National Defence
Défense nationale

Canadian
Forces
College

Collège
des
Forces
Canadiennes

LOGISTICS COMMAND: STRUCTURING THE ROYAL CANADIAN LOGISTICS SERVICE FOR THE FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

Major Jonathan Fortin-Grondin

JCSP 46

Solo Flight

Disclaimer

PCEMI 46

Solo Flight

Avertissement

Canada

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

JCSP 46 – PCEMI 46
2019 – 2020

SOLO FLIGHT

LOGISTICS COMMAND: STRUCTURING THE ROYAL CANADIAN LOGISTICS SERVICE FOR THE FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

By Major Jonathan Fortin-Grondin

LOGISTICS COMMAND – STRUCTURING THE ROYAL CANADIAN LOGISTICS SERVICE FOR THE FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

INTRODUCTION

> [Logistics] represents the CF's most decentralized and borderline incoherent set of organizations and processes when viewed from the top and looking down.
>
> – Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, *Report on Transformation 2011*

In 1968, the Logistics Branch was created as part of the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act. Bill C-243 saw the traditional Logistics trade unified under one command, the fourth command, where it provided services to the Canadian Forces.[1] With the Canadian Forces reverting to the traditional environmental command structure in 1984, the Logistics Branch remained unified for governance purposes.[2] The logistic functions of force generation and force employment reverted under the umbrella of the three environments, where it remains today. In 2017, the Logistics Branch became the Royal Canadian Logistics Service (RCLS).

The RCLS is the largest entity within the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and represents 14% of the entire force.[3] The RCLS Branch has the following mission "the Royal Canadian Logistics Service will produce highly skilled, professional, [sic] Logisticians who deliver operational and institutional sustainment excellence."[4] Since the RCLS does not have command of its logisticians, the Branch is *managed* through a complex multi-layered governance framework which consists of multiple committees and sub-committees that are generated across the CAF as seen in figure 1.

---

[1] J.N.M. Parent, "United we Stand, Divided we Fall: Unification of the Canadian Armed forces Logistics Branch," (Master of Defence Studies Thesis, Canadian Forces College, 2012), IV, 27.

[2] *Ibid*., 5.

[3] Department of National Defence, "Logistics Branch Governance Framework 2016," last accessed 03 March 2020, http://intranet.mil.ca/en/organizations/sjs/logistics-framework-org.page ; J.N.M. Parent, "United we Stand, Divided we Fall: Unification of the Canadian Armed forces Logistics Branch," 39.

[4] Department of National Defence, "Royal Canadian Logistics Service," last accessed 04 March 2020, http://intranet.mil.ca/en/organizations/sjs/logistics.page.

Figure 1 – Logistics Branch Governance Organization Chart

Source: Department of National Defence, "Logistics Branch Governance Framework 2016."

The various committees strive to achieve the RCLS mandate to:

> . . . develop a Branch training and management framework that ensures Canadian Forces tactical and functional requirements are addressed within the Logistics training system and to inculcate an *enduring operational focus that meets the needs of the Environmental Commanders* [emphasis added] and fosters the Warrior Spirit within the Branch.[5]

The mandate clearly shows that the RCLS plays a limited force generation role (trade-specific training) and actively tries to balance and feed the requirements of the environment commanders instead of the branch. The absence of a centralised command has resulted in the CAF's logisticians effectively splitting into three separate environments, or three distinct force generation pools.[6] This lack of *command unity* over the RCLS demonstrates a sub-optimised approach to generating a highly sought-after and

---

[5] Department of National Defence, "Royal Canadian Logistics Service."
[6] J.N.M. Parent, "United we Stand, Divided we Fall: Unification of the Canadian Armed forces Logistics Branch," 60.

scarce resource--logisticians. This approach not only reduces the available pool of resources but also creates inter-operability issues amongst logisticians while force employed. The RCLS is the only pan-service group not currently unified under a single command.

With the challenges that the current CAF Logistics structure presents, it is imperative to consider what impact the unification of the logistics community into one separate command would have on Logistics force generation and employment. This paper will demonstrate that the creation of a unified Logistics Command (LOGCOM) would enhance the force generation and force employment of the CAF's logisticians.

This paper will first look at previous CAF transformation initiatives as well as the Australian Joint Logistics Command model to analyse how the creation of a LOGCOM would affect the CAF. This section will demonstrate the importance of creating a LOGCOM in the CAF. The following section will utilise the Walt and Gilson policy model to evaluate how this transformation can succeed and what impact it would have on the CAF's environmental commands. It will prove that the previous efforts in creating a LOGCOM failed due to the inability to change the CAF's culture. The final section will take a comparative approach to other similar CAF service providers, such as Military Police and Health Services, to demonstrate that their unification under a single command constitutes a CAF best practice. It is important to note that this essay will only focus on the effects that a LOGCOM would have on force generation and force employment. Parallels can be drawn on its applicability to RLCS force management, support, and development.

