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DGDS AND THE SECURITY AGENDA: PRIORITY VERSUS SHORT-TERM FOCUS

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INTRODUCTION

''The Policy on Government Security states that Deputy heads of all departments

are responsible for approving the DSP [Departmental Security Plan] that details decisions

for managing security risks and outlines strategies, goals, objectives, priorities and

timelines for improving departmental security and supporting its implementation.''[1] A

DSP serve to address the identified security risks of its department which requires annual

review and updates.[2] Herein, security management involves continuous evaluation of

risks and implementation of appropriate security controls to mitigate the risks.[3] Between

2004 and 2015, various audit and security reform teams highlighted that without an

updated departmental security policy suite, it was impractical to improve processes.[4] In

March 2014, the Director General Defence Security (DGDS) organization was

established and the Departmental Security Officer (DSO) was provided full functional

authority over the program.[5] DGDS became central in the departmental security plan

governance structure[6] where the Senior Security Advisory Committee (SSAC) was re-

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[1] Government of Canada, ''Security Audits: Management Action Plan Follow-up,'' *National Defence*, ADM (RS) (December 2015), Accessed 26 May 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/audit-evaluation/security-audits-management-action-plan-follow-up.html

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] Government of Canada, ''DAOD 2006-1, Defence Security,'' *National Defence* (15 June 2015), Accessed 26 May 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/defence-administrative-orders-directives/2000-series/2006/2006-0-defence-security.html

[4] Government of Canada, ''Security Audits: Management Action Plan Follow-up…(2015).

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] Government of Canada, ''National Defence Security Orders and Directives, Chapter 1: National Defence Security Program and Responsibilities,'' *National Defence, DGDS* (8 June 2015, Version 2.6), Accessed 27 May 2020, https://collaboration-admpa.forces.mil.ca/sites/DI/SafetySecurity/vcds-ndsod-c01.pdf

established and therefore demonstrated the setting of improved foundation and solidification of the security program governance.[7] Numerous conditions for success were put in place such as Vice-Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) priority staffing no.2, creation of hundreds of positions (military and civilian) and funding for security related training and education.[8] Nevertheless, these conditions only existed on a short-term focus of the Defence Security Program which lasted approximately 2-3 years.[9] While significant progress was made in the short-term, the focus to shift to maturing the security policy suite to ensure compliance and strengthening the governance structure, processes and controls in order to reduce security risks [10] has not evolved accordingly. This statement will be demonstrated by discussing the evolution of DGDS to its actual state, to the current issues/gaps and proposed options to return to a solid foundation and consider a long-term momentum.

DGDS EVOLUTION & CURRENT STATE

Director of Defence Security (DDS) was the organisation known prior DGDS establishment.[11] The applicable security policies were known as the Security Orders, the National Defence Security Policy (NDSP), the National Defence Security Instructions (NDSI) and the Defence Security Manual.[12] The NDSP and NDSI were actually never formally approved by the VCDS [approval authority], but became legally binding by default in the absence of other official security policy suite and common uses/references

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[7] Government of Canada, ''Security Audits: Management Action Plan Follow-up…(2015).
[8] Karen Fournier (27 May 2020), CFSU(O) Deputy COS, (K. Laprade interview), Ottawa, Canada.
[9] *Ibid.*
[10] Government of Canada, ''Security Audits: Management Action Plan Follow-up…(2015).
[11] Government of Canada, ''CANFORGEN 015/14, Security Awareness Week 2014,'' *National Defence* (10 February 2014), Accessed 27 May 2020, http://vcds.mil.ca/apps/canforgens/default-eng.asp?id=015-14&type=canforgen
[12] Government of Canada, ''DAOD 2006-1, Defence Security,'' *National Defence* (2015).

within DND/CAF on an extended period of time.[13] Numerous security audits were

conducted since 2004 in order to address shortcomings until a Security Reform Team

(SRT) was finally stood up in 2013 to address the identified issues.[14] The SRT tag along

with DDS underwent substantial changes in the overall structure beginning with the

appointment of a DGDS as the lead security advisor for DND and the new Departmental

