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TO TARGET OR NOT TO TARGET, THAT IS NOT THE QUESTION!

Maj D.G. Bourque

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AIM

1. This paper will address whether or not targeteers in CAF should have their own MOS ID, what are the benefits and impediments/disadvantages to this solution. This paper will also outline what our “Five Eyes” (FVEY) allies are doing with targeteers.

INTRODUCTION

2. The evolution of targeting in the last three decades has been dramatic and as a result of changing warfare to asymmetrical threats and non-state actors, the aspects of targeting such as Collateral Damage Estimate (CDE), which is a process used to estimate the number of casualties if the target were to be executed with certain type of munition. This CDE process has taken an ever evolving and growing role within modern operations. “The expectation of efficient combat results with no collateral damage or fratricide steadily increased with the development of precision munitions”¹ and with the increase of the use of precision munitions comes increased requirement of targeteers.

3. Also from the origins of targeting, the main focus was destruction of targets, but now “the ultimate goal of targeting is about changing behaviour and that is accomplished by kinetic

¹ Paul Rozumski, *Air Force Intelligence Officer Targeteers: A Discussion on Specialization*, Fort Leavenworth, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2011, 2.

and non-kinetic means,”² this major change in targeting has not only complicated the process but has made it much more difficult to plan and prosecute targets. Currently the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) targeteers are being heavily deployed for OPERATION IMPACT in the Middle East to support multinational joint targeting. This skill set is in high demand and is also something that comes with much skill fade. Like all technical aspect of the military once a certain skills are no longer used skill fade sets in and the member would require refresher training to get their abilities back to an acceptable standard. The use of precision guidance’s munitions has increased exponentially in the past decades, this is due to the fact that the CAF is often involved in conflicts with non-state actors which often use the local population to blend in and as human shields. This type of scenario has continued to prevail and our forces will likely be forced to operate in this type of environments.

4. This only solidifies the need for better training, more expertise and experience in targeting at all levels. Thus far in the development of Canada’s targeting capability the Royal Canadian Artillery (RCA) Corps has taken ownership over the targeting tradesman ship in order to provide operational output for the CAF.

DISCUSSION

5. Targeting, in general, spans all the way from the tactical level to the strategic level. It is for this reason that there are several levels of courses given to targeteers to ensure to cover the complete span of levels of operations. As seen in the introduction, targeting is a very technical

²Ibid., 66.

craft and experience gained from the tactical level helps targeteers progress through targeting processes all the way to strategic level targeting. The CAF had paid little attention to targeting in the past, only sending specifically selected individuals to attend other nations targeting courses, this changed in 2014 when a course ran by the British Army was conducted in Gagetown to qualify future instructors on a Canadian Joint Tactical Targeting course. Since then the Canadian Forces Warfare Center has conducted a pilot serial of the Joint Tactical Targeting course and several serials in the following two years, which were all conducted in Kingston. This however has been the extent of the targeting course in the CAF and currently there is no operational level or strategic level targeting courses, thus when individuals are required to fill these types of targeting roles they are sent on courses given by NATO allies.

6. Since most of the CAF targeteers go through allied courses for training it is important to consider how the FVYE community approaches targeting. Out of all the FVYE community, the only one that has a specific trade for targeting falls within the United States Air Force (USAF), this enlisted trade is the only one within the FVYE nations to employ a trade for targeting. The USAF also considered creating a Intelligence officer targeting trade, however the result of the research project found that “evidence indicates there is no benefit to the Air Force in creating specialist targeting officers.”³ The major point of the analysis was that senior leadership expected critical thinking and analytical thinking to create the holistic foundation for young officers. “To become a holistic thinker an officer must first gain experience in multiple professional competencies with tailored education and training to hone expertise,”⁴ thus the senior leadership

³ *Ibid.*, 83.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 83.

of the USAF would rather an officer that has had multiple experience over a stove piped targeteer. The only USAF unit to hold a targeting trade is within the 480th Intelligence Wing, which has a total of 6000 personnel and whose main mission is Air Force targeting.⁵ The only other case within FVYE community having specific targeting sub-trade is a specific targeting rank within the US Army, the rank of Warrant Officer 131-A. This position however is only given within the field artillery trade. All of the other FVYE communities use a balance of targeting background from Air Force, Intelligence and Field Artillery to provide there nations with a joint operational targeting framework.

BENEFITS

7. There are however benefits to having a trade of qualified targeteers, the fact that it is a very technical craft with high skill fade, currency for CDE being every three years, having individuals staying within a targeting role would greatly advantage keeping a technical edge and would reduce currency issues. Another advantage would be the management of targheteers and operational positions that are required to be filled. The current model sometimes takes finding an Artillery officer available, sending them on the required courses and then deploying them as targeteers within a coalition targeting team. The use of a targeting trade would mitigate this sort of random selection for positions and would ensure the members have sufficient experience in a certain jobs and avoid just in time training.

⁵ Ibid., 30.

8. In addition, the fact that there is a fairly new type of threat emerging, cyber, the possible non-kinetic targeting using cyber should not be left off the table.⁶ The CAF does not know exactly how to approach cyber warfare, however there will definitively be a targeting role to play during future conflicts. Especially since the Russians use hybrid warfare, as they are currently doing in Latvia against the Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) Battle Group.

IMPEDIMENTS AND DISADVANTAGES

9. The greatest impediment of organization change is the organization itself. According to Richard Scotts model of organizational analysis, in order to ensure change within an organization, you must have one of the following criteria: either the institution is facing legitimacy issues from an exterior source or from an internal source.⁷ At this point neither of these criteria are being met for targeting. The Scott model also discusses three pillars within the institution: normative (values, norms), cognitive (same thing as last time/ how our allies do the same thing), and regulatory (rules/treaties). If the three pillars are aligned it makes the greatest chance for institution change to be successful. In the case of targeting, the three pillars from Scotts model are not aligned. Cognitively the CAF and our allies have never seen targeting as its own trade, this coupled with the fact that on a normative layer this would strike at the hart of the Royal Canadian Artillery Corps who have been the champions of the targeting enterprise in recent years. On a normative layer the Intelligence branch would consider targeting as something they also hold dear to there hearts and would assume targeting falls under the Intelligence

⁶ Marco Roscini, *Cyber Operations and the Use of Force in International Law*, United Kingdom, Oxford, 2014, 1.

⁷ Richard Scott, *Institutions and Organizations: Ides, Interests and Identities*, London, SAGE, 2014, 55-74.

branch. This already causes tension between the RCA and Intelligence branch. Even if the regulative pillar were to be aligned with having targeting as its own trade, knowing that the other two pillars would not be aligned would not set the CAF up for success in creating a trade for targeteers. The fact that the change is not coming from legitimacy issues also compounds the fact that the pillars are not aligned to accommodate the change, thus making the CAF its own enemy to implementing this change.

10. One of the greatest strengths of a joint targeting cell, when considering all levels of targeting, is the fact that having multiple backgrounds within the targeting cell better enables jointness. Having individuals from multiple background ensures that the cell as a whole better understands the culture of each environment, thus better enabling the team to act within a joint headquarters. According to a US assessment of Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, “the Army intelligence are the experts in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB); their expertise, experience and analytical capabilities are critical to any effective joint targeting effort against enemy ground forces.”⁸ In the case of the US forces, they were missing a crucial element in their joint targeting process, a significant void was observed when targeting enemy ground forces. This void was then filled with the help of US Army Europe Battle Coordination Element which played a vital role in proper joint targeting during the Air campaign in Kosovo. This example solidifies the fact that in order to have a truly joint targeting process you need inputs from all environments to have comprehensive approach to targeting.

⁸ Robert S. Bridgford and Luke G. Grossman, “BCD Targeting for Operation Allied Force”, Field Artillery, no. 1, January, 2000, 14.

11. Throughout the past decade the CAF have looked at several different specialties within the forces and whether they should have their own MOS ID. Two examples are Counter Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and Joint Tactical Air Controller (JTAC). After in depth analysis from all those who have a stake in each of these specialties, the result was the recommendation not to create a separate MOS ID. With the conclusion that it was not recommended to create separate MOS ID's for these specialties, it was specifically stated that the specialization of the JTAC must be better managed and an Air Land Integration Center (ALIC) was stood up in Kingston under Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Center (CADTC). Within ALIC there are Army and Air forces Officers and Non-Commissioned members (NCM) that are qualified JTAC to manage qualifications to ensure proper training of all JTAC in the CAF. ALIC also ensures proper development and execution of all JTAC courses within the CAF, they attend all working groups and JTAC writing boards. They are also in charge of the JTAC training budget, the acceptance for aircraft and the cost that is associated with the training of JTAC's. The JTAC have even further specialized from within, creating JTAC instructors (I) and evaluators (E). These two specialties have different training requirements and are able to watch over the training of new JTAC's. With ALIC and JTAC E's within the brigades and JTAC I's within the Artillery school, they manage a critical operational requirement. A similar model should be considered when looking at targeting within the CAF.

CONCLUSION

12. CAF must continue to foster the growth of the targeting enterprise and continually grow its experienced tactical targeteers that they can move on to the operational level and then to

strategic targeting within their environments. The true strength of joint forces is the experience that each individual brings to the table in order to critically think about a specific problem. As was seen by the USAF in Operation Allied Force in Kosovo the strength of a joint targeting process was the need to have both Army and Air Force targeteers in order to produce the best and most relevant targeting output.

13. Of our FVYE allies, the only one to have a specific MOS ID for targeting was the USAF, which falls within very specific parameters and are all under 480 Intelligence Wing. The CAF just does not have the numbers to do anything similar within Canada. Other than the USAF, the US army has a targeteer sub-trade for a specific rank, which would not be feasible for the CAF. All the rest of our FVYE allies do not have separate trades for targeteers. Thus cognitively for the CAF learning from our allies would show that the CAF should not create a separate MOS ID for targeteers.

14. Although there are some advantages in creating a MOS ID for targeteers, they are outweighed by the disadvantages and cognitively knowing that the CAF has already looked at two separate cases of specialities that thought about create separate MOS ID's and came to the conclusion that they should not, sends a very strong message that targeting is not different.

15. It is clear when considering Scotts model for institutional change that the Cognitive pillar does not align with making the decision to create a separate MOS ID for targeteers. Learning

from our allies shows us that it is not feasible and also from within the CAF the fact that the CAF has already had a hard look at two specialities and decided not to create separate trades of them, shows the CAF the cognitive dissonance surrounding the subject.

RECOMMENDATION

16. It is not recommended that the CAF create a specific MOS ID for targeteers, however the targeting enterprise should follow a similar model to what JTAC's have created in order to provide the CAF the best targeting expertise possible.

17. The CAF should put its current focus in getting the right individuals, no matter what trade, qualified with the right experience in order to grow the CAF targeting knowledge. The CAF should also continue to look at the possibility of creating an operational level targeting course. This would allow the CAF to continue to grow its targeting expertise and create a pool of individuals who can then transition into strategic targeting roles. This would also improve the CAF reach back from theaters of operations and provide political link to theater targeting cells.

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