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DIFFERENT YET SIMILAR: COMPARING CANADA'S WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH ABROAD AND AT HOME

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

3D	Defence, Diplomacy and Development
ASWG	Arctic Security Working Group
CAF	Canadian Armed Forces
CBSA	Canadian Border Services Agency
CCG	Canadian Coast Guard
CFC	Canadian Forces College
CFDS	Canada First Defence Strategy
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CSC	Correctional Service Canada
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DFATD	Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development
DFO	Fisheries and Oceans Canada
DIAND	Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development
DND	Department of National Defence
GAC	Global Affairs Canada
GC	Government of Canada
GPSF	Global Peace and Security Fund
IPS	International Policy Statement
JRCC	Joint Rescue Co-Coordination Centre
JTFN	Joint Task Force North
KPRT	Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team
MSOC	Marine Security Operations Centre
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NSP	National Security Program
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OGD	Other Government Department
PCO	Privy Council Office
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RCN	Royal Canadian Navy
RoCK	Representative of Canada in Kandahar
SAR	Search and Rescue
START	Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force
TBSC	Treasury Board Services of Canada
TFK	Task Force Kandahar
WoG	Whole-of-Government
WGA	Whole-of-Government Approach

ABSTRACT

Developed in the early 2000s, Canada's Whole-of-Government concept was applied for the first time in Afghanistan and has since engrained itself in many of the Canadian government's engagements abroad and at home. While some policy emphasizing the importance of the Whole-of-Government approach was produced, there is a lack of government documentation describing what the concept specifically entails. In response, this paper conducts a detailed study of Canada's application of the Whole-of-Government approach in Afghanistan and the Arctic.

In comparing both cases, this study demonstrates that while important differences exist, enough commonalities are present to justify the applicability of lessons learned from either case to the broader concept. Accordingly, this paper establishes that the successful implementation of the Whole-of-Government approach is contingent on fostering early engagement between partners and ensuring that their cooperation is mutually beneficial. Additionally, this paper demonstrates that numerous barriers, including conflicting organizational cultures and incompatible mandates, inhibit effective interdepartmental cooperation and collaboration. This study concludes that while not necessarily cost prohibitive, the successful application of the Whole-of-Government concept across all departments is difficult to achieve. Accordingly, there is merit in adopting a more compartmentalized approach based on departmental expertise and mandates.

DIFFERENT YET SIMILAR: COMPARING CANADA'S WHOLE- OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH ABROAD AND AT HOME

In his address at the Conference of Defence Associations Institute Graduate Student Symposium in October 2003, the political strategist, academic, and former senator Hugh Segal advocated that Canada develop a " 'grand strategy for a small country' that integrates military, diplomatic, and foreign aid instruments in a thrust that preserves security and opportunity at home, advances leverage with our allies, and responds in an integrated way to the threats that are real from abroad." Segal's call for an integrated government response to challenges of foreign and domestic nature was not made in isolation, nor was it uniquely Canadian. Indeed, many nations and multilateral organizations seemed to recognize the necessity of fostering greater collaboration among government departments and agencies to address complex problems.[1] Though the nomenclature underpinning this philosophy has varied, including 3D (diplomacy, defence, and development) and Whole-of-Government (WoG) amongst others, this approach aimed at breaking down stovepipes among different government departments became a significant driver of the foreign engagement strategies of Western countries by the mid-2000s.[2]

Indeed, as Canada's engagement in Afghanistan was about to transition from Kabul to the Province of Kandahar, the Liberal government under Paul Martin issued an International Policy Statement (IPS) detailing how Canada would take a leading role in the world by leveraging the combined efforts of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Department of National Defence (DND), and the

[1] Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Whole-of-Government Approaches to Fragile States," OECD *Journal on Development* 8, no. 3 (2008).

[2] Wilemijn Keizer, *Review of the Existing Studies and Evaluations of Whole Of Government Integration and Operations* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, March 2009).

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).[3] Despite the change in government from Liberal to Conservative, Prime Minister Stephen Harper adopted the Liberal IPS and the 3D approach, rebranded as WoG.[4] As such, the Whole-of-Government Approach (WGA) became the underpinning element of Canada's strategy to combat the Taliban and return stability to the country until the withdrawal of troops from Kandahar and Kabul.[5]

While Canada's application of WoG efforts in Afghanistan was undoubtedly one of the first and most significant expressions of this approach, the WGA did not cease with the withdrawal of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) from that country. The concept continued to shape Canada's foreign engagements, as demonstrated by Global Affairs Canada's (GAC's) 2016 *Evaluation of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) and Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF)*.[6] Moreover, the WoG terminology began to seep into the Canadian Armed Forces vernacular for domestic operations and engagements. Today in Canada, WoG has evolved far beyond its foreign 3D and seemingly refers to interdepartmental efforts in general. However, it is unclear whether this evolution came as a result of Canada successfully articulating a "grand strategy for a small country" as Hugh Segal called for 16 years ago or if WoG simply became a catch-all term without any formal grounding in policy, procedures or practices.

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[3] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (Overview)* (Ottawa: DFAIT, 2005), Foreword.

[4] Stewart Patrick, and Kaysie Brown, *Greater than the Sum of its Parts? Addressing "Whole of Government" Approaches to Fragile States* (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007): 59.

[5] It should be noted that at the time of publishing, the Canadian Armed Forces maintained a small detachment charged with providing security to the Canadian embassy in Kandahar and its personnel. However, this detachment operates as part of Operation ADENDA, which is separate from Operation ATHENA and ATTENTION which occurred respectively in Kandahar and Kabul. For this reason, Operation ADENDA will not be considered as part of the study of Canada's WoG efforts in Afghanistan.

[6] Department of Global Affairs Canada, *Evaluation of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) and Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF)* (Ottawa: GAC, September 2016).

This issue deserves further consideration as the ambiguous delineation of the WGA between foreign and domestic contexts could lead to the misuse of lessons learned from past experiences and further complicate efforts to establish best practices on how to facilitate future interdepartmental cooperation. To help address this ambiguity, this paper will strive to answer the question: In what way does Canada's Whole-of-Government approach differ in foreign and domestic contexts?

This question is particularly relevant for three main reasons. First, WoG remains part of the vernacular employed by the CAF and GAC, amongst other departments. Whereas GAC's mandate focusses its efforts abroad, the CAF has both a foreign and domestic mandate. As such, delineating the commonalities and differences of the WGA will help the CAF better institutionalize the concept within its doctrine and processes. Second, as the following literature review will detail, countries that have adopted the WGA to address fragile, conflict-affected, and post-conflict states have struggled, and many lessons have been learned from their difficulties and failures. Nonetheless, it is yet uncertain whether these international lessons can be leveraged to enhance the effectiveness of interdepartmental cooperation in a domestic context. Third, several contemporary political challenges – including global warming, the threat of cyber actors, and the expansion of the space domain – implicate multiple governmental departments. Presumably, then, an effective response to any of them at the federal level would be optimized through a concerted interdepartmental or WoG approach. However, it has yet to be determined whether such coordination can be achieved based on existing frameworks or if the WoG concept will have to be entirely redesigned.

To address this question, this paper will focus on two case studies where interdepartmental cooperation was required to achieve the goals of the federal government. First, Canada's mission to support the Afghan government and people in the Province of Kandahar from 2006 to 2011 will be examined as a case exemplifying Canada's WGA abroad. Second, the Canadian government's commitment to expand its presence and investment in the Arctic[7] will be assessed as a domestic example of the WGA.

These cases are relevant for three reasons. First, the very nature of each case precludes any solution being derived from a single government department. Though the level of cooperation required to succeed in these endeavours can be questioned, it remains undeniable that multiple departmental mandates overlap in addressing these issues. Second, though different, the level of complexity and complication in addressing these two cases remain significant. No simple solution exists to either issue, and any plan of action would require at the very least coordination among the departments involved. Third, both cases entail a significant expanse of Canadian treasure over a long period in a land that is foreign to most Canadians. Fourth, the IPS published in 2005 by the Martin government and carried out by the Harper government covered both the Canadian mission in Kandahar and the increased focus on the Arctic. Therefore, the differences in the parameters for this study will be limited as both cases originated from the same policy cover, and occurred in a similar timeframe, under the same government and the same leadership.

[7] Though there are numerous definitions of what constitutes Canada's Arctic and Canada's North, for the purposes of this paper these terms will be used interchangeably and will refer to the Canadian territory located north of the 60th parallel.

Under these parameters, this paper will suggest that while significant differences exist between Canada's foreign and domestic Whole-of-Government approaches, based on Canada's experience in Afghanistan and the Arctic, the principal challenges and lessons learned remain relevant to both contexts. To this end, Chapter one will be focussed on defining what WoG means in a Canadian context. This will entail a detailed review of the policy framework which guides Canada's WGA in Afghanistan and the Arctic. Chapter two will detail Canada's WGA in Afghanistan. It will address the implementation of the WoG efforts in the field and will examine the relationships among the different departments involved. Chapter three will review Canada's WoG efforts in the Arctic. To facilitate the comparison between both case studies, this chapter's structure will mirror that of chapter two. Chapter four will compare the case studies and issue recommendations on how Canada could adapt its WoG framework to better serve the needs of the country abroad and at home.

METHODOLOGY

The research conducted in support of this paper principally relies on qualitative data from primary and secondary sources. The primary sources are mainly comprised of governmental policy papers, reports to parliament, independent reviews and interview transcripts contained in newspapers, journals, and multilateral organization websites. To add context to the primary data, this study also relies on secondary data mainly comprised of articles from academic journals and books focussed on the WGA. While the majority of the secondary data refers specifically to Canada's WGA, some sources addressing the WGA in a broader context were also included. It should be noted that the findings of these broader articles reflect those found in studies of the Canadian context and do not

significantly affect the outlook of this paper. Some quantitative data, derived from primary and secondary sources, will also be used to provide context to this paper, particularly in terms of the number of personnel implicated and dollars spent in Canadian WoG efforts in Afghanistan and the Arctic.

CHAPTER 1: DEFINING CANADIAN WOG

The concept of cooperation among government departments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multilateral organizations and alliances has an ever-expanding number of names. Considering the following list from analysts Sarah Jane Mehard and Kristine St-Pierre:

- 3D
- whole-of-government
- joined up
- interagency
- comprehensive approach
- integrated missions
- hybrid/joint operations
- provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs)
- clusters
- one UN[8]

While many of these concepts are similar or at least share certain commonalities, they nevertheless remain distinct. While certain concepts, such as one UN, are fairly static, others, like PRT, 3D and WoG, can vary depending on the context in which they are used. For instance, the role and composition of most of the PRTs deployed in Afghanistan would

[8] Sarah Jane Meharg and Kristine St-Pierre, "Accommodating Complexity in New Operations," in Mission Critical: Smaller Democracies' Role in Global Stability Operation, ed. C. Leuprecht, J. Troy and D. Last, (Montreal and Kingston: Queen's Policy Studies Series, McGill-Queen's University Press, The School of Policy Studies, Queen's University at Kingston, 2010), 52.

vary not only based on the region they were operating in but also based on the state that would generate them.[9]

As such, it would be difficult to conduct proper research on the Canadian WGA without defining what this concept entails. Indeed, while some policy and articles refer to Canada's efforts to achieve additional effectiveness through interdepartmental cooperation as the 3D approach, others indicate that WoG is more appropriate since Canada's contributions abroad were not limited to DFAIT, CIDA and DND, but also included Correctional Service Canada (CSC), the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).[10] This first chapter will focus on defining what WoG means in its Canadian context by examining the policy background which supports the application of the WGA in Afghanistan and the Arctic.

Canada's foreign WoG policy framework

Little evidence can be found of 3D or WoG existing as concepts in Canada prior to the 21st century. Indeed, it appears that the concept was first mentioned in official government documents in a 2002 study conducted by the Treasury Board Services of Canada (TBSC). Attempting to determine what were the obstacles to interdepartmental cooperation, the study concluded that two significant barriers were "the lack of governance structure to provide the leadership on cross-department collaboration efforts [and] the vertical nature of government accountability tools. Despite these barriers, TBCS has continued to develop its thinking on this topic and produced in various iterations a 'Whole

[9] Craig T Cobane, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Security Assistance: Comments on an Evolving Concept," *DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management* 27, no. 4 (2005): 93.

[10] Howard G. Coombs, *Canadian Whole of Government Operations: Kandahar – September 2010 to July 2011*, (Ottawa: Conference of Defense Associations Institute, December 2012), 3.

of Government Framework.' "[11] This framework was largely limited to a funding structure and fell short of what we would consider today to be WoG. Instead, the WoG concept would begin to be developed in a 2004 policy document from the Privy Council Office (PCO) entitled *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*. The policy pledged to make national security a focal point in the Martin government's upcoming international policy review. The result would be an "increasingly integrated approach to defence, diplomacy and development (the "3Ds")."[12]

Securing an Open Society added that multiple government departments, constabulary forces, and civilian experts each had a role to play in establishing peace and stability in Afghanistan. By implication, Canada's approach would have to go beyond the 3Ds.[13] The *International Policy Statement* of 2005 and the 2008 *Report of the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan* (the Manley Report) ultimately established the meaning of WoG in Canadian policy terms for the next decade.[14]

International Policy Statement

Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World provides a comprehensive review of Canada's foreign policy. The document is composed of five sub-documents, including an overview which described the government's overall foreign policy outlook, as well as four additional papers detailing the roles of DND, DFAIT (diplomacy and commerce) and CIDA. In the foreword section of

[11] Keizer, *Review of the Existing Studies . . .*, 39.

[12] Privy Council Office, *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy* (Ottawa: PCO, April 2004), 47.

[13] Ibid, 49-50.

