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A CANADIAN DEFENCE PERSPECTIVE ON CONTRIBUTIONS TO GLOBAL PEACE AND SECURITY: IMPROVING STABILITY IN FRAGILE STATES

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JCSP 45

Master of Defence Studies

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PEACE AND SECURITY: IMPROVING STABILITY IN FRAGILE STATES**

Major Jonathan Evans

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Table of Contents

| | |
|--|-----------|
| Abstract | 3 |
| Definitions | 4 |
| Introduction | 2 |
| Part 1 - Background | 6 |
| 1.1 International engagements within fragile states | 6 |
| 1.2 Fragile state policy in Canada..... | 12 |
| 1.3 The Canadian call to increase contributions | 18 |
| 1.4 Canada’s role in the UN and NATO | 22 |
| 1.5 The changing nature of peace operations | 28 |
| 1.6 Blurring the line between military and civilian entities | 32 |
| 1.7 Defining peace operations | 36 |
| 1.8 Canadian institutional orientation | 40 |
| 1.9 Peace operations and stabilization | 43 |
| 1.10 Peace operations and hybrid warfare | 48 |
| Part 2 – Assessment of organizations | 51 |
| 2.1 Assessment criteria | 51 |
| 2.1.1 The Canadian challenge of interoperability | 52 |
| 2.1.2. CAF focus on Warfighting..... | 53 |
| 2.1.3 Canadian capacity building..... | 55 |
| 2.1.4 Canadian peace operations training and education. | 56 |
| 2.2 Assessment of ongoing Canadian initiatives | 58 |
| 2.2.1 The Peace Support Training Centre..... | 58 |
| 2.2.2 CA force structure and Orientation..... | 61 |
| 2.2.3 Peace and Stabilization Operations Program..... | 64 |
| 2.2.4 CANADEM..... | 67 |
| 2.3 Auxiliary analysis..... | 69 |
| 2.3.1 Pearson Peacekeeping Center..... | 70 |
| 2.3.2 UK Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) | 72 |
| Part 3 – Recommendations | 76 |
| 3.1 Increase GAC led integration practices | 77 |
| 3.2 Orient the military towards smart pledges | 78 |
| 3.3 Formalize CB efforts | 79 |
| 3.4 Create mechanisms for interdepartmental education | 81 |
| Conclusion..... | 83 |

Abstract

This project investigates the role Canada plays in the stabilization of fragile states in an attempt to improve the operationalization of Canadian foreign policy. Based on trends in global conflict and the refocusing of the international security apparatus, it reviews ongoing Canadian peace and security initiatives to provide recommendations to advance unilateral and multilateral fragile state engagement. The analysis seeks to determine how Canadian actions in fragile states can be developed from a defence perspective. Using practitioner, academic and civil society literature as a baseline, it appraises Canadian organizations to identify areas for growth. By concentrating on interdepartmental interoperability, institutional orientation and education, it argues that in order to better help global peace and security through action in fragile states, Canada must formalize cross departmental civilian-military/police education and integration processes. Specific recommendations include: increasing GAC-led integration practices, the orientation of the military towards smart pledges to peace operations, the formalization of Capacity Building (CB) efforts and the creation of mechanisms for interdepartmental education.

Definitions

Integration. When referring to the United Nations (UN), this term will indicate a mission in which “... there is a shared vision among all UN actors as to the strategic objectives of the UN presence at the country-level.”¹ In a more general sense, the term will be used to refer to the blending of separate entities into a functioning whole.² In the case of the government of Canada, it will be used in reference to interdepartmental interoperability and the merging of capabilities, security partners, and local actors.

Interoperability. “The ability of military systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to operate effectively together; especially crucial for communications equipment.”³ This term will also use in the more generic North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) definition, which describes it as “the ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve common objectives.”⁴

Intervention. Any application of pressure to a state, including conditional support programmes by major international financial institutions. The term will also be used to describe any additional consensual or non-consensual interference in the internal affairs of another state, to include any outright coercive actions, military, political and economic sanctions, blockades, diplomatic and military threats, and international criminal prosecutions.⁵

Peace Operations (Peace Support Operations) (see also Section 1.7). This term includes “preventive deployments, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations, diplomatic activities such as preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace building, as well as humanitarian assistance, good offices, fact-finding, [and] electoral assistance.”⁶

Smart Defence. “NATO introduced the concept of ‘Smart Defence’ in 2010 in response to defence spending cuts in a number of NATO countries, and concerns about the capabilities of different NATO militaries and their ability to operate together. Essentially, ‘Smart Defence’ is about burden sharing. Through better coordination and cooperation, burden sharing enables NATO countries to give up some capabilities — thus saving money — while specializing and upgrading in other areas. This, in turn, enables the alliance to retain its strength, even while individual members spend less on their militaries.”⁷

¹ United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines* (New York: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Department of Field Support, 2008), 53.

² Retrieved from <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/integrate>, accessed on May 7, 2019.

³ Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/ar/peacekeeping/sites/glossary/i.htm> accessed on May 7, 2019.

⁴ NATO, *North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Interoperability: Connecting NATO forces* (2017, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_84112.htm, accessed 6 Jul 2018).

⁵ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), 8.

⁶ Retrieved from <https://www.un.org/ar/peacekeeping/sites/glossary/p.htm>, accessed on May 7, 2019.

⁷ Michael Byers, *Smart Defence: A Plan for Rebuilding Canada’s Military* (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2015), 13.

Smart Pledges. “Commitments made in partnership between two or more UN Member States to better fill the needs of UN peacekeeping missions.”⁸

⁸ Retrieved from, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2017/11/united_nations_peacekeepingdefenceministerialsmartpledges.html, accessed on 7 May, 2019.

Introduction

Since winding down its mission in Afghanistan, Canada has undertaken whole-of-government responses to conflict-driven crises in Libya, Ukraine, Mali, Sudan and South Sudan, and currently Iraq, to say nothing of the significant outlays of development, humanitarian, and peacebuilding assistance that it has contributed to multilateral efforts in many more countries. So surely, after all this time and experience, it can be said with confidence that Canada does fragile states engagement well? Sadly, the all too frequent answer is “not yet.”⁹

In the 2016 book “From Kinshasa to Kandahar: Canada and Fragile States in Historical Perspective”, Michael Carrol, from Grant MacEwan University, provides a Canadian defence and strategic studies assessment concerning the continued need for Canada to engage in fragile states. Using an historical perspective, he asserts that Canada’s capacity to operate within this type of environment will continue to necessitate comprehensive governmental approaches to find solutions to emerging global trends. Because this critical aspect of Canadian policy and organizational orientation towards internationalism cuts across academic and practitioner contributions in the area of peace and stabilization, it remains primed for further research and analysis. With a deeper understanding of the international framework and models for interdepartmental and multinational integration, challenges faced by Canada in fragile states can be afforded better solutions. While attempting to refine potential expeditionary output, this project focuses on determining how Canadian contributions to global peace and stability in fragile states can be improved from a defence perspective.

The prospect for advancement in this area of research is also recognized by the United Nations (UN). As directed by the 2015 High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO) report, the UN seeks to evolve its approach to peace operations. The report

⁹ Carroll Michael, “From Kinshasa to Kandahar: Canada and Fragile States in Historical Perspective.” (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2016), 237.

highlights that “With a current generation of conflicts proving difficult to resolve and with new ones emerging, it is essential that UN peace operations, along with regional and other partners, combine their respective comparative advantages and unite their strengths in the service of peace and security.”¹⁰

By reviewing relevant literature, policy, and studies about the Canadian involvement in peace operations from Afghanistan to Iraq, this project provides analysis on growing security and development challenges faced when operating in fragile states. Looking into Canada’s ability to contribute to counter-insurgencies, stability operations and peace enforcement, this work explores the need for purpose-built intergovernmental organizations and processes to address this portion of the conflict spectrum. It does this by building on “Soldiers First” principles¹¹ but countering an overreliance on the repurposing of conventional warfighting entities.

This study confronts ongoing challenges to Canadian defence and security frameworks, including: the tension between contribution and results-based warfare, traditionalist and modernist military perspectives, the difficulty of defining peace and war in hybrid conflict, and the prioritization of regional or global contributions. We attempt to redefine peace operations to improve Canadian unilateral and multilateral contributions to global peace and stability in fragile states. Following a review of conceptual framework relied upon to resource relevant capabilities, we seek to appraise Canadian processes and institutions to critique current gaps in the government’s ability to provide relevant UN, NATO, and other global contributions.

After outlining international framework and the need for interdepartmental and international integration, this research looks to refocus institutional orientation onto relevant

¹⁰ United Nations, *Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People*. (New York: United Nations General Assembly Security Council, 2015), 9.

¹¹ Coombs Howard, ‘Soldiers First’: *Preparing the Canadian Army for Twenty-First Century Peace Operations*. (International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, 2018), 205–20.

security and development challenges. We look at Canada's capacity to contribute to global interventions by reviewing institutional capacity to operate in fragile states through a lens of education and comprehensive mission training. The motivation of this project is meant to better situate Canada's engagement with threats to global and national security, either unilaterally or through the UN and NATO. While looking into Canadian contributions to global peace and stability, the research gravitates towards the need and utility of whole of government approaches to peace, stability, and COIN operations to better inform Canadian methods of addressing fragile states. Overall, the conversation takes place within the realm of Canadian defence, security, and development. It leverages relevant Canadian and international literature as well as institutional frameworks to better inform the Canadian perspective on peace operations.

The project is divided into three sections, providing background in academic, government, and practitioner-based literature, a review of existing models for contributions to global peace and security, and finally, recommendations to improve the Canadian institutional orientation and approach to peace operations.

The first section highlights the need for change and growth in Canadian contributions. It outlines the prevalence of global engagements within fragile states and the evolution of relevant Canadian policy. Furthermore, the background identifies key challenges to interoperability for Canadians on operations and summarizes the changing nature of peace operations. It also identifies areas necessary for growth to occur, specifically in Canadian specialist contributions to UN and NATO operations. Finally, this section assesses the limited focus and resourcing of national capability and Canada's institutional inability to mirror policy aspirations.

The second section of the project conducts analysis of institutions currently mandated to address the trends identified in the first chapter. These include the Peace Support Training Center

(PSTC), Global Affairs Canada's (GAC) Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOP), and CANADEM.¹² In addition to highlighting current force structure concerns, this section outlines past and relevant entities that could be leveraged to bolster support to current organizations oriented toward the capability gap. These consist of the former Canadian based Pearson Peacekeeping Center (PPC) and the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) developed by the UK. This auxiliary analysis offers alternative approaches to orienting towards, preparing for, and addressing emerging challenges in fragile states. The second chapter also identifies existing institutional gaps and questions the government of Canada's ability to contribute relevant capabilities to UN and NATO missions. After highlighting organizational vulnerabilities, this section points to the CAF conventional warfighting bias as a limiting factor to Canadian contributions to multinational peace, stability, and COIN operations.

From practitioner reports, reviews of formalized and ad hoc programming, and academic research, this project identifies the need for Canadian institutional structures to orient towards relevant global threats. It argues that, in order to better help global peace and security through action in fragile states, Canada must formalize cross-departmental civilian-military/police education and integration processes.

The third and final section of the project finally provides a series of recommendations necessary for implementation.


¹² According to its website, CANADEM is "a Canadian international not-for-profit NGO dedicated to advancing peace and security through the rostering, rapid mobilization, and mission management of experts committed to international service with the UN, other IGOs, NGOs, and governments". www.canadem.ca.

Part 1 - Background

1.1 International engagements within fragile states

There is a prevailing trend of global engagements taking place within fragile states. A surge in human displacement and violent conflict caused by weak state infrastructure has been documented globally. A 2017 report from the Global Terrorism Database found that “... more countries experience violent conflict than at any time in nearly 30 years.”¹³ The recent increase in conflict not confined to state borders has been broadly recognized by the international community. A 2018 Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) project on trends in armed conflict found that intrastate conflict continues to challenge threat reduction efforts and has recently contributed to increased international involvement in fragile states as depicted in figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1. Number of Armed Conflicts by Conflict Type



Source: The 2018 PRIO Conflict Trends Project¹⁴

¹³ World Bank Group, *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict*. (Washington : World Bank, 2018), xvii.

¹⁴ Kendra Dupuy, *Trends in Armed Conflict 1946-2017* (Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2018), 2.

In 2016 the UN General Assembly noted that “this reality has accelerated momentum for countries at risk and for the international community to focus on improving efforts at preventing the outbreak, escalation, recurrence, or continuation of conflict.”¹⁵ The UN has acknowledged this trend as being substantial enough to change the focus of its operations. Since the 1990s, the UN has been working towards shifting “... away from managing and responding to crises and toward preventing conflict sustainably, inclusively, and collectively can save lives and greatly reduce these costs.”¹⁶

This trend has also been documented by prominent Canadians, as seen in a 2011 report from former Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) Maurice Baril on “the Future Roles for the Canadian Forces.” The report notes that:

Security is no longer exclusively measured in geographic borders that are physical. Maintaining secure borders requires analyses that assess the impact of economic variables, pandemics such as H1N1 and HIV/AIDS, people movement due to climate changes, and the nature of intra-state conflicts. Borders are permeable, and money, disease, migration, ideas, and technology impact on how foreign and defence policy is and will be determined.¹⁷

The notion of threats to global peace and stability as being solely the result of state on state conflict is very antiquated and has required a shift in Canadian defence planning and institutional orientation for a long time.

This former CDS perspective has been echoed by a German report and country study on approaches to global stabilization. The 2014 review of lessons learned from Germany, Canada, the UK and the US highlights state fragility as one of the most significant issues threatening the maintenance of global peace and security.¹⁸ The report identifies a “...consensus that such

¹⁵ World Bank Group, *Pathways for Peace...*, xvii.

¹⁶ *Idem*.

¹⁷ Baril Maurice, *Future Roles for the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa: Centre for International Policy Studies, 2011), 20.

¹⁸ Rotmann Philipp, *Stabilization: Doctrine, Organization and Practice Lessons for Germany from Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States*. (Berlin: Global Public Policy Institute, 2014), 11.

‘fragile states’ will become more relevant as a challenge and a task for international politics.”¹⁹

The account also brings to light the debate on the importance of the stabilization of fragile states to global peacebuilding and security governance. This German perspective enforces the emerging trend of stabilization efforts, regardless of it being defined as “... the broad promotion of stability, or more narrowly as the management of acute, occasionally chronic conditions of emergency (crises).”²⁰

This prominent challenge of globalization in the 21st century transcends humanitarian considerations. Since 2005, there has been a consensus within the international community recognizing the value in responding to the security and development challenges imposed by state fragility because of the ensuing economic and security impact on donor countries.²¹ Furthermore, in his 2011 book “Fragile States: Causes, Costs, and responses”, Wim Naude from the UN University argues that “[o]vercoming state fragility is one of the most important international development objectives of the 21st century.”²² He goes on to describe the depth of the challenge it presents to the international community. Citing the increase in state fragility as having dramatic impact on the design and implementation of development policy, he highlights this phenomenon’s ability to deprive millions of people through lack of authority, legitimacy and capacity.²³

There is growing international recognition that globalization paired with weak state infrastructure are contributing to an increasing need for western nations to facilitate stabilization overseas. In a 2018 PRIO project on conflict trends, it was noted that “... of the 48 intrastate

¹⁹ Idem.

²⁰ Idem.

²¹ Darren Brunk, *Whole-of-Society’ Peacebuilding: A New Approach for Forgotten Stakeholders*. (Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 71, no. 1, 2016), 62.

²² Wim Naudé et al, *Fragile States: Causes, Costs, and Responses: A Study Prepared by the World Institute for Development Economics Research of the United Nations University* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 1.

