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## THE ARMY RESERVES: AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

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**JCSP 46**

**Solo Flight**

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**Major Vincent Lussier**

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# THE ARMY RESERVES: AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY

## INTRODUCTION

1. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) employs 18 000 army reservists across more than 100 units and headquarters in the country. Most of these units were created in the Great War and little has changed since, in terms of force generation and employment concepts. Notwithstanding individual augmentation to the regular army, a reserve unit has not been mobilized for overseas service since World War II.<sup>1</sup> On the domestic front, despite a significant increase in CAF assistance requests by provinces in response to natural disasters such as floods, fires, snow and ice storms, a reserve unit has also yet to be mobilized for active service. In its most recent defence policy review (2017) entitled *Strong Secure Engaged* (SSE), the CAF recognized the requirement for significant changes to the Reserve Force so that it can meet its “full operational potential”<sup>2</sup>. The vision for the new Reserve Force is summarized in one catch phrase as “full-time capability through part-time service”<sup>3</sup>. This implies better integration with the regular army and more focused objectives for its units, but it is unclear how this will be achieved without a comprehensive review of the Army Reserve Force Design.

2. This essay will aim to answer the question of how the Army Reserves (ARes) could best support the government of Canada as an instrument of national security? Following an examination of Canada’s national security posture in response to global and domestic security threats, as well as the Canadian ARes’ mandate and force structure in comparison to like-minded allies, this essay will conclude that comprehensive changes to

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<sup>1</sup> Find Sic

<sup>2</sup> Government of Canada, “Strong Secure Engaged”, Canada’s Defence Policy, 2017, p.67.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p.67

the current ARes model could provide the Government of Canada with increased capabilities to respond to domestic emergencies at little to no increase in long term cost. Specifically, this essay will demonstrate that Canada would have much to gain from an Army Reserve Force that is purpose built, trained and equipped, for a solely domestic role.

3. The first part of the essay will examine current global and domestic security threats and trends that should be informing Canada's security posture, with a view to identifying gaps in terms of national security capabilities. The second part of the essay will specifically examine how the ARes can help Canada bridge its national security gaps; first by looking at its current force structure and mandate and then at its force generation and employment concepts. The third part of the essay will draw conclusions from the previous two, and compare with what like-minded allies have done in efforts to optimize force structures to better address modern-day security requirements.

#### **PART 1: HOW GLOBAL THREATS AFFECT CANADA**

4. Canada recognizes two broad categories of threats to human security: those that are human-induced such as terrorist activities or cyber threats, and those that stem from natural hazards, such as floods, fires and storms<sup>4</sup>. The first category pertains to national and transnational criminal activity, which the Government of Canada has been addressing successfully. For example, the most recent National Security and Intelligence Committee report puts *foreign interference*, at the center of national security threats to Canada which has prompted the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal

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<sup>4</sup> Government of Canada, Emergency Management Framework, 2017, retrieved from : <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/2017-mrgnc-mngmnt-frmwrk/2017-mrgnc-mngmnt-frmwrk-en.pdf>

Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to work with the highest levels of government towards policies enabling cyber-crime investigations and prosecutions in Canada.<sup>5</sup>

Canada appears to have been successful in adapting policy and the mandate of its institutions to oppose these types of emerging criminal activities . The second category of threats to security, natural hazards, is more complex to adjust to, as it is impossible to predict the time, place, type and severity of such events. Due to these unknown factors, it becomes challenging to anticipate and mitigate risks. In its *Emergency management framework for Canada* (2017), the Ministry of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness recognizes that this category of threats is likely to increase, and acknowledges that the country is currently ill-prepared in terms of emergency management:

“(...) scientists predict that climate change will continue to increase the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events such as heat waves, heavy rainfalls and related flooding, droughts, forest fires, serious winter storms, hurricanes and tornados; that may increasingly strain emergency management capacities and budgets across Canada.<sup>6</sup>”

5. The National Strategy for critical infrastructure recognizes that critical infrastructure such as telecommunications towers and energy sources are typically interdependent and thus their loss could have a cascading effect and paralyze significant portions of the country and continent<sup>7</sup>. The increased frequency of natural disasters and associated threats to critical infrastructure and national security in Canada can best be

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<sup>5</sup> Government of Canada, “National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians – Annual Report”, 2019, retrieved from [https://www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2020-03-12ar/annual\\_report\\_2019\\_public\\_en.pdf](https://www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2020-03-12ar/annual_report_2019_public_en.pdf)

<sup>6</sup> Government of Canada, “Emergency Management Framework”, p.4.