LOGISTICS AND PREVIOUS TRANSFORMATIONS

The CAF is experienced in the practice of unifying its enablers, including Logistics, under a single command. With its creation in 1968, the Logistics Branch was a unified entity. This structure was also prevalent in two of the most recent CAF transformation initiatives of 2005 and 2011. The Australian Defence Force adopted a similar approach in 2017 when it created a Joint Logistics Command. These three separate case studies will demonstrate the importance of creating a LOGCOM.

2005 –Hillier's Transformation

When General Rick Hillier became the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) in 2005, he initiated the first wave of CAF transformation as a result of the CAF's substantial engagement in Afghanistan. Through his experiences in Afghanistan, Hillier saw a need to reorganise the CAF and subsequently created new operationally-focused headquarters and promoted jointness of the CAF.[7] Major-General Natynczyk was entrusted with leading this transformation and was tasked with creating a series of new headquarters, including a support command, named Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM).[8] Hillier quickly realised that grouping the CAF enablers under one command was an efficient way to increase the CAF's operational effectiveness. His vision was to ". . . create one organization that encompasses all national-level operational support (Op Sp) disciplines, with one Commander responsible to provide or arrange for support to the Canadian Forces (CF) domestic, continental and international operations."[9]

---

[7] David Perry, "Doing Less with Less. Canadian Defence Transformation and Renewal," Vimy Paper, Conference of Defence Association Institute, 2014, 8.

[8] Michael K. Jeffrey, Inside Canadian Forces Transformation: Institutional Leadership as a Catalyst for Change, Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009, 26-27, 31.

[9] R.J. Hillier, Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) Initial Planning Guidance – Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM), Ottawa: DND Canada, 2006, 1.

CANOSCOM confirmed that a unified support command, including Logistics, was a fundamental element in ensuring operational effectiveness.

In his book on the 2005 transformation, Michel Jeffrey, a retired Lieutenant-General who was part of Hillier's transformation team, articulated that the pre-2005 environment command-based structure was not conducive to effective force employment. He concluded that:

> As a consequence, the CF was still thinking in terms of what environmental capabilities it could provide, rather than fully developing joint force packages. This meant, amongst other things, that *deficiencies in key strategic enablers* [emphasis added], such as command and control, airlift, surveillance and *logistics* [emphasis added] essential to operating in this new environment, were allowed to persist.[10]

Jeffrey also determined that the lack of integration would continue to erode the operational effectiveness of the CAF. The decentralisation of logistics elements and the focus on the environmental system had a direct impact on the CAF's ability to conduct operations, or force employment. CANOSCOM stood up on the first of February 2006 to solve this problem. As the support command, it was responsible for planning, executing, and terminating theatre-level support for both domestic and international operations.[11] The creation of CANOSCOM was viewed as a success and had achieved some level of integration. By implementing a dedicated command, CANOSCOM was able to optimise the CAF's support to its mission without interference from the environment command.

Regarding force generation, Hillier's transformation team realised that the evolving operating environment would require faster responses from the CAF. The CDS's action team concluded that the future environment would ". . . require that [the]

---

[10] Michael K. Jeffrey, Inside Canadian Forces Transformation: Institutional Leadership as a Catalyst for Change, 11.

[11] *Ibid*., 31; R.J. Hillier, Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) Initial Planning Guidance – Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM), 2.

operational level commander have immediate access to the required forces, without having to appeal to other authorities for their use."[12] This critical point directly supports the argument for a unified LOGCOM. The analysis from 2005 is still relevant today and in the future operating environment. As the world is rapidly evolving, logistical support must be optimised in the CAF. Logistical support to operations is complex and cannot be provided in a moment's notice. It requires people and processes to function effectively. CANOSCOM proved that central planning and oversight (in other words, processes) are critical to force employment.

The Leslie Report of 2011 agreed that the centralisation of logistical resources through CANOSCOM was a success.[13] Leslie's report built on the CANOSCOM concept and integrated people and, therefore; force generation under this centralised command.

2011 – The Leslie Report

In 2010, the Minister of National Defence announced a new round of transformation. The Canadian Forces Transformation Team was created with Lieutenant-General Leslie as its chair. The transformation team was tasked with recommending organisational changes to increase efficiency and effectiveness, reducing overhead, and finding places where resources could be transferred to new emerging capabilities.[14] Report on Transformation 2011, better known as The Leslie Report, was completed in merely ten months. Although the document mainly focused on headquarters realignment and processes, it also addressed Logistics and readiness.

---

[12] Chief of the Defence Staff Action Team 1, Part 1, Executive Summary and Key Recommendations, Ottawa: DND Canada, 2005, 3.

