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Combatting Hateful Conduct: The Persistent Enemy

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Solo Flight

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COMBATTING HATEFUL CONDUCT: THE PERSISTENT ENEMY

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INTRODUCTION

On 18 November 2017, Cpl Nolan Caribou took his life in the Canadian Forces Base Shilo training area, while on exercise with his unit, the Royal Winnipeg Rifles. An investigation by the Medical Professional Technical Suicide Review (MPTSR)¹ unearthed several concerns about his treatment by unit members. At the core of these allegations was the revelation that Cpl Caribou had been endlessly bullied by his peers and immediate supervisors while his higher chain of command failed in their response to appropriately address his complaints.²

Cpl Caribou's case exemplifies the extreme impact of hateful conduct. Bullying and harassment deteriorate morale and productivity in the workplace, but also fail the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in its efforts to recruit and retain valuable knowledge and experience from various diverse communities. Recently, the CAF amended Defence Administration Order and Directive (DAOD) 5019-0 to include the definition of *hateful conduct* and published a Military Personnel Command (MILPERSCOM) instruction to address this issue.³ That said, this is not the first time that the CAF has endeavoured to cease bullying and racism within its ranks. The late 1990's *Standard for Harassment and Racism Prevention (SHARP)* was the CAF's first attempt to set an appropriate standard of

¹ Department of National Defence, *Statement - Statement by Commander 3rd Canadian Division on the Findings of the Board of Inquiry into the Death of Corporal Nolan Caribou* (Edmonton, AB: National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces, 17 December 2018).

https://wfpquantum.s3.amazonaws.com/pdf/2018/43353_Nolan%20Caribou%20press%20releases.pdf

² Sean Bruyea, "Why a military suicide should have been prevented — and why it wasn't," *CBC News* (18 December 2018), accessed 20 May 21. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/opinion-sean-bruyea-military-suicide-1.4950709>

³ Commander MILPERSCOM, *New CAF Administrative Order and Military Personnel Instruction on Hateful Conduct* (Ottawa: The Maple Leaf, 24 July 2020), accessed 26 May 2021.

<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/defence/2020/07/new-caf-ao-mp-instruction-hateful-conduct.html>

behaviour and rid the CAF of harassment and racism, followed by Operation HONOUR in 2015.

This paper will analyze the CAF's previous efforts to realign its harmful conduct and behaviours to meet the expectations of Canadian society. Using the Walt and Gilson policy formation model, an analysis will be conducted to examine SHARP training, Operation HONOUR and the Hateful Conduct policy contained within the MILPERSCOM instruction. In particular, the paper will complete a comparison between Operation HONOUR and Hateful Conduct to determine if this new initiative will realize positive progress compared to its predecessor. From this analysis, this essay will show that the CAF senior leadership must engage former member victims to expand its process and intellectual content, otherwise, hateful conduct will be continue to persist in the CAF.

SHARP DECLINE

SHARP training, introduced in 1998, was the CAF's first formalized training attempt to address harassment, bullying, discrimination and sexual misconduct throughout its ranks.⁴ A 1998 MacLean's magazine surfaced the brutal treatment and rape of women in the ranks,⁵ still forging their existence in the CAF, following a Canadian Human Rights Tribunal decision in 1989 that opened up all military occupations to women.⁶ SHARP training faded away by 2000, but the CAF released a harassment

⁴ Department of National Defence, *The Operation HONOUR Manual* (Ottawa: The Government of Canada, 3 December 2019), para 9. In the context of this essay, SHARP refers to the training and harassment policies that were in complimentary tools in the 1988 to this era.

⁵ Jane O'Hara, Brenda Branswell, John Geddes, Shanda Deziel, Sharon Doyle Driedger, and Stephanie Nolen "Rape in the Military", *Maclean's* (25 May 1998), accessed 21 May 2021. <https://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/rape-in-the-military/>

⁶ Gauthier, Houlden, Gauthier, Brown v. Canadian Armed Forces (T. D. 3/ 89), [20 February 1989]. Canadian Human Rights Tribunal Decision , <https://decisions.chrt-tcdp.gc.ca/chrt-tcdp/decisions/en/item/7013/index.do?q=gender+integration+>

policy that relied solely upon the victim to take action to resolve issues at the lowest level, before escalating further for chain of command support.⁷

