

Canadian
Forces
College

Collège
des
Forces
Canadiennes



CANADA, NORAD, AND NORTH AMERICAN SECURITY COOPERATION IN A NEW GEOSTRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Lieutenant-Colonel Mark Remington

JCSP 45

Solo Flight

Disclaimer

Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do not represent Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used without written permission.

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2022

PCEMI 45

Solo Flight

Avertissement

Les opinions exprimées n'engagent que leurs auteurs et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

© Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2022

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

JCSP 45 – PCEMI 45

2018 – 2020

SOLO FLIGHT

**CANADA, NORAD, AND NORTH AMERICAN SECURITY COOPERATION IN A
NEW GEOSTRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT**

Lieutenant-Colonel Mark Remington

“This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.”

“La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.”

CANADA, NORAD, AND NORTH AMERICAN SECURITY COOPERATION IN A NEW GEOSTRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Canada and the United States share a unique continental defense relationship forged by common values, geography, economic interconnectedness and relative isolation from powerful actors in both Europe and Asia. The North American Air Defence (NORAD) Command agreement, as it was once known, was formally signed in May 1958; however, serious Canadian-American defence cooperation began roughly two decades earlier in response to potential threats posed by Nazi Germany with the so-called “Kingston Dispensation” pronounced by Prime Minister MacKenzie King and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt at Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario in 1938. The asymmetry in the capacity that both countries brought to the table for mutual defence was as transparent back then as it remains today, with FDR claiming that “I give you assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if the domination of Canadian soil is threatened by another Empire.” King’s reply was somewhat less bold: “We, too, have our obligations ... and one of these is that, at our own instance, our country is made as immune to attack or possible invasion as we can reasonably be expected to make it...”¹ Nevertheless, the bi-national NORAD agreement has served both nations well, albeit in varying capacities and against continuously evolving threats.

Renewed numerous times over its six decade-plus existence – the last renewal being in 2006 which added to its portfolio a maritime warning mission² – NORAD once

¹ Justin Massie and Srdjan Vucetic, “Canadian Strategic Cultures: From Confederation to Trump,” in *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, ed. Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 35.

² Andrea Charron and James Fergusson, “From NORAD to NOR[A]D: The Future Evolution of North American Defence Co-operation,” *Canadian Global Affairs Institute*, May 2018, 4, https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/3753/attachments/original/1527022907/From_NORAD_to_NOR_A_D_The_Future_Evolution.pdf?1527022907. Actual Agreement here: <https://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=105060>, latest TORs here: <https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=800013>.

again requires a strategic review from policy makers on both sides of the border.

Increased Russian maritime activity in the North Atlantic, ever-present Russian Arctic air and naval operations along with an expansionist China eyeing that region, a rogue, nuclear armed North Korea regime, and the nuclear aspirations of Iran all represent significant security threats to North America. There are, of course, others as well: the ongoing threat of domestic and international terrorism, cybercrime, state-sponsored cyber-attacks and espionage, human and drug trafficking, transnational health security, and the threats posed by the offshoring of critical Canadian and US manufacturing to foreign countries (a realized risk that has been raised ever since the practice began in the 1980s)³. In the next few years Canada will be required to assess these threats as they relate to both Canadian and North American security and the costs associated with mitigating them will not be cheap.

The North Warning System (NWS), for example, now rapidly approaching obsolescence,⁴ will need to be replaced along with other capital intensive procurement programs such as the RCAF's CF-18 and tanker replacements, the RCN's Canadian Surface Combatant program, and the Coast Guard's new icebreakers and many other of its ships to name just a few. From a Canadian defence perspective these procurement costs will be staggering and, given the timeline of the capability gaps that each seek to fill, they will all need to be brought online roughly in parallel. That will cause further complications in both the CAF's and Coast Guard's ability to absorb these new

³ Markides C. Constantinos and Norman Berg, "Manufacturing Offshore is Bad Business," *Harvard Business Review*, September 1988, Accessed May 12, 2020, <https://hbr.org/1988/09/manufacturing-offshore-is-bad-business>.

⁴ James Fergusson, "Missed Opportunities: Why Canada's North Warning System is Overdue for an Overhaul," *Macdonald-Laurier Institute*, January 2020, 3, <https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/canadas-north-warning-system-needs-overhaul-new-mli-commentary/>.

capabilities as well as the Treasury's ability to fund them. With this in mind Canadian defence policy makers will need to undergo a serious triage of capability needs and desires, particularly as they relate to Canada's stated defence priorities in *Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE)*: the defence of Canada, the security of North America, and selected engagement overseas.⁵ More important to Canada than any other alliance – arguably more so than NATO – NORAD must continue to be at the forefront of discussions when contemplating Canadian defence policy and expenditures.

