and operational force projection capacity has improved significantly in recent decades and allows for a credible reinforcement of Europe. In 2018, during another TRIDENT JUNCTURE the CAF demonstrated this improved capacity in Norway. In 1986 a similar exercise had shown the difficulty of such an effort and proven to be "seriously deficient."⁴⁶ Canadian foreign correspondent Matthew Fisher, reported that TRIDENT JUNCTURE 2018, "[w]ith 2,000 troops forward deployed, this has been by far the biggest, most complex military operation for the Canadian Forces since the Afghan combat mission ended seven years ago." Quoting Bgen Anderson, the senior Canadian officer in Norway, the CAF "have retained the ability to project power at the speed of relevance."⁴⁷ While showcasing the improvements since 1986, this robust

⁴⁵ Government of Canada. Department of National Defence, *Current Operations List*, Ottawa, last modified on 10 April 2020. Retrieved on 20 April 2020. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/list.html>.

⁴⁶ Sean M. Maloney, "Purple Haze: Joint Planning in the Canadian Forces from Mobile Command to J-Staff, 1975-1991 (Part 1)," *Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin* 5, no. 4 (Winter 2002-2003), p.62.

⁴⁷ Matthew Fisher, "Trident Juncture 18: NATO's Norwegian Exercise," Calgary: Canadian Global Affairs Institute, November 2018. Retrieved on 2 May 2020. https://www.cgai.ca/trident_juncture_18_natos_norwegian_exercise.

presence putting Canada as the 4th largest national contingent of a 50,000 strong exercise and costing \$28 million had little mention in Ottawa. It did not trigger any high-level mentions by politicians or senior civil servants for being part of a bigger Canadian strategy in NATO or Europe. Nevertheless, one mention by Bgen Anderson might indicate that the target audience for Canada in these massive exercises might have changed: “There are multiple audiences here but the most important one is NATO itself.”⁴⁸ The confrontation with Russia is thus secondary, the unity and reassurance of the alliance is the main effort. This is in direct support of the national objective of maintaining a strong European unity in the balance of power with the U.S as all NATO nations were present including Sweden and Finland, even if the major contributors were Western Europeans.

In terms of partnerships and international organizations specifically involving Eastern Europe, Canada is a member of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).⁴⁹ Along with NATO committees, Canada has strong organizational ties across all of Europe and multiple avenues to engage its military strategy outside of NATO if necessary since it can’t seem to get consensus on action with partners such as Ukraine.⁵⁰ But it would be naïve to conclude that “Canada [can] use its deep diplomatic reach inside NATO, the EU,

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Government of Canada. Global Affairs Canada, *Partnerships and Organizations*, last modified 27 March 2020. Retrieved on 17 April 2020. https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/partnerships_organizations-partenariats_organisations.aspx?lang=eng.

⁵⁰ On NATO facilitating multilateralism see Denis Stairs, “Way Back Then and Now: NATO and the Canadian Interest,” Part 1, Chap. 1 in James Fergusson and Francis Furtado, *Beyond Afghanistan: An International Security Agenda for Canada*, 3-24. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016, p. 10, 16.

and other international agencies to drive the response to great power politics” strictly because of membership.⁵¹ This effort must be used in combination with concrete military resources to allow Canada the right to be “in” and push its national objectives.⁵²

Canadian military strategy objectives in Eastern Europe

The Guidance on International Priorities for Defence Engagement delineates Canada’s strategic interests as: “Security and Prosperity, Global Stability, the Rules-based International Order [and] Collective Defence.” This paper argue that, in view of Canada’s limited resources mentioned above but with multiple avenues to use these resources, the Canadian military strategy should discard generic and winded strategic interests and aim to support the national objective of Atlanticism more specifically and efficiently.⁵³ This paper assesses that, to support a grand strategy of Atlanticism, the military strategy in Eastern Europe must aim to:

- Balance the power of the U.S. by cultivating support for Canada when needed.
- Contribute to the forward defence of allies in a credible and sustainable way against a peer competitor.
- Limit dissensions between East and West Europe partners.
- Cultivate the perception of NATO by the U.S. as a relevant and efficient organization in countering Russian expansionism.

⁵¹ John Hemmings and Megan Wolf, *Is Canada...* <https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/canada-ready-new-age-power-politics-john-hemmings-megan-wolf-inside-policy/>

⁵² Joe Jockel, and Joel Sokolsky, “Canada and NATO: Keeping Ottawa in, expenses down, criticism out...and the country secure,” *International Journal* 64, no. 2 (2009), p. 317-318.