[14] DFAIT, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (Overview)* (Ottawa: DFAIT, 2005); Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan, *Report of the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan* (Ottawa: The Panel, 2008).

the overview paper, Prime Minister Paul Martin emphasizes that while Canada values "multilateralism and [knows] the great good that international cooperation can achieve, we must ultimately be committed to playing a lead role in specific initiatives and, on occasion, to resolving to go it alone."[15] He goes on to say that to this end, Canada must adopt a 3D approach, "undertaking defence efforts to strengthen security and stability, pursuing diplomacy to enhance prospects for nation-building and reconstruction, and making certain that development contributions are brought to bear in a coordinated and effective way."[16]

The document then proclaims that Canada's three core priorities on the international stage, "prosperity, security and responsibility" are closely interrelated and mutually supportive.[17] While recognizing that multilateral collaboration is preferable to going it alone, it also acknowledges that Canada must be able to leverage non-traditional diplomatic tools like intelligence, law enforcement, financial instruments and military force in a comprehensive manner.[18] The overview concludes by stating that:

> The Government of Canada believes that an integrated "3D" approach, combining diplomacy, defence and development, is the best strategy for supporting states that suffer from a broad range of interconnected problems. In short, our official aid programs and our broader international policies must operate in tandem. This requires government departments to work more closely together—from planning through to execution—so that contributions as disparate as police force training, civil engineering and private sector development combine into one, comprehensive approach to capacity building.[19]

To enable this level of cooperation and integration of capabilities, the Government of Canada (GC) authorized the creation of the START, which would be embedded within

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[15] DFAIT, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (Overview)* (Ottawa: DFAIT, 2005), Foreword.

[16] *Ibid*.

[17] *Ibid*, 5.

[18] *Ibid*, 12.

[19] *Ibid*, 20.

DFAIT. This new entity would "ensure that there is longer-term planning for early responses to international crises and that the required government skills and expertise are at the ready," and coordinate the efforts of GC departments in assisting unstable states. It would also manage the Global Peace and Security Fund, endowed with 500 million dollars to "provide security assistance to failed and fragile states, as well as resources for post-conflict stabilization and recovery."[20]

From a defence perspective, the IPS mandated the CAF to develop the procedures and relationships necessary to facilitate interdepartmental collaboration. Though it did not allow for the creation of any new entity within the CAF which would be responsible for this level of integration, the policy did state that:

> the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces will work more closely with other government departments and agencies, including Foreign Affairs and the Canadian International Development Agency, to further develop the integrated "3D" approach (defence, diplomacy and development) to complex conflict and post-conflict situations. This will include consulting and sharing information as required with the Stability and Reconstruction Task Force being established in Foreign Affairs. [21]

While mandating the DND and CAF to share information and collaborate with START, it did not establish any hierarchy between the two. Therefore, while in theory, the START would take a lead role in planning and coordinating the contributions of the GC departments in stabilization and reconstruction engagements, the CAF would be able to maintain by and large its autonomy to operate in accordance with its own priorities. Hence, this omission left room for potential conflict in the application of the 3D or WGA as the

[20] *Ibid*, 14; Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (Diplomacy)* (Ottawa: DFAIT, 2005), 2, 11.

[21] Department of National Defence, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (Defence)* (Ottawa: DND, 2005), 26.

CAF were not mandated to coordinate their overall strategy or actions in the field with the START.

In reviewing the IPS, it became apparent that while a significant emphasis was placed on the need to foster greater interdepartmental cooperation when dealing with fragile or post-conflict states, there was a lack of detail on how this cooperation was to be achieved. Certainly, some departments were specifically identified as being the focus of the WoG approach, and the START was issued a planning and coordination mandate. However, the policy did not mandate GC departments to report information or activity to the START, nor was any entity tasked with developing the collaboration procedures and framework. Finally, while there was merit to housing the START within DFAIT, this decision created the possibility that it would be willfully circumvented by other departments to maintain their departmental independence from foreign affairs and protect the integrity of their mandate. Despite potential flaws, the IPS remained an important document in priming the drive towards greater interdepartmental collaboration in foreign engagements.

The Manley Report

Three years into Canada's mission in Kandahar, the panel headed by the Honourable John Manley released its evaluation of the progress of Canada's mission in Afghanistan. The report noted points of friction and provided recommendations on how to improve the outcome of Canada's efforts in Kandahar. Several points specifically addressed deficiencies with interdepartmental cooperation processes. The Manley Report would prove to be the single most influential document affecting how the GC articulated its WGA in Kandahar, with many of its recommendations adopted and implemented.

The Manley report's criticisms of Canada's WGA can be grouped into four major categories: a lack of an overall strategy and viable objectives, a lack of proper oversight and guidance, inadequate measures to monitor the mission's progress and a lack of CIDA and DFAIT representatives with appropriate delegations of authority. Concerning the first point, the report noted that while general direction for the mission was given based on the 2006 Afghan compact, departments were free to interpret how they could reach these aims within the context of their departmental mandate, which impeded the coordination of interdepartmental efforts.[22] This problem was compounded by a lack of oversight and guidance on the mission as START had proven to be ineffective at coordinating DFAIT and CIDA's efforts and had no influence on CAF's actions and strategy. Had proper authority to control efforts in Kandahar been vested in an adequate oversight body, the lack of adequate metrics to monitor progress would have significantly complicated any attempts at coordinating WoG efforts. Finally, the report noted that CIDA and DFAIT's presence in Kandahar was woefully inadequate in terms of numbers, the seniority of their personnel, and the authorities that had been delegated to the field level to approve initiatives or commit funds to projects.[23]

Key Policy Takeaways

In summary, though there existed a clear political will to increase the level of interdepartmental cooperation in Afghanistan, the IPS lacked the procedural framework required to enable its implementation. This meant that Canada's WGA was more

[22] Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan. . . , 18-19, 36; House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defense, *Canadian Forces in Afghanistan*, 39th Parliament, 1st Cession, June 2007: 5.

[23] *Ibid, 27-28*.

aspirational than anything as individual departments had few incentives to increase their level of collaboration and maintained their freedom to act independently according to their governmental mandates. While the Manley Report helped the GC address several issues impeding the WGA, some issues persisted in spite of the government's efforts. As the case study in Chapter 2 will go on to demonstrate the effective application of the WGA in Afghanistan was subjected to significant hurdles tied to resource allocation, inadequate delegations of authority at the field level and cultural barriers among departments.

Canada's Arctic WoG policy framework

While the policy documents reviewed above often refer to a WoG or 3D approach, these terms seldom appeared in domestic policy, with the exception of TBSC documents.[24] Indeed, the only mention of WoG concerning the Arctic within the policy reviewed in this paper can be found in DFAIT's 2010 *Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy*.[25] However, the fact that the WGA was not explicitly mentioned in domestic policy should not be construed as proof that this approach was not applied domestically or in the Arctic. Instead, as the study of four policy documents will reveal, Canada's strategy in the far-North hinged on leveraging interdepartmental cooperation.

Recognizing that the Arctic presented both foreign and domestic concerns, Canada's North remained a feature part of the 2005 IPS. While the Overview of the policy did not address the Arctic in much detail, it did recognize that Canada's security and

[24] Keizer, *Review of the Existing Studies . . .*, 39.

[25] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy. Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada's Northern Strategy Abroad (Ottawa: DFAIT Canada, 2010), 5.

sovereignty depended on a combination of military and non-military resources.[26] Meanwhile, the diplomacy volume of the policy asserts that ensuring the sovereignty and security of Canada's Arctic can only be "done in collaboration with northerners and based on sound scientific research, with a special emphasis on exploring adaptation to the impacts of climate change," thus acknowledging its WoG nexus.[27] Finally, the defence document stresses the importance of collaborating with other departments to address the new types of threats which faced Canada's North following the end of the Cold War.[28]

The role of DND and the CAF in the WGA would be further detailed in the 2008 *Canada First Defence Strategy* (CFDS). Though this policy placed a strong focus on countering threats to Canadian security, it nevertheless acknowledged the CAF's responsibility to assist other departments in fulfilling their Arctic mandates. Likewise, the document recognized that the CAF would need to rely on other departments to be successful in its mandate of protecting Canada's North.[29]

Canada's Northern Strategy

In 2009, when the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) published *Canada's Northern Strategy*, the importance of having an interdepartmental approach to the North became obvious. The strategy presented the GC's vision for the Arctic, which included prosperity, self-reliance, and self-governance for

[26] Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (Overview)* (Ottawa: DFAIT, 2005), 8.
[27] DFAIT, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (Diplomacy)*. (Ottawa: DFAIT, 2005), 8.
[28] DND, *Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (Defence)* (Ottawa: DND, 2005), 17.
[29] Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa, ON: Government of Canada, 2008), 7-8, 14.

indigenous peoples, respect of Northern traditions, sustainable development, government engagement in communities and protection of the territory. The strategy also included four mutually reinforcing priorities:

- Exercising our Arctic Sovereignty
- Promoting Social and Economic Development
- Protecting our Environmental Heritage
- Improving and Devolving Northern Governance[30]

While not specifically mentioning the WGA, the policy nevertheless emphasized that its success hinged on strong leadership both abroad and at home.[31] This underscores the three-layered approach which inspired the strategy.

First, interdepartmental cooperation would be needed at the federal level as few of the initiatives presented in the policy could be addressed by any singular department. For instance, while the Polar Epsilon project aimed to increase DND's surveillance capability over the North, it depended on collaboration with Canada's Space Agency. Similarly, Canada's scientific research undertaken as part of the International Polar Year demanded close collaboration among Industry Canada, DIAND, and Environment Canada. [32]

Second, given the difference in mandates between the federal government and Canada's territories, cross-governmental collaboration was required. For instance, the development of the commercial fisheries harbour constructed in Pangnirtung was a collaborative venture between Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) and the Government of Nunavut. Furthermore, the Federal government could take on a supporting role to enable projects of territorial purview, namely the annual provision of $2.5 billion through the

[30] Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Canada. . ., 1-2.
[31] *Ibid*.
[32] *Ibid*, 10, 24.

Territorial Formula Financing. This financing supported territorial projects in various areas such as health, education, and infrastructure, thus promoting the social and economic development of the Arctic.[33]

Third, as it was recognized that the GC's Arctic priorities affected not only Canada but all Arctic nations, the effective implementation of the strategy hinged on effective multilateral cooperation. In some instances, this would be achieved through bilateral accords, such as the memorandum of understanding signed between the DIAND and the Russian Ministry of Regional Development. In other instances, a pan-Artic approach was favoured, leveraging Canada's seat on the Arctic Council to address issues such as the welfare and development of indigenous communities with the other Arctic countries.[34]

Though the strategy did not call for the creation of a formal coordinating body or other monitoring mechanisms, it nevertheless emphasized the importance of the Arctic to Ottawa. Accordingly, while omitting the use of the WoG phrase, it created a framework which would inform the efforts of individual departments and act as a forcing function for cooperation.

Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy

In 2010, DFAIT issued a *Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy* that provided additional guidance on how Canada's Arctic priorities could be supported from a foreign affairs perspective. The statement outlined 13 areas of focus, with each area being tied to one of DIAD's priorities:

Exercising Sovereignty

[33] *Ibid*, 17-18.
[34] *Ibid*, 13, 34.

- engaging with neighbours to seek to resolve boundary issues;
- securing international recognition for the full extent of our extended continental shelf;
- addressing Arctic governance and related emerging issues, such as public safety;

Promoting Economic and Social Development
- creating the appropriate international conditions for sustainable development;
- seeking trade and investment opportunities that benefit Northerners and all Canadians;
- encouraging a greater understanding of the human dimension of the Arctic;

Protecting the Arctic Environment
- promoting an ecosystem-based management approach with Arctic neighbours and others;
- contributing to and supporting international efforts to address climate change in the Arctic;
- enhancing our efforts on other pressing environmental issues;
- strengthening Arctic science and the legacy of International Polar Year;

Improving and Devolving Governance: Empowering the Peoples of the North
- engaging Northerners on Canada's Arctic foreign policy;
- supporting Indigenous Permanent Participant organizations; and
- providing Canadian youth with opportunities to participate in the circumpolar dialogue.[35]

Given the importance of the Arctic to Canada and the rapid changes that are affecting it, DFAIT recognized the need for Canada to assume a leadership role on the international stage to ensure its interests would be met. To achieve this goal, "the full resources of the Government of Canada" needed to be brought to bear through a "whole-of-government" approach."[36]

Although the *Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy* did reflect the three-layered approach presented in *Canada's Northern Strategy*, as a foreign policy document

[35] DFAIT, *Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy. Exercising Sovereignty. . .*, 3-4.
[36] *Ibid*, 5, 23, 26.

it remained primarily focussed on Canada's relationship with other Arctic nations and multilateral organizations. For example, while the policy acknowledged that Canada was committed to "acting domestically while cooperating internationally" regarding the sustainable economic development of the Arctic, it presented DFAIT's engagement plan abroad in detail without providing any specifics on domestic initiatives.

Regardless of the document's main focus, it is clear that DFAIT recognized the importance of cooperating with other departments to achieve its aims. For instance, the National Energy Board had the lead in establishing the "Arctic safety and environmental requirements for offshore drilling" in both the domestic and international contexts. Moreover, DFAIT's efforts to promote Canadian sovereignty were complementary to those of other departments, namely the Coast Guard, the RCMP, and DND who were responsible for the surveillance and physical security of Canada's Northern border.[37]

The roles of other departments were therefore acknowledged, but the statement was less clear about how the necessary interdepartmental collaboration was to be achieved. This omission echoed a similar shortcoming in *Canada's Northern Strategy* which did not establish whether the PCO or another agency would be responsible for synchronizing the efforts among departments. Without clarity, there was a risk that Canada's Northern WGA would ultimately result in a series of uncoordinated silos of excellence. Though an argument could be made that this level of detail is beyond the scope of a national policy statement, it should be noted that the IPS called for the creation of the START to coordinate Canada's efforts in stabilizing fragile states abroad.

[37] *Ibid*, 11-12.

Ultimately, while DFAIT's *Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy* lacked detail on how its WGA would be achieved, it did affirm that its success hinged on the efforts of multiple departments. Even if the term whole-of-government only appeared in the statement once, the idea was ever-present.

Conclusions on Canada's WoG Policy

Canada's first clear articulation of a WoG policy first emerged in 2005 and addressed interventions in fragile states. Though initially, it focussed primarily on synchronizing the efforts of DFAIT, CIDA and DND, it rapidly expanded to include other governmental departments. By the time *Canada's Northern Strategy* was published in 2009, WoG came to earn its namesake, demanding cooperation across most if not all government departments. While not all policy documents contained the term WoG specifically, the need for interdepartmental cooperation was clear in the way the policy was written. As such, this study posits that Canada's policy concerning the Arctic published by the Harper government relied on the WoG framework much like the IPS.