By 2014, the abhorrent standard of conduct seen in the 1990s had re-emerged in the ranks, brought to light by another MacLean's magazine report about persistent sexualized behaviour in the CAF.⁸ The incoming CDS, General Jonathan Vance, acknowledged the cultural problem following the 2015 Deschamps report and responded by creating Operation HONOUR to reduce Harmful and Inappropriate Sexual Behaviour (HISB) in the CAF. Unfortunately, in spite of extensive efforts to craft a comprehensive program that eliminates HISB, the CAF deemed Operation HONOUR a failure in early 2021, following numerous allegations against high-ranking officers, setting it aside, similar to SHARP training.⁹

The latest policy requirement was derived in response to recent societal trends of extreme hate. The case of former Manitoba reservist Patrik Mathews, a recruiter for a neo-Nazi hate organization, exemplifies that pervasive extremism in the ranks exists, illustrating the requirement to respond.¹⁰ That said, this new policy targets all forms of conduct, racism, discrimination, bullying, micro aggression, and hateful conduct, that could deny Defence Team personnel of respect and dignity, negatively impacting CAF recruiting, retention, and morale.¹¹

⁷ Department of National Defence, *The Operation HONOUR Manual* (Ottawa: The Government of Canada, 3 December 2019), para 1.2-1.3.

⁸ Noémi Mercier and Alec Castonguay, "Our military's disgrace", MacLean's (16 May 2014), accessed 28 May 2021. <https://www.macleans.ca/news/canada/our-militarys-disgrace/>

⁹ Lee Berthiaume, "Canadian Armed Forces misconduct allegations put spotlight on hostile sexualized culture," *Global News* (13 March 2021), accessed 30 March 2021.

¹⁰ Andrew Russell, "Canadian Armed Forces creates 'hateful conduct' policy to combat extremism in its ranks," *Global News* (15 July 2020), accessed 24 May 21. <https://globalnews.ca/news/7180617/canadian-armed-forces-hateful-conduct-policy-extremism/>

¹¹ Commander MILPERSCOM, *New CAF Administrative Order and Military Personnel Instruction on Hateful Conduct* (Ottawa: The Maple Leaf, 24 July 2020), accessed 26 May 2021.

THE PROBLEM AND THE TOOLS

The persistence of harmful behaviours in the Canadian military, in spite of past efforts to curb them, demonstrates resistance to solutions, a defining characteristic of wicked problems.¹² Additionally, wicked problems can be considered to be a symptom of another problem.¹³ SHARP training was introduced in response to the reports of rape and sexual assault in the CAF; however, the “resistant to GI” male population responded to the presence of woman in the ranks with toxic conduct, from belittling comments to rape. For example, the problem of HISB could have been targeted by an inclusivity campaign to achieve better gains in accepting female service members at the time of SHARP. Hateful conduct conforms to these hallmarks of wicked problems, and thereby requires a comprehensive policy solution to create success in reducing or eliminating it.

The Walt and Gilson Policy Triangle provides a systematic approach to solving wicked problems that considers four factors - content, context, actors and process. While all four components are complexly interrelated,¹⁴ Walt and Gilson contend that focusing on policy *content* neglects the other three dimensions, which can make the difference between effective and ineffective policy choice and implementation.¹⁵ Further to this

<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/maple-leaf/defence/2020/07/new-caf-ao-mp-instruction-hateful-conduct.html>

¹² V. Morrison, *Wicked Problems and Public Policy* (Montréal, Québec: National Collaborating Centre for Healthy Public Policy, June 2013), 1.

https://mars.cfc.forces.gc.ca/CFCLearn/pluginfile.php/2623/mod_folder/content/0/Morrison%20en.pdf?forcedownload=1

¹³ Horst W.J. Rittel, and Melvin M. Webber, "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning," *Policy Sciences* 4, no. 2 (June 1973): 165.

<http://cfc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=poh&AN=16620094&site=ehost-live&scope=site>

¹⁴ Gill Walt, and Lucy Gilson, "Reforming the health sector in developing countries: the central role of policy analysis," *Health Policy and Planning* 9, no. 4 (1994): 355.

<http://cfc.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://doi.org/10.1093/heapol/9.4.353>

¹⁵ Ibid Walt, 355.

assertion, it is important to recognize the *context* or organizational antecedents that foster and precipitate bullying and harassment problems.

