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NATO: FROM DEFENSE ALLIANCE TO GLOBAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION?

Commander Erik Tremblay

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NATO: FROM DEFENSE ALLIANCE TO GLOBAL SECURITY ORGANISATION?

“Geography has made us neighbors. History has made us friends. Economics has made us partners. And necessity has made us allies. Those whom nature hath so joined together, let no man put asunder.”

- John F. Kennedy, 35th president of the United States (1961-1963).

“NATO is obsolete... a bad bargain”¹, “brain dead”²; the alliance is “a danger to world peace and a danger to world security”³. These rather harsh words, spoken by the heads of states of three of the most influential members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), do not exactly convey the vote of confidence “the most successful military alliance in history”⁴ celebrating its 70th Anniversary could wish for. While all three leaders eventually revised their initial statements to some degree, they are nonetheless indicative of some uneasiness within the alliance. And yet, NATO membership keeps growing, with the recent accession of North Macedonia, its 30th member, in March 2020. Ever since the Warsaw Pact dissolved in 1991, NATO has been struggling with an identity crisis, as its core *raison d’être* vanished. Some believe it should carry on the path of expanding its mandate to address current threats wherever they are, has it has done in the Balkans, Libya and Afghanistan. Others argue it should go back to its roots of deterring a more assertive, if not aggressive Russia; or counter-balance a rising China.

This paper will show that NATO should continue to evolve from a defence alliance to an increasingly global security organisation, because transnational security issues have become a greater threat than national rivalry. First, the analysis will highlight the rise of transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy and migrants; and the relative fall of inter-state territorial conflicts. Next, the paper will examine how the notions of *human security* and Responsibility to Protect (R2P) are

¹ Ashley Parker, “Donald Trump Says NATO is Obsolete”, *New York Times*, 2 April 2016.

² Ed Alcock, “Emmanuel Macron warns Europe: NATO is becoming brain-dead”, *The Economist*, 7 November 2019.

³ Jack Maidment, “Jeremy Corbyn claimed NATO was a danger to world peace”, *The Telegraph*, 14 May 2017.

⁴ Jens Stoltenberg, (speech “The Future of NATO”, World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland, 23 January 2020.)

compelling NATO to evolve beyond its traditional role. Finally, the analysis will explore how further enlargement benefits the Alliance as it continues its shift towards a global security agenda.

THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL THREATS

For some, NATO's personality disorder is easy to fix. The Alliance should remember its origins; as summarized by NATO's first Secretary General: "Keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in and the Germans down."⁵ The Alliance should, the argument goes, re-center its psyche around the original purpose it was created for and is arguably best at: collective defense of its members and more specifically, deterrence of Russian aggression. NATO's immediate problem is Russia, they say, because "it has launched another round of empire building by annexing Crimea and intervening in Syria."⁶ Granted, Russia has reportedly been increasing its number of SSC-8 mobile nuclear-capable intermediate ballistic missiles stationed in Europe, in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.⁷ President Putin has been quite open about his goal of restoring Russia to its former Soviet era glory. He often reminds all that when the USSR collapsed, "Russia" lost a quarter of its national territory, half its population and 41% of its GDP.⁸ He routinely boasts about Russian advancements in military capabilities, including the new RS28 *Sarmat* heavy intercontinental ballistic missile, nuclear-powered air-launched stealth strike missile and the *Avangard* hypersonic glide vehicle, just to name a few.⁹ There is no question that under president Putin, who famously said: "You can do a lot more with weapons and politeness than just politeness",¹⁰ Russia is building and flexing its military muscle, not to mention

⁵ NATO, "Lord Ismay", last accessed 18 May 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_137930.htm.

⁶ Alexander Moens and Cornel Turdeanu, "Fear and Dread - Russia's Strategy to Dismantle North Atlantic Cooperation", *Standing Guard on the NATO Frontier*, Macdonald-Laurier Institute Publication, July 2008, 4.

⁷ NATO, "INF Treaty", last accessed 18 May 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_166100.htm.

⁸ President of Russia website, "Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, March 1, 2018", last accessed 26 April 2020, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957>, 30.

⁹ Ibid, 32-39.