<sup>7</sup> Government of Canada, “National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure”, 2009, p. 4, retrieved from <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/srtg-crtcl-nfrstrctr/srtg-crtcl-nfrstrctr-eng.pdf>

illustrated by the number of times the CAF was mobilized to provide assistance to provincial and municipal authorities. According to the Department of National Defence, there have been 26 instances where military assistance was provided to provincial authorities in the last decade<sup>8</sup>, compared to only six in the preceding 20 years.

Notwithstanding the obvious physical and economic impacts of natural disasters on Canadian soil, climate-induced migration also presents a security risk. The 2010 earthquake in Haiti for example, prompted the United States government to hastily approve over 50 000 new visas for migrants under a temporary protected status, allowing them residency for a period of three years<sup>9</sup>. In July 2017 as the three year period was coming to an end, the Canadian Army was asked to mobilize troops and equipment in support of the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) because of the overwhelming number of Haitian asylum seekers crossing over from the United States<sup>10</sup>.

Notwithstanding potential massive climate migration to Canada from the most vulnerable areas of the world, the United States Geological Survey has already predicted that Atlantic coastal cities such as New York and Boston risk being inundated within the next century<sup>11</sup>, likely triggering further significant population displacements towards countries like Canada.

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<sup>8</sup>Government of Canada, Operation Lentus, retrieved from: <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-lentus.html>

<sup>9</sup>Ruth Ellen Wasem, “U.S. Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants”, Congressional Research Service, 2011, p.12, retrieved from <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21349.pdf>

<sup>10</sup> Government of Canada, Operation ELEMENT, retrieved from: <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/recently-completed/operation-element.html>

<sup>11</sup> USGS Report: Sea level rise accelerating in U.S. Atlantic Coast, 2012, retrieved from <https://csengineermag.com/usgs-report-sea-level-rise-accelerating-in-u-s-atlantic-coast/>

6. All of this begs the question of how is Canada postured to respond to, and mitigate the impacts of natural disasters and climate-induced security risks on its soil? Understanding these events only occur sporadically and vary in types, magnitude and scope, there currently are no dedicated domestic provincial or national response forces to address natural disasters. Rather, humanitarian resources and equipment to respond to such events tend to be improvised based on requirements of the scenario at play. The Federal Policy for Emergency Management views emergency management as a shared responsibility at all levels of government, with the Ministry of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (MPS) as the lead federal department. To that end, the MPS houses a Government Operations Center (GOC) within its own headquarters in Ottawa, which it operates 24/7 and serves as the government's single point of contact for any emergency requiring federal-level involvement,<sup>12</sup>. In any emergency, the MPS can coordinate planning and resources within its own ministry, across federal departments if required, and with its provincial counterparts<sup>13</sup>. At the provincial level, every Canadian province and territory is required to maintain an emergency operations center, enabling inter-governmental and inter-departmental coordination and responses<sup>14</sup>. When municipal authorities are struck by a natural disaster, overwhelmed provincial and territorial authorities may request a provision of service or humanitarian assistance to the federal

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<sup>12</sup> Department of Public Safety (CA), "National Emergency Response System", 2011, p.8, retrieved from <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/ntnl-rspns-sstm/ntnl-rspns-sstm-eng.pdf>

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, p.5

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, p.7



MPS<sup>15</sup>. The MPS may then formulate a Request for Assistance (RFA) to the Department of National Defence (DND) to mobilize its armed forces, or approve a provincial RFA<sup>16</sup>.

7. The CAF's response to natural disasters in Canada has been named Operation Lentus<sup>17</sup>. DND's 2017-2018 Departmental Results Report illustrates Op Lentus' contributions for that fiscal year:

“In FY 2017-18, the Defence Team responded to natural disasters and humanitarian crises, where over 4,600 CAF troops helped Canadians as they recovered from floods and fires. In response to floods, the CAF evacuated community residents from Kashechewan First Nation and Mud Lake, Newfoundland; and, helped Quebec's flood relief efforts in five regions. The CAF also assisted with flood relief in St. John, New Brunswick and in Ontario and with evacuations and managing the wildfire situation in British Columbia and northern Manitoba”<sup>18</sup>.

