

Canadian
Forces
College

Collège
des
Forces
Canadiennes



ETHOS IN CAF TRAINING AND EDUCATION: ABSENCE BY DESIGN

Lieutenant-Commander Maxime Maugeais

JCSP 45

Solo Flight

Disclaimer

Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do not represent Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used without written permission.

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2022

PCEMI 45

Solo Flight

Avertissement

Les opinions exprimées n'engagent que leurs auteurs et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

© Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2022

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

JCSP 45 – PCEMI 45
2018 – 2020

SOLO FLIGHT

ETHOS IN CAF TRAINING AND EDUCATION: ABSENCE BY DESIGN

Lieutenant-Commander Maxime Maugeais

“This paper was written by a student attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.”

“La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.”

ETHOS IN CAF TRAINING AND EDUCATION: ABSENCE BY DESIGN

Our National Defense Policy states that one of the CAF's objectives is to "restore constructive Canadian leadership in the world and to promote Canada's interests and values".¹ However, while these are noble objectives, CAF leadership and values have not always been exemplary. Indeed, in 1989 the CAF had lost the trust of the government for not being able to integrate women in the forces in a way that was consistent the values of the Canadian society.² A few years later, the civil-military crisis caused by the Somalia affair challenged our military's professionalism once again.³ More recently, the CAF has been confronted by the need to change its sexualized culture yet finds itself challenged by its limited ability to shape its own culture.⁴ Another example, albeit less contentious but still having negative impacts on operations, is that in "2013/14, a greater percentage of Regular Force personnel were obese [...] than personnel in 2004 (25.0% vs. 20.2% respectively.)"⁵ As the Chief of de Defense Staff General Vance stated, given the need for the CAF to be more ethical and professional, there is a need to "train people to understand more thoroughly what's right and what's wrong in this institution."⁶

Despite the wisdom of our relatively recent capstone doctrine for the profession of arms, (i.e. *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* and the four subsequent manuals), institutionalizing this doctrine remains a challenge for many reasons. One reason, as this paper will argue, is the limited ability that the CAF Individual Training and Education (IT&E) system

¹ Canada and Department of National Defence, *Strong, Secure, Engaged - Canada's Defence Policy*, 7.

² Forces Armées Canadiennes, A-PA-005-000/AP-006, *Le leadership dans les Forces canadiennes : Diriger l'institution*, 10.

³ Horn et al., "Chapter 6: Lasting Change or a Flash in the Pan?"

⁴ Forces armées canadiennes, "Quatrième Rapport d'étape Sur La Lutte Contre l'inconduite Sexuelle"; Deschamps, "Examen externe sur l'inconduite sexuelle et le harcèlement sexuel dans les Forces armées canadiennes."

⁵ François Thériault, Karyn Gabler, and Kiyuri Naicker, "Health and Lifestyle Information Survey of Canadian Armed Forces Personnel: 2013/2014."

⁶ Department of National Defence, *Chief of the Defence Staff Video Message on the Survey into Sexual Misconduct in the CAF*.

has to train the values and beliefs found in the CAF ethos. To explain this limitation, this paper will argue that the current CAF Military Employment Structure (MES), the MES manual, the Canadian Forces Professional Development System (CFPDS), and the Canadian Force Individual Training and Education System (CFITES) doctrine oversimplify the idea of performance (i.e. job performance). As a result, the CAF falls short on delivering IT&E programs that meet the aim and spirit of our leadership doctrine. To this end, this paper will first show that our leadership doctrine sets expectations for CAF IT&E that exceed those of traditional trade or vocational training programs. Second, the shortcoming of the MES and IT&E directives and doctrine that prevent the development of IT&E programs consistent with the profession of arms will be discussed. Last, this paper will argue that the CAF should have a paradigm shift with how it develops leadership. More specifically, the IT&E system must be able to add affective domain (e.g. values, beliefs, expectations, attitudes) related training objectives in IT&E programs so that the IT&E system can reach its “ultimate objective [...] to transform green recruits into fully capable, confident, professionals.”⁷ In sum, this paper will argue that the CAF must change its understanding of job requirements as well as training and education if it is to not only develop IT&E programs aimed at enabling CAF members to learn ‘What to do’, but also the critical professional requirement of ‘How to be’.