[13] Department of National Defence, "Report on Transformation 2011," Last accessed 21 February 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/report-on-transformation-2011.html, 61.

[14] Department of National Defence, "Report on Transformation 2011, 2 ; Andrew Godefroy, "The Ghost of General Otter: Putting the Canadian Forces Report on Transformation 2011 in Context" (Research Paper, Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2012), Executive summary.

The report was quick to demonstrate the structural issues of the CAF, clearly stating that the enablers, such as Logistics, have ". . . broad pan-CF remits for which no obvious logical location existed; at least within the current Environmental force generators."[15] Leslie understood that the specific and pan-CAF nature of Logistics made it unsuitable for remaining within the environmental commands. Logistics requires a separate command. Although CANOSCOM was a start, the Leslie report concluded that it was still inadequate for Logistics.

> Force Support is a cross-cutting enabler and critical foundational activity that permeates and underpins Force Employment and Force Generation. This functional area is the focus of many existing organizations, but currently has no central oversight beyond those niche capabilities provided by CANOSCOM.[16]

After evaluating multiple options, The Leslie Report identified a solution to permanently resolve the oversight and inefficiencies currently associated with CAF Logistics. Leslie recommended the creation of a centralised command for the CAF support functions.[17]

The Leslie Report was received with mixed reviews. General (then retired) Hillier even went as far as stating on television that full implementation of the report had the potential to destroy the CAF.[18] Focused on trimming headquarters, the operational commands, including CANOSCOM, were merged into the Canadian Joint Operations Command. The merger was acceptable to Leslie as he intended to create a separate Joint Support Command. This command would align with the rest of the environmental commands and would oversee the same functions. On the creation of the Joint Support Command, the report stated that it would ". . . oversee internal force generation of

---

[15] Department of National Defence, "Report on Transformation 2011, 55.
[16] *Ibid*., 43.
[17] *Ibid*., 11.
[18] Andrew Godefroy, "The Ghost of General Otter: Putting the Canadian Forces Report on Transformation 2011 in Context, 7.

support functions, just as an Environmental Chief. In this sense, the Force Support

concept bridges and encompasses elements of both Force Employment and Force

Generation."[19]

Leslie concluded that in order to fix the CAF's logistical issues, it was necessary

for the removal of the Logistics Branch from the environmental commands with

placement under a separate command. By having direct command of all CAF Logistics,

the Joint Support Commander could optimise the CAF force generation and force

employment of its Logistics. There was no ambiguity in the report; the Joint Support

Commander would own the CAF's Logistics. In addition to the current capability

residing in CANOSCOM, the Joint Support Command would ". . . exercise full vertical

and horizontal control of all bases, supply depots, and non-deployable formed support

units, in a supported/supporting construct."[20]

The 2011 transformation report presented a complete and honest evaluation of the

CAF's Logistics. The recommendation to create a unified Joint Support Command was

also influenced by a study of Canada's military allies such as Australia, the United

Kingdom, and the United States, who also sought to regroup their joint enablers.[21]

Australia and the Joint Logistics Command

As part of its defence initiatives, Australia created a Joint Logistics Command

(JLC) in 2017. This command acts as the head of Logistics for the Australian Defence

Force. It has the following role "the Joint Logistics Command (JLC) mission is to lead

the coordinated delivery of effective and efficient logistics to enable Defence to train,

---

[19] Department of National Defence, "Report on Transformation 2011, 61.
[20] *Ibid*., 47-48.
[21] *Ibid*., 20.

fight and win."[22] By regrouping its Logistics under the JLC, the Australian Defence Force increased its Logistics' efficiencies which in return increased its force employment.

The JLC is a two-star command that resides under the Joint Capability Group. As a command, it is responsible for ensuring that ". . . the Command's functions and effects are aligned and harnessed to ensure the full potential of JLC's logistics capability in support of military operations are realised."[23] Two of the major roles that JLC headquarters oversees are the management of joint logistics and the planning, coordination, and execution of logistics delivery. The JLC fulfils its mission by ". . . enabl[ing] the Services to meet their raise, train and sustain function."[24] The JLC not only manages the Australian Defence Force Logistics for operations and exercises but also acts as a force generator for the joint logistics capability. While recent, the adoption of a centralised structure has increased both force generation and force employment of Australia's military Logistics.

Although the two CAF transformation initiatives, as well as the Australian JLC, support the creation of a LOGCOM, it could be argued that a new command would only replicate how the current environment commands function. The creation of a LOGCOM could also be viewed as being counterproductive to CAF efficiency as it would not optimise the overall force generation and force employment of the CAF.[25] This argument is not valid as the CAF is currently growing new capabilities and headquarters. The creation of a LOGCOM could arise from within the existing positions that are associated

---

[22] Australian Government Department of Defence, "Joint Capabilities Group," Last accessed 23 March 2020, https://www.defence.gov.au/jcg/.