Much exploration into workplace harassment has been completed to understand the underlying causes of this problem. Hoel and Salin's research categorized organizational antecedents into four contextual headings.¹⁶ For the purposes of this analysis, culture and leadership, dominant military characteristics, will be used to evaluate as *context* of hateful conduct.

Military organizations rely heavily upon its team builders to indoctrinate and train its members to create a sense of shared identity,¹⁷ which starts almost immediately upon entry into the military and cultivates *organizational culture*. The training environment, where soldiers are indoctrinated through harsh mental and physical conditions, standards, routine, and inspections, sometimes compromises ethical conduct. Moreover, if one's superior has been brought up within these indoctrination conditions, it is difficult to break out of the cycle as they see it as necessary to build the team.¹⁸ Additionally, ideas such as the CAF's *warrior spirit* transcend time without being redefined as the organization changes, thus making the institution resistant to policy change.

Leadership, required to achieve operational objectives, is an antecedent that may cultivate acts of hateful conduct. *Leadership* must also be applied with measured consistency to foster a productive and healthy work environment. An authoritarian

¹⁶ Helge Hoel and Denise Salin, "Organisational antecedents of workplace bullying", in *Bullying and Emotional Abuse in the Workplace* (London: Taylor and Francis, 2003), 204. The four organizational antecedents are as follows: the changing nature of work, work [organization], [organizational] culture and climate, and leadership

¹⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-004, *Leadership in the Canadian Conceptual Foundations*, (Kingston ON: Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), 50-51.

¹⁸ Hoel, 211.

leadership style may create a climate of fear that leaves no room for substantiated criticism or complaints, while conversely, abdication of leadership, creates the conditions for harassment to flourish.¹⁹ The Corporal Caribou case tragically exemplifies how junior leaders orchestrated malign activities and harassed Corporal Caribou, while senior leaders applied a light-handed approach following the member's complaint,²⁰ causing excessive harm and proliferating bullying.

The *actors* or *stakeholders* are critical in the policy formulation process as they represent the affected groups, and contribute to understanding the *context*, culture and leadership, that led to the wicked problem.²¹ *Process* determines how the *content* will be delivered, engages *actors* and evaluates the evolving *context* throughout the change effort to adapt further *content*.²² The historical overview illustrates the changing context and actors, which requires appropriate *content* and an adaptive *process*, thus identifying Walt and Gilson's model as an appropriate means of conducting this analysis.

WHY SHARP WAS DULL

SHARP training was a dismally unsuccessful, knee-jerk response to several damaging MacLean's articles rather than a formulated policy. That said, the CAF's 1998 approach to the rape reports is worthy of analysis in this paper as it clearly highlights the policy shortcomings of the CAF's first attempt at tackling this wicked problem.

Regarding the Walt and Gilson policy model, the CAF failed in terms of all four factors of policy change. While the policy *content* was essentially a briefing, its messaging,

¹⁹ Ibid., 213.

²⁰ Caroline Barghout, "Probe of soldier's suicide reveals hazing, harassment, fight club at Winnipeg armoury," CBC News (17 December 2018), accessed 27 May 2021.

²¹ Walt, 355.

²² Health Knowledge: Education, CPD, and Revalidation from Phast, "Principal Approaches to Policy Formation," accessed 27 May 2021, <https://www.healthknowledge.org.uk/public-health-textbook/medical-sociology-policy-economics/4c-equality-equity-policy/problems-policy-implementation>

delivery and execution failed as a result of lack of actors, and inadequate *context* and *process*.

In terms of *actors*, the CAF demonstrated minimal stakeholder engagement in developing SHARP. This assertion is evidenced by the *content* of the SHARP training video itself. The video contained a number of harassment vignettes containing unacceptable comments and behaviours. Comments to the effect of “he can’t be gay, he’s an indian...”²³ negated the seriousness of the issue. It also pointed to the reality that the CAF did not engage marginalized communities for a preview and feedback of the product. Essentially, the only stakeholders involved were senior military officials, responding to public outcry, and the unit and formation commanders responsible to execute it.