EXPECTATIONS FOR THE INCLUSION OF VALUES IN IT&E PROGRAMS

As will be discussed in the next section, the CAF MES and IT&E systems do not rely on the notions of beliefs and values to describe the job requirements of CAF members. This is an issue because "values give an organization a self-ordering quality, a kind of organizational

⁷ Canadian Armed Forces, *A-PA-005-000/AP-004, Leadership in the Canadian Forces - Conceptual Foundations*, 99.

ballast, which provides direction and stability in periods of turmoil, stress, and change”.⁸ This shortcoming is astonishing given that the CAF Leadership doctrine is replete with statements that explicitly link the idea of job performance to the notions of values, attitudes, and beliefs. To start, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* explains that military members are part of the profession of arms and as professionals, are held to high performance and ethical standards. *Duty with Honour* states that professionals are

“governed by a code of ethics that establishes standards of conduct while defining and regulating their work. This code of ethics is enforced by the members themselves and contains values that are widely accepted as legitimate by society at large.”⁹

This document also specifies that professions have four specific attributes namely: responsibility, expertise, identity, and vocational ethic. To expand on these attributes, the CAF leadership doctrine goes to great lengths to explain its values-based leadership and ethos. *Leadership in the CF: Conceptual Foundations* states that "CF leadership is a *values-based* concept, evoking the attributes of duty and *honour* and defined as: directing, motivating and enabling others to accomplish the mission *professionally* and *ethically*..."¹⁰ In addition to stating that the CAF leadership is values-based, our leadership doctrine describes our ethos and explains its importance. On this, it states that “the military ethos embodies the *spirit* that binds the *profession* together. It clarifies how members view their responsibilities, apply their expertise and express their unique military identity.”¹¹ Additionally, it is the “ethos that *guides*

⁸ Canadian Armed Forces, 18.

⁹ Canadian Armed Forces, “The Profession of Arms in Canada,” 6.

¹⁰ Canadian Armed Forces, *A-PA-005-000/AP-004, Leadership in the Canadian Forces - Conceptual Foundations*, i.

¹¹ Canadian Armed Forces, “The Profession of Arms in Canada,” 21.

them [CAF members] *in the performance of their duty.*”¹² Ultimately, our doctrine is clear that our ethos sets clear expectations of professional behaviours and

“it comprises values, beliefs and expectations that reflect core Canadian values, the imperatives of military professionalism, and the requirements of operations. It acts as the centre of gravity for the military profession and establishes an ethical framework for the professional conduct of military operations”¹³

This is particularly important given that armed conflicts continue “to become more complex, characterized by highly nuanced political situations, [...] and unprecedented public scrutiny—all of which combine to increase the demands placed on the military professional.”¹⁴ To meet these demands, in addition to expertise and the right personally traits, leaders must also have “motives, values, cognitive abilities, social and problem-solving skills.”¹⁵ Consequently, it is essential that our MES and IT&E system are able to integrate the values found in CAF doctrine. Indeed, in order for transformational leaders to become the social architects our doctrine demands, they must “make clear the emerging values and norms of the organization.”¹⁶ Furthermore, these leaders have to “pay increased attention to aligning their internal practices and cultures with the expectations of the citizenry.”¹⁷ Therefore, while this is not yet the case, values and norms need to become part of our vocabulary, with clear mental models, not just rhetoric.¹⁸ Put differently, to do their part to institutionalize the profession or arms and the CAF ethos, the MES and the IT&E systems must provide IT&E opportunities for CAF members to

¹² Canadian Armed Forces, 10.

¹³ Canadian Armed Forces, 25.

¹⁴ Canadian Armed Forces, 4.

¹⁵ Zaccaro, “Trait-Based Perspectives of Leadership,” 8.

¹⁶ Northouse, “Transformational Leadership,” 200.

¹⁷ Okros, “Leadership in the Canadian Military Context,” 6.

¹⁸ Gabriel et al., *À la manière des guerriers*, 207.