¹⁰ No author, "Putin's War of Words", *New York Times*, 4 December 2014.

information warfare and nuclear menacing. All this may be so, but the real question becomes: is a Waltsonian response, in which NATO builds-up military power to counter-balance Russia, the best one? Neorealists argue this inevitably results in the *security dilemma*, whereby one's security creates greater instability, as the opposite side builds-up matching power and then some, in a spiralling arms race in which overall security becomes a zero-sum game.¹¹ In fact, President Putin openly recognised this: "as other countries increase the number and quality of their military potential, Russia will also need to ensure it has new generation weapons and technology."¹²

Arguably, the world is less predictable than it once was, but what are the odds that Russia, Iran, North Korea or any other state, actually breaches the territory of a NATO state in the next decade? What conceivable reason or set of circumstances could realistically lead one to take such action? And more importantly, given its finite if not insufficient resources, is this really the most serious threat NATO ought to guard against today? Many believe it is not. Some scholars assert that defending territory has become less important for NATO than promoting stability and allied interests globally.¹³ "Today, terrorists born in Riyadh and trained in Kandahar hatch deadly plots in Hamburg to fly airplanes into buildings in New York."¹⁴ Indeed, NATO has seen more fighting since the end of the Cold War than during the 50 years following its creation and virtually all of the fighting has been outside NATO member territory (see Annex A). Other types of security threats have risen in importance, including global terrorism, transnational crime, piracy, environmental degradation, migrants and pandemics. Cyber-attacks can now have just as crippling an effect as territorial invasion, through a wide range of means from meddling with elections to disrupting power grids, oil production, communications, GPS and banking. Migrants are

¹¹ Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* vol. 30, no.2 (January 1978): 170.

¹² President of Russia website, "Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, March 1, 2018", 37.

¹³ Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeitheer, "Global NATO", *Foreign Affairs*, (September 2006): 2.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, 2.

compelled to leave wherever they are for various reasons: social (ie: discrimination based on race or religion), political (ie: lack of democratic rights or persecution), economical (ie: unemployment or poor education), environmental (ie: droughts or pollution), health & safety (ie: poor health infrastructure or epidemics) and existential threats (ie: ethnic cleansing, war). Figure 1 provides a partial glimpse at the magnitude of this complex issue.

Table 1 – Key Facts on Migration.

| Key Facts on Migration | 2000 | 2020 |
|---|-------------|--------------|
| Estimated number of international migrants | 150 million | 272 million |
| Estimated proportion of world population who are migrants | 2.8% | 3.5% |
| Number of refugees | 14 million | 25.9 million |
| Number of internally displaced persons due to violence & conflict | 21 million | 41.3 million |
| Top 3 countries: | | |
| • Syrian Arab Republic | - | 6.1 million |
| • Colombia | - | 5.8 million |
| • Democratic Republic of the Congo | - | 3.1 million |

Source: United Nations, “World Migration Report 2020”, International Organization for Migration, 10.

Migration is all but one of the many transnational issues one finds alarming trends on, but it is an important one because it is indicative of underlying problems. Some 821 million people in the world suffered from hunger in 2018 and this number is trending-up.¹⁵ In 2015, 734 million people (10% of the world’s population) lived below the extreme poverty line; and, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing world recession expected, an estimated 60 million more could fall into extreme poverty by the end of 2020.¹⁶ People in such dire conditions are often forced to resort to desperate measures. Opium production and cocaine manufacture have reached

¹⁵ United Nations, “Food Security”, last accessed 17 May 2020, <https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/food/index.html>.

¹⁶ World Bank, “Understanding Poverty”, last accessed 17 May 2020, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview>.

record levels, with amounts produced up by 74% since 2018.¹⁷ Some 35 million people suffered from drug addiction worldwide in 2019. Not only does international drug trade causes hundreds of thousands of deaths yearly, it is also fuels other harmful activities. Some 92% of the world's poppy crop is produced in Afghanistan, which represents 40% of its Gross National Product and is thought to be the main source of funding of the Taliban.¹⁸ These types of transnational threats call for not only a Whole-of-Government, but a "Whole-of-World" approach. This is a key reason NATO has begun and must continue its globalization.