[23] Australian Defence Doctrine Publication, ADDP 4.0, *Logistics Series Defence Logistics*, 3rd ed. Canberra: DoD Australia, 2017, 3-3,2.

[24] Australian Government, "Joint Logistics Command," Last accessed 23 March 2020, https://www.directory.gov.au/portfolios/defence/department-defence/joint-capabilities-group/joint-logistics-command.

[25] Department of National Defence, "Report on Transformation 2011, 54.

with Logistics. Centralising all logistics under one command would produce an increase in the CAF's force generation and force employment by having access to the complete CAF Logistics inventory for all missions.

The 2005, 2011, and Australian JLC initiatives demonstrate that centralising Logistics would increase the efficiency of not only the Logistics Branch but the CAF. CANOSCOM focused on the force employment aspect of Logistics. Through a detailed analysis, the Leslie report demonstrated the importance of creating a LOGCOM as a separate command. A LOGCOM would authorise the centralisation of all Logistics resources under a unified command and would allow the Logistics Branch to own and conduct its force generation activities.

CHANGE AND THE IMPACT ON ENVIRONMENTAL COMMANDS

Although the Leslie report presented a clear vision for the Logistics Branch and the creation of a LOGCOM, the CAF did not adopt the proposed structure. The failure to adopt the model can be associated with the CAF's inability to transform and change its culture. The approaches of the 2005 and 2011 transformations did not include significant input from the environment commands. This section will look at how the application of the Walt and Gilson policy model could help in breaking the cultural transformation barrier associated with transferring Logistics from the environmental commands to a LOGCOM.

The Model

The Walt and Gilson policy model was developed in 1994 when its authors realised that most policy analysis models put too much emphasis on policy content. Walt and Gilson explain that such emphasis while creating policies tends to hinder its

implementation.[26] For a successful change in policy to occur, the Walt and Gilson model argues that the emphasis ought to reside on the actors involved in the policy reform.[27] As seen in figure 2, the Walt and Gilson model places actors as the central element to policy reform.


Figure 2 – Walt and Gilson Policy Model

Source: G. Walt and L. Gilson, "Reforming the health sector in developing countries: the central role of policy analysis," 354.

This model explains that although content, process, and context are necessary for effective policymaking, the actors are at the centre of any policy change.

Environmental Culture

By analysing the proposed creation of a LOGCOM with the Walt and Gilson policy model, it becomes apparent why the 2005 and 2011 reports did not create a unified LOGCOM. The CAF did not adequately include the environment commanders (actors) and was therefore not able to change the current culture. When studying the impact of organisational culture in the CAF, Ross W. Ermel articulates that the environmental

---

[26] G. Walt and L. Gilson, "Reforming the health sector in developing countries: the central role of policy analysis," *Health Policy Planning* 9, no. 4 (1994): 355-356.
[27] *Ibid.*, 353.

culture drives each command to the point that they would rather work with the CAF allies instead of the other CAF commands.[28]

This environment-centric culture is the sole issue that will always prevent the creation of a LOGCOM. Throughout history, the environment commands owned, trained, and formed their Logistics. From the environments' perspective, logisticians require Navy, Army, or Air Force specific training and must be raised in each respective environment's culture to provide effective support. The idea that only a sailor can support a ship, or that it takes an Army Logistics Officer to sustain a land-based task force is an outdated concept. In his graduation thesis, Mark Parent captures the significance of that challenge:

> This important paradigm shift of breaking away from old traditions (e.g. "every service has its own Logisticians") and ways of thinking (e.g. "I need my Logisticians to be a sailor/aviator/soldier to be able to support my operations") would be for certain military leaders (e.g. combat operators as the pilot and infantry communities) very provocative and disheartening indeed.[29]

By not changing the uniform colour-based culture, any transformation initiatives that see Logistics unified under a separate command will not succeed. In his study of CAF transformation, Doctor Fitzsimmons describes the importance of *selling* the concept of transformation to CAF leadership. The power and influence that the environment commanders possess are vital to any structural transformation.[30] The Walt and Gilson

---

[28] Ross W. Ermel, *The Impact of Organizational Culture: A Study of Selected Strategic Change Initiatives in the Canadian Forces*, Last accessed 04 March 2020, http://dtpr.lib.athabascau.ca/action/download.php?filename=mba-10/open/ermelross.pdf, 33.

[29] J.N.M. Parent, "United we Stand, Divided we Fall: Unification of the Canadian Armed forces Logistics Branch, 2.

[30] Dan Fitzsimmons, "Transformation in the Canadian Forces: A Sociological Institutionalist Approach to Change in the CF from Peacekeeper to War Fighter," Paper for the Canadian Political Science Association, Carleton University, 2009, 3.

model supports this concept. The creation of a LOGCOM would require a change in this environmental culture, a change that must come from the environment commanders.