“internalize the values of the institution”¹⁹ and lead them to reject the idea that their profession is only a trade.²⁰

CURRENT MES, CFPDS, AND CFITES LIMITATIONS

Although this paper discusses human performance in the context of training and education, it will not do so by analyzing various competency models. This is a separate and complex topic since the term competency is not clearly defined in the literature and consensus is lacking²¹, definitions can be contradictory²², pros and cons are still being debated²³, and there is a lack of empirical research on the merit of various competency models²⁴. Ultimately, given that “there is such confusion and debate concerning the concept of 'competence' that it is impossible to identify or impute a coherent theory”²⁵, this paper will focus on explaining why the affective domain (e.g. attitudes, beliefs, expectations, values) are not found in CAF job descriptions and consequently their associated IT&E programs.

Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAOD) 5070-0: Military Employment Structure indicates that one of the MES principles is ‘operational effectiveness’ and the MES manual specifies that it is its leading principle. This manual states that

“to be an effective fighting force all members require core expertise primarily related to the environment in which they will be employed on operations. The addition of

¹⁹ Canadian Armed Forces, *A-PA-005-000/AP-004, Leadership in the Canadian Forces - Conceptual Foundations*, 18.

²⁰ Gabriel et al., *À la manière des guerriers*, 206.

²¹ Hoffmann, “The Meanings of Competency,” 276; Eilström and Kock, “Competence Development in the Workplace,” 6.

²² Eric Soderquist et al., “From Task-based to Competency-based,” 325.

²³ Bolden and Gosling, “Leadership and Management Competencies: Lessons from the National Occupational Standards,” 13.

²⁴ Eilström and Kock, “Competence Development in the Workplace,” 5.

²⁵ Le Deist and Winterton, “What Is Competence?,” 29.

specialized and support knowledge and skills facilitate the effective application of this core expertise.”²⁶

It is important to note that in this definition, there is no mention that to be an effective fighting force, military members must possess the values and beliefs required for honourable and ethical conduct. The document continues and states that the MES structure is comprised of occupations, sub-occupations, and at the more granular level, jobs. Jobs are defined as “a set of activities or the aggregation of tasks performed to achieve the outcome at a rank level for a specific occupation or generic occupation group.”²⁷ Again, while the idea of discrete tasks or activities is explicit in this definition of ‘job’, there is no mention of the operational requirement to perform these tasks or activities in a way that is consistent with the profession of arms. In fact, none of the MES manual, the DAOD 5070-0, or DAOD 5070-1: Military Employment Structure Framework make mention of the profession of arms, ethics, values, attitudes, beliefs, or ethos. Put differently, neither directives nor the doctrine manual on MES link job performance to the values-based leadership concepts expressed in our leadership doctrine and required by the profession of arms. On a parallel note, this discrepancy actually contradicts one of the MES’ own guiding principle which is to “optimize the training and development of CAF members.”²⁸

DOAD 5031-8 on the CFPDS and the Canadian Forces Individual Training and Education System (CFITES) doctrine do acknowledge that attitudes affect performance. However, this DOAD mandates that professional competencies must be observable and measurable.²⁹ This is also reflected in CFITES volumes that explain that performance objectives

²⁶ Canadian Armed Forces and Director Personal Generation Requirements, “A-PD-055-001/AG-001 - The Canadian Armed Forces Military Employment Structure,” 3–1.

²⁷ Canadian Armed Forces and Director Personal Generation Requirements, 4–2.

²⁸ Canadian Armed Forces, “DAOD 5070-0, Military Employment Structure.”

²⁹ Canadian Armed Forces, “DAOD 5031-8, Canadian Forces Professional Development.”

must have observable and measurable performance standards.³⁰ As CFITES explains, Performance Objectives must be tasks that have a beginning and an end. Their associated standards commonly rely on the measures of completeness, soundness of judgement, accuracy, or speed to determine if the process and/or product of the associated Performance Objective were attained by students.³¹ None of these measures of performance address the need to develop and assess attitudinal objectives linked to the affective domain (e.g. values, beliefs, attitudes). Even the measure ‘soundness of judgement’ is reduced to measuring the quality of a decision yet there is much more to ethical and honourable behaviours than making correct decisions. While one could argue that the measure of ‘accuracy’ could be used to measure one’s ability to accurately perceive the various dimensions of an ethical dilemma or acknowledge frictions stemming from cultural differences, CFITES reduces ‘accuracy’ to physical dimensions (e.g. length, height, angles, etc.) that can be measured with tools or calculations. The only real provision that CFITES has to enable the inclusion of attitudinal objectives is in the form of Educational Objectives. These are defined as supporting the “development of educational requirements and is a description of the cognitive skill or applied knowledge the individual will demonstrate.”³² As for other MES and IT&E terms related to performance, the notions of skills and knowledge are explicitly mentioned but not attitudes, values, and beliefs. The explanation of Education Objectives does mention that:

