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POWER TILT : BREXIT AND COLLECTIVE DEFENCE IN EUROPE

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Exercise Solo Flight

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POWER TILT: BREXIT AND COLLECTIVE DEFENCE IN EUROPE

By Commander Michael Wood

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POWER TILT: BREXIT AND COLLECTIVE DEFENCE IN EUROPE

At the time of writing, the debate in British Parliament rages over Brexit, the exit of Great Britain from the European Union. Most of the attention regarding Brexit is focused upon the economic, trade, and foreign policy impacts of the absence of one of the European heavyweights, with an almost obsessive deathwatch of the Brexit effect upon British political careers. Its impact will reach multiple social, economic and political structures, and well beyond the currently popular Irish Border debate. Security will be severely affected as Britain distances herself from her European neighbours. It will include serious effects upon NATO, and its obligation to assure European security against the aggressive actions of a resurgent Russia, and respond to threats generated from instability in Africa and the Middle East.¹ This paper will demonstrate that Brexit will pose a challenge to NATO cohesion and its subsequent obligation to provide European security. In particular, this paper will expose a false Brexit/NATO security belief, and explore potential fractured cooperative relations due to the prioritization of Britain distancing itself from European nations, subsequent shrinking of budgets for defence, and the diminished credibility of NATO by major contributing members due to the UK's greater interest in bilateral defence constructs.

Exploring the impact of Brexit upon NATO cannot be ignorant of EU Security constructs, however the security impact of Brexit upon EU establishments such as the CFSP² will not be specifically explored in this paper. However, it is clear that the UK has

¹ The Western Balkans could also be included here, although improving. These two regions have recently created recent instability due to refugee migration flows into EU nations.

² Common Foreign and Security Policy – Organisation that deals with EU external relations. Others include the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), European Defence Agency (EDA), European Defence Union (EDU) and the recently approved Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).

identified already that its security will diminish as it becomes more detached from the EU.³ This paper will touch upon how the relationship between NATO and these important organizations might be impacted because of the diminished influence of Britain in the EU security sphere through Brexit.

NATO's Security Need

In order to identify impacts upon NATO caused by Brexit, a brief review of the current NATO mission and objectives is prudent.⁴ NATO's overall objective is currently focused upon providing strategic security to its member nations from various threats. Although there are multiple threats⁵ identified in the lists of NATO topics, the organization is presently concerned with countering terrorism through improving awareness and developing response capabilities against organizations such as al Qaeda,⁶ and great power competition and deterrence, containing Russia after its Crimean/Ukrainian provinces annexation.⁷ NATO's emerging understanding of threats from radicalized, returning nationals shaped by violence in Syria is also of concern.⁸ NATO's continued commitment to Afghanistan is a significant operation, by which its participating member's nations often measure their contribution as proof of their

³ Richard G. Whitman (2017) "Avoiding a Hard Brexit in Foreign Policy" *Survival*, 59:6, 47-54, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2017.1399724. Pg 48.

⁴ NATO. "NATO's Purpose" 18 April 2018. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_68144.htm accessed 29 April 2019.

⁵ Including nuclear, missile defence, cyber defence, collective defence measures through exercises and communication networking, women & peace security programs, etc.

⁶ And developing response capabilities to these threats.


⁷ Although NATO's operation in Afghanistan cannot be understated, for the purposes of this paper, we must assume Brexit will not significantly impact NATO's overall contribution to this operation, although the UK might increase its contribution to appease leading NATO members like the US.

⁸ NATO Press Release. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg "Projecting Stability and Fighting Terrorism at the Level of NATO Foreign Ministers" 06 December 2017. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_149472.htm?selectedLocale=en accessed 8 May 2019.

commitment to the organization. In order for the impact of Brexit to have meaningful weight, it would have to impact upon one or many of these significant security objectives.