HUMAN SECURITY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

There is much debate, amongst scholars and members alike, about NATO's evolution from a Europe-centric collective defense alliance to a global security organization. France, Germany and eastern members maintain the core mission of NATO must remain collective defense. Southern members and Canada believe that without an imminent threat to allied territory, peacekeeping and crisis management must become primary functions of a evolved NATO. The US and Great Britain argue "NATO must prepare for the full spectrum of missions", from peace keeping to full-fledge defense action within and outside Europe.¹⁹ Meanwhile, many scholars contend that states and multilateral organisations must embrace a broader concept of *human security*, focused on "making human beings secure".²⁰ In unison, the United Nations (UN) stated:

"The concept of security must change from an exclusive stress on national security to a much greater stress on people's security, from security through armaments to security through human development, from territorial security to food, employment, and environmental security."²¹

¹⁷ United Nations Office on Drugs, *World Drug Report 2019*, (Vienna: United Nations Publication, 2019), 1.

¹⁸ Imrana Shelk, "War on Terrorism and NATO's Role in Afghanistan", *Journal of European Studies* (July 2019): 62.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 7.

²⁰ Karen Mingst and Margaret Karns, "Human Security: The Environment and Health." in *United Nations in the 21st Century*, 4th edition. (Philadelphia : Westview Press, 2012), 247.

²¹ UN Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1993*, (New York : UNDP Publications, 1993), 2.

The UN recognized the need to counter-balance the *sacrosanct* notion of state-sovereignty enshrined in the UN Charter Article 2(7), with the concept of *Responsibility to Protect* (R2P) individuals, “when their own governments are manifestly unwilling or unable to do so”.²² This puts the onus on UN member states to intervene in clear cases of human rights abuse and genocide. The question then becomes how should the world respond? The UN Security Council, which clearly has a core mandate to intervene, often lacks the means or the collective political will, either to achieve a majority or to avoid being vetoed by one of the “Great Five”. All too often, significant human suffering occurs before a UN Task Force arrives on site. The US has the means and has proven (on selected occasions) more efficient at mounting “coalitions-of-the-willing” and reacting more quickly to crises and or when others would not. But at times, it has done so with questionable legitimacy. NATO, on the other hand, has the means; and legitimacy can come either from a formal UN mandate under Chapter VII or VIII, a unanimous vote of the North Atlantic Council (NAC), based on a collective defense or R2P rationale. Under NATO’s consensus-based decision making, all members technically have a veto power, but each can still tacitly support a decision without committing troops, at least in non-Article 5 situations. This prevents total gridlock all too often seen within the UN when veto power is exercised.

The concepts of human security and R2P have undoubtedly influenced NATO, as shown in its Strategy Concept 2010, in which it explicitly re-affirmed its commitment to the UN Charter principles. It also introduced *Cooperative Security* as its third core task, which seeks to promote international security, through partnership with relevant countries and non-state actors.²³ NATO acknowledged that instead of waiting for threats to appear at the border, it is best to confront them

²² Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij, and Thomas Weiss, *UN Ideas That Changed the World*, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009), 143.

²³ NATO, *Strategic Concept - For the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, (New York: NATO Publications, 2010), 8.

at a strategic distance via cooperative efforts aimed at the stabilization of whole nations and societies. Jens Stoltenberg, NATO's secretary-general, stated "the best way is to enable local forces to fight terrorism themselves".²⁴ As a matter of fact, NATO still has 400 personnel in Afghanistan doing just that under Operation Resolute Support. And this is only the most recent instance of a clear trend over the last 17 years. As shown in Annex A, 11 of the last 16 NATO operations since Afghanistan in 2003, a turning point, have been "out of area", in response to situations that did not directly threaten NATO territory. Whereas in the 13 years earlier, since its very first operation in 1990, only one of 25 missions was outside Europe.²⁵

Countless studies have shown that "human security requires strong and stable states." ²⁶ Wassily Leontief, Nobel prizewinner in economics in 1973, established the relationships between disarmament, development and security. It showed the strong detrimental impact of arms spending on economic growth in developing countries, concluding that "the world can either continue the arms race with characteristic vigor or move consciously towards a more balanced social economic development. But it cannot do both." ²⁷ NATO is facing a similar dilemma. Clearly, it is prohibitively expensive for the Alliance to try to be everything to everyone, including being "fully prepared across the entire spectrum of security missions". Should the Alliance invest in its integrated command structure, computer incident response center, NATO Response Force, integrated European air defense system or missile defense system? Some capabilities are multi-purpose, but others are mainly or only useful towards one or the other of NATO core tasks. Maintenance of a multi-million dollar ballistic missile defense system does not

²⁴ Ibid, 3.

