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COIN: LESSONS AND SUCCESS FACTORS IN AFGHANISTAN WAR

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INTRODUCTION

Following the September 11 attacks and the confirmation that Al Qaida was the felon, the Bush Administration decided to project military forces when it turned down a final offer to Taliban that they extradite Osama Bin Laden. Within the context of fighting terrorism under *Operation Enduring Freedom* (OEF), the United States began major combat in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, in order to hunt leader of Al Qaida and depose the Taliban. [1]

The U.S. effort initially focused on U.S. air strike on Taliban and Al Qaida forces, accelerated by the combination between U.S. special operations forces (SOF) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) forces in order to support the Northern Alliance and a number of Pashtun warlords. [2] The U.S. and its allies succeeded in overthrowing the Taliban regime quickly through regular warfare and then the Taliban reduced its activities through the subsequent counterinsurgency (COIN) operation.

However, since 2006, these initial military successes which brought much optimism were in trouble by the advent of an elongated insurgency as the Taliban, Al Qaida, and the global jihadist network. In addition, Pakistan's tacit support, uncontrolled border areas, such as the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and maintain sanctuary in neighboring countries led to be crucial to the survivability of insurgent forces. As a result, the war was conducted with a small scale of guerrilla warfare or terrorist attack, and the

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[1] Kenneth, Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy," Congressional Research Service (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 4 January 2013), 8.
[2] Kenneth, Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy," Current Politics and Economics of the middle East, Vol 5, Issue 2, 2014. 319-320.

U.S. which had not been prepared for counterinsurgency (COIN) operation in Afghanistan suffered the great difficulties. These dirty journeys made the U.S. and coalition forces sick and tired spending most of their time within endless security and safety.

As the war in Afghanistan continued and the number of deaths increased without any success, anti-war public opinion rose in the U.S and abroad. In the end, the Bush administration revised its national security strategy and defense strategy which placed a new counterinsurgency manual and stressed the importance of security gains and local communities with real benefits. [3] But it did not contain enough solutions for Afghanistan's reconstruction, economic development, and security.

This led to Afghanistan people's repulsion against the U.S. and coalition forces and provided the opportunities and conditions which Taliban organizations could regenerate inside Afghanistan. Further, the failures to arrest Osama bin Laden and depose the Taliban in Afghanistan could not politically link between national strategy and military operation.

As such, the U.S. and coalition forces suffered many difficulties and uncertainties from insurgent movements such as guerrilla warfare, the Fourth-generation warfare, suicide bombing, and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) despite their overwhelming military power. Also, the U.S. forces and the distinguished research institutes are trying to find out the development of doctrine and research in order to solve the complex and

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[3] The White House, "Revitalizing National Defense." 9 December 2008. <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/defense/>Accessed 17 April 2019.

unexpected operational environment. This situation can be equally applied to the Republic of Korean Armed Forces (ROKAF).

The ROKAF has not yet had experience of stabilization operation and counterinsurgency (COIN) because of the defense strategy which focuses on deterrence, defence, and offense operation against North Korea. So, the ROKAF has only rough doctrines about the COIN but lacks substantial efforts and research.

Therefore, it is very meaningful to learn the U.S. experience in the Afghanistan war and to contrive a precise plan and apply to the situation on the Korean peninsula. In conjunction with the above questions, this paper will prove the lessons and success factors of counterinsurgency operations conducted during the war in Afghanistan. This paper will first consider the previous studies on COIN and understand the role of three actors and then it applies to mention the Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, and Transition (SCHBT) operation concept. Finally, this paper will examine the implications of the lessons for the ROKAF. [4]

CONSIDERATION OF PREVIOUS STUDIES ON COIN

Since COIN of the Afghan War and the Iraq War was the highest priority of the U.S. national security, there are various studies on the success and failure of the COIN.

Anthony Cordesman who is a national security analyst for ABC News states the Afghanistan conflict is asymmetric warfare fought by different sides with different goals and strategies using radically different methods. He said that failure of COIN in Afghanistan was due to short of a political and grand strategic end, inapposite solutions

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[4] U.S. Joint Chief of Staff. Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 2018. VII 6-11.

to the use of terrorists as proxies in asymmetric warfare, the loss of Golden Time for deposing the Taliban and Al Qaeda groups, and the difficulty of establishing indigenous security or military forces in the country.[5] In other words, if the U.S. had attempted to project an aggressive military power and improve the capabilities to directly counterinsurgency, it would not have been a failure.

