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MILITARY ALCHEMY: INCREASING THE ARMY'S OPERATIONAL OUTPUT WITH ALLIED RESERVE INITIATIVES

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JCSP 45

Master of Defence Studies

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**MILITARY ALCHEMY: INCREASING THE ARMY’S OPERATIONAL
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By Major James Boddy

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ABSTRACT

Although Canada's defence requirements originally centered on the Militia, which later became the Canadian Army Reserve, the Reserve's importance and capabilities progressively eroded as a result of funding pressures, institutional neglect, and the lack of a clearly defined role. The Auditor General of Canada clearly identified that "Army Reserve units lacked clear guidance on preparing for international missions, had lower levels of training as cohesive teams, and had not fully integrated this training with that of the Regular Army."¹ This led the Canadian military to commence efforts to address the Reserve's issues. Many of the Army's allies have dealt with similar issues and increased their overall operational outputs by enhancing and better integrating their reserve forces.

This paper discusses how the Army can leverage some of its allies' policies and initiatives to similarly increase its operational output. It does this by initially discussing the Reserve's operating environment before comparing how the Canadian Army, the Australian Army, the British Army, and the United States Marine Corps structure, train, manage, generate, and enable their reserve forces to participate in operations. This paper also considers how the Army should amend and implement its initiatives to better ensure their success.

Some of the major recommendations provided by this paper relate to how the Army should approach its reserve enhancement efforts and several allied initiatives that the Army should consider adopting to increase its operational output. It also discusses the Reserve's suitability for becoming the primary force generator for various missions.

¹ Canada, Office of the Auditor General, "Report 5—Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence," last accessed 8 January 2018, http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201602_05_e_41249.html#hd4f.

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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

The roles Reserve Forces play within a nation's military must be carefully chosen and then supported with the appropriate resources if that force is to have a meaningful and ongoing impact on that country's defence and security needs. Those roles must be realistic insofar as the strategic environment is concerned and affordable from the standpoints of force size, training and equipment.

- Former Minister of National Defence, The Honourable David Pratt²

The Canadian Army Reserve has been an integral component of Canada's military since it was created in 1855.³ While perceptions of the Reserve's importance have occasionally risen and fallen since that time, it demonstrated its value over the past thirty years by consistently generating up to 21% of the personnel that deployed on the Canadian military's international operations.⁴ Despite the magnitude of this contribution, the Auditor General of Canada noted within his 2016 report to Parliament that "Army Reserve units lacked clear guidance on preparing for international missions, had lower levels of training as cohesive teams, and had not fully integrated this training with that of the Regular Army."⁵ The identification of these issues led the Canadian government to re-emphasise the importance of the Canadian Armed Forces' (CAF) Primary Reserves within its current defence policy, *Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE)*.⁶ The Army also started working to better integrate and qualitatively improve the Reserve.⁷ This increased emphasis builds on other CAF initiatives that may significantly impact the Reserve by adjusting its structure and how it is managed. These initiatives are important because the

² David Pratt, *Canada's Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper* (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2011), 47.

³ Canada, Department of National Defence, "Demobilization: The 1855 Volunteers," last updated 1 June 2017, last accessed 25 January 2019, <http://cmhg-phmc.forces.gc.ca/cmh-pmc/page-448-eng.aspx>.

⁴ David Pratt, *Canada's Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper*, 25.

⁵ Canada, Office of the Auditor General, "Report 5—Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence."

⁶ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 2017), 67.

⁷ For the rest of this essay, the term "Army" is meant to be the Canadian Army and includes both the regular and reserve forces of the Army. The term "Reserve" in this essay means the Army Reserve and not the CAF's Primary Reserve.

Reserve and the Army's success are linked. This connection was clearly highlighted in 2018 by the Commander of the Canadian Army, Lieutenant-General Paul Wynnyk, when he identified that "Strengthening the Army Reserve is strengthening the Canadian Army."⁸

As this study will show, the Army can increase its operational output by leveraging many of its allies' experiences to enhance the Reserve's ability to predictably force generate capabilities for operations. This is because many of Canada's allies have undertaken initiatives to modernize and better integrate their reserve forces into their overall efforts. Careful consideration of these efforts should also help the Army to avoid attempting initiatives that its allies abandoned as a result of their failing to achieve the required results or creating undesirable consequences. While other papers have been written on the Reserve's issues and how individual allied initiatives might address specific problems, this paper focuses on how the Australian Army, the British Army, and the United States Marine Corps organize, equip, train, force generate, employ and support their reservists to provide a basis for identifying how the Army could address the myriad of issues affecting the Reserve.

Although efforts to strengthen the Reserve should simultaneously strengthen the Army, the implementation of reserve enhancement initiatives may be unsuccessful if they are not configured to work with the Army's other systems and processes. Any allied initiatives that the Army chooses to implement will likely need to be adapted considering that they were designed to work within militaries that have different cultures, structures,

⁸ Canada, Department of National Defence, 1901-1 (DLFD SI-5), *Fragmentation Order 001 – Mission Tasks Tranche 1 to Canadian Army Operation Order 27 June 2017 – Strengthening the Army Reserve* (Ottawa: Canadian Army, 2018), 1-2.

and policies. Understanding the Reserve and its operating environment is therefore the first step in determining how allied reserve enhancement initiatives can be tailored to modernize and better integrate the Reserve into the Army.

As such, Chapter 2 provides a historical overview of the Reserve, including previous reserve-enhancement efforts. It also considers contemporary discussions about the Reserve's role and structure, the self-perception of reservists, and regular force - reserve relations. Chapter 3 focuses on how the Army's operational output links to Canada's defence policy and the Reserve's contribution to generating this output. It also discusses how the Reserve is organized, trained, and managed to generate this output and the measures in place to incentivize Reservists to serve and to deploy on operations. Chapters 4 to 6 focus on these same criteria to investigate how the Australian Army, the British Army, and the United States Marine Corps generate capability from their reserves. These chapters also consider the initiatives that these militaries have introduced to increase their reserve forces' operational output and provide recommendations for how the Army can potentially leverage these initiatives to increase its operational output. Chapter 7 discusses the current measures being developed and implemented by the Canadian military and how it can increase the likelihood that these efforts will be successful. Finally, Chapter 8 offers some concluding remarks for the way forward.

CHAPTER 2 – HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND LITERARY DISCUSSIONS

As part of understanding how potential reserve enhancement and integration initiatives will be received by members of the Reserve and by other key stakeholders within and outside the Army, an understanding of the Reserve's history, including why previous enhancement initiatives were unsuccessful and the contemporary discussions about the Reserve and reservists is required. This chapter will initially focus on the Reserve's history before considering these literary discussions.

Historical Overview

Canada's early defence requirements were met by the British military, supported by the Canadian Militia, which eventually became the Reserve. The Parliament of the United Province of Canada established the Militia following the withdrawal of the majority of the British forces from Canada in 1855.⁹ The Permanent Active Militia, which later became the Army's Regular Force, was established in 1883 and was initially smaller than the non-active component of the Canadian Militia.¹⁰ The decision to maintain a small Permanent Active Militia resulted from the belief that the nation's "citizen soldiers" were more than capable of defending Canada.¹¹ As such, the Permanent Active Militia's original role was to train the rest of the Militia if it was mobilized.¹² Canada successfully employed this framework to mobilize large forces during both World Wars.¹³

⁹ Canada, Department of National Defence, "A Decade of Turbulence: Withdrawal of British Troops from Canada," last updated 1 June 2017, last accessed 1 January 2018, <http://cmhg-phmc.forces.gc.ca/cmh-pmc/page-507-eng.aspx>.

¹⁰ Pratt, *Canada's Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper*, 18.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 65.

¹² *Ibid.*, 18.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 19.

In 1947, Canada's Minister of National Defence, Brooke Claxton, identified that the Department of National Defence should find "efficient and inexpensive ways of meeting Canada's defence needs" that would provide Canada with "a reasonable military capability based on the [idea] of emphasizing Reserves over Regular Forces [and] mobilization."¹⁴ This emphasis on the Reserve lasted until 1948, when Canada's North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commitments and the potential requirement to counter Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe obliged the Canadian government to maintain a larger regular force within the Army.¹⁵ While NATO's founding member nations initially believed that large numbers of soldiers would be required to defeat the Soviet military if a war occurred, this perception quickly changed once the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons. This is because NATO's member nations believed that any war with the Soviet Union would quickly escalate into a nuclear war and provide insufficient time for mobilizing reserve forces.¹⁶ As such, the Army was assigned a national survival and civil defence role, which was passed to the Militia in 1956.¹⁷ While the Militia traditionally played a major role in Canada's defence plans, its new role highlighted its diminished importance within the Army and caused morale within the Militia to plummet.¹⁸

While the 1964 Defence White Paper did not completely remove the Militia's civil assistance task, it clearly highlighted that its primary role was to support the Regular

¹⁴ Douglas Bland, *The Administration of Defence Policy in Canada 1947 to 1985* (Kingston: Ronald P. Frye & Company, 1987), 13, 15.

¹⁵ Pratt, *Canada's Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper*, 19.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 19.

¹⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence, *1964 White Paper on Defence* (Ottawa: Canada Communications Group, 1964), 25; Pratt, *Canada's Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper*, 19.

¹⁸ Corinne McDonald, "The Canadian Armed Forces: The Role Of The Reserves," written 29 November 1999, last accessed 10 January 2018, <http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/prb9911-e.htm>.

Force.¹⁹ This was not an overly popular task amongst militia proponents, who believed that this task would thwart efforts to grow and expand the Militia.²⁰ While the role of augmenting the Regular Force has been included within every Canadian defence white paper since 1964, the 1994 Defence White Paper also laid out a four-stage framework for responding to crises or emergencies. The first stage involved "force generation," which consisted of producing forces for operations and included preparing reservists to augment regular force units.²¹ This stage was followed by "force enhancement," which encompassed improving the military's existing forces and the potential creation of temporary units. "Force expansion" was the third stage and involved increasing the military's size to meet the requirements of a major crisis or emergency.²² Finally, the last stage was "national mobilization," which "could touch upon all aspects of Canadian society and would only come into effect with the proclamation by the Governor-in-Council of a 'war emergency' under the Emergencies Act."²³

The 1994 defence policy identified that the Reserve's main role was "the augmentation, sustainment and support of deployed forces" and noted that "Reserve Forces are intended as augmentation and sustainment for Regular units, and, in some cases, for tasks that are not performed by Regular Forces."²⁴ Canadian historian Dr. J.L. Granatstein noted that "the leadership of the Reserve Army was not happy with the augmentation role which took individuals rather than formed sections, platoons or

¹⁹ Canada, Department of National Defence, *1964 White Paper on Defence*, 24.

²⁰ Jack English, *The Role of the Militia in Today's Canadian Forces* (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2011), 20-21.

²¹ Canada, Department of National Defence, "1994 White Paper on Defence," last accessed 8 January 2018, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/dn-nd/D3-6-1994-eng.pdf.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

companies,” despite the fact that “in the early and middle 1990s, no Militia unit was capable of providing a formed and fully-trained section, let alone a platoon or company.”²⁵ As such, reserve proponents began to ascribe the mobilization role to the Reserve.²⁶ This position was reinforced by the report produced by the 1995 Special Commission of the Restructuring of the Reserves, which recommended a greater role for the Reserve, including their inclusion within a “no cost” mobilization plan.²⁷ The mobilization role was finally assigned to the Reserve in 2002 when General Ray Henault, then the Chief of the Defence Staff, identified that “within the Army, the Reserves (Militia) provide the framework for mobilization, the Army’s connection with Canadians, and augmentation within the Canadian Forces.”²⁸ This role was quickly replaced when the Army reemphasised that the Reserve’s primary role was supporting the Regular Force.²⁹

Besides attempting to restructure the Reserve following the release of the Special Commission’s report in 1995, the Army tried to assign new roles to individual reserve units in 1999.³⁰ A significant part of this effort involved attempting to assign combat service support roles to reserve units, regardless of their history and traditional function.³¹ Although the effort would have equipped reserve units to perform well defined operational roles, it was not clearly explained to or understood by reservists and their proponents. This lack of understanding caused the effort to be hugely unpopular amongst

²⁵ Jack Granatstein, “In the Search for an Efficient, Effective Land Force Reserve,” *Canadian Military Journal* 3(2) (Summer 2002): 7.

²⁶ Pratt, *Canada’s Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper*, 22.

²⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence, *1995 Land Force Reserve Restructuring* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1995), 20.

²⁸ English, *The Role of the Militia in Today’s Canadian Forces*, 8.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 8.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 14.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 14.

reservists and their supporters who believed that the Army was copying the U.S. Army's "Abrams doctrine."³² This doctrine led the U.S. Army to place its strategic support capabilities in the U.S. Army Reserve such that "if the president of the United States sent the Army to war, he would be forced to mobilize the reserves, thereby requiring him to get the support of the American people."³³ This doctrine also led the U.S. Army to equip and structure its reserve forces to predictably generate specified outputs for operations.

The effort to revise the reserve units' roles increased the distrust that existed between the members of the Regular Force and the Reserve. It also led to the creation of reserve lobby groups, such as Reserves 2000.³⁴ These groups were enabled by the fact that many of the Reserve's "stalwart figures in 1995 were major players in Canadian public and corporate life, [who] were able to command attention in Ottawa."³⁵ These groups successfully leveraged their political connections to frustrate and delay the Army's plans to restructure the Reserve and to assign new roles to reserve units. Although the official rationale for abandoning its efforts to enhance the Reserve and to assign new roles to reserve units is not clearly identified within the literature, many of the proposed reforms would have been expensive. As these changes would have occurred during a period of significant reduced defence spending during the 1990s, it is reasonable to conclude that the Army discontinued these efforts as a result of both financial reasons and external political pressure.³⁶ Although the Army abandoned the majority of its plans

³² Pratt, *Canada's Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper*, 15.

³³ Conrad C. Crane and Gian Gentile, "Understanding the Abrams Doctrine: Myth Versus Reality," last updated 9 December 2015, last accessed 23 February 2019, <https://www.rand.org/blog/2015/12/understanding-the-abrams-doctrine-myth-versus-reality.html>.

³⁴ Pratt, *Canada's Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper*, 22.

³⁵ Jack Granatstein and Charles Belzile, *The Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves, 1995: Ten Years Later* (Calgary: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2005), 5.

to drastically restructure the Reserve, its efforts eventually led to the Reserve's reorganization into ten Brigades.³⁷

Despite the successful reorganization of the Reserve, the Auditor General of Canada recognized in 2016 in his report on the Reserve that reserve units still suffered from numerous systemic issues that undermined their ability to prepare for missions, to remain sustainable, and to effectively train their personnel.³⁸ In a separate inquiry completed in 2017 to influence the new defence policy, the Senate of Canada identified that many of the Reserve's problems were exacerbated by recruiting and retention issues and a lack of equipment.³⁹ The Senate also noted that the Reserve provides the CAF with access to a broad range of specialist capabilities that may be useful on missions that require non-traditional skills or ways of approaching problems.⁴⁰

While numerous recent studies have considered many issues affecting the Reserve, it remains that that the Reserve has played a significant role in ensuring the success of Canada's efforts on expeditionary operations over the past 30 years. Although mobilization is not mentioned within the 2017 defence policy, *SSE* has re-emphasised the Reserve's importance within Canadian government's plans for the military. This includes increasing the Primary Reserves to an average paid strength of 30,000 members and identifying its intention to leverage the Reserve to create "full-time capability through

³⁶ World Bank, "Military Expenditure – Canada," last accessed 23 February 2019, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CD?locations=CA>.

³⁷ Granatstein and Belzile, *The Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves, 1995: Ten Years Later*, 23.

³⁸ Canada, Office of the Auditor General, "Report 5—Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence."

³⁹ Canada, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *Reinvesting in the Canadian Armed Forces: A Plan for the Future* (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, 2017), 49-50, 53.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 53-54.

part-time service.”⁴¹ The CAF also modified the Primary Reserves’ role in 2018 to reflect that it performs the following three key roles within the military:

- at the strategic level, being integrated across the spectrum of institutions;
- providing an operational capability by being “trained and ready to respond”; and
- providing the CAF with a presence in and connection with over 100 communities across Canada.⁴²

While previous defence policies noted the Primary Reserves’ importance, the military’s current efforts highlight its support for enhancing and better integrating the Primary Reserves into the CAF’s overall efforts.

Literary Discussions

As part of considering ways to maximise the Reserve’s operational output, a basic understanding of four key contemporary literary discussions relating the Reserve’s role and organization and to reservists is required.

The first discussion relates to the Reserve’s role. Although the Reserve’s role of augmenting the Regular Force has been enshrined in Canadian defence policy since 1964, some reserve proponents, including Major-General Éric Tremblay, who formerly commanded the Canadian Defence Academy, and Dr. Howard Coombs, a history professor from the Royal Military College of Canada and the former Commander of 33 Canadian Brigade Group, argue that the Reserve should have a greater role within the military.⁴³ Granatstein and Lieutenant-General (retired) Charles Belzile, the former

⁴¹ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy*, 67.

⁴² Canada, Department of National Defence, “Canada’s Reserve Force,” last updated 20 November 2018, last accessed 3 April 2019, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/departmental-results-2017-18-index/supporting-documents-index/canadas-reserve-force.html>.

⁴³ Éric Tremblay and Howard Coombs, “Canadian Armed Forces Reserves – Quo Vadis?” *Canadian Military Journal* 16(3) (Summer 2016): 24.

Commander of Mobile Command (which later became the Army), meanwhile contend that Canada's lack of mobilization planning is "very imprudent" and that "the Militia's role in Stages 3 and 4 of mobilization planning . . . [is] essential."⁴⁴ Also arguing against the augmentation role were members of the Reserve who claimed that "sending large numbers of a Militia unit to serve with regulars, whether on deployment or as instructors, compromises [the unit's] ability to train recruits and others."⁴⁵ Countering this position are Granatstein and Belzile, who identified that reservists have become increasingly supportive of the augmentation role because "of the benefits reservists who [have] been deployed bring to their Reserve unit."⁴⁶

Arguing against expanding the Reserve's role to include mobilization are those like former Minister of National Defence, David Pratt, who highlight that the "cost of technology, training and equipment – and the long lead times for procurement – generally militate against mass mobilization scenarios."⁴⁷ While the global security trends predicted by the government in publications like *Future Security Environment 2013-2040* do not rule out the possibility of major wars occurring, they generally predict that the current types of conflict will continue in the future and will be augmented by technological advances.⁴⁸ Maintaining a large strategic reserve to hedge against being unprepared for an un-forecasted major conflict would be risky for the CAF as such a

⁴⁴ Granatstein *et al.*, *The Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves, 1995: Ten Years Later*, 7-8.

⁴⁵ Canada, The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, "Canadian Security and Military Preparedness," last updated February 2002, last accessed 10 January 2018, <https://sencanada.ca/Content/SEN/Committee/371/defe/rep/rep05feb02-e.htm>.

⁴⁶ Granatstein *et al.*, *The Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves, 1995: Ten Years Later*, 28.

⁴⁷ Pratt, *Canada's Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper*, 54.

⁴⁸ Canada, Department of National Defence, A-FD-005-001/AF-003 *The Future Security Environment 2013-2040* (Winnipeg: 17 Wing Winnipeg Publishing Office, 2014), 89-90, 96.

force would likely be eliminated if the government opted to reduce spending. Given the low value that the CAF would derive from a purely strategic reserve in all instances other than war, it is reasonable to conclude that the CAF should continue leveraging the Reserve to augment regular force units for operations.

The second discussion relates to how the Reserve should be organized and commanded. The two polar extremes of this discussion focus on segregating reservists into their own command or fully integrating them into the CAF's existing structures. Historically, proponents of reserve segregation generally claimed that the Reserve's problems were caused by the Regular Force. This included identifying that force reductions and budget cuts that negatively impacted the Reserve were decided upon by regular force officers seeking to protect the Regular Force's capabilities.⁴⁹ Although the Chief of the Land Staff, Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffery "opened the books to the Reserves, aiming to persuade the honorary colonels and Reserves 2000 that the Regulars really weren't stealing the Reserves' funding," proponents of segregation claimed that the Reserve would be better protected from regular force deprivations if it was separate from the Regular Force and under the command of a reservist.⁵⁰ Some proponents of segregation even suggested that the Primary Reserves should become a distinct "Level 1" organization within the CAF that was commanded by a reservist who holds the rank of Lieutenant-General or Vice-Admiral.⁵¹ Pratt identified that organizing the Primary Reserves in this manner would significantly complicate command within the CAF by "bifurcat[ing] the existing command structure and [would] be the first step toward

⁴⁹ Pratt, *Canada's Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper*, 45.

⁵⁰ Pratt, *Canada's Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper*, 45.; Jack Granatstein, "In the Search for an Efficient, Effective Land Force Reserve," 9.

⁵¹ Pratt, *Canada's Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper*, 45.

establishing a separate Reserve Force Army, Navy and Air Force,” which would counter the aim of the “total force” concept.⁵²

Proponents of greater integration contend that a higher degree of fusion between the Reserve and the Regular Force enhances their ability to work together and to generate capabilities for operations.⁵³ Although the Reserve currently exists between these two poles, with the Reserve being essentially segregated up to the brigade-level, the Army and CAF are moving towards increasing reserve integration. This includes efforts to harmonize the military’s human resources policies and to strengthen the Reserve’s ability to generate personnel for operations.

The third discussion relates to the cultural differences that exist between regular and reserve force personnel. While members of regular forces generally consider themselves to be professional soldiers, they often do not consider reservists as being “truly professional.”⁵⁴ Within his seminal work on civil-military relations, *The Soldier and the State*, Dr. Samuel Huntington noted that “the officer corps normally includes a number of nonprofessional ‘reservists.’”⁵⁵ Huntington considered reservists to be a “temporary supplement to the officer corps” whose “motivations, values, and behavior frequently differ greatly from the career professional.”⁵⁶ The CAF publication, *Duty with Honour*, takes the opposite position and classifies every member of the CAF as being a professional.⁵⁷ Three academic researchers from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem,

⁵² *Ibid.*, 46.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 46

⁵⁴ Edna Lomsky-Feder, Nir Gazit, and Eyal Ben-Ari, “Reserve Soldiers as Transmigrants: Moving between the Civilian and Military Worlds,” *Armed Forces & Society* 34(4) (July 2008): 604.

⁵⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Toronto: Vintage Books, 1964), 17.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁵⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence, A-PA-005-000/AP-001 *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada 2009* (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy, 2009), 10.

meanwhile suggest that the difference between regular force personnel and their reserve counterparts is more ascribable to the different working cultures that exist within regular forces and reserves.⁵⁸ They also claim that regular force personnel consider anything that falls outside their culture and way of approaching problems to be unprofessional.⁵⁹ While their paper focusses on Israeli reservists, their assertion is applicable to the Canadian military given the myriad of negative attitudes that exist within the Regular Force in relation to the Primary Reserves' professionalism and capabilities. Even if reservists approach problems differently, Dr. John English, a retired Canadian regular force infantry officer and former Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, notes that "good discipline and technical expertise are determined not by reserve or regular status, but by training."⁶⁰ English infers that any gap that exists between the Regular Force and the Reserve can be reduced with additional training.⁶¹

The final discussion within the literature focusses on the "transmigrant" nature of reservists, which exists as a result of their requirement to frequently transit between their military and non-military lives.⁶² While the dual nature of reservists reduces the likelihood that they will fully embrace the Regular Force's specific culture and practices, the Israeli researchers note that reservists are highly committed to the defence of their country and want to serve in a meaningful capacity, despite being limited in the time that they have available as a result of their other commitments.⁶³ They also identified that

⁵⁸ Lomsky-Feder *et al.*, "Reserve Soldiers as Transmigrants: Moving between the Civilian and Military Worlds," 604.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 604.

⁶⁰ English, *The Role of the Militia in Today's Canadian Forces*, 28-29.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 28-29.

⁶² Lomsky-Feder *et al.*, "Reserve Soldiers as Transmigrants: Moving between the Civilian and Military Worlds," 598-599.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 605.

reservists are jealous of their time in uniform and do not want it to be wasted on menial activities.⁶⁴ While the Israeli researchers claim that service is important for reservists, Pratt suggests that the income generated from serving in the Reserve is also a key motivator.⁶⁵ This highlights that reservists are motivated by a range of factors that may also include familial pressure, desiring a sense of adventure, or to gain job experience.

Reservists are trained to the same level as their regular force counterparts; however, their training focuses on a narrower range of skills as a result of their generally having less time available to complete their career training.⁶⁶ They also often possess education and experience that is not generally found within the Regular Force as a result of their non-military backgrounds. The dual nature of reservists provides the Army with a greater degree of access than it would otherwise have to Canadian society. This includes the fact that a greater percentage of Canada's reservists live in major urban centres, come from a more diverse range of ethnic backgrounds, and are female.⁶⁷ This is unlike the Regular Force, which tends to be more heavily skewed towards Caucasian males who are recruited from rural areas and small cities.⁶⁸ The wider range of education, experience, gender, and ethnicity resident within the Reserve provides the CAF with access to diverse ways of thinking and approaching issues that are not necessarily found within the Regular Force. This diversity generally provides reservists with skills that are ideally suited to stability, peace support, and capacity building operations.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 605.

⁶⁵ Pratt, *Canada's Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper*, 38.

⁶⁶ Canada, Department of National Defence, "Canada's Reserve Force."

⁶⁷ Hans Jung, "Can the Canadian Forces Reflect Canadian Society," *Canadian Military Journal* 8(3) (Autumn 2007): 28.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 28.

The Israeli researchers also identified that reservists' relationship with their military is "emotional, nostalgic, and embedded in social ties."⁶⁹ As such, it is reasonable to conclude that the identity of many reservists is tied to their membership within a specific regiment or trade. Substantially changing the role of these units, such as what occurred when the Army attempted to assign combat service support roles to the Reserve, threatens this identity and may result in unintended and undesirable consequences like convincing large numbers of reservists to leave the military.

As this chapter and a detailed review of the Canadian literature on the Reserve have highlighted, numerous authors have written articles about the Reserve or about reserve forces in general. Although many of these authors provide valuable insights into the problems affecting the Reserve, the majority of the Canadian authors have approached this subject from a purely Canadian viewpoint. For instance, Tremblay and Coombs' discussion about improving the Reserve's abilities and better integrating it into the Army focuses on evolving the Army's current practices without considering how the Army's allies have addressed similar issues within their militaries.⁷⁰ While other authors, like Major Lance Hoffe, have discussed how other armies addressed similar problems, they tend to focus on a narrow range of issues affecting the Reserve.⁷¹ Unlike these other papers, this paper focuses on some of the issues limiting the Reserve's ability to increase its operational output by more broadly considering how other nations' reserve related practices could potentially assist the Army with addressing these challenges.

⁶⁹ Lomsky-Feder *et al.*, "Reserve Soldiers as Transmigrants: Moving between the Civilian and Military Worlds," 606-607.

⁷⁰ Éric Tremblay and Howard Coombs, "Canadian Armed Forces Reserves – Quo Vadis?" 24.

⁷¹ Lance Hoffe, "The Canadian Army Total Force Concept: Optimizing the Army Reserve Contribution," Joint Command and Staff Program course paper (Canadian Forces College, 2018), 5-10.

Before moving onto the next chapter, which considers how the Army and the Reserve trains, generates, manages and enables its capabilities and the current initiatives that will impact how these functions occur, it is worth reemphasising that the Reserve was chronically underfunded and frequently viewed as being little more than an augmentation pool by the rest of the Army following the end of the Second World War. The Army only commenced its most recent attempts to enhance the Reserve's capabilities and to better incorporate it into its overall efforts after the Auditor General of Canada identified the numerous systemic issues that were impacting the Reserve within his 2016 report to Parliament. As the Army works to address these issues, it must take the differences that exist between the Reserve and the Regular Force into account during the development and implementation of Army and reserve-enhancement initiatives. Similarly, the Army must understand the factors that lead reservists to serve, including how they perceive themselves as military professionals. This understanding is important for guiding future efforts to enhance the Reserve's ability to generate personnel and capabilities for operations because the Reserve's ability to perform this function is directly tied to the willingness of its personnel to serve in the military and on operations. Failing to properly consider these differences and reservist motivations could limit the successful implementation of any future reserve-enhancement efforts.

CHAPTER 3 – THE CANADIAN ARMY RESERVE’S ENVIRONMENT

With an understanding of the Reserve’s history and the contemporary literary discussions about the Reserve and reservists, the next step in determining how allied reserve related practices and initiatives could increase the Army’s operational output involves understanding the Reserve’s current operating environment. This chapter discusses the Army’s operational output and how it relates to Canada’s defence policy, the types of operations that the Army is likely to support, and how reservists are trained, managed, generated, and enabled to deploy on these operations. This chapter also considers the Canadian military’s current major initiatives and how they may impact the Reserve’s ability to generate personnel and capabilities for operations.

Operational Output

The Army’s mission is to “posture for concurrent operations by generating combat effective, multi-purpose land forces to meet Canada’s defence objectives.”⁷² It does this by generating forces capable of meeting the demands of domestic and expeditionary operations spanning the spectrum of conflict. These forces consist of formed elements or individuals who possess the training, experience, knowledge, and equipment necessary to succeed on the operations that they have been assigned. The Army’s operational output relates to its ability to generate these forces. Tasks that enable this to occur include providing leadership during the preparation for and employment of forces on operations; developing the leadership, occupation, mission, and equipment-specific skills and knowledge that are required; and, sustaining combat power by looking after the Army’s personnel and their equipment. The generation of these forces is based

⁷² Canada, Department of National Defence, “The Canadian Army of Today,” last accessed 31 December 2018, <http://www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca/en/about-army/organization.page>.

on political direction to meet the Canadian government's defence objectives, which are outlined within Canada's defence policy.

SSE clearly delineates the core missions that the CAF is expected to perform.

These include:

- detecting, deterring and defending against threats to Canada and North America;
- leading and/or contributing forces to international peace operations and [NATO] or coalition efforts;
- engaging in capacity building;
- assisting civil authorities and law enforcement; and
- responding to international and domestic disasters or major emergencies.⁷³

Besides possessing the ability to perform these missions, *SSE* specifies that the CAF must be capable of simultaneously generating up to 7000 personnel for international peace and stability operations, including 4000 on a sustained-basis.⁷⁴

Force Generation and Management

The Army is clearly not responsible for generating all of the forces required to fulfill these missions alone. Rather, it produces land-centric capabilities, while the Royal Canadian Navy, the Royal Canadian Air Force, the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command, the Legal Branch, and the Health Services and Military Police Groups generate capabilities related to their specific areas of responsibility. Although it is expected that the Army will continue generating the majority of the personnel who deploy on future land-centric CAF missions, the military's other force generators will

⁷³ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*, 82.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 81.

still need to support these operations when the requirements of these missions exceed the Army's capacity.

It is expected that the types of missions that the Army will support in the future will be comparable to the operations that it participated in over the past 30 years while also being influenced by the conflict trends anticipated within the Canadian military's *Future Security Environment 2013-2040* publication. These historical operations spanned the spectrum of conflict and include peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, Africa, and the Middle East, counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, deterrence operations in Eastern Europe, and capacity building efforts in the Ukraine, Africa, and the Middle East.

The number of personnel required to support these commitments varies significantly. For instance, the Army contributed the majority of the personnel who deployed on various CAF operations in the Balkans between 1991 and 2005.⁷⁵ The Army also committed more than 2000 of the 2800 personnel who were deployed at any given time to Afghanistan for Operation ATHENA.⁷⁶ The Army currently has around 60 personnel deployed in the Middle East on Operation IMPACT, which is a stability and security operation, 200 personnel in the Ukraine on Operation UNIFIER, which is a capacity building mission, and 450 personnel on Operation REASSURANCE to deter Russian aggression in Eastern Europe.⁷⁷ The Army is also supporting many smaller

⁷⁵ Canada, Department of National Defence, "ARCHIVED - Canadian Forces Operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina," last updated 6 July 2018, last accessed 4 April 2019, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=canadian-forces-operations-in-bosnia-herzegovina/hnps1u07>.

⁷⁶ Canada, Department of National Defence, "ARCHIVED - Joint Task Force Afghanistan," last accessed 14 January 2019, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-abroad-past/op-athena-jtf-afghanistan.page>; Canada, Department of National Defence, "ARCHIVED - Operation ATHENA."

⁷⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence, "CFTPO Dashboard," last updated 15 January 2019, last accessed 15 January 2019, <http://mcs-lcm.forces.mil.ca/CFTPO/sourcing.aspx#!5724760>.

missions, including having one officer in Cyprus on Operation SNOWGOOSE and approximately 40 personnel in the Sinai Peninsula on Operation CALUMET.⁷⁸

The Army generates personnel for these operations from the Regular Force and the Reserve. As such, reservists have participated in the majority of the missions supported by the Army. For instance, they comprised 44% of the 2nd Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group when it was deployed to Croatia in 1993.⁷⁹ The Reserve also generated several formed sub-units on an ad hoc basis that deployed to the Balkans in the early 2000s. These sub-units were manned and led by reservists.⁸⁰ Reservists also comprised between 10 to 21% of the personnel who deployed on the CAF's expeditionary operations between 2000 and 2010.⁸¹ Reserve participation on the CAF's expeditionary operations during this timeframe included augmenting regular force units and deploying ad hoc formed sub-units, like force protection companies. Reservists also have and continue to deploy on smaller missions. Although the Army's current operational tempo is significantly less than during its involvement in Afghanistan in the late-2000s, reservists presently comprise 8% of the Army's deployed personnel.⁸²

While most expeditionary operations are authorized by Crown prerogative, the National Defence Act (NDA) authorizes the CAF to conduct domestic operations and clearly identifies who can authorize these operations.⁸³ This enables the military to

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ English, *The Role of the Militia in Today's Canadian Forces*, 29.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 29.

⁸¹ Pratt, *Canada's Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper*, 25.

⁸² Canada, Department of National Defence, "CFTPO Dashboard."

⁸³ Canada, Department of National Defence, A-LG-007-SLA/AF-002 *The Crown Prerogative as applied to Military Operations* (Ottawa: Office of the Judge Advocate General, 2008), 19-20; Canada, National Defence Act, R.S.C., c. N-5, s. 273.6, s. 274-277 (1985).

rapidly deploy on domestic operations by streamlining the approval process. The Army has frequently deployed personnel, including reservists, on such operations. For instance, reservists were included within the units that supported the Province of Quebec with combatting the impacts of serious flooding in 2017 and the Province of British Columbia with combatting forest fires in 2018.⁸⁴ These operations were conducted in accordance with the NDA and the Canadian Joint Operation Command's Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations (SOODO). Although referring to Canada's former defence policy, the *Canada First Defence Strategy*, the SOODO identifies key strategic objectives that the Army can help achieve. These include upholding the sovereignty over, and integrity of, Canadian territory; deterring or defeating direct threats to Canada; responding to contingencies anywhere in the country; and mitigating the effects of natural and man-made disasters.⁸⁵

The SOODO contains several contingency plans (CONPLAN) that assist the military with planning and conducting activities to meet these objectives. The CONPLANS that generally require significant involvement from the Army are CONPLAN LENTUS, which focuses on supporting Canadian civil authorities' disaster relief efforts, CONPLAN CITADEL, which focusses on defending Canada and North America, and CONPLAN MAJAID, which applies to supporting Canadian civil authorities following a major air disaster.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ Canada, Department of National Defence, "Operation LENTUS," last accessed 14 January 2019, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-canada-north-america/op-lentus.page>.

⁸⁵ Canada, Department of National Defence, 3000-1 (J5), *Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations (SOODO)* (Ottawa: Canadian Joint Operations Command, 2014), 3-4.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.

The Army relies upon its four divisions to generate the forces required to meet its remits to these operations. The Second (Quebec), Third (Western Canada), and Fourth (Ontario) Canadian Divisions each contain a regular force mechanized brigade group, a regular force divisional support group, and two to three reserve brigade groups. The Fifth Canadian Division is based out of Atlantic Canada and contains the Canadian Combat Support Brigade, a regular force divisional support group, and two reserve brigade groups. Each regular force brigade group contains three infantry battalions, an armoured regiment, an engineer regiment, an artillery regiment, a service battalion, and a headquarters and signal squadron. The Canadian Combat Support Brigade is primarily comprised of regular force personnel and is made up of the Army's enabler capabilities, such as general support engineering, electronic warfare, and intelligence. The ten reserve brigade groups each contain a several infantry, armoured, and artillery units, plus an engineer regiment, a service battalion, and a signals regiment. These brigades vary in size and establishment based on the Militia's historical laydown. The Reserve's units are primarily staffed with part-time members of the Primary Reserves and supported by a small cadre of full-time personnel drawn from both the Regular Force and the Primary Reserves. These full time personnel manage the day-to-day affairs of their units, including planning and delivering training.

The Army generates capabilities in accordance with its Managed Readiness Plan. This plan specifies which capabilities regular force units are responsible to generate for operations. It also provides predictably and sustainability to the Army's force generation efforts by identifying units as conducting high readiness training, being on high readiness or deployed, or being available for tasks. Every regular force member is hypothetically

eligible to deploy on operations provided that they have completed several mandated training activities, their administration is up to date, they are medically and dentally fit, and they are not on counselling and probation. Members of the Reserve are eligible to deploy provided they meet the same requirements. The key difference is that the NDA clearly specifies that reservists can only deploy on operations if they volunteer or are placed on active service by the Governor-in-Council.⁸⁷

While the Managed Readiness Plan specifies what capabilities regular force units must generate, it does not provide similar direction to reserve units. This leads reserve units to force generate capabilities and personnel on an ad hoc basis. The Army should identify explicit operational outputs for reserve units within the Managed Readiness Plan. This would increase the Reserve's operational focus, provide predictability to its force generation efforts, and create an expectation of reservists deploying. It would also theoretically permit reserve units to complete large portions of their pre-deployment training on a part-time basis over a longer timeframe before their personnel join deploying task forces for shorter periods of collective training.

Permitting reservists to complete part of their pre-deployment training at their home unit may convince additional reservists to volunteer for operations by reducing the amount of time that they need to spend away from home. While a review of the literature did not identify why the Army does not conduct pre-deployment training in this manner, it has likely not implemented such a training program simply as a result of the fact that it would differ from how the Army traditionally conducts its pre-deployment training. Other factors that may have contributed to the Army training in this manner potentially

⁸⁷ Canada, National Defence Act, R.S.C., c. N-5, s. 31-33 (1985).

include a lack of trust in the Reserve's ability to prepare personnel for operations and the inability of some reserve units to independently complete this training. The Army has also not amended the policy and regulatory issues that may prevent such training from occurring as a result of not previously considering these matters in depth.

The Canadian military currently uses three classes of service to manage the employment of its reservists.⁸⁸ These classes are:

Class A service is the part-time employment most often associated with service in the Reserve Force . . . with a training level of about one evening a week and one weekend a month.

Class B service is full-time service - that is to say, 13 or more consecutive days - that is not operational in nature.

Class C service is normally for service on approved contingency or routine operations, whether international or domestic.⁸⁹

While the activation of reserve units by the Governor-in-Council could occur in the event of an emergency, members of the Reserve have only deployed voluntarily on international operations since the Korean War.⁹⁰ In addition to the limitations specified within the NDA, deploying reservists on operations is also governed by the Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command Directives for International Operations (CDIO) and the SOODO. The CDIOs permit reservists to participate in expeditionary operations provided that they meet the requirements listed above for regular force personnel, are assigned to a position within the Canadian Forces Taskings, Plans, and Operations (CFTPO) system,

⁸⁸ Canada, Department of National Defence, "ARCHIVED - The Reserve Force and Reserve Classes of Service," last updated 2 May 2002, last accessed 14 January 2019, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=the-reserve-force-and-reserve-classes-of-service/hnmx1bib>; Canada, Office of the Auditor General, "Report 5—Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence."

⁸⁹ Canada, Department of National Defence, "ARCHIVED - The Reserve Force And Reserve Classes of Service."

⁹⁰ Pratt, *Canada's Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper*, 51.

and are placed on a Class C contract covering the period that they will be deployed.⁹¹ The SOODO identifies that reservists serving on domestic operations can be do so on Class A, B, or C contracts.⁹² The selection of a specific contract depends on the nature and anticipated length of an operation. It also obligates force generators to ensure that “their Reserve Force personnel have achieved the training standard required to meet the anticipated operational requirement, are available for the anticipated duration of the operation and have completed the supporting administration.”⁹³

Although the SOODO identifies that reservists can participate in domestic operations provided they volunteer, are called out, or are placed on active service, the NDA only permits reservists to be placed on active service by the Governor in Council, under the following conditions:

- an emergency that threatens the defence of Canada;
- in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada under the United Nations Charter; or
- in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada under the North Atlantic Treaty, the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD) Command Agreement or any other similar instrument to which Canada is a party.⁹⁴

The act defines an emergency as being “an insurrection, riot, invasion, armed conflict or war, whether real or apprehended.”⁹⁵ This definition does not include other events that might be categorized as emergencies, like natural or manmade disasters. Changes to the

⁹¹ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command Directives for International Operations 1000 Series* (Ottawa: Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command, 2012), 4-5, 13.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 4.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁹⁴ Canada, Department of National Defence, 3000-1 (J5), *Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations (SOODO)*, Annex HH, Appendix 2, 1-2; Canada, National Defence Act, R.S.C., c. N-5, s. 31 (1985).

⁹⁵ Canada, National Defence Act, R.S.C., c. N-5, s. 2 (1985).

NDA would be required to permit the non-voluntary activation of reservists for situations that fall outside the act's current definition of events that constitute an emergency.

Training

Reserve units traditionally received enough funding to permit every member of the unit to conduct 37.5 days of training per year to ensure a basic level of readiness within the Reserve.⁹⁶ This funding was intended to enable reserve units to conduct “unit-level individual and collective training, training on National Defence policies, such as policies related to sexual harassment, preparation for training courses, administration, and civic and ceremonial duties in the local community.”⁹⁷ Thirty-seven and a half days of funding was insufficient for conducting high-quality collective training because the lower-level mandated activities consumed a large portion of this money. The small number of training days leftover hindered the ability of reserve units with high participation rates to conduct the training required to build up to higher-level and more interesting activities, such as complex ranges or platoon-level live-fire training.

The Army replaced this funding model with a new system in 2017, called the Canadian Army Reserve Funding Model.⁹⁸ This new system funds all planned activities while taking into account the strength and the average attendance rates of each reserve sub-unit.⁹⁹ While a benefit of this model is that it forces the commanding officers of reserve units to develop and cost detailed training plans in advance, it also reduces the chain of command's ability to conduct un-forecasted activities and could create

⁹⁶ Canada, Office of the Auditor General, “Report 5—Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence.”

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ Canada, Department of National Defence, *New CA Reserve Funding Model, Div G5 – 28 Jul 17* (Halifax: 5 Canadian Division, 2017), 4-5.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 6, 8.

significant financial pressures for reserve units if their average participation level unexpectedly increases. This model still allows reservists to serve more than 37.5 days per year due to its emphasis on funding activities rather than funding units for an arbitrary number of training days.

The Auditor General of Canada identified that “at least 44 percent of Reservists had participated in fewer than 25 days of training or other unit activities.”¹⁰⁰ This low participation rate is exacerbated by the Army not having a policy stipulating the minimum number of training days that reservists must attend every year. Reservists can remain members of the military provided that they attend enough reserve events to avoid being placed on non-effective strength. This can only occur if they fail to participate in a single event over a 30-day period and their unit conducts at least three activities during this timeframe.¹⁰¹ This allows reservists to remain in the military provided that they participate in at least one half-day event per month. Considering that many units do not conduct training over the summer timeframe, the theoretical minimum threshold for remaining in the Reserve is only eight half-days per year. Although the low level of participation amongst this group enabled reserve units to focus their resources on soldiers who were interested and willing to parade more frequently, it also highlights the fact that many reservists lack the basic skills and training required to be deployable.

Many reserve units are also understrength, which limits their ability to effectively train.¹⁰² Personnel shortages within these units also reduce their ability to generate personnel and formed elements for operations. The Auditor General of Canada identified

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 6, 8.

¹⁰¹ Canada, Department of National Defence, CMP MIL PERS INSTR 20/04, *Administrative Policy of Class “A”, Class “B” and Class “C” Reserve Service* (Ottawa: Military Personnel Command, 2009), 14.

¹⁰² Canada, Office of the Auditor General, “Report 5—Canadian Army Reserve—National Defence.”

in his 2016 report that “12 of the 123 Army Reserve units had fewer than half of the soldiers needed for their ideal unit size.”¹⁰³ The Army has started addressing this issue by increasing the Reserve’s effective strength since taking control of its recruiting from the Canadian Forces Recruiting Group in April 2017, as shown in Figure 1.¹⁰⁴




Figure 1 –Canadian Army Reserve intake between April 2016 and December 2018¹⁰⁵

The small size of many reserve units combined with low participation rates undermines the Reserve’s ability to effectively train and to provide its leaders with challenges that adequately prepare them for fulfilling rank-appropriate roles on

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ Canada, Department of National Defence, “Canadian Army implements an expedited enrollment process for its Primary Reserve Force,” last accessed 24 February 2019, https://www.canada.ca/en/departement-national-defence/news/2017/04/canadian_army_implementsanexpeditedenrollmentprocessforitsprimar.html; Canada, Department of National Defence, *Reserve Recruiting briefing to Army Council February 2019* (Ottawa: Canadian Army, 2019), 6.

¹⁰⁵ Data taken from Guardian on 01 February 2019 and provided by Canadian Army G1 Personnel Generation (see Annex D).

operations. For instance, every reserve unit is entitled to a commanding officer who holds the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and a regimental sergeant-major who holds the rank of Chief Warrant Officer. Reserve units that are only a platoon or a company in size fail to provide higher-ranking leaders with suitable developmental opportunities.

Another factor potentially limiting the ability of some reserve units to effectively train is the lack of junior leaders in some reserve trades. For instance, the 2017 Reserve Annual Military Occupation Review identified that the effective strength for non-commissioned members in some reserve trades was less than 50% of their permissive manning level.¹⁰⁶ The reserve brigades are not well enabled to address this issue due to the Reserve not having a career management system that enables it to “post” reservists to units that require additional leadership or specialist capabilities. The requirement for such a system is also hindered by Reserve’s inability to pay these reservists for the additional mileage they would incur if they were obligated to parade with units that were farther away than their normal unit.

Job Protection

Although the Army cannot compel reservists to deploy without an Order-in-Council, its ability to generate reservists for operations is also limited by Canada’s current job protection legislation. The Canadian government has incorporated job protection for reservists into the Public Service Employment Act; however, this legislation is only binding on the federal public service and federally regulated businesses, like banks.¹⁰⁷ While every province and territory protects reservists against

¹⁰⁶ Robert McDonald, “Canadian Army Reserve force realignment framework,” Joint Command and Staff Program course paper (Canadian Forces College, 2018), 4.

dismissal while they are training for or deployed on operations, disparities exist between what service related activities are protected under their individual labour statutes.¹⁰⁸ They also have vastly different standards regarding other forms of training and the length of time that an employee must work for a company before they are afforded these protections. None of the federal, provincial, or territorial acts cover students attending post-secondary institutions.¹⁰⁹ The lack of protection afforded to reservists who do not meet the conditions specified within the applicable act conceivably limits their availability for deployment, which reduces the Reserve's force generation potential.

The Canadian military has attempted to mitigate such limitations since 1978 through the creation of programs that seek to increase employer support for reservists.¹¹⁰ One of these programs, the Compensation for Employers of Reservists Program, introduced in 2012, reimburses employers for the additional costs they incur when their Reservist employees deploy on operations.¹¹¹ This program does not, however, provide compensation when Reservist employees attend training. This certainly reduces an employers' willingness to allow Reservists to participate in such activities without using their vacation time, unless this training is specifically protected under an applicable provincial labour statute.

¹⁰⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence, "Job Protection Legislation," last accessed 5 January 2019, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-reservist-support/job-protection-legislation.page>.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*; Annex B provides an overview of the federal, provincial, and territorial labour acts' protections and limitations.

¹⁰⁹ British Columbia, *The Employment Standards Act, R.S.B.C.*, s. 52.2 (1996); Alberta, *Employment Standards Code, R.S.A.*, E-9, Div. 7.1 (2000); New Brunswick, *Employment Standards Act*, S.N.B., c. E-7.2, s. 44.031(1982); Manitoba, *The Employment Standards Code, C.C.S.M.*, c. E110, s. 59.5(2) (1998).

¹¹⁰ Canada, Department of National Defence, "Compensation for Employers of Reservists Program – Backgrounder," last accessed 4 April 2019, <https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2014/11/compensation-employers-reservists-program.html>.

¹¹¹ Canada, Department of National Defence, "Compensation for Employers of Reservists Program," last accessed 5 January 2019, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-reservist-support/compensation-employers-reservists-program.page>; Canada, Department of National Defence, "Compensation for Employers of Reservists Program – Backgrounder."

Current Canadian Initiatives

While the Army's current operational tempo reduces the requirement to deploy reservists on operations, the Canadian government identified within *SSE* that the CAF must provide reservists with more training and deployment opportunities.¹¹² The 2017 defence policy also notes that the Primary Reserves will be increasingly expected to “deliver upon select deployed missions in a primary role.”¹¹³ Some of these primary roles include light urban search and rescue, capacity building, and combat capabilities such as mortars and pioneers.¹¹⁴

Three initiatives are currently being pursued by the CAF and Army that will impact the Army's operational output, how it generates forces, and the Reserve's role in supporting operations.

The first initiative is the Force Mix and Structure Design, which is being led by the Chief of Force Development. This initiative involves conducting a comprehensive review of how the CAF will concurrently support the missions specified within *SSE* to determine the organizational changes that will be required to enable the military to meet the demands of Canada's defence policy and to explain how its structure links to these tasks.¹¹⁵ While the number of personnel that *SSE* stipulates that the CAF must be capable of concurrently producing has already been discussed, it is expected that the Canadian military will have to amend its structure to fulfill this requirement.¹¹⁶ For instance, the Army has twelve regular force manoeuvre units, but only enough enabler personnel, such

¹¹² Canada, Department of National Defence, *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*, 68.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 68.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 69.

¹¹⁵ David Hill, *Briefing Note for the Commander of the Canadian Army, Force Mix Structure Design (FMSD) – Initial Orientation* (Ottawa: Canadian Army, 2017), 1.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 81.

as intelligence operators, to support five. Thus, the Army can realistically generate around 6000 fully supported personnel for operations once, or around 2000 on an ongoing-basis, which falls short of the requirement specified within *SSE*. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that *SSE*'s requirement for the CAF to be capable of simultaneously generating forces for all of these missions will necessitate increasing the Army's operational output. It is anticipated that this will need to occur by re-balancing the Army's manoeuvre and enabler capabilities and amending how the Reserve is structured and employed to increase the Army's ability to generate "full time capability from a part time force."¹¹⁷

Next, Military Personnel Command (MPC) is working on an initiative called "The Journey," which involves modernizing the CAF's human resources policies. One of the major changes being considered within this initiative relates to how regular force and reserve personnel are managed.¹¹⁸ This includes providing regular force personnel with more flexibility and reservists with more opportunities in how they can serve. Despite the importance of this effort, clear timelines have not yet been assigned to drive the development and implementation of this initiative, nor is there a clear understanding across the military about what this initiative will actually deliver because of the complexity associated with some of The Journey's components.

Finally, the Army has initiated the Strengthening the Army Reserve initiative to fulfill its obligations to modernize and integrate the Reserve. This initiative aims to

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 34.

¹¹⁸ Canada, Department of National Defence, *The Journey*, briefing to Armed Forces Council (Ottawa: Military Personnel Command, 2017), 29.

enhance the Reserves' capabilities and to increase its ability to support operations.¹¹⁹ Aspects of this initiative include assigning specific mission tasks to reserve units, providing reserve units with equipment tables that authorize them to hold the equipment required to perform their assigned tasks, and streamlining processes that impact reserve units, like allowing them to control their recruiting activities.¹²⁰ The mission tasks assigned to reserve units following the release of the 2017 defence policy include generating mortar, pioneer, direct fire support, and light urban search and rescue capabilities.¹²¹ These tasks build upon the existing Territorial Battle Group, Arctic Response Company Group, influence activities, and public duties tasks that were previously assigned to reserve units.¹²² The Director of Land Force Development is also considering the viability of assigning other tasks to reserve units, like cyber defence and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear reconnaissance.¹²³

The Combat Training Centre has also redesigned the reserve individual training model as part of this initiative to permit reservists to complete their training up to the Developmental Period 3A-level over four summers.¹²⁴ This effort is being implemented in conjunction with the Army's Full Time Summer Employment initiative, which

¹¹⁹ Canada, Department of National Defence, 3350-1 (Dir ARes 2), *Canadian Army Operation Order – Strengthening the Army Reserve* (Ottawa: Canadian Army, 2016), 4.

¹²⁰ Canada, Department of National Defence, 3185 (DAS 4-2), *Canadian Army Operation Order – Strengthening the Army Reserve – Update* (Ottawa: Canadian Army, 2017), Annex G, Appendices 1, 4-6.

¹²¹ Canada, Department of National Defence, 1901-1 (DLFD SI-5), *Fragmentation Order 001 – Mission Tasks Tranche 1 to Canadian Army Operation Order 27 June 2017 – Strengthening the Army Reserve*, 5-6.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 3.

¹²³ Richard Masson, *Briefing Note for Army Strategic Planning Team, Update On Strengthening the Army Reserve Mission Tasks – Tranche 2* (Ottawa: Canadian Army, 2018), 1-2.

¹²⁴ Canada, Department of National Defence, 4500-1 (CA PD), *CADTC Army Reserve Military and Training Directive* (Ottawa: Canadian Army, 2017), Annex A, 2; The CAF defines a developmental period as being “a timeframe in a career during which an individual is trained, employed and given the opportunity to develop specific occupational or professional skills and knowledge. Developmental periods are distinguished by progressive increase in the levels of accountability, responsibility, authority, competency, military leadership ability and the knowledge of operations and war.”

provides reservists with guaranteed employment for the entire summer during their first four years of service with the Reserve.¹²⁵ Providing reservists with guaranteed summer employment enables them to complete their training rather than having to accept non-military employment for monetary reasons. These efforts are intended to better enable students who serve in the Reserve to complete their training before graduation.

As part of the Strengthening the Army Reserve initiative, the Army has identified a force generation ratio of one-to-seven whereby reserve units are expected to produce one reservist for operations for every seven members of the unit.¹²⁶ The Army has also directed that the operational output expected from mission tasked reserve units is at least a sub-sub-unit.¹²⁷ Although the Army has not validated its one-to-seven ratio, the requirement to produce elements of this size using this ratio is unattainable for most reserve units because of their small establishments. For instance, the Reserve Mortar Platoon contains 50 positions.¹²⁸ A reserve unit would require 350 personnel to produce enough personnel to generate one mortar platoon based on the identified force generation ratio. The Army does not have any reserve units that have an effective strength large enough to generate a mortar platoon at this ratio.¹²⁹ To mitigate this shortfall, the Army's division commanders directed multiple units to collectively generate the personnel

¹²⁵ Canada, Department of National Defence, "Army Reserve offers new Full-time Summer Employment program," last updated 6 July 2018, <http://www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca/en/news-publications/national-news-details-no-menu.page?doc=army-reserve-offers-new-full-time-summer-employment-program/jd1uzg6d>.

¹²⁶ Canada, Department of National Defence, 1901-1 (DLFD SI-5), *Fragmentation Order 001 – Mission Tasks Tranche 1 to Canadian Army Operation Order 27 June 2017 – Strengthening the Army Reserve*, 14.

¹²⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence, 3185 (DAS 4-2), *Canadian Army Operation Order – Strengthening the Army Reserve – Update*, 6.

¹²⁸ Canada, Department of National Defence, 1901-1 (DLFD SI-5), *Fragmentation Order 001 – Mission Tasks Tranche 1 to Canadian Army Operation Order 27 June 2017 – Strengthening the Army Reserve*, Annex C, 1-2.

¹²⁹ Data taken from Guardian on 01 February 2019 and provided by Canadian Army G1 Personnel Generation (see Annex D).

required to meet the requirements of these mission tasks. Only one unit per division has been formally equipped and assigned the responsibility for each mission task.¹³⁰ The unattributed sharing of tasks potentially exposes the Army to future risk should these supporting units be assigned their own mission tasks. This is because unofficially tasked units will lose the ability to support the tasked units if they are directed to generate personnel for their own tasks. This issue is exacerbated by reserve units being asymmetrically distributed across the Army's divisions as a result of their generally being located within the communities that they were originally established. For instance, the 3rd Canadian Division has 11 reserve infantry units available to support the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry's three battalions, while the 4th and 5th Canadian Divisions have 28 units available to support the Royal Canadian Regiment's three battalions.

Ideally, the advancement of the three above listed initiatives should occur in concert with one another considering how the outcomes of each project will impact the others. For instance, increasing the Reserve's ability to generate personnel for operations might necessitate restructuring the Army to increase the number of regular force personnel supporting reserve units and updating the human resource policies that govern reserve training and employment. While the Army has to develop reserve forces that are capable of generating specific capabilities for operations as a result of the direction contained within *SSE*, its efforts should focus on sustainably increasing its overall operational output. This is because efforts to modernize and integrate the Reserve that do

¹³⁰ Canada, Department of National Defence, 1901-1 (DLFD SI-5), *Fragmentation Order 001 – Mission Tasks Tranche 1 to Canadian Army Operation Order 27 June 2017 – Strengthening the Army Reserve*, Annex A.

not contribute to this objective will likely be abandoned if the Army has to maximize its output in the future.

The armed forces of several of Canada's allies have already enacted measures aimed at leveraging their reserves to increase their operational output. Although the Abrams Doctrine provides an interesting model for organizing reserve forces, the Australian Army, the British Army and the United States Marine Corps will be considered in Chapters 4 to 6 because they are similar in size to the Army. Despite the fact that many of their practices may be of limited use given the political, cultural, and organizational differences that exist between the Army and these other militaries, it remains that the Army may be able to more effectively focus its efforts by studying how these other militaries organize, manage, generate, train, and incentivize their reservists and the lessons they learned through their reserve modernization and integration efforts. The next chapter considers the Australian Army and its reserve-related initiatives and practices.

CHAPTER 4 – THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY

Although the Australian Army is smaller than the Army, it has a relatively similar culture and is also based on the British Regimental system. The Australian Army's Regular Force consists of 30,410 personnel, including reservists who are employed in a full-time capacity.¹³¹ The Australian Army's Reserve Forces are sub-divided into the Active and Standby Reserves. The Active Reserve comprises 15,030 personnel, who perform duties similar to those performed by members of the Reserve.¹³² The Standby Reserve is comparable to the CAF's Supplementary Reserve and comprises former members of the Regular Force who no longer serve in an active capacity. Australian law compels personnel who are releasing from the Australian military to serve in the Standby Reserve for five years before they may be fully released.

The role of the Active Reserve “is to deliver specified capability to support and sustain [the Australian Defence Force's] (ADF) preparedness and operations.”¹³³ It performs this role by “delivering specified warfighting capabilities, conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and domestic security as part of whole of government approach, maintaining and providing specialist individual capabilities, and contributing to Army surge capabilities.”¹³⁴ The role and core tasks assigned to the Active Reserve highlight that the Australian government considers it to be an operational reserve that can be drawn upon to support operations, rather than a strategic reserve that

¹³¹ Australia, Department of Defence, “2017-18 Defence Annual Report,” chapter 7, last accessed 28 December 2018, <http://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/17-18/>.

¹³² Australia, Department of Defence, “2017-18 Defence Annual Report,” chapter 7; Andrew Davies and Hugh Smith, “Stepping up: Part-time forces and ADF capability,” *Australian Strategic Policy Institute Strategic Insights* 44 (November 2008): 22.

¹³³ Australia, Department of Defence, “The Australian Army: An Aide-Memoire,” last accessed 30 December 2018, https://www.army.gov.au/sites/g/files/net1846/f/aide_memoire.pdf.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

should only be employed when major emergencies occur. The former Chief of the Australian Army, Lieutenant-General (retired) Peter Leahy, best summarized the decreased requirement for strategic reserves when he identified that “[c]hanged political and security circumstances have meant that it is no longer a priority to maintain military forces in order to provide the basis for a rapid expansion of the Australian Army to a size required for major continental-style operations.”¹³⁵ Leahy further noted that the character of conflict is changing such that “military forces are likely to have to sustain and protect populations and assist in the re-creation or repair of national infrastructure” and that “civil skills or specialist knowledge that is held by members of the Army Reserve” will be required to successfully undertake these tasks.¹³⁶

The Australian Army initiated Plan BEERSHEBA in 2011, which involved a major restructuring of the Army. The ADF also initiated Project SUAKIN in 2013 to reform its human resource practices. These initiatives enhanced the Australian Army’s overall operational output and better enabled it to leverage its reserve forces for operational purposes.

Plan BEERSHEBA

Prior to Plan BEERSHEBA, the Australian Army’s Regular Force was organized into three specialized brigades.¹³⁷ The Army’s reorganization restructured these brigades into three symmetrical multi-role formations.¹³⁸ Each brigade now consists of an armored cavalry regiment, two infantry battalions, an engineer regiment, an artillery regiment, a

¹³⁵ Peter Leahy, “The Australian Army Reserve: Relevant and Ready,” *Australian Army Journal* 2 (1) (Summer 2013): 14.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 14-15.

¹³⁷ Craig Bickell, “Plan Beersheba: The Combined Arms Imperative Behind the Reorganisation of the Army,” *Australian Army Journal* 10(4) (Summer 2013): 38.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 38.

signals regiment, a service support battalion, and the brigade headquarters.¹³⁹ The 2nd Brigade is unique in that it also contains an amphibious infantry battalion.¹⁴⁰ The Australian Army's Regular Force also includes a Combat Support Brigade, which is similar to the Canadian Combat Support Brigade, an Aviation Brigade, and a Combat Service Support Brigade, which contains several service battalions and medical units.¹⁴¹ All of these formations report directly to the Australian Army's Forces Command, which is responsible for generating the "Army's foundation warfighting capability in order to ensure individuals and force elements are successful in Adaptive Campaigning."¹⁴²

The Australian 2nd Division, which is commanded by a reservist Major-General, is responsible for commanding the Australian Army's reserve formations and its three regional force surveillance units, which perform reconnaissance and observation functions that are comparable to the capabilities provided by the Canadian Rangers.¹⁴³ Plan BEERSHEBA aimed to better integrate Australia's six reserve brigades with their regular force counterparts by pairing each regular force brigade with two reserve brigades.¹⁴⁴ The reserve brigades were also assigned specific force generational responsibilities, including providing one battalion-sized force per pair of reserve brigades to support their partnered regular force brigade when it enters the "ready" phase of its

¹³⁹ Australia, Department of Defence, "The Australian Army Structure as of January 2018," last accessed 30 December 2018, https://www.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/australian_army_structure_as_at_jan_2018.pdf.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴² Australia, Department of Defence, "Forces Command," last accessed 30 December 2018, <https://www.army.gov.au/our-people/units/forces-command>.

¹⁴³ Australia, Department of Defence, "2nd Division," last accessed 28 December 2018, <https://www.army.gov.au/our-people/units/forces-command/2nd-division>; Australia, Department of Defence, "51st Battalion, Far North Queensland Regiment," last accessed 28 December 2018, <https://www.army.gov.au/our-people/units/forces-command/2nd-division/51st-battalion-far-north-queensland-regiment>.

¹⁴⁴ Peter Clay, "The Australian Army's 2nd Division: an update," *United Service* 65(2) (June 2014): 30.

36-month long readiness cycle.¹⁴⁵ Thus, while the Australian Army's reserve forces are organized in a segregationist manner "on paper," they are also integrated into the Army's overall force generation efforts.

Force Generation and Training

Besides periodically generating one battalion-sized unit for their partnered regular force brigade, Australian reserve units have participated on operations in a variety of roles ranging from providing regular force units with individual augmentation to deploying on operations at the sub-unit-level. For instance, the Australian Army's 4th Brigade, which is a reserve formation, was primarily responsible for force generating the personnel who deployed on Operation ANODE.¹⁴⁶ This was the Australian-led effort to improve law and order in the Solomon Islands. In addition to being commanded by an Australian reservist, the majority of the 115 personnel deployed on this operation between 2007 and 2013 were reservists who were supported by a small contingent of regular force personnel. Upon its conclusion, the ADF's Chief of Joint Operations, Lieutenant-General Ash Power, commented at the time that "Operation ANODE has been a great demonstration of how our Reserve forces can be called upon with confidence to deploy and run successful multi-national operations with our regional partners."¹⁴⁷ The 4th Brigade's ability to continuously force generate sub-units for Operation ANODE highlights that reserve forces are capable of being the primary force generators for

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 30, 32.

¹⁴⁶ Australia, Department of Defence, "Operation Anode," last accessed 28 December 2018, <http://www.defence.gov.au/Operations/SolomonIslands/>; Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, "About RAMSI," last accessed 28 December 2018, <http://www.ramsi.org/about-ramsi/>.

¹⁴⁷ Australia, Department of Defence, "Australia-led Combined Task Force concludes role with RAMSI," last updated 2 July 2013, last accessed 28 December 2018, <https://web.archive.org/web/20130908030438/http://news.defence.gov.au/2013/07/02/australia-led-combined-task-force-concludes-role-with-ramsi/>.

smaller missions, provided that the requirements of the mission align with their capabilities.

Former Australian Defence Academy associate professor, Dr. Hugh Smith, and retired Australian Brigadier Nick Jans Ph.D., a visiting fellow with the Australian Defence College's Centre for Defence Leadership & Ethics, suggest that the decision to assign primary force generation responsibility to regular or reserve forces should be based on where the operation falls on the spectrum of conflict, the time in which forces need to deploy, and the distance that forces need to travel to reach the area of operations.¹⁴⁸ For instance, Smith and Jans assert that reserve units and sub-units are ideally suited to conducting operations that occur along the more benign end of the spectrum of conflict, such as peace support and capability building missions, and that regular force organizations are better suited to more dangerous missions.¹⁴⁹

Australian reserve units receive sufficient funds to permit most reservists to complete around 40 days of training per year.¹⁵⁰ The Australian Army has also established the requirement that members of its Active Reserve must complete at least 20 days of training annually to remain in the reserves.¹⁵¹ As part of preparing their personnel for operations, Warning Orders are issued to Australian reserve units to access additional funding to prepare their personnel to deploy on operations or to join regular force units for their pre-deployment training.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁸ Hugh Smith and Nick Jans, "Use Them or Lose Them? Australia's Defence Force Reserves," *Armed Forces & Society* 37(2) (April 2011): 308.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 307.

¹⁵⁰ Andrew Davies and Hugh Smith, "Stepping up: Part-time forces and ADF capability," 22; Smith and Jans, "Use Them or Lose Them? Australia's Defence Force Reserves," 305-306.

¹⁵¹ Smith and Jans, "Use Them or Lose Them? Australia's Defence Force Reserves," 306.

¹⁵² Davies and Smith, "Stepping up: Part-time forces and ADF capability," 5.

While not related to Plan BEERSHEBA, the Australian Army established Reserve Response Forces in six major urban centers in 2003.¹⁵³ These elements currently perform enhanced domestic security tasks. Each Reserve Response Force is made up of 120 personnel, who are expected to be available for deployments and tasks on a notice to move of seven days.¹⁵⁴

The ADF also established the High Readiness Reserve in 2006.¹⁵⁵ Reservists who volunteer to serve with this force agree to be available on a notice to move of 28-days or less for a two-year period.¹⁵⁶ They also receive a one-time bonus of A\$5000 and an annual health care stipend of A\$2500.¹⁵⁷ They must parade between 30 and 50 days annually and are allowed to voluntarily parade more than 50 days per year.¹⁵⁸ These additional benefits and extra training days provide considerable monetary benefit considering that Australia does not tax its reservists' pay and allowances.¹⁵⁹

Finally, the ADF reintroduced a program called the Gap Year program in 2015, which permits members of the Active Reserve to serve in a full-time capacity for a year.¹⁶⁰ This program is based on the Australian military's Ready Reserve Scheme, which existed between 1991 and 1996.¹⁶¹ The Ready Reserve Scheme allowed reservists to complete one-year of full time service, followed by four-years of part-time service that

¹⁵³ ABC News, "Army unveils reserve response force," last updated 2 July 2003, last accessed 8 April 2019, <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2003-07-02/army-unveils-reserve-response-force/1879808>; Smith and Jans, "Use Them or Lose Them? Australia's Defence Force Reserves," 307.

¹⁵⁴ Smith and Jans, "Use Them or Lose Them? Australia's Defence Force Reserves," 307.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 306.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 306.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 306.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 306.

¹⁵⁹ Australia, Department of Defence, "How You'll Benefit," last accessed 23 February 2019, <https://reserves.defencejobs.gov.au/pay-and-benefits>.

¹⁶⁰ Smith and Jans, "Use Them or Lose Them? Australia's Defence Force Reserves," 307.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 306.

included 50-days of training annually.¹⁶² Although the scheme was popular amongst reservists, it was eliminated in 1996 as a result of financial cutbacks.¹⁶³

While nothing in the literature indicates that the Australian Army has attempted to assign specific mission tasks to its reserve units, the Royal Australian Navy unsuccessfully attempted to transform its Intelligence Officer trade into a purely reserve occupation.¹⁶⁴ The Australian Naval Reserve was incapable of generating enough intelligence officers to meet the Navy's operational requirements. The Australian Navy's unsuccessful effort highlights that reserve forces may not be the ideal force for solely generating frequently employed capabilities. Rather, a preferable generation model might involve having the Regular Force and the Reserve share the responsibility for generating such capabilities, based on the Reserve's capacity. Smith and Dr. Andrew Davies, who is the former Director of Australian Strategic Policy Institute's Defence & Strategy Program, suggest that reserve forces could be assigned the sole responsibility of generating capabilities that are required less frequently or only during larger conflicts, such as air defence and tanks, where mobilization of the Reserve would be more likely.¹⁶⁵

Project SUAKIN

While efforts like Plan BEERSHEBA have increased the Australian Army's operational output by better integrating its reserve forces into its overall force generation efforts, the ADF has also sought to better integrate the Australian military's regular and reserve forces through the implementation of Project SUAKIN in 2013. This project transformed how the ADF manages its personnel by harmonizing its regular force and

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 306.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 306.

¹⁶⁴ Davies and Smith, "Stepping up: Part-time forces and ADF capability," 12.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 12.

reserve human resources policies and establishing seven service categories (SERCAT) under its “Total Workforce Management” model. It also established a system to manage the careers every military member, regardless of their status as a part or full-time member of the ADF.¹⁶⁶ SERCAT 1 comprises Employees of the Defence Australian Public Service who have been assigned to work under military command.¹⁶⁷ SERCAT 2 comprises members of the Standby Reserve. Personnel in SERCAT 3 serve in a capacity that is equitable to serving as a Class A Reservist with the CAF’s Primary Reserves. SERCATs 4 and 5 constitute reservists who are members of the High Readiness Reserve. SERCAT 6 equates to full-time personnel serving in an atypical manner such as working flex-days. Finally, personnel in SERCAT 7 serve in a capacity similar to the CAF’s Regular Force.

The implementation of Total Workforce Management permits members of the ADF to more easily transition between categories based on their personal circumstances, including their availability and desire to serve. While the SERCATs equate to various forms of reserve and regular force service, Project SUAKIN shifted the emphasis away from classifying personnel as being members of the Regular Force or the Reserve to categorizing them as being full or part-time. Although University of South Australia Professor Brad Wall suggests that Total Workforce Management’s personnel categorization will do little to change regular-reserve relations, he believes that amending terminology and creating multiple service categories may reduce the cultural barriers that

¹⁶⁶ Australia, Department of Defence, “ADF Total Workforce Model,” last accessed 28 December 2018, <http://www.defence.gov.au/ADF-TotalWorkforceModel/ServiceSpectrum.asp>.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

exist between regular force and reserve personnel by changing the way that reservists are labelled and identified within the military.¹⁶⁸

As part of fully leveraging its Reserve's capabilities, Davies and Smith suggest that the Australian Army should create a civilian skills database that includes the qualifications and skills of individual reservists.¹⁶⁹ They claim that such a database would enable the Australian Army to potentially leverage the abilities of individual reservists that may not be identified through their military trade alone. For instance, reservists who are qualified tradespersons outside the military might seek to serve within unrelated occupations because they offer the opportunity to do something different. While such reservists would theoretically spend the majority of their military careers serving in their chosen occupation, being aware of their civilian qualifications could enable the Army to provide them with opportunities to perform their civilian trade on operations.

Job Protection and Employer Support

The degree to which the Australian Army relies upon its Reserve as a force generation resource necessitates either maintaining a larger reserve force or better enabling its reservists to deploy. The Australian government has not significantly increased the Active Reserve's establishment. Rather, it enacted the 2001 Defence Reserve Service (Protection) Act, which prevents employers from discriminating against, disadvantaging, or dismissing reservists as a result of their military service.¹⁷⁰ The Australian government strengthened this legislation in 2017 to compel educational

¹⁶⁸ Brad West, "The Future of Reserves: In Search of a Social Research Agenda for Implementing the Total Workforce Model," *Australian Army Journal* 14(1) (Autumn 2018): 113.

¹⁶⁹ Davies and Smith, "Stepping up: Part-time forces and ADF capability," 13.

¹⁷⁰ Australia, Defence Reserve Service (Protection) Act, Part 4 (2001).

institutions to accommodate reservist students who are required for operations or training.¹⁷¹ Table 1 outlines the range of protections afforded to reservists under the act.

| | |
|--|--|
| Protection against discrimination | All kinds of defence service. |
| Employment, partnership, and Education protection | All kinds of defence service except for certain kinds of voluntary continuous full-time service. |
| Financial liability, bankruptcy, loans and guarantees protection | Continuous full-time service following a call out. |
| Enforcement and remedies | All kinds of defence service. |

Table 1 – Protections provided to Australian Reservists¹⁷²

The act also prevents employers from forcing Reservists to use their “annual leave or long service leave for absences on Defence service.”¹⁷³ Unlike the various Canadian Provincial acts that generally only protect reservists who are preparing for or deployed on operations, the Australian job protection legislation covers reservists while they are “absent on defence service,” which is defined as being:

- any period during which the member is travelling from his or her residence to the place at which he or she is required to report for defence service;
- any period while he or she is rendering defence service; and
- the period (if any) after he or she has ceased to render that service until he or she resumes work, or is reinstated in employment.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ Australia, Department of Defence, “Changes to Defence Reserve Service (Protection) Act 2001,” 4.

¹⁷² Australia, Defence Reserve Service (Protection) Act, Part 3, s. 11 (2001).

¹⁷³ Australia, Fair Work Ombudsman, “Defence reservists: rights and responsibilities at work,” last accessed 15 January 2019, <https://www.fairwork.gov.au/ArticleDocuments/723/Defence-reservists-rights-and-responsibilities-at-work.pdf.aspx>.

¹⁷⁴ Australia, Defence Reserve Service (Protection) Act, Part 2, s. 8 (2001).

While the protections afforded to reservists may appear to be punitive to employers, the Australian government has also created a program to mitigate the impacts that employers might suffer as a result of their employees' defence service. The Australian Employment Support Payment Scheme is similar to the CAF's Compensation for Employers of Reservists Program in that it provides employers with compensation to offset the costs associated with their employees' service. Unlike the Canadian program, the Australian scheme covers all forms of defence service and can be accessed if reservist employees work in either a full or a part-time capacity and are away for a period of at least five consecutive days.¹⁷⁵

Recommendations

Although differences in legislation, constitutional separations of power, and human resources policies limit the utility of some of the Australian military's initiatives, many of its efforts should be explored by the Army.

Implementing a Gap Year program within the Army would enable Canadian youth to increase their understanding of and interest in the CAF. One of the principle benefits that the Australian military has identified with this program is that it provides applicants with the opportunity to learn more about the military without committing to serve for a long period of time. The fact that that the ADF received 3519 applications for 495 positions in 2017, of which, 35 per cent of participants were women highlights the tremendous interest that the program has generated in Australia.¹⁷⁶ Many of the

¹⁷⁵ Australia, Department of Defence, "Employer Support Payment Scheme," last accessed 15 January 2019, <https://www.defencereservessupport.gov.au/benefits/employer-support-payment-scheme/>.

¹⁷⁶ Mark Abernethy, "Tapping into the next generation successful for ADF recruitment," *The Australian Financial Review*, last updated 20 June 2018, last accessed 15 January 2018, <https://www.afr.com/news/special-reports/afr-focus-defence/tapping-into-the-next-generation-successful-for-adf-recruitment-20180619-h11lad>.

participants in such a program may later choose to join the Regular Force or remain in the Reserve if their experience with the military is professionally and personally rewarding. At a minimum, the program would promote citizenship and other ideals that are aligned with the Canadian Primary Reserves' roles. Although implementing such a program may require MPC to create new terms of service to permit applicants to serve full-time in the military for only one year, implementing such a program would be relatively inexpensive. For instance, employing 250 students in such a program would likely cost less than C\$10 million annually if these students were paid at the Private (Basic)-level.

The Army could increase the number of reservists immediately available for operations by creating a High Readiness Reserve. The value of such of a force would be derived by the Army's ability to rapidly activate these personnel for operations. The Australian's specifically refer to this as being "called for" rather than "called out," which in the Canadian context requires their being placed on active duty by the Governor-in-Council. As part of implementing such a force, MPC would have to adjust the current reserve terms of service and the CAF's compensation and benefits. Implementing these changes would also require the Treasury Board's support to enable the creation of the associated benefits. The key stipulation to the creation of such a force is that reservists who voluntarily joined the High Readiness Reserve would essentially have to pre-commit to participating on operations, regardless of if or where the military decides to employ them. Rather than becoming merely a force generation pool for operations, such a force should be held as an operational reserve and activated on an as needed basis. This pre-commitment could potentially also be leveraged to make up personnel shortfalls within deploying organizations. It is anticipated that the costs associated with creating a High

Readiness Reserve would be relatively low. For instance, providing a High Readiness Reserve bonus of C\$5000 to 1000 personnel would cost C\$5 million annually. It is also reasonable to conclude that the Army would only have to marginally increase the Reserve's funding to enable any required training activities to occur.

Next, the Army should consider creating Reserve Response Forces in urban centres as this would provide the CAF with a resource that could be rapidly activated to respond to domestic emergencies. Potential tasks for such an organization could include disaster response and resiliency, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear decontamination. The generation of personnel for these forces could either be mission tasked to reserve units or created as a supplementary organization within the brigades. While the Army has already signaled its intent to employ reservists in this capacity during the summer timeframe, permanently assigning this task to the Reserve would alleviate the requirement for tasking regular force units to fulfill this role on an ongoing basis.¹⁷⁷

The Australian Navy's unsuccessful attempt to make its Intelligence Officer trade a reserve-only capability highlights a major risk associated with solely force generating "no fail" capabilities from the Reserve. It is therefore recommended that the Army maintains similar capabilities within the Regular Force to make up reservist force generation shortfalls or considers reducing the one-to-seven force generation ratio if the Reserve cannot sustainably meet this requirement.¹⁷⁸ Although force generating reservists at a lower ratio would reduce the number of personnel theoretically available to deploy,

¹⁷⁷ Canada, Department of National Defence, 3350-1 (G33), *COS Army Ops Direction/Warning Order Canadian Army Reserve Support to IRU Manning* (Ottawa: Canadian Army, 2019), 2.

¹⁷⁸ For clarity purposes, reducing this ratio involves increasing the number of reservists from which a unit would be expected to generate one reservist for operations (i.e. one-to-eight or one-to-ten).

reservists could still be employed in other positions if the Reserve is capable of producing more personnel.

The Army should consider creating a system to manage the careers of reservists, even if this function is performed at the brigade-level. This would enable the Reserve to conduct more consistent training by temporarily reassigning reservists who are leaders or possess required qualifications to support other reserve units. As part of enabling this to occur, the Army should also solicit MPC's support in convincing the Treasury Board to reinstate the incidental travel expense to permit reservists to be reimbursed for any additional expenses that they would incur as a result of these "postings."

The Army should also consider creating and maintaining a civilian skills database as this could provide access to a wide range of capabilities that are not inherent to the Army. For instance, the CAF frequently experiences difficulty with generating construction tradespersons for operations. A civilian skills database would enable the Army to find and potentially deploy reservists who possess the skills needed to perform these roles. A civilian skills database could also enable the Army to identify reservists with qualifications, like specific cultural skills, that would be highly useful on peace support and training missions.

Although the Canadian government cannot directly strengthen the job protection legislation available to most reservists as a result of labour legislation constitutionally being the purview of the provinces, it can pressure the provinces to strengthen their protections, provided that it is willing to risk harming its relationship with the provinces to secure this objective. For instance, the Canada Health Act stipulates minimum standards that the provinces must achieve to receive billions of dollars in health transfer

payments from the federal government.¹⁷⁹ It is expected that the Canadian government will not be willing to risk its relationship with the provinces to achieve this objective given the Reserve's relative political importance. Therefore, the Army should solicit MPC and the Canadian Forces Liaison Council's support in convincing the provinces to strengthen their legislative protections and to move towards more consistent job protections for reservists. Such an effort conducted in conjunction with expanding the Compensation for Employers of Reservists Program to include individual training activities might enable the Army to more fully leverage the Reserve and enable individual reservists to complete the training they require to advance their military careers.

Despite being supported with stronger job protection legislation, the Australian reserve brigade's ability to consistently produce personnel and formed elements for operations highlights the ability of reserve forces to assume force generation responsibilities. Although the Army should consider assigning force generation responsibilities to its reserve formations, the assignment of these responsibilities must be guided by the Reserve's capacity and the Army's operational tempo. The Army should initially base its expectations of the reserve brigades potential force generation capacity on their contributions to Afghanistan as this was the largest mission that the Reserve supported in the past 20 years. This baseline should be updated according to changes to the reserve formations' trained effective strength and the demonstrated willingness of reservists to participate on specific operations. It must also be noted that the reserve brigades have a finite ability to force generate personnel. This means that reserve

¹⁷⁹ Canada Health Act, R.S.C., c. C-6, s. 7 (1985).

formations can theoretically become the primary force generators for small missions and contribute personnel and formed elements to larger missions provided that they do not exceed their capacity. Finally, optics may also influence the assignment of force generation responsibility to reserve formations. This is because it is impractical to deploy large numbers of reservists on operations if the Regular Force is not also heavily committed considering the extra costs that the military will incur as a result of having to pay reservists for their service and the potential for creating a backlash amongst members of the Regular Force who want to deploy.

Although this chapter identified several recommendations that could increase the Army's operational output, it is expected that the Army will not be able to simultaneously implement all of these recommendations. This is because the Army has a finite capacity to work on major initiatives and numerous competing priorities. Therefore, the Army should initially focus its reserve enhancement efforts towards creating a civilian skills database and a reserve career management system. This is because these efforts should be relatively easy to implement and would enhance the Reserve's ability to consistently train and generate personnel for operations.

While the Australian Army's reserve enhancement and integration efforts provide many ideas that the Army could emulate, the British Army has also implemented numerous reserve-focussed efforts that are worthy of study. The next chapter will focus on these efforts and how they contribute to the British Army's operational output.

CHAPTER 5 – THE BRITISH ARMY

The British Army consists of the Regular Force, the Ghurkhas, the Army Reserve, and several smaller entities. As of October 2018, the British Army's Regular Force had 79,640 personnel and its Reserve had 29,600 personnel.¹⁸⁰ The British Army Reserve's role is to provide "highly trained soldiers who can work alongside the Regulars on missions in the UK and overseas [and to give] people who have specialist skills, like medics and engineers, a range of exciting opportunities to use them in new ways."¹⁸¹ While the British Army Reserve could be employed as a strategic reserve, its role clearly highlights its existence as an operational reserve that exists to augment the Regular Force.

Future Force 2020

While the Australian Army leveraged its reserve forces to increase its operational output, the British Army has relied upon its reserves to offset the reduction in capability that occurred when the British government reduced its Regular Force by 20,000 personnel in 2010.¹⁸² As part of maintaining its capability level, the British government sought to integrate its reserve forces into the British Army's force generation efforts and expanded it to 30,000 positions.¹⁸³ The organizational changes that were required due to the Regular Force's personnel reduction and the Reserve's increased importance led the British government to create the Future Force 2020 strategy. An independent commission was also established in 2011 to study the British military's reserve forces so that the British military could enhance its reserve forces and better leverage their potential. This

¹⁸⁰ United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, "UK Armed Forces: Quarterly Service Personnel Statistics, 1 October 2018," last accessed 29 December 2018, 4, 7.

¹⁸¹ United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, "Who we are: The Army Reserve," last accessed 29 December 2018, <https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/the-army-reserve/>.

¹⁸² Claire Mills, Louisa Brooke-Holland, and Nigel Walker, *A brief guide to previous British defence reviews* (London: House of Commons, 2018), 52.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 52.

study considered all aspects of the British Army Reserve, including its role, organization, training, equipment, funding, compensation, and job protection legislation.

The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom's Reserve Forces concluded that the British Army Reserve was in decline and that many of the Army's processes were having a negative impact on its ability to function.¹⁸⁴ For instance, the Commission noted that the emphasis placed on generating junior reservists as augmentees for regular force units negatively impacted the development of the British Army Reserve's Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers by robbing them of deployed command opportunities.¹⁸⁵ Another significant point identified by the Commission was that the Regular Force often considered reserve pay as being uncommitted money and available for reallocation.¹⁸⁶ The Commission also determined that the extremely small size of some reserve units was detrimental to their ability to plan and conduct higher-level and more interesting collective training, which obviously limited their ability to produce well trained soldiers.¹⁸⁷

The Commission proposed a series of measures to address the systemic issues that were negatively impacting the British Army Reserve. These included creating reserve units that focus on homeland security, resiliency, capacity building, and cyber operations.¹⁸⁸ It also suggested that the Army use these tasks as a conduit for leveraging society's volunteer ethos and "exploiting the best talent the country has to offer."¹⁸⁹

Finally, the Commission recommended increasing the British Army Reserve's funding to

¹⁸⁴ United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, *Future Reserves 2020: The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom's Reserve Forces* (London: Ministry of Defence, 2011), 6

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 16.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 14.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 25-26.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 6.

enhance the quality of training it conducts and to provide reserve units with suitable equipment.¹⁹⁰

Organization, Force Management, and Force Generation

As part of the reorganization that occurred as a result of Future Force 2020 and the Independent Commission's recommendations, the British Army is now organized into the Home Command and the Field Army. Home Command provides the British Army's institutional support, including operating its garrisons, overseeing its recruiting activities, and managing its individual training system.¹⁹¹ The Field Army generates the British Army's operational capability and is comprised of numerous formations including the 1st Division, 3rd Division, and Force Troops Command.

Unlike the Canadian Army, which annually rotates the responsibility for force generating capabilities through its divisions, the Field Army's formations have been permanently assigned specific force generation responsibilities. For instance, the 3rd Division is a conventional land formation that is continuously maintained at a high level of operational readiness.¹⁹² The 1st Division generates a light brigade for operations and contains units that have been configured to perform specific roles, such as stabilization, capacity building, and regionally-focused defence engagement tasks.¹⁹³

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 11-12.

¹⁹¹ United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, "Who we are," last accessed 29 December 2018, <https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/>; United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, "Headquarters, Regional Command," last accessed 29 December 2018, <https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/formations-divisions-brigades/regional-command/>.

¹⁹² United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, "Continual Operational Readiness: 3rd (United Kingdom) Division," last accessed 29 December 2018, <https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/formations-divisions-brigades/3rd-united-kingdom-division/>.

¹⁹³ United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, "Light Role Excellence: 1st (United Kingdom) Division," last accessed 29 December 2018, <https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/formations-divisions-brigades/1st-united-kingdom-division/>.

Finally, the Force Troops Command generates the Army's combat support and service support capabilities.¹⁹⁴

Reserve units exist within each of these formations and prepare their personnel to perform a wide range of specialized tasks that span the spectrum of conflict. The British Army leverages its Reserve's capacity by employing several force generation models. These include generating individuals to augment deploying regular force organizations, generating formed elements, and conducting mass mobilization during national emergencies. Reservists can be force generated by volunteering for a specific position or through pre-negotiated special arrangements. Reservists can also be compulsorily activated; however, calling out reserve force personnel is a highly sensitive political act.¹⁹⁵ While activation as a result of reservists volunteering or being called out is comparable to the provisions contained within Canada's NDA, the special arrangement means of activating reservists is more comparable to Australia's High Readiness Reserve. Reservists can only be enrolled in a special arrangement with their employers' support considering that the British government enters into contracts with both the volunteering reservists and their employers when establishing these arrangements. These contracts obligate employers to make their employees available for any "training obligations specified within the agreement" and for activation for "permanent service anywhere in the world" for a period of up to nine months.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁴ United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, "Cutting-edge enabling capabilities: Force Troops Command," last accessed 29 December 2018, <https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/formations-divisions-brigades/force-troops-command/>.

¹⁹⁵ United Kingdom, Reserve Forces Act, c.14, p. IV-VII, s. 28 (1996).

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, c.14 p. IV, s. 28.

As part of calling out members of its Reserve, the British Army also employs a process it calls “intelligent mobilization.”¹⁹⁷ This process specifies how many personnel reserve units are expected to generate and allows the units to choose who will deploy. The British military could issue a formal order obligating the deployment of non-identified personnel if the units fail to produce the number stipulated within an activation order. Alternatively, it could fill the remaining positions with regular force personnel if the British government was unwilling to compel reservists to deploy. Davies and Smith identified that generating formed elements in this manner is popular amongst reservists because it allows them to deploy with their “mates” and enables them to take advantage of the United Kingdom’s job protection legislation.¹⁹⁸ This is because the United Kingdom only protects reservists against dismissal when they are activated as a result of a special arrangement or when they are called out.¹⁹⁹ While some may question whether efforts like “intelligent mobilization” would potentially dissuade people from becoming or remaining reservists, Davies and Smith dismiss this notion because they believe that reservists generally want to deploy.²⁰⁰ They also suggest that deploying in this manner may benefit reservists by providing them with an excuse when they inform their employers that they are being deployed, rather than having to convince their employers to preserve their jobs if they voluntarily deploy.²⁰¹

The British Army has adopted two metrics that guide the generation of reservists for operations. The first is a one-to-eight force generation ratio, whereby, the British

¹⁹⁷ Davies and Smith, “Stepping up: Part-time forces and ADF capability,” 7.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁹⁹ United Kingdom, Reserve Forces (Safeguard of Employment) Act, c.17, s. 1 (1985).

²⁰⁰ Davies and Smith, “Stepping up: Part-time forces and ADF capability,” 7.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 7.

Army Reserve is expected to produce one soldier for operations for every eight serving reservists.²⁰² The second identifies that reservists should ideally only be compelled to deploy for a period of one out of every five years.²⁰³ Although reservists can still voluntarily deploy more frequently, limiting non-voluntarily deployments in this manner mitigates the impact that frequent operational tours would have on their civilian lives and careers. Maintaining this limitation is important because reserve officers and non-commissioned officers might leave the Reserve if service-related demands conflict with their non-military obligations.²⁰⁴ Losing large numbers of reservists for this reason would decrease the number of experienced personnel available to support operations and would diminish the attractiveness of serving in the Reserve.

One benefit of mixing regular force and reserve units within the same formation is that reservists are now also provided with more opportunities to train with their affiliated regular force counterparts. Such training opportunities provide an enticing reason to join the Reserve. For instance, the majority of the British 1st Division's subordinate brigades have been assigned a global region for training and capacity development efforts.²⁰⁵ Pairing regular and reserve units within these formations enables reservists to occasionally deploy with their affiliated regular force units on international training events. Assigning different operational roles and global regions to reserve units also enables reservists to join units based on their interests. This is somewhat similar to the

²⁰² United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, *Future Reserves 2020: The Independent Commission to Review the United Kingdom's Reserve Forces*, 35.

²⁰³ Davies and Smith, "Stepping up: Part-time forces and ADF capability," 6.

²⁰⁴ Smith and Jans, "Use Them or Lose Them? Australia's Defence Force Reserves," 315.

²⁰⁵ United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, *Formation Regional Alignment Plan (FRAP) Network as at 22 Oct 18* (London: British Army, 2018), 3.

advantages provided by the Canadian Army's decision to assign mission tasks to reserve units.

Despite the increased integration that has resulted from blending regular and reserve units within the same formations, the British Army has not harmonized its regular force and reserve training. British reservists still receive significantly less training than their regular force counterparts. For instance, the Regular Force version of the Advanced Command and Staff Course, which is the British equivalent of the Canadian Joint Command and Staff Program, consists of 46 weeks of residential training, while the reserve variant comprises 16 days of residential training and six weeks of distance learning.²⁰⁶ The vast disparities in training standards limit the ability of reservists to credibly serve in higher-level command and staff positions.

Funding, Equipment, and Benefits

As part of enhancing the Reserve's capability, the British Army increased the funding provided to reserve units to enable them to boost their training from 35 to 40 days annually.²⁰⁷ Members of the British Army Reserve are expected to participate in at least 16 days of training annually, which includes attending pre-identified mandatory core training activities to maintain a minimum level of capability.²⁰⁸ Untrained reservists are also not counted against the British Army Reserve's permissive manning level as the Reserve is permitted to maintain an additional 8000 untrained personnel on its

²⁰⁶ United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, "Advanced Command and Staff Course – ACSC," last accessed 23 February 2019, <https://www.da.mod.uk/Course/ACSC>; United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, "Advanced Command and Staff Course (Reserves) – ACSC-R," last accessed 23 February 2019, <https://www.da.mod.uk/Course/ACSC-R>.

²⁰⁷ United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, *Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued* (London: Ministry of Defence, 2013), 20.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 20.

strength.²⁰⁹ Although the British Army increased its reserve funding and provided reserve units with additional equipment, like support weapons, Dr. Patrick Bury from the University of Bath noted that it has not addressed all of the issues raised by the Independent Commission.²¹⁰ Bury points out that while reservists were initially excited about the prospect of being able to train with suitable equipment, many became jaded as a result of their units not receiving this promised equipment.²¹¹ This highlights the potential impacts to institutional credibility that can result when major promises remain unfulfilled.

The British Army Reserve now provides its personnel with various service bonuses to incentivize retention. For example, British reservists receive a tax free incentive of £300 when they join the Reserve and of £1000 when they complete various levels of their training.²¹² They also receive an annual service bonus if they participate in a specified number of training days, usually 19 or 27 depending on the type of unit, and successfully complete a series of military skills tests.²¹³ This bonus ranges from £440 to £1742 a year depending on the amount of service a reservist has completed. Retiring members of the Regular Force also receive a “re-joining bonus” of £5000 if they transfer to the Reserve and complete four additional years of service, rather than completely leaving the British Army.²¹⁴ Although one could question the use of financial incentives as a retention tool, the annual service bonus could be useful for increasing the Canadian Army Reserve’s overall capability by convincing its personnel to participate in more

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 23.

²¹⁰ Patrick Bury, “Future Reserves 2020: perceptions of cohesion, readiness and transformation in the British Army Reserve,” *Defence Studies* 18:4 (August 2018): 428.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, 428.

²¹² United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, “Reservist Benefits,” last accessed 17 January 2019, <https://apply.army.mod.uk/what-we-offer/reserve-soldier/army-reserve-benefits>.

²¹³ *Ibid.*

²¹⁴ United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, *Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued*, 33.

training events. Specifically, those who do not frequently attend training events, but are close to meeting the requirements needed to obtain this bonus, may increase their level of participation.

Mobilized British reservists are also eligible to receive a “Reservist Award” of up to £822 a day for medical professionals who are employed with the military in this capacity or £548 a day for all other reservists.²¹⁵ This incentive reimburses reservists for any reduction to their salary that they experience as a result of being mobilized.²¹⁶ While a pay reimbursement incentive should be capped to ensure that the CAF is not paying doctors or other high-earning professionals large sums of money to serve in unrelated roles, creating a similar benefit may convince more reservists to volunteer for operations.

Finally, the British government provides financial compensation to employers of reservists who are deployed or participating in mandatory training activities. Employers can receive an “Employer Award” of up to £110 a day to cover ongoing expenses incurred as a result of their employees’ service requirements.²¹⁷ Employers are also allowed to seek compensation for the costs associated with temporarily replacing their reservist personnel, such as advertising and agency fees.²¹⁸ While the CAF’s Compensation for Employers of Reservists Program provides similar assistance, the support provided by the British program is useful for soliciting the employer support needed to establish special arrangements with reservists, which help ensure the British Army’s ability to draw upon its Reserve for operations.

²¹⁵ United Kingdom, The Reserve Forces (Call-out and Recall) (Financial Assistance) Regulations p. 2, s.3 (2005).

²¹⁶ United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, *Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued*, 32.

²¹⁷ United Kingdom, The Reserve Forces (Call-out and Recall) (Financial Assistance) Regulations p. 6, s.6 (2005).

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*

Recommendations

The Canadian Army should place a greater level of emphasis on having the Reserve generate formed sub-units and sub-sub-units for operations. Generating personnel in this manner would enhance the Reserve's ability to plan and conduct operations by providing reserve leaders with additional experience as commanders and as senior staff officers. The opportunity to command on operations may also incentivize more reservists to voluntarily deploy. Providing reserve leaders with deployed command and senior staff opportunities would also enable the Army to break the feedback loop that exists as a result of senior regular force leaders not wanting to employ reservists in these roles as a result of their lack of experience as long as reservists continue to receive equivalent training for staff and command preparation.

The Army should also investigate the viability of individual reserve units based on their strength and attendance to determine if they are capable of planning and conducting higher-level training. Consideration should be given to amalgamating unviable units into tactical groups, such as the Winnipeg Infantry Tactical Group. Amalgamating significantly understrength reserve units provides these units with the personnel required to conduct more complicated and interesting training. It also takes the pressure off of these units to continuously produce commanding officers and regimental sergeants-major, thereby providing these units with the time and personnel required for properly developing their leaders for senior positions. Amalgamating units into tactical groups that preserve the traditions and accoutrements of the individual units should also enable the Army to avoid the backlash that would occur if the decision was taken to disband these units or merge them together to form entirely new organizations.

Although the Army has already started assigning mission tasks to individual reserve units, it should also consider assigning tasks related to providing disaster response and assistance to civil authorities, stability operations, and capability development. These should become secondary tasks for reserve units so as to not displace their traditional roles. Reserve units that are assigned these tasks would require additional funding to ensure that the training required for developing and maintaining these capabilities does not undermine their efforts to preserve their core functions.

Mobilization schemes like “intelligent mobilization” should also be considered, especially if the Army establishes forces like the Australian High Readiness Reserves or Rapid Response Force, bearing in mind that these forces would be expected to remain at higher states of readiness. While mobilizing the Reserve may be politically unpalatable in most instances, this scheme could be advantageously employed by the Army if a large number of reservists voluntarily identify their willingness to be more easily activated. Allowing reservists to complete part of their pre-deployment training at their home units before joining their regular force counterparts may also incentivize more reservists to deploy on operations.

Although establishing a minimum attendance requirement may increase the general level of participation within the Reserve, it could also lead reservists who infrequently partake in reserve activities to release from the military, thereby freeing up positions for others to serve. Careful consideration of such a change should occur before it is implemented and the chain of command should be provided with discretion in applying the policy to minimize the likelihood that overly negative and unintended consequences might result from the rigid enforcement of such a policy. Another option

for increasing the Reserve's participation and readiness involves providing a system to incentivize reservists to attend more training events, such as the British Army Reserve's service bonus. While such a bonus might include an attendance requirement, it should focus on attaining and maintaining robust, but achievable, training targets. Setting the requirements for such an incentive too high may simply lead reservists who infrequently participate in reserve events to not attempt to obtain this reward.

Finally, consideration should be given towards providing reservists with a stipend to make up any losses in pay they experience as a result of their service. Such a reward would be useful for incentivizing reservists to volunteer for deployments; however, the stipend should be capped to prevent it from imposing a significant financial burden on the military. The selective use of such a stipend may also incentivize reservists to volunteer for less attractive operations. This is because more interesting deployments will likely attract reservist volunteers without the requirement to provide such incentives.

Considering the Army's finite staff capacity and numerous competing priorities, it is recommended that it initially focuses on increasing the Reserve's capability-level by establishing robust, but achievable, training requirements. The Army should also focus on expanding the types of mission tasks assigned to reserve units to include disaster response, stability operations, and capacity building. Both measures should be relatively simple to implement and would allow the Reserve to better contribute to the Army's operational output by generating soldiers who are better trained for the types of operations that the Army routinely supports. This paper will now focus on the United States Marine Corps' reserve practices and the lessons that the Army can derive from the Marines.

CHAPTER 6 – THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

Although the United States Marine Corps has not recently undertaken any significant reserve modernization, restructuring, or integration initiatives, its reserve employment practices are worthy of study due to the frequent activation and deployment of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Reserve units on operations over the past two decades. The United States Marine Corps comprises 185,000 regular force Marines and 38,500 active reservists.²¹⁹ The field forces of the Marine Corps' Active Component consist of three divisions, which are each supported by an aircraft wing and a logistics group.²²⁰ Each division contains three regiments of infantry that each have between two and four battalions.²²¹ Two of the three divisions also have an artillery regiment that contains three to four battalions, a tank battalion, an armoured and a non-armoured reconnaissance battalion, an amphibious assault battalion, and close support engineer battalions.²²² The aircraft wings contain fixed wing and rotary attack, transport, and logistics squadrons.²²³ The logistics groups are made up of combat logistics regiments and medical, dental, and engineer support battalions.²²⁴ The U.S. Marine Corps Forces Reserve's formations generally mirror their active component counterparts, with the majority of the Marine's reservists serving in the 4th Marine Division, the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, or the 4th Marine Logistics Group.²²⁵

²¹⁹ United States, Department of Defense, *Defense Manpower Requirements Report, Fiscal Year 2018* (Washington: Department of Defense, 2017), 9.

²²⁰ United States, Department of Defense, MCRP 5-12D, *Organization of the United States Marine Corps* (Washington: Department of the Navy, 2016), 1-3.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, 5-2 to 5-4.

²²² *Ibid.*, 5-2 to 5-4.

²²³ *Ibid.*, 6-4 to 6-6.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, 7-3 to 7-5.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 1-11.

The current organization of the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Reserve highlights that segregated reserve forces can successfully generate the capabilities militaries require. Its segregated nature is also understandable given the geographical distribution of the Marine Corps' active and reserve units. The Marine Corps' active units are primarily located on both coasts of the United States, Hawaii, and Okinawa, Japan, while U.S. Marine Corps Forces Reserve operates from 160 training centres that are situated in 47 different states and Puerto Rico.²²⁶ Some Marine reserve units might be situated close enough to active Marine facilities to permit integrated training to occur; however, the majority are not.

Although the Marine Corps is administratively organized in the above listed formations, it forces fight as self-contained task forces that consist of ground, air, aviation, and logistics assets. The smallest of these task forces is the Marine Expeditionary Unit, which consists of a battalion of infantry supported by an aviation combat element and a logistics element.²²⁷ Next is the Marine Expeditionary Brigade, which is made up of an infantry regiment, an aircraft group and a logistics group. The Brigade normally contains 3000 to 20,000 Marines and sailors.²²⁸ Finally, the largest of the task forces is the Marine Expeditionary Force, which is made up of a division, an aircraft wing, and a logistics group.²²⁹

The Marine's Reserve was originally established in 1916 and its personnel supported their active component counterparts during both World Wars and the Korean

²²⁶ United States, Department of Defense, "U.S. Marine Corps Forces Reserve MARFORRES Media Information," last accessed 22 January 2019, <https://www.marforres.marines.mil/About/Media-Info/>.

²²⁷ United States, Department of Defense, MCRP 5-12D, *Organization of the United States Marine Corps*, 1-8.

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, 1-6.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, 1-3.

War.²³⁰ The U.S. Marine Corps Forces Reserve was reorganized into its current structure in 1963 after the American Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara identified the requirement for the Marines to establish a strategic reserve.²³¹ This decision provided the Marine Corps with a fourth Marine Expeditionary Force that could be mobilized in the event of a major war. Although this structure is currently in place, the demand for forces that was imposed upon the Marine Corps by Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the requirement to maintain a forward presence across the globe, necessitated activating individual reserve units to augment the Marine's Active Component.

The U.S. Marine Corps Forces Reserve has been frequently leveraged as an operational reserve over the past twenty years. This shift towards serving as an operational reserve is also manifest in the Commander Marine Forces Reserve's mission statement, which states that:

Commander, Marine Forces Reserve (COMMARFORRES) commands and controls assigned forces for the purpose of augmenting and reinforcing the Active Component with trained units and individual Marines as a sustainable and ready operational reserve in order to augment and reinforce active forces for employment across the full spectrum of crisis and global engagement.²³²

To prepare for potentially augmenting or reinforcing the Active Component, Marine reservists complete the same common and trade specific training that other Marines receive and participate in training one weekend a month and annually for a two-week

²³⁰ Jonathan L. Riggs, "Making the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Reserve Truly Operational: A Case Study in the Reorganization of the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Reserve," (Master of Military Studies Research Paper, USMC Command and Staff College, 2012), 5-6.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, 6.

²³² United States, Department of Defense, "U.S. Marine Corps Forces Reserve Mission," last accessed 22 January 2019, <https://www.marforres.marines.mil/About/Mission-Statement/>.

period.²³³ This equates to approximately 38 days of training every year. Marine reserve units receive detailed guidance about the training standards that must be achieved during this training time, which enables the U.S. Marine Corps to predictably generate a pre-determined level of capability from its reserve forces.²³⁴

The U.S. Marine Corps Forces Reserve is relatively unique in comparison to the other reserve forces examined in this study because the Marines frequently activate and deploy entire reserve units on operations. The Marine Corps' ability to activate entire reserve units is enabled by the requirement for members of the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Reserve to commit to serving for eight years when they join the Corps.²³⁵ The Marines offer several paths for completing this commitment. Every one of these paths include spending several years on active service with the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Reserve before transferring to the Individual Ready Reserve, which is similar to the CAF's Supplementary Reserve. All Marine reservists, regardless of their status as members of the Active or Ready Reserve, are eligible to deploy when their unit is mobilized.

While the requirement to serve for eight years might seem like it would dissuade Americans from joining the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Reserve, many Marine reservists join under the most onerous agreement, which is referred to as a 6x2 contract. This contract obligates Marine reservists to serve as active members of the Active Reserve for six years, before completing their two remaining years with the Individual Ready

²³³ United States, Department of Defense, "Becoming a Marine," last accessed 22 January 2019, <https://www.marines.com/becoming-a-marine/overview.html>.

²³⁴ Harry J. Thie, Roland J. Yardley, Peter Schirmer, Rudolph H. Ehrenberg, Penelope Speed, *Factors to Consider in Blending Active and Reserve Manpower within Military Units* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007), 67.

²³⁵ United States, Department of Defense, MCO 1133R.26E, *Reserve Optional Enlistment Program (ROEP)* (Washington: Department of the Navy, 1999), 1.

Reserve.²³⁶ This contract is favoured by Marine reservists because six years of active service is the minimum time required to access the educational incentives provided by the Montgomery G.I. Bill.²³⁷ Members of the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Reserve who join under this contract are eligible to receive up to US\$13,248 that they can apply towards furthering their education.²³⁸ They can also use this benefit to fund their immediate family members' educations, provided that certain conditions are met.²³⁹ These include completing a specified period of service and still being members of the military.²⁴⁰ While the educational stipend leads many reservists to join the American military, allowing this stipend to be transferred to immediate family members incentivizes many reservists to continue serving beyond their initial eight year commitment. It is therefore recommended that the CAF consider copying the American military by allowing its reservists to also transfer their educational stipend to their immediate family members.

The Department of Defense has also established a policy that governs how frequently reserve units can be involuntary activated. This measure is intended to preserve the long-term viability of the American military's reserve forces. This policy permits reserve units to be activated on a one-to-four ratio for mobilization to "dwell periods."²⁴¹ For example, American reserve units should receive a four-year dwell period if they are mobilized for one year. Mobilization periods start when a unit is activated and

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, 1.

²³⁷ United States, Department of Veterans Affairs, "Montgomery GI Bill Selected Reserve (MGIB-SR)," last accessed 22 January 2019, <https://www.va.gov/education/about-gi-bill-benefits/montgomery-selected-reserve/>.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*

²³⁹ United States, Department of Veterans Affairs, "Transfer Post-9/11 GI Bill to Spouse and Dependents," last accessed 23 February 2019, https://www.benefits.va.gov/gibill/post911_transfer.asp.

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁴¹ United States, Department of Defense, *Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component. Volume I Executive Summary & Main Report* (Washington: Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), 43-44.

end once it is released from active service. Dwell periods are calculated from when a unit is released from active service until it is mobilized again. While individual reservists may voluntarily deploy more frequently, this policy only allows the Secretaries of the military departments to authorize the activation of conventional reserve units if the one-to-four ratio is respected. The Secretary of Defense's approval is required to activate reserve units during their dwell period.²⁴² This policy helps control American military expenditures by limiting reserve deployments. It also enables the military to maintain the viability of its reserves by not allowing frequent involuntary deployments to become a major recruiting and retention issue. American reserve units are fully aware of when their dwell periods end, which enables these units to complete any preparatory activities that are required for a potential deployment. Preparing forces in this manner enables the American military to deploy reserve units on operations within 30 days of their being activated.²⁴³

The U.S. government has also established robust job protection legislation that enables reservists to participate on operations and training activities. The current job protection measures are provided through the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA).²⁴⁴ This act protects reservists from discrimination and reprisals by their employers in relation to their military service and from being dismissed from their civilian occupations while they are serving.²⁴⁵ The act defines service as being “the performance of duty on a voluntary or involuntary basis in a

²⁴² United States, Department of Defense, Instruction 1235.12 – *Accessing the Reserve Components (RC), 2016, incorporating change 1* (Washington: Department of Defense, 2017), 20.

²⁴³ United States, Department of Defense, MCO 3000.19B, Marine Corps Total Force Mobilization, Activation, Integration, and Deactivation Plan (Washington: Department of the Navy, 2013), 3-9.

²⁴⁴ United States, Department of Labor, “VETS USERRA Fact Sheet 3,” last accessed 14 January 2019, https://www.dol.gov/vets/programs/userra/userra_fs.htm.

²⁴⁵ United States, Title 38 C.F.R. Pensions, Bonuses, and Veterans' Relief, p. 3, c. 43., s. 4301.

uniformed service under competent authority and includes active duty, active duty for training, initial active duty for training, [and] inactive duty training.”²⁴⁶ It act also obligates employers to provide reservists with

benefits determined by seniority that the person had on the date of the commencement of service in the uniformed services plus the additional seniority and rights and benefits that such person would have attained if the person had remained continuously employed.²⁴⁷

Although the protections afforded within USERRA do not extend to students, they empower American reservists to actively seek out opportunities to deploy with their affiliated branches of the American military.

Recommendations

Given the Marine’s success with having its reservists initially commit to serving for eight years, the Army should consider creating programs that include obligatory service for its reservists. For instance, agreeing to obligatory service could be a precondition for serving with organizations that receive additional remuneration, like the Australian High Readiness Reserve, or for attending expensive or highly desirable military courses. Although the CAF already provides reservists with an educational stipend, the Army should also consider providing additional educational stipends to reservists who agree to complete a period of obligatory service with the Reserve or allowing reservists to use this stipend to pay for their family members’ education.²⁴⁸ The implementation of obligatory service for reservists should include defined training and participation requirements.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, s. 4303.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 4316.

²⁴⁸ Canada, Department of National Defence, “Educational Reimbursement,” last accessed 22 January 2019, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/training-paid-education/education-reimbursement.page>.

The U.S. job protection legislation directly enables its ability to mobilize entire reserve units. The Army should solicit MPC's assistance in attempting to convince the federal and provincial governments to introduce similar protections into their labour acts. This includes seeking to have the federal and provincial governments obligate employers of mobilized reservists to provide their employees with the seniority, benefits, and promotions that they would have accrued had they not deployed. The inclusion of such a measure within the various employment acts might incentivize more reservists to voluntarily deploy on operations by reducing some of the negative job related aspects associated with deploying.

CHAPTER 7 – MOVING FORWARD

This chapter builds upon the three previous chapters and the recommendations made in those chapters by discussing how the Army should approach some its current initiatives, including providing the Reserve with an updated role and assigning force generation responsibilities to the reserve brigades. It also considers how the Army can increase the likelihood of its initiatives being implemented successfully.

The Army Reserve's Role and Output Potential

The Australian and British Armies made significant changes to how their reserves were structured and employed after conducting comprehensive reviews of their reserve forces. These reviews enabled both armies to understand what they wanted their reserve forces to produce before they changed how their reserve forces were organized and how they generate capabilities for operations. It is therefore recommended that the Army conduct a fundamental review of what capabilities it expects the Reserve to generate. This review should build upon the previous reviews of the Army and the Reserve that were discussed in Chapter 2. The outcome of this review should assist the Army with identifying how the Reserve needs to be structured, equipped, trained, and supported to produce these required outputs. It will also inform efforts to establish or amend the policies required to govern the generation of reservists within the CAF and the Army's self-imposed constraints.

Despite the differences that exist between the Army, the Australian Army, British Army, and the Marines, the fact that these allies all employ their reserve forces as operational reserves suggests that they consider strategic reserves to be of limited utility within the contemporary operating environment. As such, it is reasonable for the Army to

continue employing the Reserve as an operational reserve rather than assigning it with strategic reserve responsibilities, including preparing for a mass mobilization task that is unlikely to be employed. Even if the Army continues to use the Reserve as an operational reserve, it is recommended that the Reserve receive an enhanced role that reflects its increased importance within *SSE*. The role of the Reserve should be amended as follows:

The role of the Canadian Army Reserve is to force generate formed elements and individual personnel for CAF missions and to assist the Canadian Army with maintaining its connection with Canadian communities.

As previously mentioned, the Army identified that each reserve unit should force generate one reservist for operations for every seven serving with the unit. Based on this ratio, the Reserve can theoretically generate around 2690 personnel once, if a surge of personnel is required for operations.²⁴⁹ This number is based on the Reserve's current overall effective strength and would drop to 1953 personnel if only trained reservists who are not filling institutional positions are included within the force generation pool.²⁵⁰ Although the inclusion of only trained reservists lowers the Reserve's force generation expectation, not including untrained reservists is reasonable because they are unable to deploy before completing their Developmental Period 1 training. If the decision is taken to include untrained reservists in the force generation output expectations, then the one-to-seven ratio will have to be adjusted to account for the circumstances of each unit. For instance, 31% of the Reserve's personnel are currently untrained as shown in Figure 2.²⁵¹ Figure 3, meanwhile, highlights the fact that more than 40% of the personnel in 25

²⁴⁹ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Canadian Army Strength, G1 Personnel Generation SITREP – November 2018* (Ottawa: Canadian Army, 2018), 16.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 16.

²⁵¹ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Reserve Recruiting briefing to Army Council February 2019*, 7.

reserve units have not completed their Developmental Period 1 training.²⁵² The Reserve's ability to force generate personnel will not suddenly increase even if reserve units substantially increase their number of untrained personnel in a short timeframe.




Figure 2 – Breakdown of Canadian Army Reserve strength²⁵³

²⁵² *Ibid.*, 8.

²⁵³ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Reserve Recruiting briefing to Army Council February 2019*, 7-8.




Figure 3 – Breakdown of Non-Developmental Period 1 qualified personnel across Canadian Army Reserve units²⁵⁴

Efforts to increase the Reserve’s operational output should therefore focus on expanding its trained effective strength and the willingness and ability of individual reservists to deploy. This is because enlarging the Reserve’s trained effective strength will directly increase the number of personnel who can potentially deploy. Efforts that support the achievement of this aim include expanding the Reserve’s strength through recruiting and retention initiatives and enabling reservists to complete their training in the most efficient manner possible. Enhancing the quality of the collective training conducted by reserve units is also important as it should help sustain reservists’ interest in continuing to serve with the Reserve. Although increasing the Reserve’s trained effective strength is important, this effort will be meaningless if the Army cannot convince

²⁵⁴ Data taken from Guardian on 01 February 2019 and provided by the Canadian Army’s G1 Personnel Generation (see Annex C).

individual reservists to volunteer for deployments. Therefore, the Army also must increase the willingness and the ability of individual reservists to deploy. Efforts aimed at achieving this goal could include enhancing federal and provincial job protection legislation, providing additional financial benefits, and creating a system that enables the Army to more easily generate capability from the Reserve.

If reservist force generation remains subject to the Army Managed Readiness Plan's three-year cycle, then the annual reserve force generation requirement essentially becomes 1/21 of the Reserve's overall capacity. Using this ratio, the Reserve should only be expected to produce up to 651 personnel annually for operations, provided that only trained reservists who are not filling institutional positions are included in the force generation pool. Employing this lower ratio would ensure that reserve force generation remains sustainable and would provide a baseline for assigning standing force generation responsibilities to the Reserve.

The Australian Army's ability to leverage its Reserve as a primary force generator for operations demonstrates that reserve forces are capable of fulfilling this role. Provided that the generation of reservists remains subject to the 1/21 force generation ratio discussed above, the Canadian Army Reserve should be able to fulfill a similar role. Based on the distribution of the Army's reservists, the divisions should be able to generate the following on an ongoing basis:

| Rank | Non-Institutional/Field Force Positions | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------|---|-----|-----------|-----|-----------|-----|-----------|-----|---------------------------|-------------|----------------|
| | 2 Cdn Div | | 3 Cdn Div | | 4 Cdn Div | | 5 Cdn Div | | Total Reserve Field Force | | |
| | Total | 1/7 | Total | 1/7 | Total | 1/7 | Total | 1/7 | Total | Surge (1/7) | Average (1/21) |
| BGen | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 0 |
| Col | 4 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 6 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 22 | 3 | 1 |
| LCol | 40 | 6 | 42 | 6 | 60 | 9 | 37 | 5 | 179 | 26 | 9 |
| Maj | 71 | 10 | 96 | 14 | 127 | 18 | 75 | 11 | 369 | 53 | 18 |
| Capt | 199 | 28 | 212 | 30 | 278 | 40 | 137 | 20 | 826 | 118 | 39 |
| Lt | 62 | 9 | 46 | 7 | 76 | 11 | 34 | 5 | 218 | 31 | 10 |
| CWO | 30 | 4 | 42 | 6 | 50 | 7 | 24 | 3 | 146 | 21 | 7 |
| MWO | 55 | 8 | 64 | 9 | 91 | 13 | 64 | 9 | 274 | 39 | 13 |
| WO | 100 | 14 | 134 | 19 | 188 | 27 | 80 | 11 | 502 | 72 | 24 |
| Sgt | 369 | 53 | 243 | 35 | 527 | 75 | 235 | 34 | 1374 | 196 | 65 |
| MCpl | 419 | 60 | 402 | 57 | 573 | 82 | 267 | 38 | 1661 | 237 | 79 |
| Cpl | 1298 | 185 | 1269 | 181 | 2054 | 293 | 854 | 122 | 5475 | 782 | 261 |
| Pte(T) | 437 | 62 | 316 | 45 | 512 | 73 | 207 | 30 | 1472 | 210 | 70 |
| Pte(B) | 279 | 40 | 219 | 31 | 389 | 56 | 263 | 38 | 1150 | 164 | 55 |
| Total | 3364 | 481 | 3091 | 442 | 4932 | 705 | 2285 | 326 | 13672 | 1953 | 651 |

Table 2 – Potential Canadian Army Reserve force generation capacity²⁵⁵

Although numerous possible models exist for generating personnel for operations, there are two easily identifiable models worth considering: rotating the responsibility for generating personnel between the divisions in accordance with the Managed Readiness Plan, or assigning the responsibility for generating personnel for specific missions to individual divisions. It is recommended that the Army assign responsibility for generating personnel for specific smaller missions to individual divisions. Generating personnel for smaller missions in this manner would enable information and lessons related to the mission to be passed to other personnel deploying on the mission more effectively. The generation of reservists for larger missions should continue to be based on the Army's

²⁵⁵ Canada, Department of National Defence, *Canadian Army Strength, G1 Personnel Generation SITREP – November 2018*.

Managed Readiness Plan as these reservists will generally deploy with regular force elements that are produced by their division.

Although the Army has signalled its intent to have the Reserve generate a domestic response capability during the summer timeframe, the Reserve could theoretically be assigned primary responsibility for generating the support provided to all domestic operations. This is provided that the Canadian government becomes more willing to activate the Reserve, or provided that special organizations, like the Australian Rapid Response Force, are formed to respond to domestic emergencies. The personnel within these organizations would have to be subject to an agreement that enabled their rapid activation when required, such as the special arrangements the British Army establishes with its reservists and their employers.

Implementing Initiatives and Design Thinking

Although several of the Army's allies have successfully enacted initiatives to modernize and better integrate their reserve forces into their overall efforts, the Army will have to judiciously adapt any of its allies' initiatives that it decides to employ to ensure that they do not create serious unintended consequences. This is because those initiatives were designed for their militaries, which have different structures, procedures, and cultures. As part of reducing the likelihood of unintended consequences occurring, the Army should apply systems thinking and aspects of design thinking to guide its efforts to adapt its allies' initiatives and to create new initiatives to modernize and better integrate the Reserve.

Oxford Dictionary defines a system as being “a set of things working together as parts of a mechanism or an interconnecting network; a complex whole.”²⁵⁶ Dr. Dietrich Dörner, from the University of Bamberg, identifies that complexity is “the label we will give to the existence of many interdependent variables in a given system.”²⁵⁷ The high level of interdependency that exists within complex systems means that one must simultaneously account for a large number of variables when making changes to these systems because actions taken that affect one part of a system will also impact its other components.²⁵⁸ The factors upon which decisions are made can also change as alterations are made to complex systems because of the interdependency that exists between these systems’ variables. Thus, decisions taken to amend processes and components within a system need to be periodically reviewed and adjusted to ensure that the system continues to function as designed.

The Army is a complex system. It consists of numerous subordinate systems that interact with one another to generate military forces to support the Canadian government’s direction and initiatives. Some of these systems include recruiting, individual training, force management, force generation, releasing individuals, and procurement. The Army also operates within a complex environment that contains a myriad of actors and policies that govern how it generates military power. For instance, the Army is subject to acts of parliament, political decisions relating to how and where military force will be employed, a finite budget, policy constraints, the interests of other government departments, the willingness of Canadians to join the Army, and extra-

²⁵⁶ Oxford dictionary, “System,” last accessed 22 January 2019, <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/system>.

²⁵⁷ Dietrich Dörner, *The Logic of Failure* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1997), 38.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 38.

national factors like the contemporary operating environment and our allies' interests and goals.

Given the Army's complexity and the environment that it functions within, a systems approach may help predict how altering aspects of the Army could impact its other components and processes. It should also enable the Army to better define "the problem" that it needs to solve. This is because improving the Army's individual components, including the Reserve, might not increase its overall effectiveness considering that these improvements could create adverse impacts elsewhere. A pioneer of systems thinking, Dr. Russell Ackoff from the University of Pennsylvania, summarized the issue as being similar to how "installing a Rolls Royce engine in a Hyundai can make it inoperable."²⁵⁹ This inoperability can arise when systems are employed that are not designed to function together. The Army must understand the potential impacts associated with employing its allies' practices and then adjust these processes to function with its other components. Failing to suitably amend any of its allies' practices that it adopts could lead the Army to inadvertently create internal incoherence. This could cause the Army's efforts to fail, or worse, decrease its operational output. Dörner notes that one of the best methods to avoid such impacts is to understand how aspects of the system interact by continuously investigating these impacts and interactions as the system is adjusted.

Ackoff also pointed out that "improving the performance of the parts of a system taken separately will [not] necessarily improve the performance of the whole."²⁶⁰ The

²⁵⁹ Russell Ackoff, *A Lifetime of Systems Thinking*, last accessed 23 December 2018, <https://thesystemsthinker.com/a-lifetime-of-systems-thinking/>.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

value associated with improving an individual component should be considered from the viewpoint of its benefit to the overall system. If the Army's ultimate goal is increasing its operational output, then increasing the Reserve's output supports the achievement of this aim provided that this improvement does not cause a net reduction to the Army's overall output by undermining its other components. If the changes result in a net gain to the Army's operational output, then decreases to other parts of the Army, including the Regular Force, are justifiable and should be accepted provided that this increase is sustainable.

As changes to parts of a complex system can impact other parts of the system, it is imperative that the Army monitors these changes and makes appropriate adjustments, when necessary, to ensure that they result in a net gain to the Army's overall operational output. The impacts associated with changing systems can take time to fully manifest. Thus, the Army should avoid repeatedly adjusting the system in an attempt to optimize the Reserve's output. Rather, it should wait until the impacts of these adjustments are noticed and understood before making further amendments, unless the initial results indicate that an early catastrophic failure will occur. It is recommended that the Army employ analytics to improve the chain of command's understanding of how reserve initiatives may impact the Army. This is because analytics would provide the chain of command with the statistical evidence it requires to make better informed decisions in relation to the implementation of these initiatives. The Army should also continue relying upon the chain of command's intuition when assessing the appropriateness and value of these initiatives to ensure that suitable division, brigade, and unit-level adjustments are made to these programs.

Although systems thinking will better enable select allied initiatives to operate with the Army's other systems, the Army should also employ design thinking to enhance the chain of command's understanding of the environment in which potential reserve enhancement initiatives will occur. This includes improving the Army leadership's understanding of the issues currently limiting the Reserve's ability to increase its operational output and how these initiatives will impact various stakeholder groups, the Reserve, and the Army. Some of the stakeholder groups that will need to be understood as part of this process include francophone and anglophone reservists and their families, reserve supporters including honorary colonels and members of groups like Reserves 2000, members of the Regular Force, the Army's senior leadership, the Canadian government and other governmental departments, and Canadian civilians. Empathetically analyzing these stakeholder groups will assist the chain of command with understanding how these groups perceive themselves, other stakeholders, the Army, and the Reserve. It will also help the chain of command to understand how they might react to various reserve enhancement initiatives. This understanding will assist the Army with suitably amending these initiatives to increase these groups' support.

David Leonard and Claude Coltea from the American management consulting company Gallup identified that "more than 70% of change initiatives fail."²⁶¹ They also noted that the primary reason that these efforts fail is because companies "don't focus enough on front-line managers" and "don't focus front-line managers on the exact actions

²⁶¹ David Leonard and Claude Coltea, "Most Change Initiatives Fail -- But They Don't Have To," last updated 24 May 2013, last accessed 1 January 2018, <https://news.gallup.com/businessjournal/162707/change-initiatives-fail-don.aspx>.

they need to take to achieve the company's desired business outcomes.”²⁶² This highlights the importance of employing change management systems to facilitate the implementation of new initiatives. Regardless of the chain of command’s insistence on implementing measures to modernize and better integrate the Reserve, the leaders insisting on these changes will eventually leave their current positions and the pressure to implement these changes may dissipate. Former Minister of National Defence David Pratt noted that previous reserve enhancement efforts were frustrated by senior members of the military who delayed implementing measures to enhance the reserves until the government was replaced and the direction could be ignored.²⁶³

Regardless of the quality of initiatives that are produced and implemented, it is recommended that the Army employ a change management system to increase the likelihood that these initiatives will be successful. Dr. Brian Golden, the Vice-Dean of the University of Toronto’s Rotman School of Management, identified that successful change requires clear vision, personnel with the skills and the incentives required to implement this vision, appropriate resources, and an action plan.²⁶⁴ He also developed a four stage change management system that starts out by establishing goals and the architecture required to achieve these goals, followed by soliciting management and key stakeholder support before leveraging this support to gain wider buy-in for the initiative.²⁶⁵ Efforts to sustain the change must occur once widespread support of the

²⁶² *Ibid.*

²⁶³ Pratt, *Canada’s Citizen Soldiers: A Discussion Paper*, 23.

²⁶⁴ Brian Golden, “Transforming Healthcare Organizations,” *Healthcare Quarterly* 10(Special Issue) (November 2006): 18.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 12.

initiative is secured and the initiative is working. Figure 6 provides an overview of Golden's change management system.




Figure 4 – Golden's change management system²⁶⁶

Securing stakeholder support will hopefully enable the Army to avoid the backlash that occurred in 1999 when it attempted to assign combat service support roles to reserve units.²⁶⁷ As part of securing this support, the Army must explain how its efforts will provide the Reserve with the personnel and equipment that reserve units require to properly train and an operational role that includes the expectation that the Reserve will generate personnel and formed elements for operations.

In addition to using systems thinking, design thinking, and change management systems, the Army must develop relevant metrics that it can track after reserve enhancement initiatives are implemented to determine whether these efforts are achieving the desired results. The first metric that the Army should track is the Reserve's trained effective strength because it directly relates to the Reserve's potential operational output.

²⁶⁶ Golden, "Transforming Healthcare Organizations," 12.

²⁶⁷ English, *The Role of the Militia in Today's Canadian Forces*, 14.

Additional metrics that should be tracked in relation to this metric are recruiting and retention statistics and the percentage of reservists completing their Developmental Period 1 training. Next, the Army should monitor the number of reservists volunteering for operations by unit and by rank-level. This information will confirm whether the Reserve is meeting the Army's force generation ratio or if the Army's expectations should be adjusted. Tracking the willingness of reservists to deploy by rank-level will also confirm whether the Reserve is capable of being assigned the primary responsibility for generating personnel for smaller missions, which tend to require a higher percentage of senior personnel. Finally, the Army should monitor the impacts that its initiatives have on the Regular Force's operational output. This is because gains to the Reserve's output should not exceed losses experienced by the Regular Force as a result of these efforts. Until formal metrics are developed, the Army should measure the regular force formations and units' performance on Exercise MAPLE RESOLVE because it will provide a baseline for determining whether changes to the Reserve and the Army are negatively impacting the Regular Force's capabilities.

CHAPTER 8 – CONCLUSION

As an integral component of the Army, modernizing and integrating the Reserve should enhance the Army's ability to generate capabilities for operations. Although the Reserve is not currently generating many personnel for expeditionary missions due to the reduced requirement to deploy Army personnel overseas, it consistently demonstrated its value over the past thirty years by producing a significant portion of the soldiers who served on operations. The generation of large numbers of personnel by the Reserve during this timeframe enabled the Army to preserve its operational output by providing regular force units with the respite they needed to maintain their capabilities.

Despite providing such a valuable contribution to operations, the Auditor General of Canada noted in his 2016 report to Parliament that the Reserve was in a poor state. This led the Canadian government to emphasise the Reserve's importance within *SSE*. The 2017 defence policy also identified several core missions that the military must be able to simultaneously conduct. It is expected that the requirements imposed by these missions will necessitate changing how the CAF organizes, trains, generates, manages, and enables its personnel to increase its ability to meet these demands. Enlarging the CAF's capacity will also oblige the military to enhance the Reserve's ability to generate capabilities for operations.

The identification of the Reserve's importance within *SSE* and the requirement to increase the CAF's capacity led the Army to start addressing the Reserve's systemic issues. This has primarily occurred through the implementation of several key initiatives that should fundamentally alter the Reserve and its role in generating operational outputs. Although Chapter 2 identified that reservists generally want to serve in the military, the

significant differences that exist between the Reserve and the Regular Force necessitate developing and implementing initiatives that are designed to work with the Reserve's unique culture and requirements.

Several of the Army's allies have undertaken similar efforts to leverage their reserve forces to a greater degree. Although each of these armies approached the issue differently, their efforts demonstrated the connection that exists between a reserve force's effective strength and its operational capability. In addition to proving that reserve forces can assume force generation responsibilities and are well suited to producing personnel for disaster response, stability, and capacity building operations, the employment of reserve forces by the Australian Army, the British Army and the United States Marine Corps also highlight the importance of increasing the availability of individual reservists for operations through efforts like strengthening job protection legislation and creating organizations capable of quickly generating reservists.

Although these allies' reserve-enhancement initiatives were designed for their militaries and are not necessarily applicable to Canada, the Army can still learn from these efforts. This might involve amending aspects of these initiatives to fit the Army's unique requirements, or avoiding unsuccessful efforts. Modifying these initiatives to work within the Army will also necessitate understanding how they might negatively impact the Army's other processes and stakeholder groups. This will allow the Canadian versions of these initiatives to be amended in a manner that best ensures their success.

The Army ultimately must understand what it needs to generate for operations before it can enact changes to meet these requirements. A fundamental review of the Army and the Reserve that builds upon previous reviews will best facilitate the

achievement of this goal by increasing the Army's understanding of the changes that need to occur. This will assist the Army with determining how the Reserve and the rest of the Army's organization, training, and other processes should be amended to allow the Army to predictably and sustainably generate the capabilities required to accomplish *SSE's* core missions. Fortunately for the Army, studying its allies' reserve-related practices and initiatives will assist its efforts to increase its operational output by identifying ways to enhance the Reserve's ability to meaningfully contribute to this objective.

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ANNEX A – SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Chapter 3 – The Canadian Army Reserve’s Environment

- The Army should continue employing the Reserve as an operational reserve rather than as a strategic reserve.
- The Canadian military should seek to have the NDA’s definition of “emergency” expanded to include a broader range of issues, including natural and manmade disasters.
- Reserve units should be assigned explicit force generation responsibilities within the Managed Readiness Plan and the opportunity to complete their pre-deployment training over a longer period of time on a Class A basis.
- The Army should develop its remits to the Force Mix and Structure Design, The Journey, and the Strengthening the Army Reserve initiatives simultaneously.
- The Army should focus on sustainably increasing its operational output, rather than enhancing the Reserve’s output at the expense of the Army’s other capabilities or the Reserve’s ability to generate these outputs over the long term.

Chapter 4 – The Australian Army

- The Army should share the force generation responsibility for high demand trades between the Regular Force and the Reserve.
- The Army should consider creating a “Gap Year” program to incentivize Canadian youth to learn more about and increase their interest in the military.
- The Army should consider creating higher-readiness reserve forces similar to the Australian Army’s High Readiness Reserve and Reserve Response Force.
- The Army should seek to have any allowances provided to reservists for serving with forces like the High Readiness Reserve and Reserve Response Force be deemed as being tax free.
- The Army could develop a career management system to enable the Reserve to better manage the employment of its personnel.
- The Army should solicit Military Personnel Command’s (MPC’s) support in convincing the Treasury Board to reinstitute an incidental travel allowance to enable the Reserve to reimburse personnel who incur additional costs as a result of their being “posted” to other reserve units.
- The Army should create a civilian skills database to identify non-military education, training, and skills that may provide value to the Canadian military.
- The Army should work with MPC to expand the reservist job protections contained within the existing federal and provincial labour statutes to include training activities.
- The Canadian military should expand the Compensation for Employers of Reservists Program to include individual and collective training activities.
- The Army should assign force generation responsibilities to reserve formations based on the Army’s operational tempo and the reserve formations’ capacity.

Chapter 5 – The British Army

- The Reserve should force generate formed elements in a manner that provides its leaders with suitable development.
- The Army should assess the viability of individual reserve units and amalgamate units that are too small to effectively train and force generate personnel for operations.
- The Army should consider assigning mission tasks related to disaster response, stability operations, and capability development to reserve units.
- The Army should consider implementing “intelligent mobilization” as a means of generating more reservists for operations.
- The Army should establish either minimum parading requirements for the Reserve or provide incentives to increase attendance based on robust, but achievable, training targets.
- The Army should consider providing pay loss stipends to reservists who deploy.

Chapter 6 – The United States Marine Corps

- The Army should consider imposing obligatory service for reservists who volunteer to serve with specific reserve organizations that provide additional financial compensation or for additional education benefits. This obligatory service should include minimum parading requirements.
- The Army should allow reservists to use the educational stipend available to reservists to pay for their family members’ education.
- The Army should work with MPC to convince the federal and provincial governments to include provisions within their labour statutes that obligate employers to provide their reservist employees with the seniority, benefits, and promotions that they would have received had they not deployed.

Chapter 7 – Moving Forward

- The Army should conduct a fundamental review of the Reserve to determine what capabilities it expects the Reserve to force generate. This review should build upon the previous reviews conducted by the Army and the CAF. This will enable the Army to determine how the Reserve should be structured, equipped, trained, and supported.
- The requirement to force generate personnel using the one-to-seven ratio should be based on the Reserve’s trained effective strength.
- Efforts to increase the Reserve’s operational output should focus on increasing its trained effective strength and the willingness and ability of reservists to deploy.
- The force generation of reservists should follow the Army’s Managed Readiness Plan. The Reserve should be only expected to force generate 1/7 of its trained effective strength as a one-time surge or 1/21 of its trained effective strength on an ongoing basis.
- The divisions should be assigned primary force generation responsibility for smaller missions.

- The divisions should continue rotating the responsibility for force generating formed Reserve elements that deploy with regular force task forces on larger missions in accordance with the Army's Managed Readiness Plan.
- The Army should employ systems thinking, design thinking, and a change management system to enable its reserve enhancement initiatives to be adjusted to work with its other systems and to secure the support required to ensure the successful implementation of these efforts.
- The Army should accept lower outputs from its other components if its reserve enhancement initiatives create a net increase to the Army's overall operational output and are sustainable.
- The Army should avoid repeatedly adjusting its reserve initiatives. Rather, it should only make changes once the impacts of prior changes are understood.
- The Army should provide the chain of command with the authority to adjust reserve initiatives to fit local circumstances.
- The Army should empathetically assess how the various stakeholders that may be impacted by Reserve enhancement initiatives perceive themselves, other stakeholders, the initiatives, the Army, and the Reserve to ensure that these initiatives are adjusted to ensure their successful implementation.
- The Army must develop metrics to track whether its reserve enhancement initiatives are producing the desired results. Key metrics that should be tracked include the Reserve's total effective strength, the number and rank-level of deploying reservists, and the Regular Force's operational output.

ANNEX B – RESERVIST JOB PROTECTIONS AND LIMITATIONS WITHIN CANADIAN LABOUR ACTS²⁶⁸

| PROVINCE/ TERRITORY | NF | NS | PEI | NB | QC | ON | MB | SK | AB | BC | YK | NWT | NU | Federal |
|--|---|--|---|---|--|---|---|--|---|--|---|---|--|--|
| LEGISLATION | Labour Standards Act (Part VII.4) | Labour Standards Code (Section 60H(1)) | Employment Standards Act (Section 23.1) | Employment Standards Act (Section 44.03) | An Act Respecting Labour Standards (Section 81.17.1) | Employment Standards Act, 2000 (Section 50.2) | The Employment Standards Code (Section 59.5(2)) | Labour Standards Act (Section 80.1) | Employment Standards Code (Division 7.1) | The Employment Standards Act, R.S.B.C. 1996 (Section 52.2) | Employment Standards Act (Section 60.04) | Employment Standards Act (Section 32.1) | Labour Standards Act (Part V.2) | Canada Labour Code (DIVISION XV.2) |
| EMPLOYMENT PRE-CONDITION FOR ELIGIBILITY | 6 consecutive months | one year | six consecutive months | 1st request-7 consecutive months; 2nd request +, 12 mths between requests | 12 consecutive months for OUTCAN; 12 mths between requests if previous req was 12 wks + | six consecutive months or as prescribed by employer | seven consecutive months | NIL | 26 consecutive weeks of employment | NIL | 6 consecutive months of continuous employment | 6 consecutive months of continuous employment | 6 consecutive months of continuous employment | six consecutive months of continuous employment with an employer (PROPOSED - Reducing the qualifying time for job protection from 6 to 3 mths) |
| LEAVE TYPE | unpaid leave | unpaid leave active duty or training in the Reserves | unpaid leave active duty or training in the Reserves | unpaid leave of up to 18 months max | unpaid leave | unpaid leave | unpaid leave | "reasonable" unpaid leave | unpaid leave | unpaid leave | unpaid leave | unpaid leave | unpaid leave | unpaid leave (PROPOSED-Limiting protected leave to 24 months in a 60 month period incl workup and post deployment period of two six month operational tours in a five year period) |
| Deployed Op (OUTCAN) | deployment or training required for imminent deployment | "active duty"; Generic "period of service" | "active duty"; Generic "period of service" | incl pre-deployment or post-deployment activity 18 months max | incl pre-deployment or post-deployment activity 18 months max | incl pre-deployment or post-deployment activity | "active duty"; Generic "period of service" | "has volunteered for service" required to be absent from his or her employment | incl pre-deployment or post-deployment activity | deployed CAF OP outside Canada incl pre-deployment or post-deployment activity | incl preparation, training, rest or travel from or to the employee's residence that is designated by the MND; | incl pre-deployment or post-deployment activity | incl pre-deployment or post-deployment activity | Op as designated by the MND including preparation, training, rest or travel from or to the employee's residence |
| DOMOP | deployment or training required for imminent deployment | "active duty"; Generic "period of service" | "active duty"; Generic "period of service" | incl pre-deployment or post-deployment activity 18 months max | incl pre-deployment or post-deployment activity 18 months max | CAF OP emergency or with its aftermath AND/OR search and rescue operation | "active duty"; Generic "period of service" | "has volunteered for service" required to be absent from his or her employment | providing assistance in dealing with an emergency or with its aftermath incl pre-deployment or post-deployment operations or activities | providing assistance in dealing with an emergency or with its aftermath | incl preparation, training, rest or travel from or to the employee's residence that is designated by the MND; | incl pre-deployment or post-deployment activity | incl pre-deployment or post-deployment activity | Op as is designated by the MND including preparation, training, rest or travel from or to the employee's residence |
| Annual Training | NIL | Generic "period of service" including "training" | Generic "period of service" including "training" | continuous period of up to 30 days in a calendar year for annual training as per QR&O 9.04(2), including related travel time; | annual training for the period prescribed by regulation or, if no such period is prescribed, for a period of not more than 15 days | NIL | Generic "period of service" including "training" | "has volunteered for service" including "training" | annual training, including related travel time, for an amount of up to 20 days in a calendar year; | NIL | annual training for the prescribed period or, if no period is prescribed, for a period of up to 15 days | Generic "period of service" including "training" | Generic "period of service" including "training" | "annual training for the prescribed period or, if no period is prescribed, for a period of up to 15 days" PROPOSED - 'Military Skills Training' defined as core career and occupational requirements |

²⁶⁸ Produced by the Director General Army Reserve 3 (DG ARes 3) staff in November 2018, and provided by the DG ARes 3, Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm Day

ANNEX C – CANADIAN ARMY RESERVE STRENGTH BREAKDOWN STATISTICS²⁶⁹

| 2 Cdn Div | | Total Strength | Total Strength Vs Posns | Non Effective Strength | Non Eff Strength Vs Total | Effective Strength | Effective Strength vs Total | NDP1 | NDP1 Vs Total | Trained Effective Strength | Trained Eff Strength Vs Total | Total Established Posn |
|------------------|-------------|----------------|-------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|-------|---------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------|------------------------|
| 34 CBG | R de Hull | 136 | 96.5% | 1 | 0.7% | 135 | 99.3% | 44 | 32.4% | 91 | 66.9% | 141 |
| 35 CBG | Fus du St-L | 107 | 41.5% | 1 | 0.9% | 106 | 99.1% | 21 | 19.6% | 85 | 79.4% | 258 |
| 35 CBG | Fus de Sher | 246 | 84.5% | 3 | 1.2% | 243 | 98.8% | 64 | 26.0% | 179 | 72.8% | 291 |
| 35 CBG | 12 RBC (M) | 133 | 56.8% | 2 | 1.5% | 131 | 98.5% | 25 | 18.8% | 106 | 79.7% | 234 |
| 35 CBG | R de Chaud | 128 | 64.0% | 2 | 1.6% | 126 | 98.4% | 35 | 27.3% | 91 | 71.1% | 200 |
| 35 CBG | 62 Fd Regt | 153 | 76.5% | 3 | 2.0% | 150 | 98.0% | 28 | 18.3% | 122 | 79.7% | 200 |
| 35 CBG | 35 CER | 129 | 54.7% | 3 | 2.3% | 126 | 97.7% | 45 | 34.9% | 81 | 62.8% | 236 |
| 35 CBG | Sher H | 126 | 88.7% | 3 | 2.4% | 123 | 97.6% | 29 | 23.0% | 94 | 74.6% | 142 |
| DRU | 4 Int Coy | 100 | 89.3% | 3 | 3.0% | 97 | 97.0% | 45 | 45.0% | 52 | 52.0% | 112 |
| 34 CBG | 2 Fd Regt | 123 | 92.5% | 4 | 3.3% | 119 | 96.7% | 30 | 24.4% | 89 | 72.4% | 133 |
| 34 CBG | 34 Sig Regt | 150 | 100.0% | 5 | 3.3% | 145 | 96.7% | 62 | 41.3% | 83 | 55.3% | 150 |
| 34 CBG | 6 R22eR | 170 | 75.6% | 8 | 4.7% | 162 | 95.3% | 40 | 23.5% | 122 | 71.8% | 225 |
| 34 CBG | 34 CER | 178 | 75.4% | 9 | 5.1% | 169 | 94.9% | 72 | 40.4% | 97 | 54.5% | 236 |
| 35 CBG | 6 Fd Regt | 114 | 34.7% | 6 | 5.3% | 108 | 94.7% | 27 | 23.7% | 81 | 71.1% | 329 |
| 34 CBG | 34 Svc Bn | 308 | 98.4% | 17 | 5.5% | 291 | 94.5% | 128 | 41.6% | 163 | 52.9% | 313 |
| 34 CBG | R de Mais | 163 | 63.7% | 9 | 5.5% | 154 | 94.5% | 35 | 21.5% | 119 | 73.0% | 256 |
| 35 CBG | 35 Sig Regt | 165 | 75.3% | 10 | 6.1% | 155 | 93.9% | 47 | 28.5% | 108 | 65.5% | 219 |
| 34 CBG | 4 R22eR | 298 | 102.4% | 20 | 6.7% | 278 | 93.3% | 122 | 40.9% | 156 | 52.3% | 291 |
| 35 CBG | R du Sag | 161 | 85.2% | 12 | 7.5% | 149 | 92.5% | 51 | 31.7% | 98 | 60.9% | 189 |
| 34 CBG | RCH | 146 | 103.5% | 12 | 8.2% | 134 | 91.8% | 53 | 36.3% | 81 | 55.5% | 141 |
| 34 CBG | RHC | 204 | 93.2% | 19 | 9.3% | 185 | 90.7% | 54 | 26.5% | 131 | 64.2% | 219 |
| 34 CBG | Fus MR | 221 | 72.7% | 24 | 10.9% | 197 | 89.1% | 45 | 20.4% | 152 | 68.8% | 304 |
| 34 CBG | CGG | 165 | 56.9% | 19 | 11.5% | 146 | 88.5% | 40 | 24.2% | 106 | 64.2% | 290 |
| 35 CBG | Voltigeurs | 269 | 99.6% | 34 | 12.6% | 235 | 87.4% | 82 | 30.5% | 153 | 56.9% | 270 |
| 35 CBG | 35 Svc Bn | 185 | 58.9% | 26 | 14.1% | 159 | 85.9% | 46 | 24.9% | 113 | 61.1% | 314 |
| 34 CBG | RMR | 229 | 140.5% | 43 | 18.8% | 186 | 81.2% | 78 | 34.1% | 108 | 47.2% | 163 |
| Total: | | 4,507 | 77.0% | 298 | 6.6% | 4,209 | 93.4% | 1,348 | 29.9% | 2,861 | 63.5% | 5,856 |

²⁶⁹ Data taken from Guardian on 01 February 2019 and provided by the Canadian Army's G1 Personnel Generation, Lieutenant-Colonel Dan Clarke

3 Cdn Div

| | |
|--------|----------------------|
| 38 CBG | Sask D |
| 41 CBG | 20 Fd Regt |
| 41 CBG | 41 Sig Regt |
| 41 CBG | 78 Fd Bty 20 Fd Regt |
| 41 CBG | 41 CBG HQ |
| 38 CBG | 38 Sig Regt |
| 38 CBG | 26 Fd Regt |
| 39 CBG | 39 Svc Bn |
| DRU | 6 Int Coy |
| 38 CBG | 38 CBG HQ |
| 41 CBG | Seaforth of C |
| 38 CBG | 116 Ind Fd Bty |
| 41 CBG | SALH B Sqn |
| 39 CBG | 5 Fd Regt |
| 41 CBG | 20 Ind Fd Bty |
| 38 CBG | R Wpg Rif |
| 41 CBG | SALH |
| 41 CBG | KO Calg R |
| 39 CBG | BCD |
| 41 CBG | L Edmn Regt |
| 39 CBG | 38 CER |
| 38 CBG | 38 Svc Bn |
| 38 CBG | 10 Fd Regt |
| 39 CBG | 15 Fd Regt |
| 38 CBG | FGH |
| 41 CBG | RM Rang |
| 41 CBG | R Westmnr R |
| 41 CBG | 39 CBG HQ |
| 38 CBG | Cameron Highr |
| 39 CBG | 39 CER |
| 39 CBG | N Sask R |
| 41 CBG | 41 CER |
| 39 CBG | C Scot R |
| 39 CBG | 41 Svc Bn |
| 39 CBG | BCR |
| 39 CBG | 39 Sig Regt |

| Total Strength | Total Strength Vs Posns |
|----------------|-------------------------|
| 52 | 41.6% |
| 72 | 53.7% |
| 141 | 45.5% |
| 55 | 56.7% |
| 52 | 59.8% |
| 131 | 32.5% |
| 84 | 48.6% |
| 154 | 50.7% |
| 112 | 62.9% |
| 36 | 42.4% |
| 187 | 88.2% |
| 26 | 22.4% |
| 70 | 83.3% |
| 89 | 47.3% |
| 87 | 74.4% |
| 138 | 69.3% |
| 97 | 67.8% |
| 173 | 75.2% |
| 120 | 72.3% |
| 225 | 53.6% |
| 144 | 60.8% |
| 159 | 35.6% |
| 62 | 45.9% |
| 176 | 85.9% |
| 81 | 57.0% |
| 134 | 74.9% |
| 265 | 90.8% |
| 49 | 57.6% |
| 94 | 49.7% |
| 179 | 53.0% |
| 140 | 68.0% |
| 108 | 79.4% |
| 210 | 78.1% |
| 192 | 61.9% |
| 144 | 86.2% |
| 172 | 55.7% |

| Non Effective Strength | Non Eff Strength Vs Total |
|------------------------|---------------------------|
| 0 | 0.0% |
| 1 | 1.4% |
| 2 | 1.4% |
| 1 | 1.8% |
| 1 | 1.9% |
| 3 | 2.3% |
| 2 | 2.4% |
| 4 | 2.6% |
| 3 | 2.7% |
| 1 | 2.8% |
| 6 | 3.2% |
| 1 | 3.8% |
| 3 | 4.3% |
| 4 | 4.5% |
| 4 | 4.6% |
| 7 | 5.1% |
| 5 | 5.2% |
| 10 | 5.8% |
| 7 | 5.8% |
| 14 | 6.2% |
| 9 | 6.3% |
| 10 | 6.3% |
| 4 | 6.5% |
| 12 | 6.8% |
| 6 | 7.4% |
| 10 | 7.5% |
| 21 | 7.9% |
| 4 | 8.2% |
| 8 | 8.5% |
| 16 | 8.9% |
| 13 | 9.3% |
| 11 | 10.2% |
| 28 | 13.3% |
| 26 | 13.5% |
| 20 | 13.9% |
| 24 | 14.0% |

| Effective Strength | Effective Strength vs Total |
|--------------------|-----------------------------|
| 52 | 100.0% |
| 71 | 98.6% |
| 139 | 98.6% |
| 54 | 98.2% |
| 51 | 98.1% |
| 128 | 97.7% |
| 82 | 97.6% |
| 150 | 97.4% |
| 109 | 97.3% |
| 35 | 97.2% |
| 181 | 96.8% |
| 25 | 96.2% |
| 67 | 95.7% |
| 85 | 95.5% |
| 83 | 95.4% |
| 131 | 94.9% |
| 92 | 94.8% |
| 163 | 94.2% |
| 113 | 94.2% |
| 211 | 93.8% |
| 135 | 93.8% |
| 149 | 93.7% |
| 58 | 93.5% |
| 164 | 93.2% |
| 75 | 92.6% |
| 124 | 92.5% |
| 244 | 92.1% |
| 45 | 91.8% |
| 86 | 91.5% |
| 163 | 91.1% |
| 127 | 90.7% |
| 97 | 89.8% |
| 182 | 86.7% |
| 166 | 86.5% |
| 124 | 86.1% |
| 148 | 86.0% |

| NDP1 | NDP1 Vs Total |
|------|---------------|
| 17 | 32.7% |
| 27 | 37.5% |
| 39 | 27.7% |
| 24 | 43.6% |
| 1 | 1.9% |
| 41 | 31.3% |
| 34 | 40.5% |
| 46 | 29.9% |
| 41 | 36.6% |
| 1 | 2.8% |
| 55 | 29.4% |
| 7 | 26.9% |
| 31 | 44.3% |
| 26 | 29.2% |
| 34 | 39.1% |
| 54 | 39.1% |
| 42 | 43.3% |
| 84 | 48.6% |
| 36 | 30.0% |
| 71 | 31.6% |
| 68 | 47.2% |
| 64 | 40.3% |
| 20 | 32.3% |
| 42 | 23.9% |
| 17 | 21.0% |
| 58 | 43.3% |
| 100 | 37.7% |
| 2 | 4.1% |
| 30 | 31.9% |
| 42 | 23.5% |
| 53 | 37.9% |
| 27 | 25.0% |
| 68 | 32.4% |
| 95 | 49.5% |
| 26 | 18.1% |
| 56 | 32.6% |

| Trained Effective Strength | Trained Eff Strength Vs Total |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 35 | 67.3% |
| 44 | 61.1% |
| 100 | 70.9% |
| 30 | 54.5% |
| 50 | 96.2% |
| 87 | 66.4% |
| 48 | 57.1% |
| 104 | 67.5% |
| 68 | 60.7% |
| 34 | 94.4% |
| 126 | 67.4% |
| 18 | 69.2% |
| 36 | 51.4% |
| 59 | 66.3% |
| 49 | 56.3% |
| 77 | 55.8% |
| 50 | 51.5% |
| 79 | 45.7% |
| 77 | 64.2% |
| 140 | 62.2% |
| 67 | 46.5% |
| 85 | 53.5% |
| 38 | 61.3% |
| 122 | 69.3% |
| 58 | 71.6% |
| 66 | 49.3% |
| 144 | 54.3% |
| 43 | 87.8% |
| 56 | 59.6% |
| 121 | 67.6% |
| 74 | 52.9% |
| 70 | 64.8% |
| 114 | 54.3% |
| 71 | 37.0% |
| 98 | 68.1% |
| 92 | 53.5% |

| Total Established Posn |
|------------------------|
| 125 |
| 134 |
| 310 |
| 97 |
| 87 |
| 403 |
| 173 |
| 304 |
| 178 |
| 85 |
| 212 |
| 116 |
| 84 |
| 188 |
| 117 |
| 199 |
| 143 |
| 230 |
| 166 |
| 420 |
| 237 |
| 447 |
| 135 |
| 205 |
| 142 |
| 179 |
| 292 |
| 85 |
| 189 |
| 338 |
| 206 |
| 136 |
| 269 |
| 310 |
| 167 |
| 309 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|--------------------|-------|-------|-----|--------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 41 CBG | 41 CER Det Calgary | 73 | 72.3% | 11 | 15.1% | 62 | 84.9% | 28 | 38.4% | 34 | 46.6% | 101 |
| 38 CBG | R Regina Rifles | 85 | 51.8% | 13 | 15.3% | 72 | 84.7% | 34 | 40.0% | 38 | 44.7% | 164 |
| 41 CBG | Calg Highrs | 230 | 86.8% | 38 | 16.5% | 192 | 83.5% | 55 | 23.9% | 137 | 59.6% | 265 |
| 38 CBG | Lake Sup Scot R | 149 | 90.9% | 40 | 26.8% | 109 | 73.2% | 52 | 34.9% | 57 | 38.3% | 164 |
| 38 CBG | C Scot R Det Comox | 1 | 2.9% | 1 | 100.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 0 | 0.0% | 34 |
| Total: | | 4,948 | 60.7% | 404 | 8.2% | 4,544 | 91.8% | 1,648 | 33.3% | 2,896 | 58.5% | 8,145 |

4 Cdn Div

| | |
|--------|---------------------|
| 31 CBG | 31 CBG HQ |
| 31 CBG | Windsor Regt |
| 31 CBG | 11 FD Regt |
| 33 CBG | 2 Ir RC |
| 33 CBG | PWOR |
| DRU | Hast & PE Regt |
| 31 CBG | 31 CER |
| 32 CBG | 56 Fd Regt |
| 33 CBG | 2 Int Coy |
| 33 CBG | ONT Regt |
| 31 CBG | 1 H |
| 33 CBG | 49 Fd Regt |
| 33 CBG | GGHG |
| 33 CBG | 33 Sig Regt |
| 33 CBG | 33 CER |
| 31 CBG | E&K Scot |
| 33 CBG | CH of O |
| 32 CBG | Linc & Welld Regt |
| 32 CBG | 32 CER |
| 31 CBG | Grey And Simcoe For |
| 33 CBG | 30 Fd Regt |
| 32 CBG | 48 Highrs |
| 33 CBG | Brock Rif |
| 31 CBG | 31 Svc Bn |
| 31 CBG | A & SH OF C |
| 32 CBG | 32 Sig Regt |
| 31 CBG | RHF of C |
| 33 CBG | 33 Svc Bn |
| 31 CBG | 31 Sig Regt |
| 33 CBG | GGFG |
| 33 CBG | 42 Fd Regt |
| 32 CBG | 7 Tor Regt |
| 31 CBG | 4 RCR |
| 32 CBG | 32 Svc Bn |
| 33 CBG | ALQ Regt |
| 32 CBG | SD & G Highrs |

| Total Strength | Total Strength Vs Posns |
|----------------|-------------------------|
| 46 | 71.9% |
| 131 | 75.7% |
| 120 | 89.6% |
| 86 | 52.4% |
| 143 | 87.7% |
| 183 | 111.6% |
| 202 | 85.2% |
| 146 | 109.0% |
| 71 | 65.7% |
| 135 | 54.4% |
| 135 | 95.1% |
| 96 | 64.0% |
| 224 | 83.0% |
| 133 | 79.2% |
| 174 | 73.7% |
| 148 | 86.0% |
| 253 | 72.5% |
| 184 | 77.6% |
| 190 | 80.5% |
| 176 | 74.6% |
| 122 | 74.8% |
| 208 | 66.7% |
| 84 | 51.2% |
| 242 | 53.3% |
| 184 | 84.0% |
| 213 | 97.3% |
| 201 | 96.2% |
| 177 | 57.3% |
| 80 | 62.5% |
| 275 | 84.4% |
| 85 | 63.9% |
| 177 | 69.4% |
| 215 | 97.7% |
| 233 | 75.4% |
| 85 | 51.8% |
| 81 | 47.1% |

| Non Effective Strength | Non Eff Strength Vs Total |
|------------------------|---------------------------|
| 0 | 0.0% |
| 1 | 0.8% |
| 1 | 0.8% |
| 1 | 1.2% |
| 3 | 2.1% |
| 4 | 2.2% |
| 5 | 2.5% |
| 4 | 2.7% |
| 2 | 2.8% |
| 4 | 3.0% |
| 4 | 3.0% |
| 3 | 3.1% |
| 10 | 4.5% |
| 6 | 4.5% |
| 8 | 4.6% |
| 7 | 4.7% |
| 12 | 4.7% |
| 9 | 4.9% |
| 10 | 5.3% |
| 10 | 5.7% |
| 7 | 5.7% |
| 12 | 5.8% |
| 5 | 6.0% |
| 15 | 6.2% |
| 12 | 6.5% |
| 14 | 6.6% |
| 14 | 7.0% |
| 13 | 7.3% |
| 6 | 7.5% |
| 21 | 7.6% |
| 7 | 8.2% |
| 16 | 9.0% |
| 20 | 9.3% |
| 22 | 9.4% |
| 9 | 10.6% |
| 9 | 11.1% |

| Effective Strength | Effective Strength vs Total |
|--------------------|-----------------------------|
| 46 | 100.0% |
| 130 | 99.2% |
| 119 | 99.2% |
| 85 | 98.8% |
| 140 | 97.9% |
| 179 | 97.8% |
| 197 | 97.5% |
| 142 | 97.3% |
| 69 | 97.2% |
| 131 | 97.0% |
| 131 | 97.0% |
| 93 | 96.9% |
| 214 | 95.5% |
| 127 | 95.5% |
| 166 | 95.4% |
| 141 | 95.3% |
| 241 | 95.3% |
| 175 | 95.1% |
| 180 | 94.7% |
| 166 | 94.3% |
| 115 | 94.3% |
| 196 | 94.2% |
| 79 | 94.0% |
| 227 | 93.8% |
| 172 | 93.5% |
| 199 | 93.4% |
| 187 | 93.0% |
| 164 | 92.7% |
| 74 | 92.5% |
| 254 | 92.4% |
| 78 | 91.8% |
| 161 | 91.0% |
| 195 | 90.7% |
| 211 | 90.6% |
| 76 | 89.4% |
| 72 | 88.9% |

| NDP1 | NDP1 Vs Total |
|------|---------------|
| 1 | 2.2% |
| 36 | 27.5% |
| 35 | 29.2% |
| 37 | 43.0% |
| 56 | 39.2% |
| 61 | 33.3% |
| 93 | 46.0% |
| 72 | 49.3% |
| 13 | 18.3% |
| 29 | 21.5% |
| 66 | 48.9% |
| 35 | 36.5% |
| 62 | 27.7% |
| 38 | 28.6% |
| 67 | 38.5% |
| 42 | 28.4% |
| 59 | 23.3% |
| 62 | 33.7% |
| 61 | 32.1% |
| 61 | 34.7% |
| 24 | 19.7% |
| 55 | 26.4% |
| 25 | 29.8% |
| 94 | 38.8% |
| 36 | 19.6% |
| 69 | 32.4% |
| 59 | 29.4% |
| 65 | 36.7% |
| 25 | 31.3% |
| 93 | 33.8% |
| 18 | 21.2% |
| 32 | 18.1% |
| 94 | 43.7% |
| 86 | 36.9% |
| 27 | 31.8% |
| 26 | 32.1% |

| Trained Effective Strength | Trained Eff Strength Vs Total |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 45 | 97.8% |
| 94 | 71.8% |
| 84 | 70.0% |
| 48 | 55.8% |
| 84 | 58.7% |
| 118 | 64.5% |
| 104 | 51.5% |
| 70 | 47.9% |
| 56 | 78.9% |
| 102 | 75.6% |
| 65 | 48.1% |
| 58 | 60.4% |
| 152 | 67.9% |
| 89 | 66.9% |
| 99 | 56.9% |
| 99 | 66.9% |
| 182 | 71.9% |
| 113 | 61.4% |
| 119 | 62.6% |
| 105 | 59.7% |
| 91 | 74.6% |
| 141 | 67.8% |
| 54 | 64.3% |
| 133 | 55.0% |
| 136 | 73.9% |
| 130 | 61.0% |
| 128 | 63.7% |
| 99 | 55.9% |
| 49 | 61.3% |
| 161 | 58.5% |
| 60 | 70.6% |
| 129 | 72.9% |
| 101 | 47.0% |
| 125 | 53.6% |
| 49 | 57.6% |
| 46 | 56.8% |

| Total Established Posn |
|------------------------|
| 64 |
| 173 |
| 134 |
| 164 |
| 163 |
| 164 |
| 237 |
| 134 |
| 108 |
| 248 |
| 142 |
| 150 |
| 270 |
| 168 |
| 236 |
| 172 |
| 349 |
| 237 |
| 236 |
| 236 |
| 163 |
| 312 |
| 164 |
| 454 |
| 219 |
| 219 |
| 209 |
| 309 |
| 128 |
| 326 |
| 133 |
| 255 |
| 220 |
| 309 |
| 164 |
| 172 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|----------------------|-------|---------------|-----|--------------|-------|--------------|-------|--------------|-------|--------------|-------|
| 32 CBG | QOR of C | 282 | 107.6% | 32 | 11.3% | 250 | 88.7% | 63 | 22.3% | 187 | 66.3% | 262 |
| 32 CBG | Lorne Scots | 250 | 82.8% | 32 | 12.8% | 218 | 87.2% | 61 | 24.4% | 157 | 62.8% | 302 |
| 32 CBG | Tor Scot Regt | 217 | 88.6% | 28 | 12.9% | 189 | 87.1% | 56 | 25.8% | 133 | 61.3% | 245 |
| 32 CBG | R Regt C | 271 | 85.5% | 40 | 14.8% | 231 | 85.2% | 42 | 15.5% | 189 | 69.7% | 317 |
| 32 CBG | QY Rang | 215 | 86.0% | 37 | 17.2% | 178 | 82.8% | 53 | 24.7% | 125 | 58.1% | 250 |
| 31 CBG | RHLI | 254 | 79.6% | 44 | 17.3% | 210 | 82.7% | 56 | 22.0% | 154 | 60.6% | 319 |
| Total: | | 7,127 | 77.2% | 519 | 7.3% | 6,608 | 92.7% | 2,145 | 30.1% | 4,463 | 62.6% | 9,236 |

5 Cdn Div

| | |
|--------|--------------------------------|
| 36 CBG | 36 Svc Bn |
| DRU | 3 Int Coy |
| 36 CBG | 1 Fd Regt |
| 36 CBG | 36 Sig Regt |
| DRU | CCSB HQ |
| 36 CBG | 36 CER |
| 36 CBG | PLF |
| 36 CBG | PEI Regt |
| 36 CBG | CB Highrs |
| 36 CBG | West NS Regt |
| 36 CBG | 37 Sig Regt |
| 37 CBG | 37 Svc Bn |
| 36 CBG | Hal Rif |
| 36 CBG | NS Highrs |
| 36 CBG | 84 Ind Fd Bty |
| 37 CBG | 3 Fd Regt |
| 37 CBG | 8 CH |
| 36 CBG | NS(NB)R |
| 37 CBG | 1 R Nfld Regt |
| DRU | CA Int Regt Det Ottawa (7 Int) |
| DRU | 21 EW Regt |
| 37 CBG | 37 CER |
| 36 CBG | R NB Regt |
| 37 CBG | 2 R Nfld Regt |

Total:

| Total Strength | Total Strength Vs Posns |
|----------------|-------------------------|
| 161 | 51.9% |
| 59 | 56.7% |
| 65 | 48.5% |
| 112 | 36.0% |
| 27 | 77.1% |
| 130 | 54.9% |
| 126 | 53.6% |
| 114 | 68.3% |
| 106 | 50.0% |
| 123 | 75.0% |
| 101 | 46.1% |
| 207 | 66.8% |
| 103 | 53.1% |
| 208 | 67.1% |
| 47 | 40.2% |
| 117 | 45.2% |
| 171 | 56.8% |
| 172 | 105.5% |
| 151 | 64.3% |
| 103 | 92.8% |
| 144 | 62.6% |
| 217 | 91.6% |
| 226 | 68.5% |
| 131 | 79.9% |
| 3,121 | 61.3% |

| Non Effective Strength | Non Eff Strength Vs Total |
|------------------------|---------------------------|
| 2 | 1.2% |
| 1 | 1.7% |
| 2 | 3.1% |
| 4 | 3.6% |
| 1 | 3.7% |
| 6 | 4.6% |
| 6 | 4.8% |
| 6 | 5.3% |
| 6 | 5.7% |
| 7 | 5.7% |
| 7 | 6.9% |
| 16 | 7.7% |
| 8 | 7.8% |
| 17 | 8.2% |
| 4 | 8.5% |
| 10 | 8.5% |
| 18 | 10.5% |
| 19 | 11.0% |
| 21 | 13.9% |
| 15 | 14.6% |
| 22 | 15.3% |
| 34 | 15.7% |
| 36 | 15.9% |
| 23 | 17.6% |
| 291 | 9.3% |

| Effective Strength | Effective Strength vs Total |
|--------------------|-----------------------------|
| 159 | 98.8% |
| 58 | 98.3% |
| 63 | 96.9% |
| 108 | 96.4% |
| 26 | 96.3% |
| 124 | 95.4% |
| 120 | 95.2% |
| 108 | 94.7% |
| 100 | 94.3% |
| 116 | 94.3% |
| 94 | 93.1% |
| 191 | 92.3% |
| 95 | 92.2% |
| 191 | 91.8% |
| 43 | 91.5% |
| 107 | 91.5% |
| 153 | 89.5% |
| 153 | 89.0% |
| 130 | 86.1% |
| 88 | 85.4% |
| 122 | 84.7% |
| 183 | 84.3% |
| 190 | 84.1% |
| 108 | 82.4% |
| 2,830 | 90.7% |

| NDP1 | NDP1 Vs Total |
|-------|---------------|
| 60 | 37.3% |
| 26 | 44.1% |
| 20 | 30.8% |
| 24 | 21.4% |
| 0 | 0.0% |
| 58 | 44.6% |
| 54 | 42.9% |
| 48 | 42.1% |
| 31 | 29.2% |
| 39 | 31.7% |
| 30 | 29.7% |
| 83 | 40.1% |
| 36 | 35.0% |
| 60 | 28.8% |
| 9 | 19.1% |
| 25 | 21.4% |
| 63 | 36.8% |
| 72 | 41.9% |
| 44 | 29.1% |
| 30 | 29.1% |
| 61 | 42.4% |
| 84 | 38.7% |
| 46 | 20.4% |
| 39 | 29.8% |
| 1,042 | 33.4% |

| Trained Effective Strength | Trained Eff Strength Vs Total |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 99 | 61.5% |
| 32 | 54.2% |
| 43 | 66.2% |
| 84 | 75.0% |
| 26 | 96.3% |
| 66 | 50.8% |
| 66 | 52.4% |
| 60 | 52.6% |
| 69 | 65.1% |
| 77 | 62.6% |
| 64 | 63.4% |
| 108 | 52.2% |
| 59 | 57.3% |
| 131 | 63.0% |
| 34 | 72.3% |
| 82 | 70.1% |
| 90 | 52.6% |
| 81 | 47.1% |
| 86 | 57.0% |
| 58 | 56.3% |
| 61 | 42.4% |
| 99 | 45.6% |
| 144 | 63.7% |
| 69 | 52.7% |
| 1,788 | 57.3% |

| Total Established Posn |
|------------------------|
| 310 |
| 104 |
| 134 |
| 311 |
| 35 |
| 237 |
| 235 |
| 167 |
| 212 |
| 164 |
| 219 |
| 310 |
| 194 |
| 310 |
| 117 |
| 259 |
| 301 |
| 163 |
| 235 |
| 111 |
| 230 |
| 237 |
| 330 |
| 164 |
| 5,089 |

Army Totals:

| | |
|--------|-------|
| 19,703 | 69.6% |
|--------|-------|

| | |
|-------|------|
| 1,512 | 7.7% |
|-------|------|

| | |
|--------|-------|
| 18,191 | 92.3% |
|--------|-------|

| | |
|-------|-------|
| 6,183 | 31.4% |
|-------|-------|

| | |
|--------|-------|
| 12,008 | 60.9% |
|--------|-------|

| |
|--------|
| 28,326 |
|--------|

ANNEX D –RESERVE INTAKE AND RELEASE STATISTICS²⁷⁰

| Month | Intake | Release | Average Intake (by Fiscal Year) | Average Release (by Fiscal Year) |
|--------------|---------------|----------------|--|---|
| Apr-16 | 118 | 331 | 199 | 243 |
| May-16 | 152 | 231 | 199 | 243 |
| Jun-16 | 193 | 202 | 199 | 243 |
| Jul-16 | 159 | 182 | 199 | 243 |
| Aug-16 | 127 | 184 | 199 | 243 |
| Sep-16 | 322 | 160 | 199 | 243 |
| Oct-16 | 229 | 226 | 199 | 243 |
| Nov-16 | 203 | 259 | 199 | 243 |
| Dec-16 | 169 | 295 | 199 | 243 |
| Jan-17 | 172 | 225 | 199 | 243 |
| Feb-17 | 247 | 227 | 199 | 243 |
| Mar-17 | 294 | 388 | 199 | 243 |
| Apr-17 | 143 | 380 | 239 | 240 |
| May-17 | 207 | 248 | 239 | 240 |
| Jun-17 | 222 | 172 | 239 | 240 |
| Jul-17 | 129 | 197 | 239 | 240 |
| Aug-17 | 203 | 186 | 239 | 240 |
| Sep-17 | 274 | 201 | 239 | 240 |
| Oct-17 | 214 | 194 | 239 | 240 |
| Nov-17 | 283 | 218 | 239 | 240 |
| Dec-17 | 169 | 293 | 239 | 240 |
| Jan-18 | 259 | 201 | 239 | 240 |
| Feb-18 | 356 | 234 | 239 | 240 |
| Mar-18 | 405 | 352 | 239 | 240 |
| Apr-18 | 261 | 150 | 373 | 143 |
| May-18 | 396 | 196 | 373 | 143 |
| Jun-18 | 482 | 170 | 373 | 143 |
| Jul-18 | 368 | 165 | 373 | 143 |
| Aug-18 | 333 | 132 | 373 | 143 |
| Sep-18 | 431 | 122 | 373 | 143 |
| Oct-18 | 381 | 126 | 373 | 143 |
| Nov-18 | 465 | 116 | 373 | 143 |
| Dec-18 | 243 | 113 | 373 | 143 |

²⁷⁰ Data taken from Guardian on 01 February 2019 and provided by the Canadian Army's G1 Personnel Generation, Lieutenant-Colonel Dan Clarke