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FACED WITH FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS: CMTC A CAPABILITY OR A PLACE?

Major Bryan L. Ouellet

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By / Par le Major Bryan L. Ouellet

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AIM

1. The aim of the service paper is to propose a modification to the existing and currently applied collective training system for the Canadian Army (CA) due to recent financial restraint within the CAF. There will be a specific limitation for this proposition based on realistic deployment capabilities the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has been/will be able to provide at the Domestic and International level; one-time Battle Group (BG). The fundamental issue being addressed therein will answer this question: “Canadian Manoeuvre Training Center (CMTC) is capacity and not a place. What can be the optimal role of CMTC with current financial restraints within the CA?”

INTRODUCTION

2. The CAF force generation has been going through an adaptive process in order to align individual and collective training cycles and its evolution with Government’s requirements, international contributions and mostly due to its funding allocation. Like all departments, the CAF is faced with new budget constraints and like its colleagues, it is its duty to be a contributor by reorganizing itself across the board to meet its mandates. The training structure is one major area where financial concerns can be absorbed in order to facilitate other necessities. The CF must prepare for the future based on assessments of potential opponents and possible theatres of operation. It is of most importance for the CAF that civilian decision-makers provides essential guidance to military defence planners to shape Canadian military preparations.¹ The CAF

¹ Michael, Roy, “Canadian Defence Priorities, CF Forces Posture and Strategic Readiness.” Defence R&D CORA Technical Memorandum, 2012, p.24.

response was the publication of “Strong, Secure, Engaged” (SSE) in 2017 encompassing the new vision and approach forward to support the Government of Canada Defence policy.

3. While the CAF reform instituted in the SSE provides a great deal of approaches, this paper will focus on the training capabilities and its aspects. The focus will be put on the SSE look forward to answer a much needed remodeling in training, the different agencies’ role in this planned process, the cost involved to training, especially “Road to High Readiness” and its implication with CMTC through the evaluation for the directions forward for a Canadian contribution. This paper will first expose the restructuration requirements based on capabilities within the CA through an examination of Gov’t policies and SSE evaluation. Hence, it will be followed with a look on CA training doctrine as well as Operational Planning (OP), Foundation training (FT) and Collective Training (CT). Finally, those examinations will be then linked into a cost analysis of CMTC and its impact. This overview will allow gap identification and propose some potential and refined options that could redirect the CA’s training system to meet CAF new traits published in SSE.

DISCUSSION

Coordination of effort Government - SSE

4. The Canadian military, encompassing CA, has a responsibility to generate a relevant Land Forces (LF) combined with tailored operational capabilities. Thus, the government ought to draw upon the expertise of their military advisors and civilian defence analysts when formulating strategic policy in response to global military developments². In short terms, the new Canada defence policy, elaborated in the SSE, released last year will ask the CAF to make economical

² Michael, Roy, “Canadian Defence Priorities, CF Forces Posture and Strategic Readiness.” Defence R&D CORA Technical Memorandum, 2012, p. 10-1.

choices.³ As an example, the CA will undergo a recapitalization of much of its land combat support and will expand its light infantry capabilities which will allow it to be more “agile and effective”.⁴ These are the main characteristics that emerge from the new publication to react to the complex operation theatres. With this new orientation, the CA will provide flexibility for the Department of Defence to enable operations and interoperability across the spectrum of conflict. The new vision for Defence ask the CAF to succeed in this environment by fielding agile, well-educated, flexible, diverse and combat ready military. To meet those demands, the CA needs to dwell on the well-educated piece and re-manage its training system as new equipment and capabilities are pouring in. Although SSE is said by the Government of Canada, more specifically under the Trudeau’s regime, to be a more realistic and rigorously funded, it is already hitting barriers in its relatively small annual increases. In the first fiscal year (2017) of the policy, DND is on track to deliver barely better than half of the intended spending on new equipment and infrastructures.⁵ In fact, according to a Canadian Global affairs institute (CGAI) policy update, the cash spending is stated to increase by 70 per cent over the next decade, while defence budget, in accrual terms, is set to only increase by only just 40 per cent.⁶

5. It will be important to consider the impact of such monetary introduction on current doctrine and training system to ensure a proper coordination of effort and to avoid duplication across the CA. Doctrine is the baseline by which operation, training and institutional changes occur in the CA. Its establishment is the root of all process to acquire discipline and uniformity of efficiency within all levels and across the spectrum of tasks and mandates given by the

³ Ken, Hansen, Hansen, Ken. “What’s happening to Canada’s defence spending?” March 6th, 2018.