Effecting Change

Even though the current CAF structure works with the environments in generating logistical capabilities for operations, the current approach is complicated and not optimal. In 2012, the Standing Committee on National Defence expressed concerns regarding the state of readiness of the CAF; in other words, its ability to force generate. Then Major-General Vance's testimony explained why the current approach to readiness tends to focus mainly on the *fighting* force. Based on General Vance's testimony, the report determined that ". . . there is always a tendency to look at the large pieces of the Canadian Forces: the battalions, the ships, the aircraft as being the most important element of readiness, while forgetting the enablers that allow forces to operate effectively."[31] The CAF's readiness is directly tied to its ability to force generate, an activity controlled by the environmental commands. Understandably, the Navy, Army, and Air Force focus primarily on their *fighting* elements, as it is, after all, their raison d'être. When it comes to force generation, Logistics is not the priority of the environmental commands. The CAF must have a dedicated force generation element to focus on the generation of logistics capabilities as it plays a vital role in CAF force employment.

The Walt and Gilson model shows that cultural changes, such as centralising Logistics, can only be accomplished via the environment commanders with clear and meaningful dialogue surrounding the importance of the process. Walt and Gilson explain

---

[31] House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defence, The State of Readiness of the Canadian Forces, December 2012, 1:41, 12.

that "focus on policy content diverts attention from understanding the processes which explain why desired policy outcomes fail to emerge."[32] Understandably, the environment commanders would be opposed to *losing* their Logistics; as it is an essential element in accomplishing their mandate. The creation of a LOGCOM does not and cannot equate to the environment commanders not having logistics support. Using the approach suggested by the Walt and Gilson model means that environment commanders would be at the centre, shaping both the content (LOGCOM) and the process. In this instance, the process would define how the environment commanders would continue to receive logistical support. By instituting change through the application of the Walt and Gilson model, the environment commanders could ensure that the necessary support to their command would not be negatively impacted and would, therefore, be able to accomplish their mandate. With the creation of a LOGCOM through this approach, the environment commanders would benefit from receiving logistical support from a central command without having to execute the complex management functions that are associated with Logistics. It would allow environmental commanders the luxury to focus their efforts, time, and resources on the elements that are unique to their command.

The Walt and Gilson policy model gives a precise approach to the creation of a LOGCOM. Environment commanders must have the ability to receive logistical support but need not command it. By putting the environment commanders at the centre of the process, the cultural resistance that plagued the 2005 and 2011 transformations would not occur. The next section will look at other CAF enablers that successfully support the environment commanders while belonging to a different command.

---

[32] G. Walt and L. Gilson, "Reforming the health sector in developing countries: the central role of policy analysis, 354.

THE ENABLERS STRUCTURE

Aside from Logistics, the CAF is composed of multiple cross-service enablers. In his thesis, Parent evaluated the structure of the Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers Corps to demonstrate the need to place Logistics under one command.[33] This analysis, however; focused on an Army Corps that produces land-centric focus to other services. In this section, an evaluation of the Military Police and Health Services will be conducted. These two case studies will demonstrate that vertical integration of CAF enablers has been implemented with success.

The Military Police

The Military Police's vertical integration resulted from the 2005 and 2011 transformation reports. The Canadian Forces Military Police Group (CF MP Gp) was created in 2007 and regrouped all Military Police units that were not under environmental commands.[34] In 2011, the environmental commands completed vertical integration by transferring their Military Police units to the CF MP Gp. Today, the CF MP Gp has full command over all Military Police elements of the CAF.[35] Figure 3 demonstrates how the CF MP Gp was structured to provide continuity of service to the environmental command by creating Navy, Army, and Air Force Military Police groups. This structure and its applicable processes enabled the transfer of the Military Police function under a separate command. By working with the environment commanders, the CF MP Gp achieved its vertical integration, something that has not been possible for the Logistics Branch. The

---

[33] .N.M. Parent, "United we Stand, Divided we Fall: Unification of the Canadian Armed forces Logistics Branch," 36, 61.

[34] Department of National Defence, "Canadian Forces Military Police Group (CF MP Gp)," Last accessed 04 March 2020, http://intranet.mil.ca/en/organizations/vcds/cf-mp-gp.page.

[35] *Ibid*.

environmental Military Police groups all have the same mandate: to provide policing services to its supported environment and to facilitate force generation.[36]


Figure 3 – Military Police Structure

Source: Department of National Defence, "Canadian Armed Forces Organizational Chart."

To accomplish its mandate, the CF MP Gp realises the following vision ". . . [to] generate and sustain a credible & professional force properly resourced and enabled to conduct operations in the joint, combined environment through the implementation of its assigned mission and core functions."[37] The Canadian Forces Provost Marshal is the commander of the CF MP Gp and exercises full command over all Military Police

---

[36] *Ibid*.