While a return to the pre-Cold War strategic environment is unlikely in the short- to medium-term, the relative security that North America has historically been accustomed to due to the geographic buffers it has enjoyed is quickly being eroded. This essay will argue that Canada, if it aims to maintain strong relations with the United States, must continue to invest in the expensive capabilities required to protect its air, space, and maritime approaches. However, it should do so pragmatically, understanding its limitations in certain areas while exploiting others that may be less capital intensive but still yield an acceptable return from a security standpoint. At the same time, it must continue to fully understand the policies of the United States and carefully assess how far the Americans are willing to accept perceived deficiencies in Canadian defence postures before they feel it necessary to intervene in a more direct and visible fashion, thus undermining Canada's historical policy of spending on our own forces as more or less the "defence against help."⁶

⁵ Department of National Defence, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's National Defence Policy*, (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2017), 60 – 61, <https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/dnd-mdn/documents/reports/2018/strong-secure-engaged/canada-defence-policy-report.pdf>.

⁶ Dr. Michael Dawson, "NORAD: Remaining Relevant," *The School of Public Policy Publications* 12, no. 40 (November, 2019): 1, <https://doi.org/10.11575/sppp.v12i0.68098>.

If and when Canada begins to renegotiate the NORAD agreement with the United States, it will need to show its willingness and ability to maintain a measure of defensive hard power; but, as the security situation against North America continues to rapidly evolve, there is a significant opportunity for Canada to gain by taking advantage of niche capabilities that would aid in the security of both countries while still respecting sovereign boundaries and being fiscally palatable to the Canadian public. Indeed, by failing to recognize the importance of the NORAD agreement, funding it appropriately, and aligning itself with the United States and other allies in serious policy decisions such as those being forced upon us by a rapidly growing, powerful and revisionist China, Canada could unwittingly risk compromising its own foreign interests and objectives in other important international policy areas.

Security Cooperation Overview

While most Canadians are aware to some extent about NORAD (Santa!) and US-Canadian security cooperation in general, the “Kingston Dispensation” should not be underestimated in terms of the profound pivot it represented in Canada’s strategic geography. It had been, for example, but just a few years since both countries still had official invasion plans against one another.⁷ Furthermore, and perhaps more dear to Canadian historical tendencies than to those of many Americans, there was President Madison’s failed attempt at invading Upper and Lower Canada in 1812, which arose, among other things, out of growing anti-British sentiment owing to the perceived ongoing Royal Navy injustices committed against US sailors and US trade interests on

⁷ Srdjan Vucetic, *The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialized Identity in International Relations* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 137 – 138. See also <https://www.macleans.ca/culture/books/how-canada-planned-to-invade-the-u-s-and-vice-versa/> accessed 20 May, 2020.

the high seas.⁸ It should also not be forgotten that the Continental Army advanced and temporarily took control of British territory from Fort St John's just north of Lake Champlain all the way down the St. Lawrence to Quebec City during the early days of the Revolutionary War. Indeed, early Congressional revolutionary thinking thought that: "Under the guise of promoting continental peace and security' – Congress promised to 'adopt [Canada] into our union as a sister colony' – Canada was to be obliterated as a military and political threat."⁹ Of course, these events are now ancient history. Indeed, for most Canadians any sense of real, deep-rooted, *substantive* fear regarding American aggression has been sidelined to the margins. Nevertheless, Canada has and continues, for various reasons, to walk a tightrope in its relationship with the US; one that concurrently attempts to balance sometimes-diverging foreign policy interests abroad with tightly coupled, converging economic interests within North America. Interestingly, it has been noted that: "Canada, though closest of the allies to the United States in geography and culture, has a record of more independent thought and action than more distant allies."¹⁰

In any event, while Canada's allegiance to the British Commonwealth and Empire was never jeopardized by the Kingston Dispensation, it did force Canada to reconsider its defence policies. From Confederation up until this point, owing to its geographical isolation and small population, Canada's relatively small consequence in world affairs has been described, perhaps somewhat harshly, as: "If Canada had any strategic

⁸ Donald R. Hickey, *The War of 1812: A Short History, Bicentennial Edition* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2012), 8 – 9.

⁹ Rick Atkinson, *The British are Coming, Lexington to Princeton, 1775 – 1777: Volume One of the Revolution Trilogy*, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2019), 144.

¹⁰ Srdjan Vucetic, *The Anglosphere: . . .*, 124.

importance, it was the country's ability to supply Britain with soldiers, material, and food."¹¹ Now, a mutual agreement with the United States that mandated a newfound focus on continental security required that Canada develop a defence policy that was bound to some extent to the security aims of its much larger neighbor to the south. This growing security cooperation and policy reorientation was further reinforced by the Ogdensburg Declaration of 1940, which set up the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, and then followed up by the 1947 Joint Declaration on North American Defense Cooperation.¹² With the beginning of the Cold War and the transpolar Soviet threat that would emerge it became apparent that further coherence of US and Canadian continental defence policies was required – in particular the integration of air defence assets – which ultimately led to the formation of NORAD in 1958.

Canada has since benefited greatly from the bi-national arrangement. While its overall contributions are obviously much smaller than those of the US, they have nonetheless proven valuable on two fronts. First, Canada's continued engagement in air defence and investments in early warning and Command and Control (C2) systems has ensured it a seat at the table in the majority of issues related to continental defence, which helps to alleviate some of the Canadian fear surrounding US military power encroaching into its sovereign realms. Second, and equally important, has been the gradual economic and industrial integration in the defence sector between the countries writ large.