⁵³ Government of Canada. Department of National Defence. *Guidance on International Priorities for Defence Engagement*, Ottawa, 2020, p.1.

PROPOSALS FOR A CANADIAN MILITARY STRATEGY FOR EUROPE

The strategies of the past Cold War cannot be applied directly when looking at the current problems in Eastern Europe. However, some lessons can be drawn from the successes and failures of this period to highlight proposals for a Canadian military strategy in Eastern Europe. The first to investigate is George Kennan who was the U.S. deputy head of mission to Russia in 1946 and in the “Long Telegram”, is reputed to be the author of the containment strategy. “Of course, Kennan believed that military strength was absolutely imperative. Nevertheless, his suggested approach to the Soviet threat leaned heavily on diplomacy and ‘soft power’.”⁵⁴ But, while the most cost-effective and renowned way for Canada to achieve influence, pressing hard on the soft power approach might not be the best bet for Canada anymore. The usual sources of Canadian soft power have been battered in the last two decades and may not yield the same results in Eastern Europe or in Russia. In a conclusion of previous research made by the author on Canadian soft power:

Norm entrepreneurship, institutionalism and peacekeeping were the mainstay of Canadian claims at being a normative superpower. The successive chapters of this thesis have demonstrated that the Canadian government has made critical choices resulting in a withdrawal from all three pillars, albeit to different magnitudes. Without these pillars, Canada’s attractiveness and international legitimacy is ineffective to support a soft power foreign policy.⁵⁵

Canada might not have the same soft power credentials it once had but its position may be served well by deploying some of its middle-power capability and its “smart power”

⁵⁴ Ibid, p.30.

⁵⁵ Simon Mailloux, *A Study of the Current State of Soft Power in Canada’s Foreign Policy: Examining Canada’s Normative Superpower Status in the International Community*, Thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Degree of MSc International Politics, Glasgow University, (2011), p. 41.

potential to reconcile divisions and support the alliance defence's.⁵⁶ The risk-benefit balance is in Canada's favour. As Haglund argues, "If any entity runs the risk of becoming marginalized in the new NATO, it is Western Europe not Canada."⁵⁷ This position was largely proved by the tensions between "Old Europe" and the U.S. following the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the later rancorous stance taken by the Trump administration, albeit against all the NATO members.⁵⁸

The strain on burden sharing on defence between Eastern and Western Europe is a conflict that the Canadian military strategy must account for and avoid deepening whenever possible. In this case, fostering the inclusion of Spain and Italy along with Poland and Slovakia in its battlegroup in Latvia is the right approach for Canada and has the added benefit of keeping costs down. France, in the UK battle group, is working strictly with western European states and Canada could drive the inclusion of an Eastern European member of NATO which could foster better ties. While the mission in Ukraine is comprised primarily of U.S., U.K. and Eastern European partners, Canada would do well to support the inclusion of France, Spain, Italy, the Benelux and Germany to foster better cooperation and minimize the tension between East and West.

A strong military strategy in support of the Atlanticism national objective must endeavor to avoid repeating the errors of the past.⁵⁹ One such mistake was the

⁵⁶ Joseph S. Nye Jr., *The Future of Power*, New York: Public Affairs, 2011, p.103, 201, 207-2010.

⁵⁷ David G. Haglund, "The North Atlantic Triangle Revisited: Canadian Grand Strategy at Century's End," *Contemporary Affairs* 4, (2000), p.95.

⁵⁸ Joe Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, "Canada and the War in Afghanistan: NATO's odd man out steps forward," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 6, no. 1 (2008), p. 103.

⁵⁹ Alexander Lanoszka, "From Ottawa to Riga: Three tensions in Canadian defence policy," *International Journal* 72, no. 4 (2017), p. 521.