Still, the policies were not entirely the same. First, the policy for fragile states explicitly called for a central agency to assume the role of coordinating interdepartmental efforts. Canada's Northern Strategy did not. This clear discrepancy between both sets of policy documents raises the question of whether the government assumed that interdepartmental collaboration would be easier to achieve in a domestic context. Second, both the IPS and the Manley Report explicitly required departments to synchronize their efforts and to avoid a stovepipe approach. Accordingly, Canada's WGA to fragile states can truly be considered collaborative in its conceptualization, if not in its application. Conversely, this requirement was not formally articulated in Canada's WGA in the Arctic.

Certainly, *Canada's Northern Strategy* presented multiple examples of departments coordinating their efforts to implement northern projects. Yet, considering the overall vagueness of DFAIT's *Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy* on the subject of interdepartmental collaboration, it is possible that Canada's WGA in the Arctic was designed to be less integrated than government's approach to fragile states.

Irrespective of these differences, the two sets of policies share a lack of detail on the interdepartmental mechanism and processes which would allow for information sharing and coordination. Certainly, policy cannot be overly prescriptive and must address the broad lines and goals of a governmental strategy. Nevertheless, given that no overarching Canadian policy exists on how to apply a WGA, and that, in both cases, no governmental body or agency was tasked to develop one, frictions and shortfalls were all but inevitable. While this absence of guidance might have been an oversight, it might reflect a presumption that interdepartmental collaboration is a natural function of any government which does not require formal direction.

Taking into consideration the policy background for Canada's WGA, this paper will proceed to examine how this policy was implemented, first in Afghanistan and then in the Arctic. It is expected that these case studies will add context to the policy framework and inform the comparison which will ensue.

CHAPTER 2: CANADA'S WGA IN AFGHANISTAN

Canada's policy framework supporting its WGA to foreign engagements was published shortly before Canada commenced its 2006 mission in Kandahar. As Prime Minister Paul Martin had stated in the foreword to the IPS, Canada was "committed to

playing a lead role" in combating terror and bringing assistance to vulnerable populations.[38] Accordingly, Canada would be called on to lead the effort to re-establish security in spite of the Taliban presence, assist in the establishment of a competent governance structure responsible to the central government, and deliver development assistance to the population in an effort to improve the economy and the lives of the largely poor and agrarian southern province.

While each of these lines of effort can be linked to a role traditionally held by an individual department (the 3Ds), the thinking at the time was that they could not be addressed independently from one another. Supposedly, the establishment of a secure environment was essential to allow humanitarian and development aid to flow in unimpeded while security could never be fully achieved until the needs of the population were met.[39] Simultaneously, it was also believed that good governance depended on and was crucial to the security and development of the province.[40]

As such, Canada's mission to bring stability to Kandahar not only constituted an ideal test case for the newly developed WGA but, given the length of the engagement, as well as the amount of invested resources, it also served as an excellent case study of the complexity and difficulties of articulating an effective foreign WoG strategy. To this end, this chapter will begin by examining how the mission was established from the perspective of its objectives, its structure, and its leadership. The study will then focus specifically on

[38] DFAIT, Canada's International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World (Overview) (Ottawa: DFAIT, 2005), Foreword.

[39] Taylor Owen, "3D Vision: Can Canada reconcile its defence, diplomacy, and development objectives in Afghanistan?" The Walrus, 12 July 2007.

[40] Chris Alexander (speech), "UN in Afghanistan: Interview with the Deputy Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General, Ambassador Chris Alexander," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Brussels, Belgium, 2 November 2006.

the interdepartmental dynamics, taking into account friction points which arose from departmental cultures and mandates.

The Articulation of the Canadian Mission in Kandahar

As Canada's mission in Afghanistan transitioned from Kabul to the province of Kandahar in 2006, the GC assumed the responsibility to lead the counter-insurgency to defeat the Taliban in the territory where their movement was birthed. It bears mentioning that Canada's national strategy for Kandahar was nested within a broad yet dysfunctional NATO strategy. Yet, as Gordon Smith wrote in a report for the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute "Canada 'wears' Kandahar, and the fight to turn loyalties in a NATO-positive direction must clearly be the priority."[41] To understand how Canada intended to achieve this effect, it is necessary to study the goals that influenced Canada's strategy. In light of Canada's objectives, this study will then analyze how Canada articulated its WGA of Kandahar. This assessment will not only focus on the resources committed by the different departments but also the governmental guidance and oversight which applied to interdepartmental collaboration.

Canada's Objectives

Though Canada's mission in Kandahar was focussed on bringing stability to the province and defeating the Taliban insurgency, significant difficulty was encountered in articulating a set of objectives which would enable the achievement of this goal. As a member and facilitator of the Afghanistan Compact, Canada's initial strategy in Kandahar

[41] Gordon S. Smith, "Canada in Afghanistan: Is it Working?" Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (March 2007): 24.

reflected the priorities established during the London Conference on Afghanistan.[42] While Afghan Compact established security, governance, rule of law and human rights, economic and social development, and counter-narcotics as priorities for the stabilization efforts, the objectives and benchmarks which had been identified were relatively vague, difficult to measure, or overly simplistic. For instance, the security priority demanded that coalition troops, in collaboration with Afghan forces, "promote security and stability in all regions of Afghanistan, including by strengthening Afghan capabilities," and that all "illegal armed groups will be disbanded by end-2007 in all provinces."[43] The inadequacy of the strategy articulated in the Afghanistan Compact made it difficult for countries to coordinate their efforts coherently.

As noted in an Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) paper from 2008 on "Whole-of-Government Approaches to Fragile States," success in implementing a coherent WGA is contingent on having established a unifying set of broad joint objectives stemming from an interdepartmental analysis of the problem.[44] This type of problem analysis did not occur in Canada prior to the start of the Kandahar Mission. Consequently, as researchers Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown pointed out in 2007, "Canada continue[d] to struggle in achieving cross-departmental agreement on objectives and motivations for its interventions, as well as designing and implementing country

[42] NATO, *The Afghanistan Compact*, London February 2006; Report to Parliament, Standing Committee on National Defense, *Canada's engagement in Afghanistan - fourteenth and final report to Parliament*, 2012: 6.

[43] *Ibid*.

[44] OECD, "Whole-of-Government Approaches. . ., 187.

strategies."[45] This lack of consensus over the objectives of Canada's strategy resulted in the GC departments acting in accordance with their own internal priorities.[46]

Canada's WoG approach also initially lacked metrics to track the effectiveness of the mission. Certainly, the lack of a clear national and NATO multi-year strategy was partly responsible for making the assessment of the effectiveness of the WGA difficult.[47] Nevertheless, as the Manley Report pointed out, measurable and verifiable criteria to gauge the effectiveness of Canada's WoG strategy had not been identified as part of the start of Canada's mission in Kandahar.[48]

Based on the findings and recommendations of the Manley Report, the GC revised the objectives and measures of effectiveness of its strategy for Kandahar. The new strategy would include six priorities:

> 1. Enable the Afghan National Security Forces in Kandahar to sustain a more secure environment and promote law and order.
>
> 2. Strengthen Afghan institutional capacity to deliver core services and promote economic growth, enhancing the confidence of Kandaharis in their government.
>
> 3. Provide humanitarian assistance for extremely vulnerable people, including refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons.
>
> 4. Enhance border security, with facilitation of bilateral dialogue between Afghan and Pakistani authorities.
>
> These Kandahar-centred priorities were reinforced by two priorities at the national level:
>
> 5. Help advance Afghanistan's capacity for democratic governance by contributing to effective, accountable public institutions and electoral processes.

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[45] Patrick, and Brown, *Greater than the Sum of its Parts. . .,* 57.

[46] Caroline Leprince, "The Canadian-led Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team: A success story?" *International Journal* 68, no. 2 (2013): 367.

[47] GAC, *Evaluation of the Stabilization*. . .

[48] Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan. . ., 7.

6. Facilitate Afghan-led efforts toward political reconciliation.[49]

These priorities were complemented by a set of 44 specific targets which the GC aimed to have completed by the end of the mission in 2011.[50] These targets and priorities were part of a larger package of reforms proposed by the Manley Report which helped to focus Canada's efforts in Kandahar. Nevertheless, as many of Canada's new goals could be achieved by individual departments independently, they did not provide significant incentives to further interdepartmental cooperation.

While the new priorities and objectives helped align the efforts of the GC departments in a similar direction, according to the CAF's Daniel Eustace, a major at the time, the benefits of this approach were mitigated by the difficulty in explaining how Canada's overall strategy could ultimately lead to the stabilization of Kandahar.[51] This problem was compounded by a strategic impatience surrounding Canada's mission in Kandahar motivated by political pressures at the highest levels.[52] Together, these factors incentivized departments to work independently according to their traditional spheres of competence.

Ultimately, as the counterinsurgency strategist David Kilcullen notes, fighting an insurgency demands the integration of "civil and military efforts, based on a common diagnosis of the situation and a solid, long-term commitment to the campaign."[53] Since counterinsurgency is often resolved through political compromise (and success is therefore

[49] Report to Parliament, Standing Committee on National Defense, *Canada's engagement*. . ., 4-5.
[50] *Ibid*, 6.
[51] Daniel Derek Eustace, "State building as strategy: An interrogation of NATO's comprehensive approach in Afghanistan between 2006 and 2011" (Doctorate Thesis, University College Cork, 2014): 56.
[52] House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defense. . ., 34; OECD, "Whole-of-Government Approaches. . .,186.
[53] David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla –Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 112.

typically relative), establishing proper measures of effectiveness is also a critical aspect of implementing a WoG strategy.[54] Unfortunately, while some improvements can be observed in the way the GC articulated its strategy in Kandahar, the end product remained flawed in several regards, thus limiting the effectiveness of its WGA.

Canada's Contribution

Although the objectives of Canada's mission in Kandahar were ill-defined when the CAF first entered the province, it was nevertheless understood that the GC's efforts needed to promote and support good governance, development, and security. As was the case throughout the Afghanistan experience, the coordinating organization responsible for the Canadian contribution would be the PRT.[55] Composed of around 350 personnel, the Kandahar PRT (KPRT) was vested with resources and personnel originating from CIDA, DFAIT, DND, CBSA, the RCMP, and CSC.[56] While the diverse composition of the PRT respected the spirit of the WGA, certain factors contributed to reducing the effectiveness of the interdepartmental collaboration within the organization.

The uneven representation from each department was a problem. Out of the 350 members of the PRT, only about 30 were civilians from departments other than DND.[57] The significance of this numerical discrepancy was somewhat mitigated by the fact that much of the CAF members in the KPRT were tasked with support roles, such as escorting convoys or providing medical and administrative support. Nonetheless, 85% of the KPRT

[54] Andrew Mumford, "Puncturing the Counterinsurgency Myth: Britain and Irregular Warfare in the Past, Present, and Future," *Strategic Studies Institute* (September 2011): 21.

[55] Michael J. McNerney, "Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model Or a Muddle?" *Parameters* 35, no. 4 (2005): 32-33.

[56] *Ibid*, 53-54.

[57] Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan. . ., 28

personnel involved in providing development aid were members of the CAF.[58] Following the publication of the Manley Report, the civilian component of the KPRT was bolstered by nearly 70 percent, bringing their number up to 50, and somewhat rebalancing the civilian and military commitment.[59] Still, the KPRT only represented a small portion of the troops the CAF had contributed to the mission; most resided within Task Force Kandahar (TFK). TFK included the Battle Group, a 1,200 strong organization which possessed the majority of Canada's combat power in Kandahar, and the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team, which was mandated to train the Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army. In total, Canada's troop contribution was fifty-times the number of 50 civilians from other governmental departments.[60]

Beyond imbalance in personnel, the expenditure ratio between the military and development aid was at a four to one ratio. However, balance is difficult to define, if not achieve, and is a flawed metric to measure the effectiveness of a WGA. Indeed, as noted in a 2007 report to the Standing Committee on National Defence, "[f]irst, there is no accepted definition of what military/development cost ratio would be considered 'balanced' and second, the two activities are so inherently different that any comparison is largely irrelevant."[61]

Though it was recognized that not all departments involved in the WGA approach needed to have balanced resources or equal roles, the resource and personnel offset gave the CAF a disproportionate level of influence over the direction of the mission. As a result,

[58] House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defense. . ., 80.
[59] Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan. . ., 28; Leprince, "The Canadian-led. . ., 368.
[60] House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defense. . ., 47-48.
[61] *Ibid*, 78

even though Canada's WOG strategy called for the improvement of security, governance, and development in Kandahar, as the Standing Committee concluded, "too much time and effort was being spent on engaging the Taliban in combat, rather than getting on with widespread development efforts that [were] so obviously needed."[62] As the researcher Michael McNerney notes, "[b]uilding capacity of the host nation to provide security and good governance for its citizens is the most important factor for stabilization and reconstruction. Yet, the resources seldom reflect it."[63]

Given the military's resource advantage over other departments and the fact that GC civilians in Afghanistan were not insured if harmed while deployed outside of a base, the CAF was forced to assume some roles for which it was not specifically trained.[64] Though Canadian military doctrine maintains that the armed forces can conduct simultaneous tactical activities that range across the spectrum of conflict, otherwise known as Three Block War, peacekeeping researcher Walter Dorn contends that this approach is inefficient, and that aid and good governance should remain the prerogatives of civilians specialized in those fields.[65] While towards the end of the mission, more resources were invested in development, the CAF nevertheless maintained a predominant presence on the ground. As such, military officers often took the lead in governance assistance and development aid.[66] Though it is acknowledged that the security situation throughout most of the province made it difficult for civilians to operate autonomously on the ground, the

[62] House of Commons, Standing Committee on National Defense. . ., 78.
[63] McNerney, "Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan. . ., 35.
[64] Stephen M. Saideman, *Adapting in the Dust: Lessons Learned from Canada's War in Afghanistan* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 71.
[65] A. Walter Dorn, and Michael Varey, "The Rise and Demise of the 'Three Block War,'" *Canadian Military Journal* 10, no. 1 (2009): 42.
[66] Keizer, *Review of the Existing Studies*. . ., 42; Leprince, "The Canadian-led. . ., 364.

premise underlying the WGA was that the CAF's presence should have provided the security and assistance for other departments to deliver effects throughout the province. However, as political scientist Stephen Saideman notes, the dysfunction in the civilian-military relationship often meant that civilian objectives in the field would often be secondary to military priorities.[67]

Ultimately, while the GC deployed members from several departments to Afghanistan, and activities supporting security, governance, and development did take place, Canada's WGA in Kandahar was largely skewed in favour of security and the military effort. As recognized by Sarah Chayes, a prominent American author and Kandahar entrepreneur, there was a demand for direct military action in Afghanistan to help strengthen the security environment.[68] However, the structure of Canada's mission in Kandahar appears to have privileged the security aspect too greatly at the expense of other departments and priorities.[69] Had Canada's WoG structure been more responsive to the reality in the field and had more thought been given to a framework supporting civilian deployments, then it might have been possible to balance the contribution of each department in Kandahar according to the requirements on the ground. Unfortunately, in spite of an increase in civilian personnel, military and civilian efforts were never fully integrated nor weighted in accordance with the scope of the mission.

