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## FORMALIZING CAPACITY BUILDING IN THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

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### JCSP 45

#### Service Paper

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## AIM

1. This paper discusses the need to formalize Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) approaches to Capacity Building (CB). It presents key considerations and factors affecting the establishment of a Canadian Army (CA) response to the likely increase of ad hoc deployments in the area of military diplomacy. Through the introduction of potential CB entities in the CA, the paper presents opportunities for its alignment with ongoing CAF employment modernization, Primary Reserve (PRes) retention initiatives, and the improvement of interdepartmental interoperability.

## INTRODUCTION

2. CB is a growing area for Peace Support Operations (PSO), Counter Terrorism (CT) and stability operations. United Nations (UN) capacity development processes require technical or functional capacities - amongst other peacebuilding tools - to create an enabling environment for local governance.<sup>1</sup> Not to be confused with complete security sector reform, the concept developed in this paper will focus mostly on the military function of train and advise, and not complete security assistance or equipping of foreign militaries.<sup>2</sup> CB initiatives to peacekeeping and stabilisation are gaining momentum on the global stage. They focus on sustainable solutions established from within conflict-ridden countries to gain support of their populations and to reduce the eventual or permanent need for international assistance. CB has also become a key activity in the search for exit strategies. As seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, building local capacity has become a central theme in international military operations.<sup>3</sup>

3. In addition to being an emerging trend in global governance and western military deployments, CB is a key aspect of Canadian military policy. Strong Secure Engaged (SSE) touts CB to “support the security of other nations and their ability to contribute to security abroad” as a core mission for the CAF.<sup>4</sup> In a 2018 Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) report analysing the current defence policy against its predecessors, CB is the only core mission without a counterpart in the past two foundational documents.<sup>5</sup> This development in strategic policy creates a requirement for further analysis at the Army level. The discussion below will review current and future trends in CB, its application in a Canadian context, and challenges and opportunities surrounding its formalization by the CA.

## DISCUSSION

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<sup>1</sup> UNDP. “Global Event Working Paper: Capacity Development in Post-Conflict Countries.” United Nations Development Program, Regional Bureau for Arab States, 2010: 11

<sup>2</sup> Williams, Peter. “Being Left of Bang, or Proactive: The Future Place of CB in The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces.” *Canadian Military Journal* 15, no. 2 (2015): 17

<sup>3</sup> Jakobsson, Maria, Nilsson Claes, and Kristina Zutterland. “Arming the Peace- The Sensitive Business of CB.” Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2011: 7

<sup>4</sup> <http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/docs/canada-defence-policy-report.pdf> p.17

<sup>5</sup> DRDC. “2017 Defence Policy Review: Impact on Capability Based Planning.” Defence Research and Development Canada, 2017: 10.

4. CA employment of CB entities will continue to drain resources and systems not designed to the unique challenges it presents. An increase in hybrid warfare equates to more expeditionary missions involving interventions into failed or fragile states for the CAF and its allies.<sup>6</sup> This ‘hybrid threat’ will feature cooperation between conventional enemies and a number of non-traditional entities, driving a merging of public safety, human, and national security concerns.<sup>7</sup>

5. Beyond the requirement for military CB organizations to meet this growing demand, it may be necessary to consider its integration with operationalized capabilities of Other Government Departments (OGD). Typical CB deployments call for intense and sustained reconstruction and development activities in addition to military training. It may be time for serious consideration of leveraging deployable capabilities from OGDs and external agencies to provide a more focused application of Global Affairs Canada (GAC) and military budgets.<sup>8</sup> This outside of departmental thinking is necessary for the CA to be successful in its future operating environment. As described in Defence Plan 2018-2023, as part of a Whole of Government (WoG) approach, the CA will need to “...adopt a new approach to defence – one that values the ability to anticipate new challenges, adapt to changing circumstances, and act with exemplary capability and professionalism while supporting peace and security around the world.”<sup>9</sup> In response to this line of thinking, the CA should consider organizational responsibility to generate the CAF CB nucleus.