³⁰ Canadian Armed Forces, “A-P9-050-000/PT001 - Canadian Forces Individual Training & Education System Volume 1: Interim Guidance-Introduction/Description”; Canadian Armed Forces, “A-P9-050-000/PT-Z01 - Canadian Forces Individual Training & Education System Volume 1(1): Glossary”; Canadian Armed Forces, “A-P9-000-002/PT-003 - Canadian Forces Individual Training & Education System Volume 3: Analysis of Instructional Requirements.”

³¹ Canadian Armed Forces, “A-P9-000-002/PT-003 - Canadian Forces Individual Training & Education System Volume 3: Analysis of Instructional Requirements.”

³² Canadian Armed Forces, “A-P9-050-000/PT001 - Canadian Forces Individual Training & Education System Volume 1: Interim Guidance-Introduction/Description,” 30.

“In cases where it is difficult to directly link education objectives to performance in terms of specific tasks and discrete employments, education objectives should be linked, at minimum, to the broader performance requirement (i.e. to conduct oneself in an ethical manner in all CF situations) and to the professional military attribute that the education objective is expected to develop over time in the member.”³³

However, whereas the better part of CFITES Volume 3 is dedicated to Task Analysis and the drafting of task-based Performance Objectives, CFITES does not have the equivalent for Educational Objectives. In fact, besides providing the brief explanation quoted above on the aim of Educational Objectives, CFITES provides no further guidance on how to develop these objectives. On a more anecdotal note, Educational Objectives are often frowned upon within the Training Development community because they are perceived as not being ‘performance oriented’ since their standard is not linked to the performance of a task.

As this section has explained, the MES and IT&E related DOADs and doctrine rely almost exclusively on tasks, and to a lesser extent on skills and knowledge, to capture the work that CAF members must carry out. The only caveat to this, besides the token provision for Educational Objectives, is the recent creation of the Leader Development Framework (LDF) which has helped shape the recent Officer General Specifications (OGS) and NCM General Specifications (NCMGS). Unfortunately, while these specifications do list the five meta-competencies (expertise, cognitive capacities, social capacities, change capacities, and professional ideology) and the seventeen discrete competencies embedded in this framework and that these are less reductionist than the otherwise task-based occupational specifications, these

³³ Canadian Armed Forces, 30.

LDF components have been mapped to tasks with no mention of the attitudes, values, and beliefs necessary to carry them out in a way that is consistent with the profession of arms.³⁴

Ultimately, since the IT&E system is designed to develop IT&E programs based on MES specifications but that these do not include the values found in our leadership doctrine and that the IT&E system doctrine only focuses on observable and measurable behaviours, the current and future CAF courses will not be able to meet the spirit of our leadership doctrine.

PARADIGM SHIFT

It has been argued that task-based approaches like the CAF's MES inhibit "organisational learning and development by promoting a focus on observable behaviours and indicators to the exclusion of less overt aspects such as values, beliefs and relationships."³⁵ Additionally, a reductionist approach to performance like the one codified in CAF DOADs and the MES manual has been "extensively criticised for weaknesses in its ability to represent occupations which are characterised by a high degree of uncertainty, unpredictability and discretion, and its arguable tendency [...] to atomise work roles rather than represent them holistically."³⁶

In order to readjust its aim, the CAF needs a paradigm shift. First and foremost it needs to update the DAODs and doctrinal documents previously mentioned to capture the fact that the values and the other expectations of performance mentioned in our leadership doctrine form an integral part of occupational training. This is particularly important given that there are "significant differences in how leadership is practiced within the CF. Obvious differences exist

³⁴ Chief of the Defense Staff, "OGS"; Chief of the Defense Staff, "NCMGS."