[67] Saideman, *Adapting in the Dust*. . ., 71.
[68] Standing Committee on National Defense, *Canadian Forces in Afghanistan*. . ., 83.
[69] Smith, "Canada in Afghanistan. . .,7.

Leadership and Guidance at the Core of the WGA

While Canada's contribution in Afghanistan may have been more weighted in favour of the CAF, Patrick and Brown offer that "[w]hat is critical is not that each agency's contribution be roughly proportional but that interventions be informed by whole of government principles."[70] This thought is echoed by Kilcullen, who maintains that a successful approach to a counterinsurgency depends on "civil and military efforts under unified political direction and common command-and-control, funding and resource mechanisms."[71] Elements from GC departments deployed to Kandahar never fully managed to achieve this level of integration.

One explanation for this failure is a lack of governmental guidance on how the WGA should be articulated. As previously noted, the IPS helped highlight the importance that Canadian actions abroad should be underscored by a WGA. However, no additional governmental guidance was provided to detail how departments should coordinate their efforts or how they should share information critical to building a common definition of the problems they aimed to address. As the scholar Caroline Leprince noted, this lack of guidance left individual departments susceptible to clash over their internal priorities and their perceived mandates.[72]

Though it can be argued that the START was meant to act as a central coordinating agency for the different departments involved in Afghanistan, the positioning of the agency within DFAIT exacerbated interdepartmental tensions "as departments have tended to

[70] Patrick, and Brown, *Greater than the Sum of its Parts*. . ., 61.
[71] Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla*. . ., 106.
[72] Leprince, "The Canadian-led. . ., 364, 366.

regard the office more as a creature of DFAIT than a genuine interagency body." [73] Indeed, through START, DFAIT controlled the funding authority for projects which would originate from different governmental departments and agencies such as CIVPOL and CSC. Though projects would ultimately obtain the funds they required, bureaucratic and legal constraints created lengthy approval processes which encouraged a breakdown of established interdepartmental cooperation. [74]

This problem was further compounded by the complexity of the bureaucratic structure in Ottawa. While an associate deputy minister had been granted authority by the Prime Minister to be the lead interdepartmental coordinator for Afghanistan, some departments bypassed him by coordinating their actions on the ground through their own internal Afghanistan task forces. As noted in the Manley Report, this only served to impede interdepartmental cooperation.[75] Thus, while some structures were in place to facilitate interdepartmental cooperation, their lack of bureaucratic heft and coherence ultimately eroded their effectiveness.[76]

While Canada's WoG concept was flawed at the outset of the mission in Afghanistan, it should be noted that in response to the Manley Report, the GC did undertake reforms. Three initiatives stand out. First, Ottawa created the position of the Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK). Overseeing the activities of all Canadian agencies in Afghanistan, the RoCK was considered the civilian equivalent to the military commander of TFK. Though at the outset, departments apart from DFAIT were reluctant to integrate

[73] Patrick, and Brown, *Greater than the Sum of its Parts*. . ., 63, 67.
[74] Leprince, "The Canadian-led. . ., 367.
[75] Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan. . ., 28.
[76] Patrick, and Brown, *Greater than the Sum of its Parts*. . ., 7.

the RoCK within their reporting structures, the position ultimately facilitated the coordination of civilian initiatives at the field level. Second, to facilitate the funding of projects in Kandahar, special authorities were granted so that the directors of CIDA and DFAIT could approve projects of up to 2 million dollars.[77] Third, since the DFAIT associate deputy minister in charge of interdepartmental coordination in Afghanistan lacked the authority to enforce departmental integration, the PCO took over the coordination role.[78] Benefiting from the authority of the Prime Minister, the PCO could compel a greater level of collaboration in implementing programmes and policies.[79] While these initiatives did not succeed in completely abolishing the departmental stovepipes in Ottawa, they nevertheless had a positive impact on Canada's WGA in Afghanistan.[80]

Interdepartmental Dynamics in the WoG Construct

Structural factors also contributed to the difficulties encountered in implementing Canada's WGA in Afghanistan. Even after the release of the Manley Report, several challenges persisted. More specifically, organizational culture and competition, as well as differences in departmental mandates, formed significant obstacles to the implementation of an effective WGA.

Organizational culture and competition

In light of the existence of different cultural identities within government agencies and department, a study conducted by the OECD has warned governments not to underestimate the significance of transactional costs and disincentives to cooperate when

[77] Leprince, "The Canadian-led. . ., 371.
[78] Owen, "3D Vision. . .
[79] Coombs, *Canadian Whole of Government Operations. . .,* 5.
[80] Leprince, "The Canadian-led. . ., 371; GAC, *Evaluation of the Stabilization. . .*

trying to implement a WoG strategy.[81] Additionally, interdepartmental competition should also be recognized as a significant barrier to cooperation.

Differences in organizational cultures significantly impeded cooperation in the KPRT. Notably, security and foreign affairs agencies tend to privilege immediate results, while development agencies tend to be focused on sustainability. [82] Indeed, it was observed that while CIDA tended to be focused on long-term projects which respected pre-established departmental procedures, the CAF would often focus on implementing short term projects with immediate, measurable results.[83] Beyond this, the CAF's highly hierarchical and task driven structure created tension within the PKRT. Members of the military failed to understand the role of civilians working in the organization, and on some occasions, attempted to take over command. While the dynamic within the KPRT was eventually adjusted to increase the profile of civilian departments, the implementation of this change was an additional source of tension.[84]

Beyond differences in organizational cultures, departmental competition over resources often proved to be a source of friction within the PRT. While it can be assumed that government departments should wilfully cooperate, competition over resources and government favour may instead motivate them to compete over achieving results and gaining visibility to secure funding and resources. As noted by Patrick and Brown, while cooperation can generally be achieved amongst working-level officers from different departments, performance pressures and the lack of professional rewards at higher

[81] OECD, "Whole-of-Government Approaches. . ., 189.
[82] *Ibid* , 186.
[83] Smith, "Canada in Afghanistan. . ., 17.
[84] Leprince, "The Canadian-led. . ., 360; McNerney, "Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan. . ., 39.

governmental echelons tend to overwhelm any incentive to foster cooperation among departments. [85] As described earlier in this chapter, the resource imbalance among departments may have helped ferment jealousy and resentment amongst government agencies as no clear process was in place to adjust resources once they had been committed to a department. [86] The Canadian public's perception that the mission in Kandahar was largely led and driven by the CAF would have helped to further the interdepartmental tension.[87] Though this issue can partly be blamed on governmental communication policies, it nevertheless fostered competition among the departments for visibility and acknowledgement.[88] Ultimately, it can be difficult to determine whether cultural tensions or competition over resources is the most important factor obstructing WoG collaboration; both factors are relevant when studying the impediments to the WGA.[89]

Conflicting Mandates

While cultural differences and competition inhibited interdepartmental cooperation in Afghanistan, the difference in departmental mandates was also problematic. Certainly, at the outset of the mission, when the WGA was initially implemented, the outlook towards interdepartmental cooperation was generally well received. In a series of interviews conducted by the magazine *Vanguard*, David Mulroney, Associate deputy minister at DFAIT and head of the interagency task force, Stephen Wallace, Vice President of CIDA, and David Fraser, commander of TFK, all expressed positive expectations of their ability

[85] Patrick, and Brown, *Greater than the Sum of its Parts. . .,* 68.
[86] *Ibid*, 61.
[87] Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan. . ., 20.
[88] Coombs, *Canadian Whole of Government Operations. . .,* 13.
[89] Victoria Metcalfe, Simone Haysom and Stuart Gordon, "Trends and challenges in humanitarian civil–military coordination: A review of the literature," (*HPG Working Paper, Humanitarian Policy Group, Overseas Development Institute*, May 2012), 29.

to implement a WoG strategy in Kandahar.[90] However, as the "painful gestation" of the IPS seemed to forecast, implementing an interdepartmental consensus on how and why Canada should be engaged around the world quickly became more difficult.[91]

One significant obstacle to the WGA was the divergence between the CAF and CIDA's mandates. Indeed, to create a climate of security and fight a counterinsurgency, the CAF adopted a short-term approach aimed at separating the civilian population from the insurgents both physically and psychologically. It therefore favoured the implementation of quick impact projects aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the population. This required the investment of funds in local initiatives benefiting local communities. Conversely, CIDA tended to adopt a more holistic approach focussed on long-term, sustainable development. This approach generally implied that it would sponsor international/multilateral organizations which would implement large scale development programmes. It also favoured investments that would not be threatened by local instability or sacrifice sustainability for short-term returns.[92] This dichotomy proved problematic for implementation of a WoG strategy focussed on Kandahar as a significant portion of the funds controlled by CIDA would benefit pan-Afghanistan programmes as opposed to being focused on the province.[93]

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[90] Robert Parkins and Chris Thatcher, "Common Narrative: Canada's Integrated Approach to Afghanistan," *Vanguard*, July 2007; Robert Parkins and Chris Thatcher, "Afghan Algebra: where 3D equals 1C," *Vanguard*, September/October 2007. David Fraser, "The Evolution of 3D: The Military's New Paradigm," *Vanguard*, September 2006.

[91] Patrick, and Brown, *Greater than the Sum of its Parts. . .,* 59.

[92] Robert Fife, Michelle Zilio and Victoria Gibson, "Freeland Orders Internal Review of Afghan Aid," *The Globe and Mail*, 9 November 2018; GAC, *Evaluation of the Stabilization. . .*

[93] Report to Parliament, Standing Committee on National Defense, Canada's engagement . . .

Certainly, there is value in investing in jointly financed projects, as Nipa Banerjee, a career civil servant turned professor of international development, has maintained.[94] While Banerjee also recognizes the validity of direct-funded projects, the 2016 *Evaluation of the START and GPSF* openly critiqued the appropriation of funds towards military priorities as being a source of programming drift. Meanwhile, the importance of quick impact projects to address security concerns was a central component of the Manley Report.[95] It bears noting that, while not available at the time, recent research conducted on the stabilizing effects of quick impact projects have largely discredited the validity of this approach.[96] Ultimately, both types of projects received development funds in Afghanistan, but the competition for resources based on the interpretation of departmental mandates remained a significant source of friction.

Though control over funding considerably affected the willingness of CIDA and the CAF to coordinate their effort, collaboration with NGOs proved to be another major source of contention. Indeed, the nature of CIDA's work demands it establish a close working relationship with these organizations, many of which generally prefer to distance themselves from the military to preserve their neutrality.[97] CIDA's reluctance to be closely associated with the CAF is understandable, as its collaboration with DND in Afghanistan caused CARE Canada and World Vision to refuse its funding in 2006. This incident led to

[94] Nipa Banerjee, "Canada's Afghanistan aid urgently needs review - but that doesn't mean we should go it alone," *Ottawa citizen*, 26 November 2018.

[95] Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan. . ., 29.

[96] Christoph Zürcher, "What do we (Not) Know About Development Aid and Violence? A Systemic Review," *Development Review* 98 (2017): 512.

[97] Birthe Anders, "Tree-huggers and baby-killers: The relationship between NGOs and PMSCs and its impact on coordinating actors in complex operations," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 24, no.2 (2013): 284.

CIDA only contributing "a small contingent [of] mostly junior officers to the PRT," thus limiting the effectiveness of the WGA.[98]

While differences in the CAF and CIDA mandates were significant, they were not the only incongruities which had an adverse effect on interdepartmental integration. For example, as DFAIT was mandated to coordinate resources for governmental departments applied to foreign policy goals, it maintained strong control over CSC and CIVPOL. Both agencies were therefore limited in their ability to implement programmes and act on their mandates due to bureaucratic and funding constraints.[99] Also, Patrick and Brown signalled a concern that forcing departments to collaborate could "lead to a homogenization of distinct departmental concerns, violate the mandates of any of them, or reduce their comparative advantage."[100] Ultimately, a more robust policy framework underlying the WGA might have helped alleviate certain frictions and provide a better outline of how departments were expected to cooperate. With no such policy in place in Kandahar, Canada's attempt at implementing a WoG strategy remained fraught.

Key Takeaways from Canada's WGA in Kandahar

While by no means an abject failure, Canada's first attempt to implement a coherent WGA abroad nevertheless faced significant barriers. Based on a largely aspirational policy, it lacked a framework detailing how interdepartmental cooperation would be achieved. Beyond this, however, the implementation of the strategy was flawed, as its objectives were not informed by a consensus from the contributing departments. This led to the composition of the WoG team being inadequate to meet the objectives of the mission, a

[98] Leprince, "The Canadian-led. . ., 366.
[99] *Ibid*, 362.
[100] Patrick, and Brown, *Greater than the Sum of its Parts. . .,* 61-62.

factor which was compounded initially by a lack of oversight and guidance from the government once deployed. Contributing to these structural problems, a series of factors related to cultural barriers and competition, as well as incompatibilities in departmental mandates exacerbated the interdepartmental friction and ultimately led to the WGA only being partially implemented.