⁴ Department of National Defence. “Strong, Secure and Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy.” Ottawa: DND Canada, 2017 p.7.

⁵ David, Perry, “Following the funding in Strong, Secured, Engaged.” Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2018, p.2.

⁶ Ibid, p.7-8.

Government. The introduction of new capabilities, especially equipment/platform, through the SSE new vision and money attribution, will impact the training and instructional concepts. By introducing new capabilities, like the Tactical Armored Patrol Vehicle (TAPV) in 2016-17 and in a near future the soon to be replaced type B fleet, you impute valuable operational resources to the instructional side of the house. This directly impacts Land Readiness (LR) by reattributing the effort and qualified personal with the operational status, for a certain period of time, to participate to Individual Training (IT). These new equipment, often through the procurement process share some similarities or are the next generation to the previous model in handling and specifications, will still require a timely conversion course to permit its secure use during operation and especially during Collective Training. This relation between IT and CT will impose on the units of all levels supplementary planning constraints from a LR perspective. The schedule at which this new equipment is being attributed throughout the force has a major impact on CT and financial ramifications if delayed are being encountered. SSE demands for an “agile and flexible” force throughout the all training process, IT, CT and Road to High Readiness (RTHR) in order to enable the CA to accomplish those qualities the training program itself has to reflect the SSE demands.

Constant evolution of training

6. Training is ultimately a function of leadership, executed through personal involvement by commanders.⁷ As the CA with the SSE publication looks towards guiding its forces and adhering to a scaled plan with thought out phases of operability; it is the role of certain units to now

⁷ Department of National Defence. *B-GL-300-008/FP-001, Training for Land Operations*. (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2010), p. 1-6-1.

develop the picture to achieve those characteristic within the financial limitations. The Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Center (CADTC) has its directive; it is responsible for directing training and intellectual development for all land operations, including the production of doctrine and the integration of lessons deriving from all aspect of the Corps.⁸ With this said, CADTC has to be the producer of future visions and plans like “Land operations 2021” published in 2015 before the emergence of SSE. The focus of past publications might not be similar to the new vision that publication is now stating. As an example, “the 2013 forces focus of effort was at the unit level, the priority for 2018 is at the tactical level, principally Brigade (Bde).”⁹ This forthcoming vision is not being seen at international level as OP REASSURANCE is a representative of 2013. Does future plan align with the emerging characteristic of SSE to be agile and scalable? The Bde has a set organisation battle chart (orbat) that is contrary to the flexibility of a Battle group formation that can be scalable. Its training can, through an emphasis from CADTC in the future, reflect the operation needs. The same can be said for the equipment point of view, right now with the application of SSE being in its initial phase, the scarcity of the new equipment is a challenge for CADTC as they have to ensure both IT and CT perquisites are met. Having to juggle with the fleet and equipment to suit all units throughout the phases of training is a constant irritator at all level. The centralization of equipment would make it cost effective, but with the sizable geography on which the CA is operating domestically, the human Resource (HR) to support this option would have the same adverse financial results.

7. Training structure which encompasses the level at which training is being conducted such as platoon, companies, battalion and Bde always has been the base for CT. Based on practices

⁸ Ibid, p. 4-1-1.

⁹ Department of National Defence. *B-GL-300-008/FP-001, Training for Land Operations*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2010, p. 35.

and previous models, training at these levels is designed by CADTC to complete specific tactical and operational task. The structure establishes the limit of an existing force potential, and the Battle Task Standard (BTS) are the check list of what needs to be accomplish. Substantial changes to the training structure have major impacts over time on defence funding. The changes demanded by SSE will have a direct link to the future of force-employment to reflect the CA vision and mission. AT what extend can these changes be made. Operational readiness obtained through the training structure is based on 3 factors; personnel, equipment and training.¹⁰ SSE is aiming at a change for the first and second one out of the three. CADTC is responsible for the third factor and has to align it to the existing structure with the smallest impact as the other two are in fact outside of its control. The existing CT for operability has been scaled down to 12 month progression¹¹ and could be where it can be scaled down again depending on the mission at hand. Hence, through the foundation training (FT), time saving has been performed as some required skills for RTHR and some of the Individual BTS are now combined within the CT. The evaluation of Land ops 2014 showed that renewed focus with the initiative to reduce in-house training and increase distance learning (DL) for occupational course¹². We have seen the use of CMTC exportability for numerous Computer Assisted Exercise (CAX) at level 6 and 7 in order to reduce cost and strain on HR prior to deployment.

