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CANADIAN ARMY RESERVE FORCE REALIGNMENT FRAMEWORK

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Service Paper

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**CANADIAN ARMY RESERVE FORCE
REALIGNMENT FRAMEWORK**

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CANADIAN ARMY RESERVE FORCE EMPLOYMENT REALIGNMENT FRAMEWORK

AIM

1. The aim of this service paper is to propose an employment realignment framework for the Canadian Army (CA) Reserve Force Employment Model. Although a full employment realignment framework will require a full and detailed examination, this paper will establish the preliminary scope for what should be considered to realign the CA Reserve Force with future employment requirements. By realigning the CA Reserve Force with the proper role and subsequent missions and tasks, the CA Reserves will better integrate into the requirements set forth by the Government of Canada including support to domestic and expeditionary operations, and aid to the civil power.

INTRODUCTION

2. Since the birth of Canada in 1865, Military Reserves have been integral to its defence. Even before the birth of Canada, regional militias have acted as a force in place from the 17th to 19 centuries.¹ Since 1865 the Reserve Force including the CA Reserves, has participated in numerous domestic and expeditionary operations including both World Wars, and peace-keeping and peace-making operations up to present day.² In 2018 CA Reserves continue to support training operations around the world as part of an integrated approach that currently “provide up

¹ James B. Whisker, *The Militia*, (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), 8.

² John A. Fraser, *In Service of the Nation: Canada's Citizen Soldiers for the 21st Century*, (Ottawa: National Defence Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change, 2000), 1-12.

to 20% of required land force personnel to expeditionary operations through individual and formed capability augmentation on sustained operations.”³

3. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), including both the Regular and the Reserve Forces, is mandated to protect the interests of Canada as part of the total force concept outlined in “The Canadian Armed Forces: The Roles of the Reserves” by Corinne McDonald.⁴ In the 1999 report, it states that the role of the Reserves is: to augment Regular Forces for mobilization; assist with national mobilization when called upon; and to act as a community link between the CAF and the public.⁵ As a key element of a CAF total force concept, the Canadian Army (CA) Reserves are required to contribute to the protection of Canada as most recently outlined in the Canadian Government’s 2017 National Defence Policy of *Strong Secure Engaged* (SSE).⁶ A policy document, SSE proposes to modernize the Reserve model with a focus to have “full-time capability through part-time service.” SSE aims to “deliver upon select deployed missions in a primary role” that include information operations, and “cyber operators and Light Urban Search and Rescue.”⁷ Further, SSE identifies the importance of a Reserve Force and the need to improve Reserve recruiting and employability. However, although a good policy document, it fails to identify how these goals may be achieved. Confusion in the role of the CA Reserves has created long-term problems for their recruiting, employment, and retention.

³ Department of National Defence, “Canada’s Reserve Force”, last accessed 26 January 2018, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs-report-plan-priorities/2017-canadas-reserve-force.page>.

⁴ Corinne McDonald, “The Canadian Armed Forces: The Role of the Reserves”, Publications List Library of Parliament, 29 November 1999, A. Role, <http://www.res.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublicationsArchive/bp1000/prb9911-e.asp#INTRODUCTIONtxt>.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Department of National Defence, *Strong Secure Engaged*, (Ottawa: Minister of National Defence, 2017), 67. <http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/docs/canada-defence-policy-report.pdf>.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 68.

DISCUSSION

4. The CA Reserves are a unique CAF capability. Outside of the Regular Force Support Staff who aid the Reserves the CA Reserves are not full-time employees of the Federal government and have primary employment that is not often tied to government employment but rather with the private sector. The complex mix of part-time military employment with private sector primary employment is a complicated balance. A simplified balance could have multiple positive impacts on the CA Reserves. These could include increased recruitment, faster and more relevant qualifications, increased throughput increasing force capability and capacity, and better retention due to greater job satisfaction and reasonable expectations.

5. Unlike other countries such as the US and the UK where there is significant investment in their militaries, over 3.5 and 2.1 percent GDP respectively in 2015 that trickled down to their Reserves, Canada was below 1 percent.⁸ Simply there is little to be shared to the CA Reserves from the CAF in the form of new federal financing. Therefore this Service Paper will focus on realigning the CA Reserve role and capabilities vice strategic financial reinvestment by the government to bring the CA Reserves equal to the Regular Force.

6. Following the report by the Canadian Auditor-General in 1992, regarding realignment of the CA Reserves, the government and the CAF have been attempting to reshape the Reserves into a relevant and coherent organization that can meet the demands of Canada.⁹ Throughout the

⁸ Ministry of Defence, *UK Defence in Numbers*, (UK: Ministry of Defence UK, 2016), 4.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/561135/UK_Defence_in_Numbers_2016-revised.pdf.

⁹ John A. Fraser, *In Service of the Nation: Canada's Citizen Soldiers for the 21st Century*, (Ottawa: National Defence Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change, 2000), 15.

1990s there was a concerted effort to realign the Reserves. In 2000, the final report was released proposing a way ahead but this was met with the reality of fiscal restraint and general government ambivalence to the purpose of the CA Reserves. This resulted in such issues as dwindling CA Reserve numbers, well below the mandated 18500 personnel and even below the critical lower limit of 14500.¹⁰ Compounding this was a shrinking operating budget in 2000 and 2001 that included a Reserve pay cut of approximately \$30 million.¹¹ The message of Reserve Restructure was again falling victim to changing governmental and CAF priorities. What was missing was finding a long-term role and relevance for the CA Reserves that would not lose relevance after a few short years or changes of government.

7. Through the years the CA Reserves have attempted to find a place in the CA but rather the CA should find the most effective manner in which to employ the CA Reserves. The friction created by the difference between CAF Regular Force requirements against CA Reserves capability creates unrealistic demands on CA Reserve force generation. Compounding the issue for the CA Reserves, beyond being able to force generate across 15 separate Military Occupation Structure Identification (MOSID), is retention. The 2017 Reserve Annual Military Occupation Review (RAMOR) shows that some CA Division Reserve NCMs are well below 50 percent Effective Strength (ES) of the Permissive Manning Levels (PML). Further, of the filled ES positions, annual release projections are between 7 and 12 percent. Unfortunately recruiting projections via the Strategic Intake Plan (SIP) are focusing on taking in approximately 13 to 15 percent.¹² This model generally assumes that all intakes will graduate and become Development

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 20.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 21.

¹² Department of National Defence, “Intake Summary NCMs” and “Releases NCM”, *Reserve Annual Military Occupational Review 2017*, last updated 21 January 2018.

Period (DP) 1 qualified which will barely offset annual attrition rates across all CA Reserve trades. Also review of prior trends in previous RAMORs, Reserve careers of citizen-soldiers span approximately 2 to 5 years who are mainly looking for employment while attending high school, college or university.

8. The problem with increasing the SIP across all CA Reserve trades means that the trend will likely continue with below 50 percent ES across all trades. Attempting to increase the SIP across all trades will likely produce the same results. Decreasing the number of trades and focusing on a specific capability vice all capabilities should be able to increase the functional capability in the CA Reserves in certain key areas in accordance with proper realignment of the CA Reserve role in the CAF.

9. Retaining regimental history but focusing on first principals of combat will increase CA Reserve employability in the CAF. Thus building a unique force generator similar to the US Marines that primarily trains everyone as a “riflemen” through the “School of Infantry”, and then expand into specialties.¹³ This plan could operate in a CA Reserve construct since all CA Regular Force Corps and Regiments are first trained to operate a weapon and then specialize second, the Reserves would be able to follow this same plan. A primary role for the CA Reserve should then be to function as DP 1 Infantry. Also, those identified as Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) would be first and foremost Infantry and employed as Infantry. CS and CSS would gain secondary qualifications such as Armoured, Artillery, Engineers, Transport, Logistics and RCME in a manner similar to how Infantry upgrade to crew served

¹³ US Marine Corps, “What’s After Boot™: School of Infantry”, last accessed 30 January 2018, <http://whatsafterboot.com/soi.asp>.

platoon support weapons and higher level infantry qualifications: when the time is available and need is required. This would be achieved through core DP training or Occupational Specialization Qualifications (OSQ).

10. Once a member is at a minimum DP1 Infantry qualified to the common standard as Regular Force Infantry, then that member is both employable and deployable. However the issue of job security for the member becomes a friction point when they are asked to be gone for extended periods of time from their primary employment with the private sector. The US National Guard (NG) currently has a process in place that ensures National employment protection for serving members vice provincial legislation for the CA Reserves. The protection for the members falls under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA).¹⁴ This protection provides NG members the opportunity to deploy without concern for their primary employment when they return home. This normally results in increased performance by the member when deployed due to confidence that when the member returns from deployment they will still have employment and financial security.¹⁵ Unlike the USERRA model, the CA Reserve's do not have a common federal level overarching job protection act but rather individual provincial legislation.¹⁶ The problem then for both Reserve members as well as civilian employers is understanding what each provincial jurisdiction has set into law since many vary in structure since it is acknowledged that "no two pieces of Job Protection Legislation across the country are alike. There are differences in the provisions, legal requirements and

¹⁴ Congress of the United States Congressional Budget Office, "The Effects if Reserve Call-Ups on Civilian Employers," (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005), 1.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Department of National Defence, "Job Protection for Reservists: What is it?", last accessed 27 January 2018, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/business-reservist-support/job-protection-legislation.page>.

penalties.”¹⁷ A simplified model that is delivered through federal jurisdiction brings the issue of the CA Reserves to the federal level thus creating a common policy for the Reserves that is the same as the Regular Force. To have the CA Reserves integrated into the CAF fully as a force multiplier, as a CA capability like Combat Arms, CS and CSS, the Federal Government needs to enact laws to define the job protection of its federal employees vice relegating the responsibility to the provinces. Reserve Force realignment requires the responsibility for the Reserves to be federally mandated and commanded at the national level but also able to be controlled during non-emergency times at the provincial level. In this way job protection across Canada remains, and the benefit to the CAF is a common employment picture for all of its personnel. A secondary benefit of bringing the CA Reserves under the CAF and Federal umbrella is the tracking of Reserve personnel including training levels, improved employment and deployment opportunities, and increased access to benefits.

11. This common look and feel of the CA Reserve along with improved access to better trained and job protected individuals can have a net positive impact on the force generating capabilities of the CAF. The Canadian military should relook at how to best employ CA Reservists to find the best solution to manning shortages that would benefit both the Regular and Reserve Forces. Focusing all CA Reserve locations and positions on the primacy of fighting and supporting operations in manner like Infantry will give long-term viability and sustainability for the Reserves.

12. To synchronize the DP1 infantry qualification and follow-on training, training windows will need to be created early in the member’s career and during recruits’ peak interest levels,

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

within the first 2 to 3 years. If training is conducted in a manner equal to Regular Force training it validates the level of training received and sets a common qualification baseline that the CAF can use to employ personnel.

13. A follow on effect of increasing the viability and function of the CA Reserves is the increased visibility of the CAF across Canada and possibly increase Regular Force Recruiting as a byproduct. Since the CA Reserves reach out into small pockets of the Canadian demographic and various diaspora, this can have an increased positive effect on recruiting minorities and women into the CAF.

CONCLUSION

14. This paper has focused on the traditional problems plaguing the recruiting and employment of CA Reservists. Many attempts at realigning the CA Reserves have occurred since 1992 but none have effectively addressed the underlying issue of the CA Reserve role in the CAF.¹⁸ The cycle of employment opportunities for the CA Reserves have followed the needs of provincial and federal government at a period in time, but not focusing on what the Reserves actually bring to force capability, which is an Infantry centric capability. In an attempt to best harness this capability the role of the CA Reserves needs to adjusted to meet that capability within the scope of what can be provided which is man power via the role of infantry. Basic infantry support to domestic operations occurs through the provision of manpower when requested through the aid-to-civil-power and facilitated by the CAF. Even under the construct of

¹⁸ John A. Fraser, *In Service of the Nation: Canada's Citizen Soldiers for the 21st Century*, (Ottawa: National Defence Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change, 2000), 15-21.

Territorial Brigades Groups, the CA Reserves will require to be controlled and supported by the Regular Force. This is required since resources to support the CA Reserves reside within the CAF Regular Force units, not within the CA Reserves.

15. The early integration and training by the CAF will give a common understanding of CA Reserve capabilities that can be provided by the CAF. Knowing that the CA Reserves have a strong role in the defence of Canada should have a net positive effect for the CAF ability to force generate when and where required.

RECOMMENDATION

16. The CA Reserves should to be rerolled as an Infantry centric DP1 force generation multiplier for the CAF. Training would need to be aligned with CAF Regular Force Standards to meet the needs of creating Infantry DP1 early in the career of all CA Reservists. Additional training opportunities would need to be afforded to Reserve personnel but not at the expense of the providing the core responsibility of DP1 infantry. CA Reserve units should remain as they currently exist to retain historical links, and unit pride and morale, but units must understand their new purpose, and prepare and train for their new primary Infantry role.

17. The Federal Government should create an overarching common law that protects the employment and job security of all CA Reservists in the same manner across Canada similar to that provided by the US to their NG via USERRA. This act would shape the CA Reserve similar to the NG, but keep Command with the Federal Government but allow control in non-

emergencies or call-ups to be exercised at the provincial level increasing responsiveness by the CA Reserves to the CAF.

18. Finally, renaming the CA Reserves to meet their new role as a capability of the CAF. A suggestion is the CA Defence Guard (CADG). Although similar to the acronym of USNG it would be uniquely Canadian however benefitting from a similarity to the positive aspects of the USNG. A new name and a new role for the CA Reserve Force could positively impact the employability, feasibility, and relevance of the CA Reserve as a capability for the CAF and the Canadian government.

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