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EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT JOINT TASK FORCE CENTRAL ACTIVATION AND COMMAND AND CONTROL PROTOCOLS

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EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT JOINT TASK FORCE CENTRAL ACTIVATION AND COMMAND AND CONTROL PROTOCOLS

AIM

1. The aim of this service paper is to evaluate the current activation procedure for Joint Task Force Central (JTFC) and assess whether the present command and control (C2) structure is the best option for domestic operations (DOMOPs) within Ontario.

BACKGROUND

2. Regional JTF (RJTF) Concept. The Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) Standing Operation Order for Domestic Operations (SOODO) establishes six geographical areas across Canada, each one serviced by an RJTF.¹ With the exception of JTF North (JTFN), all of these RJTFs are only activated on order from CJOC, which typically occurs in the event of a domestic emergency. An RJTF is generally not the lead agency in a domestic operation. Instead, the RJTF is the CAF's response to a Request For Assistance (RFA) and will work alongside another federal, provincial or territorial department. The core of each RJTF is based on an already in-place force, with the existing commander and staff of that organization dually employed as the commander and staff of that particular RJTF. In accordance with (IAW) the CJOC SOODO, the purpose of the RJTFs is to maintain the ability to provide for the rapid, effective and scalable execution of DOMOPs in support of other governmental departments.²

¹3000-1 (J5) *Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations (SOODO)*, report (Ottawa: CJOC, 2014).

²*Ibid.*, 8.

3. JTFC Purpose. IAW the CJOC SOODO and Annex A, JTFC is the RJTF servicing the Ontario Area of Operations (AO). IAW the JTFC SOODO, the core of JTFC is 4 Canadian Division (4 Cdn Div), whose headquarters (HQ) is located in Toronto, ON. JTFC/4 Cdn Div will generate and employ forces capable of conducting full spectrum operations to meet Canada's defence objectives.³

4. JTFC Composition. IAW the CJOC SOODO, forces will be tailored to meet the needs of the DOMOP.⁴ In addition to the integral forces of 4 Cdn Div, JTFC, when activated, can also command a diverse multitude of forces from outside of the Canadian Army (CA). Essentially, JTFC may be apportioned a diverse multitude of CAF assets within Ontario, less most of the CAF entities located in the National Capital Region (NCR). The nature of the DOMOP will dictate the requisite forces.

5. Existing Contingency Plans (CONPLANs). 4 Cdn Div/JTFC must be prepared to force generate forces for the following CONPLANs:

- a. CONPLAN LENTUS. Support to Canadian civil authorities in the event of a disaster relief operation.⁵
- b. CONPLAN RUBICON. Support to Canadian civil authorities in the event of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) event.⁶

³3350-1-40 (G5 Ops 2) Joint Task Force Central - Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations (SOODO), report (Toronto: JTFC HQ, 2016), 6.

⁴3000-1 (J5) Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations (SOODO), report (Ottawa: CJOC, 2014).

⁵*Ibid.*, 13.

- c. CONPLAN MAJAID. Support to Canadian civil authorities in the event of a major air disaster.⁷

DISCUSSION

6. DOMOP Scheme of Maneuver. Speed of action is paramount when mounting a force for a DOMOP. IAW the JTFC SOODO, Comd JTFC intends to achieve a strategic effect as quickly as possible during a DOMOP, thereby requiring the rapid deployment of a scalable and appropriate force within the JTFC AO.⁸ In the event of a DOMOP in the JTFC AO, the following actions occur IAW the JTFC SOODO:⁹

- a. Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) receives an RFA from the Minister of Public Safety (MPS).
- b. The CDS submits a Tasking Order for CJOC.
- c. CJOC activates one of the existing CONPLANS.
- d. CJOC tasks JTFC to mount a force package to participate in the DOMOP.

⁶*Ibid.*, 13.

⁷*Ibid.*, 13.

⁸3350-1-40 (G5 Ops 2) *Joint Task Force Central - Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations (SOODO)*, report (Toronto: JTFC HQ, 2016).

⁹*Ibid.*


- e. JTFC HQ is activated. Essentially, the staff officers of 4 Cdn Div HQ are dually employed as 4 Cdn Div staff and JTFC staff. For example, the 4 Cdn Div G3 simultaneously assumes the role of JTFC J3.
- f. JTFC HQ will liaise with the Ontario Provincial Emergency Operations Centre (PEOC) and determine the optimal CAF force package to participate in the DOMOP.
- g. Comd CA (CCA) detaches 4 Cdn Div (or elements thereof) from CA (the force generator) and attaches it OPCOM to CJOC (the force employer) for the requisite period of the DOMOP.
- h. Comd 4 Cdn Div must detach forces from 4 Cdn Div and attach them operational control (OPCON) JTFC. But since Comd 4 Cdn Div and Comd JTFC are the same person, this amounts to detaching a force from oneself to oneself.
- i. Other force generators will detach forces already garrisoned in the JTFC AO, as required, and attach them OPCON to JTFC. Strategic Joint Staff (SJS) and/or CJOC will retain command of any Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) assets. The JTFC ACCE must coordinate usage of air assets with the CJOC JFACC.

- j. JTFC will deploy its Immediate Response Unit (IRU), which is a fully equipped battalion-sized force package perpetually on a 24-hour notice-to-move (NTM), to the DOMOP location.

 - k. As required, additional JTFC resources will be tasked to participate in the DOMOP. This could include a maritime task force (MTF) and/or an air task force (ATF). If the DOMOP is expected to last for more than 30 days, JTFC will relieve the IRU with one of its three primary reserve (PRes) Territorial Battalion Groups (TBGs). Additionally, while Special Operations Forces (SOF) may operate within the JTFC AO during a DOMOP, command of such elements will likely be retained by Comd Canadian Special Forces Command (CANSOFCOM). Finally, if required, additional CAF-wide resources may be assigned to JTFC to assist in the DOMOP.

 - l. Once the RFA has been terminated, units will redeploy to their home stations and command relationships will revert back to normal.
7. The Dual Identity of JTFC and 4 Cdn Div. Considerable staff effort is invested to activate JTFC—an organization whose sole purpose is to provide command and control during a DOMOP. The key question, however, is whether it is necessary to create a DOMOP-specific headquarters when, in fact, 4 Cdn Div HQ already exists and is largely composed of the same

people who would constitute the JTFC HQ. As outlined in CFJP 3.0, a JTF HQ is based on the following structure:¹⁰



8. 4 Cdn Div HQ is identical to the JTF HQ model above with the only exception being that it is a land staff vice joint staff. This point, however, is moot since an activation of JTF HQ would employ the same people acting in their mirrored joint roles. As such, there are two possible courses of action (COAs) with respect to command and control of CAF assets during a DOMOP in Ontario:

- a. COA 1 – Status Quo: Activate JTFC HQ and assign it operational command (OPCOM) to CJOC. This COA sees no change from the existing procedures. JTFC HQ is attached OPCOM to CJOC while formations and units (with the exception of RCAF assets) are attached OPCON to JTFC. The chief advantages to this COA are as follows:

- (1) Direction and guidance already exists.

¹⁰Canadian Forces Joint Publication 3.0: Operations, report (Ottawa: Canadian Forces Warfare Centre, 2010), 45.

- (2) There is a clear distinction between 4 Cdn Div HQ's force generation remits to the CA and its force employment responsibilities as JTFC HQ.
 - (3) Non-CA forces (RCN and RCAF in particular) tasked to support the DOMOP are not subordinated to a CA division but instead to a non-environmental joint entity.
- b. The disadvantages to this COA is that headquarters personnel are unnecessarily assuming two titles. Whether a 4 Cdn Div HQ staff officer is employed as the 4 Cdn Div G3 or the JTFC J3 he/she is still the same person with the same responsibilities.
- c. COA 2 –Leverage the Existing 4 Cdn Div HQ Structure. The majority of the forces constituting JTFC (when activated) are the land forces from the formations and direct report units (DRUs) of 4 Cdn Div. Furthermore, nearly all of the JTFC HQ staff are the same people serving the mirrored staff functions in 4 Cdn Div HQ. As such, this COA challenges the utility of JTFC as a separate organization. Instead, DOMOP assignments would be tasked directly to 4 Cdn Div. Required resources that are not integral to 4 Cdn Div would be assigned OPCON to 4 Cdn Div. The advantages to this COA are as follows:
- (1) There would no longer be a need for dual staff work. At present, documentation often needs to be generated for both JTFC and 4 Cdn Div.

- (2) There would no longer be any confusion regarding in which capacity a member of 4 Cdn Div HQ/JTFC HQ is operating.
- (3) 4 Cdn Div already has full command of its formations and DRUs. As such, there would no longer be a need to detach these formations and units only to re-attach them to the same commander (and with less command authority), just operating under a different title and capacity.

d. The disadvantages to this COA are as follows:

- (1) 4 Cdn Div becomes both a force employer and a force generator. JTFC is armed with different authorities and a different mandate than those of 4 Cdn Div. This would need to be reconciled.
- (2) At present, IAW the CJOC SOODO, in the event of a DOMOP JTFC is attached OPCOM to CJOC.¹¹ But since the JTFC Comd and HQ staff is dually employed, they can still respond to CA orders in their capacity as 4 Cdn Div Comd and HQ staff. If the JTFC entity is eliminated, then two possibilities exist, both of which containing serious drawbacks:

¹¹3000-1 (J5) *Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations (SOODO)*, report (Ottawa: CJOC, 2014).

- (a) 4 Cdn Div is attached OPCOM to CJOC for the duration of the DOMOP. This becomes problematic given that 4 Cdn Div no doubt has existing remits due to the CA. And the CA cannot realistically detach an entire division, especially if it is on the road-to-high-readiness and beholden to specific gateway training events.

 - (b) The CA, rather than CJOC, becomes the force employer during the DOMOP. In the event a DOMOP CONPLAN is activated, the CDS assigns the task to the CA. The CA then conducts an analysis, determines what existing CA priorities must be set aside, and then promptly assigns the DOMOP task to 4 Cdn Div. The chief concern here is that the CA is ill-resourced to function as a force employer. Additional person-years (PYs) would need to be transferred to the CA such that they could maintain a responsive current operations command and control cell. This would require serious restructuring of both CJOC and the CA, not to mention the other force generators.
- (3) Even if this COA worked well for Ontario, it would be difficult to implement in isolation. For this COA to be truly worthwhile, MARPAC would need to fully assume the AO of JTF Pacific (JTFP), 3 Cdn Div for JTF West (JTFW), and 2 Cdn Div for JTF Quebec (JTFQ). Given the unique and existing fulltime mandate of JTF North (JTFN), their

organizational structure could remain unchanged. Finally, given the unique organizational structure of MARLANT, 5 Cdn Div HQ and their combined double-hatted roles as JTF Atlantic (JTFA), it may make sense to preserve the status-quo in their combined AO.

9. The following additional factors should be taken into consideration when considering the COAs discussed above:

- a. Rapid Response Operations (RROs). In addition to force generating a CAF response to a CONPLAN activation, RJTFs are also mandated to prepare for and conduct RROs. IAW the CJOC SOODO, RROs are force employment capabilities that require an immediate CAF action to save lives, reduce human suffering or mitigate damage caused by man-made natural disasters.¹² Additionally, RJTF Comds have been delegated the authority to declare an RRO within their AO.¹³ Given the seriousness and time sensitivity of RROs, it is imperative that any obstacles that would otherwise hinder the CAF response in such a scenario be eliminated. Nugatory staff work in transferring command of forces (particularly the IRU) from 4 Cdn Div to JTFC constitutes such a hindrance.
- b. CONPLAN LEXICON. The national capital region (NCR) presents some unique difficulties with respect to DOMOPs:

¹²3000-1 (J5) Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations (SOODO), report (Ottawa: CJOC, 2014), 9.

¹³*Ibid.*

- (1) Although the NCR is a defined and self-contained region, it spans two RJTF AOs (JTFC and JTFQ).
 - (2) The NCR hosts a multitude of CAF HQs. Additionally, several law enforcement agencies including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Ottawa City Police have defined jurisdictions within the NCR. A robust RJTF HQ can foster relationships with these various law enforcement agencies and ensure effective interoperability.
- c. IAW the protocols described in paragraph 6 above, the 2014 shooting of Corporal Nathan Cirillo should have resulted in an RRO declared by Comd JTFC. A CAF response, if necessary, could have been mounted by JTFC and commanded and controlled by the JTFC HQ. Instead, multiple Ottawa-based HQs endeavoured to exercise a certain degree of command and control over the situation, thereby creating confusion. This uncertainty spawned the creation of CONPLAN LEXICON. This CONPLAN effectively activates the stand up of a new RJTF—JTF-NCR—in the event of a DOMOP in the NCR.¹⁴ The responsiveness of this CONPLAN is yet to be validated. But considering that JTFC has a fully resourced command centre in Toronto and that 4 Cdn Div commands CAF assets in Ottawa and Petawawa, a case could be made that 4 Cdn Div/JTFC is sufficiently resourced to mount, deploy and command a coordinated CAF response to a DOMOP in the NCR.

¹⁴3000-1 (J5 RDIMS# 399977) *CONPLAN LEXICON Endorsement*, report (Canadian Joint Operations Command, 2016).

- d. RCAF Assets. IAW the CJOC SOODO, the combined air operations centre (CAOC) is responsible to the CJOC JFACC for planning, tasking, executing and assessing the success of air operations.¹⁵ The CAOC coordinates with the RJTF ACCEs to manage the employment of RCAF assets during a DOMOP.¹⁶ This means that JTFC does not have direct control of any air assets during a DOMOP. This is understandable given the perpetual state of deployability and operational readiness within which the RCAF must work. However, this lack of command somewhat constrains JTFC in mounting a fulsome force package to execute a DOMOP. Given the paramount need for speed of response and given that JTFC has a fully functional ACCE, an OPCON command relationship of air assets during the prosecution of a DOMOP should be considered.

CONCLUSION

10. The ability to achieve a strategic effect as quickly as possible during a DOMOP is of paramount importance to Comd 4 Cdn Div/JTFC, Comd CJOC and the CDS. Therefore, it is essential that any barriers to a rapid CAF response be eliminated, thereby increasing CAF efficacy and its ability to save Canadian lives.

¹⁵3000-1 (J5) Standing Operations Order for Domestic Operations (SOODO), report (Ottawa: CJOC, 2014), 31.

¹⁶*Ibid.*

RECOMMENDATIONS

11. The following staff-level recommendations are offered:
 - a. Consider the amalgamation of 4 Cdn Div and JTFC such that only 4 Cdn Div exists. Roles and authorities inherent to JTFC become granted to 4 Cdn Div during a DOMOP scenario. Similar amalgamation could be feasible for JTFP, JTFW and JTFQ. It is acknowledged that such changes would have considerable impact on existing CA, RCN and CJOC structures and roles.
 - b. Consider a transfer of command of air assets to 4 Cdn Div/JTFC during a DOMOP. The current arrangement, which relies on coordination through liaison officers, is not optimized for DOMOP responsiveness.
 - c. Re-consider the utility of CONPLAN LEXICON. Instead, perhaps 4 Cdn Div/JTFC could conduct a war game to gauge their ability to mount, command and control a CAF response to a DOMOP in the NCR.

Annex: A. RJTF Areas of Operations.

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
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4 Can Div/JTFC Orientation Brief. January 11, 2018. Toronto.

RJTF Areas of Operation¹⁷



¹⁷4 Can Div/JTFC Orientation Brief, January 11, 2018, Toronto.