²⁵ NATO, "Operations and Missions", last accessed 17 May 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_520.htm.

²⁶ Sadako Ogata and Johan Cels, "Human Security: Protecting and Empowering the People," *Global Governance* 9, no. 3 (2003): 275.

²⁷ Richard Jolly, Mac McGraham, and Chris Smith, "The Thorson Report", in *Disarmament and World Development* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1986), 235.

help stabilize failed states that breed global terrorism and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). Choices must be made. Having realized the Alliance must deal with global security issues at the source, a question that remains is how to go about it – remain a regional organisation that acts globally or grow further into a global organization?

GLOBALIZING THE ALLIANCE

Another way NATO has chosen to act at the strategic level via cooperative efforts is through enlargement of the club. NATO's "Open door policy" is rooted in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, which states that "any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty" can be invited to join.²⁸ As shown in Figure 1, some 18 countries have taken-up the offer, more than doubling the size of the initial membership of 12.




Figure 1 – NATO Membership and Partnerships.

Source: NATO, Enlargement, last accessed 17 May 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm.

²⁸ NATO, "The North Atlantic Treaty", last accessed 18 May 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/official_texts_17.htm.

How much further should NATO enlargement go? While in theory, more members means larger security resources to address threats, it also adds more territory to protect and a broader set of potentially diverging national interests to reconcile before reaching unanimity on key decisions. By all accounts, achieving consensus in a timely manner with 30 nations around the table is already a challenge. When the Alliance debated to increase the number of troops for ISAF in Afghanistan, “the internal fight about who would be responsible for what got almost as vicious as the fight against the Taliban”.²⁹ There are also definite interoperability challenges with integrating states with largely obsolete Soviet-era weaponry and limited capacity for burden sharing. Some also argue that the necessary commitment to defense spending that comes with NATO membership, further increases militarization of the world, including the proliferation of weapons, a known source of hazard and instability. This also carries the risk of upsetting Russia, and others, which could trigger another arms race, as per the *security dilemma* discussed earlier, and some say even lead to a second Cold War.³⁰ Clearly, further enlargement must be done very carefully so as not to antagonize anyone, but it is worth the risk. Countries wishing to join the Alliance must meet specific requirements, including a democratic political system, a functioning market economy, respect of minorities, a commitment to the peaceful settlement of conflicts, and an openness to develop democratic civil-military relations and institutional structures. These are all undeniably positive country-building measures of the kind that breed stability and security both internally and globally. Some stated NATO’s most remarkable achievement has been “its contribution to peace and security through the modernization and professionalization of the militaries, greater interoperability and respect for civilian authority”.³¹ On this basis, further

²⁹ Howorth, Jolyon. "OTAN et PESD : complexités institutionnelles et réalités politiques." *Politique étrangère*, no. 4 (hiver 2009): 820.

³⁰ NATO Association of Canada, “Should NATO Continue its Expansion?”, 9 May 2016, <http://natoassociation.ca/should-nato-continue-its-expansion/>.

³¹ Hudson Institute, “Why NATO Should Accept Mexico”, 18 July 2012, <https://www.hudson.org/research/8944-why-nato-should-accept-mexico>.

NATO enlargement should be viewed as a positive proposition for all. A bigger and stronger NATO “will help to counter aggression from rogue states and prevent instances of extreme nationalism, and ethnic, racial, and religious conflict.”³² Bosnia & Herzegovina, Georgia and Ukraine have declared their aspirations to NATO membership. So have Finland, Sweden and Moldova, even under threat of Russian countermeasures. The inclusion of close allies, such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Singapore and South Korea is regularly floated. Afterall, they already are closely integrated and strong contributors to many NATO operations.³³ Besides, is the US not “pivoting” towards the Asia-Pacific region? Some even envision a *Global NATO*, stating “the Alliance must extend its membership to any democratic state that can help it fulfill its new role”, arguing “only a truly global alliance can address the global challenges of the day.”³⁴ Technically, this would require an amendment to Article 10 to open the door to non-European states, but practically the precedent hardly needs to be made.