[37] Department of National Defence, "Canadian Forces Provost Marshal Annual Report Fiscal Year 2018-2019," Last accessed 03 March 2020, https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/dnd-mdn/documents/reports/2019/cfpm-annual-report-2018-2019.pdf, 3.

personnel.[38] This structure allows the CF MP Gp to control force generation of Military

Police resources without interference from the environmental commands. The Military

Police doctrine stipulates that the force generation of its capabilities is conducted across

the complete CF MP Gp, and not just based on what environment constitutes the majority

of the deployed task force.[39] By having access to the complete Military Police inventory

(people and resources), the Provost Marshal can successfully balance the requirements of

the environmental commanders, the force generation of Military Police, the force

employment for the Canadian Joint Operations Command, and all other military policing

requirements. The unity of command that CF MP Gp possesses allows for a better

balancing of its limited resources, something that is not achievable within the current

CAF Logistics structure.

The centralisation of the Military Police function also allowed for an increase in

force employment efficiency. Before its vertical integration, planning for Military Police

employment on operations lacked the necessary focus and expertise. The lack of planning

through a specialised headquarters resulted in ". . . no set command, control and

organization structures for commanders to respect, and deployed MP units were

constantly changing through the course of a mission."[40] The continuously evolving nature

of the operating environment prompted the Military Police to increase its role and tasks,

such as detainee operations, during CAF deployments.[41] The ability to adapt the

employment of a specialised branch, such as Military Police or Logistics, requires in-

---

[38] Department of National Defence, "Canadian Forces Provost Marshal Annual Report Fiscal Year 2018-2019," 7.

[39] Department of National Defence, B-GL-362-001/FP-001, *Military Police in Operations*, Ottawa: DND Canada, 2012, 1-6.

[40] *Ibid*., 2-12.

[41] *Ibid*., 2-1.

depth knowledge of the branch. Changes to the employment concept of a specialised group can only be successful if generated within its component. For instance, the Air Force would be the only place where the CAF would turn to adapt fighter jet employments. This fundamental principle reinforces the need for a LOGCOM. A unified command would ensure that the CAF's Logistics Branch remains ready for the future operating environment.

The Health Services

Similar to the Military Police, the Health Services branch is vertically integrated into a single command. The integration resulted from the Defence Service Project (Project Rx2000) that examined the quality of healthcare delivery to the CAF. The CDS initiated the project in 2000 as a result of both internal and external reviews of the CAF medical system. The reports indicated that the CAF's ". . . health care delivery is not uniform, is frequently below Canadian standards and the CF medical services are no longer *adequately structured* [emphasis added], postured or capable."[42] Additionally, the reports showed that the CAF Health Services, in its former structure, was not able to provide the necessary care to the CAF at home and on operations.[43] Project Rx 2000 delivered a new structure for Health Services, one that respected the principle of primacy of operations (force employment) but also focused on increasing the efficiency of the Health Services in garrison (force generation).[44]

The result of Project Rx 2000 was a structure that unified Health Services into a vertically integrated organization, one that encompassed all aspects of the Health

---

[42] Department of National Defence, *Quality Healthcare Delivery to the Canadian Forces Anytime, Anywhere*, Defence Services Project, 00000297 – Rx2000, 2000, 1.
[43] *Ibid.*, 3.
[44] *Ibid.*, 4-5.

Services function. Today, the Canadian Forces Health Services Group's (CF H Svcs Gp) mandate is to ". . . provide health services across Canada and overseas to Canadian military personnel and to any other populations as directed by the Minister of National Defence."[45] To achieve this mandate, the CF H Svcs Gp is structured as depicted in figure 4.


Figure 4 – Health Services Structure

Source: Department of National Defence, "Canadian Armed Forces Organizational Chart."

Contrary to the Military Police, the CF H Svcs Gp is not structured in environmental command support groups but instead divided into two regional command groups. To support the environment commanders, the CF H Svcs Gp has medical advisors embedded in the Navy, Army, Air Force, and Joint commands. It allows the respective commanders to receive advice that is specific to the needs of their

---

[45] Department of National Defence, "Health Services," Last accessed 04 March 2020, http://cmp-cpm.mil.ca/en/health/health-services.page.

environment.[46] This integration at the headquarters level allows for a better liaison with the CF H Svcs Gp, which in turn tailors the medical support provided to each environment's force generation activities.[47] This model has proven to be efficient and could easily apply to the creation of a LOGCOM.