8. To effectively provide domestic responses, the CAF is divided in six Regional Joint Task Forces (RJTF) across Canada<sup>19</sup>. These RJTF's are mandated to provide an Immediate Response Unit (IRU) ranging between 400-600 troops in support of provincial authorities, and can be mobilized upon federal government approval. The RJTF leadership typically co-locates itself within the provincial emergency response center and provides command and control over all employed military assets. These may include ships, aircrafts, and Canadian Rangers, but it more often consists of providing unskilled

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<sup>15</sup> Government of Canada, “Federal Policy for Emergency Management”, 2012, p.1, retrieved from <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/plc-mrgnc-mngmnt/plc-mrgnc-mngmnt-eng.pdf>

<sup>16</sup> Government of Canada, “National Emergency Response System”, 2011, p.13, retrieved from <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/ntnl-rspns-sstm/ntnl-rspns-sstm-eng.pdf>

<sup>17</sup> Government of Canada, Operation LENTUS, retrieved from <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-lentus.html>

<sup>18</sup> Government of Canada, “Departmental results report 2017-2018”, retrieved from <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/departmental-results-report/departmental-results-2017-18-index/trends-spending-human-resources.html>

<sup>19</sup> Government of Canada, “Regional Joint Task Forces”, retrieved from <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/conduct/regional-task-force.html>

labor from the regular army and reserves, in support of provincial and/or municipal authorities. The word “unskilled” is used to underline the fact that Canadian soldiers receive no equipment or training whatsoever to fight fires, floods or any other natural hazard-related event. Rather, domestic deployments are simply considered to be an addition to regular training for operations overseas and according the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the commander of the army, these deployments are putting a heavy strain on CAF resources. In a recent Globe and Mail article entitled: “Growing natural-disaster response risks dulling Army’s fighting edge”, “Canada’s top soldier (warned) that as the army gets called out to a growing number of floods, wildfires and other natural disasters, there is a risk that work will hurt the force’s ability to defend the country<sup>20</sup>”. To emphasize the notion that frequent calls for the army to serve on domestic disaster response operations are currently unsustainable if the army is expected to fight and win wars, the commander of the Canadian army added: “If we become focused on solely humanitarian-assistance, disaster response, when the country really needs us, when the stakes are very high and we have to fight and we’re not ready, that’s going to cause casualties and it’s going to cost loss of national interest.<sup>21</sup>”

9. Canada’s security apparatus is structured to effectively oppose criminal activity. Scarce law enforcement resources and intelligence service personnel are entirely focused on crime fighting. The country’s regular armed forces are rightfully structured to train for, and win wars, with domestic responses to hazards being an afterthought in terms of training and equipment procurement. Little thought is given to how Canada will posture

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<sup>20</sup>Lee Berthiaume “Growing natural-disaster response risks dulling Army’s fighting edge”, published in the Globe and Mail on 20 Jan 2020, retrieved from <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-growing-natural-disaster-response-risks-dulling-armys-fighting-edge-2/>

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

itself to compose with increasing natural hazards and other domestic threats. In the face of increasing risks to Canadians due to floods, fires, snow storms, pandemics, not to mention the risk of large-scale terrorist attacks or the inevitable environmental migration, the requirement for physical surveillance, infrastructure protection, patrolling and presence will increase. Specific training and equipment will be needed to keep responders and civilians safe. In a recent news article entitled: “Canada's military feeling the strain responding to climate change”, General Jonathan Vance, Canada’s CDS recently mentioned: “You just can’t go out and fight a fire. You need some training to do that. So we’re going to need some forces ready at hand, fully trained to be able to support local firefighters and so on.”<sup>22</sup>

10. Natural hazards, although increasing in frequency, are likely to remain sporadic in nature, requiring periodic capacity surges in support of all levels of government and law enforcement authorities to protect Canadians. This highlights a growing requirement for a purpose trained, built and equipped domestic response force that could be assembled and called upon quickly, but that would otherwise remain mostly inactive to minimize unnecessary costs. The next section will examine to what extent the Army Reserves under its current structure, could be leveraged to provide a solution.