Not the Start of the Tilt: A Brexit Belief and Border Truths

In order to consider some of the impact of the divorce of the UK from the EU, it serves well to briefly consider some of Brexit's rationale. The success of the Brexit Leave campaign was mostly due to concerns relating to UK sovereignty and migration.⁹ The



Brexit Leave Figure 1: Changing British Priorities 2000 – 2018¹⁰

Campaign capitalized upon growing and popular concerns upon immigration flows and gambled that this was suitable security argument for the Leave team. They simply argued that Britain was losing control of its sovereignty due to relaxed EU policies on immigration with a heavy implication, likely false, that the migrant flow also represented a terrorist and criminal threat. It struck a chord with a voting core. The Brexit Leave vote

⁹ Watt, Nicolas. BBC News 25 May 2016 “EU referendum: Vote Leave focuses on immigration” <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36375492> accessed 11 May, 2019.

¹⁰ Adam, Karla and Booth, William. The Washington Post “Immigration worries drove the Brexit vote. Then attitudes changed.” 16 Nov 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/immigration-worries-drove-the-brexit-vote-then-attitudes-changed/2018/11/16/c216b6a2-bcdb-11e8-8243-f3ae9c99658a_story.html?utm_term=.cc10562ae17e accessed 7 April, 2019.

was carried by an energized key block of voters that were motivated by this fear, although there is evidence of present regret.¹¹ Nevertheless, the importance of the Brexit immigration-wary vote reinforces a mandate for Britain to focus upon the security concerns associated with migration crises, which coincides with some NATO objectives.¹² NATO is still seen to be a major player with respect to a security mechanism response to the migrant crisis,¹³ despite Brexit, as it retains responsibility for security through provision of forces or brokering negotiations.¹⁴

NATO responsibility for security is for all member nations. However, the actual responsibility for specific border security *remains* under the sovereign control of the UK. Britain is not a member of the open border Schengen Agreement,¹⁵ and as such, retains absolute control of who enters, leaves or transits their border. This includes the various migrants or undesirable persons that the Brexit Leave rhetoric used as a campaign tool for their own ends. Ironically, the UK did not need Brexit to control its migrant flow, despite what the Brexit Leave campaign wanted voters to think.¹⁶ Therefore, with respect to

¹¹ Adam, Karla and Booth, William. The Washington Post “Immigration worries drove the Brexit vote. Then attitudes changed.” 16 Nov 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/immigration-worries-drove-the-brexite-vote-then-attitudes-changed/2018/11/16/c216b6a2-bcdb-11e8-8243-f3ae9c99658a_story.html?utm_term=.cc10562ae17e accessed 7 April, 2019.

¹² NATO. “*Assistance for the refugee and migrant crisis in the Aegean Sea.*” 27 June 2016 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_128746.htm?selectedLocale=en. Accessed 15 April, 2019.

¹³ Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (Collective Defence) is often discussed, regularly supported, and singularly invoked, but not used for migrant issues.

¹⁴ Shams Al Din Al Hajjaji, *NATO, the EU, and the Arab Refugee Crisis*, 6 Penn. St. J.L. & Int'l Aff. (2018). Pg 159. Shams argues that NATO is the clear negotiating power that would be able to meet military powers in Egypt to resolve migration issues.

¹⁵ Schengen Visa Info. “Schengen Area – The World’s Largest Visa Free Zone” 9 May, 2019. <https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/schengen-visa-countries-list/> accessed 6 May, 2019.

¹⁶ Inkster does warn that should the UK decide to alter its labour-economic visa policies post-Brexit, there would likely be a reciprocal EU counter-visa action which is neither trade nor business friendly. This would effectively thwart the actions that many Brexit Leave voters sought.

purely border concerns and migrants, the departure of the UK from the EU should be a largely neutral impact with respect to NATO security concerns.¹⁷

Pre-Tilt UK and NATO

The current relationship between NATO and the UK is strong. Certainly the Special Relationship¹⁸ between the US and the UK is strengthened through NATO.¹⁹ As a result, the UK has consistently been a stalwart supporter of an Atlantic-focused NATO, vice a purely European defence organization. This is in balance to the Franco-German influence that calls for a more continentally focused defence organization, although the UK certainly recognizes the importance of both.²⁰ Although Brexit opposition will claim that a ‘European UK’ should focus upon creating a closer connection with allies on the continent, it is the connection between the UK and the US that has been the force multiplier that has strengthened and stabilized NATO for over 70 years. Should Brexit occur, the UK’s usefulness as a facilitator for the US in European affairs will likely diminish, forcing a tilt of the US dealing directly with the EU for security concerns.²¹ NATO will need to be the UK’s guy wire to prevent this US lean into Europe.

