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## BALANCING CANADIAN ARMY TRAINING REQUIREMENTS: ECONOMY VERSUS EFFICIENCY

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### JCSP 45

#### Service Paper

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ECONOMY VERSUS EFFICIENCY**

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## BALANCING CAF TRAINING REQUIREMENTS: ECONOMY VS EFFICIENCY

*Victory usually goes to the army who has better trained officers and men.*


- Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

### AIM

1. The aim of this service paper is to analyse the efficacy of Canadian Army (CA) foundation training for multiple combat and non-combat operations both at home and abroad. Specifically, the requirements of theatre mission specific training (TMST) which equips forces with requisite and specific tools for an international mission but entails additional costs in terms of time, resources and manpower.
2. This paper will lead to recommendations on balancing the foundational and TMST training requirements and economising the associated costs. Following the discussion, recommendations will be made.

### INTRODUCTION

3. The CA serves as an important instrument of national policy and provides the Government of Canada (GoC) with various kinetic and non-kinetic options both domestically and internationally. Although the primary role of the CA remains to protect sovereignty of the homeland, it is expected to perform the continuum of operations, including the operations other than war (OOTW). The mandate entrusted upon the CA requires it to prepare for broad spectrum of conflicts across the world. Figure 1, taken from *Training Canada's Army*, shows the spectrum of conflict and the continuum of CA operations.



**Figure 1: The Spectrum of Conflict and the Continuum of Operations**

*Source: Training Canada's Army, Ottawa: DND Canada, 2001, 13.*

4. The future security environment (FSE), with the rise in complexity of warfare and instability in different regions, necessitates that the CA prepare for different scenarios to defend national interests. National defence policy stipulates this role as:


“In a global security environment defined by complexity and unpredictability, Canada requires an agile, well-educated, flexible, diverse, and combat-ready military capable of conducting a wide range of operations at home and internationally.”<sup>1</sup>

5. Training and readiness for full spectrum operations, despite being a difficult proposition, is a resource intensive process requiring manpower, equipment, infrastructure and finances. In the wake of increasing domestic and international operations, commitments on Operation IMPACT, Operation PRESENCE and Operation REASSURANCE, when considered against available training resources, necessitate evaluation of current foundational and collective training to determine its viability and applicability for international operations. The following section of paper will assess current training methodology, especially for individual, collective and theatre mission specific training, draw comparison with contemporary armies (where applicable) and extend pertinent recommendations.

## DISCUSSION

### CAF Training Framework

6. Training is a continuous process which ensures battle worthiness of an outfit by honing individual and collective skills. CA doctrine provides guidance on a three stage training framework that revolves around the supporting phase, training phase and operations phase. Each phase relates to and depicts to a readiness posture – support, training and high readiness (HR) – and entails different set of resources. Figure 2, *The Force Generation Cycle*, is a pictorial representation of the three stage process and can be seen below.



**Figure 2: The Force Generation Cycle**

Source: *Training Canada's Army*, Ottawa: DND Canada, 2001, 101.

7. The progressive nature of training, as seen in Figure 2, is one of the fundamental steps towards HR. Commencing with phase 1, which acts as an enabler by providing requisite support in phase 2 and 3, moving towards phase 2 which focusses on individual and collective training

<sup>1</sup> Department of National Defence, *Strong, Secure and Engaged* (Ottawa: Canadian Defence Publishing, 2017), 51.

and terminating in phase 3 with operations focussed at the application of combat capabilities. The training cycle is spanned over three years, approximately one year for each phase.<sup>2</sup> Considering the fact that training is a resource intensive process and personnel are not available simultaneously, it becomes impracticable for all troops to undergo the same set of training at the same time and be placed at highest standard of readiness concurrently. Armies around the world work on the same rotational and scalable idea of force generation packages to meet domestic and international defense requirements. Like the CA, “The British Army articulates the distinction between force preparation (general purpose training) and force generation (training for mission/war), which parallels the funding requirement of force elements to readiness.”<sup>3</sup>

8. These training preparedness cycles vary with international defence commitments (tailored according to nature of commitments). In order to ascertain the efficacy of CA training for international operations it is imperative to examine component training in the succeeding paragraphs.