## **PART 2: THE CANADIAN ARMY RESERVES**


11. There are currently 123 ARes units across Canada assembled under 10 brigade-groups which are further divided among 4 divisions based on geographic location (see figure 1.1). Most units have existed since the Great War and specialize in one of the

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<sup>22</sup> Darren Major and Salimah Shivji, “Canada's military feeling the strain responding to climate change” June 2019, retrieved from <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-s-military-adopting-climate-change-1.5186337>

combat arms; infantry, armor, artillery or combat engineers. Brigade-group headquarters are responsible for overseeing training and administration only, and thus do not command units in the field. Rather, it is the regular army divisions which brigades answer to, that are responsible for the command and control of all ARes personnel within their area of responsibility.

12. Figure 1.1 extracted from the 2016 Auditor General Report on the Army Reserves



13. The army reserve’s mandate – unambiguous from its inception until the end of the Cold War - consisted of generating combat troops and units for the sole purpose of mobilization in times of war or national emergency. In this capacity, the ARes effectively generated most of the combat troops overseas during both world wars<sup>23</sup>. As the Cold War was nearing its end, those crafting the 1987 Defence White Paper recognized the inevitable obsolescence of the institution in the age of nuclear power and

<sup>23</sup> J.L. Granatstein and LGeneral (Ret’d) Charles Belzile, “The Special commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves, 1995: Ten Years Later”, 2005, p.6, retrieved from [https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/41/attachments/original/1413661138/Restructuring\\_The\\_Reserves\\_-\\_English.pdf?1413661138](https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/41/attachments/original/1413661138/Restructuring_The_Reserves_-_English.pdf?1413661138)

sought to find a new meaning for the ARes. This led to the concept of the “Total Force” – a term still used in the CAF’s 2017 Defence Policy – which speaks to reserve-integration into the regular army in support of operations, as being the *raison d’être* of the institution.<sup>24</sup> The 2017 Standing Senate Committee report on National Security and Defence titled: “Reinvesting in the Canadian Armed Forces: A Plan for the Future” speaks of the ARes contributing more than 20% of individual troops during the Afghanistan war.<sup>25</sup> While far from insignificant, the “Total Force” is nonetheless built on the hope that ARes members will continue to provide individual augmentation to operations, but there are no guarantees as “the only time consent for full-time service is not required is through an order signed by the Governor General acting on the advice of Cabinet.<sup>26</sup>” Case in point, the Standing Senate Committee learned that of the over 500 Canadian soldiers deployed on operations in 2017, only 60 were from the ARes.<sup>27</sup> During this timeframe (fiscal year 2013-14), a report from the Auditor General costed the ARes training and preparation at 724 million dollars<sup>28</sup>. This seems rather expansive when compared for example, with an annual 905 million dollars for Canada’s entire federal policing program.<sup>29</sup>

14. To summarize, units are no longer expected to be raised for deployment and its members not bound by any obligation to serve. While terms of service will be addressed

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<sup>24</sup> Rand Corporation, “Comprehensive Analysis of Strategic Force Generation Challenges in the Australian Army, Rand Corporation”, 2018, p.42-44.

<sup>25</sup> Standing Senate Committee Report on National Security and Defence titled: “Reinvesting in the Canadian Armed Forces: A Plan for the Future”, p.48, retrieved from [http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection\\_2017/sen/yc33-0/YC33-0-421-11-eng.pdf](http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/sen/yc33-0/YC33-0-421-11-eng.pdf)

<sup>26</sup> 2016 Spring Reports of the Auditor General of Canada, “Report 5—Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence” retrieved from [https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl\\_oag\\_201602\\_05\\_e\\_41249.html](https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201602_05_e_41249.html)

<sup>27</sup> Standing Senate Committee report on National Security and Defence, p.48.