¹⁷ Nigel Inkster (2016) *Brexit, Intelligence and Terrorism*, *Survival*, 58:3, 23-30, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2016.1186974. pg. 28.

¹⁸ Churchill coined this term during his Fulton speech 1946 to describe the commonality of the two countries and to encourage closer/permanent association; an early indication of the UK’s Atlantic lean.

¹⁹ Vinjamuri, Leslie and Naselli, Jason. Chatham House. *“Britain’s EU departure could be used to transform the future of NATO as well as improve the UK’s relationship with the United States”* 4 April 2019. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/brexit-makes-nato-more-important-atlantic> accessed 4 May 2019.

²⁰ Nigel Inkster (2018) *“Brexit and Security”* *Survival*, 60:6, 27-34, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2018.1542797. Pg. 28.

²¹ Vinjamuri, Leslie and Naselli, Jason. Chatham House. *“Britain’s EU departure could be used to transform the future of NATO as well as improve the UK’s relationship with the United States”* 4 April 2019. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/brexit-makes-nato-more-important-atlantic> accessed 4 May 2019.

Loss of Influence: A Real Exit Cost

With the recent rounds of Brexit negotiations proving fruitless, the exact form of how Britain will exit the EU remains unclear. What is known is that the EU has declared²² that Britain would not be able to selectively participate in advantageous components of the EU and drop other sectors.²³ It is clear from the EU that Britain's exit will be economically and politically whole, with a resulting conclusion from this decision would include an ousting from EU-related collective security constructs as well.²⁴ This subsequent loss of voice within EU security mechanisms is damaging, and could be an argument to suggest that it would amplify Britain's influence in NATO, but not necessarily within the EU.

The UK has clearly stated that their position with regards to NATO will not change.²⁵ Their traditional leadership role within NATO will continue,²⁶ and has been met with action to support their words. The UK has been one of NATO's stalwart supporters, as they have kept their military modern and relevant, quickly provides troops and ships for various NATO operations, such as Operation Forward Presence, and one of the few NATO members that commit to contributing over 2% of its GDP towards defence.²⁷ The UK has clearly signaled their future participation in NATO is assured.

²² Likely to encourage remaining EU partners to remain or prevent the re-negotiation of terms of their participation

²³ François Heisbourg (2018) Europe's Defence: Revisiting the Impact of Brexit, *Survival*, 60:6, 17-26, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2018.1542796. pg. 18.

²⁴ Many EU defence organisations 'dual-hat' or assume availability of NATO constructs, they would struggle to stand alone.

²⁵ Risso, Linda. UK in a Changing Environment. "*Brexit and NATO: an essential piece of the puzzle*" 9 May 2018. <https://ukandeu.ac.uk/brexit-and-nato-an-essential-piece-of-the-puzzle/> accessed 17 April, 2019.

²⁶ DSACEUR is currently UK GO/FO, recent NATO Sec Gen was Lord Robertson.

²⁷ NATO Press Release "*Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2011 – 2018)*" 14 March, 2019. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_03/190314-pr2018-34-eng.pdf Accessed 5 May, 2019.

However, with the loss of participation within EU collective security arrangements, the UK would undoubtedly double its efforts to maintain its traditional key leadership role within NATO, and perhaps more through individual bilateral agreements that remain outside of EU jurisdictions. While UK global influence is assured with its position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, NATO would remain one of Britain's few vectors into EU security matters. However, NATO's influence upon Europe is not the clarion call of authority that it once was.²⁸ Claims exist that NATO's influence is in decline as European countries look to support EU security efforts from within, such as the European Defence Fund (EDF).²⁹ NATO's once bright star has dimmed in the eyes of US leadership,³⁰ which in turn diminishes the UK's general influence through this historic organization in Europe.³¹ Even the UK's leadership and future influence within NATO may come into question.

The UK's past strong voice and counter balance to a Franco-German dominance within EU security structures will be reduced post Brexit. This traditional counterbalance allowed the UK to play a leadership role of driving cooperation between the US and various NATO members within the EU. After Brexit, this role would likely fall to a Franco-German clique to drive cooperation between EU countries and the US, a difficult situation as this clique often served to protect weaker NATO and EU members.³²

²⁸ François Heisbourg (2018) Europe's Defence: Revisiting the Impact of Brexit, *Survival*, 60:6, 17-26, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2018.1542796. pg. 22.