Crucially, since 1993 Canada has been identified in US law as a member of the US Defense Industrial Base – also referred to as the National Technological Industrial Base

¹¹ Kim Richard Knossal, "The Imperatives of Canada's Strategic Geography," in *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, ed. Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 13.

¹² Justin Massie and Srdjan Vucetic, "Canadian Strategic Cultures:" . . . , 35.

(NTIB) – giving Canadian industry advantages over other countries in competing for US Department of Defense (DoD) contracts.¹³ However the NTIB is but one of many agreements Canada enjoys with the US, all of which are designed to spur defence industrial integration across the border. Notable others include the Defense Development Production Sharing Agreement, Reciprocal Defense Procurement and Government Quality Assurance Agreements¹⁴ as well as an International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) exemption for the importation without the need of a license of many US unclassified defence products and services.¹⁵

Continental aerospace warning and control, along with a highly integrated defence industrial base, do not however, tell the whole story with respect to Canada-US security cooperation. In the maritime domain the two countries have a long history of collaboration in blue water operations where RCN ships routinely take part in US Navy (USN) task forces as well as littoral surveillance, law enforcement and interdiction, which include partnerships not only with the RCN and USN, but also with the RCMP, the US Coast Guard, the Canadian Border Services Agency, and others.¹⁶ But, in contrast, to

¹³ Kristina Obecný and Gregory Sanders, “U.S.-Canadian Defense Industrial Cooperation,” *CSIS Reports* (Lanham: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2017), 16, <http://web.a.ebscohost.com.cafvl.idm.oclc.org/ehost/ebookviewer/ebook?sid=0bad0ef3-c309-4fec-af82-27f15c14d638%40sessionmgr4006&vid=0&format=EB>.

¹⁴ Department of Defense Industrial Policy, *Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States: Report to President Donald J. Trump by the Interagency Task Force in Fulfillment of Executive Order 13806* (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2018), 122 – 123, <https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-1/-1/1/ASSESSING-AND-STRENGTHENING-THE-MANUFACTURING-AND%20DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE-AND-SUPPLY-CHAIN-RESILIENCY.PDF%20P.16>

¹⁵ William Greenwalt, “Leveraging the National Technology Industrial Base to Address Great-Power Competition: The Imperative to Integrate Industrial Capabilities of Close Allies,” *Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security* (Washington DC: Atlantic Council, 2019), 26, https://atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Leveraging_the_National_Technology_Industrial_Base_to_Address_Great-Power_Competition.pdf

¹⁶ Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky, “Continental Defence: ‘Like Farmers whose Lands have a Common Concession Line’,” in *Canada’s national security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategy, Interest, and Threats* ed. David S. McDonough (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012), 131.

the formal bi-national C2 structure that exists within NORAD, and despite the addition of the maritime warning mission to its portfolio of responsibilities in 2006, the partnership in the maritime domain remains in comparison largely opportunistic with little appetite on either side of the border for permanent enhanced integration.¹⁷

On the other hand, the recent increase in Russian submarine activity in the North Atlantic has caused the USN to reprioritize its operational focus on its side of the pond from one that was more concerned with “Humanitarian Aid/Disaster Relief missions and drug interdiction work in U.S. Southern Command’s U.S. 4th Fleet”¹⁸ to one that must now counter threats eerily reminiscent of the Cold War. Interestingly, with the stand-up in Norfolk, Virginia of the USN’s 2nd Fleet in 2018 (which is co-located with NATO’s Joint Force Command, Norfolk), Canada was chosen to provide the fleet’s vice commander. Although not identical in scope, this arrangement nevertheless shares some commonalities with the unique international command structure found in NORAD. More importantly, though, it is yet another signal that the US is seeking out optimized strategies to counter emerging great power threats by fostering more substantial allied and partner cooperation across a wide spectrum of security initiatives.

This significant call for outreach to allies and partners was identified in the 2017 Quadrennial National Security Strategy and re-affirmed in both the 2018 National Defense and National Military Strategies. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly clear that

¹⁷ Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky, “Continental Defence:” . . ., 132 – 133.

¹⁸ Sam Lagrone, “Navy Reestablishes U.S. 2nd Fleet to Face Russian Threat; Plan Calls for 250 Person Command in Norfolk,” *USNI News*, May 4, 2018. Accessed 29 April 2020, <https://news.usni.org/2018/05/04/navy-reestablishes-2nd-fleet-plan-calls-for-250-person-command-in-norfolk>.

the US realizes that great power competition necessitates expanded ally and partner engagement despite some occasional political rhetoric to the contrary:

“The 2018 NMS acknowledges the unique contributions of allies and partners, a strategic source of strength for the Joint Force. Building a strong, agile, and resilient force requires better interoperability and enhancing the combat lethality and survivability of our allies and partners. The NMS also informs engagement with interagency partners, both abroad and domestically, to enable the Joint Force to best support the application of all instruments of national power throughout the continuum of conflict.”¹⁹