6. CB has been a part of Canadian military deployments and is a likely area of growth for future Force Employment (FE). This trend is correlated to the decrease in direct conflict between major powers, and the increasing number of ‘small wars.’<sup>10</sup> The Canadian military exposure to CB has been consistent from the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Starting with contributions to the International Military Advisory Training Team (IMATT) in Sierra Leone from 2000 until 2013, and leading into to the Strategic Advisory Team in Afghanistan (SATA) on Op ARGUS 2005 – 2008, the CA has been continuously engaged in CB. In a post Afghanistan operating environment, there has continued to be CB in Mali with Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM), and with conventional forces involved in Op PROTEUS in Jerusalem on the Palestinian Authority Security Forces, and in Op UNIFIER in Ukraine.

7. The concept of CB employment to date has consisted of a wide range of entities contributing to CA output. It is likely that a multitude of capabilities required to deliver training will continue to be spread across the elements. Most responses to international CB deployments have been fairly ad hoc, leveraging Canadian Forces Tasking Plans and Operations (CFTPO) fills outside of the Managed Readiness Plan (MRP) and without a consistent center for coordination. The Canadian response is typically reactive with a lack of conventional Canadian CB doctrine, networking, or institutional orientation to output. Determining factors to the diversity of organizations and entities chosen to perform the task has been directly correlated to its placement on the conflict spectrum, the scale of contribution, and the risk envelope associated

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<sup>6</sup> Chuka, Neil, and Jean Born. “Hybrid Warfare: Implications for CAF Force Development.” Defence Research and Development Canada, 2014: 33.

<sup>7</sup> Kanada, ed. *Designing Canada’s Army of Tomorrow: A Land Operations 2021 Publication*. Ottawa, 2011: 21

<sup>8</sup> Chuka, Hybrid Warfare..., 23

<sup>9</sup> Vance, Jonathan. “Defence Plan 2018-2023.” Department of National Defence, 2018: 5.

<sup>10</sup> Kanada, *Designing Canada’s Army...*, 15.

to the mission. To better understand the potential creation of an organization to formalize the CA CB process, a deeper look into its application on the conflict spectrum is required.

8. CB can take place anywhere on the conflict spectrum and, depending on the risk envelope, is performed by special or conventional forces. With missions specifically focused on CT, CANSOFCOM has primarily been involved in CB activities, as seen in Malaysia in 2014.<sup>11</sup> In addition to CT, CANSOFCOM has the proper tools to conduct global security landscaping pre-conflict, especially in high-risk environments. Within this special skillset, further analysis could potentially identify a point of diminishing returns. Continuously deploying highly trained Special Operations Forces (SOF) operators for pre conflict CB will remain a drain on the strategic tool, and lead to a tear point where conventional forces are better suited to the mission – as seen in Sierra Leone, Jerusalem, and the Ukraine. This is the space where the CA formalization of a CB function needs to take shape.

9. In addition to the wide spectrum of risk, levels of conflict and varying types of capacities required, there are difficulties establishing dedicated units and headquarters in the Regular Forces (Reg F). Within current defence policies, the number of priorities and concurrent operations provide challenges to Reg F human resourcing. As noted by the operational directive Defence Plan 2018-2023: “One of the most significant challenges that we will face in the implementation of SSE will be the human resource capacity to tackle simultaneously the many actions required for the execution of the policy direction.”<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, the 2016 auditor general CAF Recruitment and Retention Report found that the total number of Reg F members has decreased, and that there is a growing gap between the number of members needed and those who are fully trained.<sup>13</sup> Providing a conventional force CB organization will come into conflict with the retention of traditional regiments and corps to meet conventional war fighting mandates, with CAF development of new cyber, Targeting and Influence Activities (IA)/Public Affairs (PA) functions (capacity for change), and with projected recruitment and retention issues.

10. Further human resource challenges for the development of a CB function in the CA result from the requirement for advisory and training teams to be comprised of senior leaders. CB places an emphasis on leadership positions and requires organizations to operate across strategic to tactical levels and to integrate with think tanks and OGDs. The requirement for small, experienced, and highly educated teams would place great pressure on any hierarchical organization. Although the Reg F would offer a standing solution to provide access to capabilities and structures, their continual improvised use would lead to increasing opportunity cost. There is a need to look outside of the full time force to leverage part time solutions.