One of the numerous advantages of using a single command structure is the ability to control the doctrine associated with it. The commander of the CF H Svcs Gp is responsible for the ". . . development and maintenance of CF HSS doctrine. The Commander CF H Svcs Gp exercises responsibility for pan-CF and joint doctrine through the CF Doctrine Board."[48] By having a unified doctrine, Health Services has drastically improved its ability to support environmental command force generation, force generated medical support, and force employment of these resources. Contrary to the Health Services, the Logistics Branch currently has four different doctrines, one per element and a joint doctrine. Unlike the Health Services, the Logistics Branch force generates by element, using elemental logistics doctrine. Operation *Impact* demonstrates how training with different doctrines reduces the effectiveness of Logistics force employment. Lieutenant-Colonel Luc Girouard wrote about the issues that multiple Logistics doctrines had on Operation *Impact*, noting ". . . how challenging the fusion of these sustainment doctrines can become when applied practically in theatre."[49] A unified command with a single doctrine, such as the Health Services, enables force generation activities. Additionally, a common doctrine alleviates the issues associated with merging different

---

[46] Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-410/FP- 000, *Joint Doctrine Health Services Support to Operations*, Ottawa: DND Canada, 2007, 1-21.

[47] *Ibid*., 1-15.

[48] *Ibid*., V.

[49] Luc Girouard, "The Fusion of Doctrines: A Discussion of Sustainment Operations During Operation IMPACT," *Royal Canadian Airforce Journal* 7, no. 1 (Winter 2018), 33.

doctrines while on deployment. A single doctrine that results from a unified command increases the efficiency of force employment.

When applying the structure of the Military Police and Health Services as a case study for the creation of a LOGCOM, it would seem natural to make the argument that they are not comparable. Within the environmental commands, the Logistics function is combat-integrated and woven throughout the complete structure from the unit to the highest level of headquarters. It would mean that the Military Police and Health Services are solely specialised forces that are added when required. However, this concept is inaccurate as both the Military Police and Health Services are integrated throughout the environmental commands at various levels. The Health Services function is as integrated as Logistics is, starting at the unit level.[50] Through its vertical integration, the CF H Svcs Gp maintains a high level of service throughout the environmental commands while maintaining full command of its inventory. Of all the CAF enablers, Health Services resembles the CAF's Logistics the closest and has demonstrated that vertical integration, while maintaining support to the environmental commands, is achievable.

The Military Police and Health Services represent two successful cases where the service support providers are vertically integrated. Both support branches have a single chain of command where each commander has full command over its complete inventory (people and resources). The cultural attachment to environmental commands is alleviated through an environment-based structure, as demonstrated in the Military Police model, or by strategically positioning advisors, such as the Health Services structure. Both the CF MP Gp and CF H Svcs Gp are responsible for force generation of their assets while

---

[50] Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-410/FP- 000, *Joint Doctrine Health Services Support to Operations*, 1-15.

supporting the force generation activities of the Navy, Army, and Air Force. Finally, the case studies demonstrate that possessing a single doctrine dramatically increases the effectiveness of force employment, something that can be achieved by unifying all elements of the CAF's logistics under a separate LOGCOM.

CONCLUSION

In 1968, the Logistics Branch was created as a unified branch and as a separate command. When the CAF recreated the environmental structure in 1984, the Logistics Branch was divided back into three separate commands but remained unified through a governance model. With the challenges that the current CAF Logistics structure presents, it is imperative to consider what the impact of unifying the Logistics community into one separate command would have on Logistics force generation and employment. This paper demonstrates that the creation of a unified Logistics command (LOGCOM) would undoubtedly enhance the force generation and force employment of the CAF's logisticians.

The CAF's transformation initiatives of 2005 and 2011 demonstrated how efficiency could be gained by creating a LOGCOM. As a result of the 2005 transformation, CANOSCOM was established and focused on the force employment aspect of Logistics. In 2011, The Leslie Report demonstrated how the creation of a separate command would increase both the force generation and force employment capability of the CAF's Logistics. In 2017, the Australians affirmed the necessity of unification by creating a Joint Logistics Command. The two CAF reports and the Australian Logistics model support and encourage the creation of a CAF LOGCOM. This unified command would allow the centralisation of all logistics resources under a unified

command which would increase the CAF's ability to conduct force generation and force employment activities.

The Walt and Gilson policy model explains how to facilitate the necessary changes required to create a LOGCOM. It demonstrates that such policy changes can only occur by placing the environment commanders (actors) at the centre of the model. Doing this would allow changes to generate from within the environmental commands which would create sound processes to ensure a continuity of logistical support. The approach that Walt and Gilson's model proposes would also negate the cultural barrier changes that prevented the creation of a LOGCOM stemming from The Leslie Report.

The Military Police and Health Services are two examples of CAF enablers that have integrated vertically. These two case studies have a single unified chain of command where each commander has full command over its entire inventory (people and resources). Both organisations have demonstrated that through structure and process, support to the environmental commands is achievable without negative impacts. The CF MP Gp and CF H Svcs Gp are responsible for force generation activities and force employment while supporting the Navy, Army, and Air Force commanders' force generation activities. The Military Police and Health Services structural models show that a unified chain of command with a single doctrine increases the CAF force generation and force employment.