SHARP training did not appreciate the full *context* of the CAF’s conduct problems. Without proper victim stakeholder engagement, the CAF was unable to recognize how its *culture* and *leadership* were affecting its personnel. The CAF exemplified the unique paradox of an organization that attempts to create cohesive teams, while ostracizing certain subsets within those teams. Following GI, research highlights an institution where many women were immediately made to feel like they were unwelcome in their workplaces;²⁴ and yet, in the wake of sexual assaults and rape, they felt they had to remain quiet as it was not “right to tell on your team workers.”²⁵ The CAF’s team

²³ “Canadian Forces - Standard for Harassment and Racism Preventions,” YouTube video, 1:25:03, posted by “A. Ryan,” 1 October 2020,

²⁴ Lynne Gouliquer, “Soldiering in the Canadian Forces: How and Why Gender Counts!” (Ph.D thesis, Department of Sociology, McGill University, 2011), 24.

²⁵ O’Hara.

building culture clearly suppressed the voices of victims, and without proper female engagement, the context of the problem was not fully realized.

In terms of *leadership*, the CAF had a renowned history for dismissive leadership when complaints were brought forward. Even more troubling, some leaders would exert their leadership authority by turning cases against a complainant. In her 1992 rape case, Dawn Thompson's chain of command exercised its authority by charging and making an example of her for being in the male barracks where the rape happened, against the Fleet School rules.²⁶ [O'hara] This example illustrates how a demonstration of leadership, punishing a rape victim for breaking the rules, enabled the leadership *context* to remain obscured. Moreover, it glaringly sheds light on the CAF's lack of *process* by demonizing instead of supporting victims.

As stated, the CAF lacked a rigorous *process* to successfully reducing harmful behaviours in the SHARP era. Alongside the video, the CAF did have an instituted harassment policy since 1988, updated in 2000 with DAOD 5012-0, and opened up the first-ever military ombudsman's office, in 1998, as an external entity to hear military complaints and concerns.²⁷ However, even these seemingly positive initiatives were flawed and not conducive to reducing the harassment cases. Instead, the harassment policy put the onus on the victim to let the harasser know that their actions were unwanted and inappropriate.²⁸ Again, depending on the ranks involved and the environment of the harassment, this approach may not be conducive for a victim who feels that their career will suffer or they will be disrupting the team environment.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Gouliquer, 11, 216.

²⁸ Ibid., 235.

Additionally, within SHARP training, there was no mention of the ombudsman's office as a support mechanism for victims, [video] thus demonstrating even further, a disjointed policy *process*.

In summary, the CAF did not have adequate outreach to the key stakeholders to understand context and contribute to the policy process of its harassment effort. The content did not advance the GI cause, nor did it decrease the incidents of harassment and harmful conduct. While some felt it did elevate harassment awareness, many others found it laughable,²⁹ which is more than likely the most accurate portrayal of its effectiveness. Essentially, an inadequate policy formulation approach failed both the initiative and CAF members.

IF AT FIRST YOU DON'T SUCCEED

Operation HONOUR, now defunct and implemented 15 years following SHARP, did see positive progress in terms policy formation. An external review authority (ERA) was brought in by the CAF and it discovered rampant sexual misconduct concerns in the military, making a number of recommendations in the Deschamps report. Operation HONOUR is a broad and expansive policy that adapted over a 6-year period, therefore, an exhaustive review would be lengthy. As such, its analysis will focus on key points that have direct bearing on the Hateful Conduct Policy.

The involvement of an ERA already showed promise in the CAF achieving improved actor engagement, as the institution showed a willingness to accept external scrutiny. For the most part, the CAF improved its stakeholder engagement, which

²⁹ Department of National Defence. *External Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces* (Ottawa: The Government of Canada, 27 March 2015), para 9. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/sexual-misbehaviour/external-review-2015/training.html#three353>

included the Department of National Defence (DND), military leaders at all levels.³⁰ It also included a new stakeholder, not seen with the SHARP-era policy, the bystander, with the expectation of intervention to support the victimized; however, it did overlook one key set of actors: the released victims of sexual misconduct. This group owns the voices of lived experience with respect to trauma, which could foster emotional intelligence growth when leveraged in the program *content*. The case of Major General Dawe exemplifies how even the most capable leaders are lacking in emotional intelligence. He chose to lend his support in the court case of a sexual assault perpetrator over the perpetrator's victims who both left the CAF as a result.³¹