<sup>28</sup> 2016 Spring Reports of the Auditor General of Canada, “Report 5—Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence” retrieved from [https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl\\_oag\\_201602\\_05\\_e\\_41249.html](https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201602_05_e_41249.html)

<sup>29</sup> “National Security and Intelligence Committee report” p. 80.

in the next section, serious thought should be given to the ARes mandate in light of the ever-increasing demand for CAF domestic responses and the strain this is putting on the Canadian Army. To that end, ten years following the 1995 Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves (SCRR) which supported the “Total Force” concept, two surviving members of the Commission, Charles Belzile and Jack Granatstein, were asked to re-visit their original report in light of significant world changes since 1995.

Specifically highlighted was that the 9/11 events brought “urgency” to what was then labelled “homeland defence”, which DND now calls “domestic operations”<sup>30</sup>. The report found that:

“The CF Reserves are ideally placed for this task (domestic responses) with their units found in more than 110 communities, large and small, and in every province. In the event of a terrorist attack in Toronto, Montreal or Vancouver, for example, the presence of one or two thousand trained reservists will certainly be invaluable to the civil authority in preserving public order and in tasks of rescue, containment and clean-up<sup>31</sup>.”

15. Turning the ARes into a domestic response force is not the direction outlined in Canada’s newest defence policy. On the contrary, SSE’s vision on strengthening the ARes includes reserve units being assigned “mission roles”, which means that a Unit is responsible to generate a specific combat capability such as mortars and pioneers.<sup>32</sup> That said, generating specific mission roles or capabilities such as the ones mentioned above, require significant individual and collective training, which is hard to achieve for a part-time force under the current terms of service.

16. The terms of service in the ARes are such that, upon completion of basic occupancy training, currency training conducted at Unit-level is on an entirely voluntary basis, with some exercises yielding but a fraction of their members. A 2016 Auditor

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<sup>30</sup> The Special commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves, 1995: Ten Years Later”, p.20

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, p.20.

<sup>32</sup> Department of National Defence, Strong Secure Engaged, 2017 p. 16.

General report on the Army Reserves whose objective was to determine its readiness and preparedness for domestic and international missions, found that: “In 2015, when Army Reserve units met for their annual large-scale collective training events across Canada, only 3,593 soldiers (26 percent of trained soldiers) attended these exercises<sup>33</sup>”. The ability of a force to respond quickly and decisively- especially in an age where information travels extremely fast – is tied to its *institutional credibility*, which the current Commander of the Canadian Army (CCA) has identified as his center of gravity<sup>34</sup>. It’s arguably difficult to maintain such credibility if only a quarter of members attend training exercises. As far back as 2007, the Canadian Army stated in “Land Operations 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations” that: “In the future security environment, the Land Force will require a degree of agility that will permit the *rapid projection* of increasingly modular and mission-tailored forces capable of regrouping and re-tasking across the full spectrum of conflict.<sup>35</sup> Currently, responsiveness depends on hope, with no underlying terms of service to ensure members will answer the call. But for members to answer the call, effective recruiting is required, which is what the next section will examine.

17. Because of their Great War and Second World War legacies, several ARes units are still located in communities that have since undergone major demographic changes. Some of these communities are no longer home to very many inhabitants and thus force generation, to include recruiting, training and retention, have become next to impossible.

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<sup>33</sup>2016 Spring Reports of the Auditor General of Canada, “Report 5—Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence” retrieved from [https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl\\_oag\\_201602\\_05\\_e\\_41249.html](https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201602_05_e_41249.html)

<sup>34</sup>Canadian Army, “Army Operating plan 2018/2019-v2”, p.7.

<sup>35</sup> Canadian Army, “Land Operations 2021: Adapted Dispersed Operations”, 2007, p.32.

In a 2017 briefing note to the Deputy Commander of the Canadian Army entitled:

“Apportionment – The Canadian Forces Primary Reserves”, it was recognized that:

“The Army Reserve was rationalized and the structure we have today is largely based on having all 123 units having sufficient structure to meet their tasks without a realization or recognition that some of these units are not viable based on size and the demographic footprint where they are located.<sup>36</sup>”