³⁵ "A Step in the Right Direction? Investors in People and the Learning Organization - Bell - 2002 - British Journal of Management - Wiley Online Library," 15.

³⁶ Lester, S., "Management Standards: A Critical Approach," 28.

across the Navy, Army, Air Force and Special Forces contexts.”³⁷ Additionally, these differences extend across occupations and specialist capacities.³⁸ Consequently, instead of focusing mainly on the current leader development courses tied to the OGS and NCMGS and their developmental periods (DPs), we must deliberately insert leadership development related objectives in occupational and specialty courses. This paper is not suggesting that the CAF foregoes the current DP training but that it improves it by including affective performance objectives and supplements it by including leadership related competencies in the occupational and specialty courses when appropriate. The recommended paradigm shift also requires the IT&E system to acknowledge that “intellectual development through education and value development through professional socialization tend to have incremental and delayed effects.”³⁹ Consequently, the CAF must be willing to resource courses that include learning activities that are not pass or fail like for traditional Performance Objectives. However, this might prove to be a major obstacle since some have argued that the CAF’s “culture of discounting education runs deep.”⁴⁰

Nevertheless, there are several leadership topics that could be added against the backdrop of occupational and specialist training. Whether it be ethical reasoning⁴¹, cross-cultural competencies⁴², cultural intelligence⁴³, systems thinking⁴⁴, character-based leadership⁴⁵, psychological strengths or grit⁴⁶, there are a myriad of learning activities that could be devised to

³⁷ Okros, “Leadership in the Canadian Military Context,” 80.

³⁸ Okros, 80.

³⁹ Canadian Armed Forces, *A-PA-005-000/AP-004, Leadership in the Canadian Forces - Conceptual Foundations*, 26.

⁴⁰ Horn et al., “Chapter 6: Lasting Change or a Flash in the Pan?,” 122.

⁴¹ Gabriel et al., *À la manière des guerriers*.

⁴² Northouse, “Culture and Leadership.”

⁴³ Davis, Wright, and Forces armées canadiennes, “La Culture et l’intelligence Culturelle.”

⁴⁴ Skaburskis, “The Origin of ‘Wicked Problems.’”

⁴⁵ Manley, “Character Based Leadership for the Canadian Armed Forces: A Concept Whose Time Has Come.”

⁴⁶ Laurence and Matthews, *The Oxford Handbook of Military Psychology*.

help the development of metacognition and shape beliefs and values in a way that is consistent with the profession of arms. For example, rituals and symbols are powerful psychological mechanism to help reinforce values and beliefs.⁴⁷ Additionally, recent advances from the field of positive psychology which a “significant part of [...] involves the scientific analysis of human character strengths”⁴⁸ could inform the instructional analysis, design, and development of training objectives from the affective domain. As one example, the Values in Action Inventory of Strengths (VIA-IS)⁴⁹ describes the development and psychometric characteristics of 24 character strengths. Such a guide could be very beneficial to the IT&E community for developing learning opportunities aimed at shaping virtuous characters, including measuring some attitudes and beliefs, provided that they are not tied to the limiting pass/fail requirements. This is important because

“what an organization chooses to measure - and, importantly, what is not measured - sends very strong signals to all about what is valued. Significant disconnects arise when the company slogan trumpets one value but then does not measure whether or not it is practiced.”⁵⁰

In addition to the narrower field of positive psychology, advances in the broader cognitive and behavioural sciences now provide better insights on how to shape behaviours through cognitive and metacognitive training.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Gabriel et al., *À la manière des guerriers*.

⁴⁸ Laurence and Matthews, *The Oxford Handbook of Military Psychology*, 209.

⁴⁹ Peterson and Seligman, *Character Strengths and Virtues*.

⁵⁰ Okros, “Leadership in the Canadian Military Context,” 128.

⁵¹ Laurence and Matthews, *The Oxford Handbook of Military Psychology*, 228.