Canada’s Looming Procurement Nightmare

Security cooperation between Canada and the United States has, on the main, been advantageous for both countries, helping to foster a secure North America and to perpetuate the strong economic ties that provide for a mutually beneficial relationship. However, Canada is now facing a series of large capital defence procurement decisions that will require a skillful balancing act between competing interests and resources. On the surface, Canada’s most recent defence policy publication, *SSE*, should give pause to criticism by longstanding defence procurement skeptics since the document does contain seemingly well thought-out costing descriptions and budgeting strategies for a variety of defence initiatives, including high-ticket items such as new Surface Combatants for the RCN and new fighter aircraft for the RCAF. Nevertheless, defence procurement in Canada is notorious for its inefficiencies and protracted timelines.

While *SSE*’s three overall priorities – the defence of Canada, defence of North America, and selected meaningful security contributions abroad – certainly make sense based on Canada’s past and present determinations of the threat environment and its ongoing multilateralism, the document is conspicuously vague on how its laundry list of

¹⁹ The Joint Staff, *Description of the National Military Strategy* 2018 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2018), 3 – 4, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/UNCLASS_2018_National_Military_Strategy_Description.pdf.

procurement initiatives actually matches the overarching security goals. Rodman

describes it thus:

“... as a strategy the document appears to be organized backwards: it begins with people and then moves to procurement. It is only in the latter chapters that those people’s missions, and what equipment will be needed for their execution are discussed. Those missions are not well defined, nor do they come with any coherent threat picture or other discussions of the priorities of the department.”²⁰

There may be good reasons of political sensitivity for minimizing explicit statements about threats and mission sets to counter them, but that creates a significant challenge when deciding on the best force structure and equipment needed to realize stated security goals – particularly at a time, such as now, where already limited resources will likely be further constrained owing to unforeseen financial burdens resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.²¹ *SSE* notes that, on top of increasing annual defence budgets by some 75% between 2016 and 2027, the entirety of capital procurement costs covered under *SSE* will equal CAD \$108 billion.²² It now seems clear that, faced with difficult priorities both within and without the Department of National Defence (DND), governmental decision-makers will be forced to either delay, de-scope, or outright cancel some of these programs.

Thus the questions regarding core government security priorities become ever more pertinent; if the priorities outlined in *SSE* are to be taken at face value they would imply that engagement overseas would need to be sacrificed somewhat to ensure that

²⁰ Lindsay Rodman, “You’ve Got it All Backwards: Canada’s National Defence Strategy,” in *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, ed. Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 277.

²¹ Eugene Lang, “RIP SSE: What the COVID-19 Pandemic Means for Defence Funding,” *Canadian Global Affairs Institute*, May 2020, 2, https://www.cgai.ca/rip_sse_what_the_covid_19_pandemic_means_for_defence_funding

²² Allan Sens, “Canada’s New Defence Policy and the Security of North America,” in *North American Strategic Defence in the 21st Century*, ed. Christian Leuprecht, Joel J. Sokolsky, and Thomas Hughes (Cham: Springer, 2018), 113.

basic mandates of the defence of Canada and North America can best continue. Paradoxically, however, this is unlikely to happen given that both Canada's and the United States' historical behavior since World War II has been to project power outwards, beyond their shores in order to create a geographically distant first line of defence. As Charron points out, "... neither country faced or faces any significant defence threat on the continent or in the hemisphere. Traditional threats continue to originate across the oceans primarily on the Euro-Asian continent."²³

While Charron also aptly points out that NORAD traditionally "... operates largely beneath the political radar"²⁴ in both countries, especially because of American power projection, Canada necessarily needs NORAD far more than does the United States. The US could, if absolutely required, defend itself without Canadian cooperation against an attack, perceived or real, aimed at the US homeland. A case in point was the US standup of USNORTHCOM in the wake of 9/11 and its responsibility, among others, to counter a limited, rogue ballistic missile threat to the United States – not Canada – following Canada's awkward decision not to join the Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program in 2005.²⁵ This logically leads to the obvious and seemingly eternal question: how little can Canada get away with (the so-called "easy riding" strategy identified by Sokolsky²⁶) before the US takes notice and takes unilateral action? This question never really does get resolved because, despite successive governments' best efforts going back decades, "Defence policy in Canada usually does not originate from a strategic idea but

²³ Andrea Charron and James Fergusson, "NORAD: Beyond Modernization," *Centre for Defence and Security Studies* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, 2019), 54.

https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/NORAD_beyond_modernization_2019.pdf.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 6.

