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Requirement for a Dedicated targeting occupation

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Requirement for a Dedicated Targeting Occupation

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REQUIREMENT FOR A DEDICATED TARGETING OCCUPATION

AIM

1. As mandated by the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), the targeting process shall become the primary method used in the application of lethal and non-lethal force to ensure all Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) operations are effect-based. This paper argues that the creation of a dedicated Military Occupational Structure Identification (MOS ID) for targeting is not required and that resources currently in place is sufficient to achieve the objective stated in the CDS Directive.

INTRODUCTION

2. The CDS directives governing the planning and conduct of targeting operation, as defined in the CAF Joint Targeting Directive (TD), will fundamentally affect future CAF operations.¹ The TD will affect how a Task Force (TF) selects, validates, nominates, and prosecutes targets using both lethal and non-lethal means. Targeting is defined as “[t]he process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them taking account of operational requirements and capabilities”.² This process is command-led, Ops-driven, and heavily enabled by intelligence.

3. As a process, targeting is regulated by a set of rules that ensure the application of force is achieving the desired effect, while respecting all laws and regulations applicable. This process itself is not complex, but each step is critical and must be performed with the upmost

¹ Department of National Defence. *Canadian Armed Forces Joint targeting Directive, DRAFT*, January 2018.

² Department of National Defence. *CFJP 3.9 Targeting, 1st Edition* (Ottawa: DND Canada 2014), GL-7.

professionalism. Furthermore, the targeting process will be applied to CAF use of force in the future. This raises the question of the necessity to create a dedicated MOS ID for personnel responsible for the application of force through this process. This paper will argue that a dedicated MOS ID will negatively impact the technical expertise of CAF personnel involved in targeting and limit their employment opportunities and career progression.

DISCUSSION

4. The TD mandates the CAF to be capable of conducting targeting in the full spectrum of potential use of force.³ A full spectrum approach must include information operations and public affairs to ensure coherence with the wider context and alignment with national policies.⁴ This implies that Designated Supported Commanders (DSC) will need to rely on a very wide range of military expertise, depending on the specific effect they want to achieve. The technical expertise required for the development of a target and its prosecution with lethal or non-lethal means, including cyber and other offensive information operations, cannot be condensed into a single MOS ID. For example, an intelligence operator with an imagery analysis specialty plays a critical role in various stage of the targeting process. He is involved in the development of the target, the Collateral Damage Estimate (CDE), and also the Battle Damage Assessment (BDA). The expertise he is bringing to the targeting process has been acquired throughout his career, more than often conducting intelligence collection and analysis that is not necessarily related to targeting. The Imagery Analyst (IA) qualification requires a six months specialty course given to selected qualified intelligence operator. A targeting specialist, or ‘targeteer’, could technically

³ Joint Targeting Directive, 2.

⁴ Department of National Defence. *CFJP 3.9 Targeting, 1st Edition* (Ottawa: DND Canada 2014), 3-1.

obtain his IA qualification (AIMX), but he would be limited in the amount of experience he is bringing to the targeting enterprise.

5. The operator would likely suffer from the same deficiency in experience due to the wide range of possible munition and non-munition use of force. Operators, both specialists and generalists bring a great deal of expertise in their respective field, and on various weapon systems. The technical expertise for the application of force in the full spectrum is too vast to be reasonably combined in a single occupation. This would result in the inevitable fragmentation of the targeteer occupation into multiple sub-occupations to focus on unique skillsets and/or responsibilities. The complexity of sub-dividing the targeteer occupation is to determine along which line separating these specialities. To be truly representative of the various unique functions of targeting, this new occupation would need to be separated to reflect the four services. It would also need to be divided between those planning the mission based on the desired effect, those responsible for the identification of enemy's vulnerabilities and development of potential targets, and finally those who will be applying the force against the selected target. Among this last category, another division will likely be required to reflect the vast difference and required skillset between munition and non-munition application of force.

6. The creation of a specific targeting occupation would also limit the employment opportunities for its members. While it can be argued that other than administrative, staff, or command duty, there are limited employment opportunities for members of traditional combat arms outside of the application of force, the same cannot be said of other trades such as cyber operators or public affair officers. Both of these occupations will play an increasing role in

targeting in the future while continuing to be employed outside of targeting operations. Unlike traditional combat arms occupations, specialists of the Information operation (IO) domain have a crucial defensive role to play in which the targeting process may not apply. For example, only a fraction of Public Affair (PA) officers will eventually be involved in offensive information operations. A targeteer specialised in these types of operations would require the same extensive training to perform at the expected level without the possibility to be employed in other PA tasks.

7. However important role joint targeting will play in the planning and the conduct of future CAF operations, the size of a dedicated targeting occupation would likely be too small to ensure proper diversity of employment for its members. This would negatively impact career progression and possibility for advancement. Branches rely on the availability of multiple positions in multiples organizations to ensure its members are exposed to a variety of tasks and operating conditions. This provides the member with the breadth of experience required to advance in rank. Given CAF limited resources, the targeting enterprise is likely to be centralized into a unique targeting center nested within CAF main force employer. This would severely limit the employment opportunities for targeteers. The U.S. military is large enough to ensure targeting personnel are exposed to various units, formations, and commands throughout their career. The same cannot be said of the CAF and most of its allies.

8. The joint targeting process follows a six-step Joint Targeting Cycle (JTC) defined in CFJP 3.9.⁵ Each of these phase is critical to ensure that commander's intent is met; that proper targets are developed and validated; that thorough analysis is conducted to avoid Collateral

⁵ CFJP 3.9, 4-2.

Damage (CD) or negative impact to the mission; that all parties involved are held accountable for their contribution to the effort; and finally, that the use of force is actually achieving the desired effect. Achieving proficiency in the application of this process, at all level, can be done through specific training to complement the technical expertise of individual occupations.

Training military personnel in the targeting process will be a far more effective way to comply with the CDS directive while preserving the technical expertise and employment opportunities of each occupation involved in targeting. Ultimately, the targeting process is easier to learn than the technical expertise of individual occupation it may employ.

9. The targeting training deficiencies in the CAF became apparent in the fall of 2014 with the launch of Op IMPACT. At that time, Canada had no formal training leading to proper qualification in the joint targeting process and had to rely on courses provided by NATO, the U.S., and the U.K. While some personnel had the training – and few more some experience from a participation in Op MOBILE or other coalition operations – it became clear that relying on our allies to address training deficiencies was not sustainable. This deficiency has since been addressed and the CAF, through the Canadian Forces Warfare Center (CFWC), now has a complete training system on joint targeting covering all aspect on the process (ANNEX A). CFWC has the resources to train CAF personnel that require specific qualifications to perform their duty at all stages of the targeting cycle. While the designation of CFWC as the training authority for joint targeting has yet to be confirm, CFWC owns the Qualification Standards (QS) for all targeting courses offered in the CAF. Courses are delivered by the CFWC, with the exception of the Collateral Damage Estimate (CDE) course delivered by the Army Staff College in Kingston.

10. Training in the targeting process should not be limited to what the CFWC has to offer. All occupations susceptible to be involved in targeting have a role to play in increasing the exposure to the targeting process during their own occupation training. The Canadian Forces School of Military Intelligence (CFSMI) for example will significantly increase the targeting content of its basic intelligence courses for both officers and NCMs. While this training will not provide any formal qualification for targeting, it will ensure the process is widely known and accepted as the preferred method for the use of force in the CAF. The same goes for advance staff officer courses such as the Army Operation Course (AOC) and the Joint Command Staff Program (JCSP). Efforts to integrate the targeting process in the education of staff officers will facilitate the recognition that both deliberate and dynamic aspects of the joint targeting cycle “supports all of the planning horizons of the JOPP – future plans, future operations, and current operations – ensuring that the targeting process adaptively supports achievement of the commander’s objectives as opportunities arise and plans change”.⁶ Proper targeting training for future staff officers and commanders could ensure efficient integration of the targeting cycle into all stages of the planning process.

11. The large number of CAF personnel that contributed to Op IMPACT since 2014 in a role associated with the CAF targeting effort benefited from a unique opportunity to consolidate their training and to gain a valuable experience in the application of the targeting process. Deployment opportunities like this are essential to ensure experience and proficiency in all phases of the targeting process. It could be argued that there are some benefits to keep personnel assigned to

⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Publication 3-60 - Joint Targeting* (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007), II-2.

the targeting effort involved in this capacity throughout their career. The most important ones would be to ensure the professionalism of the targeting enterprise and deep understanding and application of the targeting process. However, the benefits of preserving this experience is outweighed by the limitations described above. There are ways to preserve operational experience in the targeting process, especially during periods where there are limited deployment opportunities. One of these would be to deploy personnel into established coalition. In the absence of large CAF operations such as ATHENA, MOBILE, IMPACT, or REASSURANCE, a contribution to coalition targeting efforts could minimize the loss of perishable skills and maintain a cadre of experience personnel in the application of the targeting process.

CONCLUSION

12. Ultimately, the application of the joint targeting process as mandated by the CDS targeting directive will not change the type of tasks already performed by the CAF. It will, however, fundamentally change how these tasks are being planned, approved, conducted, and assessed. The joint targeting process will also maximize the available resources by ensuring the application of lethal and non-lethal force is tailored to the desired effect. Finally, it while minimizing the risks of collateral damages. While the targeting process is comprehensive and covers all aspects of the targeting cycle, it is not complex and can be properly taught to selected personnel who completed their occupation training, or have reached their operational functional point (OFP).

13. Creating a dedicated occupation for targeting would preserve the operational experience in the various stages of the process, but it would negatively impact the technical expertise that

each occupation is providing to the targeting effort. It will also reduce the employment opportunities for targeteers and limit their career progression. Finally, a targeteer occupation would likely be fragmented to a point where sub-occupation would have little in common with their Branch counterparts. Maintaining the course with the current occupation structure and ensuring the availability of quality training in the joint targeting process is, at this moment, the best way to comply with the CDS directive while ensuring other CAF responsibilities are met.

RECOMMENDATION

14. It is recommended that the CAF maintains the current occupation structure and rely on complementary training to familiarize personnel to the joint targeting process. This will ensure proficiency in the application of the targeting process while maintaining a high level of technical expertise and skills that can be used for targeting or any other tasks. To guaranty availability of training for all personnel susceptible of being involved in targeting, the CAF must ensure that the CFWC is properly funded, manned, and resourced to develop, maintain, and deliver a complete system of targeting training that addresses all CAF targeting requirements. To ensure maximum use of the targeting cycle by staff officers, the CAF should ensure development of doctrine and procedures to facilitate the inclusion of the joint targeting process into the Operational Planning Process (OPP).

15. To ensure availability of qualified personnel, all services should seek to maintain an appropriate number of personnel properly trained in the targeting process. Additionally, all branches directly and indirectly involved with targeting should make necessary amendment to

introduce targeting in their occupation training to ensure common understanding of the joint targeting process.

16. Given that the CAF operational tempo may vary, efforts should be made maintain a cadre of personnel with operational experience in the various phases of the targeting process. In the absence of larger CAF missions, opportunities to deploy targeting personnel into established coalition should be maximized to preserve perishable skills.

Annex: A. CFWC Joint Targeting: Education and Training Concept

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Joint Targeting : Education and Training Concept



Joint Targeting Familiarisation Seminar (JTFS) (1-day)

EXEC TEA (0.5-day)

Joint Targeting Senior Leader Seminar (Col & Above 2 day - TBC)

Joint Targeting Staff Officer Course (JTSO) (10 day) ID: 120941

Joint Targeting and Intelligence Course (JTIC) (5 day) ID: 121123 – to new JTSO

Canadian Army : Land Targeting Course (LTC) (10 day) ID: 118119

Hybrid Target Development Course (HTD) (5-day) ID: 120942 – to new JTSO and JATD

Targeting Planning & Analysis Course

Joint Applied Target Development (JATD) ID: 121122

Targeting Assessment Course

Target Imagery Analysis/Target Graphics production (TIA) ID: 120943 – To AIMX

Target Engagement Authority/Course (TEA) ID: 120937

Basic CDE Course ID: 119990

Advanced CDE Course ID: 120849

Advanced CDE Course ID: 120849

PPM-TMP Course and OJT

Weapon Engineering Application Course

Education level knowledge/skills

Course leading to a Qual/job requirement

Course in development / formalisation (17/18)

Course to be developed (18/19)

Course no longer running – grouped in another