9. The CA training system rests on individual, collective, continuation and TMST. Individual training, dictated by Individual Battle Task Standards (IBTS) doctrine, lies in the responsibility of unit commanders and aims at honing professional skills and the knowledge of individuals. Collective training, dictated by Battle Task Standards (BTS) doctrine, is focussed at team and subsequent combined training. Continuation training offsets skills fading and TMST focusses on specific-to-theatre training.

10. The levels of training corresponding to individual, collective and TMST training:<sup>4</sup>

a. Individual Training.

i. Level 1 corresponds to triaging for individual skills and acquisition.

b. Collective Training.

i. Level 2 pertains to small teams to undertake a task;

ii. Level 3 relates to sub-sub units with more command and control challenges;

iii. Level 4 deals with arms specific training, however, may be conducted in combined arms context;

iv. Level 5 training is combined team training, undertaking combined arms manoeuvre and culminating in combined arms fire;

v. Level 6 training is unit level training (out of combined arms training) and ends with a field exercise; and

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<sup>2</sup> Department of National Defence: 14 B-GL-300-008/FP-001, *Training Canada's Army...*, 101.

<sup>3</sup> David E. Johnson (et al.), *Preparing and training for the full spectrum of military challenges* (RAND, 2009), 159.

<sup>4</sup> Department of National Defence: 14 B-GL-300-008/FP-001, *Training Canada's Army...*, 22.

- vi. Level 7 training is the highest level of training at brigade level and tests operational preparedness at joint level.
- c. TMST.
- i. “[TMST] will usually include ...BTS training that needs reiteration ... as well as rules of engagement (ROE) training, environmental survival skills and non-combat skills such as negotiation and languages.”<sup>5</sup>
  - ii. TMST provides and equips personnel with special theatre mission requirements which are not part of individual and collective training. TMST may be planned and dovetailed with individual and collective training during phase 2 and 3 if the nature and timeframe of the mission is known. Otherwise it can be organized separately.
  - iii. TMST, if made part of normal training conducted after Level 4, has definite benefits of saving subsequent time and resources.
  - iv. Generalised (Non-Theatre) TMST. While theatre specific aspects are applicable to a particular theatre, certain aspects of TMST like knowledge of LOAC and psychological operations (Psy Ops) are applicable to all the theatres. Therefore, irrespective of the theatre, these can be made part of foundation training.

10. The training phases identified in Figure 2 are directed towards conventional settings. These phases follow the comprehensive approach from individual training to combined arms training and from lowest to highest level, yet (in light of discussion in above paragraph) they do not fulfill the requirements in Figure 1 for OOTW particular to a conflict. Under the ideal scenario, training must include cultural, social, informational and psychological dimensions for the particular theatre. Analysis of past conflicts reveals that understanding of these theatre peculiarities is crucial to success for the mission.<sup>6</sup> With lessons learnt from Somalia to experiences in Afghanistan; theatre training has been deemed essential for mission success. In his study of (Op APOLLO and Op ARCHER) Op ATHENA in 2013, Dr Windsor agreed that the Road to High Readiness training model worked in preparing their platoons, companies and battalions for the Kandahar campaign.<sup>7</sup>

### **Economy versus Efficiency**

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<sup>5</sup> Department of National Defence, 14 B-GL-300-008/FP-001, *Training Canada's Army* (Ottawa: Canadian Defence Publishing, 2001), 143.

<sup>6</sup> John Granatstein & Dean Oliver, “The Somalia Affair,” *Canadian Military History*, Volume 22, no 4 (Autumn 2013), 60.

<sup>7</sup> Department of National Defence, *CAF Evaluation of Land Readiness*, (Ottawa: Canadian Defence Publishing, 2016.)