²⁶ Joel Sokolsky, "Realism Canadian Style: National Security Policy and the Chrétien Legacy," *Policy Matters* 5, no. 2 (June 2004): 11, <http://irpp.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/pmvol5no2.pdf>.

rather from the dynamics of the federal budget.”²⁷ This fact is more relevant now than ever given the already discussed multitude of large-scale capital defence projects piling up plus the *unfunded* requirements needed to modernize NORAD itself as identified in *SSE*.²⁸

Matching Canadian Capabilities to North American Security Threats

Short of all-out war involving Canada, it would be foolish to assume there will be a tidal shift in Canadian defence policy and spending. Canada will likely continue to delicately balance its long-standing tightrope act of appeasing its larger southern neighbor in areas of continental security so as to maintain its own sense of sovereignty and freedom of diplomatic maneuver globally. Canada’s relationship in security matters with the US waxes and wanes with the evolution of the geo-political sphere; the last significant convergence of the relationship happened in the months and years following the attacks of 9/11 when Canada stood by the US militarily in Afghanistan and at home with a new internal focus of NORAD through Operation Noble Eagle.²⁹ Of equal importance though was heightened cooperation between other government security departments and their American counterparts owing to genuine Canadian angst about a tightening US-Canada border: the primary filter for the lifeblood of the Canadian economy.

While the threat of Jihadi terrorism against Canada and the US still exists, the geo-strategic environment has changed significantly. Canada’s security policies need to

²⁷ David Perry, “Canadian Defence Budgeting,” in *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, ed. Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 73.

²⁸ James Fergusson, “Missed Opportunities,” . . . , 1.

²⁹ Joel Sokolsky, “Realism Canadian Style,” . . . , 29. Operation Noble Eagle is NORAD’s air defence mission to counter commercial airline hijacking events, among other things, that was conceived of in the immediate aftermath of the events of 9/11.

keep pace in order to remain relevant and conducive to a productive Canada-US relationship. The US obviously prefers compatibility between Canadian and American foreign policies and generally seeks Canadian participation in overseas coalition operations. Yet, while Canadian participation is always welcome, it will never make a significant difference in and of itself regardless of the relative operational strain such undertakings might impose on our own forces. With the growing US/China standoff that is likely to take place over the next ten to fifteen years, Canada needs to match its specific capabilities to a foreign security policy that ensures the country remains aligned with and relevant to NATO and can also contribute to North American security in a meaningful way. This is especially the case as the US is obviously looking for allied help across the competition continuum in order to maintain the US-led international order.³⁰

Canada should, going forward, take notice of some of the efforts in the US to expand the NTIB in several ways. While Canada has been a member of the NTIB since 1993, Congress recently also added the UK and Australia as part of its broader desire to “embark in closer industrial-cooperation and technological-cooperation efforts”³¹ as outlined in the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act. Annual reporting on NTIB progress is now required and is intended to cover four broad areas of cooperation: NTIB Governance, Investment Security, NTIB Controlled-Technology Transfer, and Cybersecurity of Small-to-Medium Enterprises.³² While the current climate emanating from the White House might seem to overshadow these Congressional-led cooperation

³⁰ Department of Defense, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2018), 1, 8, <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>.

³¹ William Greenwalt, “Leveraging the National Technology Industrial Base” . . . , 28.

³² *Ibid.*

efforts (see, for example Executive Order 13788),³³ it is imperative for Canada to look at this potential window of security cooperation in the longer view. Additionally, these US efforts seek to expand traditionally underserved cooperative relationships such as those found in Science and Technology and Research and Development, which have often been limited in scope due to historical foreign disclosure and export control issues.

The United States is, in fact, looking to form a so-called “defense free-trade zone within the NTIB”³⁴ to foster innovation, reduce barriers to technology transfer (the phenomenon known as “ITAR taint”, for example), and ultimately gain a synergistic defence cooperative among its closest allies while still compartmentalizing true national security secrets for all parties involved. Some might argue that this is likely fantasy given the legacy of US paralysis in the arena of foreign disclosure; but that is likely more a bureaucratic and cultural issue than it is a legislative one. If allies such as Canada, which has excellent technological expertise in many high-tech areas including aerospace components, satellites, robotics, and C4ISR among others, approached the US to offer that expertise in some of these niche areas as part of a broader North American security cooperation initiative, it could very well get some encouraging interest in Washington.³⁵

While this soft-power approach to defence could be well received on both sides of the border due to the clear potential for mutual economic and security gains, it will certainly not be enough to counter laggard Canadian investments in its own defence modernization. As mentioned previously Canada faces an increasingly unaffordable bill

³³ Federal Register, *Executive Order 13788 of April 18, 2017: Buy American and Hire American* (Washington DC: Office of the Federal Register, 2017). Accessed May 14, 2020 <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-04-21/pdf/2017-08311.pdf>

³⁴ William Greenwalt, “Leveraging the National Technology Industrial Base,” . . . , 30.

³⁵ Kristina Obecny and Gregory Sanders, “U.S.-Canadian Defense Industrial Cooperation,” . . . , 8.

to replace much of its high-ticket aging equipment, which will in all probability – based on historical precedence – not be offset by commensurate increases in defence funding, especially at the time of COVID-19 and the massive spending associated with it. This will require a reckoning of sorts among policymakers and senior CAF Commanders as to what capabilities are truly needed in the emerging large power rivalries and which ones are, to some extent, attritable. From this perspective the effectiveness of NORAD both in terms of deterrence and reactive capabilities stands out in a renewed light as one of the most important security levers Canada can take advantage of.