Nevertheless, many valuable lessons can be derived from this case study. First, establishing an "effective dialogue between the key actors involved in a WGA" early on must be a priority. [101] This can be achieved by involving the WoG partners in the elaboration of the mission objectives and parameters. While these guidelines must inform the role of each department, they must not constrain the ability to adapt the parameters and force composition of the mission to the evolving conditions in the field nor should they create superfluous layers of bureaucracy limiting the freedom to act within departmental mandates.[102] Proper oversight of the mission should be maintained by an authority capable of exerting its influence over each department. Finally, the leadership influenced by individual departments and the authorities delegated to them should be balanced in accordance with the needs of the mission; this is particularly relevant when dealing with highly hierarchical organizations such as the CAF.[103]

Interdepartmental partners should plan and train together prior to their deployment. Although personnel constraints may limit the availability of civil servants for joint interagency training, it should be noted that prior experiences with members of various departments attending training exercises with the military such as Exercise MAPLE

[101] OECD, "Whole-of-Government Approaches. . ., 187.
[102] *Ibid*.
[103] Leprince, "The Canadian-led. . ., 376.

GUARDIAN have had positive effects on the cohesiveness of interdepartmental teams.[104] While mission specific training would benefit cooperation at the field level, there is also a requirement to bridge the interdepartmental divide in Ottawa. Though it may be hard to achieve, affecting a change in the strategic culture of the Canadian government would facilitate future attempts at adopting a WGA. Currently, the existing National Security Program (NSP) at the Canadian Forces College (CFC) offers a year-long platform for members of different departments to interact, though the availability of places is limited.[105] Regardless, as the NSP is unique in Canada, other opportunities to foster intra-government contact and professionalization should be sought after or created.[106]

Finally, the policy framework established by the IPS needs to be revisited to add more precise guidelines on the WGA. Understanding the difficulty associated with crafting policy with wide governmental implications, an intermediate policy solution could address funding structures. While some analysts recommend the elaboration of interdepartmental budget lines tied to foreign missions, another approach could be to standardize contracting procedures across all departments to alleviate certain frustrations which were felt in Afghanistan.

While these lessons are derived from Canada's experience in Kandahar, the likelihood that any of the associated recommendations are implemented would increase should they also benefit Canada's domestic application of the WGA. Accordingly, the next

[104] *Ibid*, 369.
[105] Don Macnamara, "'Comprehensive' National Security," *Frontline Defense* 7, no. 6 (2010).
[106] Coombs, *Canadian Whole of Government Operations. . ., 13.*

chapter will focus on the case study of the implementation of Canada's WoG strategy in the Arctic.

CHAPTER 3 CANADA'S WGA IN THE ARCTIC

The notion that government departments collaborate to achieve efficiencies or harness each other's resources in a domestic context is not new. However, as the 2002 TBSC report demonstrated, several barriers initially hampered interdepartmental cooperation.[107] Nevertheless, as WoG gained prominence in foreign affairs in the early 2000s, it was believed that this concept could be leveraged domestically to help departments achieve shared goals. This attitudinal shift was predicated on the understanding that traditional departmental silos hampered the ability of government to address certain challenges effectively. The emergent organizational philosophy demanded more horizontal inclusivity and collaboration among government departments.[108] This approach was particularly true for Canada's Arctic.

While the end of the Cold War initially attenuated concerns about the vulnerability of Canada's Arctic territories, the effects of climate change returned questions of security and sovereignty to the fore. As ice increasingly melted over summer months, passages which previously precluded any navigation suddenly opened up to naval traffic. From an economic standpoint, this was a boon as it offered Arctic countries access to the region's rich reserves of natural gas and oil as well as allowing for alternate means of ferrying minerals excavated in the North to foreign markets. However, along with potential benefits came concerns of competing claims over access to the newly accessible waterways and

[107] Keizer, *Review of the Existing Studies . . .*, 39.

[108] Peter Gizewski, "Discovering the Comprehensive Approach," in *Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach*, ed. Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski (Kingston: Queen's Centre for International Relations, 2011), 13-23.

resources. Furthermore, increased traffic in the Arctic raised the likelihood of ships becoming distressed and of spills occurring.

To address these emergent challenges and opportunities, a WGA would need to be leveraged in the Arctic. As noted by Brigadier-General Chris Whitecross, former commander of Joint Task Force North (JTFN), "The Team North approach to addressing the security concerns of the Arctic [was] imperative because no single department, federal or territorial, works independently in the north."[109] While considerable emphasis was placed by the Harper government on the military's role in ensuring territorial sovereignty, the complex challenges in the Arctic demanded the inclusion of civilians as well.[110]

According to the political scientist Rob Huebert, territorial sovereignty hinges on three requirements. First, a functioning government must have the ability to effectively govern the territory. Second, a local population must be present over the said territory. Third, territorial boundaries must be recognized by the international community.[111] The political scientists Andrea Charron and James Fergusson suggest that sovereignty can be threatened in two ways: the withdrawal of (de jure) recognition of a country's control over a territory by members of the international community and/or a country's loss of (de facto) control of over part or all of its territory. While the latter threat may appear to lend itself more to military countermeasures, control hinges on physical presence which can be asserted through the local population. In the event that de facto control cannot be established over the entirety of a territory, it can only be challenged if de jure sovereignty

[109] P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Adam Lajeunesse, "The Emerging Arctic Security Environment: Putting the Military in its (Whole of Government) Place," in *Whole of Government through an Arctic Lens* ed. P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Heather Nicol (Antigonish: Mulroney Institute of Government, 2017), 17-18.

[110] *Ibid*, 28.

[111] Rob Huebert, *Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security in a Transforming Circumpolar World* (Toronto: Canadian International Council, 2009), 1-2.

is contested.[112] Together, these two definitions of sovereignty demonstrate that this principle is not singularly dependent on a military's capability of defending a territory.

Environmental stewardship, responsible governance, and economic and social development in the North all help validate Canada's international claims of sovereignty.[113] Given the large breath of issues affecting the Arctic and the multifaceted nature of the concept of sovereignty, this paper's review of Canada's WGA in the North will be focussed on Arctic sovereignty in its various aspects. Accordingly, this chapter will commence by studying the implementation of the WGA followed by the examination of interdepartmental dynamics. It will conclude by drawing out lessons from Canada's implementation of the WGA in the Arctic.

Applying the WGA in the Arctic

The review of Canada's Arctic policy demonstrates that WoG principles were deeply embedded within it. While this may have been in part a product of the time, given the increasing popularity of the WoG concept, the nature of the challenges inherent to operating in the Arctic undoubtedly forced the Harper government to frame its approach to the North more holistically. To further understand the drivers of Canada's WGA in the North, its implementation will be studied through the lens of the Government's objectives, departmental contributions, and the leadership and coordinating structures which oversaw the efforts.

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[112] Andrea Charron, and James Fergusson, *Arctic Sovereignty: Preoccupation vs. Homeland Governance and Defence* (Calgary: Canadian Global Affairs Institute, September 2018), 2-4.

[113] Shelagh D. Grant, "Arctic Sovereignty and International Law," in *Whole of Government through an Arctic Lens* ed. P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Heather Nicol (Antigonish: Mulroney Institute of Government, 2017), 48.

Canada's Arctic Sovereignty Objectives

Canada's Arctic policy articulated four objectives. While these goals were generally accepted by the different departments engaged in the Arctic, some confusion arose from the interpretation of the concept of sovereignty. As highlighted in a 2010 Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence, two schools of thought emerged. The first saw sovereignty principally from a realist perspective, perceiving competing forces which would vie for control over territory and resources. Adherents to this school saw enforcing sovereignty as an objective on its own, distinct from the other pillars of the policy. The second school perceived sovereignty in the Arctic principally as a matter of domestic policy, hinging on responsible governance of the territory and its people.[114] Accordingly, this approach viewed sovereignty as being inextricable from the other three pillars. While seemingly academic in nature, this disagreement had implications for departmental engagement in the North.

One of the leading proponents of the Realist school was Prime Minister Harper himself. In a speech announcing the construction of new Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships, he said:

> Canada has a choice when it comes to defending our sovereignty over the Arctic. We either use it or lose it. And make no mistake, this Government intends to use it. Because Canada's Arctic is central to our national identity as a northern nation. It is part of our history. And it represents the tremendous potential of our future.[115]

This statement, particularly given the context of the speech, conveyed the idea that the circumpolar States' relation was competitive, if not adversarial. Notably, the choice of the

[114] Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence, *Canada's Arctic Sovereignty*, 40th Parliament, 3rd Cession, June 2010: 4.

[115] Prime Minister's Office, "Prime Minister Stephen Harper Announces New Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships," News Release, 9 July 2007.

word "defence," over security or safety, implied that DND was the principal department concerned with ensuring Canada's sovereignty over its Arctic territories. This view of the Arctic was supported by select academics, such as Huebert, who posited that "the Arctic is becoming increasingly accessible to a number of different actors who are descending upon it with both different and not mutually beneficial agendas." [116] Similarly, Scott G. Borgerson, a former US Coast Guard officer, advocated for the US to take more of a leading role in the Arctic less the region devolved into armed conflict.[117] Although this vision of Arctic sovereignty did not inherently preclude interdepartmental collaboration in the North, it did favour a more siloed approach, with DND principally looking after sovereignty while other departments would focus on governance, environmental stewardship and development.

Among those who questioned the realists, Ian Livermore, a DND researcher, raised doubts about the likeliness of the threat to Arctic sovereignty posed by adversarial powers such as Russia.[118] Similarly, Adam Chapnick, a Canadian Forces College professor, noted that concerns about protecting the Arctic against adversarial powers had been previously dismissed by former Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy and that the focus of Canada's efforts should instead have been focussed on stewardship.[119]

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[116] Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence, *Canada's Arctic Sovereignty*. . ., 4.

[117] Scott G. Borgerson, "Arctic Meltdown the Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming," *Foreign Affairs* (March-April 2008), 15.

[118] Ian Livermore, "From Cold War to North Pole Alliance: Canada and the Changing Face of Defence and Foreign Relations in the Arctic," in *Whole of Government through an Arctic Lens* ed. P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Heather Nicol (Antigonish: Mulroney Institute of Government, 2017), 69.

[119] Adam Chapnick, "A diplomatic counter-revolution: Conservative foreign policy, 2006-11," *International Journal* (Winter 2011-2012), 143.

Though stewardship did not preclude an armed presence in the North, it did favour the presence of "a constabulary force capable of policing our waters, responding to emergencies and providing SAR," as opposed to fighting an armed conflict against a competitor.[120] While acknowledging the importance of international recognition of territorial boundaries, Donat Pharand, an expert on the international law of the sea, stressed that effective exercise of Canadian jurisdiction over the Arctic was equally as necessary.[121] The 2010 Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence on *Canada's Arctic Sovereignty* highlighted that security and sovereignty in the Arctic needed to engage elements of all four pillars of Canada's Arctic Strategy and had to leverage resources across departments.[122]

Compounding the problems linked with Canada's Northern strategy was a lack of measures of effectiveness and performance associated with it. Certainly, it could have been argued that the government's strategy was effective at meeting its objectives so long as Canada's Arctic sovereignty remained unchallenged. However, it would be near-impossible to determine if this state of affairs was attributable to government action or if the status quo would have persisted regardless. From a WoG standpoint, this is problematic as it would be difficult for the government to evaluate whether the departments involved in the Arctic were performing as required.

Ultimately, in spite of the disagreement on how to best maintain Canada's Arctic sovereignty, the strong policy framework underlying Canada's Northern strategy helped

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[120] Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence, *Canada's Arctic Sovereignty*. . ., 6-7.

[121] Donat Pharand, "The Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit," *Ocean Development and International Law* 38, no. 1 (2007), 7.

[122] Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence, *Canada's Arctic Sovereignty*. . ., 5-6, 16.

align the actions of the departments. As the following section will demonstrate, significant cooperation was achieved among departments working in the Arctic, though difficulties were encountered while attempting to implement WoG solutions to some large scale, pan-governmental problems.

Canada's Contribution to Arctic Sovereignty

Whether Arctic sovereignty was associated narrowly to defence-related activities or more broadly to the stewardship of the North, interdepartmental collaboration remained essential. Unfortunately, as this study will go on to demonstrate, this same dependency on collaboration could become problematic when addressing large scale projects which required cross-departmental funding.

Considering that the CAF and DND were mandated to protect Canada's interests abroad and at home, they would traditionally have held the primary responsibility of defending Canada's territorial land and waters in the North.[123] However, many Arctic and defence experts such as Whitney Lackenbauer, Adam Lajeunesse, and Elinor Sloan suggested that a clear risk of warfare related to Canada's Arctic did not exist.[124] As such, from a defence perspective, the CAF could only conduct symbolic sovereignty operations to highlight the presence of the federal government in remote reaches of the Arctic. Accordingly, the GC relied on diplomacy led by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD, formerly DFAIT and CIDA) to mitigate the influence of aspiring "near Arctic" states such as China whose interests might not have aligned with

[123] Lackenbauer, and Lajeunesse, "The Emerging Arctic Security Environment. . ., 4.

[124] *Ibid*, 2; Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence, *Canada and the Defence of North America*, 41st Parliament, 2nd Cession, June 2015: 12.

Canada's.[125] Nevertheless, the CAF's presence in NORAD and its relationship with foreign militaries granted DFATD additional diplomatic heft when dealing with other circumpolar states.[126] Therefore, even though the importance of defence in the Arctic was downplayed by many, the interdepartmental collaboration between DND and DFATD still served to protect Canada's interests.

Effective stewardship over the Arctic represented a more broadly accepted means of ensuring Canada's sovereignty over its Northern territory. In the domestic context, it entailed maintaining the "relationship between the government and the governed, including the enforcement of domestic laws and regulations, as well as the government's commitment in the human security realm."[127] While the legal responsibility for security and safety in the North belonged primarily to the RCMP and Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), the CAF nevertheless embraced a WGA in providing an important supporting role to these agencies.

