National Defence
Défense nationale

Canadian Forces College

Collège des Forces Canadiennes

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN THE 21st CENTURY: THE NEED FOR MUTUAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Maj Joshua Yanduwa

JCSP 44

Exercise *Solo Flight*

PCEMI 44

Exercice *Solo Flight*

Canada

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN THE 21st CENTURY: THE NEED FOR MUTUAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Maj Joshua Yanduwa

PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN THE 21st CENTURY:
THE NEED FOR MUTUAL COOPERATION BETWEEN
THE UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

INTRODUCTION

In the early period of Peace Support Operations (PSO), peacekeepers tasks were mainly tied to monitoring cease-fires, exchange of prisoners, disarmament and demobilization of military forces. Peacekeeping and peace building operations were based on the consent of the parties involved in the conflict, the signing of ceased-fire agreement and the conduct of operations in an impartial manner.[1] After the end of the Cold War, however, these tasks increased and diversified to include protection of civilians, monitoring human rights, protection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Security Sector Reform (SSR) as well as capacity building. PSO further shifted from inter-state to intra-state with peacekeepers having to deal with bands of militias and armed civilians with ill-defined chains of command, thereby, increasing the risk of conducting Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).[2] The immediate consequence of these multidimensional PKO was the need to include police, civilians and increase the logistics requirements. These created additional burdens on the Security Council (SC).

As the principal organ charged with the maintenance of international peace and security by the UN Charter, the SC was faced with the enormous challenges of post-Cold War PSOs. The continuing presence of violent conflicts and resulting humanitarian tragedies in large parts of the world, combined with the insufficient UN capabilities to tackle them, warranted a new

---

[1] UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines. Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training DPKO. Available at: *www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone_eng.pdf*

[2] Walter Dorn, "Air Power in UN Operations: Wings for peace, UN first Air Force," Military Strategy and Operational Art, 2014. 1.

look at the idea of regionalizing PSO as stipulated in Chapter VIII of the UN charter.[3] The 1992 UN Secretary General Agenda for peace reaffirmed regional actions as a matter of decentralisation, delegations and cooperation with UN efforts in order to ease the burden on the council.[4] These statements 'triggered' the need for mutually cooperation with regional organizations.

The important roles regional organizations could play in PSO have some limitations and challenges that need to be overcome. These include the issue of partiality, the lack of standardisation and training, financial limitations, the different interpretation of the mandate and perception over the use of enforcement action. From the various missions conducted by regional organizations in the past, it was obvious that most of them do not possess the capabilities to conduct PSO without support from external actors. Walter Dorn, a specialist in PSO, in his article "Regional organization is not the way" mentioned self-interest, lack of authority, power perception and capacity as the limitations of regional peacekeeping.[5] He argued against the practicability of employing regional or sub-regional organizations to conduct PSO. This further reaffirms that regional organizations also requires the assistance of the UN to effectively carryout their mandate.

In view of this, the paper argues that because neither globalism nor regionalism of PSO are efficient to resolve the enormous challenges associated with them in the future, mutual cooperation between both the UN and regional organizations are required to achieve synergies. These organizations are good at different things and their strength and weaknesses can

---

[3] United Nations, Charter of the UN Chapter VIII, 1945.
[4] Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 1992, Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace Making and Peacekeeping, A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992, 64.
[5] Dorn Walter, "Regional peacekeeping is not the way, Peacekeeping and International Relations, Vol. 27, No.2.

complement each other. In an era of severe resource constraints and multiple security problems, the applicability of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter in the post-Cold War order suggest not just partnership but also a functional division of labour.[6] This idea should be seen as complimentary rather than a supplementary as it would enable the international community to quickly address conflicts in a more comprehensive manner by building on the strength and compensating for the weaknesses of both organisations. To prove this argument, this paper will first examine the limitations of the UN in various PSOs it has conducted and analyze with the strength that regional organizations have. Next the limitations and failures of regional organisations will be analysed against the strength and capabilities the UN possesses. Finally, the discussion of the right combination of regional organizations and existing UN capabilities to ensure synergy will be presented.