From a geographical perspective, there is a case for a “North American Pillar” with Mexico,³⁵ considering the extent to which the three North-American economies are intertwined and their people similarly afflicted by narco-trafficking.³⁶ But in today’s global world, shared values and common interests should be more relevant factors in forming partnerships than geography. In terms of shared values, why should Belarus, a European country with a questionable record on democracy and human rights, be more eligible to join NATO than Brazil, India or South Africa? Although, there are good state-building and global security reasons to consider its eventual membership as well as many of the “stan” countries.³⁷ Far-fetched? The

³² Ibid, 4.

³³ Thom Woodroffe, “NATO: the Australian experience”, *The Drum Opinion*, 21 May 2012, 2.

³⁴ Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, “Global NATO”, *Foreign Affairs*, (September 2006), 3.

³⁵ Hudson Institute, “Why NATO Should Accept Mexico”, 6.

³⁶ Ibid, 5.

³⁷ Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

notion of Russia itself joining NATO was brought-up a number of times, namely by Michael Gorbachev in 1990 and Boris Yeltsin in 1991, and discussed between Vladimir Putin and Bill Clinton in 2000.³⁸ Russia signed-up to the NATO Partnership for Peace program in 1994 and in recognition of their common interests and shared security threats, the Russia-NATO Council was stood-up in 2002. Although it is difficult to imagine full NATO membership for Russia anytime soon, it cannot be totally ruled-out in the future.

NATO countries have high stakes in the Middle East, both as a source of oil and breeding ground for international terrorism. Not surprisingly, President Trump recently asked NATO to “become much more involved in the Middle East”.³⁹ There are other ways to do this, besides sending troops. One would be for long-time allies in the region, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, and broken countries in the process of rebuilding (ie. Irak and Syria) to join. This is a long shot to be sure, but perhaps the US project of a Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA), which is to include all the Gulf Cooperation Council ⁴⁰ states, Egypt, Jordan, is a step in this direction. What if gradually some or all of the 30 plus countries previously mentioned joined the Alliance, doubling its size; wouldn’t NATO start looking like the UN Department of Peace Operations with teeth? The intent here is not to advocate for immediate NATO enlargement in all directions, but merely to point-out that such path is not inconceivable. In fact, this globalisation trend started as early as 2002, at the 60th NATO Summit in Prague, in the wake of 911 and the decision by the NAC to consider the US under attack and invoke Article 5.⁴¹ Some believe the regionalization of the international security system will prevail, because many countries are reluctant to intervene in situations that are not sufficiently tied to their national interests, which inevitably creates

³⁸ Madeline Roache, “Breaking Down the Complicated Relationship Between Russia and NATO”, *New York Times*, 4 April 2019, 2.

³⁹ Samuel Stolton, “Is NATO about to become 'more involved' in the Middle East?”, *Aljazeera*, 14 Jan 2020.

⁴⁰ The GCC includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

⁴¹ NATO, “Prague Summit Declaration”, last accessed 17 May 2020, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/official_texts.htm?text=112211

challenges in decision-making and burden-sharing for global defense or security alliances.⁴²

However, regional organizations often lack the capacity to enforce security in their own regions.

One example is the African Union, who was not inclined to send troops to Kosovo and requested

NATO assistance to curtail piracy off the Coast of Somalia.⁴³ One of the greatest comparative

advantage of a global military alliance such as NATO over unilateral, regional or ad hoc

“coalitions of the willing”, is that it comes with well-established command structures, standardized procedures, interoperable equipment and troops that are already trained to work together.

