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## EDUCATING PERSONNEL TO PREPARE FOR JOINT OPERATIONS

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### JCSP 45

#### Service Paper

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**EDUCATING PERSONNEL TO PREPARE FOR JOINT OPERATIONS**

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## **EDUCATING PERSONNEL TO PREPARE FOR JOINT OPERATIONS**

### **AIM**

1. To evaluate the proper level to introduce education and practical experience of Joint concepts, doctrine and functions to personnel in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).

While this paper will assess concepts envisioned in the Leadership Development Framework (LDF), this framework and its products have not yet been effectuated into the CAF; therefore, further assessment will be needed upon its implementation.

### **INTRODUCTION**

2. The education and Force Generation (FG) of officers and Non-Commissioned Members (NCM), in the areas of competencies to function in a Joint environment, are critical assets for CAF mission development and execution. CAF leadership is ultimately empowered to enable the organization at all levels to create conditions that meet the vision of Canada's Defence Policy — Strong, Secure, Engaged. This paper looks at CAF education requirements, leadership expectations and practical application of Joint doctrine to understand if current FG of Joint expertise is optimized to meet the current identified requirements and expectations.

3. The education review will be weighed against the newly developed LDF and resulting Competency Directory (CD), also referred to as CAF CD. This will be contrasted against the current FD standard identified in Officer and NCM Developmental Periods (DP). The review of leadership expectations will assess Department of National Defence (DND) publications and literature to extrapolate imposed expectations for Joint operations. Finally, a review of a practical application of doctrine will be conducted in order to investigate the effects of component and Joint doctrine on a backdrop of Operation IMPACT (Op IMPACT).

## DISCUSSION

4. CAF educational requirements. CAF educational and training requirements fall under the purview of Military Personnel Command (MILPERCOM). These requirements are then divested to component commands for FG, while MILPERSCOM ensures that the CAF training institutions and centres of excellence adhere to the prescribed standards. Most pertinent to this review are the CAF Professional Development (PD) standards and the recently developed CAF CD. While component commanders must ensure that the level of training is commensurate with these standards, it is important to note that they are not precluded from exceeding them.

- a. Publications and literature. The identification of PD standards for knowledge and competencies, required of leaders to operate in a Joint environment, is outlined in the Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAOD) 5031-8.<sup>1</sup> This directive clearly outlines the requirement for “an understanding of joint and combined operations”<sup>2</sup>, which starts in DP 3 for officers at Major (Maj) to Lieutenant Colonel (LCol) levels — yet there is no similar requirement identified for NCMs. However, a separate defence site expands the DP outline and specifies NCM requirements at DP 5, which equates to the Chief Petty Officer 1st Class (CPO1) or Chief Warrant Officer (CWO) level.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, an important distinction was also made within the officer requirements, it was identified that DP 3 started at the Joint Command Staff Programme (JCSP), which is nominally

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<sup>1</sup> "DAOD 5031-8 Canadian Forces Professional Development," last modified -11-13, accessed Oct 12, 2018, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-defence-admin-orders-directives-5000/5031-8.page>.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>3</sup> "Programmes and Qualifications - Officers | DND CAF," last modified -06-20, accessed Oct 12, 2018, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-prof-dev/officer.page>.

considered a senior Maj course. In both cases, the requirement for a comprehensive Joint knowledge and competencies is only expected at senior leadership levels, typically exceeding ten to fifteen years of service.

- b. Models and frameworks. The LDF was used as a framework to develop the current definition of the CAF CD, a directory intended to modernize CAF career management as well as the Canadian Forces Performance Appraisal System (CFPAS).<sup>4</sup> The CAF CD outlines a table of nineteen competencies for officers and NCMs, accompanied by Behavioural Indexes (BI) to illustrate progression of performance across ranks. In reviewing the CAF CD and associated BIs for indications of knowledge and competencies of the Joint environment, the results were strikingly similar to those of the DP assessment. It was observed that only certain competencies mentioned the requirement for Joint level awareness and performances measures. There was also little discrepancy for officers, the BI associated with these specific competencies started at the LCol level. While the officer standards were unwavering, the NCM table saw a mention of “Develops competencies and awareness relevant to joint operations...”<sup>5</sup> at the Warrant Officer (WO) or Petty Officer 1st Class (PO1) level; two levels lower than seen in the DP tables.
- c. Educational institutions and centers of excellence. While MILPERSCOM establishes the standard for Officer and NCM PD in the CAF, component schools

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<sup>4</sup> LGen C.T. Whitecross, *Development of the Canadian Armed Forces Competency Dictionary (CAF CD)*, [2015]).