The RAND report which analyzes quantitative examination of 89 cases of insurgencies showed that most insurgencies with more than two parties involved have longer, more complex, and uncertain endings. Some insurgencies could be successful in hierarchies or rural terrain and availability of sanctuary are vital to insurgencies. Especially, the report explains four key indicators to be applicable across COIN environments in order to inform policy and strategic analysis. [6]

First, modern insurgencies tend to last for more than ten years, and the government's probability of victory is halved with time. Based on this result, the COIN campaign's planner should assume that a campaign will last ten years and defeated insurgencies can splinter into smaller, more violent terrors or attacks with the intent of reigniting hostilities. [7] Second, elimination of sponsorship paralyzes an insurgent group and leads to its defeat due to the crippling effects of inconsistent support. That is because sponsors typically provide direct and indirect supports such as kinetic strikes, weapons, deployed trainers, logistics, money, and sanctuary. [8]

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[5] Cordesman, Anthony. "The Lessons of Afghanistan." CSIS Policy Report, (Washington, D.C., 4 October 2002), 31-36.

[6] Connable, Ben & Libicki, Matin. "How Insurgencies End." RAND National Defense Research, (Santa Monica, CA, 2010), 16-17.

[7] *Ibid*. 12-13.

[8] *Ibid*. 13.

Third, democracies do not often succeed against insurgencies and are rarely successful in fully democratizing. According to the RAND report, only fifteen of 89 cases could partially be described as democracies. Finally, it emphasizes the aspect of cost-effectiveness in terms of the U.S. massive budget. In other words, the efficient support should provide only to stabilized areas where there are hope and possibility and only to elite or group members who are influential on their society in order to prevent irresponsible negotiations by insurgents. [9]

Austin Long who is an outstanding researcher in RAND corporation stresses four success factors to cope with COIN. First, the organization for COIN should be improved and expended with U.S military, indigenous government, and civilian. The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) model in Afghanistan was an admirable sally but does not cover far enough. Second, amnesty and reward programs, like Carrots and Sticks should be implemented to the rational peasant in COIN campaigns. Third, most important is improving border security system because providing sanctuary in neighboring countries must be lethal to COIN's success. Finally, peace-building efforts should be targeted to the lowest echelons and separate the rebel groups from the sponsoring forces and residents. [10]

According to summarizing the previous studies above, most of studies focus on the external actors to find a reasonable solution such as the overwhelming military power, the stick and carrot strategy for the rebel group, the improvement of border securities, elimination of sponsorship, the expended organization with U.S military, civilian, and

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[9] *Ibid*. 13.

[10] Long, Austin. "On Other War: lessons from five decades of RAND counterinsurgency research." RAND National Defense Research, (Santa Monica, CA, 2006), 9-12.

indigenous government, people-centered approach. In other words, it can be seen that the success of COIN is to reduce the activities of the rebel group by directly defeating or neutralizing the rebel groups with direct military forces and by indirectly cutting off the support of the local people and external support.

**THE ROLE OF THREE FACTORS FOR SUCCESSFUL COIN**

The success factors presented in the previous studies are clearly important factors for effectively implementing COIN operations. However, since the significance of the indigenous government is underestimated and there is a universal error in determining success by overwhelming external intervention forces, it is necessary to reconsider the following points.

First, the successful COIN is not dependent on one powerful element, especially the overwhelming military power of the external intervention forces. Military power was not always a core factor in COIN warfare. In the end, since most of COIN have their own specific contexts and unique environmental conditions, various conditions and factors must be considered at the same time in order to conduct COIN operation.

Second, most of the previous studies were based on external factors. In other words, it was considered that how did the external forces execute their mission, how many troops and soldiers conduct COIN operation, and how to build the nation after COIN warfare. However, there have not been many studies which have identified the role of internal indigenous government in the host nation. As seen in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq, it is necessary to raise the role of internal actors and receive the help of the internal indigenous government in order to prevent repeated failures.