“commitment-capability gap” which during the Cold War represented the discrepancy between the multiple deployments of forces undertaken across the world in support of peacekeeping or other police efforts that were taken against the commitments assumed by Canada inside NATO “in case of emergency”.⁶⁰ Moreover, a reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent of power competition in Eastern Europe to compensate for a commitment-capability gap is insufficient. The lessons of the past are clear as Godefroy outlines:

“While US senior officers maintained that “NATO will continue to require forces with dual capability,” they also offered that ‘the conventional or non-nuclear capability of these forces in Western Europe must be sufficient to counter effectively and defeat any attack short of full scale non-nuclear aggression.’ It was the first clear indication that the United States was going to lead the transition of the West’s nuclear-centric approach to war away from a strategy of mutually assured destruction towards a more flexible response.”⁶¹

This lesson is even more important in view of Russia’s current hybrid warfare tactic which aims to stay “between the boundaries of war and peace” to negate strategic deterrence and put the pressure on the troops in the Baltic which, as the Rand Corporation points out, in any cases are difficult to cover with the U.S. tactical nuclear umbrella.⁶² While the Canadian battlegroup in Latvia is a strong deterrent, mounting tensions would call upon the strategic deployment ability exhibited during TRIDENT JUNCTURE to send rapid Canadian reinforcements as envisioned in SSE’s “concurrent operations”

⁶⁰ Andrew B. Godefroy, *In Peace Prepared: Innovation and Adaptation in Canada's Cold War Army*, Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014, p.172 and Joe Jockel and Joel Sokolsky, “Dandurand revisited: rethinking Canada's defence policy in an unstable world,” *International Journal* 48 no. 2 (1993), p. 384. For the reduction of military spending along with increased commitments during the Cold War, see also Alexander Lanoszka, “From Ottawa to Riga: Three tensions in Canadian defence policy,” *International Journal* 72, no. 4 (2017), p. 523-525.

⁶¹ Ibid, p.180.

⁶² Ross Fetterly, “The World has Changed. Canada’s Defence Strategy hasn’t Changed with it,” Ottawa: Macdonald-Laurier Institute, 8 October 2019. Retrieved on 15 April 2020. <https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/canada-confronts-complex-threat-environment-ross-fetterly-inside-policy/>. See also Michael Kofman et al., *Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017, p.73-77.

plan.⁶³ This assumption is especially true since the military capabilities of Western Europeans are not what they used to be, as pointed out by Michael Shurkin a specialist on European strategy, and cannot be relied upon to let Canada slowly off the hook as it was in the 1970s and onwards.⁶⁴ If the Canadian military falls into the commitment-capability gap, limiting its capacity to reinforce or even sustain a credible presence in Latvia by committing the few remaining troops available, the national objective would suffer.

A lesson concerning joint operations from the Cold War must also influence the current Canadian military strategy. As the CAF lost numerical and technical superiority in the air against soviet forces, the situation on the ground changed. “Therefore, without any real ability to achieve even local air superiority against the Warsaw Pact... on its own the land forces in Mobile Command came to increasingly worry about their own ability to manoeuvre on the battlefield.”⁶⁵ The RCAF used to have its air policing efforts in the Baltic region but it has moved to Romania in recent years in a surprising example of a lack of synergy and joint planning. In view of Russia’s capacity to quickly isolate the

⁶³ Government of Canada. Department of National Defence. *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy*, Ottawa, 2017, p.81 and Alexander Lanoszka, “From Ottawa to Riga: Three tensions in Canadian defence policy,” *International Journal* 72, no. 4 (2017), p. 528-530.

⁶⁴ Michael Shurkin, *The Abilities of the British, French, and German Armies to Generate and Sustain Armored Brigades in the Baltics*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017. Retrieved on 14 April 2020. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1629.html. The key findings of the research are especially interesting in the problem at hand: The British Army can provide an armored task force within 30 days and would require 30 and 90 days to scale up to a full armored brigade. France can probably field one medium or heavy battalion task force within a week. Generating the equivalent of a full armored brigade probably would take several weeks to a month. The German Army most likely would require a week or more to mobilize an armored battalion; a full brigade probably would take a month. See also Julian Lindley-French, “NATO: Countering Strategic Maskirovka,” *Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute*: Calgary, (May 2015), p.2.

⁶⁵ Andrew B. Godefroy, *In Peace Prepared: Innovation and Adaptation in Canada's Cold War Army*, Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014, p.208.

NATO battlegroups, the air policing mission in Romania should be relocated in direct support of ground forces in Latvia.⁶⁶

While maintaining Canada's open support to its NATO allies, a long-term military strategy must also consider the weaknesses of the enemy and exploit them when possible.