A 2017 Senate Committee report stated that, “the Army Reserve Force has not received the resources it needs to recruit, equip and train for the full range of Canada’s defence requirements.<sup>37</sup>” Although this may be accurate, it does not change the fact that many units are faced with significantly diminished recruiting pools. The 2016 Auditor General report found that “58 of the 123 Army Reserve units were at less than 70 percent of their ideal unit size. Of these, 12 Army Reserve units were at less than 50 percent of their ideal unit size<sup>38</sup>”. In a 2017 speech on the transformation of its Army Reserves, the Chief of the Australian Army made clear that he needed a pool of 1000 people aged between 17-29, to sustain the recruitment and force generation of one soldier<sup>39</sup>. Assuming these numbers are somewhat applicable to the Canadian context, to force generate a fully manned reserve unit, the CAF would need to locate units in population centers of roughly over 700 000 people, of which there are currently nine in Canada, located across four provinces (one in British Columbia, two in Alberta, one in Manitoba and three in both

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<sup>36</sup> Briefing note from Colonel Foster-Director of Army Reserves to the Deputy Commander of the CA: “Apportionment – The Canadian Forces Primary Reserves”, 30 May, 2017.

<sup>37</sup> Government of Canada, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *Reinvesting in the Canadian Armed Forces: A Plan for the Future*, May 2017, p. 48.

<sup>38</sup> Auditor General Report, 2016.

<sup>39</sup> Lieutenant General Angus Campbell, Chief of Army, “Australian Army Reserve transformation - A total force” Address to the Royal United Services Institute (Victoria), Defence Plaza Melbourne, 12.30pm, Thursday 27 July 2017.



Ontario and Quebec)<sup>40</sup>. The maritime provinces would require a work-force analysis to determine the best emplacement for their unit(s).

18. Any organization is useless without people. If the ARes was to deliver domestic response capabilities, unit rationalization would need to occur, by first ridding itself of undermanned units and focusing efforts only on those units where demography supports force generation.

19. To summarize, the ARes could be leveraged as a solution to the increasing demands for domestic responses under the following conditions: First, the mandate would have to be narrower so that a part-time force could focus its training in a limited amount of calendar days. This would likely mean that training for combat, beyond basic weapons training, would disappear, rather focusing on likely domestic requirements such as first aid, operating rescue vehicles and equipment, urban containment, etc. Second, the terms of service would need to change for the ARes to become institutionally responsive and reliable. This implies a percentage of full-time cadre in every unit for leadership, liaison, training and maintenance purposes. Otherwise, the domestic burden will remain on the regular army. Third, units would need to be located in large enough population centers, not only to be close to the population they serve but to be able to self-generate. The next section will examine what like-minded allies have done in efforts to optimize force posture and structures with a view to better addressing modern-day security requirements.

### **PART 3: WHAT CANADA'S ALLIES ARE DOING**

20. The United States has both an Army Reserve Component (RC) and an Army National Guard (ANG). While the RC is designed to augment the Active Duty (regular

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<sup>40</sup> List of the 100 largest population centers in Canada, retrieved from [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_the\\_100\\_largest\\_population\\_centres\\_in\\_Canada](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_the_100_largest_population_centres_in_Canada)

army) component much like Canada, the difference lies in the obligation of formed units to deploy for year-long rotations if called upon, based on a given force generation model, which changes based on the strategic environment and the demand for armed forces.<sup>41</sup> While the RC consists of federal troops, every state has its National Guard (state troops) which can be activated by the Governor on no-notice, upon declaration of a state of emergency. By the end of the day on 9/11, for example, the governor of New York had mobilized 3500 ANG troops to assist first responders.<sup>42</sup>

21. National Guardsmen and women, much like Canada's reservists, train part-time – on average one weekend every month and two full time weeks every year – and stand ready to serve their state. That being said, they are still a component of the Army and thus may be called on active duty – as was the case during the decade-long Global War on Terror<sup>43</sup> – or be mobilized for service across states in extreme emergencies. During Hurricane Katrina which killed 1800 people, displaced over one million more and inflicted 160 billions of dollars in damage<sup>44</sup>, Lieutenant-General Steven Blum, at the time chief of the Guard Bureau was quoted saying: “All 50 states, four territories, any place that had a Guard unit, sent help. Over 50,000 Guard members responded to Katrina with

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<sup>41</sup> Rand Corporation, p.29.