In essence, “NATO has evolved from a defense into a security organization”,⁴⁴ and it should continue to do so. Instead of focusing solely on collective defense in the Euro-Atlantic region, the Alliance is offering a broad range of security services to its members and partners. It recognizes that while national rivalry from Russia and others has not entirely disappeared, it is no longer the only nor main evil to guard against. Transnational threats, such as global terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs are much greater concerns; and their root cause lies in failed or fragile states, who lack the institutions to enforce the rule of law and enable their people to prosper. NATO has realized that the best and perhaps only defense against such hazards is to intervene at the source, wherever that may be. Such “forward defense” calls for a global reach, well outside Europe, and an effective approach to this end is through further NATO enlargement and partnerships with like-minded nations and relevant non-government actors. Crisis intervention, peacekeeping and nation-building “out of area” contribute to human security, which in turn pays collective defense dividends. And as the R2P principle becomes *sine qua non*, states will feel increasingly compelled to respond. Given the complexity and lethal risks of the interventions required, who else than a global security-oriented NATO will be able to step-up?

⁴² Moon Younghoon, "The Future of NATO." *Harvard International Review* 34, no. 3 (Winter 2013): 20.

⁴³ Ibid, 21.

⁴⁴ Jamie Shea, "Keeping NATO Relevant." *Policy Outlook*, (April 2012): 1.

ANNEX A – NATO OPERATIONS SINCE 1990

| # | Operation | Location | Description |
|----|--|---------------------------|---|
| 41 | NATO Mission Iraq (Jul 2018 – Present) | Iraq | Training and capacity-building to help Iraqi forces secure the country against terrorism and prevent the re-emergence of ISIS. |
| 40 | Resolute Support (2015 – Present) | Afghanistan | Training, advice and assistance to Afghan security forces and institutions. Support rule of law and good governance. (UN Security Council Resolution 2189). |
| 39 | Sea Guardian (2016 – Present) | Mediterranean Sea | Maritime awareness, counter-terrorism at sea and support to capacity-building. |
| 38 | Air Policing (2014 – Present) | Albania, Slovenia, Baltic | Detect, track and identify all violations of its airspace and to take appropriate action. |
| 37 | Unified Protector (Mar – Oct 2011) | Libya | Enforce arms embargo, enforce no-fly zone, counter military forces threatening civilians. |
| 36 | Ocean Shield (Aug 2009 – Present) | Horn of Africa | Counter-piracy. New element: assist states in the region to improve their own ability to combat piracy. |
| 35 | Allied Protector (Mar – Aug 2009) | Horn of Africa | Counter-piracy. Conducted by Standing NATO Maritime Group 2. |
| 34 | Allied Provider (Oct – Dec 2008) | Gulf of Aden | Counter-piracy. |
| 33 | AMISON (2007 – Present) | Somalia | African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Airlift support to AU peacekeepers, capacity-building, training to African Forces. |
| 32 | Riga Summit (Aug – Nov 2006) | Latvia | Technical security, CBRN response, air and sea policing, IED detection, CIS and MEDEVAC support. |
| 31 | Humanitarian Assistance to Pakistan (2005 – 2006) | Pakistan | Airlift supplies, engineers, medical units and specialist equipment to northern Pakistan struck by severe earthquake. |
| 30 | Hurricane Katrina (Sep – Oct 2005) | USA | Coordinate the movement of urgently needed material, support humanitarian relief operations |
| 29 | AMIS (2005 – 2007) | Sudan | AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Provide air transport to 37,000 AMIS personnel, train and mentor over 250 AMIS officials. |
| 28 | NTM-I (2004 – 2011) | Iraq | NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I). Help Iraq establish effective and accountable security forces. |
| 27 | Distinguished Games (Jun – Sep 2004) | Greece | Provide chemical, biological radiological and nuclear <u>defence</u> assets, AWACS radar aircraft to support Olympic and para-Olympic games. |
| 26 | ISAF (2003 – 2014) | Afghanistan | International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Enable Afghan security forces and local authorities to enable functioning democratic institutions and the rule of law. (UN Security Council Resolution 1510). |
| 25 | Display Deterrence (Feb – Apr 2003) | Turkey | <u>Defence</u> of Turkey during the second Persian Gulf war. |
| 24 | Allied Harmony (2001 – 2003) | Macedonia | Provide advisory elements to assist the government in ensuring stability throughout the country. |
| 23 | Active Endeavour (2001 – 2016) | Mediterranean Sea | Deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist activity in the Mediterranean Sea. |