CONCLUSION

It is not surprising that “the increasing complexity in the contemporary operating environment is what is driving everyone in the Western World to put more emphasis on education.”⁵² That being said, there is still a need for military training “to better understand the nature and growth of expertise.”⁵³ Notwithstanding the challenges of including attitudinal objectives in CAF IT&E programs, this paper has made clear that the profession of arms and the Chief of the Defense Staff are unequivocal in that CAF leaders, at all levels, need to be better trained and educated. This education, and training, must include attitudinal elements which historically have not been included in the CAF’s systems approach to training. In order for the IT&E System to have a chance at doing this, the Chief of Military Personnel (CMP) will have to be willing to modernize its definitions of human performance related terms and update its MES related DAODs and doctrine. For its part, the IT&E System will have to let go of the notion that only observable and measurable performance objectives that support pass/fail decisions are worth training and educating. If this change does happen, instructional developers should turn to the field of cognitive behavioural sciences and positive psychology in particular to analyze the IT&E requirements for affective objectives and subsequently design and develop the associated learning activities. If this was achieved, not only would the IT&E System now be in a much better position to systematically influence the socialization of new recruits as well as support the ongoing development of CAF leaders to be better prepared to contend with tactical to national strategic issues, but additionally, through the continuous feedback from IT&E programs, the CAF would be better able to continuously refine its leadership doctrine and develop it much like

⁵² Horn et al., “Chapter 6: Lasting Change or a Flash in the Pan?,” 126.

⁵³ Laurence and Matthews, *The Oxford Handbook of Military Psychology*, 271.

it does for other capabilities, so that it remains operationally relevant and aligned with Canadian values.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- “A Step in the Right Direction? Investors in People and the Learning Organization - Bell - 2002 - British Journal of Management - Wiley Online Library.” Accessed May 23, 2020. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8551.00229>.
- Bolden, Richard, and Jonathan Gosling. “Leadership and Management Competencies: Lessons from the National Occupational Standards.” *Centre for Leadership Studies*, May 7, 2004, 12.
- Canada, and Department of National Defence. *Strong, Secure, Engaged - Canada's Defence Policy*, 2017. http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/201/301/weekly_acquisitions_list-ef/2017/17-23/publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/mdn-dnd/D2-386-2017-eng.pdf.
- Canadian Armed Forces. “A-P9-000-002/PT-003 - Canadian Forces Individual Training & Education System Volume 3: Analysis of Instructional Requirements.” Chief of the Defence Staff, n.d.
- . “A-P9-050-000/PT001 - Canadian Forces Individual Training & Education System Volume 1: Interim Guidance-Introduction/Description.” Chief of the Defence Staff, n.d.
- . “A-P9-050-000/PT-Z01 - Canadian Forces Individual Training & Education System Volume 1(1): Glossary.” Chief of the Defence Staff, n.d.
- . *A-PA-005-000/AP-004, Leadership in the Canadian Forces - Conceptual Foundations*. Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy - Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005.
- . “DAOD 5031-8, Canadian Forces Professional Development.” Policies. Government of Canada, November 13, 2013. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/defence-administrative-orders-directives/5000-series/5031/5031-8-canadian-forces-professional-development.html>.
- . “DAOD 5070-0, Military Employment Structure.” Policies. Government of Canada, May 29, 2014. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/defence-administrative-orders-directives/5000-series/5070/5070-0-military-employment-structure.html>.
- . “The Profession of Arms in Canada,” 2009.
- Canadian Armed Forces, and Director Personal Generation Requirements. “A-PD-055-001/AG-001 - The Canadian Armed Forces Military Employment Structure.” Chief of the Defence Staff, July 1, 2015.
- Chief of the Defense Staff. “A-PD-055-002/PP-003 Canadian Forces Officer General Specification (OGS).” National Defence, October 3, 2017.
- . “A-PD-055-002/PP-004 Canadian Forces Manual of Military Employment Structure Volume 2 Part 2 Non-Commissioned Member General Specification (NCMGS).” National Defence, February 9, 2011.
- Davis, Karen D, Justin C. Wright, and Forces armées canadiennes. “La Culture et l’intelligence Culturelle.” In *L’intelligence Culturelle et Le Leadership: Introduction l’intention Des*