So, what are the various actor models that should be considered for successful COIN? The solution is based on the RAND report written by Seth Jones, which distinguishes external actors from internal actors and analyzes the correlations of actors involved in COIN warfare. Figure 1.1 illustrates the framework of the COIN campaign in Afghanistan. [11]

Figure 1.1 A Counterinsurgency Framework

RAND MG595-2.1

For the effective coin operation, he presented three sets of actors, external actors, insurgent groups, and indigenous government. The ultimate goal of these actors is to achieve victory, but it is hard to achieve the goal only to focus on victory in the battle between the actors. In other words, all actors need the strong support of the people or popular as a mediator in order to achieve their goals. Population support is a common goal for all three actors in an insurgency. After all, securing the support of indigenous people and popular is basically the most effective way to succeed in COIN warfare. [12]

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[11] Jones, Seth. "Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan," RAND National Defense Research, (Santa Monica, CA, 2008), 12.
[12] *Ibid.*

THE FALLACY OF EXTERNAL ACTORS

External intervention forces play an important role between the insurgent groups and the indigenous government by sponsoring indirectly as well as defeating insurgents directly. James Dobbins who is an American diplomat, and as Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan stresses that unstable host nation without the significant ingenious capacity for security requires external military forces for 10 to 20 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants in the absence of indigenous capabilities. And the magnitude of the total troops and the level of risk were inversely related. In circumstances in which the parties to the conflict coped with external military forces and are ready to collaborate with it, that requirement may be reduced to one or less per 1,000 inhabitants.[13] In the end, strong external intervention is indispensable for a successful COIN operation.

But in the RAND report, Seth Johns emphasizes the importance of indigenous military, police, and indigenous government roles. It is a long-term view that it is necessary to understand the root cause of war, history, customs, cultural background, and the nature of the local conflict. Moreover, he mentions that it is critical to train continuously the indigenous security forces and shape the capacity of indigenous security forces because they normally understand the climate, terrain, customs, culture, and population better than external security forces. Trustworthy indigenous governments which can be provided to their people in a timely manner can be the most optimal medicine to defeat insurgent groups. [14]

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[13] Dobbins, James. "The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building," RAND National Defense Research, (Santa Monica, CA, 2007), xxvi.

[14] Jones, Seth. "Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan," RAND National Defense Research, (Santa Monica, CA, 2008), 7-11.

AN INDIGENOUS GOVERNMENT

The second actor, the indigenous government which comprises the government's armed forces, police, and governance capacity is a critical factor to win the COIN warfare. The secure environment in the host nation is the greatest duties and roles given to the indigenous government for a successful COIN. Insurgent groups can endure and expand their capabilities if the security forces are comparatively frail and lack legitimacy.

British General, Frank Kitson stated that the stable population is the most core factor in COIN operations as "this represents the water in which the fish swims." [15] Also, analysis of the sixty COIN warfare since the Second World War shows that the security of the indigenous government played an important role to beat insurgency operation. As figure 1.2 illustrates, there is some correlation between the competency of security forces and the success of COIN. [16] As can be seen in Figure 1.2, the higher the level of security forces of the indigenous government, the higher the possibility of victory in COIN.

Figure 1.2 Competencies of Security Forces and Success of Counterinsurgencies

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[15] King, Frank. "Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping," June 2010. 49.
[16] Jones, Seth. "Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan," RAND National Defense Research, (Santa Monica, CA, 2008), 11-17.

These security efforts include fighting insurgent groups, border patrols, securing roads and controlling crime organizations. The mission of the security forces should be to get rid of the insurgent organization such as the command and control structure, guerrillas, logistics support, money, and political support from the population and external support. [17]

An active police force is also decisive to be able to permeate and control an insurgent area and, if well maintained, will decrease guerrilla activities and influence. The police can be provided to external forces a piece of key information by carrying out information, surveillance and reconnaissance work on insurgent group and criminal organization. [18]

After the initial success of external forces overthrow the insurgent groups and retake the stability in host nations, external forces should prepare hand over to indigenous forces their functions and capabilities based on the transition conditions.