In terms of *context*, the CAF did much better in facing the cultural and leadership challenges between the Operation HONOUR and the SHARP eras. The Deschamps report recognized that the CAF had a significant cultural problem such that there existed a disconnect between CAF personnel embodying the expected professional military ethos and the reality experienced by many CAF members day-to-day.³² Reinforced by General Vance in the order, he also boldly stated that he intended to eliminate HISB,³³ an admission that the CAF had a serious problem. Regarding *leadership*, the report identified that the chain of command tolerated sexual jokes to unwanted sexual

³⁰ Department of National Defence, *Canadian Armed Forces Progress Report Addressing Inappropriate Sexual Behaviour*, (Ottawa: Chief of Military Personnel, 1 February 2016), 4.
https://mars.cfc.forces.gc.ca/CFCLearn/pluginfile.php/2623/mod_folder/content/0/sexual-misconduct-progress-report-en.pdf?forcedownload=1

³¹ Ashley Burke, "Commander of Special Forces to be replaced early after apologizing for handling of sexual assault case," CBC News (30 April 21), accessed 27 May 21.
<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/commander-special-forces-peter-dawe-apologizes-open-letter-1.6008705>

³² Department of National Defence. *External Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces* (Ottawa: The Government of Canada, 27 March 2015), para 4.1.

³³ Department of National Defence, *CDS Op Order – Op HONOUR*, (Ottawa: Chief of Defence Staff, 14 August 2015), 3.

interactions, continuing to degrade the trust of junior members, but also desensitizing them to these behaviours and proliferating the problem.

Operation HONOUR developed a responsive *process* that induced positive results. The CDS created four definitive lines of effort,³⁴ and also included subsequent progress reports that would continue to shape the content and process of the response. For example, the first progress report recommended bystander intervention training, which was formalized in the second report.³⁵ Finally, the Directorate Professional Military Conduct - Operation HONOUR was stood up with the responsibility of taking the lead on developing policy, training, performance measurements, advising chains of command.³⁶

Operation HONOUR's *process* did have a few delinquencies that resulted in the policy's demise. In spite of the CDS's direction that all levels of leadership must embrace the HISB definition and enact policy when sexual misconduct incidents occur, there was no oversight body created to ensure that sexual misconduct cases were being handled uniformly throughout the CAF by unit Commanding Officers. While an Operation HONOUR Tracking and Analysis System monitored case data for tracking and metrics purposes,³⁷ it still did not give an accurate picture of the unit-level responses to HISB as a means of assessing the procedural "health" of units. An oversight body would have ensured procedural standardization, toward fostering a healthy work environment and duly applying process.

³⁴ Ibid., 6-7. The four lines of effort: understand, respond, support, and prevent.

³⁵ Department of National Defence, Canadian Armed Forces - Second Progress Report Addressing Inappropriate Sexual Behaviour, (Ottawa: Chief of Military Personnel, 30 August 2016), 9.

³⁶ Government of Canada, *The Operation HONOUR Manual* (Ottawa: The Government of Canada, 3 December 2019), para 1.8.

³⁷ Commander MILPERSCOM.

Secondly, the CAF had no policy consideration for HISB offenders of senior ranks. The recent and numerous high-profile cases confirm this suggestion that junior ranks feel that there are two systems of justice in the CAF.³⁸ Additionally, these cases highlight a trend of legacy incidents being reported, pointing to a damaging mindset that senior ranks condone and cover up this behaviour. With no road map in place to deal with senior-rank misconduct, it further amplifies how the leadership context negatively impacts institutional change, as it leads junior ranks to believe that meaningful change is not possible. In spite of these shortcomings, Operation HONOUR improved HISB recognition as a result of a greater focus on policy development, enabling productive and adaptive change to happen.

ANOTHER DAY, ANOTHER POLICY

To assess the new Hateful Conduct policy, the determinations from the Operation HONOUR regarding *context*, *actors* and *process* will be evaluated in conjunction with policy to determine its potential content effectiveness.