11. The CA PRes presents an opportunity to crosscut civilian, academic and bureaucratic silos, but also complicates the employment of CB organizations. Having CB as a PRes entity is supported by the government of Canada’s Defence policy online news backgrounder that

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<sup>11</sup> National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. “Canada’s Defence Relations in the Asia-Pacific Region,” 2018.

<sup>12</sup> Vance, Defence Plan..., 5.

<sup>13</sup> Office of the Auditor General. “Report 5- Canadian Armed Forces Recruitment and Retention - National Defence.” Reports of the Auditor General of Canada, 2016.

proposes the employment of the Reserve Force to deliver select deployed missions in a “primary role such as CAF CB.”<sup>14</sup> Although this strategic guidance does not direct re-organization of specific units, it creates potential for organizational growth. The Canadian WoG approach requires the CA to develop a Joint Interagency Multinational Public (JIMP)-capable force, highlighting yet again the requirement to revisit and improve upon existing PRes relationship.<sup>15</sup> The PRes has access to CB and PSO relevant professionals including Police, bureaucrats and IT experts, with cross cultural competencies - potentially increasing the pool of education and trades available for GAC initiatives. Pulling leadership or training cadres from the PRes would not result in the same cost for the CA as the permanent force. The use of part time dispersed military members also provides an opportunity to maintain cadres for bulk training across Divisions in the event that mass expansion was required.

12. Having a PRes lead CB function in the army does present additional challenges to its development and maintenance. There would be delays in initial deployments and readiness levels. As seen with Influence Activities Task Forces (IATF), there could be inconsistent numbers available for workup training, and challenges in achieving individual training for specialists. There is also limited scope to provide flexible and well understood contracting to deploying members. Establishing realistic timelines and lower risk deployments could mitigate some of these factors. Additionally, Reg F support and full time employment opportunities would be required to maintain a permanent operational footprint.

13. The use of PRes organizations to form the nucleus of CA CB could be tied directly to ongoing initiatives and organizations throughout the CAF. The re-organization of PRes units may be implemented through Strengthening The Army Reserve (STAR),<sup>16</sup> and bolstered by the modernization of CAF employment practices. As part of the requirement to enhance reserve recruiting and employment,<sup>17</sup> adding CB networks close to city centers and OGDs would expand employment and recruitment as part of STAR. Enabling deployment opportunities into lower threat environments in small teams – not requiring synchronization with Battle Groups - would provide additional recruitment and retention opportunities for the PRes.<sup>18</sup> Similar to other STAR initiatives, CB could potentially provide full-time capability to the CAF through part-time service. There would be capacity through STAR and flexible employment to leverage networking with IATF and Peace Support Training Center (PSTC) to further expand the capability. The modernization of CAF employment practices through the Journey would allow for easier transfer of skills for CB functions.<sup>19</sup> This could result in the retention of senior leaders on the verge of permanent retirement - who are ideal candidates to conduct CB. Programming and entities involved would not necessarily be required to be permanently geographically co-located, and the function could add flexibility to improve recruitment and modernize employment through networks.

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<sup>14</sup> DND, “Backgrounder: Well-Supported, Diverse, Resilient People and Families.” Department of National Defence, 2017.

<sup>15</sup> Kanada, *Designing Canada’s Army...*,58

<sup>16</sup> DND, *Backgrounder...*

<sup>17</sup> Departmental Evaluation Committee Meeting. “Evaluation of Land Readiness.” Department of National Defence, 2016.

<sup>18</sup> DND, *Backgrounder...*

<sup>19</sup> DND, *Backgrounder...*

14. Establishing a CB facilitation function in the CA could also help grow the Canadian comprehensive approach to operations. CA CB initiatives could be expanded upon to allow for pre-crisis integration with OGDs. This groundwork is vital because interdepartmental mobility is undoubtedly required in future warfare. Based on a 2016 departmental evaluation of land readiness, “CA operations with OGDs would be further enhanced through greater engagement with civil authorities / agencies in planning and exercises to improve familiarity and interoperability.”<sup>20</sup> CB provides an opportunity for pre-emptive interdepartmental integration. Likely missions would not include only CA personnel, but rather, a combination with other services within a Canadian WoG approach. CAF employment modernization could be pushed further to promote interoperability with OGD and civilian contracting to include lateral employment. CB expertise can be enabled by serving or retired defence bureaucrats, as CB efforts made by the Department of National Defence (DND)/CAF must be part of a broader WoG effort.<sup>21</sup>