Also, Governance capacity can influence the victory of COIN because it involves the provision of core services such as the justice system, the influence of warlords and tribal militias. [19] It is also important for the indigenous government to secure support for the people in order to maintain stability, disarm the rebel groups, and develop the area. That is, the indigenous government needs to gain support from friendly residents by

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[17] Trinquier, R. "Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency," (New York, 1978), 31.
[18] Jones, Seth. "Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan," RAND National Defense Research, (Santa Monica, CA, 2008), 17-18.
[19] Kaufman, Daniel. "Myth and Realities of Governance and Corruption," in Global Competitiveness Report 2005-2006 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2005), 81-98.

supporting the interventionist forces and improving self-sufficiency. Especially in this process, corruption of indigenous government should be avoided as a top priority, and corruption is the cause of the abolishment of the indigenous government's ability to govern.

In conclusion, external actors should take care to ensure that the indigenous government fosters and maintains its natural security forces and provides political and economic incentives to coordinate the details of this process.

INSURGENT GROUPS

The insurgency in Afghanistan consisted of "six main insurgent groups: the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami, the Haqqani network, foreign fighters (mostly Arabs and Central Asians), tribes based in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and criminal networks."[20] These six insurgent groups operate not only in Afghanistan but also in neighboring countries and are complexly connected to each other in terms of tactical, operational and strategic level.

According to the result from RAND research, "those insurgencies that received support from the external state won more than 50 percent of the time, those with support from nonstate actors won just over 30 percent of the time, and those with no external support won only 17 percent of the time."[21] That is, the success of insurgent groups depends on external support. Especially the assistance from external states tend to have

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[20] Jones, Seth. "Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan," RAND National Defense Research, (Santa Monica, CA, 2008), 37.
[21] Jones, Seth. "Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan," RAND National Defense Research, (Santa Monica, CA, 2008), 21.

greater opportunities which reinforce the capabilities of insurgent groups by providing weapons, troops, money, technique, logistics support and so on. [22]

There are two types of external support for insurgent groups. First, foreign governments, resident ethnic groups, direct military support, international terror network, military training, economic and material assistance, and diplomatic support can provide direct assistance. [23]

Second, it is external support for using the outside territory as a sanctuary for insurgent groups. In particular, the existence of an operational base outside the country of the insurgent group is closely related to the success of the insurgency operation. [24] In other words, it can be seen that it is necessary to continuously block the external support to the insurgent groups by performing the successful anti-rebellion. These activities include the control of inflow of activity funds or the control of information through strong border control or international cooperation.

In addition, COIN's success factors are related to the rebel group leader. Typically, rebel groups are not equipped with strong organizational or hierarchical order. In the end, the elimination of non-friendly or hostile leaders is a top priority. [25] For example, when leaders of Saddam Hussein, Gadhafi, and bin Laden and other terrorist organizations are removed, their followers can easily lose sight of their centripetal force and easily collapse.

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[22] *Ibid.*

[23] Byman, Daniel. "Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism," (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 53-78.

[24] Fearson, James and Laitin, David. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.", American Political Science Association, March 2003.

[25] Jonston, P. "Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency." International Security. Vol 34. 2012, 10-20.

THE SHAPE, CLEAR, HOLD, BUILD, AND TRANSITION CONCEPT

Afghanistan war has demonstrated that every insurgency is complex, uncertain, and unique. So, COIN approaches should be an adaptable and agile strategy that is focusing on comprehensive civilian and military efforts. The key objectives of External forces are to defeat insurgents, degrade their capabilities, disrupt their organizations. Some core objectives of indigenous government are to diminish violence, address injustice, and exercise political control over its population territory. [26]

Many Western countries including the U.S. have studied diverse doctrinal solutions to successfully accomplish COIN operations, which are complicated by political, military, historical, cultural, financial and multi-coalition's interests. Panetta Leon who was secretary of Defence of the U.S stated that "the U.S will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. Force commitments to stability operations. Accordingly, the U.S. forces will retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of COIN and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan." [27]

Based on this consistent direction, the U.S Army and Marine Corps issued *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (FM) 3-24 in 2007 and began to develop the U.S.'s experience and knowledge through various doctrine publications, research activities, and seminars. In 2018, the doctrine of *Counterinsurgency Joint Publication* (JP) 3-24 which contained the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and

[26] U.S. Joint Chief of Staff. Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 2018. III-1-2.
[27] Secretary of Defense Panetta, Leon. "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense," Statement on Defense Strategic Guidance, January 2012.

considerations for military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental, coalition's forces, and inter-organizational agencies was published in terms of more comprehensive approaches.