From a security standpoint the "increased activity in the North [was] expected to bring more illegal fishing, maritime and aerospace accidents, dumping, pollution, trespassing, and criminal activity."[128] Accordingly, the CAF cooperated closely with the RCMP and the CCG, supplementing their capabilities with ships for transport and reconnaissance platforms to enhance common situational awareness of the Arctic landscape.[129] Likewise, the RCMP and CBSA partnered to create Territorial Integrated Border Enforcement Teams to patrol likely avenues for security breaches such as the

[125] Lackenbauer, and Lajeunesse, "The Emerging Arctic Security Environment. . ., 24-29.
[126] Adam Lajeunesse, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, "The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic: Building Capabilities and Connections," in *Whole of Government through an Arctic Lens* ed. P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Heather Nicol (Antigonish: Mulroney Institute of Government, 2017), 143.
[127] Lackenbauer, and Lajeunesse, "The Emerging Arctic Security Environment. . ., 5.
[128] Lajeunesse, and Lackenbauer, "The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic. . ., 119.
[129] Lackenbauer, and Lajeunesse, "The Emerging Arctic Security Environment. . ., 24.

Mackenzie River.[130] Recognizing its limited resources to fulfill its mandate in the Arctic, CBSA also committed to further developing its relationship with other government departments (OGDs) to allow for greater cooperation.[131]

Much like security, safety in the Arctic was a shared responsibility, with the lead agency varying based on the nature of the emergency. For instance, federal and territorial governments shared jurisdiction over search and rescue (SAR) operations, though the RCMP maintained primary responsibility for ground-based SAR, the CCG led maritime SAR, and the CAF was accountable for aeronautical SAR. While this division of responsibilities may seem stovepiped, SAR remained a WoG responsibility as RCMP, CCG and CAF would often coordinate their efforts directly on the ground or through Joint Rescue Co-Coordination Centres (JRCCs).[132]

Merging constabulary and safety roles, Transport Canada maintained the responsibility for marine protection, including the enforcement of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. However, the department's success largely hinged on its ability to leverage resources from other agencies such as the CAF and CCG as well as synchronizing Canada's environmental protection efforts with other circumpolar states through the Arctic Council's Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group.[133]

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[130] Jenna M. Alexander, and Dalton Cote, "Leadership in Whole-of-Government Operations: A Case Study of Security in the Canadian Arctic," *Canadian Forces Leadership Institute Monograph* 2011-01 (May 2011), 28.

[131] *Ibid*, 32.

[132] Meredith Kravitz, and Vanessa Gastaldo, "Emergency Management in the Arctic: The Context Explained," in *Whole of Government through an Arctic Lens* ed. P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Heather Nicol (Antigonish: Mulroney Institute of Government, 2017), 273-274.

[133] Alexander and Cote, "Leadership in Whole-of-Government Operations. . ., 33.

The mapping of the Canadian Arctic coastal shelf was another interdepartmental success. Though Natural Resources Canada led the effort, several departments contributed. DND directly supported mapping activities through the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). Defence Research and Development Canada and DFO supplemented the RCN's efforts through the CCG and were responsible for the scientific work necessary to support Canada's submission to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental shelf. Finally, DFATD prepared and presented the submission itself.[134]

Though many more examples of successful WoG efforts could be presented here,[135] it is also important to acknowledge the limitations and failures of the WGA in the Arctic. For instance, communications posed a significant challenge. Indeed, access to high speed and reliable voice and data communications systems were generally lacking in the North, affecting the provision of governmental services to Arctic communities. Despite this shortcoming having been identified by all levels of government, including the Standing Committee on National Defence,[136] no lead agency was appointed to address this issue nor was a budget allocated to the problem.[137] It did not help that every agency and department operating in the North possessed its own communications systems. A lack of compatibility complicated interagency cooperation on the ground and led to significant failures, such as during operation NANOOK 2009 where the increased demand on the Iqaluit communication infrastructure created a power surge and shut down power to the entire community and the federal agencies for over two hours.[138]

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[134] Lackenbauer, and Lajeunesse, "The Emerging Arctic Security Environment. . ., 15.
[135] *Ibid*, 14-17.
[136] Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence, *Canada and. . .,* 56.
[137] Imaituk Inc., "A Matter of Survival: Arctic Communications Infrastructure in the 21st Century," in *Whole of Government through an Arctic Lens* ed. P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Heather Nicol (Antigonish: Mulroney Institute of Government, 2017), 212.
[138] Kravitz, and Gastaldo, "Emergency Management in the Arctic. . ., 272.

Addressing the issue of communications in the Arctic presented a truly pan-governmental challenge, requiring agencies to synchronize their communication procurement efforts and federal, territorial and local governments to collaborate on developing a more robust communication network. Although some temporary solutions to the problem were developed, including sharing information at the federal interdepartmental level through JRCC and Marine Security Operations Centres (MSOCs), no permanent solution to the problem was found.

Leadership and Coordination of WoG Efforts in the Arctic

While the WGA continued to face challenges in the North, many WoG efforts were met with success due to the establishment of an effective coordination framework. Indeed, during hearings held by the Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans in 2009, it was emphasized that the "vastness of the Canadian North requires a level of situational awareness that can only be facilitated through monitoring, intelligence collection and information sharing across all departments/agencies involved in Northern and Arctic operations in Canada."[139] Three mechanisms were implemented to facilitate cooperation and information sharing at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

At the strategic level, the Arctic Security Working Group (ASWG) provided an unparalleled platform for the sharing of information and coordination of initiatives throughout government both horizontally and vertically. Initially founded in 1999, the group was "co-chaired by [JTFN] and the northern regional office of Public Safety Canada" and included representatives from several federal departments and agencies as well as members of the territorial governments. The group also heard from important Arctic

[139] Alexander and Cote, "Leadership in Whole-of-Government Operations. . ., 35.

stakeholders outside of the GC, including an Alaskan delegation.[140] Meeting twice a year, the ASWG provided those in attendance the opportunity to familiarize themselves with issues from across departments and territories, further their awareness of the responsibilities of each department and agency, and develop working relationships with stakeholders in the Arctic community. The ASWG also created a platform to coordinate efforts in deploying initiatives in the North or planning collaborative training exercises. As Whitney Lackenbauer and Adam Lajeunesse have explained:

> [the ASWG] promotes a 'community of competence' that encourages members to consider proactive, comprehensive, and integrated approaches to managing an evolving risk environment. Through contacts made at the meetings, ASWG members can choose to collaborate, either formally or informally, to anticipate emerging requirements and realize common goals.[141]

Altogether, the ASWG presented a successful example of civilian and military collaboration enabling horizontal and vertical WoG cooperation.

At the operational level, MSOCs provided a WoG platform that facilitated information sharing and coordination of constabulary activities. Though the MSOCs were stood up and hosted by the CAF, they included representation from CBSA, DFO, the CCG, the RCMP, and Transport Canada.[142] Although the primary focus of the MSOCs located in Halifax and Victoria were the territorial waters located to the east and west of the Canadian coasts, their area of interest extended up to Arctic waters and allowed for the monitoring of "the thousands of 'targets' that operated in Canadian waters each day with the help of information supplied by aircraft, ships, satellites, radars, and other technologies."[143]

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[140] Lackenbauer, and Lajeunesse, "The Emerging Arctic Security Environment. . ., 13.
[141] *Ibid*, 18.
[142] Lajeunesse, and Lackenbauer, "The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic. . . , 122.
[143] Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence, *Canada and*. . ., 17.

Together, these centres contributed to WoG efforts to increase awareness of the maritime domain, thus enhancing the government's ability to address security threats off Canada's coasts, including illegal fishing, pollution and smuggling. Despite their many benefits, MSOCs maintained only a limited awareness of Arctic naval traffic given that their primary focus was the maritime activity off the East and West coasts. As noted by Whitney Lackenbauer, the GC could overcome this vulnerability by creating an MSOC whose primary area of responsibility would be Canada's Arctic waters. However, there were no governmental plans at the time to move ahead in that direction.[144]

Whereas MSOCs monitored and collected information on all types of naval threats, JRCCs were focussed exclusively on SAR. Though three JRCCs existed in Canada, the responsibility for monitoring SAR incidents and coordinating responses in the Arctic fell to the centre in Trenton, Ontario. These centres were jointly staffed by representatives of the CCG and CAF, and allowed for increased collaboration when responding to SAR incidents.[145] Although the RCMP was not present, the Trenton JRCC could assist with ground SAR by dispatching air assets while also redirecting calls to JTFN, which could contribute to a search for a missing person by deploying members of the Canadian Rangers.[146] Although Canada's ability to deploy timely SAR assets in the Arctic has been criticized as inadequate, it should be taken into account that annually, less than one percent of the SAR incidents occur North of the 60th parallel.[147] Overall, the Trenton JRCC

[144] P. Whitney Lackenbauer, *From Polar Race to Polar Saga: An Integrated Strategy for Canada and the Circumpolar World* (Toronto: Canadian International Council, 2009), 30.

[145] Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence, *Canada and. . .*, 28.

[146] While the Combined Joint Operation Command maintains the responsibility directing SAR in the CAF, their subalternate headquarters maintain a degree of latitude when reacting to SAR requests to reduce response times.

[147] Lajeunesse, and Lackenbauer, "The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic. . . , 139-140.

therefore represented an effective articulation of the WGA at the operational and tactical levels.

While the ASWG, MSOCs and JRCC Trenton proved effective means of coordinating activities and sharing information amongst government departments in the Arctic, no central entity was given the responsibility to lead the WoG efforts.[148] Although the CAF interpreted that part of their mandate in the Arctic was to "lead from behind" by providing support and enabling OGDs, they lacked functional authority. [149] Moreover, even though the CAF had effectively taken the lead over multi-agency activities in the Arctic in the past, senior leadership from DND acknowledged that the military's role should remain one of support.[150] Certainly, the extant Arctic policy provided some guidance to departments. Though both academics and senatorial committees recommended that the Prime Minister take a direct role in leading efforts in the Arctic by mandating the creation of a Cabinet Committee on Arctic Affairs, no such body was stood up.

With no central body overseeing WoG efforts in the Arctic, it has remained difficult to address pan-governmental issues that are not featured in a policy document, such as the lack of effective communication infrastructure in the North or the creation of an "Arctic Action Plan" to coordinate WoG responses to emergencies.[151] Nevertheless, in spite of this shortcoming, the various coordinating bodies which oversee Arctic issues allow for effective interdepartmental collaboration on a series of security and development related issues.

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[148] The ASWG remains a consultative and information sharing body and does not have any authority to develop policy or issue binding guidance.

[149] *Ibid*, 119.

[150] Karen Everett, and Emily Yamashita, "Whole of Government in the Canadian Arctic," in *Whole of Government through an Arctic Lens* ed. P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Heather Nicol (Antigonish: Mulroney Institute of Government, 2017), 301-302.

[151] Lackenbauer, *From Polar Race to Polar Saga*. . ., 29.

Interdepartmental Dynamics in the WoG Construct

In practice, government departments have demonstrated their ability to collaborate on a series of issues and programmes in the Arctic. In examining the interdepartmental dynamics at play, some cultural and mandate related factors help explain why the WGA was successful in Canada's North. Nevertheless, several shortcomings and difficulties exist in these two areas that limit the effectiveness of interdepartmental cooperation and preclude integration beyond what has already been achieved.

Interdepartmental Culture in the Arctic

Where significant differences in departmental cultures have been recognized, efforts have been made to mitigate their impact on the WoG efforts and favour interdepartmental relation building. Notably, a series of exercises involving several departments and agencies helped to bridge the divide among organizational cultures. Moreover, as important actors in the Arctic, the CAF and DND demonstrated a significant interest in gaining a better understanding of OGDs and operating in a WoG manner. However, despite the best efforts of the government, the cultural divide among departments and agencies remained.

In their article entitled "Experiments with Joined-up, Horizontal and Whole-of-Government in Anglophone Countries," three Australian academics, John Halligan, Fiona Buick, and Janine O'Flynn, posited that fostering a culture of collaboration which enabled "readiness to think and act across agency boundaries" was critical to effective WoG

cooperation.[152] In accordance with this position, the CAF established a series of annual exercises aimed at fostering common understanding of procedures and cultural identities for departments involved in providing security in the Arctic. Indeed, the "N-series" of operations which encompassed Operations NUNALIVUT, NUNAKPUT, NANOOK:

> enhanced understanding and all domain awareness, integration of new capabilities, and sustained operations, [and as a result] the CAF will be postured to more efficiently and effectively operate in the North, rapidly responding to emerging requirements, demonstrating Canadian sovereignty across the North, and acting in partnership with local, provincial/territorial, federal, and international partners.[153]

With representation from DFO, CCG, RCMP, CAF, DND, and the territorial governments, these exercises increased the government's readiness to deal with emergencies.

Although the participation of security partners from across the Arctic was one of the most important features of the "N-series," the success in generating these opportunities for collaboration was due in no small part to the CAF. Indeed, these operations represented only the latest iteration of WoG training, as the RCN had attempted to develop its relationships with the CCG and RCMP in 2002 and 2004 during Operation NARWHAL. These efforts were followed shortly by the first CAF led WoG training exercise in 2005 named Operation HUDSON SENTINEL. While the participation and implication of OGDs increased over the years, given the budget and size of the CAF, the military remained the driving force behind these exercises.[154] Accordingly, though this training was meant to

[152] John Halligan, Fiona Buick, and Janine O'Flynn, "Experiments with Joined-up, Horizontal and Whole-of-Government in Anglophone Countries," in *International Handbook on Civil Service Systems* ed. Andrew Massey (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 91.

[153] Lajeunesse, and Lackenbauer, "The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic. . ., 126.

[154] P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Heather Nicol, *Whole of Government through an Arctic Lens* (Antigonish: Mulroney Institute of Government, 2017), viii; Lajeunesse, and Lackenbauer, "The Canadian Armed Forces in the Arctic. . ., 148.

favour exposure to different cultures, the military culture remained predominantly featured over those of OGDs.