15. CA peacebuilding opportunities and expertise could be improved through the introduction of formalized CB processes. Canadian military policy has been promoting the CA to operate effectively in a JIMP arena.<sup>22</sup> By tackling CB, the CA could adopt methodology designed to promote new and innovative thinking to support capability based planning.<sup>23</sup> With the potential re-opening of the Pearson center<sup>24</sup> and other GC initiatives including the Peace and Stabilization Operations Program,<sup>25</sup> there remains room for interdepartmental growth in CB. There is also space for international and SOF support to developing CA CB specific capabilities including the United States (U.S.) Global Peace Operations Initiative<sup>26</sup> and CANSOFCOM liaison. Establishing this level of defence networking could provide relevant WoG growth and defence diplomacy for the CA.

## CONCLUSION

16. As argued by former Commander of the Kabul Military Training Center Training Advisory Group, Col Peter J. Williams, “a mission we would undertake with the WoG and other international partners, is one way to avoid costly post-crisis deployments and to get us to where we need to be, namely, ‘Left of Bang.’”<sup>27</sup> The creation of a CB specific organization in the CA warrants further investigation based on the potential opportunity it provides to internal employment practices and the response it brings to global military operational trends. With likely heavy CA involvement in defence diplomacy and interoperability, having a focal point for the development of CB to develop doctrine, Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTP), force generation and relationships, would assist in modernizing current CA structures.

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<sup>20</sup> Departmental Evaluation Committee Meeting, Evaluation...

<sup>21</sup> Williams, *Being Left...*, 22.

<sup>22</sup> Kanada, *Designing Canada's Army...*, 14.

<sup>23</sup> Vance, *Defence Plan...*, 9.

<sup>24</sup> Dorn, Walter. “New Opportunities Should Be Explored to Better Equip Peacekeeping Personnel with Key Enablers, but Will the Liberal Government Really Seize the Day?” *Policy Options*, 2017.

<sup>25</sup> Global Affairs Canada. “Peace and Stabilization Operations Program.” Government of Canada, 2018.

<sup>26</sup> U.S. Department of State. “U.S. Peacekeeping CB Assistance.” Bureau of Political Military Affairs, 2018.

<sup>27</sup> Williams, *Being Left...*, 24.

## RECCOMENDATIONS

17. An assessment should be conducted for the viability of the establishment of a PRes lead for CA CB. The review should include the potential creation of divisional unit leads as part of STAR to facilitate networked training cadres across the provinces to include doctrine initiation and specialty capabilities. The organization created should be able to link into Military Training and Cooperation Program (MTCP) for CB project identification and forecasting, CADTC for doctrine and course development, and IATF for Civilian Military Cooperation (CIMIC) involvement.

18. The CA CB project should work towards contributing to Chief of Military Personnel (CMP) modernization of CA employment practices. This includes creating retention opportunities for retiring Reg F members and the return of double dipping to attract experienced personnel to the PRes rather than leave the CAF altogether. The program could leverage their experience to meet CB output requirements in a networked manner.<sup>28</sup> Intergovernmental PRes recruitment, training and employment opportunities should be grown within guidelines. This will allow public and private skills, training and professional practices to be leveraged, and lateral employment opportunities and the comprehensive approach to be legitimized.

19. The CA CB lead should embrace comprehensive approach to training and operations to include the development of interdepartmental TTPs. The organization should work towards the creation of, or affiliation with, deployable civilian military cross-trained entities. Through coordination with U.S. Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), PSTC, and the GAC Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOP), individual and collective training events should be established to prepare CB entities to operate in a JIMP environment.

20. CANSOFCOM affiliations should be established and maintained to enable future handshakes on projects, delineate indicators and preconditions for organization handovers, and help grow the CA capability.

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<sup>28</sup> DND, Backgrounder...

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