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PROPER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT IS THE SOLUTION TO EFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF TARGETEERS, NOT CREATING A NEW OCCUPATION

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AIM

1. The aim of the service paper is to demonstrate that there is no need to create a new occupation and Military Occupation Structure Identification Code (MOSID) for the Targeteer. The CAF has all the necessary building blocks to continue to grow the targeting enterprise in accordance with the Chief of Defence Staff's intent. Instead of creating a new trade and a large administrative burden, managing personnel efficiently can solve the problem quickly and efficiently.

INTRODUCTION

2. Targeting is defined as the “process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking into account operational requirements and capabilities,”¹ to achieve the commander's intent. Targeting has played a key role in recent operations in Afghanistan, Libya, and Iraq. To continue to minimize collateral damage and achieve the Canadian Government's intent in future missions the Chief of Defence Staff directed that the targeting enterprise needed to grow. US Targeting doctrine states that “an individual who has

¹ Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-309/FP-001, *Targeting*, Ottawa: DND Canada 2014, 1-1.

completed formal targeting training in an established Service or joint school and participates in the joint targeting cycle in their current duties,”² is a Targeteer.

3. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has seen several challenges in developing the Targeting Enterprise. Person-Years (PY) are in high demand and every occupation in the CAF believes that it requires more. However, in this PY restricted environment, the CAF must continue to grow the Targeting enterprise. One proposed solution is to create a new MOSID for Targeteers. A significant portion of the documentation for targeting and the targeting enterprise is on higher level systems; therefore, this paper will examine the possibility of creating an MOSID for the Targeteer from an unclassified perspective.

4. The advantages to creating a Targeteer MOSID are the same arguments that were proposed in the past for separating Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), and Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) into separate trades. The principle reasons used for the justification for separating these occupations into individual MOSIDs are the advantages in selecting the right people, maintaining training standards and currency, and maximizing the use of experience gained.³ Selecting the right people was more of the problem facing the JTACs, since the failure rate on the course was around 40%.⁴ The targeting course does not have such a high failure rate, therefore, the current selection system is effective. Like the JTAC program, maintaining training

² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States: Joint targeting*, JP 3-60, Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013, GL-9.

³ J.O. Penney, “Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) Requirement as an Occupation or Sub-Occupation,” (Service Paper, Canadian Forces College, 2016), 6.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 6.

standards, particularly with regards to the maintenance of currencies would be easier if targeting was a separate MOSID. It would allow personnel to develop within the targeting domain, remain in it, specialize and pass down their knowledge in a teaching establishment. In the past it was demonstrated that “a JTAC mistake can have catastrophic repercussions,”⁵ and this is the same for Targeteers. A Targeteer not having enough experience can make a mistake and approve an ordinance delivery resulting in collateral damage, a consequence that can have implications at the political strategic level. Therefore, a specialized Targeteer occupation would mitigate this risk by maximizing the targeting experience that a Targeteer receives, aiding in preventing negative strategic effects.

5. However, in the end, neither EOD specialists nor JTACs were separated into different occupations. Similarly, Targeteers should not be split into a separate occupation. Separating them would create an additional administrative burden on the CAF. The CAF being a small organization compared to its allies do not have the manning or establishment to specialize in such a way. There are other more effective methods of managing targeting that do not include creating a separate MOSID. The JTAC program solved this through personnel management, and this is the same solution proposed for Targeteers.

⁵ J.O. Penney, “Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) Requirement as an Occupation...7.

DISCUSSION

Administrative Burden

6. Creating a new MOSID for a trade that is only approximately 200 PY's strong would be an administrative burden. Developing all of the training documentation from occupational qualification standards, training plans, career progression models, career management, and the developmental period level courses from level one to four will take teams a significant number of hours to complete.⁶ This needs to be done for officers and NCMs, and then with the administration complete, the problem of personnel shortages has still not been addressed. Once this paperwork is complete, the administration has only set the conditions for this new trade, training still needs to occur, and these new targeteers still need to gain experience. In the PY restricted environment, the challenge the organization faces are: manning this new trade, and creating new administrative positions to manage personnel. Manning is the easier problem to solve by simply taking the people in these declared Targeteer positions and changing their MOSIDs. However, this only temporarily transfers the problem onto those occupations losing positions, and in most cases, this means that another capability will be lost. In addition, once a member is trained as a Targeteer and reports for duty they will have no experience to bring to the team; whereas now at a minimum they bring the expertise from their trade, whether it be artillery, intelligence, or air and maritime operations.

7. In addition, if a MOSID is created, career managers, a chain of command, and more administrative positions will need to be created. Therefore, creating a new MOSID creates more

“tail” and less “teeth.” Instead, these administrative positions could be rolled into more Targeteers or targeting enablers where they would provide a greater operational effect.

8. Targeting does not require an additional MOSID due to the short duration of training. Targeting training can be broken down as follows: fifteen training days for the targeting course; and ten days for the Collateral Damage Estimation course (CDE).⁷ In comparison when an artillery officer is selected to take the targeting course they have already spent a significant amount of time in occupational training. An Artillery officer that has been selected to complete the targeting course has at a minimum completed: the Artillery DP1.1 course (55 training days), Artillery DP1.2 course (55 days), and either the Surveillance and Target Acquisition Officer (STA O) Course (40 days), or the Forward Observation Officer (FOO) Course (47 days).⁸ In addition, they may also have completed the Artillery Operations Course (34 Days), and the Instructor-in-Gunnery (IG) Course (186 training Days).⁹ Therefore if a Targeteer was a MOSID, that individual would start their job with a minimum of 25 days of training days completed. In comparison, an Artillery officer who completes targeting training would start with a minimum of 211-408 training days of experience; this is in addition to their experience in a regiment. By creating a Targeteer occupation, the CAF would be gaining in specialization but losing all the additional experience that the current trades bring to a targeting team.

⁷ Department of National Defence, *Training Plan: Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE)*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2017), 2-2/6.

⁸ Department of National Defence, A-P1-002-A10/PH-B01, *DP1 Artillery Troop Commander – MOD 1/Pres DP1 MOD 1 to 5*. Ottawa: DND Canada, 2015. 1-4/7; Department of National Defence, A-P1-002-STA/PG-B01, *Qualification Standard and Training Plan: Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA) Officer*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2017), 1-3/5; Department of National Defence, A-P1-002-FOO/PG-B01, *Qualification Standard and Training Plan: Forward Observation Officer*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2015), 1-3/5.

⁹ Department of National Defence, A-P1-002-STA/PG-B01, *Qualification Standard and Training Plan: DP2 Artillery Operations Officer*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2017), 1-3/5; Department of National Defence. A-P1-002-A10/PH-B01, *Training Plan: Artillery Officer Instructor-in-Gunnery*, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2005), 1-3/7.

Canada's Allies

9. Compared to its Five-eyes (FVEY) allies the CAF is a small military. The two organizations that are usually compared to the CAF are the United States Marine Corps (USMC) and the Australian Defence Forces (ADF). However, there is a slight discrepancy since the USMC is 195 000 strong, which is three times larger than the CAF.¹⁰ The ADF is closer to the CAF's size with a strength of 80 000, however with a military budget of \$34.6B it is double the CAF's budget.¹¹ Despite being larger than the CAF, even these organizations do not have Targeteer occupations. Out of the FVEY partners, only the USAF has Targeteers as a separate occupation, and it has a strength of 330 000 service members. Being six times larger than the CAF allows it to specialize its forces. The USAF employs its targeteers in the 480th Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Wing, an organization 6000 strong.¹² The USAF is also the only other FVEY partner that employs JTACs as a separate occupation.¹³ Again, its size allows it to create the framework surrounding such a specialized occupation. The CAF does not have the budget or manning to do the same.

10. The CAF posting cycle poses both a risk and an advantage to targeting. A person will change employment approximately every two years, which will broaden their horizons; however, this also means that there may not be consistency in targeting positions and with targeting

¹⁰ Wikipedia. "United States Armed Forces." Last modified 20 October 2017.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Armed_Forces.

¹¹ Wikipedia. "Australian Defence Force ." Last modified 31 January 2018.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australian_Defence_Force.

¹² 25th Airforce, "480th Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Wing," Last modified 09 February 2016, <http://www.25af.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/662961/480th-intelligence-surveillance-and-reconnaissance-wing/>

¹³ J.O. Penney, "Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) Requirement as an Occupation... 6.

enterprise. One solution is to use experienced civilians in addition to the military personnel to provide their special experience and act as the consistency during the multiple posting cycles. In addition, when ex-Targeteers eventually cycle around into other targeting positions, they now have a broader exposure to military and targeting operations, having seen more facets of operations and targeting.

Diverse Training

11. Being such a small force, the CAF needs to remain efficient in the use of its personnel. In many fields this means that soldiers and officers are trained in a variety of roles, allowing for the flexibility of moving personnel between tasks. This at times creates a training burden, but the benefit of flexibility in a small organization outweighs the costs.

12. At the tactical level, this cross training has had many benefits. It has meant that more personnel are trained in a variety of tasks and creates some redundancy in the organization. In garrison this is practical when a soldier needs to go away for training; however, during war it means that attrition does not immediately affect tactical operations. For example, in a gun detachment in the US Army, every person is trained in only their role on the gun, while only the detachment commander is trained on all the positions. In the Canadian artillery, every member of the detachment is trained on every position, meaning that if an enemy wants to take the detachment out of action they must kill every single member of the detachment. The diversity in

training adds flexibility, and this flexibility is exactly what an organization such as the CAF requires.

13. As previously mentioned, in the past the CAF has considered creating new trades for specialties such as JTACs, and EOD specialists. Due to the additional administrative burden, and additional training and management costs, the CAF decided not to branch these into separate MOSIDs. This has resulted in combat engineers in a variety of positions with EOD experience, that now share that experience in all the units they are subsequently posted to. Similarly, many other army combat arms trades have JTACs returning to their ranks, sharing their experiences and bettering the overall force. At times these experiences are capitalized when these members are rotated through tactical and operational headquarters, in targeting roles. A separate service paper could even argue that the lack of a JTAC occupation in the CAF has directly and positively contributed to the targeting enterprise, particularly in dynamic targeting. This diversification of knowledge and experience continues to strengthen the CAF.

Strength in Diversity

14. Canadian doctrine states that “targeting cuts across all functional and organizational boundaries. At all levels, it will be command-led, plans-directed, operations-driven and coordinated, but intelligence-enabled.”¹⁴ The strength of the targeting process is not just the targeteer assigned to run the process, but the team itself. Specifically, the diversity of experience

¹⁴ Department of National Defence, B-GJ-005-309/FP-001, *Targeting*, Ottawa: DND Canada 2014, 1-2.

that each member brings to the team, including the targeteers. For example, the dynamic targeting team for 1st Canadian Division includes: members of a Fire Support Coordination Centre (FSCC), an Airspace Coordination Centre (ASCC), a Surveillance and Target Acquisition Coordination Centre (STACC), and Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance Coordination Centre (ISTARCC), CDE Technician, G2-Operations representative, a legal advisor, a Maritime Component Command (MCC) element, an Air Component Command (ACC) element, senior duty officer, a Joint Space Support Team (JSST), and when available a Special Operational Forces (SOF) liaison officer.¹⁵ This team is led by an artillery major called the Director of Fires. Within this team, there are many Targeteers with artillery, intelligence, air operations, combat arms, maritime operations backgrounds. Each bring their experience and training backgrounds to the targeting process. This diversity of experience allows the team broad experiences to help them solve the time-sensitive problem that they are facing during the prosecution of a dynamic target.

15. In addition, the lack of targeting exposure within the CAF has been an issue. One assessment of operations states that: “OP IMPACT was less effective because targeting authorities were not commensurate with the competency of commanders, resulting in the situation of ‘ineffective command’ as described by the Pigeau and Ross balanced command envelope.”¹⁶ The lack of competency mentioned here refers to a lack of understanding of targeting and CDE. Making targeting a separate MOSID would only magnify this problem while rotating key occupations through targeting team will increase targeting understanding throughout

¹⁵ Department of National Defence. Orders: CONPLAN JUPITER. Annex B: Appendix 6. 2014, B6-8/29.

¹⁶ J.O. Penney, “Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) Requirement as an Occupation...2.

the CAF. This increased understanding of targeting is the key to achieving the CDS' intent for targeting, and it can only be achieved through effective personnel management.

CONCLUSION

16. With CAF being the comparatively small force that it is, a new Targeteer MOSID should not be created. Creating a new MOSID is the simple solution that when examining the details creates advantages that are over-shadowed by the drawbacks. A new occupation does not solve the lack of a PY problem, nor manning problems. Instead, it causes an administrative burden, a burden that only one branch of one of Canada's larger FVEY allies has taken on, the USAF. Other solutions such as using experienced contractors, and prioritizing targeting positions during the annual posting season would more effectively address the problem. Targeting is a very important capability that will shape operations and lead the CAF into more successful operations in the future.

RECOMMENDATION

17. The CAF can achieve its aims of growing the targeting capability through other means. Personnel management is the quicker and cheaper option to achieve the CDS' intent. The structure of the targeting enterprise has been created yet the most difficult challenge is in filling the positions that now exist.¹⁷ Prioritizing these targeting positions in the career manager system is the first step that needs to be taken. This will solve the initial problem of filling the empty

¹⁷ The Targeting enterprise structure in on higher means and cannot be directly referenced.

positions and increasing the number of personnel with targeting experience. As targeting experience continues to disperse itself through the CAF, Targeteers will become less of a niche capability as the mentality of targeting and the process used will be understood by continually more people. At the time when the targeting process becomes second nature to everyone involved in operations, then the CAF may decide to select talented individuals from multiple branches and services to remain in the targeting domain and evolve the process. But even at this point, a targeteer MOSID will not be required.

18. An additional step to ensure training is effective would be to create a Joint Targeting School (JTS). Currently the Canadian Forces Warfare Centre (CFWC) has the task of running the joint targeting courses in Canada. Therefore, in addition to their warfare related tasks, they have to deliver training. CFWC has managed to accomplish this through contractors. The current risk is that less targeting expertise is being developed within CAF personnel. Separating the distinctions between warfare centre, JTS, and standards, would focus the targeting enterprise and engrain it into the institution as its responsibilities would match the other training centres and schools throughout the CAF.¹⁸ This will anchor targeting into the CAF, without creating a personnel burden.

¹⁸ Standards oversight could also be given to the targeting school.

19. The Land Targeting School which is under command of the Canadian Army Command and Staff College (CACSC) also contributes significantly to the targeting enterprise.¹⁹ Moving this school under a JTS would increase its credibility and give the targeting courses more joint depth. Overall a centralized JTS resourced with staff would: add credibility to the targeting enterprise; ensure proper instructional supervision; and separate instruction from doctrine review and writing.

¹⁹ The CACSC also falls under command of the CADTC and therefore receives the proper training supervision.

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