Source: NATO, Operations and Missions, last accessed 17 May 2020, <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics.htm?>

| | | | |
|----|--|--------------------------------------|--|
| 22 | Eagle Assist (2001– 2002) | USA | Deploy AWACS to help patrol the skies over the united states in NATO's first ever article 5 mission. |
| 21 | Amber Fox (2001 – 2003) | Macedonia | Protect international monitors overseeing the implementation of the peace plan. |
| 20 | Essential Harvest (2001– 2003) | Macedonia | Disarm ethnic Albanian groups operating throughout the country. |
| 19 | Joint Guardian (Jun 1999 – Present) | Kosovo | Kosovo Force (KFOR). End widespread violence and halt the humanitarian disaster. Help create a professional and multi-ethnic Kosovo Security Force. (UN Security Council Resolution 1244). |
| 18 | Allied Harbour (Apr – Aug 1999) | Albania | ACE Mobile Force (Land) deployed to establish Albania Force (AFOR) and help Albanian authorities deal with massive influx of refugees from Kosovo. |
| 17 | Allied Force (Mar – Jun 1999) | Kosovo | Air campaign against Former Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro) and its forces deployed in Kosovo. Ground force led by ACE Rapid Reaction Corps latter became KFOR. |
| 16 | Joint Guarantor (1998 – 1999) | Kosovo | Evacuation of OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission. Not executed as mission was expelled 4 days before conflict started. |
| 15 | Eagle Eye (1998 – 1999) | Kosovo | Aerial monitoring to verify Serb compliance with UN Security Council resolution for ceasefire and force reduction. |
| 14 | Joint Forge (1998 – 2004) | Bosnia | SFOR peacekeeping operation further reduced as Bosnian state acquired increased sovereignty and control of airspace. European Union-led force (EUFOR) took over under operation Althea. |
| 13 | Joint Guard (1996 – 1998) | Bosnia | Peacekeeping operation with new focus and smaller force called Stabilization Force (SFOR) |
| 12 | Joint Endeavour (1995 – 1996) | Bosnia & Herzegovina | First peacekeeping operation – Implementation Force (IFOR). Separate warring factions and create safe conditions for peace agreement tasks. |
| 11 | Deliberate force (Sep 1995) | Bosnia & Herzegovina | Airstrikes against Bosnian Serb C2 installations and ammunition facilities. |
| 10 | Deadeye (Aug 1995) | Bosnia & Herzegovina | Airstrikes against Bosnian Serb air defenses. |
| 9 | Sharp Guard (1993 – 1996) | Adriatic Sea | Enforce UN maritime weapons embargo on warring factions in former Yugoslavia. (combined with European Union) |
| 8 | Deny Flight (1993 –1995) | Bosnia | First combat operations in NATO history. Enforce UN no-fly zone over Bosnia, Close Air Support and air strikes in support of UN peacekeepers Four Bosnian Serb fighter-bombers shot-down. |
| 7 | Maritime Guard (1992 – 1993) | Adriatic Sea | Monitor UN Security embargo on weapons to the warring parties during the fighting in former Yugoslavia. |
| 8 | Maritime Guard (1992 –1993) | Adriatic Sea | Monitor UN Security embargo on weapons to the warring parties during the fighting in former Yugoslavia. |
| 6 | Sky Monitor (1992 –1993) | Bosnia & Herzegovina | Monitor UN no-fly zone against flights by military aircraft of the warring factions in former Yugoslavia. |
| 5 | Maritime Monitor (Jul – Nov 1992) | Adriatic Sea | Monitor UN Security embargo on weapons to the warring parties during the fighting in former Yugoslavia. |
| 4 | Agile Genie (May 1992) | Central Mediterranean & Libya | Provide increased AWACS coverage to monitor air approach routes from the North African littoral. |
| 3 | Allied Goodwill I&II (Feb – Mar 1992) | Russia | Fly humanitarian assistance and medical experts to Russia and other CIS nations when the USSR economy collapsed. |
| 2 | ACE Guard (Jan – Mar 1991) | Turkey | Deploy ACE Mobile Force (Air) to Turkey in the event of an Iraqi attack during first Persian Gulf war. |
| 1 | Anchor Guard (1990 – 1991) | Turkey | Deploy NATO AWACS to Konya, Turkey in the event of an Iraqi attack during the first Persian Gulf war. |

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