As numerous iterations of Op NANOOK revealed, there was a significant gap between the military and civilian departments in terms of planning and leadership cultures. Potentially, this difference could be partially attributed to a discrepancy in departmental budgets, though the military's tendency to impose its priorities over those of other departments should not be discounted. Furthermore, civilian departments tended to rely on a consultative decision-making process as opposed to a formalized planning structure and hierarchical decision-making process. These incongruities exposed differences in organizational cultures which limited the effectiveness of the WGA.[155]

Beyond the differences in organizational cultures, the importance placed on the military's role during Arctic exercises limited the effectiveness of WoG integration. Indeed, early iterations of the "N-series" of operation were overly focussed on activities conducted by the CAF which left other departments with little to do during certain stages of the operation. As such, some representatives from civilian departments simply left the exercises early.[156] While subsequent iterations of these operations addressed this issue in part, the nature of these exercises remained highly militarized, reflecting the Harper government's CAF centric approach to sovereignty.[157] Ultimately, the conduct of WoG exercises helped create some headway in "harmonizing operational styles and corporate culture," yet there remained much room to grow.

[155] Lackenbauer, and Lajeunesse, "The Emerging Arctic Security Environment. . ., 25-26.
[156] *Ibid*, 23.
[157] Everett, and Yamashita, "Whole of Government in the Canadian Arctic. . ., 296.

Departmental Mandates in the Arctic

Despite the significance of cultural differences among departments which hindered WoG integration, the study of departmental mandates revealed that cooperation was facilitated when there was a clear defence, security, or safety nexus to operations. However, it could also be observed that DND was the only department with a mandate strongly emphasizing the importance of the WGA, which was compounded by budgetary and personnel imbalances which favoured certain departments over others.

Given the cost and the requirement of specialized equipment to operate in the Arctic, departments with similar mandates were incentivized towards cooperation. While the CAF, RCMP, and CCG each had distinct primary SAR responsibilities, they regularly collaborated in searches. Likewise, these three agencies often operated jointly to combat illegal fishing and conduct counter-narcotics and surveillance operations.[158] While the incidence of illegal fishing and drug trafficking was fairly rare in the North, the effects of climate change were opening sea lanes in the Arctic for longer periods of the year. Moreover, the rising use of those sea lanes increased the risks of an environmental disaster. In that context, DFO, Transport Canada, the CCG, and the CAF were mandated to intervene and operate cooperatively as they had rehearsed in previous iterations of Operations NANOOK.[159] While the study of past practices indicates that departments whose mandates were tied to defence, security, and safety were incentivized to cooperate, the GC's overemphasis on a militarized version of sovereignty had a negative impact on WoG integration.

[158] Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence, *Canada and. . .*, 21.
[159] Lackenbauer, and Lajeunesse, "The Emerging Arctic Security Environment. . ., 25-26.

Although the CAF was mandated to operate in the North in support of OGDs in accordance with the WGA, they were also instructed to support Canadian sovereignty by demonstrating the government's ability to project force throughout the Arctic territory. Given the CAF's resource advantage over civilian departments, its self-assertive culture and its focus on sovereignty which aligned with the government's vision, its influence impacted the nature of the training occurring in the Arctic. Meanwhile, as no civilian department operating in the North received the mandate, or the funding, to lead the development of the Arctic WGA, very few training activities occurred without a strong presence of the military.[160] Accordingly, there was a contradiction in the CAF's mandate as they were expected on the one hand to lead the WGA in the Arctic while on the other to only maintain a supporting role to civilian departments.

This unevenness of the burden of implementing the WGA in the Arctic could further be felt given the fiscal constraints associated with the post-financial crisis era of the Harper government. With every department facing cut-backs, there were limited incentives for departments to share their limited resources on initiatives which fell outside of their direct mandates.[161] Accordingly, differences in funding between the CAF and OGDs proved to be an important impediment to the effectiveness of WoG training in the Arctic.[162]

Additionally, while this chapter is focussed on the sovereignty aspect of Canada's Arctic strategy, it is important to note that critiques have been made regarding the disproportionate funding of the military compared to social development and investments directed towards Indigenous peoples. Considering that the definition of sovereignty

[160] Everett, and Yamashita, "Whole of Government in the Canadian Arctic. . ., 295, 298.
[161] *Ibid*, 296.
[162] Lackenbauer, and Lajeunesse, "The Emerging Arctic Security Environment. . ., 25-26.

includes a governance aspect, an argument could be made that an effective WoG strategy in the Arctic should have integrated departments focussed on social and economic development, good governance and Indigenous peoples. However, the collaboration between these departments and those involved in defence, security, and safety in the Arctic remained nominal. Accordingly, while interdepartmental cooperation in the Arctic was successful in certain fields, Whole-of-Arctic integration and collaboration remained an elusive target.[163]

Key Takeaways from Canada's WGA in the Arctic

The success of the GC's implementation of the WoG efforts in the Arctic was mixed, but the effort did yield valuable insights on how the approach could be improved. From a policy standpoint, the strategy articulated across governmental departments seemed to echo the same priorities which facilitated collaboration amongst departments. However, the interpretation of those policies may have caused confusion, particularly in terms of the importance of Arctic sovereignty and what that pillar entailed. As some have argued, the importance of the military over other departments in supporting Arctic sovereignty may have been over-emphasized. Moreover, there was a lack of clarity regarding the mandate to lead the implementation of WoG efforts in the Arctic. With no central agency or Cabinet Committee in charge, departments were left to decide for themselves to which degree they would integrate their efforts with others.

Compounding the lack of leadership was a lack of measures of effectiveness to assess the strategy. To a certain extent, the government's strategy in the Arctic was more

[163] Petra Dolata, "A New Canada in the Arctic? Arctic Policies under Harper," *Canadian Studies* 78 (2015).

aspirational than end-state driven. Indeed, it seemed unlikely that any of the four pillars could ever be fulfilled to a point where the Prime Minister could declare the mission accomplished and reassign the associated resources. Nevertheless, without some kind of formalized assessment to determine the effectiveness of the policy, it would have been hard to argue for the need for further efficiencies and integration among departments.[164] Other important elements which limited the effectiveness of WoG efforts could be tied to departmental silos and the absence of funding earmarked to support WoG programmes.[165]

To a degree, a major inhibitor to the effective application of the WGA was the concept's analytical fuzziness. Given the lack of formalized definition, a review of the extant literature yielded three factors which could be used to assess effective interdepartmental collaboration and cooperation:

- building interpersonal relationships;
- developing trust through direct and informal contacts, networks, and common activities;
- developing a common understanding of each agency's role, mandate, responsibilities and regular training and exercises as ways to develop and maintain common understanding. [166]

While the departments whose mandates had a nexus with defence, security, and safety arguably met this standard, the same could not be said for departments whose mandates were not necessarily linked with the government's vision of sovereignty. Therefore, it remained open to interpretation whether the partial interdepartmental collaboration and cooperation which was achieved could be considered WoG.

[164] Maria Tretiakova, Karen D. Davis, and Cassandra Kuyvenhoven, "Cultural Complexity and the Canadian Armed Forces in Canada's Arctic: Understanding the Impact and Preparing to Meet the Challenges," *Canadian Forces Leadership Institute Monograph* 2013-01 (July 2013), 35.

[165] Everett, and Yamashita, "Whole of Government in the Canadian Arctic. . ., 304.

[166] Alexander and Cote, "Leadership in Whole-¬of-¬Government Operations. . ., 2-3.

Regardless, it is important to acknowledge the interdepartmental collaborative successes which have been achieved in the Arctic. While the civilian-military divide could not be completely overcome, the training opportunities provided by the "N-series" of operation improved the relationships and level of interoperability among the departments involved. Moreover, the ASWG, MSOCs and JRCC Trenton created forums where information could be shared and actions coordinated amongst certain departments and agencies operating in the Arctic. In studying the operationalization of Arctic sovereignty, it became clear that common training and the existence of coordinating structures helped achieve effective collaboration among departments working towards the defence, security and safety of Canada's Arctic.

To improve the efficiency of the WGA in the Arctic and extend its application to other departments, the Prime Minister could mandate the creation of a Cabinet Committee on Arctic Affairs, as recommended in the 2010 Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence. Alternatively, a non-partisan committee of deputy ministers could be stood up to similar effects. Such an initiative would help align policy priorities with emerging issues and needs, support the creation of a budget allocated to WoG efforts and coordinate the implementation of the WGA in the North.[167] It could also facilitate the creation of Arctic-specific contingency plans designed to respond to crises in the North while accounting for the unique operating environment.[168] Additionally, a Cabinet Committee on Arctic Affairs could mandate the formation of operational level organizations which would help with the sharing of information and coordination of

[167] Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence, *Canada's Arctic Sovereignty*. . ., 16.
[168] Lackenbauer, *From Polar Race to Polar Saga*. . ., 29.

activities. Though an Arctic MSOC was already suggested, other departments and agencies could also benefit from the creation of interdepartmental Arctic bureaus.

CHAPTER 4: COMPARISON AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The emergence of the WoG concept in the early 2000s and its increasing prevalence in both domestic and foreign contexts hint at the acknowledgement of the growing interconnectedness of issues across government departments. The principle underlying this concept is that integration of departmental resources and efforts will increase their individual efficiency and efficacy beyond what they could have achieved on their own. While this aspiration is laudable, it remains unclear to what degree this goal can be achieved.

It is therefore important to study previous applications of the WoG concept to determine what barriers to departmental integration remain and what practices have yielded successful outcomes. Moreover, comparing the application of the WGA in different case studies may help determine whether commonalities can be found or if every case is inherently unique. As it was noted in an OECD study of the WGA to fragile states, there is a certain uniqueness to the type of response required by different conflicts at different times.[169] Henceforth, while the WGA may be understood as a philosophy underlying government action, the applicability of lessons learned from one intervention to the next should not be taken for granted. Additionally, the question remains as to whether the WoG concept is applicable throughout government or if it is more applicable to certain

[169] OECD, "Whole-of-Government Approaches. . ., 188.

departments than others. In the same vein, it would be worth examining whether certain fields are more adaptable to WoG principles or if the concept is universal.

To address these questions, this chapter will begin with a contextual comparison of the application of the WGA in Afghanistan and the Arctic. It will then discuss common lessons drawn from the operationalization of the WGA abroad and at home and conclude with observations on the cogency and feasibility of the WoG principle.

Contextual Comparison of the WGA Abroad and at Home

At first glance, Canada's intervention in Kandahar and efforts in the Arctic appear completely dissimilar. One took place abroad in a fragile state in response to an insurgency and the other took place on Canadian soil with less of an imminent threat. However, examining the context of Canada's WoG contribution to both cases yields a number of points of comparison which will demonstrate the validity of lessons from both cases to a broader context. The comparisons that follow have been subdivided into three broad categories: Canada's objectives, the operationalization of the WoG concept, and the impacts of culture and mandates on the WGA.

Canada's WoG Objectives

Canada's strategy in the Arctic included a clear set of objectives enunciated in policy which covered sovereignty, development, governance, and environmental stewardship. Canada's objectives in Afghanistan were less clearly defined and evolved over the length of the mission. Nevertheless, in examining the objectives set out in the Afghan Compact and the ones stemming from the recommendations made in the Manley Report, security, developmental aid, and governance assistance emerge as overarching

themes to the mission. From this, it is possible to assert that in both cases, Canada's goals were multidimensional and included aspects of security, development and governance.

While Canada's objectives in both cases shared common themes, there were clear differences in their interpretation on the ground. For instance, security in the Afghan context entailed taking part in active fighting against insurgents and bolstering an extremely weak state security apparatus through training and mentorship. In the Arctic, security was closely tied to traditional constabulary roles enforcing Canadian laws over its sovereign territory. This difference meant that the roles of the agencies taking part in security-related operations were inverted. Whereas the CAF maintained the lead role in supporting Canada's security objectives in Afghanistan, domestically, it provided support to the RCMP and CCG and was only to intervene as a primary actor in the event of a military challenge to Canadian sovereignty.

Operationalizing the WGA

Beyond their objectives, Canada's WoG response to challenges in Kandahar and the Arctic bear additional commonalities, such as the requirement for several government departments and agencies to collaborate. While there were differences in governmental representation, some departments were present in both cases. CBSA, CAF and CIVPOL[170] worked collaboratively towards achieving security-related objectives both in Afghanistan and the Arctic. Moreover, while the CAF was primarily concerned with security in both cases, it was also involved to varying degrees in development and governance as demonstrated by its presence in the KPRT and its co-chairmanship of the ASWG. In

[170] Which included representation from the RCMP.

summary, the complexity and interconnectedness of the WGA are exemplified in both these foreign and domestic engagements.

As highlighted by researcher Karen Davis, Afghanistan and the Arctic shared similarities as both required the management of complex relationships among different departments, agencies and the local community to foster collaboration, minimize redundancies, and remain respectful of local history, traditions and knowledge. Davis also underscores the importance of managing short-term pressures with long-term sustainability in terms of development.[171] Though this was an important issue highlighted in the Afghan case study, competing pressures were equally felt in the Arctic as "short-term visible impact initiatives" sometimes competed with the need for sustained programmes and engagements.[172]

Another significant point of comparison was the need to balance the allocation of resources among the different objectives. While in principle, the WoG concept establishes collaborative relationships across departments and objectives, there seemed to have been an underlying competition in both cases between the security and the development efforts. In Afghanistan, several arguments were made for development projects to be focussed on assisting military efforts to increase security in Kandahar.[173] While the validity of this approach remains questionable[174], the advocacy highlights the significance of the disagreement over where funds should have been spent. Meanwhile, though the competition over resources between security and development may have been less

[171] Tretiakova, Davis, and Kuyvenhoven, "Cultural Complexity and. . ., 35.
[172] *Ibid*, 12-13, 33, 35.
[173] Smith, "Canada in Afghanistan. . ., 17.
[174] Zürcher, "What do we (Not) Know. . ., 512.

polarized in the Arctic, the government's emphasis on defence related sovereignty compared to development and environmental stewardship also created discord.[175]

Culture and Mandates in WoG

In conducting both case studies, this paper found that an important aspect of WoG was how cultural dynamics could inhibit the effectiveness of interdepartmental integration. Certainly, some departments proved more at odds than others, as the CIDA - CAF relationship in Afghanistan demonstrated.[176] Nevertheless, some of the frictions present during the "N-series" exercises could also be explained by cultural differences. While managing civilian-military relationships proved difficult, there was a recipe for success. First, common training among departments helped attenuate the significance of cultural barriers. Though the "N-series" were imperfect, they provided departments with an annual platform where interpersonal relationships could be formed, and cultural awareness could be gained. A similar phenomenon was observed on the few occasions when OGDs were invited to take part in pre-deployment exercises with the CAF prior to Afghanistan.[177]

Compatible mandates also helped. While some form of collaboration occurred across priorities in both case studies, the greatest intermeshing of departmental responsibilities occurred in Afghanistan. Indeed, while the CAF's mandate relates primarily to defence, security, and safety, the three-block war doctrine and lack of availability of civilian personnel compelled military officials to support development aid. Meanwhile, CIDA, an organization that preferred to maintain a neutral approach to conflict was compelled by governmental pressures to support security-related projects. This

[175] Heather A. Smith, "Choosing Not to See: Canada, Climate Change, and the Arctic," *International Journal* 65, no. 4 (12, 2010).
[176] Leprince, "The Canadian-led. . ., 365.
[177] *Ibid*, 367.

incompatibility in mandates was not encountered to the same degree in the Arctic where agencies and departments involved in security and safety were only tangentially involved in supporting other priorities. In Afghanistan, agencies sharing similar mandates, such as CIVPOL and the CAF, displayed a level of collaboration comparable to what could be found in the Arctic.