Although there are several models for efficient COIN operations, the Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, and Transition (SCHBT) operation concept offers the most comprehensive understanding and logical solution. It has clear objectives to corroborate physical and psychological circumstances, set up firm indigenous government control, and provide the populace's support. [28]

SHAPE

Shaping activities are the preparation and initial start-up of the COIN. It must be done continuously and persistently throughout all phages with the intent to build up the legitimacy of the indigenous government, develop indigenous force capabilities, shape the perceptions of the populace, mitigate risk, and improve information collection. The shaping activities is the step of determining the mission, task, and action by comprehensively analyzing the root cause of conflict, the insurgent group's capabilities, the expectations of indigenous people, the indigenous government's ability, rule of law, and corruption level, the capabilities of the indigenous security force's capabilities, and the coalition's capabilities. The key target audience in shaping stage is the population, the insurgent groups, the COIN forces, and regional and international audiences. [29]

After Shaping activities are set up, Clear, Hold, and Build (CHB) concept which contain full-spectrum operation (offensive, defensive, and stability operation) can be

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[28] U.S. Joint Chief of Staff. Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 2018. VII-6
[29] U.S. Joint Chief of Staff. Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 2018. VII 6-7.

applied. In each of the three stages, the main effort is relatively different, but all activities are aimed at creating security, building a firm indigenous government, and acquiring the populace's support.

In the U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24.2 *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, offensive operations are defined as "combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources and population centers. They impose the commander's will on the enemy". [30] Defensive operations are defined as "combat operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operation". [31] And Stability operations are defined as "various military mission, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure, reconstruction, and humanitarian relief". [32] Especially, Stability operations consist of the five functions: Security; Humanitarian assistance; Economic stabilization and infrastructure; Rule of Law; and Governance and participation. [33]

As illustrated in Figure 1.3, during the clear stage, offensive operations are more stressed in order to clear away the insurgency's guerilla activity from the cleared area. During the hold stage, defensive operations are more involved in order to set the criteria and conditions for host-nation security forces to take a responsibility for securing the

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[30] U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 3-24.2 Draft Tactics in Counterinsurgency, 2008. 3-6.
[31] *Ibid*.
[32] *Ibid*. 3-7.
[33] U.S. Department of the Marine Corps. MCWP 3-03 Stability Operation, 2016. 2-1.

populace. And during the build stage, stability operation is more occupied in order to empower the host-nation institute to address the core grievance. [34]

Figure 1.3 Transition Example

CLEAR

Clear is a task that "requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned area". [35] The purpose is "to disrupt insurgent forces and forces a reaction by major insurgent elements in the area". [36]

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[34] U.S. Joint Chief of Staff. Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 2018. VII-11.

As above mentioned, this clear stage focuses on defeating insurgent forces and taking control of the initiative. At this stage, external intervention forces should concentrate more on offensive operations and achieve maximum performance in the area as soon as possible. In COIN, however, the initial effort is offensive operations but does not become an end state. At the same time, defensive operations (prevention re-entering the area and re-establishing organizational structure from insurgents, defense of key infrastructure, border control, and patrol around the cleared area) and initial stabilization operations (training of indigenous forces and police, support of indigenous government, and Psychological operation to deliver message to the local population and the insurgent) also required during the Clear stage.

Even though the U.S force and Coalition forces had easily defeated and overthrew the Taliban regime in initial Afghanistan war through successful military operations, they have fallen into the midst of swamp of long-term war due to insufficient preparation for defensive and stabilization operations.

HOLD

Hold is a task that "establishment of security forces in bases among the population further the continued disruption, identification, and elimination of the local insurgent leadership and infrastructure. [37] The purpose of hold activities is designed that "continuously secure the people and separate them from the insurgents; establish a firm and persistent government presence and control over the area; conduct stability tasks and provide support to the populace; recruit, organize, equip, and train local security forces;

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[35] *Ibid*. VII 7.
[36] *Ibid*. VII 7-8.
[37] *Ibid*. VII 8-9.

establish a government political apparatus to replace the insurgent apparatus; and develop a dependable network of sources by authorized intelligence agents". [38]

In hold activities, this the main effort is changed from offensive operations to defensive operations. At this time, the accurate offensive operation continues and more concrete, continuous, and extended stabilization operations should be performed than the clear activities. The successful element of this hold stage is continuously securing the populace and re-establishing an indigenous government presence at the cleared area. Without this essential element, insurgency groups will keep trying to return to the area and take back regional power. General David Petraeus stressed the notion that the security forces within the local population are required, and that "security forces can not commute to work". [39]

Based on these regional stabilizations, external forces and security forces may gain loyalty and allegiance from the local population at the same time. If they normalize the functioning of the indigenous government, rebuild key infrastructures and facilities, and eliminate the guns with disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) possessing.

BUILD

Build activities focus on stability operations and most of the activities are conducted with host nation government and security forces, non-military agencies, and scaled down external forces. The purpose is "to simultaneously restore service, provide

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[38] *Ibid*.
[39] David H. Petraeus, "The Future of the Alliance and the Mission in Afghanistan," remarks for Panel Discussion, 45th Munich Security Conference, 8 February 2009, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/02/the-future-of-the-alliance-and/> Accessed 21 April 2019.

support to infrastructure and economic development, restore essential services, restore civil control, and build security force and law enforcement capability and capability of the host nation. disrupt insurgent forces and forces a reaction by major insurgent elements in the area". [40]

Particularly at this build stage, the roles of military and non-military parts, international development agencies are more clearly distinguished and the capacity of the indigenous government is increasingly required. That is, non-military parts focus on for the rebuilding of key infrastructure and facilities, where the external military forces are responsible for the rebuilding of security forces capacity and training security forces including the police. [41]

It also indicates that the U.S. government will oversee all activities in a COIN campaign, and recommends that "civilian and military measures should be applied simultaneously to achieve success as in an integrated strategy that will delegitimize and disempower the insurgency." [42]

Based on Figure 1.3, the success of the build stage requires that the sufficient capacity of the indigenous government increase dramatically over time, and external forces and insurgent forces must decline sharply. However, the most important point at this build stage is addressing the fundamental problem of conflict and getting a positive evaluation from the host nation people supporting the indigenous government and external forces.

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[40] U.S. Joint Chief of Staff. Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 2018. VII-9.
[41] *Ibid.*
[42] U.S. Department of State, Counterinsurgency for U.S. Government Policy Makers: A Work in Progress. October 2007. 13. < https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=481516 > Accessed 21 April 2019.

TRANSITION

Transition is an ongoing process comprised of multiple transitions at different times through all of the stages over an indeterminate of time. That is, the transition is not considered a one-time event. As seen in Figure 1.3, each transition between stages should be considered to be strict criteria and conditions compared the insurgent capabilities and the indigenous government capabilities.

For the successful transition, the U.S. doctrine mentioned that "it is advisable to establish an area coordination center (ACC) which controls, manages, and coordinates all transition operations. Members of the ACC should include representatives of all multinational forces and HN agencies (military, police, intelligence, political, and civil administration) operating at the regional and local level." [43]

However, the most important point in the transition stage is not the success of military operations, but the normalization of the functions of the indigenous government and efforts to gain the full trust and support from the HN people by cooperating between the military and non-military.

According to Charles Wolf, in order for development to be efficient in interrupting an insurgency, "it must be accompanied by efforts to extract something in return for whatever benefits and improvements are provided". [44] For example, cooperating with the government and usurping the insurgency of their support is inevitable to gain the population's mind and trust.

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[43] U.S. Joint Chief of Staff. Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 2018. VII-10.

[44] Charles Wolf quoted in Long, On 'Other War', 25 (emphasis in original). See also Shafer 'The Unlearned Lessons of Counterinsurgency', 72.

COIN LESSONS APPLIED TO THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Based on the lessons learned from the Afghan war and the application of the U.S. doctrine, the implications for the Korean peninsula can be summarized as follows.

First, from the view of external actors, it is necessary to objectively derive the number of troops of the ROK-US Combined Forces in order to operate the COIN. In addition, the concrete information (the root cause of conflict, the insurgent group's capabilities, the expectations of indigenous people, the indigenous government's ability, rule of law, and corruption level, the capabilities of the indigenous security force's capabilities, and the coalition's capabilities) needed for the Shape stage needs to be continuously updated and verified through concrete action plans and joint training. That is because most of the ROK-US training is focused on deterrence, defense, and offensive plan, the stabilization plan is required to develop the detailed plan and verify the execution through the combined exercise.

Also, in the clear phase, rapid and strong border controls are needed to effectively to block the inflow of activity fund and military support, the control of information, and providing the availability of sanctuary. Without strong border control, the COIN operation will be prolonged. In addition, it is necessary to consider the tendency and culture of North Korean people and provide them that the ROK-US alliance forces are always ready to help at any time.

Second, from the perspectives of the indigenous government, that is, the alternative North Korean government which established against the Kim Jong-Eun regime, it is necessary to support the rapid development of the alternative North Korea

security forces for maintaining security in the North Korean region. As seen in the case of Afghanistan, the delayed development of local military and police forces can be a factor in increasing insurgent activity.

The indigenous governments should early disarm the previous North Korean army and apply compensation schemes like 'carrot and stick' to weaken the organizational activities of remaining North Korean forces and insurgent forces.

Third, from the perspectives of the insurgent groups, the ROK-US combined forces must block from the support of international terrorist and Kim Jong-Eun holding up countries by complete superiority of sea, air and control the border. They will work with international terrorist groups to seek funding, weapons, and troops by trafficking chemical weapons and WMD exports. Also, it is necessary to abolish the morale and command control of the insurgent groups through the rapid elimination of unfriendly and hostile insurgent leaders.

Last, the most critical efforts should be made to secure support for North Koreans at the center of these actor's activities. It is core to apply the strict and apparent transition conditions between Clear, Hold, and Build stage and to gain the full trust and belief from North Korean people through comprehensive cooperation between the military and non-military.

CONCLUSION

The effect of COIN in Afghanistan was manifested by the interaction of the U.S. and its coalition, the indigenous government, and the Taliban group. Each of the actors who had performed the insurgency or the counter-insurgency by military power

eventually realized the key factor to victory the Afghanistan war is to captivate the heart in mind from the people.

However, support from the Afghanistan people was still low and poor because the U.S. and coalition did not take into consideration the culture, religion, custom, history of the Afghanistan people. The ineffective indigenous government and the unstable security situation also made low rate support from the people. In particular, the adequate benefit and humanitarian assistance from the development from the external forces and the ingenious government could not deliver enough to them because the people were largely inhabited in rural areas. [45]

The lessons learned from in the Afghanistan war and the new COIN doctrine from the U.S. throw out many implications for the Republic of Korean Armed Forces. Above all, hardware aspects such as making COIN planning and verifying from ROK-US combined military exercises are important, but software aspects such as training indigenous security forces, monitoring indigenous government corruption, supporting the development of cleared areas, and blocking external support for insurgent groups are also important.

In conclusion, the application of the concept of COIN on the Korean peninsula, which was undergoing the three inter-Korean summits and the North Korea-U.S. summit in Singapore and Vietnam may be inappropriate at the current time. [46]

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[45] Connable, Ben & Libicki, Matin. "How Insurgencies End." RAND National Defense Research, (Santa Monica, CA, 2010), 171.

[46] Republic of Korea. Cheong Wa Dae. "Peace, A New Future." Korean Culture and Information Service, 2018. 5-21.

However, in long term perspective, the ROKAF can prepare for the various possibility of war and take into consideration for deploying the multi-national forces to the disputed area. Since the various elements of politics, economy, diplomacy, military, and non-military are intricately intertwined and solutions are not easy to find through the complex and uncertain operational environment, research activities and studies on COIN should be continuous on a regular basis.

U.S. General Norman Schwarzkopf who was command Operation Desert Storm stressed: "*The more you sweat in peace, the less you bleed in war.*" [47]

After all, the ROKAF should open up all possibilities and prepare for various wars in order to be sure of winning any type of war.

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[47] Kruse, Kevin, "Norman Schwarzkopf: 10 Quotes on Leadership and War." 27 December 2012. < https://www.forbes.com/sites/kevinkruse/2012/12/27/norman-schwarzkopf-quotes/#56ed8a8f4eeb > Accessed 29 April 2019.

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