The July 2020 Hateful Conduct Instruction addresses the growing concerns of a wide spectrum of harmful behaviours ranging from harassment to extremism. Throughout this instruction, it is clear that the CAF recognizes the *context* of the problem by identifying the impact of hateful conduct, reinforcing ethical principles, and setting out definitions³⁹ to align its members with expectations. That said, *context* alone will not

³⁸ Mercedes Stephenson, Marc-Andre Cossette, and Amanda Connolly, “In her words: The woman behind McDonald allegations tells her story,” *Global News* (28 March 2021), accessed 27 May 21. <https://globalnews.ca/news/7722021/canadian-forces-sexual-misconduct-art-mcdonald-investigation/>

³⁹ Department of National Defence. *CF Mil Pers Instruction 01/20 - Hateful Conduct*, (Ottawa: Chief of Military Personnel, 10 July 2020), paras 2, 3.1, 4 .

combat the organizational antecedents that enable these harmful behaviours and attitudes to exist.

The CAF engaged relevant stakeholders such as authorities responsible for creating training, taking action and enforcement, recruiting, leadership at all levels and CAF members themselves.⁴⁰ Like Operation HONOUR, all CAF members have an obligation to proactively stop acts of Hateful Conduct; however, within the policy instruction, it makes no mention of external stakeholder engagement that could be valuable if leveraged to increase emotional intelligence in leaders. Instead, hateful conduct training has followed the Operation HONOUR model, consisting of a typical PowerPoint lecture, accompanied by vignettes to foster production, with mandatory numbers reporting. This flawed approach provides the audience with information, but fails to compel a sense of empathy for victims, highlighting that proper stakeholder engagement is critical in improving the change *content* and *process*.

Hateful Conduct has instituted a rigorous *process* to achieve its aims with this policy. It contains an intervention framework to prevent, detect and respond, provides recruiting and enrollment direction, and guides Commanding Officers' actions.⁴¹ Furthermore, like Operation HONOUR, an incident tracking system has been created to assist the CAF chain of command in reporting and handling hateful conduct incidents;⁴² however, there is no suggestion that an oversight body is being created to audit harmful conduct procedures. The MPTSR interviews, following Corporal Caribou's death, unearthed extensive unacceptable behaviours in his workplace, both undetected and

⁴⁰ Ibid., para 10.1.

⁴¹ Ibid., para 3.4, 5, 8.

⁴² Commander MILPERSCOM.

ignored. A CAF oversight function could perform a similar inspection, before it would be too late, thus strengthening the hateful conduct response process.

The Hateful Conduct policy is a significant improvement from SHARP training, placing emphasis on professionalism and ethics, while instituting an imperative on all members to intervene and support when hateful conduct is suspected or occurring. That said, hateful conduct is a complex and dynamic process, where both action and reaction should be understood within the social context in which they take place.⁴³ Like Operation HONOUR, the new policy *content* does not appear to explore emotional intelligence development in their CAF members, which would require engaging victim stakeholders and providing better unit-level oversight to ensure the moral health of all members.

CONCLUSION

Hateful conduct, harassment, and bullying have no place in an organization like the CAF that requires its personnel to be mentally and physically fit. Over the years, senior leadership have made attempts to stop harmful behaviours and actions that erode the morale of its members, trust in the chain of command and confidence of the Canadian public. While this policy response was provoked by an emerging societal trend of extremism, it nonetheless shares a common thread with its predecessor policies to instill the values of respect and decency in an effort to create a productive workplace for all CAF personnel. As such, it is imperative that the CAF learns from its SHARP and Operation HONOUR policy efforts in order to craft the operationally effective team it desires.

⁴³ Hoel, 204.

In an effort to assess the CAF's new response to hateful conduct, this essay analyzed the SHARP training program, Operation HONOUR and Hateful Conduct policy. The Walt and Gilson policy factors coupled with organizational antecedents were used to scrutinize each initiative. Through this analysis, it was determined that the SHARP program, and peripheral initiatives of that time, severely failed in all aspects of policy focus. Operation HONOUR was a definite move forward from the SHARP era; however, it showed a missed opportunity in stakeholder engagement and audit process. Likewise, the Hateful Conduct Instruction also seemed to move the bar ahead in addressing harmful behaviours through its bold grasp of context. Unfortunately, the new instruction, in its current construct, fails to address the principal shortcomings of Operation HONOUR, primarily training that ignores emotional intelligence growth and an audit function that assesses units' procedural and moral health. As such, this essay has shown that the CAF senior leadership must engage former member victims as stakeholders to expand its process and intellectual content, otherwise, hateful conduct will be continue to persist in the CAF.

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