²³ Idem.

conflicts in 2017, external states contributed troops to at least one of the sides in 19 of them (40%).”²⁴ The trend of increased internationalization of intrastate conflict requires further attention because these types of conflict are typically “... on average are more violent, more difficult to solve, and last longer.”²⁵ The trend in military intervention is led by the United States, who is heavily invested in seven such conflicts (Mali, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia, and the global fight against Al Qaeda).²⁶

Past failed attempts to execute these sorts of missions in fragile states have informed better organization internationally. In 2004, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) formed the International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF).²⁷ This network allows contributors to monitor and assess their engagements in fragile and conflict-affected states. INCAF “has helped inform the international community’s first best-practice standard for effective peacebuilding, articulated in the 2007 ten principles for good international engagement in fragile states and situations (Fragile States Principles).”²⁸

Although there is an acknowledged requirement to improve the global capacity to address state fragility, there has been continued debate surrounding the use of humanitarian principles as justification for intervention as outlined by the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine. This debate centers around the “...extent to which human security concerns will dictate the role of the international community in taking action in situations of crises and override the state sovereignty principle.”²⁹ It has been noted by some developing countries that the use of human security

²⁴ Dupuy, *Trends in Armed Conflict...*, 3.

²⁵ *Idem.*

²⁶ *Idem.*

²⁷ Carroll, “From Kinshasa to Kandahar...,” 247.

²⁸ *Idem.*

²⁹ UNAC, *Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: Lessons from the Past, Building for the Future* (Ottawa: United Nations Association in Canada, 2007), 95.

principles to protect the world from large scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing can be used by western nations to disregard state sovereignty and support imperialist ends.³⁰ This debate continues in academic and political circles. As a lead developer of R2P doctrine,³¹ Canada subscribes to these human security principles, and to their use as grounds for legitimate intervention.

Although there is not a universally recognized definition of ‘fragile state’, in 2016 the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), now Global Affairs Canada (GAC), offered the following interpretation:

States are perceived as fragile when the government does not demonstrate the will and/or capacity to deliver on core state functions such as the enforcement of legitimate security and authority, the protection, promotion and implementation of human rights and gender equality, the rule of law, and even the most basic provision of services (e.g., in health and education, in enabling the private sector, and in environmental protection).³²

In most cases, states will be viewed as fragile from a Canadian lens if they pose “...a direct, or in most cases, indirect security threat to Canada.”³³

With fragile state policy seen as a means of dealing with threats to Canadian interests abroad, some have also interpreted the active pursuit of foreign stabilization as a means of addressing domestic terrorism. When speaking to the security threat to Canada, one must not oversimplify intervention in fragile states as a means of fortifying Canadian domestic and foreign security realms. The direct correlation between international intervention and domestic terrorism continues to be debated in Canadian security studies. Rob Huebert, a political scientist and associate professor at the University of Calgary, questions such an interpretation, writing

³⁰ *Idem.*

³¹ ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001)

³² Carroll, “From Kinshasa to Kandahar...,” 12.

³³ *Ibid.*, 21.

that “attempting to explain contemporary terrorism only as a result of failed and failing states is incomplete at best and simply wrong at worst.”³⁴ Furthermore, as a contributing or donor nation involved in addressing causes of fragility internationally, Canada’s tendency to treat the state as the principle cause of instability or failure can be misplaced.³⁵

Counter to this assertion, however, the UK perspective compliments the Canadian position on fragile state intervention, and provides an evolved interpretation of this policy dilemma. The Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) in the UK is a product of social justice.³⁶ It has been described as “the promotion of stability overseas is... seen as an activity that is compatible with British interests and British values alike. Both point in the direction of intervention.”³⁷ As Professor John Stone from the Department of War Studies at Kings College in London suggests, however, “... current Western reluctance to commit large forces to counterinsurgency operations suggests that alternative approaches need to be considered.”³⁸

As many donor states are looking to develop innovative approaches to handling state fragility and its impact on global security, the challenge it presents to the security realm is widely agreed upon. A 2014 UN report emphasized that more than two thirds of peacekeepers are deployed into areas with significant levels of violence, involving governments that lack clear political frameworks.³⁹ Missions in Darfur, CAR, Mali, DRC, and South Sudan are all affected by weak governance, armed actors, transnational criminal networks and terrorist organizations.⁴⁰

³⁴ Ibid, 21.

³⁵ Ibid, 243.

³⁶ John Stone, *Deterrence and Overseas Stability* (Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol 12 Issue 3, 2014), 670.

³⁷ Idem.

³⁸ Idem.

³⁹ David Curran, “More Than Fighting for Peace? Conflict Resolution, UN Peacekeeping, and the Role of Training Military Personnel” (New York: Springer, 2016), 136.

⁴⁰ Idem.

Multilateral efforts for peace and stabilization within fragile states remains prevalent. It is within this context that we will assess the evolution of Canadian policy and capabilities.

1.2 Fragile state policy in Canada

Canadian policy has emerged to support the idea of fragile state intervention, while its institutions have yet to develop reciprocal capacity across its departments. The emergence of relevant policy on fragile state initiatives can be linked back to Progressive Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney.⁴¹ At the time, Canada sought to expand government assistance programs under good governance policy and standard setting in international institutions. It was under this evolution in policy that Canada placed its support for intervention in fragile states.⁴²

Following the Mulroney years, the 1994 White Paper on defence made it clear that there was a distinct difference between matters of national security and internationalism under the auspices of humanitarian involvement relating to Canadian values. The White paper explains:

Even where Canada's interests are not directly engaged, the values of Canadian society lead Canadians to expect their government to respond when modern communication technologies make us real-time witnesses to violence, suffering and even genocide in many parts of the world.⁴³

The document highlights a need to act based on Canadian values and humanitarian principles, not explicitly for reasons of national security. Although the 1995 policy statement "Canada in the World" set relevant policy goals including the projection of Canadian values, it does not explicitly implicate DND in the refocusing of its institutions.⁴⁴ The government of Canada did

⁴¹ Carroll, "From Kinshasa to Kandahar...", 17.

⁴² *Idem*.

⁴³ *Ibid*, 19.

⁴⁴ 1995 Canadian Foreign policy set three goals, including: prosperity and employment, the promotion of global peace, and the projection of Canadian Values. To achieve these goals, the policy called to focus international trade, diplomacy and assistance, while not mentioning any other departmental changes. CIDA. *Canada in the World: Government Statement*. (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 1995), iii.

not mandate institutional reorientation to include fragile state intervention throughout the 1990s.⁴⁵

Canadian involvement on the Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) further evolved the Canadian political stance on the responsibility to protect (R2P) and fragile state intervention.⁴⁶ The 2001 commission involving members of the UN General assembly was founded under the authority of the Canadian Government and led to further discussions on Canadian policy, ultimately defining conceptual framework for intervention in fragile states.⁴⁷

Canadian involvement in the development of R2P principles highlights its strategic support for humanitarian intervention. Canadian policy over the last ten years has brought into question the pre-eminence of state sovereignty in a globalized world.⁴⁸ This political shift requires the alignment of national security priorities in order to mirror the risk that state fragility presents to Canadian values and interests.⁴⁹ Although Canadian policy was altered to reflect R2P, its institutions have not been properly oriented to the challenges of the 21st century.

In a policy review of the security development nexus in the U.S., UK and Canada, Eamonn McConnon, from the International Institute for Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction at Dublin City University, provides further perspective on the inability of Canadian institutions to keep up with policy. While looking specifically into the Canadian approach, McConnon argues that "... while the Canadian government has merged security and development in its defence and foreign policy discourse, its development agency CIDA [now GAC] has not brought security into development policy in any significant way."⁵⁰ In comparing the transition of the

⁴⁵ Carroll, "From Kinshasa to Kandahar...", 19.

⁴⁶ ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect...*

⁴⁷ Carroll, "From Kinshasa to Kandahar...", 246.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 27.

⁴⁹ *Idem*.

⁵⁰ Eamonn McConnon, *Risk and the Security-Development Nexus: The Policies of the US, the UK and Canada* (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019), 151.

U.K. and US into the 21st century security development nexus, he highlights Canada's unwillingness to address security in its development discourse.⁵¹

The Canadian institutional inability to merge the gap between security and development was evident during the Afghan years. While executing COIN operations, CAF lessons learned centered very closely around the development of a whole of government approach to addressing the security and development nexus in the region.⁵² Although the strategic approach to operations required drastic modifications following the first six years of its warfighting approach, these lessons learned can be applicable in future stabilization efforts. Former CDS Maurice Baril highlights the need to redefine defence priorities by stating in 2011:

Indeed, one can view current conditions in Somalia, Darfur, Sudan, and other regions and predict that counter-insurgency and “whole-of-government” decision making will require re-thinking and “formalizing” the imbedding of civil-military cooperation/coordination into the professional development of the multiple actors who respond to stabilization and reconstruction missions.⁵³

Once civilian Representatives of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK) were able to take the lead on the Canadian mission in 2009, this institutional disparity between government departments became even more evident. The Bureaucracy of CIDA demonstrated that it operated much differently than the CAF. Its approach was very centralized, employing a traditional decision-making model reliant upon senior managers in Ottawa.⁵⁴ In contrast, the CAF increasingly delegated authority throughout the mission as epitomized by Brigadier-General Jonathan Vance's “model village” program which pushed decision making to the front lines.⁵⁵ It became evident to CIDA that

⁵¹ Idem.

⁵² Baril, *Future Roles...*, 21.

⁵³ Idem.

⁵⁴ Carroll, “From Kinshasa to Kandahar...,” 176.

⁵⁵ Idem.

better integration with security partners and local decision making would be required in order to succeed in future destabilized environments.

The mission in Afghanistan also highlights the need for shifting focus within the CAF to better align with Canadian policy on fragile state intervention. From a historic perspective, the CAF orientation on traditional warfighting capabilities has been brought into question. Over the past 20 years, the organization has not engaged other professional militaries in combat. It has been argued there is no demonstrated need to develop and maintain capabilities in such areas as “...attacks on foreign air defences and control centers, combat involving tanks and other heavily armoured vehicles, or naval battles involving advanced air-and-missile defence systems.”⁵⁶ This line of thinking is supported by a report on “Smart Defence: A Plan for Rebuilding Canada’s Military” by Michael Byers. His project analyses 47 Canadian named missions between 2000 and 2014. The report concludes that “...more than half of the missions involved the deployment of personnel only, for tasks including training, providing strategic advice to foreign governments and militaries, reconstruction, monitoring and peacekeeping for both UN and non-UN operations, and conflict mediation.”⁵⁷ Findings such as these make strong arguments for the reorientation of CAF structures to better respond to the emerging nature of conflict. These observations also point to an ongoing debate within the CAF.

Since the end of the Cold War, the CAF identity has been stuck somewhere between peacekeeper and warfighter, without clear direction from its political masters. There are two conflicting perceptions in the CAF. The first perspective identifies Canada as a peacekeeper,

⁵⁶ Michael Byers, *Smart Defence: A Plan for Rebuilding Canada’s Military* (Ottawa: Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives, 2015), 15.

⁵⁷ *Idem.*

relying on Pearsonian traditions as a lens of viewing the organization.⁵⁸ The other defines Canada as a warfighter, using the two World Wars and Korea as supporting evidence.⁵⁹ In the book *Beyond Afghanistan: An International Security Agenda for Canada*, James Ferguson and Francis Furtado attempt to provide a vision for the future identity of the Canadian military. They argue that "...since the end of the Cold War, successive Canadian governments have steadily internalized the concept that the circumstances that might require use of the Canadian Forces are varied and difficult to predict."⁶⁰ The book goes on to note that for more than a decade Canada has become less engaged in UN peacekeeping operations. It highlights Canada's fall from a top ten contributor to being in the mid-fifties over the same period of time.⁶¹

Not only have Canadian UN contributions significantly dropped in recent years, the lack of institutional orientation towards UN missions has been well documented. Peacekeeper professional education and training are severely lacking⁶² and national strategic focus on this area of the conflict spectrum closely resembles pre-Somalia inquiry institutional ailments. Prior to the debacle that led to the disbandment of a warfighting unit – the Canadian Airborne Regiment – Canada's military was left searching for identity⁶³, a situation that parallels the current climate in some respects. The mission was allowed to exist outside of a well-defined peacekeeper narrative, creating an environment that led to events widely recognized as institutional failure⁶⁴.

⁵⁸ James Fergusson and Francis Furtado, "Beyond Afghanistan: An International Security Agenda for Canada." (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016), 185.

⁵⁹ Idem.

⁶⁰ Ibid, 189.

⁶¹ Idem.

⁶² Walter Dorn, *Unprepared for Peace?* (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2016).

⁶³ George Shorey, *Bystander Non-Intervention and the Somalia Incident* (Canadian Military Journal, vol 1 Iss 4, 2000), 28.

⁶⁴ Sherene Razak, *From The 'clean Snows of Petawawa': The Violence of Canadian Peacekeepers in Somalia* (Cultural Anthropology, Vol 15, Iss 1, 2000), 63.

In addition to limited UN specific training and contributions, Canada has shown minimal capacity to contribute to NATO missions that have successfully fostered peace and stability in recent years. There is circumstantial evidence to suggest that contemporary NATO missions have generated lasting peace and stability in fragile states – as Afghanistan and Libya reveal.⁶⁵ Past failures include a combination of problematic framing of what, when, and if intervention can be conducted in a manner that improves local and regional stabilization to move towards peacebuilding.⁶⁶ Further research is required to better understand the value proposition Canada can provide to NATO, the UN and other viable 21st century contributions to peace and stability operations.

Academics within Canadian security studies continue to propose institutional changes to address current trends affecting peace and stability globally. An example of this is found in Aisha Ahmad's 2017 article "A 21st Century Foreign Policy for Canada in MENA."⁶⁷ She argues that because of these emerging threats over the past two decades, the most important aspect of this area of study requires scholars to question conventional wisdoms and identify innovative approaches. Her article supports the need to move away from simplified state-based analytical models to better understand contemporary conflict zones.⁶⁸ Her work describes Canadian engagement in fragile states in the MENA region as:

...a multi-level game, played at the sub-state, domestic, regional, and international levels. This complex systems approach ... will save Canada from being dragged into civil war quagmires, great power entanglements, and even major war...[it is]...essential to maintain Canada's security at home and on the world stage.⁶⁹

⁶⁵ Carroll, "From Kinshasa to Kandahar...", 27.

⁶⁶ Idem.

⁶⁷ Aisha Ahmad, *A Twenty-First Century Foreign Policy for Canada in the Middle East and North Africa* (International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis 72, no. 3, 2017).

⁶⁸ Idem.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 4.

Contemporary security studies continue to display interest in non-state based problems and related policy recommendations. Taking into consideration these emerging trends, a review of Canadian policy remains topical. Looking into Canada's Defence Strategy for addressing current and emerging challenges to global peace and stabilization will help identify the changes necessary to better align Canadian policy and institutional orientation.

1.3 The Canadian call to increase contributions

To better understand the government of Canada's approach to peace and stabilization, it is necessary to assess relevant policy documents. A review of the Canadian foreign policy, Defence Minister mandate, and strategic CAF guidance gives insight into Canada's strategy in fragile states. Looking at the three documents relative to capacity and resourcing, inconsistencies between political and institutional orientation become apparent. As of 2017 the government of Canada formally recognizes the threat of violent conflict, terrorism and complex security challenges to include everything from transnational crime to illegal trafficking as being within the Canadian bailiwick.⁷⁰ Its ability to act on this threat, however, requires further analysis.

Looking at Canada's foreign policy – published as “Canada's Feminist International Assistance Policy” in 2017 – from a lens of global peace and stability, the desire to increase Canadian involvement in fragile states becomes evident. The document affirms that “Canada is committed to reducing threats and facilitating stability and development in fragile states and states affected by armed conflict.”⁷¹ The policy identifies an action plan that takes a whole-of-government approach to ensure sustainable interventions in the developing world.⁷² The

⁷⁰ Global Affairs Canada. “Canada's Feminist International Assistance Policy.” (Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2017), 57.