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*

can always exceed expectations. In some cases, the need to surpass the thresholds seems to be identified based on trades and their critical role in Joint specialized areas. Schools such as the Canadian Forces School of Communications and Electronics (CFSCE), the Canadian Army Command and Staff College (CACSC), and the Naval Fleet School Atlantic and Pacific, all run courses that target Joint training below the prescribed DP rank levels. In these cases, the targeted Officer professions for this higher level of learning are Officers, and fall mainly within the areas of communication disciplines. The exception to this is the Army Operations Course (AOC), which educates all professions of Canadian Army (CA) Officers, at the rank of senior Captain (Capt). The education is typically specialized around the process of Operational Planning Procedure (OPP), a joint level analytical process for mission planning. CFSCE educates communications officers of the rank of Capt in all components — Signals, Communication Electronics Engineering Officer (CELE), and Maritime Surface and Subsurface (MARS) — at an introductory level of OPP. In the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), MARS Officers are similarly exposed to the concepts of OPP through the Operation Room Officer (ORO) course. In all three schools, the focus is on developing an understanding of the basic tenets of Joint planning at a much more junior level than prescribed in DAOD 5031-8. This heightened level of education for specific professions correlates with the fact that there are higher concentrations of joint knowledge within the communication competencies of the CAF CD. Communication has always been a critical component of Command and Control (C2), especially when working in a multi-component environment where

different technologies are required to mend divisions within the battlespace.

Therefore, it is reasonable to see these institutions leaning forward to build this knowledge ahead of standard expectations.

5. Leadership expectations. A vast amount of leadership publications and literature have been created by DND over the past few decades, and many of these make reference to Joint roles, responsibilities and expectations. These publications identify critical research and case studies completed this information helps inform and transform the future of the Joint battlespace. They also provide valuable facts to enable the development of modernized education and training guides, as they act as past lessons learned.

- a. Leading the institution. *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution*, is a cornerstone document for DND. It provides a detailed and thorough example of leadership expectation for the organization. Captured within this document are a number of key facts worth examining; one point is the outline of Joint primacy under the section “Understanding the Attributes of Professionalism”.<sup>6</sup> In this section, the importance of CAF culture is highlighted as a necessary foundation “...to support the development of strong, joint doctrine embedded in truly joint organizations”<sup>7</sup> The authors continue to reinforce this concept by stating, “Aligning culture with professional ideology means setting in motion a unifying process that contributes directly to enhancing joint operational

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<sup>6</sup> Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, Canada. Dept. of National Defence and Canadian Defence Academy, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, [2006]).

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid*

perspectives.”<sup>8</sup> These highlights of expectations clearly indicate a strategic level of importance set on leadership’s responsibility for the stewardship of the CAF culture as a means to enable Joint functions at uniquely the operational level. Since the operational level includes staff of junior ranks in leadership position, it is surprising to note that personnel would not normally have been introduced to Joint education before being placed in these roles.

- b. Intelligence gathering. The fusion of intelligence gathering has gained significant attention in recent years, as the requirement for multifaceted intelligence gathering has increased to keep pace with the advent of technology. Social media has also shaped the value of the precision of intelligence gathering, as political will is increasingly aware of the effects of media information flow. The impact of media on battlefield decision making has increased the need for centralized processing of sensitive information. This is especially noticed in the development of targets with minimal collateral damage, which requires that commanders unite their intelligence gathering capabilities to maximize precision. As allied intelligence and communication assets look to combine capabilities for greater accuracy of information, Canada will undoubtedly follow suit and help develop common practices relevant to the CAF. The current model for the United States (US) Information Environment (IE) is being developed with a heavy focus on Joint capabilities.<sup>9</sup> As the US focuses on developing Joint

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<sup>8</sup> *Ibid*, 29

<sup>9</sup> George V. Galdorisi and Stephanie C. Hsieh, *Operationalizing the Joint Information Environment: Achieving Information Dominance with the Undersea Constellation*, [2014]. <http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA620398>.



intelligence gathering to meet its Joint Vision 2020 (JV2020), DND will also need to consider what joint capabilities it will create to participate alongside its allies. As with many intelligence networks, compatibility with Canada's allies is critical to continued CAF success in a Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC).

- c. Cyber. As all nations continue to acknowledge the vital new battlefield of the cyber domain, DND will strive to play an active role in this domain. As with Intelligence networks, Canada will need to remain close to its allies who have the means to develop these capabilities. As a small nation, Canada's strengths will lie in the additions that it can bring to the collective, while continuing to benefit from the aggregate of capabilities and information. Similar to intelligence agencies, the US cyber-security domain is highly focused on the Joint assets, rather than individual components. The Joint IE is therefore a critical space to strengthen cyber-security and develop future capabilities.<sup>10</sup> In order to leverage these assets, CAF will need to develop highly capable Joint minded Officers and NCMs to ensure a high standard of credibility with allies.
  
6. Operationalizing doctrine. Doctrine is a key asset to the Operational success of the CAF. It provides guidelines and practices that permit the development of future campaigns that benefit from past lessons learned and to adapt to future threats. As such, it is important to analyze the application of DND Joint doctrine in a theatre of operation such as Op IMPACT.