The modernization of the NWS is a case in point. While there have been bilateral talks about its modernization, little is known to what extent either party has agreed to in terms of requirements, costs, cost-sharing, environmental considerations, etc. Action in this domain is critically important and frustration at the perceived lack of progress has been expressed in many different venues by both Canadian and US voices.³⁶ And while any published cost estimate – official or otherwise – is likely to be one that incorporates a substantial level of risk (one such estimate places it at roughly \$11B),³⁷ the NWS replacement need not necessarily arrive as one big gift-wrapped package that ends up barely meeting a laundry list of outdated or poorly articulated technical requirements. Here, Canada would be well advised to take a pause and study the paradigm shift that the US has (at least tried) to undertake with respect to its defense acquisition system.

³⁶ Lee Berthiaume, “NORAD Chief Urges Speedy Defensive Upgrades Amid Spectre of New Cold War,” *National Post*, 12 February 2019, last modified 12 February 2019, <https://nationalpost.com/pmn/news-pmn/canada-news-pmn/norad-chief-urges-speedy-defensive-upgrades-amid-spectre-of-new-cold-war>; “Defence Deconstructed: The Future of NORAD and Continental Defence,” *The CGAI Podcast Network*, 17 April 2020, https://www.cgai.ca/the_future_of_norad_and_continental_defence; “Defence Deconstructed: Cmdre Jamie Clarke on ‘The Strategic Outlook and Threats to North America’,” *The CGAI Podcast Network*, 31 January 2020, https://www.cgai.ca/cmdre_jamie_clarke_on_the_strategic_outlook_and_threats_to_north_america.

³⁷ James Fergusson, “Missed Opportunities,” . . . , 4.

Waterfall approaches to capability advancements entrenched within massive Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) are slowly being replaced by rapid prototyping with incremental capability gains towards realistic and affordable sets of requirements (sometimes referred to as “agile” acquisition, which has its roots in software development). The US DoD, like Canada, does not have an infinite budget and is beset by seemingly interminable acquisition legal procedures and defense instructions that rival the glacial procurement process in Canada. Congress has attempted to unshackle acquisition professionals somewhat by reducing the red tape gating processes and decision milestones that often hinder rapid development and fielding of defense articles.³⁸

When it comes to the NWS Modernization, for example, Canada and the US could agree to replace the current infrastructure incrementally, on a periodic, but well-defined basis that would avoid the pitfalls of massive cost-overruns and schedule breaches that afflict almost every large scale defense acquisition program. This would also allow for Canada to avoid the domestic political headaches of having to explain and budget for yet another multi-billion-dollar defence procurement program, and instead fund it incrementally as appropriate capabilities mature from both a technical as well as cost standpoint. Finally, by avoiding an immutable, grandiose set of hard requirements that will likely be outdated to some degree by the time the waterfall program is completed, both Canada and the US can refine requirements as the threat evolves while at

³⁸ United States Congress, *Public Law 114-92 – Nov. 25, 2015: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016* (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2015), 158 – 161, <https://www.congress.gov/114/plaws/publ92/PLAW-114publ92.pdf>. See also [https://www.dau.edu/cop/iam/DAU%20Sponsored%20Documents/Memo%20-Middle%20Tier%20of%20Acq%20Interim%20Authority-Guidance_Lord%20\(Apr%2018\).pdf](https://www.dau.edu/cop/iam/DAU%20Sponsored%20Documents/Memo%20-Middle%20Tier%20of%20Acq%20Interim%20Authority-Guidance_Lord%20(Apr%2018).pdf) or <http://acqnotes.com/rapid-acquisitions>

the same time ensuring synergistic compatibility with future US and Canadian defence assets.

For example, much of the C2 and information sharing architecture for a modernized NWS will need to be interoperable with Canada's future fighter replacement and remotely piloted air systems, neither of which are currently slated to arrive in Canada for several years hence. It would be detrimental to Canada's ability to develop a useful common operating picture if surveillance and data exchange requirements identified in a modernized NWS were prematurely set and turned out to be difficult to integrate with future Canadian air defence and surveillance assets.

Western Solidarity

The aforementioned discussions on increased defence industrial cooperation, the triage of Canadian defence priorities, as well as a shift in procurement mindset away from the MDAP paradigm and more towards an iterative, continuous improvement acquisition practice are all good ways for Canada to portray itself as a good cross-border security partner. By engaging in and sharing Canadian technical prowess with DoD industry partners, academic institutions, and US government research centers, Canada could significantly improve its "worth" in the eyes of Washington when it comes to security cooperation. This could work well for Canada in two ways: first, it would likely improve the value of Canadian industry through various partnerships, increased manufacturing or sustainment contract opportunities across a wider spectrum of activities, more industry patents, and other areas. Second, it might allow Washington to look the other way somewhat as it relates to Canada's foot dragging on defence procurement and the United States' perception that Canada does not always spend its fair

share on some very mutually important defence issues – most notably those involved with NORAD and NATO.