<sup>42</sup> Paul Fanning and Richard Goldenberg, “Responding to Terror”, the Guard Times, Volume 9, Number 5, 2001, Retrieved from <https://dmna.ny.gov/gt/septoct2001.html#respond>

<sup>43</sup> Ricky A. Kimmel, “The National Guard in Transformation: Preparing Army National Guard Brigade Combat Teams in the Army Force Generation Model”, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2006, p.73

<sup>44</sup> The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, « Hurricane Katrina », Encyclopædia Britannica, retrieved from <https://www.britannica.com/event/Hurricane-Katrina>

just a phone call. That was the largest, most rapid military response to a natural disaster in the history of the world”<sup>45</sup>.

22. Beyond the obvious federal and state-level policies required to support such endeavors, lies a sophisticated level of cooperation and understanding between all levels of government and security institutions as to the role and place of the ANG at home.

When the Australian Defence Forces commissioned Rand Corporation in 2018 to review their army’s force generation concepts, Rand summarized its findings, identifying three areas of principal importance for effective generation of armed forces: “(1) prioritizing the roles and missions of the Army, (2) designing a force to align with these roles and missions, and (3) continued communication across all levels of Defence and with Government to be able to perform the agreed roles and missions”.<sup>46</sup>

23. The National Guard has also been called upon to provide security in G8 Summits, in airports, on state borders and around critical infrastructure. The ability for States and the U.S. government to rely on formed National Guard units, actually takes the burden away from active duty forces whereas in Canada, any domestic response is led by the regular force, and augmented only by individual reservists based on their willingness and availability to serve. The National Guard provides the U.S. government with a highly agile and responsive domestic force, while also being able to leverage its units for active duty in times of war.

24. Unlike the larger U.S. armed forces, the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) are very similar to Canada in size and budget, with just over 58 000 in the permanent force,

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<sup>45</sup> Michael Dan, “How 9/11 changed the National Guard”, the Guard Bureau, 2006, retrieved from <https://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/news/2006/09/sec-060905-arnews02.htm>

<sup>46</sup> Rand Corporation, summary XVII.

approximately 30 000 of those in the Army which also has a Reserve Component (RC) of 15 000 members<sup>47</sup>. The most recent annual defence report highlights the Australian army's achievement domestically, noting its response to natural disasters such as tropical cyclone Marcus (17 March 2018), the support to Gold Coast Commonwealth Games and maritime security.<sup>48</sup>

25. To support these operations, the Army RC structure is much leaner than Canada's, with the same rough amount of people grouped under only six brigades compared to ten in Canada. Unlike Canada where RC brigades fall under regular army divisions, the six Australian RC brigades fall under the same division (the 2<sup>nd</sup> division)<sup>49</sup>, which enables a standardized approach to recruiting, training and force management. Also like Canada, the Army has three permanent brigade groups which rotate through 36-month readiness cycles (12 months reset, 12 months training and 12-month deployment window). Every permanent brigade group is paired with two RC brigades for force generation purposes only, and are obliged to generate between the two of them, a full battalion group (approximately 800 personnel) for every 12-month deployment cycle. During this period, units may be called to serve domestically, overseas or on major exercises<sup>50</sup>. In a 2017 speech, Lieutenant General Angus Campbell – then chief of the Army, said that: “Our Reserve now generates significant collective capability every year. This is most

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<sup>47</sup> Australian Government Department of Defence, “Annual Report 17-18”, p.14 retrieved from [https://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/17-18/Downloads/DAR\\_2017-18\\_Complete.pdf](https://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/17-18/Downloads/DAR_2017-18_Complete.pdf)

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, p.21

<sup>49</sup> The Australian Army, “Plan Beersheba”, retrieved from: <https://web.archive.org/web/20151204175223/http://www.army.gov.au/Our-future/Projects/Plan-BEERSHEBA/Reserves>

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

evident in the ‘reinforcing battle group’ of around 850 soldiers provided to the ‘ready ‘Army brigade during our major exercise period’<sup>51</sup>.