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<sup>10</sup> *Ibid*, 3

- a. The addition of Air Force doctrine. With the relatively recent creation of the new Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Doctrine, there is an expectation that it will help the RCAF adapt to Joint Operations. The RCAF Aerospace Warfare Centre (RAWC) has been developing this new doctrine for several years now and with the release of the 3rd edition in 2016, practices are already well at play in the way the RCAF operates today. Based off CAF Joint doctrine, the new RCAF publication details precisely how the RCAF will operate in a Joint battlespace.<sup>11</sup> The RCAF has created new terminology that merges seamlessly within a Joint context. Outlining an Air Task Force (ATF) as a component command node, which can function independently or subordinate to a Joint Task Force (JTF). This new terminology has been divested to all levels of the RCAF, changing the C2 model and lexicon for the RCAF. Despite these significant changes, the RCAF continues to struggle to reach a consensus with other components and the Canadian Joint Operation Centre (CJOC) on how it views the Joint environment. The critical misalignment is that while the RCAF can integrate into a JTF, it must retain Residual Authorities<sup>12</sup>; something that is foreign to how CJOC is accustomed to operating. These Residual Authorities remain with the FG Commander, 1 Canadian Air Division (1 CAD), and are therefore outside of the purview of the Force Employer (FE), which for expeditionary operations would be CJOC. This distinction of a FG providing capabilities to the FE with “strings

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<sup>11</sup> Canada. Dept. of National Defence and Canada. Ministère de la défense nationale, *Royal Canadian Air Force Doctrine* (Trenton, Ont. : Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, [2016]). <http://cfc.summon.serialssolutions.com/cfc.idm.oclc.org>.

<sup>12</sup> "Air Doctrine Note 14/01," last modified Dec 04, accessed Oct 13, 2018, <http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/cf-aerospace-warfare-centre/doctrine-adn-14-01.page>.

attached” is a difficult concept in a Joint C2 structure, as it is unique to the Air component. Inevitably this concept is difficult for Joint operational staff to contend with; normally it is a lack of familiarity and understanding of the requirement. In a mission such as Op IMPACT, the very concept has caused issues that have required the implication of CJOC and 1 CAD to determine possible solutions. Such differences in understanding of capabilities can be harmful to effective C2 in a Joint environment, which supports the need for greater Joint dialogue.

- b. Fusion of doctrines. Op IMPACT is arguably the most engaging operation that the CAF has undertaken since the Afghanistan campaign. It is an operation that has tested our ability to operate in a completely joint environment, providing air assets, ground training and key leadership advisory roles. It saw the first deployment of the ATF construct under and JTF commander and staff, the co-location of a Joint Task Force Support Component (JTFSC) and the National Intelligence Centre (NIC). All functions of the RCAF, CA and Special Operations Force (SOF) are represented in this mission. And, despite these collaborative endeavors, some would suggest that it was thanks to tactical ingenuity that kept the mission a success, while the operational level remained ad-hoc and ineffective at times.<sup>13</sup> One of the suggestions of the elements of complexity lay with the doctrines of influence over the mission — a lack of fused doctrine.

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<sup>13</sup> Luc LCol Girouard, "The Fusion of Doctrines: A Discussion of Sustainment Operations during Operation IMPACT," *The Royal Canadian Air Force Journal* 7, no. 1 (2018), 26.

## **CONCLUSION**

7. It is evident that new additions to the battlespace of tomorrow, such as Cyber, Targeting and Intelligence fusion will be ever-increasingly reliant on Joint assets. These domains are becoming a mesh-like asset, knitting the traditional component battlespace together like a quilt. Moreover, there is clear and strong message from political and strategic level through DND leadership literature that helps shape the future of C2. The application of Joint operations is key to future DND campaign design. These facts outline the perspective of how important the Joint space has become and the focus that the CAF is being propelled into.

8. While initiatives such as the CD better define Joint education and knowledge required, it is also important to acknowledge the intuitive direction taken in component schools to surpass the current standard. If military educational centres are exceeding the prescribed requirements, it is most likely in response to an observed demand. Additionally, with evidence of CAF's most recent Joint operation showing a deficiency in synchronizing doctrine, it shows a lack of knowledge at the operational level to create complementary Joint publications. This lack of knowledge is most certainly the result of a lack of focus on general training of Joint doctrine and practices across the CAF.

9. There is sufficient evidence that supports the idea that the development of greater competencies at the ab-initio levels of leadership would be advantageous to CAF operations. However, more detailed evaluations and case studies are needed in order to determine the intensity, frequency and delivery method of this educational requirement.

## **RECOMMENDATION**

10. It is recommended that further evaluation of the effect of emerging disciplines in the battlespace be conducted in order to assess the impact on Joint competencies required of Officers and NMCs. It is further recommended, that MILPERSCOM consider and evaluate an increase of education surrounding Joint doctrine and processes at junior leadership levels in order to prepare future leaders for these emerging responsibilities.

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