12. Given adequate resources, when personnel and time are available, there is no better thing than realistic training. Considering the direct relationship between operations and training, no laxity can be afforded on the training because objective training in realistic environments is crucial for mission success. As the CA says, “train as you fight.”<sup>8</sup> However, in face of budgetary constraints and dwindling defence budgets, confronted by most of the militaries, maintaining optimal and maximum operational readiness is a challenging proposition.<sup>9</sup> The fundamental problem facing the CA is how to achieve all of the training aims while reducing cost and preserving quality and maintaining effectiveness.<sup>10</sup>

13. In the face of budget strain, adaptable and scalable force readiness models appear to be the most viable. The DND training evaluation board confirmed that these limitations have been addressed by prioritization and protection of resources for high priority training areas.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, the CA readiness cycle has increased from 18 months, during Afghanistan War, to 36 months, with a reduction in HR confirmation exercises.<sup>12</sup> However, reduction in resources raises the question with respect to quality of training in phase 1 and phase 2. Furthermore, “Design [and conduct] of CT is left more open to interpretation and provides the flexibility to absorb resource constraints at the cost of quantity and quality”.<sup>13</sup>

14. Inadequacies identified in the foundation training (phase 2), raise questions with respect to its applicability for international operations. “As a result of time and personnel constraints the quality of [collective] training is often affected with simple “check in the box” activities conducted to meet training gateways but not develop fundamental capabilities”.<sup>14</sup> This has been compensated by maximum allocation of resources for phase 3, focussed on deployed operations, which receives the lion’s share and addresses qualitative concerns. “Force readiness is a key priority for DND that ensures that resources are aligned and available to support determined readiness levels, and the DND/CAF is therefore able to position military capabilities to meet planned and anticipated requirements.”<sup>15</sup>

15. The model presented in Figure 2 will work well for complex international operations, but might be overkill for simple operations involving small numbers of deployed individuals. Figure 3, the Managed Readiness Program (MRP) and Collective Training (CT) synchronization matrix,<sup>16</sup> depicts repetition of activities in phase 2 and 3, when units do not deploy on operations. In the absence of a mission, the preservation of training standards appears to become the purpose of phase 3, thus resulting in the repetition of most of the activities (to avoid skills fade) in the previous phase. In order to economize and avoid repetitions, optimum use of technology (simulators and computer assisted exercises) in all phases may prove be a viable option.

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<sup>8</sup> Paul Gunnison *et al*, *Train as We Fight: Training for Multinational Interoperability*, (Fort Benning: 2004), 1.

<sup>9</sup> Department of National Defence, *CAF Evaluation of Land Readiness...*, Annex F.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 21.


<sup>12</sup> Howard Coombs, “25 Years after Somalia”..., 41.

<sup>13</sup> Jesse Eijk, “Too Busy To Fight: Degradation Of Infantry Core Combat Capabilities Through Excessive Tempo” (Joint Command and Staff Programme paper, Canadian forces college 2016), 3.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>15</sup> Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Joint and Common Forces Readiness*, (Ottawa: Canadian Defence Publishing, 2017.)

<sup>16</sup> Department of National Defence, *CAF Evaluation of Land Readiness...*, Annex F.



**Figure 3: Managed Readiness Programme and Collective Training Model**  
*Source: Training Canada's Army, Ottawa: DND Canada, 2001, Annex E.*

16. The fact that Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) will operate in a multi-national environment, places importance on interoperability of coalition partners. Aspects like command and control in coalition framework etc. do not form part of foundation training and are required to be incorporated in TMST. Besides, routine joint training with allies, in-theatre training can help streamline the operating procedures with coalition partners.

17. Current HR training (in phase 3) is based on a uniform model, that is, 'one-size-fits-all'. Regardless of envisaged role of individuals (specialists) in the operation, same type of training is imparted. More the time is available, more training is packed in. This results in inefficient use of time and money as everyone is trained to the same probability, which one may not encounter. A clerk getting the similar training as a combatant, which is of no use to him, is inefficient utilization of resources. However, specialist within a trade, like sniper, assault pioneer and mortar specialists within infantry, besides getting their primary specialist training may also be imparted cross specialist training. Cross occupation training may compensate personnel deficiency in a particular trade and specialty. "Nature and associated structures of current operations have resulted in a notable increase in tempo within battalions by disproportionate targeting of certain ranks."<sup>17</sup> It may carry risks and implementation problems. While

<sup>17</sup> Jesse Eijk, "Too Busy To Fight"...6.

focussing on primary tasks and acquiring cross trade training for tertiary tasks (of critically deficient specialists) can mitigate these risks.