Security Officer (DSO).[15] The responsibilities associated with this new appointment were

the implementation of a more robust oversight regime over the Defence Security Program

and concurrently the enhancement of DND security posture and the reduction of the

department security risks.[16] The transfer of industrial, physical and personnel security

responsibilities from the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal (CFPM), the promulgation of

clearly defined security policy and an effective security education programme to ensure

compliance were identified as necessary initiatives.[17]

      The transfer of the CFPM security folio identified above was completed as well as

the creation of numerous military police positions within DGDS, constituting the trade

with the most positions within the organization.[18] Within less than approximately a year

and a half, DDS previously occupied by twenty members/employees got transformed into

DGDS with an increase of approximately two hundred members/employees positions.[19]

While the security was considered as internal services therefore normally attributed a tiny

piece of pie in the department results' framework, the funding accompanying the new

organization was not negligible and was evidence of the department's new vision on

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[13] Mary Blois (26 May 2020), DGDS Program Security Officer (K. Laprade interview), Ottawa, Canada.
[14] Government of Canada, ''Security Audits: Management Action Plan Follow-up…(2015).
[15] Government of Canada, ''CANFORGEN 015/14, Security Awareness Week 2014…(2014).
[16] *Ibid.*
[17] *Ibid.*
[18] Mary Blois (26 May 2020), DGDS Program Security Officer…(Interview).
[19] *Ibid.*

security being from now on a priority from which all were to adhere.[20] All positions were

assigned under VCDS staffing manning priority one (1) meaning they had to be filled

100%; realistically filled at 98%.[21] As per DAOD 2006-1, ''Security is everyone's

responsibility at the DND and the CAF,''[22] and therefore no longer belong the role and

responsibilities of the MP Trade which was filling most of the previous positions during

DDS's tenure.[23] Under this reformed organization, LOG Branch are filling the Policy

Section, Combat arms are filling the security awareness, training and education Section

etc. and numerous civilians from various other government departments are to ensure

continuity while providing expertise in various areas.[24]

This increase in personnel arrived just in time to contribute to the first version of

the National Defence Security Orders and Directives (NDSODs) published in June 2015

under the authority of the DAOD 2006, Defence Security.[25] The NDSODs are the

security baseline of this department, they translate the Treasury Board Security direction

to the DND/CAF context.[26] Their objectives were to ensure the safeguard of personnel,

information, assets and resources while detailing the security responsibilities of all DND

employees and CAF members.[27] Expected results includes but not limited to: a security

governance structure, clear understanding of security roles and responsibilities, delivering

of appropriate training, establishment of security committees providing additional

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[20] Karen Fournier (27 May 2020), CFSU(O) Deputy COS…(Interview).
[21] Government of Canada, ''Career Manager Information System,'' CMP/DMilC (data accessed on 27 May 2020).
[22] Government of Canada, ''National Defence Security Orders and Directives, Chapter 1…(2015).
[23] Mary Blois (26 May 2020), DGDS Program Security Officer…(Interview).
[24] Karen Fournier (27 May 2020), CFSU(O) Deputy COS…(Interview).
[25] Government of Canada, ''National Defence Security Orders and Directives, Chapter 1…(2015).
[26] Government of Canada, ''SIXNET, DGDS PPT (20 October 2016), Accessed 28 May 2020.
[27] Government of Canada, ''National Defence Security Orders and Directives, Chapter 1…(2015).

oversight etc.[28] As security is constantly evolving, the NDSODs were to be relevant, adaptable and flexible; herein include a proper review cycle by subject matter experts on an annual basis.[29] The NDSODs have undergone five (5) annual cycle reviews while several versions have been published since their inauguration. [30] The initial launch reflected the publication of sixteen (16) chapters covering the mandatory security controls articulated under the Directive on Departmental Security Management (DDSM) with the addition of other control objectives aligned with the unique nature of the business and operations of the department.[31] In 2020, there was one additional chapter added, bringing the security policy suite to a total of seventeen (17) chapters.[32]