26. A trained battalion group, which can be relied upon during every deployment cycle is not insignificant. Part of what makes this possible is the Defence Reserve Service Protection Act (2001) – for which there is no equivalent in Canada - which “makes it an offence for an employer to discriminate against, disadvantage, hinder or dismiss an employee or prospective employee for rendering Defence service.<sup>52</sup>” Beyond effective policy, the ADF’s approach to enable RC generation was not to impose more rules and obligations on its members. Surprisingly, the ADF’s *Total Force Model*<sup>53</sup> provides much more employment flexibility than in Canada, recognizing for example, five different categories of service for its reservists<sup>54</sup> ranging from full-time employment with minor limitations, to what the ADF refers to as the “stand-by reserve”, which applies to members unwilling or unable to serve for a period exceeding 48 months<sup>55</sup>. On that note, Australia differentiates its active reserve –an operational reserve, from its stand-by reserve – a strategic reserve with trained individuals which could be leveraged in extremis.

27. To be able to increase the RC recruitment by more than 50% in 2017 while retaining its talent pool, the army conducted a comprehensive analysis of its training and

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<sup>51</sup> Lieutenant General Angus Campbell, Chief of Army, “Australian Army Reserve transformation - A total force” Address to the Royal United Services Institute (Victoria), Defence Plaza Melbourne, 12.30pm, Thursday 27 July 2017.

<sup>52</sup> Australian Defense Reserve Support, “Reservist Handbook”, 2018, p.11 retrieved from <http://content.defencejobs.gov.au/pdf/triservice/ReservistsHandbook.pdf>

<sup>53</sup> Australian Department of Defence, “The Service Spectrum”, retrieved from <https://www.defence.gov.au/ADF-totalworkforcemodel/ServiceSpectrum.asp>

<sup>54</sup> Australian Government Department of Defence, “Annual Report 17-18”, Chapter 7, retrieved from <https://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/17-18/Chapter7.asp#planning>

<sup>55</sup> Australian Defense Reserve Support, p.24.

adapted to the realities of RC units and people living in urban versus rural areas. The chief of the Army noted:

“Soldiers who live in urban areas often have more flexible training attendance options, due to simple proximity. These range from weeknight / weekday options, through to weekends and modular blocks of training. For rural, regional and remote soldiers, many of whom may be hundreds of kilometres away from their unit’s hub, such options are neither feasible nor desirable. An example of modular training may see up to 3 x 9 day blocks (weekend, workweek, weekend) and 5 x weekend blocks within a training year”<sup>56</sup>.

Further, to sustain recruitment understanding that “Reserve locations reflect Australia’s demography in 1917 rather than that of 2017”, the chief of the army recognized the requirement to study the most recent population census prior to determining new RC unit locations<sup>57</sup>.

28. To summarize, the Australian army reserves, no greater in size, are able to generate a battalion group of reservists of over 800 servicemen and women, every year in support of domestic or international operations. They have achieved this endeavor through sound policy enabling job protection, by adapting training framework for units in remote areas and by increasing flexibility through service categories, which has encouraged continued service (retention).

## **CONCLUSION**

29. This paper was not meant to diminish the Canadian Army Reserve member’s outstanding contribution to the nation in terms of force generating high quality individuals for training and operations with the regular army. Rather, it is the institution that requires significant change if it is to optimize its capacity to generate significant capability. DND and the CAF have much to learn from like-minded allies in terms of

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<sup>56</sup> Lieutenant General Angus Campbell, Chief of Army, 2017 speech.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, 2017.

security posture. Considering the ever-increasing natural hazards - not to mention other threats to domestic security – and the increasing burden this is placing on the regular army, assigning the domestic mandate to a purpose-trained, built and equipped reserve force should be further explored. Under this mandate, the ARes would not be able to augment the regular army for operations overseas as it has in the past. To address this gap, it would have to be agreed upon that the army during peace time would contribute 15-20% less troops to operations overseas, otherwise to increase regular army ranks in accordance with desired effects. The money saved from ARes unit rationalization could be put towards building larger and more modern infrastructure to house a select few fully manned units with their respective equipment. Giving ARes members a permanent monthly allowance as a premium for the obligation to respond to the call of duty should be explored, as this would contractually oblige responsiveness. But prior to any change taking place, serious discussions need to occur at the highest levels of government, so that a common understanding and agreement is reached on the domestic role of the CAF, specifically the ARes. This will enable proper policy and financial support to ARes units and members. Once achieved, a force structure review will need to occur so that the organization becomes leaner, purposely trained and equipped with an optimized command and control architecture. Lastly, continued discussion across departments will be necessary so that the ARes can achieve its mission with no risk of undesirable interference or duplication of efforts.

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