Former NATO security analyst Marshall Palmer, argues:

“As an authoritarian state, Russia is additionally threatened by the transnational appeal of liberal democracy. By exacerbating political relations between and within democracies, Russia hopes to showcase to its own population the necessity of an authoritarian political system.”⁶⁷

Russia has become expert at this, using not only the cyber domain, but also the informational one. To reduce this threat and Canada should muster “overt and covert countermeasures required to extract a price from [Russia] every time it [seeks] to politically disrupt the free world.”⁶⁸ The double-edge sword of augmenting the troops at Russia's doorstep and financial sanctions could force Russia to desist its actions. Canada can achieve this through its own resources or leveraging smaller allies in NATO in the EBRD, OECD or the OSCE to participate. Furthermore, Canada must reduce the collateral damages that Russia or any other state or non-state actor can cause in Eastern Europe. “Nine NATO allies — including the United States, the United Kingdom and even Estonia, but not yet Canada — have officially offered NATO their cyber capabilities in

⁶⁶ Alexander Lanoszka, “From Ottawa to Riga: Three tensions in Canadian defence policy,” *International Journal* 72, no. 4 (2017), p. 521, 530.

⁶⁷ Palmer, Marshall, *Canada should broaden its 'grey zone' defences*, Toronto: Canadian International Council, 25 June 2019. Retrieved on 2 May 2020. <https://www.opencanada.org/features/five-defence-challenges-facing-canada/>.

⁶⁸ Andrew B. Godefroy, *In Peace Prepared: Innovation and Adaptation in Canada's Cold War Army*, Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014, p.186.

the event a military cyber operation is needed in response to an attack.”⁶⁹ By continuing the development and using the new authorities afforded by Bill C-59 to coordinate and integrate with NATO military cyber capabilities, the CAF would achieve a stronger support to its national objectives as mentioned by the senate national security and defence committee in its recent report.⁷⁰

From May 2014, Canadian troops sent to reassure allies in Eastern Europe were initially sent to Poland. A light infantry force that had little impact on reassurance and deterrence capabilities of Canada in Eastern Europe but that allowed the number of exercises at which Canada took part in Europe to rise. In June 2017, the mechanization, expansion and relocation of troops to Latvia with the leadership role, while rising the costs to \$350 million over three years, achieved influence for the Atlanticism strategy pursued by Ottawa.⁷¹ In order to avoid the capability-commitment gap in the near future, Canada should not pursue expansion in other theatres. While Russia seems to be expanding its military influence in the Caucasus and the Black Sea, Canada should not aim to expand its efforts in these regions beyond the extent of the operation in Ukraine. Expansion such as these would stress the sustainability of the Canadian commitments and diffuse the effects as seen above in the discussion of the North Atlantic Triangle grand strategy.

⁶⁹ Gold, Josh, *Canada to Join NATO's Cyber Defence Research Centre*, Toronto: Canadian International Council, 17 December 2019. Retrieved on 2 May 2020. <https://www.opencanada.org/features/canada-to-join-natos-cyber-defence-research-centre/>.

⁷⁰ Government of Canada. Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *Military Underfunded: The Walk Must Match the Talk*, Ottawa: Canadian Senate, April 2017, p.28.

⁷¹ Alexander Lanoszka, “From Ottawa to Riga: Three tensions in Canadian defence policy,” *International Journal* 72, no. 4 (2017), p. 520.

CONCLUSION

This paper has demonstrated that Canada has returned to a grand strategy of Atlanticism in recent years. The key tenets of this grand strategy have been reconfirmed by the ever-present need of balancing the relationship with the U.S. This paper has also demonstrated that Canada has adopted a military strategy in Eastern Europe that is globally supporting this grand strategy, especially with the sustained deployment in Latvia and the force projection capacity exhibited by Canada during major NATO exercises.

However, many of the military resources available to Canada are not employed in support of the national objectives and could be realigned. This includes fostering closer cooperation between European states, the avoidance of the commitment-capability gap and joint synergy with the other domains. Canada should seek to maximize its CAD22.2 billion defence budget by supporting Atlanticism with its military strategy. American historian Michael Neiberg writes that “Canada’s ability to have a voice disproportionate to its size came, in the era of the world wars, from the tremendous accomplishments of its conventional armed forces.”⁷² Canada should strive to convert these accomplishments in a strategic voice.

⁷² Michael S. Neiberg, “A Middle Power on the World Stage: Canadian Grand Strategy in the Twentieth Century,” *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 14, no. 2 (2012), p.9.

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