Ultimately, DGDS is responsible for the coordination of directions and guidance's defined in its policy suite.[33] Likewise, ''the management of security requires the continuous assessment of risks as well as the implementation, monitoring and maintenance of appropriate internal security controls.''[34] The DSP is a three (3) year plan detailing decisions for managing security risks and outlines strategies, objectives, priorities and timelines for improving security; if we know our risks and vulnerabilities, we can effectively combat and reduce those risks.[35] The DSP is considered an evergreen document forcing us to review and evaluate on a continual base the identified risks and treatment plans (RTP) in order to ensure we appropriately mitigate security risks.[36]

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[28] *Ibid.*
[29] *Ibid.*
[30] *Ibid.*
[31] *Ibid.*
[32] Government of Canada, ''National Defence Security Orders and Directives, Chapter 17: Security and Social Media,'' *National Defence*, DGDS (20 December 2016), Accessed 28 May 2020, https://collaboration-admpa.forces.mil.ca/sites/DI/SafetySecurity/vcds-ndsod-c17.pdf
[33] Government of Canada, ''National Defence Security Orders and Directives, Chapter 1…(2015).
[34] Government of Canada, ''DAOD 2006-1, Defence Security,'' *National Defence* (2015).
[35] Government of Canada, ''SIXNET, DGDS PPT (2016).
[36] *Ibid.*

In keeping with the DSP requirements to manage security risks, the department governance structure is required for the effectiveness and integration of security risk management.[37] Key elements were the appointment of DGDS [DND functional security authority], clear delineation of roles and responsibilities and the establishment of security committees providing more oversight.[38] While the roles and responsibilities are contained in the NDSODs, the *Authority, Responsibilities and Accountabilities* (ARA) of Levels 1(L1s) were to be reviewed and drafted by the Corporate Secretary.[39] With regards to the oversight perspective, considerable efforts were made to re-establish the Senior Security Advisory Committee (SSAC) chaired by the VCDS to ensure ''security activities, requirements, and the impact of changes in government and departmental policies are known and understood by the Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) organizations responsible for the implementation of appropriate force protection and security measures.''[40] The SIXNET was also introduced with a security battle rhythm guiding assigned security liaison officers in the accomplishment of roles and responsibilities assigned to the Level 1.[41] These two examples of committees lead by senior bodies were symbolic towards setting the foundation to improve security program governance.[42]

In addition to the conditions and actions taken above, the compliance policy from Treasury Board was mandatory. It is conducted through the Management Accountability Framework (MAF) which ensures department/agencies are well managed, accountable

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[37] Government of Canada, ''National Defence Security Orders and Directives, Chapter 1…(2015).
[38] *Ibid.*
[39] Karen Fournier (27 May 2020), CFSU(O) Deputy COS…(Interview).
[40] Government of Canada, ''Security Audits: Management Action Plan Follow-up…(2015).
[41] Government of Canada, ''SIXNET, DGDS PPT (2016).
[42] Government of Canada, ''Security Audits: Management Action Plan Follow-up…(2015).

and resources are allocated to achieve results; security being one of the six areas.[43] Each

year the focus of the MAF changes to focus on the most relevant security control or to

measure how well we are transitioning to new policy updates.[44] If we are unable to

favorably respond to how we are meeting or not meeting policy requirements we are to

develop a Management Action Plan (MAP) to outline how we will address and mitigate

risks and become compliant to policy.[45] If gaps are identified in the MAF and a MAP is

created, there is an expectation that funding will be required at the L1 level to assist with

the mitigation plan. Follow up reporting is required in the following MAF cycle to ensure

deficiencies have been corrected.[46]

    Was DGDS promulgation a short-term trend or is it realistic to plan a robust

security program, keep the momentum and follow security evolution, trends and

requirements. This will be answered in the following section discussing several options

or mandatory key elements.