⁷¹ *Idem*.

⁷² *Ibid*, 58.

document formally connects security and development under a comprehensive approach,⁷³ while also recognizing the continued role of the international community in providing peace and security in fragile states.⁷⁴

Global Affairs Canada (GAC) has been charged with managing Canadian action in fragile states on behalf of the government. The organization has established the Peace and Stabilization Operations Programme (PSOP) to manage process and procedures for Canadian contributions to global peace and stability. According to its website, in addition to working with the RCMP under the Canadian Police Arrangement, GAC works with the Department of National Defence to improve Canadian contributions to peace operations.⁷⁵ Although further investigation into the program will be conducted in the next section of this project, initial findings show that the program does not include professional education and an increase to Canadian interdepartmental training beyond ad hoc initiatives. The entity seemingly only retains strategic level focus. As a relatively new program, further analysis on its impact to operational level interoperability is required to determine whether or not it has been able to operationalize Canadian foreign policy.

Similar disparity between policy and orientation can be found in the department of National Defence. Looking at the Minister of National Defence mandate letter and contrasting it with institutional reform and operational output, the chasm between political guidance and the institution becomes evident. On November 12, 2015, a public letter from the Prime Minister mandated the Minister of National Defence to increase the quality and quantity of Canadian

⁷³ *Idem*.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 57.

⁷⁵ Canada, “Peace and Stabilization Operations Program,” 2018. https://international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/response_conflict-reponse_conflits/psop.aspx?lang=eng#a2.

military contributions and coordination with the UN.⁷⁶ He was to work with the Minister of Foreign Affairs on three items, two of which relating directly to contributions to peace operations. The first one required him to “... help the United Nations respond more quickly to emerging and escalating conflicts and providing well-trained personnel to international initiatives that can be quickly deployed, such as mission commanders, staff officers, and headquarters units.”⁷⁷ The second was to lead “... an international effort to improve and expand the training of military and civilian personnel deployed on peace operations.”⁷⁸


Although a detailed analysis of Canadian institutional orientation will be provided in the second section of this project, it is important to identify the disparity between policy and orientation as part of the background. Canadian contribution to the UN since the Trudeau government took office has been researched in depth by Dr Walter Dorn from the Canadian Forces College, who has indicated that the Trudeau government has “... decreased the contribution during its first two and a half years in office to an all-time low of nineteen military personnel.” This trend is visually represented in figure 1.2.

⁷⁶ Justin Trudeau, *Minister of National Defence Mandate Letter* (Ottawa: Office of the Prime Minister, 2015).

⁷⁷ *Idem.*

⁷⁸ *Idem.*

Figure 1.2 Canada's rank among nations contributing uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping, 1991 to October 2018



Source: Tracking the Promises 2019⁷⁹

Amongst the maintenance of traditional warfighting capabilities, strategic guidance to Canada's military has also hinted towards developing capabilities to assist the militaries of states vulnerable to destabilization. Canada's current military policy *Strong Secure Engaged* (SSE) proposes the use of Capacity Building (CB) to "support the security of other nations and their ability to contribute to security abroad" as a core mission for the CAF.⁸⁰ Although retaining all other core missions from previous documents has diluted an attempt to focus on this area, this is a new component of Canadian military policy that mirrors Canada's stance on fragile state engagement. In a 2018 Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) analysis of the SSE against its predecessors, CB is the only core mission without a counterpart in the past two foundational documents.⁸¹ As made evident in the next section, CB is listed as core mission for the CAF, however, there is no formalized process or entity responsible for its generation or

⁷⁹ Dorn, Walter, *Tracking the Promises: Canada's Contributions to UN Peacekeeping*, 2019. <http://walterdorn.net/256>.

⁸⁰ Canada, *Strong Secure Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2017), 17.

⁸¹ Murray Dixson and Elizabeth Inrig, *2017 Defence Policy Review: Impact on Capability Based Planning* (Toronto: Defence Research and Development Canada, 2017), 10.

execution in the regular or reserve force in the CAF. The force generation of CB capabilities involves the repurposing of personnel and equipment outside the managed readiness planning and is typically executed in an ad hoc manner⁸².

As seen by reviewing the three documents, Canadian policy and ministerial mandates have hinted towards a re-orientation to increase involvement in peace operations, however, a deeper look into institutional progress is required. In the face of continued pressure on government departments to provide traditional outputs without significantly resourcing and forcing change, a better understanding of Canada's role in peace operations could help to re-establish a niche in global peace and stabilization.

1.4 Canada's role in the UN and NATO

Because of the size of its military and partnerships with like-minded nations, Canada subscribes to contribution-based expeditionary operations. Unilateral Canadian intervention only takes place in the form of basic diplomatic initiatives. Similar to traditional military alliances, Canada's contributions to peace operations requires an approach that works well between government departments and fits within the structure of the UN and/or NATO. This necessitates an extremely flexible and well educated military capable of rapidly adopting new processes and partners to meet the aims of the Canadian government. Contributions to multilateral military, police, and civilian peace operations continue to necessitate organizational change as models of warfare differ, and international organization evolve.

The Canadian subscription to contribution warfare has a profound impact on CAF procurement and orientation. While appraising the CAF procurement plan for the Center for Policy alternatives, Michael Byers points out that "instead of operating aircraft carriers or

⁸² Based on author's 15 years of experience as a member of the Canadian Army.

nuclear-powered submarines, we leave tasks requiring those capabilities to the United States, United Kingdom and France.”⁸³ As a relatively small military, Canada has relied upon these burden sharing principles for its defence planning. Its development of specializations for peace operations need to start adopting these same principles as these are the types of missions the CAF are being tasked with, and the type of equipment they use and need.⁸⁴

As seen in policy direction and government posturing, Canada is evolving its approach to contribution warfare into smart pledges to peacekeeping, necessitating flexibility on the part of the CAF. During the November 2017 UN Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial conference, the government announced that it would be moving away from traditional force contributions to providing high demand or niche capabilities.⁸⁵ This focus would see contributions to international peacekeeping through training assistance, and other CB initiatives.⁸⁶ The concept reflects emerging Canadian fragile state policy, highlighting the importance of “protecting those at risk with comprehensive international strategies aimed at strengthening fragile societies, and increasing effectiveness in generating and deploying peacekeeping resources.”⁸⁷

In reaction to this announcement, Howard Coombs, from the Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC), argues that although smart pledges will involve technical expertise, they still require well rounded soldiers capable of supporting sustainable and integrated peace operations. In his article “‘Soldiers first’: Preparing the Canadian Army for twenty-first century peace operations”, he argues that “These forces need to be joint, capable of working within coalition or alliance operations, and encompass sea, land, air, and space.”⁸⁸ The article further emphasizes

⁸³ Byers, *Smart Defence...*, 14.

⁸⁴ Langille, Peter. *Improving United Nations Capacity for Rapid Deployment* (New York: International Peace Institute, 2014), 14.

⁸⁵ Coombs, *Soldier First...*, 218.

⁸⁶ *Idem.*

⁸⁷ *Idem.*

⁸⁸ *Idem.*

the need for military contingents to be prepared to work intimately with partners, such as GAC. He points to the importance of generating forces prepared for the demands of the 21st century, quickly and when required.⁸⁹ He highlights that beyond developing specific expertise, the professional education of Canadian soldiers is necessary for developing their ability to think critically and creatively.⁹⁰

The limits of Canadian unilateral intervention for conventional operations also drive further need for analysis into the frameworks for force generation and employment of CAF members on peace operations. More focus on this area of defence and security could improve organizational orientation. Because Canada is unable to adopt sustained unilateral intervention, and because rehabilitating failing states is long term and costly, the Canadian approach will likely continue to be multilateral.⁹¹ Fragile states do not just require restoration of order, but technical, political and economic support, integrating expertise across branches of the public sector – which, due to agency protocols and priorities, makes execution difficult.⁹²

The Canadian role in global peace and stabilization rests between tensions in national interest, NATO structures and UN processes. Canadians assigned to UN peacekeeping tend to occupy critical command, intelligence and logistic positions, similar to American and Danish forces.⁹³ It has also been argued that some of Canada's work to strengthen international peace and security is done outside UN operations.⁹⁴ This points to a need for flexible and specialized soldiers able to operate within fragile states with continually changing structures, processes and organizations.

⁸⁹ Idem.

⁹⁰ Idem.

⁹¹ Carroll, "From Kinshasa...", 24.

⁹² Ibid, 25.

⁹³ Ferguson, "Beyond Afghanistan...", 189.

⁹⁴ Idem.

In addition to integrating with interstate partners and organizations to complete missions, the CAF needs to prepare for operations in a comprehensive manner to practically apply human security approaches. The UN Association in Canada's 50th Anniversary report recommends that the Government of Canada strengthens its coordination among Canadian actors deployed in peacekeeping missions, including troops, police, humanitarian workers, NGOs, and civilian experts.⁹⁵ It enforces the need for the government to work towards enhancing its approach to human security by supporting various related department initiatives, including academic research on the practical application of human security, as well as the practical implementation of R2P.⁹⁶

In defining future roles of the CAF, determining how multilateralism is structured and peace operations are executed is vital. Regardless of nomenclature,

peacekeeping in the twenty-first century is framed by “smart power,” which requires the use of well-trained military forces married with diplomacy, development, economics, human rights, and a host of alliances and partnerships that build an environment where the cost of war is more than the price of peace.⁹⁷


Looking at how peace operations can impact structuring of the CAF, it is necessary to refer to models provided by American joint doctrine for Warfighting, which is a key driver of NATO operations. The model also impacts how the CAF remains structured to best mirror and integrate with its closest allies. Figure 1.3 depicts the traditional approach to 21st century warfighting found in U.S. Joint Force Doctrine:

⁹⁵ UNAC, “*Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding...*”, 103.

⁹⁶ *Idem*.

⁹⁷ Baril, “Future Roles...”, 25.

Figure 1.3 U.S. Doctrinal Model of Joint Combat




Source: 2011 U.S. Joint Planning Doctrine⁹⁸

A refined representation of 21st century conflict – and a seemingly more Canadian approach – is articulated by a 2018 World Bank Group (WBG) report titled “Pathways for Peace.” As seen in figure 1.4, the WBG incorporates more of the relevant actors needed to fulfill Canadian policy mandates and UN processes.

⁹⁸ United States, *Joint Planning Doctrine 5* (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), 9.

Figure 1.4 - Sustained Approach to Operations



Source: World Bank Group⁹⁹

The debate between supporting either UN or NATO efforts for peace and stabilization is limited because of Canadian political necessity to support both. A comparison between the two requirements, however, is useful in grasping the competing pressures placed on CAF force generation. In his article “After Afghanistan: Canada’s Return to UN Peacekeeping”, Michael Byers recognizes the multiple hats worn by the CAF, but proposes that “...peacekeeping should represent a larger proportion of our discretionary missions than it does today.”¹⁰⁰ Among many supporting arguments for the UN, he points to several of its past successful missions while attempting to identify the many ongoing changes to the nature of peacekeeping¹⁰¹.

⁹⁹ World Bank Group, *Pathways for Peace...*, 284.

¹⁰⁰ Byers, “After Afghanistan...”, 34.

¹⁰¹ “Examples of successful UN peacekeeping missions include: 1992-1993, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) stabilized and administered an entire country, ran an election, and managed a transition to a power-sharing government with strong public support, while sidelining the notorious Khmer Rouge. The UN Peacekeeping Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) from 1992 to 1994, and the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) from 1999 to 2002, had similar mandates and successful outcomes. The UN Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) from 1991 to 1995 successfully demobilized the FMLN guerilla organization, as well as military

This well-informed academic perspective, however, has a history of being repressed by political factors. Over the past two decades, the focus of the Canadian government has pushed for alignment with principal allies and institutional commitments.¹⁰² This is reinforced by Canada's increased connection to NATO and use of military entities as a means of intervention for stability.¹⁰³ Although likely a false dichotomy between maintaining general combat capability within the CAF and supporting UN requests for Canadian participation in peacekeeping missions, tension is placed on the identity and orientation of the CAF when attempting to fulfill a wide spectrum of government expectations.¹⁰⁴

While looking to contribute to global peace and stabilization, national interest is a key factor in determining what capabilities are to be maintained and employed. Regardless of which international organization assets are declared, "Ottawa has tended to look at failed states in relation to specific national interests."¹⁰⁵ There is a need to look for the right balance between security considerations and economic/political realm for Canadian intervention in fragile states.¹⁰⁶ A more informed approach to this Canadian balancing act necessitates a deeper understanding of emerging trends in peace operations.

1.5 The changing nature of peace operations

The evolution of peace operations has been widely recognized by the international community as having a direct impact on the capabilities required to execute UN mandated or sanctioned missions. A 2009 report from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

and police units implicated in serious human rights abuses, and also trained a new national police force. The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) from 2005 to 2011 led to the end of the civil war, a referendum, and the relatively peaceful secession of South Sudan." Byers, "After Afghanistan..." 35.

¹⁰² Carroll, "From Kinshasa to Kandahar..." 23.

¹⁰³ Idem.

¹⁰⁴ Ferguson, "Beyond Afghanistan..." 190.

¹⁰⁵ Carroll, "From Kinshasa to Kandahar..." 23.

¹⁰⁶ Idem.

(UNDPKO) entitled “A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping” attempts to articulate these anticipated changes. The article synthesizes its argument by stating: “Simply put, the scale and complexity of peacekeeping today are mismatched with existing capabilities... [requiring]... more predictable, professional, and adaptable capacities.”¹⁰⁷

In 2018, these findings were further enforced by the development of “Action for Peacekeeping.”¹⁰⁸ The latest UN declaration on peacekeeping echoes the 2009 projection to move beyond a number-based methodology toward a qualitative approach to capabilities.¹⁰⁹ In 2018, UN member states were encouraged to “...commit to provide well trained and well-equipped uniformed personnel and to support the effective development and delivery of peacekeeping training.”¹¹⁰ The 2018 call for action identifies the need to strengthen multidimensional peacekeeping by increasing national ownership and capacity.¹¹¹ The latest declaration also reinforces 2009 projections by recommending the enhancement of “... collaboration and planning between the UN and relevant international, regional and sub-regional organizations and arrangements.”¹¹² Relevant to the Canadian contribution dilemma, the continued shift towards the UN’s use of “...regional, bilateral and multinational actors and their various instruments to assist in implementing its decisions,”¹¹³ regenerates the diversity of organizations for Canada’s contribution to international peace and security.

¹⁰⁷ UNDPKO, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting A New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping* (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2009): 3.

¹⁰⁸ UN, *Secretary-General’s Initiative on Action for Peacekeeping* (New York: United Nations, 2018), 4.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid*, 5.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid*, 4.

¹¹¹ *Idem*.

¹¹² *Idem*.

¹¹³ UNDPKO, *A New Partnership Agenda...*, 2.

The emerging trend of peace operations has also been seen as moving away from peacekeeping and towards peace enforcement. This change has been initiated by the demand placed on peacekeeping organizations.¹¹⁴ The HIPPO report concluded in 2015 that “...first and foremost... dynamics of conflict have changed to the point that so too must the concepts behind peace operations.”¹¹⁵ The report recognizes significant challenges faced by contemporary peacekeepers in complex conflict settings without having the capability to enforce UN mandates.¹¹⁶

The evolution of peace operations is epitomized by the 2013 creation of a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the Democratic Republic of Congo. UN resolution 2098 in 2013 set a precedent to “... neutralize and disarm armed actors in the DRC.”¹¹⁷ Although the HIPPO report attempts to avoid the permanent operationalization of this effect, the demand for this mandate in the DRC is widely recognized.