But these efforts might all be for naught if Canada does not signal its foreign policy stance loud and clear regarding the rapidly evolving geostrategic environment. Herein there should be no doubt that the balance of power is shifting away from the US and that Canada must deal with a China that is no longer “rising” but which has effectively “risen”. Canadian foreign policy makers must be resolute to our allies that Canada no longer views China as the benevolent, developing nation that the West believed would responsibly grow into the liberal international order following its admission to the World Trade Organization in 2001.³⁹ Events in recent years have shown this to be a false narrative, and, despite the omnipresent Canadian anxiety of losing its sovereignty by aligning too much with US interests, not aligning enough with them in this current day and age could rapidly isolate Canada from the very market that helps to sustain its own prosperity. Showing solidarity with the US and other like-minded nations on important national security topics such as opposing Huawei 5G integration in our domestic communications networks and condemning the lack of the Chinese Communist Party’s transparency in the fallout of the COVID-19 disaster are two very important imperatives towards maintaining a solid security relationship with the United States.

It is true that in the past Canada has suffered little when its foreign policies seemed to run entirely counter to those of the US. Examples of this include Canada’s non-participation in Iraq in 2003, its decision to decline cooperation in North American BMD, as well as its differing views regarding the war in Vietnam. Indeed, “As in 2003,

³⁹ World Trade Organization, “China and the WTO,” accessed 21 May 2020, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm.

in 1965, too, Canada's dependence on the U.S. economy had no direct bearing on the continuity and change in U.S.-Canadian security cooperation."⁴⁰ Yet this time things are quite different. China is not Iraq nor is it Vietnam; it is rather, a virtual strategic peer and one of its main strategic goals is to use wedge tactics to divide the US and its allies – an example of which can be seen in the current "mécontentement" between the US and the UK over the latter's decision to include, at least partially, Huawei in its 5G network.⁴¹ Canada can and must, of course, continue its own sovereign diplomatic relations with China, but it must not let grand free-trade and economic bonanza delusions with a totalitarian state effectively ostracize it from those very same blessings it currently enjoys with a democratic one closer to home.

⁴⁰ Srdjan Vucetic, *The Anglosphere: . . .*, 124.

⁴¹ Tom Cotterill, "Row over Chinese firm Huawei UK 5G could see Americans pulling plug on F-35 mission with HMS Queen Elizabeth," *The News*, 11 May 2020, accessed 12 May 2020 <https://www.portsmouth.co.uk/news/defence/row-over-chinese-firm-huawei-uk-5g-could-see-americans-pulling-plug-f-35-mission-hms-queen-elizabeth-2849328>. However, it now seems that the UK might very well exclude Huawei: <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2020/05/22/boris-johnson-reduce-huaweis-role-britains-5g-network-wake-coronavirus/>.

CONCLUSION

This essay has made the case that Canada and the US have had a long and prosperous relationship for many years. The Kingston Dispensation of 1938 effectively solidified a strategic pivot in Canada's defence calculus away from being a supplier of resources and human capital to the British empire in times of war and more towards a country that now had to deliver on the collective defence of the North American continent. NORAD, a unique bi-national arrangement between the two countries has served both well in countering aerospace threats over the decades, but is now, once again, in dire need of upgrades and re-orientation in order to keep pace with rapidly evolving 21st century multi-domain threats that deny North America its traditional geographic isolationism and sense of safety. Canada should approach these new investments with a sense of urgency, but also with a sense of pragmatism.

Except for all-out war against North America, it is highly unlikely Canadian defence policy and spending will dramatically change from historical patterns – that is the budget defines defence spending, not the other way around. With the growing list of expensive capital procurement projects facing DND over the next decade there will be a need for a mature and frank discussion about how to distinguish the absolute necessities from the nice-to-haves in Canadian defence capabilities. Canada's security relationship with the United States is invaluable and Canada enjoys a disproportionate level of economic benefit because of it. That relationship must be maintained through various means, not least of which is understanding how the US views itself in the evolving great power struggle that is beginning to take shape. The US realizes this is not a campaign it can undertake alone; instead it is increasingly looking to both diversify new partnerships

and deepen existing ones in order to successfully compete below the level of armed conflict and to minimize the possibility of events that might spike above that stratum.