DGDS ISSUES/GAPS AND PROPOSED OPTIONS

    DGDS was stood up with an appearance of abundance of human and financial

resources, solid governance and a formal security policy suite inaugurated within a short

timeframe. Unfortunately, security is not sexy and requires a lot of work and dedication.

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[43] *Ibid.*

[44] Government of Canada, ''Evaluation of the Management Accountability Framework,'' *Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat*, (Date modified 2017-12-19), Accessed 29 May 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/corporate/reports/evaluation-management-accountability-framework.html

[45] *Ibid.*

[46] *Ibid.*

DGDS claimed ''Security…Mission possible,''[47] which will be argued in the following

section where initial conditions for success and other measures will be analyzed.

The creation of hundreds of positions at DGDS in a very short time was evidence

of the priority to address long unresolved security gaps in the Defence. With a VCDS

Staffing Manning Priority No.2; the requirement to fill was almost mandatory resulting

into members from various branches posted to DGDS[48] regardless of their experience or

background in security while the civilians posted had to meet specific security

background in some cases however expected to gather security training on a continuous

basis to adapt to security trends.[49] This did not last as the VCDS Priority switched to Pri

C [VCDS Manning had changed from numerical to alphabetical priorities in the

meantime], the lowest priority of the CAF which resulted into numerous members posted

out but not replaced.[50] Several civilians' positions under the process of getting filled did

not due to new allocated budget. At the end, ''People are at the core of everything the

Canadian Armed Forces does to deliver on its mandate.''[51] This issue is not a DGDS

problem but a CAF wide problem. Based on its mandate; it would not meet the VCDS

new staffing categories A or B therefore end up at the bottom priority reflecting 73% of

all CAF positions.[52] However, Pri C is the prerogative of the Commands and Groups

principals.[53] This new VCDS category was to run on a three years cycle in order to focus

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[47] Government of Canada, ''SIXNET, DGDS PPT (2016).

[48] Karen Fournier (27 May 2020), CFSU(O) Deputy COS…(Interview).

[49] *Ibid.*

[50] Government of Canada, ''Career Manager Information System.. (2020).

[51] Government of Canada, ''Strong, Secure and Engaged, Canada's Defence Policy,'' *National Defence* (last date modified 31 May 2019), Accessed 29 May 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/canada-defence-policy/well-supported-diverse-resilient-people-families.html

[52] Government of Canada, ''Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Staffing Categories,'' National Defence HQ, VCDS PPT / D Mil C SharePoint (18 December 2017), Accessed 30 May 2020.

[53] *Ibid.*

on force employment and employment support IAW the SSE Global Engagement Strategy [recruitment and training].[54] As we are at the end of this three years cycle, there's been no changes to these categories leading to believe the vectors checks were completed yearly and priorities were to remain as such. Unless Commands and Groups are directed to make DGDS a priority in Pri C; number of members posted to DGDS significantly change.

That being said, financial resources is a necessity to fill the necessary civilian positions. Once again, the resources reflect the priority attached to them and the security (such as DSP reporting) is inopportunely included in Internal Services [Standard Treasury Board placement for security] under Management and Oversight, within the National Defence Departmental Results Framework (DRF) and Program Inventory (PI) for fiscal year 2019-2020.[55] In essence, security is part of low financial priority regardless one of the previous DGDS, (Ret) BGen Meloche's attempt to have security as its own Departmental Result (DR) since there are distinctly difference between with this department in comparison with other OGDs.[56] For both members and employees, training is an enabler when it comes to following security trends and challenges. As much as DGDS was not able to keep their momentum in this regards for the mandatory security course for all members and employees of the department [refresher no longer mandatory and issues with data/compliance][57], this organization is not able to provide updated course and training for its personnel.

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[54] *Ibid.*
[55] Government of Canada, ''National Defence Departmental Results Framework (DRF) and Program Inventory (PI) for Fiscal Year 2019-20,'' National Defence (2019-2020), Accessed 30 May 2020, http://intranet.mil.ca/assets/DefenceTeam/docs/en/vcds/drf-&-pi-placemat--jul-2019-20-(en).pdf
[56] Karen Fournier (27 May 2020), CFSU(O) Deputy COS…(Interview).
[57] David Pugliese, ''DND doesn't know how many employees took mandatory security course despite 2015 deadline,'' *National Post* (18 April 2016), Accessed 29 May 2020

When it comes to HR, solution has to reflect quality versus quantity, partnership and collaboration. In an ideal world, creating a functional specialist security field would be most than likely the best scenario where experienced personnel would be fluent and develop a firm expertise to assess and develop risks strategies plans. But in a realistic scenario we need to count on existent resources and exploit them at their full potential. This is where the whole of Government approach and allies' collaboration becomes crucial whether you have the financial means or not. Make more with less is unfortunate but perhaps quantity has truly not much value if the quality is not there which lead to the next subject, the NDSODs.

The creation and promulgation of the NDSODs sixteen chapters were done in a record time under the coordination of a policy team comprised of 6 members and employees with the majority having little security background and all without policy development experience.[58] As such, the renewal policy first step was completed by vetting the NDSP and NDSI; two overlapping, incomplete and unmaintained security policies.[59] Following this, subject matter experts (SME) were to be consulted in order to update and refresh this new security policy suite. A major issue was to find them as the department could not count on his own to ensure all relevant NDSOD's chapters were covered appropriately.[60] Security knowledge and expertise had been lost with retired generations and accordingly low priority accorded to this subject. The true issue with the security policy suite still is the lack of policy analysis capacity. The importance of policy

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https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/dnd-doesnt-know-how-many-employees-took-mandatory-security-course-despite-2015-deadline
[58] Government of Canada, ''Career Manager Information System.. (2020).
[59] Government of Canada, ''SIXNET, DGDS PPT (2016).
[60] Mary Blois (26 May 2020), DGDS Program Security Officer…(Interview).

in democratic governance is crucial as government's actions are grounded in policy.[61] In

2008, Privy Council Office raised a red flag concerning renewal included in

strengthening capacity necessary in for dealing with long-term priorities such as […]

security.[62] The quality of government depends on its capacity to think through and

develop solutions, ''Will old tools be adequate when the edifice is being drastically

renovated?''[63] Once again, collaboration and partnership is essential in order to adapt to

three fundamental shifts: changes in the nature of perennial policy problems, key policy

processes transformed and collaborative relationship with the private sectors.[64]

In addition to the latter, more than a collaborative approach was needed to ensure

the DSP and MAF expectations were going to be met. When DGDS stood up, the SSAC

was re-established and the SIXNET was stood up in order to lead the L1 towards the

department security program with terms of references, security battle rhythm etc.[65] In

reality, the SIXNET had met few times [supposed to meet on a quarterly basis][66] while

the SSAC met once in 2019 and once in 2020,[67] which could be perceived as an inability

to maintain the momentum of the security culture. This could be even further discussed

with the DSP three years cycle where L1 were advised to align their business planning

with the DSP commitments for success in Years 2 and 3, and through to the outer years

since they were not able to do so in Year 1.[68] At the end of this DSP 3 years cycle, all

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[61] Leslie A. Pal, ''Beyond Policy Analysis, Public Issue Management in Turbulent Times, Chapter 1'' Nelson Education Fifth Edition (2010)), Accessed 27 May 2020,

[62] *Ibid.*

[63] *Ibid.*

[64] *Ibid.*

[65] Karen Fournier (27 May 2020), CFSU(O) Deputy COS…(Interview).

[66] Government of Canada, ''Briefing note for the DM and CDS, Departmental security plan – Risk treatment plan update,'' DGDS Briefing Note (28 July 2016), Accessed 30 May 2020.

[67] Karen Fournier (27 May 2020), CFSU(O) Deputy COS…(Interview).