Training Infrastructure future: CMTC

¹⁰ Department of National Defence. *B-GL-300-008/FP-001, Training for Land Operations*. (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2010), p. 2-2-3.

¹¹ Department of National Defence. 1258-228 (ADM(RS)), *Evaluation of Land Readiness*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2016, p.22.

¹² Department of National Defence. 1258-228 (ADM(RS)), *Evaluation of Land Readiness*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2016, p.20.

8. The CA with reduced financial and material resources has always been successfully able to use available resources more efficiently¹³. Looking ahead with the SSE now, to redefine its training structure the CA will have to eventually analyze the necessity of its schools and training centers and the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Center (CMTC) is on the list. CMTC has a specific mandate:

“Will develop a specific scenario for the level 6&7 CAX/CPX practice event and the level 6 & 7 FTX confirmation event that should be employed by the LMD for all prior gateway training. When a specific theatre and mission are assigned, CMTC will assist the LMD with the development of a training scenario for TMST up to level 6 & 7”¹⁴.

This mandate asks from CMTC a capacity and it has delivered a world renowned training concentration since its creation. The synchronization of the joint operability for the units in on the RTHR for these exercises and the planning efforts for the confirmation stages have defined the organisation. Although, with the SSE pushing to expand its light forces capability which will allow it to be more agile and effective in a complex operational theatre, such as peace operation¹⁵, CMTC as a place does not fit the bill more than any other bases. CMTC main attraction was the capability and suitability of terrain for armored employment, especially the concentration of heavy platform in the province of Alberta. The reality is now that armored capability has been split between East and West sectors. The cost attributed to the level 6 & 7 exercises as well as the live firing is to somewhat would qualify as irrational. Unfortunately, CADTC and CMTC do hold both part of the financial details and the division of the costs associated with EX Maple Resolve and Exercise Reflex Rapid (usually around 2.5 million), the

¹³ Ibid, p.7.

¹⁴ Department of National Defence. *B-GL-300-008/FP-001, Training for Land Operations*. (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2010), p. 6-6-1.

¹⁵ Department of National Defence. “Strong, Secure and Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy.” Ottawa: DND Canada, 2017, p. 7.

live firing. The redistribution of a small percentage of those expenses towards infrastructure enhancement for operational bases would have major future impact on IT and CT level 5 and below training for the RTHR. In the short term, these changes would seem financially immense and time consuming, but in the long term coupled with an alignment with SSE way forward would be constructive.

CONCLUSION

9. In order for the CA to align itself with the new SSE publication, the defined and governmental directions have to be maintained and funding has to be respected. On an important note, the CAF has an enormous role to play in establishing its priorities for Force-employment both for domestic and international operations. Many tools are at the CA's disposition; CADTC is one of the main responsible for the training structure and can engage changes or not to the existing RTHR. As well, under the future financial constraint, it might be time to revise the way things are done and to revitalize the structure. Training establishments and training center for centralization of effort, like CMTC, might be a thing of the past due to emerging teaching deliverables technology. CMTC has defined itself to the status of capacity, especially with its exportability concept, and should be a facilitator to suit the need of the CA and unit on RTHR. Knowing the way forward with SSE, the CA has to adjust its RTHR and its operational plan design to produce an agile and flexible force that will answer the needs of the CAF as well as the Government. By formulating a new training structure encompass at the lowest level to streamline and avoid duplication along the spectrum, the CA will be able to redistribute some finance to have in a few years a major contributor to expenses management within the

departments. This reorientation is not a major rewriting of the fundamentals, but an evolution of the existing program.

RECOMMENDATION

10. It is recommended that CADTC goes through a review of RTHR baseline in order to readjust it with SSE. The new policy exposes an emerging need for a more focus training to be matched with Unit's yearly operation planning to have an agile and flexible force. With the scares resources at the Unit level and the SSE distribution timeline, there is a necessity for a more streamline training on which modules / pre-packages can be added to suit RTHR. The new operational demands can be met with add-ons for humanitarian aids, Whole of Government (WOG) approach. The Theatre Specific Mission Training (TSMT) would still be required as it is already a module provide through Kingston cell.

11. CMTC, since 2005/06, has been pushing on its exportability concept starting with the vest assisted suits program. It is only a normal progression to have it, through this new technological era, enable unit as a facilitator and a controller. This could be achieved for the level 6 and 7, as this is part of it CMTC initial mandate, without holding the exercise at Wainwright for every division. The option of a decentralized execution with a centralized HQ at CMTC via technological means would have major financial impact on training and HR. The new cost format would permit reinvestment across the CT for the CA.

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