### **Strong, Secure, Engaged**

16. The new defence policy, *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, identifies the following operational and employment possibilities for the CAF:<sup>18</sup>

- a. Contribute to international peace and stability through:
  - i. Two sustained deployments of ~ 500-1500 personnel in two different theatres of operation, including one as a lead nation;
  - ii. One time-limited deployment of ~ 500-1500 personnel (6-9 months duration);
  - iii. Two sustained deployments of ~ 100-500 personnel;
  - iv. Two time-limited deployments (6-9 months) of ~ 100-500 personnel; and
  - v. One Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation, with scaleable additional support.

17. As a sequel to above discussion and from the list above, it can be said that not all international missions require same set of expertise and training. Combat and post-combat stabilization mission in Afghanistan (Figure 1, war or high intensity conflict) cannot be compared a peace keeping or peace support operation (Figure 1, peace or low intensity conflict) in Africa. Therefore, nature and duration of international commitment has a direct bearing on the level of training required for mission. “The CAF has to be ready to respond rapidly when requested by the GoC. HRUs (high readiness units) are designated units or positions that are tasked for short-term deployments of 1 to 60 days primarily to special duty areas or operations.”<sup>19</sup> Conversely, training under time compressed scenarios, may lead to oversights in certain important areas specific to missions. Without balanced training, missions like Operation DELIVERANCE can turn out to be difficult. TMST (with *right* focus on theatre specifics), forms part of all missions and cannot be skipped altogether, but will vary depending on the mission. By embedding basic TMST activities (e.g. ROE, LOAC and sub conventional warfare) with later stages of phase 2, training can be made be more adaptable.

### **CONCLUSION**

18. Training is the most important element of operational readiness. Balancing the requirements of effective training at a manageable cost turns out to be a challenge for militaries.

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<sup>18</sup> Department of National Defence, *Strong, Secure and Engaged...*, 81.

<sup>19</sup> Department of National Defence, *Evaluation of Joint and Common Forces Readiness*.

The CA, being important tool of national policy, has to maintain a scalable level of readiness to afford GoC with viable options. The ever increasing canvas of FSE necessitates that the CA prepares for the broad spectrum of operations identified in Figure 1. The phases of the CA training cycle in Figure 2, spanned over a three-year force generation and employment cycle, is focussed on conventional operations. Applicability of GPCT alone for international operations turns out to be unviable option. However, if nature and duration of secondary expeditionary operations is known, duration of TMST can be reduced or generic TMST aspects can be embedded in the earlier training phases. Furthermore, TMST for main international commitments (long duration and complex) cannot be same as for secondary international operations commitments as it will amount to waste of time and money.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

19. CA training practices are in line with strategic and operational requirements and are similar to practices used by other NATO countries. In the face of financial realities and complex operating environment, sustainment and maintenance of HR forces is challenging. The following HR training recommendations may ease the TMST versus GPCT challenge:

### TMST

- a. Phasing of TMST. In the early stages of phase 1 and 2, generic TMST subjects like ROE, LOAC, sub-conventional warfare, low-intensity conflict and info ops may be included in a training module. On confirmation of mission, in advanced stages of phase 2 training and onwards, specifics like cultural, detailed ROEs and social considerations may be imparted as part of TMST. This will offer CAF with adaptable response in case of secondary international commitments.

### Efficiency versus Economy

- b. Use of Technology. In order to economize training, technology plays instrumental role. Simulators, computer assisted and command post exercises can help prevent skills fade and save costs. Optimal use of simulator / computer based training from lower levels (level 2 onwards) can improve training and save cost. For commanders and staff, use of war games, map and computer exercises at brigade and higher level, to be followed by field exercises, can improve their operational understanding.
- c. Cross occupation and on job training. Availability of all ranks for training, especially during 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> year of training, may not be possible due to parallel commitments. Besides, attrition rate (deficiencies) in specialist occupations places increased emphasis on cross occupation trade (e.g. infantry mortar specialist getting secondary training on sniper). On job and informal training at sub-unit level can impart practical training and hone theoretical aspects.
- d. Targeted TMST. Instead of uniform or standard training for all ranks during operations training year, occupation specialist may be imparted training specific

to envisaged role of their occupation. A training which is of no use to the individual is waste of resources.

- e. In Theatre TMST. Where time and operating environments allow, in-theatre training should be made part of TMST. In multi-nation mission, which is likely to be case for CA, it will increase interoperability with coalition partners. Furthermore, realistic operational environment will enhance the learning and understanding of personnel.

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