[68] Government of Canada, ''Briefing note for the DM and CDS, Departmental security plan – Risk treatment plan update,'' DGDS Briefing Note (10 November 2017), Accessed 30 May 2020.

risks treatments were still not completed and DGDS had to request an extension to Year 4

and the development of a new DSP.[69] In summary, limited analysis was done by L1s

when they provided their security risks to confirm they were departmental-level risks, not

duplicated and identified owner of risks to develop appropriate RTP.[70] As the MAF

requires to monitor and complete the priorities of the DSP, this new extension requested

was captured in the MAF MAP for FY 18/19 as it consequently requires alignment with

security priorities and resources, ''thus ensure that risk mitigation strategies and timelines

strengthen departmental security practices and controls.''[71]

Finally, the fact that DDS was renamed DGDS is an important factor to take into

consideration into this analysis. The VCDS established the DGDS organization and as

per SRT recommendation, the DM/CDS appointed the DGDS as the DSO and upgraded

the rank to brigadier general.[72] This upgrade would ensure the visibility was balanced

with the complexity related to a security program.[73] However an upgrade is one thing but

the priority accorded on such complex program is a challenge. With as much as six (6)

different VCDS in approximately six (6) years and close to the same amount of

DGDS/DSO [five (5)]; the continuity and the priority to the program got lost with other

agenda priorities by default[74] knowing VCDS L1 staff was also assigned staffing

manning Pri C itself.[75] As any other priorities, money is always a requirement but even

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[69] Government of Canada, ''Briefing note for the DM and CDS, Departmental Security plan – Extension Request, *National Defence DGDS* (July 2018), Accessed 30 May 2020.

[70] *Ibid.*

[71] *Ibid.*

[72] Government of Canada, ''Security Audits: Management Action Plan Follow-up…(2015).

[73] *Ibid.*

[74] Karen Fournier (27 May 2020), CFSU(O) Deputy COS…(Interview).

[75] Government of Canada, ''Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Staffing Categories…(2017).

more important is the political will on a long-term commitment that prevail.[76] After all,

the Defence Plan 2018-2023 clearly indicate its expectations towards DGDS and the

Defence Security Program and there are great expectations to be maintained.[77] With the

arrival of a new VCDS to take effect in few weeks, a confirmation of priorities is to be

expected and the fate of DGDS shall be decided.

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[76] Craig Leslie Mantle and Christopher Cowan, ''The Strategic Outlook for Canada 2018, Canadian Security and Defence in a New World (Dis) Order'' CDA Institute Vimy paper No. 36 (2018), Accessed 27 May 2020, https://cdainstitute.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/strategic-outlook-2018.pdf

[77] Government of Canada, ''Defence Plan 2018-2023,'' National Defence (last modified 18 May 2018), Accessed 20 May 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/defence-plan-2018-2023.html

CONCLUSION

Without the political will, quality and proper resources, a security culture and a sustained desire to move on to the maturity phase; all efforts made by DGDS towards the department security programme will have been an exercise of mind not able to sustain the rapidly shifting security environment. Basically, is history repeating itself with a strong impression of déjà vu? Security is not a trend and should act as catalyzer in the Defence's day to day business; evolving, adaptable and flexible. Unfortunately, the initial set conditions which promised success turned out leading to out into degradation of the security program few years after its implementation and new security policy reset. This demonstrated a short-term political will that can only slowly but surely lead to same end state of DDS. While finance is always an imperative, even if you may have more than needed, if the will and priority to keep the momentum is absent, a program will not succeed. DGDS did a lot in a short time however desperately need the buy in from the highest level in order to recoup and reassert the lost momentum versus waiting for a trigger such as Delisle[78]case or much worst to revitalize a Defence' true priority.

> As in the past, contemporary security and defence is a ''wicked'' problem, one that defies comprehensive resolution given the constantly shifting ''environment'' in which this drama unfolds.

> - Mantle and Cowan, *The Strategic Outlook for Canada*

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[78] Kathryn Blaze Carlson, '' Decoding the case of alleged Canadian Spy Jeffrey Paul Delisle,'' *National Post* (18 January 2012), Accessed 29 May 2020, https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/decoding-the-case-of-alleged-canadian-spy-jeffrey-paul-delisle

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