How to Articulate a Successful WGA?

Given that both case studies offer sufficient points of comparison to validate the applicability of lessons to foreign and domestic applications of the WGA, this now begs the question: how can a successful WGA be articulated? In studying the application of the WGA in Afghanistan and the Arctic, it becomes apparent that interdepartmental integration cannot be achieved without careful design.

Benefits of Early Collaboration

One important consideration which arose in the two case studies was the importance of achieving an early dialogue among the key actors involved in the WGA. Early engagement and buy-in facilitate the understanding of individual mandates and limitations all the while allowing departments and agencies to discuss their ability and willingness to contribute to the different pillars and priorities of an engagement. Such early engagement may help alleviate some pitfalls encountered in Afghanistan where cooperation was imposed on departments whose mandates were largely incompatible.[178]

[178] Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Annex A. The principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations," in *International Engagement in Fragile States: Can't We Do Better?* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011), 48.

Early engagement can also help shape governmental policy and expectations towards setting achievable objectives in line with available resources. However, as demonstrated by the evolving challenges in Afghanistan and the Arctic, maintaining an adaptable structure remains a critical aspect of a successful WoG strategy. To that end, there must be mechanisms in place to evaluate progress towards each priority and, if necessary, to implement changes to departmental contributions, budgets, or strategies. This eventuality needs to be understood from the outset as expectations over resources can lead to interdepartmental rivalry, though iterative planning can decrease such a likelihood.[179]

Finally, in designing a WoG structure, it remains important to consider the delegation of functional authorities and the processes for sharing information and coordinating actions. Drawing lessons from Afghanistan, forcing civilian departments to report through the START added layers of bureaucracy which inhibited effectiveness on the ground. Though some studies emphasize the importance of creating a Cabinet Committee born out of the PCO to coordinate interdepartmental efforts, lessons from the Arctic offer alternatives. Indeed, the MSOCs and JRCC demonstrate the effectiveness of operational and tactical level coordination centers when adequately staffed. Moreover, ASWG exemplifies how a platform designed to add value at little cost can facilitate coordination across multiple levels of government. While the ASWG is focussed on security, the creation of similar working groups focussed on other government priorities may also enhance interdepartmental collaboration.

[179] Tretiakova, Davis, and Kuyvenhoven, "Cultural Complexity and. . ., 35.

Narrowing the Cultural Gap

In studying the application of the WGA abroad and at home, it becomes apparent that culture plays a significant role in determining the effectiveness of interdepartmental collaboration. While much focus was placed on the civilian-military divide, the significance of culture impeding collaboration among civilian departments should not be understated.[180]

One proven means of overcoming cultural barriers is through interdepartmental training. In both case studies, training amongst departments which were required to collaborate proved beneficial on multiple levels. However, this remains an imperfect solution as several departments lack the depth of personnel and resources to plan and conduct training at a comparable scale to the military's exercises. It may be possible for smaller departments to achieve similar effects by downscaling events, though it must be noted that training exercises might be new to some departments and therefore unlikely to be prioritized.

Alternatively, cultural barriers to interdepartmental cooperation might be overcome by formalized training programmes delivered through schools of government. One typical example often presented is the NSP offered by CFC. Through this programme, members of the CAF receive strategic graduate level education on a series of topics including "Canadian governance and national security policy development," which includes interdepartmental relationships.[181] The programme is offered to a mix of CAF personnel,

[180] Owen, "3D Vision. . .; Macnamara, "'Comprehensive' National Security. . .

[181] Canadian Forces College, "National Securities Program 10 Syllabus," (National Security Program Course 10 Syllabus, 2018).

international military, and civilians serving in various departments of the Canadian government. However, this programme is offered only to senior members of government, and on average, ten public servants attend the course every year, representing roughly 30 percent of the students on the course. While beneficial, this representation would not be sufficient to alter significantly the behaviour of the Canadian public service which had over 6,480 executives in the public service in 2017.[182]

Nevertheless, an argument could be made for other training programmes to be created by either DND or by the Canadian government itself. Unfortunately, while ongoing formalized training may be part of the CAF's culture, it is not the case for the remainder of the public service. Moreover, the personnel levels of some departments may complicate the attendance of the public service as some positions can be only one person deep, therefore requiring some positions and functions to go unfilled should a public servant attend a WoG course. While there exist organizations outside of government which offer opportunities for members of the federal public service to come together, share ideas, and build relationships, no study has yet been published on their effectiveness at increasing interdepartmental collaboration or reducing barriers created by culture.[183]

Ultimately, while it is recognized that culture is an important factor to interdepartmental collaboration, solutions aimed at reducing the significance of interdepartmental cultural barriers remain imperfect.

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[182] Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, "Demographic Snapshot of Canada's Federal Public Service, 2017," last modified 25 April 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/innovation/human-resources-statistics/demographic-snapshot-federal-public-service-2017.html#toc4. In terms of comparison, the NSP is offered to Colonels and Captains (Navy) in the CAF. 13 Senior Canadian officers attend the course each year as a stepping stone to become General and Flag Officers. There were 136 General and Flag Officers in the CAF in 2018.

[183] Policy Ignite, "Policy Ignite," last accessed 23 April 2019, http://policyignite.strikingly.com

Is the WGA Feasible and Desirable?

A central appeal underlying the WGA is the belief that there is greater efficiency in governmental departments working in an integrated manner, combining their resources and coordinating their efforts to achieve greater outcomes, than if they were working in isolation. While this premise may seem reasonable, the present study has demonstrated that it is not always the case. In some instances, forcing collaboration among departments whose mandates were at odds negatively affected the performance of all partners and decreased the effectiveness of efforts across multiple lines of operation. While the Arctic case study demonstrated greater levels of interdepartmental collaboration than Afghanistan, it is important to remember that the integration mostly focussed on the provision of safety and security in the Arctic. As such, neither case offers a successful demonstration of WoG integration across all priorities.

It is therefore worth questioning whether pan-governmental integration is possible or if WoG is a misnomer. Here, the context of both case studies is valuable. In Afghanistan, the expectation of collaboration towards a common goal placed pressure on each department to maintain a certain level of involvement in the improvement of security, developmental, and governance. In short, policy coherence and the joined-up strategy supplanted departmental expertise and specificity of mandates. In the Arctic, collaboration among departments was incentivized through a series of factors. The remoteness of the North and limited departmental resources created natural partnerships amongst departments with similar mandates. The threat of budgetary cut-backs created an impetus for departments to share their resources and capabilities. Finally, the proclivity of

departments to collaborate was largely limited to their spheres of expertise, as the ASWG illustrates.

As demonstrated throughout this paper, there is an inherent cost to operating as a WoG. Collaboration among departments demands compromise, accommodation of different cultures, and adaptation of processes. Departments are therefore naturally more inclined to collaborate when there is potential for mutual gains. While some means of decreasing the costs of collaboration have been presented, it remains unclear if they would succeed in overcoming every barrier. Indeed, following the release of the Manley Report, the PCO's involvement in Afghanistan increased the level of interdepartmental collaboration but failed to overcome the cultural and mandate-related barriers among departments. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider the possibility that either there is an inherent flaw in the concept of WoG or that its successful implementation demands a level of implication from the government beyond what it is willing to provide.[184]

Alternatively, as the Arctic case study suggests, it may be time to redefine the concept of the WGA to reflect a more siloed approach, not along departmental lines but competencies. This approach may increase the propensity of departments to collaborate as the benefits of integration would be more readily apparent. It would also decrease the impediments caused by departmental cultures and mandates given the shared focus amongst partners. Considering the likeliness that there will be specificities to every WoG engagement, this compartmentalized WGA should not become overly formal to the point of precluding certain departmental associations. Rather, it should allow for groupings of

[184] Owen, "3D Vision…

convenience according to the demands of the mission. Certainly, such a construct may require some form of coordination amongst governmental priorities, but this role could be filled by the PCO or a cabinet committee as previously recommended.

While not entirely divorced from the previous recommendation, departmental groupings could be developed along a supporting-supported relationship, with lead departments being named in accordance to the relevance of their mandate. In Afghanistan, this approach would have given the operational lead for security to the DND, with CSC, CBSA and CIVPOL supporting it directly. This could have helped alleviate some of the most overbearing and counterproductive bureaucratic redundancies imposed by START and DFAIT. Bureaucratic barriers could also have been reduced by either giving these organizations direct control over their budgets or creating a common defence related budget. Though this model does present some advantages, it may not be universally applicable as assuming the role of the lead department would be staff and coordination intensive. Accordingly, this approach may favour some departments based on size and departmental culture.

It is unavoidable that any change brought to Canada's WoG approach will bear advantages and disadvantages over the existing system. However, as the current conception of the WGA is ill-defined, studying past applications of the model will increase our understanding of its strengths and weaknesses and allow Canada to avoid potential pitfalls in the future.

CONCLUSION

Canada's WGA in Afghanistan and the Arctic share both similarities and differences. While the objectives of the two missions were similar and involved multiple

departments working across different priorities, the overall coordination of leadership structures which guided the application of the WoG strategy differed. Moreover, while departmental mandates and organizational culture were significant in both cases, in the Afghan case they led to increased tensions amongst partners whereas their influence in the Arctic was less disruptive.

While the similarities are valuable, the differences are most instructive. Indeed, in spite of the lack of direct involvement in the management of the WoG relationships in the Arctic, cooperation among partners was voluntary and appeared mutually beneficial. In Afghanistan, while the complex problems facing Canada's mission seemed to invite collaboration among departments, even pressure from the PCO could not overcome intrinsic barriers. There is an inherent assumption that collaboration among department and agency partners will naturally take place. Practice demonstrates that the inherent costs to collaboration can preclude interdepartmental collaboration unless they are outweighed by potential mutual gains. Moreover, both cases demonstrate that interdepartmental collaboration is largely contingent on the compatibility of mandates and culture.

The case studies offer several best practices which might facilitate the future implementation of an effective WoG strategy. First, early consultation among partners is critical. In designing an engagement built around the WoG concept, it is necessary to determine how departmental mandates will overlap and the implications of those redundancies. It is also important to establish an effective means for sharing information and coordinating actions on the ground from the beginning. As the Afghan case study demonstrates, operational and tactical level coordination centres are meaningless if they are not adequately staffed by representatives from the key departments and agencies.

Moreover, the appropriate delegations of authorities must be given to actors on the ground to enable effective decision making. While departmental authority structures were largely intact in the Arctic, the convoluted bureaucratic structures created by the START and DFAIT slowed down decision making and the implementation of projects and frustrated some of the departmental partners.

Beyond the structural factors, these case studies reveal the importance of fostering interdepartmental relationship building and an understanding of organizational cultures. Though various means to achieve these goals have been suggested, they remain limited in their effectiveness as they are largely inspired by the CAF's culture and may not be necessarily appropriate for other departments. Accordingly, further study is required to ascertain the means of reducing cultural barriers to cooperation and collaboration among departments.

Finally, this study has suggested that inherent flaws within the WGA may necessitate a redefinition of the concept. One problem is the apparent incompatibility of some departmental mandates. While this challenge was addressed in Afghanistan by having the PCO force CIDA and CAF to collaborate, this approach decreased the effectiveness of the development assistance efforts. An alternative inspired by the Arctic case study would be to adopt a compartmentalized WGA, where partners with similar mandates and fields of expertise work cooperatively toward a set of priorities which fits their mandate. The efforts of these different groupings could then be coordinated through a cabinet or deputy minister committee to ensure that the overall goals of the government are met. While these groupings may resemble silos of competency, their structure need not

be overly formalized to the point of precluding amendments based on changing situations on the ground.

Alternatively, departments could enter into supporting-supported relationships where the department whose mandate is the most pertinent to the task assumes the lead while others provide assistance. This model could resemble that of Transport Canada which, with the support of the CCG and the CAF, is responsible for monitoring and regulating oceanic pollution caused by naval vessels. While this solution may be feasible for larger departments which have an organizational structure that might facilitate this level of interdepartmental coordination, it may not work for smaller ones.

Overall, this paper has demonstrated the relevance and applicability of lessons from different case studies of the WGA to the concept in general. However, given that this study is based solely on two case studies, further research is necessary to validate the conclusions and recommendations. Additional research would prove timely as several problems that would seem to favour WoG solutions are currently emerging. For instance, Cyberspace currently affects all levels and departments of government as well as the private sector. Though the ASWG would seem to offer a potential model for coordinating intergovernmental actions and priorities, it is possible that further research would reveal superior approaches. Ultimately, this paper demonstrates that there is not only merit to the WoG concept but also a need for it. However, the implementation of the concept will not occur automatically and demands careful consideration and design.

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