- Leaders Des Forces Canadiennes*, 11–29. Kingston, On.: Presse de l'Académie canadienne de la Défense, 2010. http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/dnd-mdn/cultural_intelligence-ef/D2-238-2-2009-fra.pdf.
- Department of National Defence. *Chief of the Defence Staff Video Message on the Survey into Sexual Misconduct in the CAF*, 2018. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/benefits-military/conflict-misconduct/operation-honour/training-educational-materials/videos/cds-survey-sexual-misconduct.html>.
- Deschamps, Marie. “Examen externe sur l'inconduite sexuelle et le harcèlement sexuel dans les Forces armées canadiennes,” March 27, 2015, 101.
- Eilström, Per-Erik, and Henrik Kock. “Competence Development in the Workplace: Concepts, Strategies and Effects.” *Asia Pacific Education Review* 9, no. 1 (February 2008): 5–20. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03025821>.
- Eric Soderquist, Klas, Alexandros Papalexandris, George Ioannou, and Gregory Prastacos. “From Task-based to Competency-based: A Typology and Process Supporting a Critical HRM Transition.” *Personnel Review* 39, no. 3 (April 13, 2010): 325–46. <https://doi.org/10.1108/00483481011030520>.
- Forces Armées Canadiennes. *A-PA-005-000/AP-006, Le leadership dans les Forces canadiennes : Diriger l'institution*. Kingston, ON: Académie canadienne de la Défense - Institut de leadership des Forces canadiennes, 2007.
- Forces armées canadiennes. “Quatrième Rapport d'étape Sur La Lutte Contre l'inconduite Sexuelle,” février 2019.
- François Thériault, Karyn Gabler, and Kiyuri Naicker. “Health and Lifestyle Information Survey of Canadian Armed Forces Personnel: 2013/2014.” Ottawa, ON, September 2016.
- Gabriel, Richard A, Académie canadienne de la défense, Canada, Forces armées canadiennes, and 17e Escadre. *À la manière des guerriers: un traité d'éthique militaire*. Kingston, Ont.: Presse de l'Académie canadienne de la défense, 2009.
- Hoffmann, Terrence. “The Meanings of Competency.” *Journal of European Industrial Training* 23, no. 6 (August 1999): 275–86. <https://doi.org/10.1108/03090599910284650>.
- Horn, Colonel Bernd, Dr. Bill Bentley, Lieutenant-General (ret) Romeo Dallaire, Senator Romeo Dallaire, and Lieutenant-General (Ret) Romeo Dallaire. “Chapter 6: Lasting Change or a Flash in the Pan?” In *Forced to Change: Crisis and Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces*, 116–33. Toronto, Canada: Dundurn, 2015. <http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/cfvlibrary-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3431504>.
- Laurence, Janice H., and Michael D. Matthews, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Military Psychology*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Le Deist, Françoise Delamare, and Jonathan Winterton. “What Is Competence?” *Human Resource Development International* 8, no. 1 (March 2005): 27–46. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1367886042000338227>.
- Lester, S. “Management Standards: A Critical Approach.” *Competency* 2, no. 1 (October 1994): 28–31.

- Manley, Major Jeffrey. "Character Based Leadership for the Canadian Armed Forces: A Concept Whose Time Has Come," n.d., 101.
- Northouse, Peter G. "Culture and Leadership." In *Leadership: Theory and Practice*, 6th ed., 383–422. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2013.
- . "Transformational Leadership." In *Theory and Practice*, 6th ed., 185–217. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications, 2013.
- Okros, Dr Alan. "Leadership in the Canadian Military Context." *Canadian Forces Leadership Institute*, Leadership, November 2010, 74.
- Peterson, Christopher, and Martin E. P. Seligman. *Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and Classification*. 2004: Oxford University Press. Accessed May 24, 2020. <https://www.apa.org/pubs/books/4317046>.
- Skaburskis, Andrejs. "The Origin of 'Wicked Problems.'" *Planning Theory & Practice* 9, no. 2 (June 2008): 277–80. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14649350802041654>.
- Zaccaro, Stephen J. "Trait-Based Perspectives of Leadership." *American Psychologist* 62, no. 1 (2007): 6–16. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.62.1.6>.