In addition to an increase in peace enforcement mandates, the UN has amplified its stabilization efforts. As noted in a report from the UNDPKO, beyond traditional peacekeeping roles on operation, the need to provide stabilization to weak governance is on the rise. The 2014 “UN General Assembly Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in all their Aspects” identified an increasing need for expanding peacekeeping into stability operations. The report states that

... where political openings present themselves, UN peacekeeping is providing expertise in strengthening the rule of law, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform, democratic processes, mine action and core

¹¹⁴ Christian Breede, *Special (Peace) Operations: Optimizing SOF for UN Missions* (International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis, Vol 73, Iss 2, 2018), 231.

¹¹⁵ Idem.

¹¹⁶ United Nations, *Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting Our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership and People* (United Nations General Assembly Security Council), 17.

¹¹⁷ Curran, David. *More Than Fighting for Peace?...*, 137.

government functions to begin to progressively consolidate peace in the country.¹¹⁸

Although not expressly mentioned by name, these responsibilities issued to peacekeepers mirror the capabilities required for counter insurgencies and stabilization missions.

Similarities between UN peace operations and stabilization efforts has been a recent area of academic discussion. In his 2017 article, “Stabilization: A Cross-cutting Task to Overcome Imminent Violent Conflict,” Andreas Wittkowsky recognizes the prominence of stabilization in contemporary UN peacekeeping. In addition to the four recognized UN stabilization missions,¹¹⁹ the article compares four additional missions not recognized as stabilization by the UN. The article determines that because of the similarities among all of the missions it is difficult to distinguish a line between the 8 operations.¹²⁰

Additional overlap between shaping efforts to stabilization and peacekeeping is the employment of Special Operations Forces (SoF). Christian Breede, from RMCC, points to the work of Grand Martin and Shamir Ben-Ari in laying the foundation for the use of SoF in UN Peacekeeping. In his 2018 article “Special Peace Operations: Optimizing SoF for UN Missions,” the emerging importance of SoF in peacekeeping as well as the challenges involved in its cultivation is brought to the fore.¹²¹ The emerging UN requirement for this capability reflects the changing nature of peace operations.

With evolving operating environments and the resulting need for interoperability between organizations, focus on the generation and development of peacekeeping capabilities becomes

¹¹⁸ United Nations. *Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations* (Report of the United Nations Secretary General, 2014), 2.

¹¹⁹ In Haiti (MINUSTAH), the DR Congo (MONUSCO), Mali (MINUSMA) and the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).

¹²⁰ Andreas Wittkowsky, *Stabilization: A Cross-Cutting Task to Overcome Imminent Violent Conflict* (Berlin: Center for International Peace Operations, 2017), 2.

¹²¹ Breede, *Special Peace Ops...*, 226.

critical. The UN and Canadian organizations have formally recognized the need for peacekeepers to be prepared through training and education in contemporary peacekeeping contexts.¹²²

Because UN mandates require in depth cooperation between different components of a peace operation, organizations, and local actors, the relationship between civilian and military entities remains vital.¹²³ A deeper look into coordination between the two entities in relation to UN missions would provide further clarity on the impact of contemporary peace operations on Canadian contributions.

1.6 Blurring the line between military and civilian entities

Research and practitioner reports have identified Civilian-Military Coordination (CIMIC) as a vital aspect of contemporary peace operations. Interoperability between these entities are intrinsic requirements for conflict prevention, a military conducting counter insurgency operations, and enabling the transition from peacekeeping to peacemaking. UNSCR 24-36 2018 welcomed the “... contribution of peacekeeping operations to a comprehensive strategy for sustaining peace, and noting with appreciation the contributions that peacekeepers and peacekeeping missions make to peacebuilding.”¹²⁴

In her 2018 article “Challenges and Prospects for Interoperability in UN Peace Operations”, practitioner and academic Gaëlle Rivard Piché recognizes the continued importance this relationship can have on UN processes. The article identifies the many objectives that require close interaction between civilian and military actors, but points to a lack of cooperation between local stakeholders, and limited resources in the face of the challenging relationship.¹²⁵

¹²² UNAC, “*Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding...*”, 14.

¹²³ Gaëlle Rivard Piché, *Challenges and Prospects for Interoperability in UN Peace Operations: A Look at Haiti* (International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, Vol 73, Iss 2, 2018), 247.

¹²⁴ United Nations, *United Nations Security Council Resolution 2436* (New York: United Nations, 2018), 3.

¹²⁵ Rivard Piché, *Challenges and Prospects...*, 251.

She highlights a civil-military divide that is well documented, and identifies weak cross-jurisdictional communication between peacekeeping and humanitarian clusters in general as causing a lack of coherence on missions.¹²⁶ The processes identified in the article as vital to achieving UN objectives include the protection of civilians and SSR, among many others that could have been analysed. She argues that a lack of guidance on how to approach the division of labour and the employment of differing skill sets prevent objectives from being met.¹²⁷ The well documented arguments presented in the article point to further need for education and training for Canadian peacekeepers to move them beyond the warfighting institutions from which they are poached.

The increasing need for cooperation between military and civilian roles on peacekeeping missions is a controversial topic for many humanitarian organizations. The dynamic between the two entities on UN missions was debated in depth at the Canadian UNAC Peacekeeping International Panel Series. A large part of the panel's time was spent discussing the role of NGOs in supporting a human security approach - especially due to the changing implications of conflict. These changes were identified as being: the increase of civilian casualties vice military, missing people, the proliferation of small arms, women and children in conflict, and the politicization of humanitarian aid.¹²⁸ The panel identified this as a "...blurring of lines of assistance between military, humanitarian and development actors, as organizations traditionally focused on state security begin to adopt a human security approach."¹²⁹ The Panel argued further

¹²⁶ Ibid, 249.

¹²⁷ Ibid, 247.

¹²⁸ UNAC, *Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding...*, 98.

¹²⁹ Idem.

regarding the "... dichotomy between the military providing humanitarian assistance, and military support."¹³⁰

The debate on the merging of the security and humanitarian sectors continues to drive a wedge between international actors. The militarization of aid reduces the image of impartial NGOs and contributes to mistrust between governments.¹³¹ Also important to the debate is the recognition that "...a relative level of security must be in place before any delivery of aid can take place, and that beneficiaries do not differentiate between which actors deliver the food or water."¹³²

In addition to the multiple perspectives in the discussion, an increased reliance on human security principles has complicated Canada's current models for crises response. Traditional military based organizations must work towards objectives often considered lower in priority. These include the need to train to achieve security and humanitarian objectives while participating on peacekeeping missions.¹³³ Lessons taken from this debate include the evolving nature of training needs and the importance of strong partnerships in the field.¹³⁴

As an advocate for human security, Canada needs to consider its implications in connecting security and development initiatives. The overlap between these departments can be found in the clear link between peacekeeping, peacebuilding and human security.¹³⁵ Specific tasks found in this overlap include:

clearing of anti-personnel land-mines, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants, DDR of child soldiers, promoting the rule of law (ending of impunity) and supporting security sector reforms (SSR),

¹³⁰ Idem.

¹³¹ Ibid, 98.

¹³² Idem.

¹³³ Idem.

¹³⁴ Ibid, 23.

¹³⁵ Ibid, 93.

reforming the police and justice systems, and working towards good governance.¹³⁶

Building on the recognition of Civil-military overlap in human security initiatives, its utility in response to hybrid threats has become more relevant to the emerging nature of conflict. In their 2018 article on Civil-Military response to Hybrid Threats, Eugenio Cusumano and Marian Corbe argue that “the increased threat of hybrid warfare has created a greater need for military and non-military actors to work together to find solutions. This includes the participation of militaries, ministries, development agencies, international institutions, NGOs and the private sector.”¹³⁷

With blurred traditional areas of responsibility and ill-defined roles for civilian and military entities, Canada needs further clarification on its approach to human security initiatives. An improved definition will assist in the development of a multifunctional response strategy to Canadian and international involvement in conflict riddled societies – as seen recently in Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan.¹³⁸ It is clear that the 3D concept¹³⁹ coming out of Afghanistan obscures the lines between political/military intervention and development, which confuses NGO impartiality and limits humanitarian space for them to work.¹⁴⁰ Furthermore, military based organizations in a humanitarian context infringe on development as it can be interpreted as political intervention.¹⁴¹ While recognizing these ongoing debates, it is important to clarify Canada’s definitions of peace operations and confirm the need for better institutional orientation in addition to strategic direction.

¹³⁶ Idem.

¹³⁷ Eugenio Cusumano and Marian Corbe, *A Civil-Military Response to Hybrid Threats* (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018), 2.

¹³⁸ UNAC, *Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding...*, 2.

¹³⁹ Defence, Diplomacy and Development

¹⁴⁰ UNAC, *Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding...*, 98.

¹⁴¹ Idem.

1.7 Defining peace operations

To understand Canada's role in peace operations, it is important to encompass the evolution of peacekeeping from a UN perspective, and then reflect on what this progress means to the Canadian approach to this portion of the conflict spectrum. Juxtaposing the evolution of UN peacekeeping and ongoing debates internal to Canadian defence and security helps identify roadblocks to improving Canadian contributions to global peace and security.

Peacekeeping remains the cornerstone of the UN as an organization, and its evolution over the years speaks to the complications of the current operating environment as discussed above. These operations "...range from large military deployments to small observer forces, from complex integrated missions to specialist police, rule of law and other civilian operations."¹⁴² Although difficult to define, UN peacekeeping operations are all requested by the Security Council and executed in accordance with the basic principles of peacekeeping – consent, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence and in defence of the mandate.¹⁴³ The missions provide transitional security presence to which different political, police, and civilian components are usually integrated.¹⁴⁴


To better situate the evolution of peacekeeping relevant to the operating environment, and the wide spectrum on which it is deployed, it is necessary to review the treatment of consent and impartiality over the years. The move from traditional to second generation peacekeeping, and then, finally, the typology of peace operations, demonstrates the evolution of these two basic peacekeeping principles. Figure 1.5 depicts the parameters and activities of these missions as originally designed.

¹⁴² United Nations, *A New Partnership Agenda...*, 3.

¹⁴³ *Idem.*

¹⁴⁴ *Idem.*

Figure 1.5 - Traditional peacekeeping




Source: Foreign Affairs Institute¹⁴⁵

Figure 1.6 depicts the evolution to wider Peacekeeping, also known as second generation Peacekeeping. As you can see, the principles of impartiality and consent are on an axis to recognize a nuanced approach to traditional UN operations.

¹⁴⁵ Jocelyn Coulon, *Whatever Happened to Peacekeeping? The Future of a Tradition* (Ottawa: Foreign Affairs Institute, 2010), 34.

Figure 1.6 Wider Peacekeeping (2nd Generation)




Source: Foreign Affairs Institute¹⁴⁶

The third evolution of peacekeeping sees it under the umbrella of peace operations and directly related to conflict prevention. Figure 1.6 depicts their typology.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, 35.

Figure 1.7 – Typology of peace operations



Source: Foreign Affairs Institute¹⁴⁷

The developing mandates of ongoing missions bring into question the treatment of consent and impartiality by current UN Peacekeeping doctrine. The Report of the Training for Peace Oslo Doctrine Seminar held on 14 and 15 May 2008, remarks that the 2008 UN Capstone doctrine

... positions itself around the current dominant form of consent-based robust UN peacekeeping operations, recent UN Security Council mandates in contexts such as Darfur, Chad and the Central African Republic, appear to be steering the UN increasingly into stabilisation-type missions. This trend raises the question whether this new doctrine is only valid for consent-based UN

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, 39.

peacekeeping operations, or whether it will guide all types of UN peace operations.¹⁴⁸

The broader use of the term peace operation does not replace other UN nomenclature, but reflects its evolution as well as the increased use of peace enforcement. According to the UN, the term “peace operation” is a wider concept used to define activities supporting the peace process.¹⁴⁹ Intervention of a third party in a conflict for the purposes of conflict resolution can take many forms, and is executed by a diversity of players including the EU, AU, and NATO or unilaterally by a state or a multilateral coalition.¹⁵⁰ The 2015 HIPPO report recommended that the UN continue to develop more integrated global-regional peace security partnerships in response to the more challenging crises of tomorrow.¹⁵¹ The more holistic term of peace operations better suits the concept of increased integration. According to the UN glossary of terms it “... encompasses peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and any other activity that may help avert or bring an end to conflict, either between states or within a state.”¹⁵² On the spectrum of conflict, the term covers any operation from normal diplomacy, up to and including most conflict short of major theatre war.¹⁵³

1.8 Canadian institutional orientation

With evolving concepts of peace operations in the UN, it is necessary to appraise Canadian operations and capabilities from a defence perspective. The CAF has robust experience

¹⁴⁸ Cedric de Coning et al, *UN Peacekeeping Operations Capstone Doctrine* (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2008), 2.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, 37.

¹⁵⁰ Idem.

¹⁵¹ United Nations, *Report of the High-Level Independent Panel...*, 10.

¹⁵² Breede, *Special Peace Ops...*, 231.

¹⁵³ Idem.

in UN-sanctioned peace enforcement in Afghanistan.¹⁵⁴ These operations increased CAF focus on the protection of civilians, viewed as population security in a COIN environment.¹⁵⁵

While recognizing the similarities between these two mandates, a 2010 Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute report by Jocelyn Coulon assessed the position and relationship between the tradition of peacekeeping and the direction of Canadian defence mandates.¹⁵⁶ The report identifies that Canadian governments have "...preferred to commit Canada to military interventions outside the UN structure, and in the particular case of Afghanistan, in a counter-insurgency mission."¹⁵⁷ The report points to a strong history of Pearsonian traditions, and reminds Canadians of the emerging importance of peace operations as "...a key instrument for managing or regulating conflicts."¹⁵⁸ Coulon goes on to identify the experience of Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan as a good starting point for re-engagement with peace operations.¹⁵⁹

The Canadian perspective and institutional orientation relative to peace operations has a history of politicization since the end of the Cold War. Canadian foreign security debates over defence capabilities have prevented the CAF from embracing its tradition as peacekeepers. Opposing views regarding the focus of Canada's military coming out of the Cold War have shaped the military culture of today. Discussions around warfighting and peacekeeping led to the retention of a full spectrum of capabilities.¹⁶⁰ The argument saw utopian internationalists asserting that warfighting was an outdated Cold War concept. Pragmatic realists argued that the future was uncertain and a wide spectrum of capabilities including warfighting needed to be

¹⁵⁴ Baril, *Future Roles...*, 24.

¹⁵⁵ *Idem.*

¹⁵⁶ Coulon, *Whatever Happened to Peacekeeping?...*, 43.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 50.

¹⁵⁸ *Idem.*

¹⁵⁹ *Idem.*

¹⁶⁰ Hugh Segal, *Geopolitical Integrity* (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2005), 53.

retained.¹⁶¹ When looking at the sequential publications of the 1994 DND White Paper, the 2005 Defence Policy statement, and the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy, a consistent thread of logic can be found.¹⁶² The prevailing argument retained from the Cold War and evident throughout each document refers to Canada as being “In an uncertain world, for a country with a large national territory and global foreign aspirations, retaining combat-capable Canadian Forces is the only sensible thing to do.”¹⁶³

Also impacting interoperability of military and civilian organizations on peace operations is the ongoing military residual cultural resistance to modernization, which has remained present in the CAF in one form or another since the end of the Second World War. In his 2011 article “Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946 – 2000 : Regimentalism, Reaction, and Reform”, Peter Kasurak provides a review of the imposition of professionalization on the CAF. The *Armed Forces and Society Journal* article presents a historical account of the clashing perspectives affecting its professionalization. The article depicts modernists as advocates for “...a profession that was integrated with Canadian society and that was education centered, [and] outward looking...”¹⁶⁴ Kasurak further describes them as “...concerned with increasing the capacity of the officer corps to absorb technology and further integrate with civilian government and society in general...”¹⁶⁵ Traditionalists are portrayed in the article as staunch supporters of “... British regimentalism, focusing on leadership, individual battalions, and internal army

¹⁶¹ Idem.

¹⁶² Ferguson, “Beyond Afghanistan...”, 194.

¹⁶³ Idem.

¹⁶⁴ Peter Kasurak, *Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946—2000: Regimentalism, Reaction, and Reform* (*Armed Forces & Society* vol 37, Iss 1, 2011), 96.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 105.

matters.”¹⁶⁶ Generally, traditionalists have attempted to reverse modernist initiatives, looking to make the institution more insular.¹⁶⁷

This debate within the Canadian military informs the research on CAF disengagement from peacekeeping and on cultural barriers between civilian and military entities on peace operations as identified by Gaëlle Rivard Piché above.¹⁶⁸ It also provides context to the lack of focus on the cultivation of capabilities and education specific to peace operations. The historic review gives insight into the institutional orientation of the CAF being stuck between warfighting and peacekeeping, and about the challenges it faces in bridging the gap between organizational priorities and emerging Canadian policy giving primacy to peace and stabilization.

1.9 Peace operations and stabilization

This section provides background on the use of the term stabilization in a UN context and ongoing academic and practitioner discussions on its relationship with peacekeeping. Providing a review of the overlap between the two concepts will better inform the Canadian approach to the development and maintenance of relevant capabilities to respond to emerging threats to global peace and security within international frameworks.

According to the UK government and some academic circles, there are no common international standards, best practices or even an agreed upon definition of stabilization operations.¹⁶⁹ Although vital to global peace and stability, the lack of working definitions is problematic to the framing of interventions.¹⁷⁰ In a 2017 Center for International Peace

¹⁶⁶ Ibid, 96.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, 105.


¹⁶⁸ Rivard Piche, *Challenges and Prospects...*

¹⁶⁹ United Kingdom, *The United Kingdom Government Approach to Stabilization: A Guide for Policy Makers and Practitioners* (London: United Kingdom Stabilisation Unit, 2018), 18.

¹⁷⁰ Idem.

Operations article entitled “Stability: A Crosscutting Task”, Andreas Wittkowsky argues stabilization is vital to the successful execution of peace operations. The author points to UN doctrine in his explanation of its broad reaching importance as depicted in Figure 1.8.

Figure 1.8 Approaches in the area of peace and security



Source: Center for International Peace Operations¹⁷¹

The debate on defining stabilization centers around the need for a broad definition to encompass all relevant activities necessary to stabilize a fragile state, or a narrow one to provide realistic expectations.¹⁷² Broad definitions listed by country can be seen in Figure 1.9 below.

¹⁷¹ Wittkowsky, *Stability Operations*..., 2.

¹⁷² *Ibid*, 3.

Figure 1.9 Broad visions of the problems and objectives of stabilisation

| Actor | Problem | Objective |
|----------------|---|---|
| Canada | 'fragility' | 'long term peace and prosperity' |
| Germany | 'fragile states', 'crisis as a permanent condition' | 'sovereign statehood, [...] transformation processes and ... peacebuilding' |
| Netherlands | 'fragile states and regions' | 'security and stability', 'peace, security and the rule of law' |
| United Kingdom | 'instability' and 'conflict' | 'structural stability' |
| United States | 'violent conflict, fragile states, and extremism' | 'preventing, mitigating and responding' to risks |

Source: Toward a Realistic and Responsible Idea of Stabilization, 2016¹⁷³

As seen in the different objectives identified by country in figure 1.9, a practitioner could develop very different operational designs depending on the sponsor country. This causes inconsistencies in the planning and execution of multilateral stabilization operations.

Furthermore, the Wittkowski article argues for the need to adopt narrower definitions of stabilization found in Figure 1.10. He asserts that more focused definitions allow for better orientation and realistic execution.

¹⁷³ Philipp Rotman, *Toward a Realistic and Responsible Idea of Stabilisation* (International Journal of Security & Development Vol 5, Iss 1, 2016), 2.

Figure 1.10 Narrow vision of the problems and objectives of stabilization.

| Actor | Problem | Objective |
|----------------|--|--|
| Canada | "upheaval: violent conflicts, political crises, natural disasters" | "creating conditions for sustainable peace-building and development" |
| Germany | "acute crises", conflict prevention and recovery | "defusing crises early enough and countering them" |
| Netherlands | "fragile states and regions" | "security and stability", "peace, security and the rule of law" |
| United Kingdom | "crises", "escalation" | "rapid crisis prevention and response" |
| United States | "shocks", "violent conflict and instability", "atrocities" | "respond to and mitigate escalation, protect and assist vulnerable populations, and stem the spread of violence" |

Source: Towards a Realistic and Responsible Idea of Stabilization, 2016¹⁷⁴

Although the definition of stability remains elusive by country and concept, looking specifically at UN approaches for stabilization, its emergence and continued prominence within UN peacekeeping is well documented. The UN has recently formally mandated four peace operations as "stabilization missions." Wittkowski highlights the commonalities between each of the four missions, which include:

¹⁷⁴ Rotman, *Towards a Realistic...*, 3.

1. Supporting political processes that strengthen state institutions and provide legitimacy, while at the same time enabling social reconciliation;
2. Contributing to a safe environment that ensures the protection of civilians;
3. Demobilization and reintegration of former combatants as well as mine clearance; and
4. Strengthening an effective and accountable security sector as well as the rule of law and human rights.¹⁷⁵

Taking note of these commonalities and prospective tasks from this list is relevant to the ongoing discussion concerning Canadian capabilities necessary to contribute to the emerging nature of peace operations. In his 2014 article “The UN Turns to Stabilization”, Robert Muggah points out:

the essential difference between peacekeeping and stabilization seems to be that in peacekeeping the aim is to arrive at and maintain a cease-fire and/or implement a peace agreement among the parties to a conflict, whilst in stabilization the theory of change is to achieve peace by managing or removing an aggressor.¹⁷⁶

In an attempt to better understand the increased employment of stability operations by the UN, he highlights internal institutional drivers and the pursuit of integrated missions. As discussed above, the changing nature of peace operations has fed the demand for multidimensional peacekeeping that combines peacebuilding and state-building activities. Muggah also notes that “If nothing else, stabilization is revealing the many fault lines and opportunities confronting the UN in the 21st century.”¹⁷⁷

When attempting to improve Canadian contributions to global peace and stability, one needs to consider the increasing international reliance on stabilization efforts in peace operations. A Canadian perspective on relevant contributions needs to commit to the development of relevant military capabilities. When looking at international peacekeeping trends, the

¹⁷⁵ Wittkowski, *Stability: A Crosscutting Task...*, 2.

¹⁷⁶ Robert Muggah, *The United Nations Turns to Stabilization* (*The Journal of Stability*, December 5, 2014).

¹⁷⁷ Idem.

maintenance of the stabilization skillsets remains topical. Conversely, training for peacekeeping will remain relevant and useful for more robust operations.¹⁷⁸ As identified by the academic Trista Grant as a member of a United Nations Association of Canada (UNAC) public panel, the skillsets of engaging with local population and civil-military relations experienced in Afghanistan should be retained.¹⁷⁹ Looking to the future, she recognizes that “While the changing security environment requires that soldiers maintain a high state of readiness in terms of combat skills, Canadian soldiers’ growing peacekeeping training and expertise should also be supported and further developed.”¹⁸⁰

1.10 Peace operations and hybrid warfare

When looking to develop and maintain capabilities on behalf of the government, understanding the semantics of stabilization and peacekeeping is as important as recognizing similarities between the two. Additionally, a brief look at the intersectionality between Canadian contributions to hybrid – or threshold based – warfare and peace operations also provides insight into potential capability overlap. As very different forms of conflict prevention, both frameworks for militarized operations work towards shaping a peaceful and stable global environment. Although politically very different concepts, the military capabilities required for each type of operation share skillsets. Recognizing these similarities could lead to efficiency in force generation, training, and education.

Intelligence gathering, dissemination and interoperability is the first area of overlap identified as vital to the successful execution of both types of operations, simultaneously providing a challenge in the execution of both. The 2000 Brahimi Report on UN Peacekeeping

¹⁷⁸ UNAC, *Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding...*, 22.

¹⁷⁹ *Idem.*

¹⁸⁰ *Idem.*

recognized the need to develop intelligence capacities in the field to support troops and force protection against violent actors.¹⁸¹ From this, and due to many other factors, the UN Joint Mission Analysis Center (JMAC) was created. Although still suffering from flawed interoperability, it provides a much-needed focus point for intelligence on UN missions.¹⁸² NATO and coalition intelligence share similar conflicts of intelligence interoperability, as national caveats and capability requirements continue to be a challenge on operations.

SoF employment is also recognized in both peace and shaping operations as a vital capability. These forces are seen by both communities as primary tools used to support the intelligence domain and operate on the fringes of combat where conflict is prevented. These forces have also demonstrated usefulness in both domains with expertise in CB and military diplomacy. They are typically trusted by governments with much larger risk envelopes than conventional forces but are very limited in number and require a long period for cultivation.¹⁸³

The second notable area of overlap is the increased need for CIMIC in both peace operations and hybrid warfare. As discussed above, the blurring of lines between civilian and military entities on peace operations is an emerging trend. In the 2018 article “Civil-military response to Hybrid threats”, Eugino Cusomano and Marian Corbe identify an

... increased need for CIMIC cooperation due to the increase in hybrid warfare. Hybrid threats have emerged, vary in nature from cyber-attacks, to energy disruptions, information warfare, from NATO’s eastern flank in Ukraine to insurgent terrorist and criminal activity in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Mali.¹⁸⁴

The third commonality between emerging capability requirements for peace ops and hybrid warfare is interdepartmental coherency on operations. An operational level of

¹⁸¹ Rivard Piché, *Challenges and Prospects...*, 250.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, 252.

¹⁸³ Breede, *Special Peace Ops...*, 226.

¹⁸⁴ Corbe, *A Civil-Military Response...*, 2.

interoperability is necessary because stability operations require "...cooperation in a comprehensive approach, which ensures that stabilization activities are interlinked with the political process and that there is compatibility with longer-term measures."¹⁸⁵ The Canadian experience in Afghanistan attests to the challenges associated with interoperability between government departments. The lack of inter-departmental cooperation as well as finger pointing led to an unsynchronized approach in Kandahar.¹⁸⁶ Although much has evolved at the strategic and political level between GAC and CAF since the closing down of the Afghanistan mission, there remains a potential structural void between the two entities operationally.

Following the Manley report, DFAIT established the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) as a pioneer in developing specific tools to work in fragile states.¹⁸⁷ This government entity now exists as the GAC PSOP. With the evolution of this new mechanism for programming in fragile states, further analysis in the next chapter will highlight challenges that exist between government departments. Looking further into Canadian institutional orientation and capability to operate through a lens of education and comprehensive mission training, this project will further identify gaps in current Canadian approaches. The next section will also help categorise potential areas to improve Canadian contributions to global peace and stability in fragile states. It will look at assessment criteria from a defence perspective, and then provide an evaluation of ongoing government initiatives in the area of peace and stabilization.

¹⁸⁵ Wittkowski, *Stability: A Crosscutting Task...*, 4.

¹⁸⁶ Carroll, "From Kinshasa to Kandahar...", 177.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 246.

Part 2 – Assessment of organizations

2.1 Assessment criteria

This section will review the demands placed on Canadian entities when it comes to peace and stabilization, to determine what criteria can be used to evaluate each organization. Following the theoretical background provided above, this portion distills ongoing issues in the Canadian internationalist landscape into measures to assess specific initiatives. The review of PSTC, PSOP, CANADEM and CAF general-purpose training will add to the discussion by identifying room for change and growth. This chapter also provides an overview of the Pearson Peacekeeping Center (PPC) and UK BSOS in search of options beyond what is currently employed by the Government of Canada. The analysis in this portion of the project will set the conditions for subsequent recommendations.

As noted above, peace operations have become increasingly complex, and continue to challenge capabilities at multiple levels in Canada. These increasing complications include multiple cross-sector objectives requiring numerous actors to execute duties simultaneously to maintain a realistic hope of success.¹⁸⁸ Systems and capacities to deal with these complexities are usually required on short notice, giving little time for training, planning, and coordination.¹⁸⁹ Interoperability remains paramount for Canadian contributions to international peace and stability efforts. In Canada and throughout other UN troop contributing nations, this problem exists at multiple levels of organization. Issues of capacity exist within foreign services, the military and peacebuilding NGOs, requiring investment in recruiting, training and professional development.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁸ Rivard Piché, *Challenges and Prospects...*, 245.

¹⁸⁹ *Idem*

¹⁹⁰ United Nations, *Implementation of 2014 recommendations...*, 10.

From a defence perspective, although there has been a push for, and an increased use of SoF capability, conventional forces will likely need to bear the weight of improving Canadian military contributions.¹⁹¹ As a result, Canadian conventional forces must develop the necessary competencies for what they see as unconventional tasks. This requires relevant military education and not just training to be taken seriously in the CAF.¹⁹² Through time, money, and forced change, Canadian conventional forces were able to reorient to a counterinsurgency in the past – as seen in Afghanistan – but with the right framing of defence initiatives, there is opportunity to provide real institutional orientation prior to unplanned forced change in the future.

Subsequent sections will look at areas to focus on, recognized as relevant topics from the background, including: interoperability, force structure, capacity building and military education. Each portion will individually unpack these concepts to provide context before using them as a measuring stick to evaluate ongoing Canadian initiatives.

2.1.1 The Canadian challenge of interoperability

Canadian interoperability has relied on individual personalities and not institutional organization to achieve basic working conditions in past fragile state interventions. With recognition of the value of interoperability, Canadian structures and processes need to start looking at formalized means of improving this segment of its contributions to peace and stabilization. This need has also been recognized globally. The 2015 HIPPO report enforces the requirement to “... shift privileging collaborative interventions and partnerships among civilian,

¹⁹¹ Breede, *Special Peace Ops...*, 239.

¹⁹² *Idem*.

police, and military interveners as well as with other entities, national, regional and international; and focusing both on the field mission and on the protection of the people.”¹⁹³

In a Canadian context, integration between uniformed and non-uniformed personnel requires more attention to improve operability within national and multinational spheres. Rivard Piché has identified the recent Canadian failure to achieve this in Haiti, and Howard Coombs has advocated for Canadian operations to adopt a comprehensive approach since before the cessation of combat in Afghanistan.¹⁹⁴ It has also been identified by academics and practitioners alike that Canada needs to better tap into international training resources to improve multinational and interagency interoperability¹⁹⁵. These connections are important “...for the development of best practices, and to promote a higher level of standardized training between Canada and other troop-contributing states.”¹⁹⁶

Socialization between actors through pre-deployment education, training and organizational development provide platforms for overcoming challenges to interoperability on operations. Missions require the implementation of complex mandates where multiple organizational cultures compete for resources.¹⁹⁷ A further review of how Canada has worked towards effectively managing these tensions through its institutions will provide insight into potential areas to improve its contributions to global peace and security.

2.1.2. CAF focus on Warfighting

As discussed in the background, Canada’s inability to offer a full-service military has created a need to focus on specific capabilities. Recognition of this form of “Smart Defence” or

¹⁹³ Martin-Brûlé et al, *Peace First? What Is Canada’s Role in UN Operations?* (International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, vol 73, Iss 2, 2018), 189.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, 199.

¹⁹⁵ Idem.

¹⁹⁶ Idem.

¹⁹⁷ Rivard Piché, *Challenges and Prospects...*, 253.

contribution warfare has existed in Canada for quite a while. Michael Byers assesses the Canadian Military as being

...made up of a small peacekeeping – and counterinsurgency – capable army organized around 550 newly refitted LAV III light armoured vehicles; a small navy organized around twelve middle-aged frigates; and a small air force organized around new transport aircraft and old but capable fighter jets.¹⁹⁸

Although his overview of Canadian military size and platforms is accurate, the depiction of the Canadian Army (CA) as being COIN centric is an assumption that does not remain the focus of the institution. In fact, the CA is “...is focused upon a conventional theatre of operations...[and]...the culture of an army that is focused upon a conventional war makes fighting a counterinsurgency very difficult.”¹⁹⁹ This main effort on general warfighting makes the transition to population security challenging for members of the CA.

The significant difficulty for any army to switch within the spectrum of conflict is broadly agreed upon. Conventional and unconventional warfare are described as being so different that, “...to succeed in one [it] will have great difficulty in fighting the other.”²⁰⁰ The types of organizations required for the differing operations have pointedly dissimilar organizational cultures.²⁰¹ After ten years working as a policy analyst at the RAND Corporation focusing on counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and peacekeeping, Jennifer Taw produced “Mission revolution : the U.S. military and stability operations” through Columbia university. After highlighting the similarities between stability operations and peacekeeping activities, her book cites the challenges for the U.S. military’s 2005 attempt to shift focus from

¹⁹⁸ Byers, *Smart Defence...*, 14.

¹⁹⁹ Caleb Walker, *Explaining Cultural Differences Between Professional Organizations: A Sports Analogy to Start Further Discussion* (Canadian Military Journal, Vol 18, Iss 4, 2018), 62.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid*, 63.

²⁰¹ *Idem*.

winning battles to creating controlled non-violent space for negotiations.²⁰² In a similar vein, looking at current CAF institutions and orientation in subsequent sections will outline the space available to improve the execution of smart defence principles.

2.1.3 Canadian capacity building

CB has been identified as a necessary tool for peace and stabilization related missions. As an important aspect of a Canadian whole of government approach, it can be linked explicitly or implicitly to UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations.²⁰³ The UNDPKO new partnership agenda in 2009 recognized the provision of CB support as a unique mission requirement.²⁰⁴ The ability to build local capacity on peace operations is a part of the conflict resolution process and can enable the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding.²⁰⁵ In a 2016 policy brief, an internal review of Security Council mandates for 16 peacekeeping missions found at least 64 separate directed tasks related to institution-building and capacity development²⁰⁶. The same review determined that as of 2011, the Department of Field Support (DFS) adopted a strategy to leverage peacekeepers as early peacebuilders, focusing them on sequencing and planning early peacebuilding tasks, to include institution-building.²⁰⁷ Specifically, the UN has recognized CB support to the African Union (AU) as an important priority that can lead to increased interoperability, enhance cooperation, and help maximize peacekeeping resources.²⁰⁸

²⁰² Jennifer Taw, *Mission Revolution: The U.S. Military and Stability Operations*. Columbia Studies in Terrorism and Irregular Warfare (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

²⁰³ UNAC, *Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding...*, 66.

²⁰⁴ UNDPKO, *A New Partnership Agenda...*, 27.

²⁰⁵ St-Pierre, *Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding...*, 70.

²⁰⁶ Leanne Smith, *Institution-Building as a Bridge Between Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Connecting the Security and Peace Nexus* (International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, 2016), 4.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid*, 7.

²⁰⁸ UNDPKO, *A New Partnership Agenda...*, 5.

CB is an emerging trend in global governance as well as in western military deployments. As discussed in the review of policy, SSE recognizes it as a core mission for the CAF.²⁰⁹ The UN capacity development processes require technical or functional capacities – amongst other peacebuilding tools – to create an enabling environment for local governance.²¹⁰

Post-Afghanistan, CB has continued for the CAF in Mali with Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM), through conventional forces involved in Op PROTEUS in Jerusalem on the Palestinian Authority Security Forces, and in Op UNIFIER in Ukraine.²¹¹ These sorts of deployments for the CAF have been fairly ad hoc, leveraging Canadian Forces Tasking Plans and Operations (CFTPO) backfills outside of the Managed Readiness Plan (MRP) and without a consistent center for coordination. The Canadian response is typically reactive, with a lack of conventional Canadian CB doctrine, networking, or institutional orientation to output. A further review of the current process for cultivating CB in the CAF could provide another window for improvement to Canadian stabilization capabilities.

2.1.4 Canadian peace operations training and education.

Canada's limited professional education and training oriented towards UN peace operations has been noted by Canadian civil society and academics for years. The Group of 78 recommends that Canada "...develop the necessary training infrastructure, identify and procure relevant equipment, and actively advocate for strengthened UN rapid response mechanisms."²¹² The need for cross departmental training institutions was also recommended in the 2015 HIPPO

²⁰⁹ Canada, *Strong Secure Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy* (2017), 17.

²¹⁰ UNDP, *Global Event Working Paper: Capacity Development in Post-Conflict Countries* (United Nations Development Program, 2010), 11.

²¹¹ Peter Williams, *Being Left of Bang or Proactive: The Future Place of Capacity Building in the Department or National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces* (Canadian Military Journal, vol 15, Iss 2, 2015), 18.

²¹² The Group of 78, *Submission by Leading Civil Society Organizations to the Defence Policy Review* (Ottawa: The Rideau institute, 2016), 1.

Report, which articulated a requirement for “...a stronger global training partnership to address priority training requirements.”²¹³

Further accompanying this research, Philip Rotmann identifies a need for learning organizations that avoid generalising responses to crises in fragile states, and establish professional methodologies, systematic monitoring and evaluation of the limits of stabilization tools.²¹⁴ Going further, Rotmann argues that “...the institutionalised commitment to reflection and learning may be more important than the shape or place of a stabilisation department or agency.”²¹⁵ On this premise, a Canadian return to peace operations would require dedicated academic organizations to commit relevant contributions to global peace and stabilization.

The nature of peace operations and the current international framework for Canadian contribution both call for improvement to the status quo of training and education. In 2018, UNSCR 2436 requested “...improved training and capacity building activities to strengthen peacekeeping, including, inter alliance, pre-deployment training and assessments, triangular partnerships, co deployments, and smart pledging, and encourages further activities in this regard...”²¹⁶ Based on the new complexity of peacekeeping missions, it has been recognized from as early as 2007, where a Canadian Panel on UN Peacekeeping determined that peacekeeper training needs to be more comprehensive, prevalent, and relevant.²¹⁷ Its recommendations for increased training include: gender issues, children’s rights protection, human rights, human trafficking, Civil-military cooperation, cultural awareness and sensitivity,

²¹³ United Nations, *High Level Panel...*, 13.

²¹⁴ Rotmann, *Towards a Realistic and Responsible...*, 11.

²¹⁵ *Ibid*, 12.

²¹⁶ United Nations, *UNSCR 2436...*, 18.

²¹⁷ UNAC, *Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding...*, 23.

and sexual exploitation and abuse.²¹⁸ The Panel noted that, beyond being combat capable, peacekeepers now require additional skills in

*negotiation and mediation, general knowledge of the UN system and mandates, a thorough understanding of rules of engagement, understanding of civil-military cooperation and humanitarian assistance, as well as mission-specific knowledge such as local customs, culture and language.*²¹⁹

Using these civil society, academic and practitioner-based recommendations to improve interoperability, military orientation, CB and education, we will evaluate the capacity of current Canadian organizations.

2.2 Assessment of ongoing Canadian initiatives

2.2.1 The Peace Support Training Centre

According to its website, “the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) is a Canadian Army, joint, inter agency and multinational training establishment.”²²⁰ It is designed to support “...the intellectual development and training of Canadian Forces, members from other government departments, and international audiences.”²²¹ The organization delivers training and fulfills Center of Excellence responsibilities for the CAF.

With a very tactical level focus, the audience for the organization varies from “...civil-military cooperation and psychological operations operators to individual augmentees to headquarters and military observer teams...”²²² Although the name might suggest a distinct focus on peace operations, the institution cultivates a broad range of capabilities, pushing it to the limits of its resources and capacity. PSTC is touted as the CAF lead for maintaining “... active relationships with other international training establishments in the fields of Peace Support

²¹⁸ Idem.

²¹⁹ Ibid, 16.

²²⁰ Geoffery Teeple, *Peace Support Training Centre* (Accessed February 12, 2019. <https://peacesupport.ca/>).

²²¹ Idem.

²²² Idem.

Operations, Civil-Military Cooperation, Information Operations, and Psychological Operations.”²²³ It also self-proclaims to be the custodian of a sound intellectual base, but does not house any academics or maintain formal connection to researchers.

To better understand the current capacities of this organization, it is important to look at its evolution from inception. Following the Somalia Inquiry, the CAF was urged to provide all of its members Peace Support Operations (PSO) training. The primary mechanism for its delivery was PSTC, located in Kingston, Ontario. Because of the CAF mission in Afghanistan, PSTC changed course offerings, with basic PSO courses dropping from 88 percent of training delivered to 45 percent.²²⁴ The dilution of focus was due to the diversification of PSTC to meet the operational needs of Afghanistan, forcing it to take on more responsibility.²²⁵ During the Afghanistan years, the organization was geared towards COIN missions.²²⁶

Based on research conducted by Walter Dorn at the Canadian Forces College, we have a better understanding of the training that PSTC provides. CAF pre-deployment training at PSTC has been criticized by members of the CAF as having a lack of cultural awareness. Many felt PSTC could have provided “...more cultural and theatre specific education to better prepare them for their missions.”²²⁷ In addition to the delivery of inadequate education and training for COIN specific missions, PSTC has struggled to provide the content it was originally intended to deliver. Dorn’s assessment of the organization is that “... PSTC provides much less than a quarter of peacekeeping training to its participants as compared to a decade ago.”²²⁸ With the emerging complexities of peace operations and the depth of training and education in UN

²²³ Idem.

²²⁴ Dorn, *Unprepared for Peace...*, 23.

²²⁵ Idem.

²²⁶ Idem.

²²⁷ Ibid, 24.

²²⁸ Idem.

specific capabilities and limitations, Dorn has determined that Canada is “...currently far behind other nations in its readiness to support the United Nations and train for modern peacekeeping.”²²⁹

As a training institution, PSTC is designed for tactical-level individual training and has been provided much wider arcs than for what it has been resourced. The center delivers courses for individual pre-deployment training and development periods for operators.²³⁰ Through the delivery of practical and theoretical training, the institution affords soldiers a brief introduction to the “...Law of Armed Conflict, Risks and Threats, Stress Management, Preventive Medicine, Mine Awareness, Negotiation and Mediation Techniques and Cultural Awareness.”²³¹

With such a tactical level focus, the institution is limited in its ability to foster and maintain intergovernmental mandates and connections to international training networks. The UN has identified a need to connect “...major contributing countries, bilateral and multilateral programme resources and networks of regional peacekeeping training centres.”²³² With a tactical focus, limited resourcing and authorities, PSTC does not maintain adequate capacity to be the Canadian government’s link into this network. The strategic and operational levels of interoperability require representation that PSTC is not resourced to provide.

In 2016, David Curran conducted an in-depth analysis of UN Peacekeeping and of the training of military personnel. Through his analysis of training institutions regarding organizations and relationships, interoperability was flagged as being a difficult area to simulate and prepare.²³³ With the low-level focus of PSTC, the institution does not formally address these

²²⁹ Ibid, 5.

²³⁰ UNAC, *Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding...*, 18.

²³¹ Idem.

²³² UNDPKO, *A New Partnership...*, 34.

²³³ Curran, *More than Fighting for Peace...*, 110.

concerns domestically or internationally. Although PSTC has provided individual-level training to civilians from other department and foreign militaries on a case-by-case basis, as a military centric organization, it does not promote enough active participation of civilian, academic or international institutions. In its current state, the Centre does not offer Canada a vehicle to improve interoperability on peace and stability operations as described by the assessment criteria, nor does it meet the requirements outlined in the review of literature.

2.2.2 CA force structure and Orientation

Looking at the composition and orientation of the CAF to address the spectrum of conflict provides context to the preparedness of its military forces to support peace operations. The orientation of the CA is a better indicator for organizational behaviour than that of the RCN and RCAF, as these organizations are typically tied to specific mission sets within their specialist areas. The CA, conversely, has more variances in its approach to operations. Overall, determining the CAF's organizational orientation provides insight into what specialty areas the Canadian government's conventional, vice special forces, are able to provide on realistic notice.

As documented in the wake of Canada's 1992 mission in Somalia, the CAF reliance on general purpose combat training for deployments can create discontinuity between mandate and mission requirements.²³⁴ As noted by the 1997 Somalia Inquiry, "the traditional approach to training was not adequate to provide military personnel with either a full range of skills or the appropriate orientation necessary to meet the diverse and complex challenges presented in post-Cold War peace support missions."²³⁵ In a 2010 article entitled "Unprepared for Peace" Dr Dorn provides a review of Canadian military education and training for peace operations. Although he cites the decentralized manner in which the CAF trains as making it difficult to comprehensively


²³⁴ Coombs, *Soldier First...*, 213.

²³⁵ Canada, *Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry* (Department of National Defence, 1997), 26.

assess training, he points to anecdotal evidence that suggests a “...lack of unit level training for peacekeeping.”²³⁶ The little relevant unit level training only takes place when preparing for specific missions, as primacy is given to traditional warfighting mandates at all army frontline units.²³⁷

Looking at the “Training Canada’s Army” manual, the CA’s continued reliance on training for conventional combat missions becomes evident. The document enforces the premise that Canada must be prepared for full spectrum operations.²³⁸ To achieve effectiveness across the conflict spectrum, the CA methodology is to focus on demonstrating conventional combat power, and scale down to unconventional stability operations when required.²³⁹ This view on the use of force does not account for the idea of increasing complexities involved in interagency coordination and other stability functions, which also could be viewed as scaling up. The conflicting views described in Figure 1.9 demonstrate the military cultural bias, as well as the desire to appease both perspectives on the issue of scale.

Figure 2.1 Training Focus of the CA



Source: Canadian Military Journal²⁴⁰

²³⁶ Dorn, *Unprepared for Peace...*, 26.

²³⁷ Based on author’s 15 years of experience serving with the CA.

²³⁸ Walker, *Explaining Cultural Differences...*, 64.

²³⁹ Idem.

²⁴⁰ Idem.

Although the value proposition the Canadian military provides other government departments rests on its ability to facilitate stability in fragile states, the orientation of the Canadian military does not foster the required skillsets in the primacy of its training. As noted by Canadian civilian UN practitioners, the CAF is “well suited to support specific tasks such as night patrolling and civil military operations, both necessary in the context of peacekeeping missions’ complex security settings...[and]...enhance early warning assessments and the deployment of rapid first response capabilities.”²⁴¹ With the focus of the Canadian military on full spectrum operations giving primacy to conventional warfighting, the preparation of its soldiers to operate in fragile states is seen as a secondary duty.

In addition to the training regime of the CA being disconnected from Canadian contributions to global peace and stability, its force structure continues to reflect concepts from the Second World War. The CA has three mechanized brigades, all oriented towards traditional warfighting.²⁴² Although there are light forces assigned to each of the brigades, the manoeuvre elements and their supporters are all structured and mandated for conventional warfare and not for population security. This structure is motivated by the desire to mirror its primary NATO allies vice aligning with the principles of smart defence discussed in the background. Canadian interoperability with NATO can exist with Canada maintaining a small counterinsurgency focused military, however, its current reliance on big military concepts continues to limit the development of relevant capabilities to address emerging threats created by global destabilization.

The orientation of the Canadian military towards conventional warfighting limits the allocation of personnel, training and equipment towards peace operations. The minimal attention

²⁴¹ Brule, *Peace First...*, 199.

²⁴² Author’s observation based on multiple years of service in two of the three army brigades in Canada.

on this area of the conflict spectrum relies upon a reactionary approach to addressing the assessment criteria as outlined in section 2.1. For Canada to benefit from operating a small armed force capable of being a global leader in stabilization, it must align towards global trends identified in the background, vice mirroring like-minded nations in an attempt to indirectly facilitate interoperability. A small stability force would complement nations who employ big military concepts and allow for focus on professional and relevant output.

Beyond the stabilization of fragile states, the refinement of CAF focus past traditional warfighting would allow capabilities such as the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) internationally, and Immediate Response Units (IRU) domestically, to receive more professional development, resourcing, and training.²⁴³ Further capability analysis and research into CAF institutional bias is required to properly shape expectations for the future roles of the Canadian military.

2.2.3 Peace and Stabilization Operations Program

The Peace and Stabilization Operations Program (PSOP) was developed in 2016 as the successor to START. The program was designed to prevent and respond to conflicts abroad and support UN peace operations to contribute to a more peaceful and prosperous world.²⁴⁴ In addition to coordinating the implementation of Canada's National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security with a budget of \$450 million over 3 years, the program is designed to work "... with partners and allies to help stop violence, provide security and create space for dialogue and conflict resolution, enabling local societies to forge pathways out of conflict and fragility towards peace and stability."²⁴⁵

²⁴³ Based on author's multiple years of experience on DART and IRU.

²⁴⁴ Canada, *Canada's National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2017-2022* (Global Affairs Canada, 2017), 6.

²⁴⁵ Idem.

Through several PSOP initiatives, GAC has been designed the lead Canadian entity for coordinating whole of government initiatives abroad. GAC achieves this through ad hoc employment of a Results and Delivery Unit (RDU) that ensures policy coherence and program integration.²⁴⁶ The organization safeguards the process through a shared logic model and a perennial Performance Measurement Framework (PMF).²⁴⁷ An example of this implementation can be found in the ongoing efforts in Iraq and Syria, which have required several federal departments to work together to achieve security, stability, and the delivery of Humanitarian Assistance (HA).²⁴⁸

To improve interoperability, GAC relies upon unprogrammed cross-departmental training and not on formalized initiatives for educating its staff. GAC develops and maintains integration processes through the participation of its officials “...in a variety of simulations, exercises, training and outreach activities with the Canadian Armed Forces and other relevant government departments.”²⁴⁹

External to PSOP, GAC offers further mechanisms to improve interoperability. GAC’s Partnerships for Development Innovation (PDI) allows Canadians to actively engage in international development. The platform provides youth internships and civilian volunteer deployments to assist in poverty reduction programming.²⁵⁰ This initiative promotes the participation of NGOs, private sector and universities to better enable Canadian entities and local partners in affected nations.²⁵¹ This type of programming has been made available to support development innovation in the DRC, Columbia, Afghanistan, Haiti and South Sudan.²⁵² There

²⁴⁶ GAC, *OECD Development Assistance Committee Peer Review of Canada* (Global Affairs Canada), 45.

²⁴⁷ *Idem.*

²⁴⁸ *Idem.*

²⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 46.

²⁵⁰ Canada, *Canada’s National Action...*, 13.

²⁵¹ *Idem.*

²⁵² *Idem.*

are no formally established units or staffed entities to provide CB outputs, but rather, the continual employment of task tailored organizations. The programing "...helps partners deliver social services [and] rebuild infrastructure and good governance."²⁵³

The formal mechanisms for the provision of education in PSOP is seemingly absent. The program has been reliant upon a robust feedback loop to inform and prepare its field officers for subsequent deployments. The feedback is enabled through the conduct of field monitoring visits by the International Humanitarian Assistance Bureau (IHAB).²⁵⁴ Through its grants management system, GAC is able to provide input into its programing cycle; however, it does not allow for organizational digestion of progressive changes to cultivate its staff. The GAC robust review process is achieved through the IHAB's focus on program improvement and the review of external actors' assessment – in addition to reviews conducted by the Auditor General of Canada.²⁵⁵ There is no formal recognition of an education process for its personnel.

The limited educational input towards PSOP staff has resulted in a dissatisfaction in the preparedness of its personnel. A 2018 Public Service Employment Survey (PSES) found only 9 percent of PSOP members "strongly agreed" that they received the training required to do their job.²⁵⁶ This was more than two and a half times lower than the average across the Canadian public service. Additionally, due to workload constraints, only 8 percent of PSOP members surveyed felt they were able to complete their workload during regular work hours, more than four times less than the average public servant.²⁵⁷ With the direct influence PSOP has on interdepartmental integration – and could have on Canadian projection of CB into fragile states –

²⁵³ GAC, *OECD Development...*, 45.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 46.

²⁵⁵ *Idem*.

²⁵⁶ Canada, 2018 Public Service Employee Survey Results for IRD - Peace and Stabilization Operations Program, (Government of Canada website).

²⁵⁷ *Idem*.

improved staffing and educational mechanisms could bolster the quality of Canadian contributions to global peace and stability. From a defence perspective, increased CAF involvement with PSOP beyond simple liaison functions could better align institutional orientation and provide common ground in educational requirements and create interdepartmental budgetary efficiencies.

2.2.4 CANADEM

Although not a direct capability of the Canadian government, the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) services a gap between policy and capacity for the Canadian government. They also allow peace operations to leverage the strength found in Canadian diaspora. Most governments have identified the staffing of bureaucracy as one of the largest deficits identified when taking part in fragile state intervention.²⁵⁸ The civilian capacity gap for global peace and security has created a need for innovative recruitment and training. In Canada, this gap is best filled by CANADEM.²⁵⁹

As a national tool, CANADEM is vital to Canadian contributions to global peace and stability. The HIPPO report concludes that “... peace operations are not military operations, but rather political operations that require military assets,”²⁶⁰ meaning that CANADEM resourcing and expansion has great potential to improve Canadian contributions to global stability.

The organization itself, established in 1997 and initially operating from funding from the ministry of foreign affairs, is a reserve of deployable civilians.²⁶¹ According to its website, CANADEM “... established and maintains a civilian reserve roster and is responsible for the

²⁵⁸ Rotmann, *Stabilization: Doctrine...*, 10.

²⁵⁹ *Idem*.

²⁶⁰ Paul LaRose-Edwards, *Canada and Peace Operations 2018 Onwards The ‘civilian’ Solution to Bringing Canada Back: Needed – Easy – Low-Cost* (CANADEM, 2017), 1.

²⁶¹ Catriona Gourlay, *Lessons Learned Study: Rosters for the Deployment of Civilian Experts in Peace Operations* (United Nations Best Practices), 28.

recruitment, screening, promotion and rapid mobilization of Canadian expertise.”²⁶² The organization is divided into 10 substantive categories: human rights, peacebuilding, rule of law, governance, democratization, elections, policing, security, admin-logistics and reconstruction.²⁶³ In a review of national rosters globally, a 2006 UN lessons learned study praised CANADEM as the largest civilian roster with over 7500 members.²⁶⁴

In 2006, the Canadian International Panel on Peacekeeping recognized the importance of DFAIT’s support for the engagement in complex peace operations through the funding of CANADEM, citing that it has more than 3,000 civilian experts ready to deploy on short notice.²⁶⁵ In its prime, after 9 years of effort, CANADEM simultaneously deployed upwards of 287 Canadian civilians in UN DPKO peace operations. Relative to other nations, “Canada and the US were tied for the lead as both had 6% of all civilian posts, UK/France had 4%, while Australian/Germany had 2%.”²⁶⁶

In 2007, federal funding to CANADEM was cut dramatically, and after ten years of inaction, the numbers of Canadians on UN DPKO operations dropped to 187.²⁶⁷ Further to this, the UN has reported the need for additional services to these sorts of rosters to better tailor the output to the needs of the UN.²⁶⁸ In 2014, a Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) study on lessons learned from stabilization practices reviewed the Canadian practice and determined that

Many interviewees express doubt...[regarding]...inconsistent and unambitious practice of evaluation and the duplication of effort between START and the NGO CANADEM in the deployment of personnel. In addition, its separation from CIDA has created a serious gap: through the double division of labor according to the criteria of duration (short vs. long term) and sectorial emphases (security/justice vs. everything else), funding and attention gaps have formed in

²⁶² Idem.

²⁶³ Idem.

²⁶⁴ Idem.

²⁶⁵ UNAC, “*Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding...*”, 100.

²⁶⁶ Dorn, *Unprepared for Peace...*, 33.

²⁶⁷ LaRose-Edwards, *Canada and Peace Operations...*, 3.

²⁶⁸ Gourlay, *Lessons Learned...*, 28.

the long-term work in the area of security and justice, which in practice lead to damaging discontinuities.²⁶⁹

Although viewed as a very successful model for mobilizing Canadian specialists on to UN peace operations, CANADEM is delinked from national objectives. Additionally, based on the assessment criteria of this project, CANADEM does not improve interoperability or the training and education of Canadian contributions to peace operations. Based on this, CANADEM is a very useful tool worth investing into for augmentation to Canadian initiatives, however, it should not be relied upon as the principle mechanism for contribution by the Canadian government.

2.3 Auxiliary analysis

In 2016, the group of 78 made several recommendations to improve Canadian contributions to UN peacekeeping. In defining the ideal Canadian model for education, the group proposes the creation of

...an international training institute, accredited by the United Nations, which both utilizes and contributes to the latest doctrine, practice and procedures for UN-led international peacekeeping and early peacebuilding/sustaining peace, including protection of civilians and the gender dimension of peace operations.²⁷⁰

Additionally, findings from a 2014 German report on improving stabilization operations determined that "...staff development, training in and integration of existing expertise in all facets of stabilization must be improved in the relevant ministries and beyond."²⁷¹ Taking these findings into consideration, this project will look to review a previous Canadian initiative in the

²⁶⁹ Rotmann, *Stabilization: Doctrine...*, 24.

²⁷⁰ Group of 78, *A Shift to Sustainable...*, 4.

²⁷¹ Rotmann, *Stabilization: Doctrine...*, 56.

Pearson Peacekeeping Center, as well as an overview of British BSOS, to better inform recommendations in the subsequent section.

2.3.1 Pearson Peacekeeping Center

The PPC was an interdepartmental education and training initiative operating between 1994 and 2013 originally in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia, and moved to Ottawa in 2008. Its founders describe its vision as the unification of different countries to learn about the art of peacekeeping.²⁷² Overtime, the nature of training and target audience would see an expanded mandate. Throughout its tenure, the initiative enabled training and education for military, police and civilian personnel from around the world.²⁷³ The PPC was initially a joint effort between DFAIT and DND, with operating costs of about \$4 million.²⁷⁴ The platform for education covered the cost of tuition and the salaries of participants, including tuition and travel fees of international students and instructors.²⁷⁵

The PPC contributed to the improvement of multilateral and interdepartmental interoperability through course content and the provision of a platform for professional integration. The center offered courses in Canada and abroad in Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America. Over its 19 years of operations, it conducted training in over 30 countries in English, French and Spanish.²⁷⁶ Using the rubric of “the new peacekeeping partnership” it was the first institution to offer integrated civilian and military training for UN peacekeeping operations.²⁷⁷ For the first 5 years, the standard courses delivered saw an equal mix of military and civilian

²⁷² UNAC, *Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding*...,19.

²⁷³ *Idem*.

²⁷⁴ Dorn, *Unprepared for Peace*..., 25.

²⁷⁵ *Idem*.

²⁷⁶ Dorn, *Unprepared for Peace*..., 65.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid*, 25.

participants with some police participation.²⁷⁸ The later years of its operation saw more military participation, but overall, the breakdown saw approximately 150 CAF personnel attend courses at PPC each year. In 2006-07, 431 Canadian students represented 22% of the total number of participants.²⁷⁹ The platform provided opportunities to international peacekeepers, allowing education to further Canadian contributions to global peacekeeping efforts.

Beyond improving the quality of Canadian output to peace operations, the PPC contributed to the profession of global peacekeeping and CB abroad through the delivery of networked education. The center achieved this through the provision of travelling courses in Brazil, Chile, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Ghana, Mali, Senegal, South Africa and USA.²⁸⁰ At times, the PPC educated four times as many international participants as Canadians.²⁸¹ Through the Military Training Assistance Program (MTAP), the organization was able to cover the travel and tuition of foreign serving military members to improve education and interoperability.²⁸² In addition to providing an educational platform for international participants, the center was directly involved with CB through partnerships. Examples of these were seen with its partnering with South African Police Services (SAPS) and the Kofi Anan International Peacekeeping Training Center (KAIPTC) to integrate with Ghana and the West Africa Police.²⁸³

Following its closure in 2013, PPC programing was not replicated by any other government organization, further contributing to the capability gaps discussed above. The center offered training touching on a diverse range of areas for both civilian and military issues, including interventions with hostile factions, mine and stress awareness, first aid, and survival

²⁷⁸ LaRose-Edwards, *Canada and Peace Operations...*, 2.

²⁷⁹ Dorn, *Unprepared for Peace...*, 25.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid*, 26.

²⁸¹ *Idem*.

²⁸² *Ibid*, 25.

²⁸³ Dorn, *Unprepared for Peace...*, 19.

skills, amongst others.²⁸⁴ The training evolved over the years, to reflect the operating environment going beyond basic military functions. In addition to the provision of core training, the PPC was an important government educational and practical tool for the joint preparation of civilian, military and police contributions to global peace and stability. The organization provided cutting-edge thinking to address emerging trends in global conflict management.²⁸⁵

The closure of PPC was derived from government questions surrounding the validity of training civilians and the increased cost to train foreign police and military.²⁸⁶ Its cessation has meant that Canada no longer has a formal mechanism beyond PSTC and unit level training to directly impact institutional performance or advance the profession of UN peacekeeping.

2.3.2 UK Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS)

As of 2011, the UK government has committed its departments to contribute to a common strategy established under the heading BSOS.²⁸⁷ More importantly, it has given primacy to the topic by promoting stability as a priority for its foreign service, security, and development agencies.²⁸⁸ The UK government views this interagency task as a reflection of national interests and as a means of uniting its "... diplomatic, development, military and security tools, and drawing on our unique experience, relationships, reputation and values."²⁸⁹

From a defence perspective, the UK views engagement in stabilization as an integrated approach with local and foreign military forces. It implicates the requirement for its military to provide support to the process above and beyond traditional military CB efforts. In the UK

²⁸⁴ UNAC, *Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding...*, 19.

²⁸⁵ Dorn, *Unprepared for Peace...*, 26.

²⁸⁶ LaRose-Edwards, *Canada and Peace Operations...*, 2.

²⁸⁷ Rotmann, *Stabilization: Doctrine...*, 11.


²⁸⁸ *Idem.*

²⁸⁹ *Idem.*

approach to BSOS, the military might not always be involved, but is able to be called upon to be integrated rapidly.²⁹⁰

BSOS offers an understanding of the increased requirement for a professionalized approach to stabilization. The UK takes into consideration the overlap between concepts such as stability, peacebuilding, early recovery, state-building and counterinsurgency, as seen in figure 2.2.²⁹¹

Figure 2.2 The relationship between stabilization and other responses to violent conflict and instability



Stabilisation is distinct from concepts such as peacebuilding, state-building, and counter-terrorism. However, these approaches are often pursued simultaneously in conflict contexts. This diagram indicates roughly how they overlap, but is only intended as an accessible visual representation of a complex inter-relationship.

Source: The UK Approach to Stabilization²⁹²

The UK policy on fragile states employs doctrine that encourages improved interoperability between its department. Under the label “Fusion Doctrine”, the UK deploys


²⁹⁰ The United Kingdom, *The United Kingdom Government Approach to Stabilization: A Guide for Policy Makers and Practitioners* (United Kingdom Stabilisation Unit, 2018), 7.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 8.

²⁹² *Idem.*

“...security, economic and influence capabilities to protect, promote and project national security, economic and influence goals.”²⁹³ In recognition of the requirement to provide cross-governmental responses in close coordination with international partners, the UK delivers its National Security Council with better choices by employing the fusion doctrine as outlined in Figure 2.3.²⁹⁴ Through its employment, BSOS results in multi-disciplinary and multi-departmental teams to maximize effects.²⁹⁵

Figure 2.3 UK Fusion Doctrine



Source: The UK Approach to Stabilization²⁹⁶

The UK has also created standing organizations responsible for managing the process of integration and education of interdepartmental action. The UK Stabilization Unit is a “...cross-

²⁹³ Ibid, 17.

²⁹⁴ Idem.

²⁹⁵ Ibid, 18.

²⁹⁶ Ibid, 17.

government, civil-military-police unit based in London, and include Government Partnerships International (GPI)²⁹⁷ ...[consisting]...of core civil servant staff members from 12 government departments, as well as serving military and police officers”.²⁹⁸ In addition to creating a platform for internal and external integration of stability actors, the unit manages the best practices and education across all 12 departments.²⁹⁹

As of 2018, the UK approach to stability enables the education of its public sector through GPI - formally known as the National School of Government International. It is made up of “... a core team of civil servants from a range of departments as well as short- and long-term expert support from across government, academia and the public sector.”³⁰⁰ It delivers cross departmental education and provides expert advice to the central government.³⁰¹

The UK has also retained military peacekeeping training as one of its key areas of focus. Its officer training incorporates negotiation skills, amongst a wide range of other practical peacekeeping tools.³⁰² The UK’s military Doctrine and Concepts Center has also continued to develop specialized capabilities with an emphasis on stability and civilian led operations.³⁰³ The UK is reflecting on its future roles following the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, and academics from the Oxford Research Group suggest that this transitional period represents an opportunity for the British Armed Forces to increase UN peacekeeper contributions.³⁰⁴

²⁹⁷ “Government Partnerships International is a cross-cutting unit, located in the SU, providing peer-to-peer support to partner governments overseas, to help them deliver better public services to citizens. This work supports UK government objectives in fragile and developing countries by increasing the impact of aid interventions and helping to build effective institutions.” “United Kingdom Stabilization Unit Website.” Government Digital Services. Accessed February 12, 2019. <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/stabilisation-unit/about>.

²⁹⁸ Idem.

²⁹⁹ Idem.

³⁰⁰ Idem.

³⁰¹ Idem.

³⁰² David Curran and Paul Williams, *The UK and UN Peace Operations: A Case for Greater Engagement* (The Oxford Research Group, 2017), 647.

³⁰³ Idem.

³⁰⁴ Idem.

Although BSOS is employed on a different scope and scale, as well as being contextualized within a dissimilar internationalist tradition, Canadian initiatives surrounding peace operations can find value in considering its approach to interoperability, military orientation, and education.³⁰⁵ These three areas have been incorporated into subsequent recommendations based on findings from a review of Canadian initiatives and UK approaches to peace and stabilization.

Part 3 – Recommendations

This chapter builds on the background in global trends in peace operations and the review of ongoing initiatives: it will provide recommendations to improve Canadian contributions to peace and stability in fragile states from a defence perspective. These institutional improvements are born from the assessment criteria used to outline ongoing Canadian initiatives, including: cross departmental integration, military orientation, CB, and professional education. This section will reinforce specific recommendations by referring to practitioner, academic and civil society reporting on similar issues.

As supported by the first two chapters, in order to better help global peace and security through action in fragile states, Canada must formalize cross departmental civilian-military/police education and integration processes. The following subsections are recommendations on the implementation of this thesis.

³⁰⁵ The Stabilization Unit provides: “a link between civil, military and police efforts; facilitates cross-government working and lesson-learning; responds to requests from UK government departments, embassies and country offices for support to fragile and conflict-affected states; increases capacity to support the UK government in understanding and developing effective, integrated responses to transnational stability and security challenges, in fragile and conflict-affected states; provides expert advice on understanding and responding to gender, peace and security issues; improves monitoring and evaluation advice and training; support effective response to crises provide a hub for international policing support to fragile and conflict-affected states, and an effective platform for GPI enhance our training offer.” Retrieved from <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/stabilisation-unit/about#the-national-school-of-government-international>, accessed on May 7, 2019

3.1 Increase GAC led integration practices

Firstly, Canada needs to build on PSOP to include more robust measures for maintaining cross departmental integration. Doing so will address Rivard Piché's recommendation to establish best practices that include "... fostering a collaborative culture, such as enhancing training, promoting strong leadership, and cultivating cooperation channels at all levels of peace operations in order to facilitate interoperability..."³⁰⁶ It will also put into action Canadian Peacekeeping Panel recommendations to "... strengthen coordination among Canadian actors deployed in peacekeeping missions, including troops, police, humanitarian workers, NGOs, [and] civilian experts..."³⁰⁷ The standing ability to allow various departments involved in peacekeeping to coordinate amongst each other under GAC will maintain consistent departmental policy between groups doing similar work.³⁰⁸ As Daren Brunk presents in a 2016 article called "Whole of Society Peacebuilding", government coordination mandates must include peacebuilding units across departments and promote the inclusion of non-state peacebuilding actors.³⁰⁹

The allocation of additional resources and broader authorities could evolve PSOP into a legitimate interdepartmental organization and adopt similar practices found in UK BSOS. Within the UK stability unit, 12 departments are represented and coordinated on a regular basis.³¹⁰ This organization would allow for a responsive means of adapting integration processes, lessons learned, and interdepartmental best practices. It would provide a wholesome interpretation of events and improve execution of tasks on unilateral and multilateral Canadian contributions to

³⁰⁶ Brule, *Peace First...*, 196.

³⁰⁷ UNAC, *Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding...*, 103.

³⁰⁸ Idem.

³⁰⁹ Brunk, *Whole of Society Peacebuilding...*, 64.

³¹⁰ Idem.

global peace and stability. Further research into the establishment of this framework in Canada should be undertaken to enable the increased resourcing of PSOP and improve the integration of Canadian assets on peace operations.

3.2 Orient the military towards smart pledges

The alignment of the Canadian military and government policy can be achieved by focusing more on operational output, and less on contingency planning for total war and posturing for interstate deterrence as discussed in section 2. The Canadian government should impose changes to traditional military institutional bias and allow non-traditional tasks – such as contributions to peace operations – to be reframed as its primary focus. By refining the CAF scope of practice, the Canadian military would actually be able to “... nurture and maintain the peacekeeping expertise it has accumulated over the years... [and help improve]...other troop contributing countries.”³¹¹ It would also provide consistency to the Canadian narrative from the domestic to the international stage.

As highlighted in section 1, refocusing the institution onto its main output since the end of the Second World War would allow it to concentrate on specific areas of contribution to the UN and NATO. Refined scope would permit the CAF to be deliberately operationalized as a national tool to further Canadian international ends. It would also enable it to modernize beyond concepts of industrialized warfare, and free up resources by negating the need for costly traditional warfighting capabilities. The modern focus would see the Canadian military align procurement, professional education, and training with niche contributions. These specific areas

³¹¹ UNAC, *Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding...*, 24.

of contribution to peace operations would likely include logistics, policing, communication, peacekeeper training, SoF, cyber, intelligence and command and control.³¹²

By shaping the CAF into experts in counterinsurgency, stability and peacekeeping operations, they will become global leaders on a portion of the conflict spectrum. Gaining expertise will allow them to address the nuanced nature of threshold warfare, pre-and-post conflict stabilization efforts, and population-based security. Preparing a force relevant to issues similar to transnational threats in Africa, recovery from the civil war in Yemen, mass migration caused by climate change, and increased urbanization, will ensure the CAF remains a highly valued commodity to the global security apparatus. Moving towards a smaller and less conventional force would simultaneously reinforce Canadian values and provide the government with legitimacy through pertinent contributions. Enabling the CAF to exclusively prepare for these types of missions would also build upon CAF experiences in Afghanistan, allowing it to project relevant capabilities on future international interventions.³¹³

3.3 Formalize CB efforts

As recommended by civil society, Canada should continue to partner and develop the capacities of pre-and-post-conflict affected nations as a primary means of contribution to international prevention and recovery efforts. In addition to affiliating with these nations unilaterally, “Canada should take advantage of its strong training expertise to build the capacity of foreign peacekeepers abroad.”³¹⁴

Instead of repurposing its warfighting organization in an ad hoc manner, DND should formalize the process by which it generates and employs CB cadres. The designation of formal

³¹² Ibid, 103.

³¹³ Ibid, 24.

³¹⁴ Idem.

structures could network personnel from across the country, develop doctrine, and retain access to relevant specialist capabilities. This could be enabled through regional coordination at joint regional level to include robust primary reserve and public servant integration. “The organization created should be able to link into Military Training and Cooperation Program (MTCP) for CB project identification and forecasting, CADTC for doctrine and course development, and IATF for Civilian Military Cooperation (CIMIC) involvement.”³¹⁵

Creating an organization and networked approach within the CAF would further enable interdepartmental integration on CB related issues. Employing a comprehensive approach to training and operations would allow for the development and custody of Canadian CB TTPs. Networking around this aspect of peace and bilateral operations would take pressure off PSTC and CANSOFCOM, allowing them to better execute their principle roles. Maintaining a nucleus for public and private skills would improve training and professional practices. A more institutionalized approach to this aspect of peace operations would also provide consistent employment opportunities for people with relevant and high demand skillsets – as well as reinforcing the success of CANADEM. CANSOFCOM affiliations within a newly formed Canadian CB community could also help enable future handshakes on projects, delineate indicators and preconditions for handovers between organizations, and help grow conventional capabilities. The unit could also maintain affiliations with relevant international partners, including the UN, NATO and the U.S. Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).

³¹⁵ Jonathan Evans, *Formalizing Capacity Building in the Canadian Armed Forces* (Canadian Forces College Service Paper, 2018), 6.

3.4 Create mechanisms for interdepartmental education

Based on the evolving nature of peace operations, associated practitioner educational requirements, and the inadequacy of ongoing government strategies and initiatives, a more robust solution to a Canadian professional education in peace operations is required. Recognizing current defects in Canadian peacekeeper training, and limited ongoing cross departmental education, it is evident this improvement necessitates an interdepartmental strategy. To best prepare all Canadians taking part in addressing global peace and security, the re-establishment of the PPC with an evolution to match the output of GPI would provide a central focus to the many topical education requirements.

The desire to resource this aspect of improving Canadian contributions to global peace and stabilization has been echoed by civil society and academics alike. The call for the government to allocate more resources to these centers has been identified as a mechanism to:

- a. Uphold high standards of training;
- b. Ensure the adequate training of all Canadian military (and civilian) personnel to deploy on peacekeeping missions;
- c. Provide more in-depth training on gender and the protection of women and children by direct training by experts on these issues;
- d. Promote greater intercultural exchange by allowing centres to bring foreign trainers, and by accepting a larger number of foreign students;
- e. Conduct more peacekeeping training abroad; and
- f. Assist other peacekeeping centres around the world in the development of training curriculum and in “training their trainers.”³¹⁶

The training center would need to reflect the diversity of organizations working on behalf of the government on operations, as well as other actors working towards shared goals. The network would require an interdepartmental nexus and include NGOs and academics in course creation and delivery. The burden should be shared across various departments such as GAC,

³¹⁶ UNAC, *Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding...*, 24.

DND, RCMP, the Department of Justice, Elections Canada, and other emerging participants in peace operations.³¹⁷ An initiative of this type would allow resources to be focused towards “...recruitment and human security training of Canadian military, police and civilian personnel that plan to deploy as part of a UN peacekeeping mission.”³¹⁸

This new structure should be designed to complement ongoing initiatives. It could be made to enable the development of strategy centrally in Ottawa and feed the continued delivery of tactical level courses at PSTC – or through other department specific initiatives. This new center would focus specifically on advancing Canadian comprehensive output operationally by, with, and through the international community.

The creation of this entity would also breed further synergy between international training and education partners. Having the capacity to deliver cutting edge programming in Canada would become an output to galvanize Canada’s peacekeeper narrative on the world stage. It would also enable bilateral arrangements to allow Canada to grow niche capabilities. For example, Canada could invest “... in the training of UN information analysts, notably by supporting courses akin to the one provided by the Norwegian Defence International Centre (NODEFIC) in Oslo.”³¹⁹ This would allow Canada to better understand and operate within UN intelligence culture and “...develop common approaches to identify which situations should be perceived as key in the implementation of UN peacekeeping mandates.”³²⁰

In addition to improving the quality of Canadian contributions to peace operations, the interconnectedness with the international learning community would improve Canadian prominence in peacebuilding. The creation of new institutional mechanisms for peace operations

³¹⁷ Ibid, 103.

³¹⁸ Idem.

³¹⁹ Brule, *Peace First...*, 198.

³²⁰ Idem.

education could promote “...conflict analyses, mapping exercises, and country strategies to include an assessment of existing points of contact between segments of the donor country society and a particular fragile or conflict affected state.”³²¹ Beyond improving interoperability between Canadian entities on operations, the creation of a national academic peace and stabilization network would inherently improve Canadian operational integration internationally.

Finally, the re-establishment of a learning institution for peace in Canada would foster Canadian contributions to knowledge and learning on the world stage. By facilitating Canada’s formal re-engagement with academic circles, the government would entrench its role as a leader in peacekeeping, in line with its Pearsonian traditions. By advancing concepts in human security and the furtherance of practical applications of R2P, Canada could promote awareness abroad through international forums and networks.³²²

Conclusion

In 2014, associate director of the GPPi in Berlin, Philipp Rotmann, highlighted that “in Canada, stabilization is an independent foreign policy instrument intended to close the gap between the capacities of CIDA (GAC) and the armed forces and make the foreign ministry more operational...”³²³ A successful approach to stabilization in Canada requires continuity between global trends, the generation of relevant capabilities, and operational output. Furthermore, better Canadian results rely upon consistency between policy and institutional orientation. Falling short of the creation of a Canadian grand strategy to forge unilateral action, the primacy of maintaining learning organizations to unite Canadian international ends and means remains critical to the successful operationalization of Canadian foreign policy.

³²¹ Brunk, *Whole of Society...*, 85.

³²² UNAC, *Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding...*, 103.

³²³ Rotmann, *Stabilization: Doctrine...*, 24.

Maintaining stability and peacebuilding capacities in Canada is a political tool used to contribute to the global security apparatus and project Canadian values. To remain relevant internationally, it is necessary to constantly review the value proposition of Canadian contributions. This project has offered a background of international and domestic trends providing opportunities and challenges to a Canadian approach to peace operations. By reviewing literature on Canadian global contributions, the above research has highlighted the strengths and limitations of ongoing Canadian initiatives.

By focusing on interoperability, institutional orientation, and education, this paper has provided a recommendation to formalize cross departmental education and integration processes. The implementation of this thesis can be achieved by: increasing GAC led integration practices, orienting the Canadian military towards smart pledges to peace operations, formalizing CB efforts, and creating stronger mechanisms for interdepartmental education.

Beyond these recommended areas for improving fragile state engagement, a further look into employment practices could diversify uniformed and non-uniformed contributions. With the solution space for Canadian internationalists existing between departments, and involving many external entities, the rigidity of institutional employment practices likely has great impact on operational output. Conducting a review of inter-organizational behavior, human resourcing and hybrid employment options could provide a better understanding of institutional bias towards the status quo and improve operationalization of Canadian policy.

In an attempt to remain policy relevant, this project has relied heavily on human security principles, and could benefit from a critical security studies perspective. A more theoretical approach to the topic could provide further insight into the conceptual underpinning of the

security and development nexus.³²⁴ Building on the 2001 ICSS establishment of R2P and the 2016 closeout of the Canadian mission in Afghanistan, further examination of the “... consequences in the field of a 3D approach... [and its impact on]... military, humanitarian and development roles and mandates...”³²⁵ would provide a more critical perspective of the Canadian approach beyond the scope of this project. Further exploration could highlight potential dangers to NGO impartiality, and the impact of securitized development separate from the benefits of stabilization in fragile states as an instrument of foreign policy.

³²⁴ Edward Newman, *Critical Human Security Studies (Review of International Studies, Vol 36, Iss 1, 2010)*, 1.

³²⁵ UNAC, *Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding...*, 103.

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