THE LIMITATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The SC relied on member states to contribute forces for PKO when the situation demands. However, the SC has on several occasions failed to speedily mobilize and deploy forces to conflict areas that required urgent attention. The Rwanda genocide was one of the cases were the UN failed to mobilise forces and urgently respond to crisis. The Force Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire initially assessed that 8000 troops would be required to facilitate and implement the Arusha Accord. However, the Council authorised only 2548 peacekeepers. Four months later only half of the authorised number of peacekeepers was deployed, despite the tensed situation

---

[6] Michael Barnett, Partners in Peace? The UN, Regional Organisations, and Peacekeeping, review of international studies, Princeton University press 1995. 426.

and atrocities going on in Rwanda at that time.[7] At the peak of the crisis on 17 May 1994, the SC through Resolution 918 authorised a force of 5500 troops to augment the mission. These troops were not made available until early July. By then many civilians were killed and lots of atrocities had been committed by the armed militias.[8] The UN Deputy Force Commander in Rwanda, Brigadier General Henry Anyidoho also noted that:

> The major handicap for the UN in achieving its assigned role is a lack of timely and positive response from member states when a distress signal goes out. In crisis, time is the essence. Often in the UN, help arrives too late owing to too much hesitation on the part of member states. It is like the fire truck arriving after the market place has been consumed by fire.[9]

The inability of UNAMIR to prevent or halt the conflict was largely due to lack of troops to enforce its mandate. This situation could have been averted if there was a framework for mutual cooperation between the UN and regional organizations. This failure prompted the UN to initiate various means for cooperation with regional organization.

In the past, various initiatives have been tried to enhance the UN's rapid deployment capabilities and yet they could not be sustained. One of such initiatives was the UN Stand-by Arrangement System (UNSAS) established by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Another initiative was the Multinational Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) spearheaded by Denmark, Canada and the Netherlands. It was deployed to the Horn of Africa in November 2000 to form the core of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) but was terminated in 2009. The Government of Canada also carried out studies in

---

[7] Alex J. Bellamy, and Paul Williams, Understanding *Peacekeeping* (Cambridge: Polity, 2010),
[8] Ibid,205.
[9] Henry Kwani Anyidoho, Brig Gen, The Role of the United Nations(address before the institute for defence policy and the South African Institute of International Affairs, 14 July 1995) 4.

September, 1995 entitled, "Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the UN," and recommended 21 ways to close the UN capability gaps in the short to midterm. It received much attention owing to its comprehensive approach.[10] The then UN Military Adviser (MILAD), Major-General Frank Kappen, referred to it as the "red wire that links other initiatives." [11] However, these initiatives encountered great oppositions from senior UN officials and did not live to achieve the desired result. The 2015 surprise announcement by China to provide an 8,000 troops reaction force consisting of military and police is the most recent example. [12] Yet, until now no concrete follow-up plans or actions have provided any indication that this plan could soon turn into reality. Mutual cooperation with regional organizations would be easier to implement and sustain.

The situation was however, different for the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) a non-UN mission led by Australia to restore normalcy in the country after the independence ballot to separate East Timor from Indonesia turned into chaos. As the ballots loomed and threats of militia violence mounted, the SC and other key actors tried to get the consent of the Indonesian government for an international intervention. However, president Habibie of Indonesia insisted that his troops would ensure a peaceful election.[13] After much pressure from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and other countries, Habibie finally gave his consent. The mission deployed in East Timor five days after the Security Council mandated its action, and 17 days after the post-ballot razing of East Timor began.[14] The speedy deployment was possible because the Australian government anticipated the likelihood of crisis in East

---

[10] Adam Roberts, "Proposals for UN Standing Forces: A Critical History,"(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 115.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Alex J. Bellamy, and Paul Williams, Understanding *Peacekeeping* (Cambridge: Polity, 2010),
[14] Taylor Francis, INTERFET: An account of intervention with consent in East Timor, Journal of International peacekeeping Vol 17, 2010.

Timor due to its proximity and prepared for any eventuality before consent was given by the Indonesian government. This further confirms the fact that regional organizations due to their proximity can mobilize troops and intervene in crisis situations faster than the UN. However, the achievement was also as a result of the diplomatic support INTERFET received both from the UN and other international bodies. Hence, mutual cooperation would enhance rapid mobilization and deployment of troops.

The force structure and combat capabilities employed by the UN in PSOs are most of the times insufficient to tackle the challenges and threats of modern conflicts. Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs) are deployed with limited capabilities based on the requirements stipulated in the UN Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) Manual.[15] These requirements had in most cases failed to take cognisance of the level of threats posed by armed militias. More so, the UN mandates sometimes changes while the troops are deployed without any concerted effort to upgrade the capabilities of the peacekeepers. Increasing responsibilities without additional capabilities has led to failure by UN troops to enforce their mandate of protecting civilians in the face of massacres like the one in the Congo.[16]

In certain situations, the host nation disregards the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to limits the caliber and amount of weapons TCCs are to bring into their country. I had my personal experience in Darfur as the logistics officer of Nigerian Battalion (NIBATT 45) at the Nyala International Airport (NIA). The Sudanese Custom officers and Intelligence Agency seized all our support weapons and kept them in a sea container at the airport. They claimed that

---

[15] UNGA 'Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions (COE Manual)' (2016 edn, 20 January 2016) UN Doc A/C.5/69/18.

[16] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1856 (December 22, 2008) UN Doc. S/RES/1856, available at: *www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2008.shtml*

we would not need support weapons because there was no war in their country. All diplomatic measures to retrieve those weapons proved unsuccessful and that affected the posture of our patrols and the amount of risks we were willing to take. The equipment seized was only released to us on our way out of the country at the end of the mission. This was not the case when the mission was under the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2007. During AMIS the Sudanese military cooperated with us as most patrols and raids were conducted jointly. Peacekeepers were not subjected to any form of intimidation and the movement of our armoured fighting vehicles were not restricted. We were allowed to employ all our weapons on the insurgents in the defence of our mandate and we had full command of the situation.

Another limitation is that the level of command authority on the military commanders in UN missions does not correspond with their responsibilities. The force commanders only have operational control over the troops assigned to them. This level of authority limits the extent to which they can employ the peacekeepers towards the achievement of the mandate. As such, most TCCs resort to taking orders from their home countries rather than following the UN hierarchy of command. India, a country completely committed to peacekeeping, has in many occasions refused to enforce their mandate to protect civilians because they regards UN hierarchy lower than their own country command. Richard Gowan, a research director at the Center of International Cooperation in the UN said Indian forces in Sierra Leone and the DRC were taking orders from the defence ministry in New Delhi, not the UN commanders in the mission.[17] The force commanders often become frustrated in such situations with little or no ability to intervene in a crisis when the situation demands it. Furthermore, the authority to intervene does not solely rest with the military commanders on ground but also the Head of Mission (HOM) or the Special

---

[17] Richard Gowan and Ian Johnstone, *New Challenges for Peacekeeping: Protection, Peacebuilding and the "War on Terror,"* Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series (New York, N.Y.: International Peace Academy, March 2007).

Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), which is always a civilian.[18] The force commander may wish to take the initiative in a crisis situation and implement certain actions, but such decisions could be overridden by the SRSG. This limited authority does not give the force commanders the leverage to exercise full authority and bear the consequences of their actions.

Also, In May 2000, the Indian force commander in Sierra Leone, Major-General Vijay Jetley ignored orders from UN officials when he was asked to defend a town against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels. As a result, the then Secretary General, Kofi Annan attempted to remove him from his post. In response, the Indian government threatened to withdraw all of its forces from UN peacekeeping operations. [19] In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon met the same threat when he attempted to dismiss an Indian contingent commander after he allowed the M23 rebels to take control of the city of Goma in 2012.[20] The UN forces were bystanders to the mass killings, rape and terror in Goma. This particular incident dented the image and credibility of the UN in the DRC.

Such instances are less likely in regional peacekeeping because the force structure and organization does not give room for such incidents. The force commander in regional intervention missions has operational command over troops attached to him unlike in UN missions. Troops are robust and equipped without any limitations by either the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) or Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). In most cases, the Rules of Engagement (ROE) are also not limited to self-defence or defence of the mandate, they allow for freedom of actions to conduct targeted attacks against militia groups. Troop's orientation and training is focused on the reality of the threat on ground and their mindsets are conditioned for

---

[18] Cedric de Coning, The role of SRSG in UN integrated mission, NUPI policy brief 2010. 1.
[19] ibid
[20] Nick long, "UN Defends Performance in Eastern DRC," Voice of America, November 22, 2012.

combat. An example is the operations of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Sierra Leone and Liberia, where armoured tanks, gunships and fighter jets were employed to target rebel groups. The rebel groups were neutralized and the actions of ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) troops created a more conducive environment for the peacekeeping process. They facilitated thirteen peace agreements, oversaw the disarmament of 24,000 combatants, created a safe environment for transparent elections, distributed ballot boxes and other election materials and provided security for the July 1997 presidential and national elections.[21] This great achievement was recently commended by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), Farid Zarif during the closing ceremony of the mission in Liberia.[22] He also recommend more active role by regional organisation in peacekeeping operations.

With this level of effectiveness and robust posture of regional troops, mutual cooperation with the UN would enhance the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions even in highly risky environments. The actions of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the DRC attest to the fact that robust capabilities are required to enforce the UN mandate in a highly risky environment. The FIB was initiated by the International Conference of the Great Lake Region (ICGLR), with the support of the AU, as part of the proposed regional neutral intervention force.[23] This initiative was hijacked by the UN and placed the FIB under the command of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO). The brigade has a total strength of 3069 troops; consisting of three infantry battalions, one artillery

---

[21] US Department of State and U.S. Department of Defence, Regional Peacekeeping: ECOWAS and the Liberian Peace Process, (Washington, 1998) 4-14.

[22] UN News, Liberia: UN mission farewell ceremony honors last departing police and military personnel, 6 February 2018.

[23] Stearns, Jason. "The Framework Agreement: A good start? Accessed 14 February 18, Available at: congosiasa.blogspot.com/2013/02/the-un-framework-agreementa-serious.html

company, and one Special Force and a reconnaissance company.[24] With these capabilities, the FIB troops were able to defeat the M23 rebels and restore normalcy in the city of Goma. There are more benefits from mutual cooperation between the UN and regional organization than each organization operating in isolation.

Another limitation is that UN troops are less likely to understand the demographic situation and to be in tune with the conflict. Understanding the cultural, religious, and social life of the host populace in a peacekeeping operation is important for the success of the mission. When interacting with local populations, it is important that local concerns and traditions are respected by the international community. During the United Nations Transition Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), the UN deployed after the Timorese had been disenfranchised and dominated by the Indonesians. In an attempt to establish a judicial system, the transition administration showed little regard for the indigenous understanding of justice and reconciliation.[25] Instead, it applied a Western-style legal system which fundamentally ran contrary to important elements in the indigenous system. The local population immediately developed the perception that the mission did not respect their norms, traditions or past collective experience. UNTAET was condemned by the locals for not adequately consulting with them about important decisions and regulations.[26] And some of these criticisms led to the premature transfer of authority from the UN to the indigenous populations.

On the contrary, members of regional organizations are likely to be more attuned with the situation at hand since most of them share the same cultural or religious background and often

---

[24] United Nations "MONUSCO Mandate," accessed February 14 2018 available online at: *https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/mandate.*
[25] Tanja Hohe, "Justice without judiciary in East Timor," Conflict, Security and Development, Vol.3,2003, 346.
[26] Alex J. Bellamy, and Paul Williams, Understanding *Peacekeeping* (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 274.

speak the same language. In some cases, personal relationships have developed among the leaders, which undoubtedly result in better understanding of the situation and may result in fruitful dialogue based on personal trust.[27] In his 1995 report, the then Secretary General was even more specific that:

> The founders of the UN, in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter envisage an important role for regional organisations in the maintenance of international peace and security. It is increasingly apparent that the UN cannot address every potential and actual conflict troubling the world. Regional or sub regional organisations sometimes have a comparative advantage in taking the lead role in the prevention and settlement of conflicts and to assist the UN in containing them due to proximity to the conflict area.[28]

The UN Charter in paragraph two and three of article 52 stipulates that regional organisations should be the first and preferred fora for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and should be referred to the SC if the attempt proves unsuccessful.[29]

Regional organizations are more likely to suffer the consequences of instability in their region due to proximity. These countries would have to bear the cost of providing for refugees, spend more on defence and bear the cost of economic recession when foreign corporations decides that the area is too risky for investment. These would encourage them to participate with a better prospect of success in finding solution to regional problems.

The Boko Haram terrorist for instance utilises the porous borders between Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon to smuggle weapons and contrabands to sustain their operations. Most of

---

[27] Powell Kristiana, "African Union's emerging peace and security regime: opportunities and challenges for delivering on the responsibility to protect, ISS Monograph Series, No. 119, 20.

[28] UN Document A/50/711 and S/1995/911, Improving preparedness for conflict prevention and peacekeeping in Africa: Report of the Secretary General, 1 November 1995, 4.

[29] United Nations, Charter of the UN Chapter VIII, 1945.

their attacks were basically conducted around the borders of these countries. Whenever the terrorist were confronted by the security forces of a particular nation in combat, they crossed the border to the next country for safety. As a result of that, the region formed a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) composed of troops from all the countries in the area. The troops were mandated and given the freedom to engage the terrorist group within the borders of those four countries. This mutual cooperation served as the turning point that made the counter terrorist operations in the region a success and brought the relative peace the region is enjoining today. Such mutual cooperation was easily achieved because all four countries suffered from one form of terrorist attack or another and viewed the problem as a collective one. Despite the risks and casualties suffered by these countries during the course of the operations, they never relented in their effort or decided to withdraw their troops. Regional organizations are likely to be more determined and exhibit greater staying power than a neutral and more distant outsider. Such determination is often lacking in most UN operations.

THE LIMITATIONS OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Most regional organizations do not have the capacity to sustain peacekeeping operations for long without the support of external bodies. Despite the fact that most UN peacekeeping missions are conducted in the African continent, none of the regional organization has the necessary capacity or experience to commit meaningfully to conflict prevention and resolution through military means without outside assistance.[30] Most regional and sub regional organizations suffer from enormous resource and capacity constraints in the areas of training,

---

[30] Dorn Walter, Regional peacekeeping is not the way, Peacekeeping and International Relations, Vol. 27, No.2.

interoperability, sustained readiness, transportation and logistics as well as funding.[31] These resource and capacity constraints are directly related to the meagre military capabilities of the organizations' member states and their dire economic situations. According to a study by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the Institute for Security Studies:

> Only few African countries are capable of deploying a battalion or more for peace operations without significant assistance. In addition, most do not possess specialized units with sufficient equipment or expertise to provide such necessary services as engineering, communications, medical or movement control. With few exceptions, African countries cannot project force great distances. It has even proven difficult for some African countries to deploy with the desired level of self-sufficiency in UN missions.[32]

These limitations are also tied to the fact that most countries in the region do not have the technological capability to produce their own military hard wares. They mostly rely on foreign militaries to purchase and maintain their equipment. To be more effective in peacekeeping missions, their willingness to intervene must be paralleled with the capacity to do so and that could be enhanced through mutual cooperation with the UN.

The UN on the other hand has a robust existing structure and global arrangements for the execution and sustainment of its mission. Through years of participating in PSO globally, the UN has been able to learn from their past failures and master the art of establishing and sustaining

---

[31] Juma M and Mengistu A, "The infrastructure of peace in Africa: Assessing the peace building capacity of African institutions, International Peace Academy, New York.

[32] Berman, E. and Sams, K. (2000), *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva,113-117.

such operations. The UN has established various agencies capable of providing support to different types of PSOs ranging from transitional administrations to peace enforcement. Aside from its strong financial base and annual budget, some UN member states have strong economies and have shown willingness to support and contribute to UN missions. Having participated in three different UN missions, regional operations and exercises with members of the Common wealth nations, I can attest to the fact that UN support structure has no equal.

The peacekeeping mission in Darfur started under the auspices of the African Union in 2007. During that period, the operations were characterized by lack of Petrol Oil and Lubricants (POL) and the troops feeding were inadequate. Minor casualties easily degenerated to permanent disabilities and even death due to poor health care services. Power was never available for 24 hours in a day and essential services were lacking. However, with the induction of UN into the mission in 2008, the mission support department of the UN established a Pakistani level III hospital in the super camp, a POL dump and contracted ration supply to the Gulf Catering Company (GCC). Essential services were provided and troops were motivated to carry out their assigned tasks. The mission has achieved modest success despite being subjected to various forms of persecution by the Sudanese government.[33] UNAMID is a practical example of how mutual cooperation between the UN and regional organizations could achieve success.

Regional organization tends to see conflict in their region through their own interest and sometimes play indirect role in fueling the crisis. The Economic Commission of Central African States (ECCAS) has in many cases been overwhelmed by the lingering crisis in that region. This is because most of its member's conflicts are tied to historical relationships with their neighbors.

---

[33] UN DPKO, Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organizations/ arrangement in a peacekeeping environment, suggested principles and mechanisms March 1999. 8-11.

In 1990 before the genocide in Rwanda, between 3500 and 4000 Ugandan troops, led by senior officers of the Uganda National Resistance Army (NRA) invaded Rwanda through Western Uganda.[34] They combined with the breakaway factions of the Rwanda military, formed the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) which was made up of officers and men who had been fighting in Uganda since 1980. The RPF had also helped President Yoweri Museveni overthrow the governments of then President Milton Obote and General Tito Okello Lutwa.[35] This kind of rivalry between these countries has negatively influenced the unity and effectiveness of ECCAS as most decisions by the leaders are driven by hatred and desire for revenge.

Also, Rwanda and Uganda has on many occasions, influenced and fueled the crisis in the DRC. In 1997, Uganda and Rwanda invaded the Congo and set up their own puppet government. They occupied large portions of the Congo because of their desire to control the wealth in the eastern part of the country.[36] On another occasion, a UN investigation report indicted Uganda and Rwanda for providing weapons and logistics support to the M23 rebel group in the DRC.[37] This report further stated that Rwanda was first involved in organizing the M23 mutiny at the end of March 2013, when Kinshasa tried to arrest the rebel leader Bosco Ntaganda for war crimes. As a result, the UN insisted that Uganda and Rwanda should no longer participate in the peacekeeping mission in DRC being party to the conflict.[38] This form of negative relationship between the great lake nations has made the regional effort ineffective and hinders progress in any peace process.

---

[34] Beswick, D (2010) 'Peacekeeping, regime security and 'African Solutions to African Problems': Exploring Rwanda's involvement in Darfur' *Third World Quarterly* 31(5).

[35] Ibid.

[36] United Nations (2001) *Report on the Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Sources of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo,* New York.

[37] Ibid.

[38] United Nations Security Council, Special Report of the Secretary-General on the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Great Lakes Region.

Regional Organizations lacks the authority to intervene in a sovereign country without due authorization from the SC. Article 53 of the UN charter stipulates that only with prior authorization of the SC would a regional organization intervene in a nations conflict.[39] To ensure proper coordination of activities, article 54 further clarifies that: the Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements for the maintenance of international peace and security.[40] These conditions are not applicable in situations where the host nation requests regional intervention since it could be done under collective self-defense based on article 51 of the UN Charter. This is very important in regulating the actions of regional organizations and to ensure their interests are in line with international best practices. However, in a situation where those interests goes contrary to the UN principles, the UN can deny a regional organization such authorization or delay it until such conditions are meet. In such situation the regional organization is rendered redundant and incapacitated to intervene.

The need for authorization is based on the desire to have the UN more closely associated with the mission from the beginning; perhaps the UN may replace the regional organization at a later stage and to make the organization accountable for every action. Also, there is a desire to avoid the negative impact of the potential reaction of the host nation should it be necessary to use force beyond self-defense. In such a case the host nation might easily be tempted to withdraw the consent given to the regional organization especially if the force is directed against its own supporters. Also, seeking authorization would clearly indicate the willingness of the regional organization to cooperate and coordinate with the UN and keep the UN abreast of the entire situation. Authorization also increases the credibility of the operation, which could be used as a

---

[39] United Nations, Charter of the UN Chapter VIII, 1945.
[40] Ibid.

tool in any negotiations with the host nation potentially as, the basis of renegotiating consent should it become an issue. Authorization is also important in the instance where operations led by regional organization resulted in mistrust, prompting the UN to deploy a PKO alongside the regional organization.

THE WAY FORWARD

In recent times, the question of guaranteeing security to the local populations, the local authority and the peacekeepers posed great challenges to the UN as operations are deployed more and more in areas with significant risk. The UN has on several occasions authorized peacekeepers to use all necessary measures including the use of force beyond self-defense, but it has not always been successful. With the advantages regional organizations has in tackling operations in more risky areas as earlier discussed, the UN could 'outsource' the security component of missions to a regional organization or a coalition of the willing. This was the case, for instance, between the United Nations Operations in Ivory Coast (UNOCI), the French Lincorne Forces (FLF) and ECOWAS Mission in Ivory Coast (ECOMICI) in January 2003. ECOWAS and France worked with the AU and UN and oversee the successful negotiations that ended up in the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement of 24 January 2003.[41] Through this agreement, they were able to install a "Government of National Reconciliation" that was tasked with preparing for elections after a DDR process, and attempted to strengthen various institutions.

To give legitimacy to the mission, Security Council resolution 1464 endorsed Linas-Marcoussis and retroactively approved ECOMICI and Operation Licorne under Chapter VIII of

---

[41] Andrea De Guttry, "Recent trends in peacekeeping operations run by regional organizations and the resulting interplay with the United Nations system," South Africa, August 2011,12-14.

the UN Charter.[42] ECOMICI and Operation Licorne provided military backing for a peaceful settlement to the conflict, while preventing a civil war and wide spread massacre that would have destabilized the region. In November 2004, the Ivorian governmental air force carried out an attack on the French position in Bouake causing nine deaths and wounding 37 among the FLF.[43] Despite the casualties, the FLF were very determined and remained to provide protection to UNOCI even after ECOWAS troops pulled out of the mission. French President, Jacques Chirac gave the order to destroy the entire Ivorian Air Force and the French forces counterattacked, destroying the two Ivorian Sukhoi Su-25s at the Yamoussoukro base, fifteen minutes after the attack.[44] Such actions would not have been possible under UN peacekeeping operations and the peacekeepers lives would have been in danger.

The UN has also 'outsourced' the security of its mission to a regional organization or coalition of the willing. This was the case between the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). And also the United Nations Missions in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT) with the European Union (EU). The deployment of these operations, always 'muscular' in nature was authorized by a UN Security Council Resolution which also define the mandate. The relationship was based on cooperation and the regional organization provided its security services in an autonomous manner and was in no way under the control of the corresponding UN PKO. The tasks conferred on the regional organizations are those relating to protection of local civilians, vulnerable groups such as IDPs and refugees, protection of UN mission members and infrastructures, and sometimes even the protection of the military component as in UNMIK.

---

[42] United Nations, UNSCR 1464 also available online at: unscr.com/en/resolutions/1464, accessed 2 May 2018

[43] Adam Nossiter. "UN and France strike leader's forces in Ivory Coast." New York Times, 4 April 2011.

[44] Ibid.

Another approach is for the UN to run its peacekeeping missions jointly with a regional organization. Example of such mission is the joint United Nations International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) with the Organization of American Society (OAS) in February, 1993. The mission's objective was to verify respect for human right in line with Haiti's constitution.[45] Observers were drawn from both UN and OAS and the responsibilities for logistics were shared among both organizations. In the beginning of the operations, the OAS General Secretariat hastily mobilized personnel and resources and move them into the mission. OAS showed its agility by operating as an initial strike force, establishing the beachhead for the Mission.

Through this operation, the UN and OAS proved that they could mount a joint scheme drawing upon the relative advantages of each Organization to the benefit of the over-all mission to protect human rights before the legitimate government was restored. Most importantly, both the OAS and the UN showed that for the first time ever, the UN system, working within the framework of Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter could restore to authority a constitutionally elected government that had been forcefully removed from office.[46] The Mission enjoyed UN planning, its resources, and experience. While the smaller OAS General Secretariat provided the flexibility and agility for the initial phase of the mission. Through mutual cooperation, both organizations contributed greatly to the overall success of the mission and proved their capabilities to execute delicate mission of this nature.

---

[45] See A/47/20B: The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti, Draft Resolution, A/47/l.56 (April 13, 1993).

[46] S. Schnably, "The Santiago Commitment as a Call to Democracy in the United States: Evaluating the OAS Role in Haiti, Peru and Guatemala, 25 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 393 (1994), 429.

CONCLUSION

The SC has in several occasions failed to speedily mobilize and deploy forces to conflict areas that require urgent attention. This was evident in their failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide. After the Rwandan genocide, various initiatives such as UNSAS and SHIRBRIG were initiated to enhance the UN rapid deployment capabilities but could not be sustained due to legal and financial problems. The situation was however, different for the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) a non-UN mission led by Australia to restore normalcy in the country after the independence ballot to separate East Timor from Indonesia turned to a chaos. The mission deployed in East Timor five days after the Security Council mandated its action.

The force structure and combat capabilities employed by the UN in PSOs are most times insufficient to tackle the challenges and threats of modern conflicts. This is because the UN COE manual, SOFA and SOMA limits the type of weapons TCCs are allowed to bring for the operation. Conversely, the force commanders in regional intervention missions have operational command over troops attached to them unlike in UN missions. Troops are robust and equipped without any limitations by either the SOMA or SOFA and are free to carry out targeted attacks against militia groups.

The UN troops are less likely to understand the demographic situation and to be attuned with the conflict. During UNTAET, the UN established a judicial system that shows little regard for the indigenous understanding of justice and reconciliation by applying a Western-style legal system. This was condemned by the locals and resulted to the premature transfer of authority to indigenous government. Conversely, members of regional organizations are likely to be more in tune with the conflict at hand as they share the same cultural background and often speak the same language. They are also likely to Share the consequences of the crisis due to their

proximity. These reasons would make them able to participate with a better prospect of success in the solution of regional problems.

Reginal organizations are also bedeviled with significant limitations and challenges. They suffer from enormous resource and capacity constraints in the areas of training, interoperability, and logistics as well as funding. These limitations are also tied to the fact that most countries in a region like Africa do not have the technological capability to produce their own military hardwares. They mostly rely on foreign militaries to purchase and maintain their equipment. The UN on the other hand has a robust existing structure and global arrangements for the execution and sustainment of its mission. Member states are willing and able to give their financial contributions to various UN missions.

With all the limitations and strength of both the UN and regional organizations already discussed, the need for mutual cooperation to achieve synergy of effort in dealing with the contemporary challenges of PKO in the world cannot be overemphasized. This cooperation should be complimentary rather than a supplementary, helping the international community to quickly address conflict in a more comprehensive manner by building on the strength and compensating for the weaknesses of both organizations. Just as demonstrated in Haiti under MICIVIH and in Ivory Coast under UNOCI.

Bibliography

Adam Roberts, "Proposals for UN Standing Forces: A Critical History,"(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

Adam Nossiter. "UN and France Strike Leader's Forces in Ivory Coast." New York Times, 4 April 2011.

Adebajo, Adekeye. *Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2002.

Angelov, Angel. "Regional Involvement in Peace Operations: An Analysis of the Debate within the UN Security Council." *Conflict, Security & Development* 10, No. 5 (2010).

Bellamy, Alex J., and Paul Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping,* Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010.

Bellamy, Alex J., and Paul Williams, "Who's keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations," *International Security* 29, No. 4 (2005): 157-195.

Berman Eric, and Katie E. "The Peacekeeping Capacities of African Regional Organizations." *Conflict, Security & Development* 2, No. 1 (2002).

Beswick, D (2010) 'Peacekeeping, regime security and 'African Solutions to African Problems': Exploring Rwanda's involvement in Darfur' *Third World Quarterly* 31(5).

Boutros-Ghali Boutros. "An Agenda for Peace," Military Technology. 18, no.11 (November1994).

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, "Improving the Capacity of the United Nations for Peacekeeping," Military Technology 18, no. 11 (December 1994).

Cedric de Coning, The role of SRSG in UN integrated mission, NUPI policy brief 2010.

Christian Walter, Regional arrangements and the UN charter. In Wolf rum, Rudiger ed, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Oxford, Oxford University

Cilliers, Jakkie. "Regional African Peacekeeping Capacity: Mythical Construct or Essential Tool?" *African Security Review* 8, No. 4 (1999).

Dorn Walter, Regional peacekeeping is not the way, Peacekeeping and International Relations, Vol. 27, No.2.

General Assembly of the United Nations, "Statement of the President at the Joint Debate on Cooperation between the UN and Regional and Other Organisations," Accessed April 4, 2018. <http://www.un.org/pga/111114_statement-joint-debate-un-regional-organisations/

Henry Kwani Anyidoho, Brig Gen, The Role of the United Nations(address before the institute for defence policy and the South African Institute of International Affairs, 14 July 1995) 4.

Juma M and Mengistu A, "The infrastructure of peace in Africa: Assessing the peace building capacity of African institutions, International Peace Academy, New York.

Kreps, Sarah E. "The United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur: Implications and Prospects for Success." *African Security Review* 16, No. 4 (2007).

Michael Barnett, Partners in Peace? The UN, Regional Organisations, and Peacekeeping, review of international studies, Princeton University press 1995. 426.

Obasanjo, Olusegun. "Africa in the 21st Century." Security Dialogue 24, no. 2 (June 1993).

Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W. "Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia," International Peacekeeping 1, no. 3 (Autumn 1994)

Olonisakin, Funmi. "UN Co-operation with Regional Organizations in Peacekeeping: The Experience of ECOMOG and UNOMIL in Liberia." *International Peacekeeping* 3. No. 3 (1996).

Peter Langille, "Conflict Prevention: Options for Rapid Deployment and UN Standing Forces," in Woodhouse and Ramsbotham,

Powell Kristiana, "African Union's emerging peace and security regime: opportunities and challenges for delivering on the responsibility to protect, ISS Monograph Series, No. 119, 20.

Report of Secretary General of the UN: In Larger Freedom Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for decision by Heads of State and Government in September 2005.

Richard Gowan and Ian Johnstone, *New Challenges for Peacekeeping: Protection, Peacebuilding and the "War on Terror,"* Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series (New York, N.Y.: International Peace Academy, March 2007).

Shaw, Carolyn M. "Regional Peacekeeping: An Alternative to United Nations Operations?"The Journal of Conflict Studies 15, No 2 (Fall 1995).

Tanja Hohe, "Justice without judiciary in East Timor," Conflict, Security and Development, Vol.3,2003,

Taylor Francis, INTERFET: An account of intervention with consent in East Timor, Journal of International peacekeeping Vol 17, 2010.

United Nations, Charter of the UN Chapter VIII, 1945.

US Department of State and U.S. Department of Defence, Regional Peacekeeping: ECOWAS and the Liberian Peace Process, (Washington, 1998).

United Nations News Centre, "Regional Organizations Must Expand Cooperation to Tackle Global Challenges." Accessed April 3, 2018. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45570#.VPcK5_nz3Pp>

United Nations Secretary General. Supplement to An Agenda For Peace. New York. United Nations General Assembly Security Council, A/50/60, S/1995/1, 1992.

UN Document A/50/711 and S/1995/911, Improving preparedness for conflict prevention and peacekeeping in Africa: Report of the Secretary General, 1 November 1995,

UN News, Liberia: UN mission farewell ceremony honors last departing police and military personnel, 6 February 2018.

United Nations "MONUSCO Mandate," accessed February 14 2018 available online/capstone_eng.pdf at: *https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/mandate.*

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1856 (December 22, 2008) UN Doc. S/RES/1856, available at: *www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2008.shtml*

UN Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines. Peacekeeping Best Practices Section, Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training DPKO. Available at: *www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/document*

UNGA 'Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions (COE Manual)' (2016 edn, 20 January 2016) UN Doc A/C.5/69/18.

United Nations (2001) *Report on the Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Sources of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo,* New York.

Williams, Paul D, and Arthur Boutellis, "Partnership Peacekeeping: Challenges and Opportunities in the United Nations-African Union Relationship." *African Affairs* 113, No. 451 (2014).

Yamashita, Hikaru. "Peacekeeping Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organizations," *Review of International Studies* 38, No. 1 (2012).