Canada will need to continue to maintain a core set of “hard-power” capabilities in order to defend Canada and North America but, given its long-standing cross-border defence industrial cooperation along with a US desire to further integrate national capabilities, Canada has a chance to potentially provide the US highly value-added defence capabilities that could offset some of the higher ticket items Canada might otherwise normally be “nudged” to acquire or maintain for itself. Moreover, in such an emerging geopolitical struggle, Canada cannot allow itself to be seduced into a false promise of fair and equitable trade and prosperity with a country such as China that has now displayed an incontrovertible pattern of hostility towards the West. Canada will obviously continue to make foreign and domestic policies that are founded in its own best interests; yet now more than ever these interests need to be more closely aligned towards the security and prosperity of North America, and the Western allies in general, with the full understanding that the world has – at least for the foreseeable future – morphed back into an environment of great power competition.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Atkinson, Rick. *The British are Coming, Lexington to Princeton, 1775 – 1777: Volume One of the Revolution Trilogy*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2019.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*. Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2017.
- Charron, Andrea, and James Fergusson. "From NORAD to NOR[A]D: The Future Evolution of North American Defence Co-operation." *Canadian Global Affairs Institute* (May 2018): 1 – 20.
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/3753/attachments/original/1527022907/From_NORAD_to_NOR_A_D_The_Future_Evolution.pdf?1527022907.
- Charron, Andrea, and James Fergusson. "NORAD: Beyond Modernization." *Centre for Defence and Security Studies*. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, 2019.
https://umanitoba.ca/centres/cdss/media/NORAD_beyond_modernization_2019.pdf.
- Constantinos, Markides C., and Norman Berg. "Manufacturing Offshore is Bad Business," *Harvard Business Review* 66, no. 5 (September 1988): 113 – 120.
<https://hbr.org/1988/09/manufacturing-offshore-is-bad-business>.
- Dawson, Michael, Dr. "NORAD: Remaining Relevant." *The School of Public Policy Publications* 12, no. 40 (November 2019): 1 – 18.
<https://doi.org/10.11575/sppp.v12i0.68098>.
- "Defence Deconstructed: Cmdre Jamie Clarke on 'The Strategic Outlook and Threats to North America'." *The CGAI Podcast Network*, 31 January 2020.
https://www.cgai.ca/cmdre_jamie_clarke_on_the_strategic_outlook_and_threats_to_north_america.
- "Defence Deconstructed: The Future of NORAD and Continental Defence." *The CGAI Podcast Network*, 17 April 2020.
https://www.cgai.ca/the_future_of_norad_and_continental_defence.
- Fergusson, James. "Missed Opportunities: Why Canada's North Warning System is Overdue for an Overhaul." *Macdonald-Laurier Institute* (January 2020): 1 – 10.
<https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/canadas-north-warning-system-needs-overhaul-new-mli-commentary/>.
- Greenwalt, William. "Leveraging the National Technology Industrial Base to Address Great-Power Competition: The Imperative to Integrate Industrial Capabilities of Close Allies." *Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security*. Washington DC:

- Atlantic Council, 2019. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Leveraging_the_National_Technology_Industrial_Base_to_Address_Great-Power_Competition.pdf.
- Hickey, Donald R. *The War of 1812: A Short History, Bicentennial Edition*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2012.
- Jockel, Joseph T., and Joel J. Sokolsky, "Continental Defence: 'Like Farmers whose Lands have a Common Concession Line'." In *Canada's national security in the Post-9/11 World: Strategy, Interest, and Threats*, edited by David S. McDonough, 114 – 137. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012.
- Knossal, Kim Richard. "The Imperatives of Canada's Strategic Geography." In *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, edited by Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic, 11 – 28. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
- Lang, Eugene. "RIP SSE: What the COVID-19 Pandemic Means for Defence Funding," *Canadian Global Affairs Institute* (May 2020): 1- 3.
https://www.cgai.ca/rip_sse_what_the_covid_19_pandemic_means_for_defence_funding.
- Massie, Justin, and Srdjan Vucetic. "Canadian Strategic Cultures: From Confederation to Trump." In *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, edited by Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic, 29 – 44. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
- Obecny, Kristina, and Gregory Sanders. "U.S.-Canadian Defense Industrial Cooperation," *CSIS Reports*. Lanham: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2017.
<http://web.a.ebscohost.com.cafvl.idm.oclc.org/ehost/ebookviewer/ebook?sid=d5302997-8251-48db-93ba-62c8ad367da6%40sessionmgr4007&vid=0&format=EB>.
- Perry, David. "Canadian Defence Budgeting." In *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, edited by Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic, 63 – 80. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
- Rodman, Lindsay. "You've Got it All Backwards: Canada's National Defence Strategy." In *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, edited by Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, and Srdjan Vucetic, 273 – 293. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
- Sens, Allan. "Canada's New Defence Policy and the Security of North America." In *North American Strategic Defence in the 21st Century*, edited by Christian Leuprecht, Joel J. Sokolsky, and Thomas Hughes, 108 – 121. Cham: Springer, 2018.

Sokolsky, Joel. "Realism Canadian Style: National Security Policy and the Chrétien Legacy." *Policy Matters* 5, no. 2 (June 2004): 1 – 44.

United States. Department of Defense. *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2018.

United States. Department of Defense Industrial Policy. *Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency of the United States: Report to President Donald J. Trump by the Interagency Task Force in Fulfillment of Executive Order 13806*. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2018.

United States. Federal Register. *Executive Order 13788 of April 18, 2017: Buy American and Hire American*. Washington DC: Office of the Federal Register, 2017.

United States. The Joint Staff. *Description of the National Military Strategy* 2018. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2018.

United States. United States Congress, *Public Law 114-92 – Nov. 25, 2015: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016*. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2015.

Vucetic, Srdjan. *The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialized Identity in International Relations*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011.

World Trade Organization. "China and the WTO." Accessed 21 May 2020.
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm.