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## ACTIONS SPEAK LOUDER THAN WORDS (OR POLICIES)

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### JCSP 45

#### Solo Flight

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SOLO FLIGHT

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## **ACTIONS SPEAK LOUDER THAN WORDS (OR POLICIES)**

### **Introduction**

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been a global leader in the promotion of the principles of democracy, individual liberties and the rule of law. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has fulfilled a variety of roles ranging from humanitarian assistance (HA) to peace and stability operations - despite these not directly supporting the collective defence of any member.<sup>1</sup> NATO was at the heart of Canadian foreign and defence policy, the source for our heritage, and a market of importance since Canada became a founding member.<sup>2</sup> International goals, affiliations, threats and pressures have evolved and with these transformations, Canada needs to assess whether the current NATO construct is still relevant and appropriate to compliment current and future Canadian defence and foreign policy as well as meeting the goals of Canadian society. This paper will argue that Canada's policy, missions and preferences are not currently aligned with nor do they fully support the existing NATO construct. Substantiation will include the history and current roles NATO fulfills; these will be compared to Canada's contributions to NATO and cross-referenced with Canadian defence spending, policy and procurement practices with the goal of demonstrating that Canada's international goals and objectives remain broadly unfulfilled within the NATO context.

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<sup>1</sup> Lute, Douglas, and Nicholas Burns. NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, February 2019. 5.

<sup>2</sup> Granatstein, J. L. Is NATO still necessary for Canada?. Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute. March 2013. 2.

## Background

Founded in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been an important contributor to security, stability and peace in Europe and North America and has shielded these and others from conventional and nuclear attack.<sup>3</sup> Arguably, the cornerstone of NATO is found within article 5 of the Treaty which states that, “an armed attack against one or more... shall be considered an attack against them all” and that following such an attack, each Ally would take “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force” in response.<sup>4</sup> History has demonstrated that this umbrella of mass-retaliation enabled European states much needed confidence in their security and facilitated negotiations, trade, trust and cooperation – and accelerated the rebuilding of their economy.<sup>5</sup> Canada was a founding member, but refused to join an exclusively military organization, as this was not in line with Canadian values and insisted that Article 2 of the Treaty be added (The Canada Clause).<sup>6</sup> Article 2 encouraged peaceful international relations and stability by means of promoting the ideals of a liberal democracy through nation building, understanding, and the elimination of conflict through international economic and political collaboration.<sup>7</sup> NATO successfully shielded Europe from the threat of nuclear war however, since that time, NATO’s tool kit hasn’t perfectly aligned with its missions, particularly reference conflicts outside of Europe.<sup>8</sup> NATO, while seeming to continue as before, has shifted focus and modifications to its

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<sup>3</sup> Lute, Douglas, and Nicholas Burns. NATO at Seventy. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Organisation, North Atlantic Treaty. "A short history of NATO." (2012). Last accessed 9 Apr 2020. [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static/assets/pdf/pdf\\_publications/20120412\\_ShortHistory\\_en.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120412_ShortHistory_en.pdf) . 1.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. 1-4

<sup>6</sup> Chapin, Paul H., and John Anderson. "Security in an Uncertain World: a Canadian Perspective on NATO's New Strategic Concept." Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 2010. 18.

<sup>7</sup> NATO Treaty, 4 April 1949.

<sup>8</sup> Chapin, Paul H., and John Anderson. "Security in an Uncertain World: a Canadian Perspective on NATO's New Strategic Concept." 12.

strategic concept are necessary.<sup>9</sup> It is obvious that Europe is currently able to defend itself and that NATO was an important instrument for Canada, but questions linger if it still serves our interests.<sup>10</sup> Successful operations in the modern battlespace include security as well as assisting in reconstruction – a task which is beyond NATO.<sup>11</sup>

### **Canada's Roles and Contribution**

NATO has been a cornerstone of Canadian foreign and defence policy and was pivotal to Canada's global security contributions, but this has changed.<sup>12</sup> Canada has performed a multitude of roles including peacekeeping operations (PKO), counter-piracy and terrorism operations, as well as HA operations, and has also assisted with democratic reforms.<sup>13</sup> None of these operations were notable successes.<sup>14</sup> A simple explanation is a lack of commitment and resources on the part of NATO nations – Canada included. NATO requires the contributions of personnel and equipment by participating nations to achieve results. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are responsible and accountable for their effectiveness, which is hindered by dated equipment, shrinking size, and reduced budget.<sup>15</sup> It has also become clear that CAF troops in theatre are at a much higher risk of injury and death than those of our allies because of this lack of equipment.<sup>16</sup> This begs the question of Canada's commitment to the continued fulfillment of these ongoing

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid. 12.

<sup>10</sup> Granatstein, J. L. Is NATO still necessary for Canada?. 3

<sup>11</sup> Organisation, North Atlantic Treaty. "A short history of NATO. 7.

<sup>12</sup> Granatstein, J. L. Is NATO still necessary for Canada?. 2.

<sup>13</sup> Warren, P. T. (2010). *Alliance History and the Future NATO: What the Last 500 Years of Alliance Behavior Tells Us about NATO's Path Forward*. Foreign Policy at Brookings, 21st Century Defense Initiative. 19-20.

<sup>14</sup> Granatstein, J. L. Is NATO still necessary for Canada?. 1.

<sup>15</sup> Allen, Taylor. "The Canadian Populace on the Canadian Forces & NATO." *NATO Association of Canada*. Last accessed 9 Apr 2020. <http://natoassociation.ca/the-canadian-populace-on-the-canadian-forces-nato/>

<sup>16</sup> Sloan, E. C. *Canada and NATO: A Military Assessment*. Canadian International Council. Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute. May 2012. 8.

missions when it appears that equipping troops adequately is problematic. It could be reasoned that Canada's involvement in NATO is akin to that of the *non-swimmers* - countries that are NATO allies but are unwilling or unable to make significant contributions but are still important because of the intangible and critical component of *legitimacy*.<sup>17</sup> Fortunately, our first and most important relationship is the bilateral one with the United States.<sup>18</sup> This has been reinforced by Canada's combat experience that operations are, overall, much better when the operation is "founded on a strongly engaged US core."<sup>19</sup> Taking this into consideration, logic dictates that this bilateral relationship is more beneficial to Canada than NATO and that perhaps priorities should be realigned. Afterall, NATO was founded on mutually beneficial security and interests and as such, it would be reasonable to expect new alliances with greater shared interests to evolve and take its place.<sup>20</sup>

### **NATO Now and Future**

Global conflict has changed over the past 70 years and the security problems that confront NATO members today take many forms and are no longer confined to the Euro-Atlantic region.<sup>21</sup> The Alliance's original creation was to deter Russian expansionism, prevent nationalist militarism in Europe, and encourage European political integration.<sup>22</sup> Fast-forward to present day – NATO is attempting to adapt quickly to a rapidly changing global technological battlespace which challenges both its original purpose and unity.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid. 11.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. 11.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. 10

<sup>20</sup> Warren, P. T. (2010). *Alliance History and the Future NATO*. 26.

<sup>21</sup> Chapin, Paul H., and John Anderson. "Security in an Uncertain World." 24.

<sup>22</sup> Organisation, North Atlantic Treaty. "A short history of NATO. 1.

<sup>23</sup> Lute, Douglas, and Nicholas Burns. NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, February 2019. 1.

Internal friction has worn on the Alliance - caused by two major categories: too many threats and not enough resources.<sup>24</sup> This is accentuated by an archaic planning process which is being surpassed by current technological advances in military arms – which precipitates Canada and the Allies to commit a far greater share of their military budgets to acquiring these new military technologies.<sup>25</sup> NATO has endured because its members were prepared to defend shared common interests and values.<sup>26</sup> Given the realities of the novel security environment, NATO must re-evaluate its mandate and amend its policies, organization, and increase capabilities to remain current.<sup>27</sup> The modern Alliance does not perceive threats the same way, nor does its membership seem to want to sacrifice pursuing national interests at the cost of the security of others.<sup>28</sup> These divisive behaviors and the application of archaic state-on-state defence plans to counter unconventional and asymmetric risks of the modern battlespace do not bode well for NATO or Canadian relevance.<sup>29</sup> NATO finds itself disassociated from its original purpose and is entrenched in contentious and costly operations that prevent it from appropriately posturing for the current security environment.<sup>30</sup>

### **(Re) Enter Russia**

Since the Cold War ended, Russia did not disappear. Their geopolitical protectionism and safeguarding of Russian culture have had a resurgence in recent years – adding to the list of issues for NATO and Canada to contend with. NATO over-

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<sup>24</sup> Warren, P. T. (2010). *Alliance History and the Future NATO*. 7.

<sup>25</sup> Lute, Douglas, and Nicholas Burns. NATO at Seventy. 8.

<sup>26</sup> Chapin, Paul H., and John Anderson. "Security in an Uncertain World." Ex.

<sup>27</sup> Warren, P. T. (2010). *Alliance History and the Future NATO*. 6.

<sup>28</sup> Chapin, Paul H., and John Anderson. "Security in an Uncertain World." Ex.

<sup>29</sup> Warren, P. T. (2010). *Alliance History and the Future NATO*. 6.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. 8.

reached, woke the Bear, upset Russia's geopolitical stability and assisted in shaping the Russian narrative through an expansion into Georgia and the Ukraine.<sup>31</sup> Russia made it clear that this was a threat to its core strategic interests would not be tolerated and further, that admitting those two countries to NATO would represent a direct threat to Russia.<sup>32</sup> Russia's actions in Ukraine may be viewed as a response to these fears, but it is also consistent with protection of the Russian identity and security.<sup>33</sup> NATO's growth sent an important signal to Russian leaders, despite NATO's reassurances - hostilities remained.<sup>34</sup> This expansion of an already heavy Alliance did not serve Canada's interests, support the goals of the Treaty or align with Canadian Foreign policy. Russia responded by incurring into Ukraine and NATO did nothing to stop them. Russia justified their actions citing an immediate threat to Russian security employing Article 51 of the UN Charter (similar to the events leading up to the Iraq War in 2003).<sup>35</sup> The point being - that the Russian question has not gone away for NATO and when it really counted, NATO was soft and did little to fulfill its foundational mandate.

### **Canada's Defence Spending**

With the requirement for modernizing equipment, increasing operational tempo, and the resurgence of Russia, NATO is questioning its capacity and capabilities in the modern battlespace. Add to this the reluctance of member nations to meet the agreed upon two percent of GDP spending and this only further aggravates the situation. For its part, Canada is currently spending 1.3% of its GDP towards defence - despite having

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<sup>31</sup> Roberts, Kari. "Understanding Putin: The politics of identity and geopolitics in Russian foreign policy discourse." *International Journal* 72, no. 1 (2017). 30.

<sup>32</sup> Mearsheimer, J. "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault." *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 5 (2014). 2.

<sup>33</sup> Roberts, Kari. "Understanding Putin." 30.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.* 41.

<sup>35</sup> Roberts, Kari. "Understanding Putin." 52.



previously promised to meet the two percent guideline by 2014.<sup>36</sup> This was never attained nor has there has not been any effort to achieve it - despite Strong Secure and Engaged (SSE).<sup>37</sup> Canadians have an aversion to the prospect of armed conflict, believe ourselves to be a non-military country, and are fairly thrifty - particularly when it comes to security and defence spending.<sup>38</sup> The question becomes – if we are not spending to equip ourselves to defend our own coasts, then how much effort should be put into defending Europe?<sup>39</sup> There may be a few explanations for this, all plausible. Canada accounts for spending differently than other nations and believes that including the cost of some veterans' programs, deploying police on PKO, coast guard operations and even computer support falls within the scope of defence spending.<sup>40</sup> This was accepted by NATO however, it does not necessarily contribute directly to ongoing NATO operations nor fill the capability gap. Another explanation is that SSE is increasing defence spending and that Canada is on track to meet the two per cent guideline. Current forecasts project the Canadian economy will grow to a GDP of \$2.7 trillion by 2024-25 and this would require spending \$54 billion to achieve the two percent target – unfortunately, the current plan forecasts defence spending of only \$32 billion by 2027, far short of the target.<sup>41</sup> Last, Canada invests significantly outside the traditional NATO construct and taking into consideration the level of aid, policing, training, and restoration operations (such as development assistance and loans) - the distribution of commitments looks quite

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<sup>36</sup> Bercuson, David J. "Here's what Canada is actually spending - and should be spending - on defence." *Financial Post*. Last accessed 09 Apr 2020. <https://business.financialpost.com/opinion/heres-what-canada-is-actually-spending-and-should-be-spending-on-defence>

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Chapin, Paul H., and John Anderson. "Security in an Uncertain World." 12.

<sup>39</sup> Perry, David. *Following the Funding in Strong, Secure, Engaged*. Canadian Global Affairs Institute, January 2018. 13

<sup>40</sup> Berthiaume, Lee. "Canada set to not spend more on defence, despite U.S. pressure." *Global News*. Last accessed 09 Apr 2020. <https://globalnews.ca/news/6236653/canada-nato-defence-spending/>

<sup>41</sup> Bercuson, David J. "Here's what Canada is actually spending - and should be spending - on defence."

different.<sup>42</sup> In short, smaller NATO member states such as Canada outperform NATO giants.<sup>43</sup> This behavior is line with article 2 of the Treaty, insisted upon by Canada, and supports Canadian foreign policy. Taken together, these points indicate that the current NATO paradigm does not necessarily align with Canadian priorities. Canadians are not in favor of war; we prefer to nation-build and Canada's spending is more concentrated outside of NATO in support of its Foreign policy. Actions speak volumes - and Canada's indicate participation in the Alliance no longer aligns with practised policy.

### **Policy and Procurement Issues**

Enter SSE, "The most rigorously costed Canadian defence policy ever developed."<sup>44</sup> It was advertised as being able to meet Canada's defence needs at home and abroad, and touted significant growth of the defence budget.<sup>45</sup> The long-term funding commitment was to provide the CAF with all the tools, personnel and equipment to fulfill missions across the full spectrum of military operations.<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, it pledged to promote Canada's global engagement to support a more stable, peaceful world (presumably including NATO).<sup>47</sup> This aligns with Minister Freeland's speech where she stated that Canada's policies must serve the interests of all Canadians and uphold our broadly held national values, and contribute to our collective goal of a better, safer, more just, more prosperous, and sustainable world.<sup>48</sup> This also ties directly to the *Canada*

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<sup>42</sup> Zyla, Benjamin. "NATO and Post-Cold War Burden-Sharing: Canada "the Laggard?". *International Journal* 64, no. 2 (2009). 39

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.* 356.

<sup>44</sup> Sajjan, H. (2017). *Strong, Secure and Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces. 11

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.* 11.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.* 11.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.* 14.

<sup>48</sup> Canada. Global Affairs Canada. "Address by Minister Freeland on Canada's foreign policy priorities."

*Clause.* The point being that Canadian values and policy do not support war – we support nation-building. SSE is a policy that increases the capacity for the CAF to spend on required equipment however, it does nothing to enable that spending to take place. Due to bureaucracy, procurement bottle-necks, bad political choices, and even worse procurement policy decisions - these leave Canada a less capable partner or a liability to NATO.<sup>49</sup> Over the first few years of SSE, DND was barely able to deliver half of the intended spending on equipment and infrastructure.<sup>50</sup> This indicates that although the funds have been allocated, not being able to spend the capital does not benefit DND and the CAF, nor does it support NATO. The future looks no better and due to COVID 19 and the history of defence budget cuts and funds re-allocations, it is unlikely that SSE will survive a federal deficit reduction, affecting procurement.<sup>51</sup> Defence Procurement is its own conundrum - plagued with independent factors which have a significant influence on the process because these variables taken together, have an interdependent, cumulative effect which is outside the control of any one agency.<sup>52</sup> One needs not look further than the Future Fighter Capability Project (FFCP) for an example. Campaign promises which led to policies and directives which did not address any requirement or fill a capability gap, further increased costs, led to a diminished defence capacity, and earned a scathing report by the Auditor General which pointed out that it was not necessary to acquire used aircraft that do not even address the capabilities required for Canada.<sup>53</sup> The FFCP fiasco's most damning point: it has transformed Canada's image as a trustworthy ally into an

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<sup>49</sup> Schaub Jr, Gary John, and Richard Shimooka. "Super Hornets, Eh? Canadian Airpower Falls Short On North American Defense." (2017).

<sup>50</sup> Perry, David. *Following the Funding in Strong, Secure, Engaged*. 1.

<sup>51</sup> Perry, David. *Following the Funding in Strong, Secure, Engaged*. 9.

<sup>52</sup> (Stone, Implementing Procurement Strategy, 3,6,7).

<sup>53</sup> Shimooka, R. *The Catastrophe: Assessing the Damage from Canada's Fighter Replacement Fiasco*. Macdonald-Laurier Institute Publication. May 2019. 1-9.

increasingly weak and suspect contributor to international peace and security to our most valued Ally.<sup>54</sup> Canada requires an alteration in defence procurement which entails a combination of increases in capacity and competency at both the defence and government levels and major changes to established capital projects procedures and processes.<sup>55</sup> Taken together, the lack or inability to spend capital, the broken procurement process and the lack of appropriate policy follow-up and delivery indicate Canada may want to support NATO on the surface however, current policies and practices render it unable to do so.

### **Counter-Argument and Shifting Society**

Despite the issues cited above, there exists a split opinion on Canada's continuing participation in security efforts – that is, Canadians really do not put much thought into NATO.<sup>56</sup> It would appear that Canada's continued membership in NATO is not in question, as 82 percent of Canadians favoured remaining in NATO.<sup>57</sup> This needs to be taken with a grain of salt since today, global interactions have vastly complicated the business of understanding events and trends, anticipating problems, and required reactions.<sup>58</sup> This is reinforced by the conflicts created by the post-Cold War power vacuum which have become an expanding source of instability. Within this context, NATO still holds value for Canada through the application of soft-power, diplomacy, reconstruction and development.<sup>59</sup> NATO has offered a partnership to non-NATO

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid. 14.

<sup>55</sup> Perry, David. *Following the Funding in Strong, Secure, Engaged*. 14.

<sup>56</sup> Moens, A. *Don't Overburden or Undervalue NATO*. Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute. December 2009. 1.

<sup>57</sup> Chapin, Paul H., and John Anderson. "Security in an Uncertain World." 21.

<sup>58</sup> Chapin, Paul H., and John Anderson. "Security in an Uncertain World." 24.

<sup>59</sup> Moen. 1

countries to cooperate with the Alliance and enabled reform while assisting evolving democratic and military institutions.<sup>60</sup> Canada's relative geographic isolation does offer some protection however, forward-based defence is still necessary and action must be taken to protect democratic values, global trade interests, and to support HA efforts in line with our liberal-democratic values despite the distance from Canada's shores.<sup>61</sup> It can be argued that NATO's two core values are still being upheld – first, that is keeping Russia at bay, even going so far as to seek rapprochement to address common threats and cooperate on specific issues.<sup>62</sup> Second - upholding the rule of law, individual freedoms, freedom of religion, and respect for human rights thus supporting the development of greater stability for the Alliance, its partners and the international community.<sup>63</sup> Despite this, the evolving nature of the future security environment is challenging efforts to reach consensus on what constitutes a threat among its membership.<sup>64</sup> Even among Canadians what constitutes a threat is divisive - a wide margin believe that the US's proximity to Canada is second only to terrorism.<sup>65</sup> Add to this that most Canadians are unaware of our defence policy or increases to spending, and are less supportive of combat operations and have high approval for PKOs - despite these activities taking place in insecure environments where fighting is likely.<sup>66</sup> Perhaps this is due to the evolving perception that PKOs entail providing a baseline of security but also assist in nation building.<sup>67</sup> The

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<sup>60</sup> Organisation, North Atlantic Treaty. "A short history of NATO. 5.

<sup>61</sup> Moens, A. *Don't Overburden or Undervalue NATO*. 1

<sup>62</sup> Bagratuni, Mikayel. "Russia and the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept: New Era of Partnership or Wishful Thinking?." Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute. April 2011. 4.

<sup>63</sup> Warren, P. T. (2010). *Alliance History and the Future NATO*. 19-20.

<sup>64</sup> Chapin, Paul H., and John Anderson. "Security in an Uncertain World." 27.

<sup>65</sup> Paris, Roland. "The US as a threat. Love for NATO. This is how Canadians feel about security issues." *Open Canada*. Last Accessed 09 Apr 2020. <https://www.opencanada.org/features/us-threat-love-nato-how-canadians-feel-about-security-issues/>

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Organisation, North Atlantic Treaty. "A short history of NATO. 7.

reality that Europe can defend itself with its own resources is well-founded and Canadians' view that NATO should take on more PKO and rebuilding/aid roles is resultant. An explanation for this perception lies perhaps in the demographics of Canada and the fact that relatively few immigrants now come to Canada from Europe.<sup>68</sup> The majority of new immigrants to Canada were admitted under the economic category, one quarter were admitted under the family-class to join family already in the country, and roughly twelve percent were admitted to Canada as refugees.<sup>69</sup> Asia (including the Middle East) and Africa both rank ahead of Europe as the top sources of recent immigrants.<sup>70</sup> When considering this demographic – the future may indicate that membership in an organization to protect Europe may leave to be desired by Canadian society. The take-away is that NATO still has utility for Canada however, the priority appears to be within the realms of HA economic assistance and rebuilding – in line with article 1 of the Treaty, “to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means.” - a role NATO performed well.<sup>71</sup>

### **Analysis and Wicked Problems**

Canada's role and future within NATO is a wicked problem. Effective solutions will invariably require stakeholders (including both Canadians and the Alliance) to change their mindsets and behaviour to remain relevant.<sup>72</sup> Past NATO strategies have involved analytic approaches to solutions, were highly formalized, structured, linear and

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<sup>68</sup> Granatstein, J. L. Is NATO still necessary for Canada?. 2.

<sup>69</sup> Statistics Canada. “Immigration and ethnocultural diversity: Key results from the 2016 Census.” Last accessed 09 Apr 2020. <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/171025/dq171025b-eng.htm?indid=14428-1&indgeo=0>

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> Warren, P. T. (2010). *Alliance History and the Future NATO*. 19.

<sup>72</sup> Bateman, Sam. "Solving the 'Wicked Problems' of Maritime Security: Are Regional Forums up to the Task?" *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International & Strategic Affairs* 33, no. 1 (2011). 2.

systematically analyzed information to arrive at a conclusion.<sup>73</sup> This archaic synthesis and the results are ill-suited to the modern battlespace, which is dynamic and ever-evolving. A more naturalistic approach to decision-making is required in which systems-based thinking is employed to examine a variety of interactions and repercussions of actions – enabling thorough analysis rather than taking specific events and analysing them in isolation.<sup>74</sup> This lends to the wicked problem, as solutions require a shared understanding of what the problem is, in addition to how it can be resolved.<sup>75</sup>

Consolidating the points above it becomes evident that there are a variety of inputs to consider when examining Canada and NATO. First, NATO is having difficulty gaining support from its membership in the forms of both capital and equipment/troop investment and has difficulty fulfilling reconstruction roles. NATO was founded on mutually beneficial security interests, yet these interests have evolved, and Europe is obviously able to stand on its own two feet. NATO has had few, if any, resounding successes in operations and was unable to contain Russia (its founding role) in the defence of the Ukraine. From a Canadian perspective, we generally shy away from conflicts however, NATO does provide value for Canada through the application of soft-power, diplomacy, reconstruction, and development. In addition, Canada's procurement system, policies and capital spending do not enable it to respond effectively in a dynamic environment. Lastly, although on the surface NATO still serves some utility for Canada internationally, societal demographics indicate that this too will shift. With these competing issues,

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<sup>73</sup> Lauder, Matthew. "Systemic Operational Design: Freeing Operational Planning from the Shackles of Linearity." *Canadian Military Journal* 9, no. 4 (2009). 42.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid. 44.

<sup>75</sup> Morrison, Val. "Wicked Problems and Public Policy." *National Collaborating Centre for Healthy Public Policy*. June 2013. 3.

variables, perceptions, and motivations of those involved (including Canadian society), the uncertain desired end-states have spawned a real wicked problem.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid.3.



## CONCLUSION

Canada's actions and inaction have indicated that foreign policy, choice of missions, and priorities are not currently aligned with nor do they fully support the existing NATO construct. Our bilateral relationship with the US has historically proven more beneficial and was founded on mutually beneficial security and interests (as was NATO at the time). Evolution is a logical expectation and it would be reasonable to expect new alliances or existing alliances to grow and change. As indicated by Canada's policies and actions - it is evident that NATO is not the best fit for Canada's efforts in the modern battlespace. Canada may have desire to remain within NATO, but due to ideological differences, preferences and behaviors of member-states, policy/spending and procurement issues within Canada, and shifts in values and priorities – perhaps Canada has outgrown NATO in some respects and fallen behind in others. Regardless, NATO has served Canada well and has been a focus for over 70 years, but Canada's international goals and objectives remain broadly unfulfilled within the NATO context and short of some broad-ranging changes, Canada's place in NATO is in peril.

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