The Logistics Branch was born as a separate command, something that was suggested as best practice in 2011. CAF Logistics is the last enabler that has not yet integrated vertically. Although this paper demonstrates the gains that a unified LOGCOM would garner, further analysis and definition of the LOGCOM structure would be

prudent. Finally, the creation of a LOGCOM hinges on sound processes to support the

environment commanders, which should be incorporated within a structure study.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Australia. Australian Defence Doctrine Publication. ADDP 4.0, *Logistics Series Defence Logistics*. 3rd ed. Canberra: DoD Australia, 2017.

Australian Government. "Joint Logistics Command." Last accessed 23 March 2020. https://www.directory.gov.au/portfolios/defence/department-defence/joint-capabilities-group/joint-logistics-command.

Australian Government Department of Defence. "Joint Capabilities Group." Last accessed 23 March 2020. https://www.defence.gov.au/jcg/.

Canada. Chief of the Defence Staff Action Team 1. *Part 1, Executive Summary and Key Recommendations*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2005.

Canada. Department of National Defence. A-PD-055-001/AG-001, *The Canadian Armed Forces Military Employment Structure Volume 1*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2015.

Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GJ-005-410/FP- 000, *Joint Doctrine Health Services Support to Operations*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2007.

Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GL-362-001/FP-001, *Military Police in Operations*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2012.

Canada. Department of National Defence. "Canadian Armed Forces Organizational Chart." Last accessed 11 June 2019. http://intranet.mil.ca/en/deptl-mgmt/org-chart.page.

Canada. Department of National Defence. "Canadian Forces Military Police Group (CF MP Gp)." Last accessed 04 March 2020. http://intranet.mil.ca/en/organizations/vcds/cf-mp-gp.page.

Canada. Department of National Defence. "Canadian Forces Provost Marshal Annual Report Fiscal Year 2018-2019." Last accessed 03 March 2020. https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/dnd-mdn/documents/reports/2019/cfpm-annual-report-2018-2019.pdf.

Canada. Department of National Defence. "Health Services." Last accessed 04 March 2020. http://cmp-cpm.mil.ca/en/health/health-services.page.

Canada. Department of National Defence. "Logistics Branch Governance Framework 2016." Last accessed 03 March 2020. http://intranet.mil.ca/en/organizations/sjs/logistics-framework-org.page.

Canada. Department of National Defence. *Quality Healthcare Delivery to the Canadian Forces Anytime, Anywhere*. Defence Services Project, 00000297 – Rx2000, 2000.

Canada. Department of National Defence. "Report on Transformation 2011." Last accessed 21 February 2020. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/report-on-transformation-2011.html.

Canada. Department of National Defence. "Royal Canadian Logistics Service." Last accessed 04 March 2020. http://intranet.mil.ca/en/organizations/sjs/logistics.page.

Canada. House of Commons. Standing Committee on National Defence. *The State of Readiness of the Canadian Forces*. December 2012, 1:41.

Ermel, Ross W. *The Impact of Organizational Culture: A Study of Selected Strategic Change Initiatives in the Canadian Forces*. Last accessed 04 March 2020. http://dtpr.lib.athabascau.ca/action/download.php?filename=mba-10/open/ermelross.pdf.

Fitzsimmons, Dan. "Transformation in the Canadian Forces: A Sociological Institutionalist Approach to Change in the CF from Peacekeeper to War Fighter." Paper for the Canadian Political Science Association, Carleton University, 2009

Girouard, Luc. "The Fusion of Doctrines: A Discussion of Sustainment Operations During Operation IMPACT." *Royal Canadian Airforce Journal* 7, no. 1 (Winter 2018): 24-35.

Godefroy, Andrew. "The Ghost of General Otter: Putting the Canadian Forces Report on Transformation 2011 in Context." Research Paper, Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2012.

Hillier, R.J. *Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) Initial Planning Guidance – Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM)*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2006.

Jeffrey, Michael K. *Inside Canadian Forces Transformation: Institutional Leadership as a Catalyst for Change*. Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2009.

Kennedy, James, and Kris Hughes. "New Logistics Ideas for a Complex World." *Military Review* (May-June 2017): 82-88.

Parent, J.N.M. "United we Stand, Divided we Fall: Unification of the Canadian Armed forces Logistics Branch." Master of Defence Studies Thesis, Canadian Forces College, 2012.

Perry, David. "Doing Less with Less. Canadian Defence Transformation and Renewal." Vimy Paper, Conference of Defence Association Institute, 2014.

Walt, G. and L. Gilson. "Reforming the health sector in developing countries: the central role of policy analysis." *Health Policy Planning* 9, no. 4 (1994): 353-370.