²⁹ *Ibid.* pg. 22.

³⁰ At least, a decrease with the current Trump administration, albeit the messaging from the administration is bipolar, as Trump has also claimed that NATO "was the best that was ever done" Golden, Hannah. *Elite Daily*. "Trump's NATO Quotes Have Been Classic Trump" 12 July, 2018. <https://www.elitedaily.com/p/trump-nato-quotes-have-beenclassic-trump-9741102> accessed 18 May 2019.

³¹ François Heisbourg (2018) Europe's Defence: Revisiting the Impact of Brexit, *Survival*, 60:6, 17-26, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2018.1542796. pg. 20.

³² Risso, Linda. UK in a Changing Environment. "Brexit and NATO: an essential piece of the puzzle" 9 May 2018. <https://ukandeu.ac.uk/brexit-and-nato-an-essential-piece-of-the-puzzle/> accessed 17 April, 2019.

It is not a stretch to consider a shuffle of dominance within the EU in order to find a new equilibrium. The UK's disassociation with the EU and its subsequent reduction of influence as a result, would allow other NATO members with greater EU influence to push further for their own objectives. The major NATO contributor, the US, would likely retain their view of the UK as an important partner, however relegated, and perhaps attempt to focus upon cooperating more with a France-Germany-led tilt due to their economic influence within the EU.³³

Decreased Relevancy: Intelligence Sharing

Any strategic defence organization such as NATO would need to have a robust, efficient and thoroughly efficient Intelligence network. This is especially important with regards to countering the potential terrorist threats that might arise from various organizations or returning radicalized nationals. There is no single measure of intelligence gathering and dissemination that would allow an observer to rank national intelligence organizations. However, either through effectiveness or prestige, the Special Intelligence Section of the UK has consistently been seen as a world-class organization with few rivals. SIS's close cooperation with the United States³⁴ and its massive federation of agencies and resources is assured for as long as it contributes in a meaningful way to the overall Western-interest security picture.³⁵

The UK contribution to global intelligence agencies³⁶ is done through various means; often as a major contributor through participation in multiple relationships such as

³³ François Heisbourg (2016) Brexit and European Security, *Survival*, 58:3, 13-22, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2016.1186973 Pg. 16.

³⁴ Through UKUSA

³⁵ Nigel Inkster (2016) "Brexit, Intelligence and Terrorism" *Survival*, 58:3, 23-30, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2016.1186974. Pg. 24.

³⁶ Such as Interpol

the ‘Five Eyes’ construct that includes Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and is able to do so presently through its relations with EU nations. It is recognized that, France and Germany aside, most EU nations lack the global intelligence service reach of the UK. However, a large portion of what intelligence sharing that the UK can collect and globally provide, especially to the US, is enabled through its relations³⁷ with EU nations.³⁸ The UK’s contribution and investment into EU organizations, such as their Intelligence and Situation Centre and European External Action Services, presents itself as a vein of intelligence information, with an excellent return of intelligence wealth in the eyes of the US. An exit from the EU would dullen this jewel of the UK’s intelligence crown, diminishing the relationship between these two major NATO members.³⁹ Moreover, the vital counter to terrorist activities within an effective, inclusive intelligence network may also lose its ability to cooperate and share data to those who could use it most effectively. Brexit may unnecessarily risk sabotaging the current intelligence constructs presently enjoyed by the EU, and over time, NATO’s ability to sense⁴⁰ through intelligence sharing could diminish.⁴¹

Continuation of Security by Other (Older?) Means⁴²

It is likely that the UK will attempt to negotiate a security agreement with the EU that will try to retain the advantages that was once normalized. This will be ambitious, as

³⁷ Sometimes limited sharing within Five-Eyes only. Not all EU members are trusted.

³⁸ Nigel Inkster (2018) “*Brexit and Security*” Survival, 60:6, 27-34, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2018.1542797. Pg. 31.

³⁹ Nigel Inkster (2016) “*Brexit, Intelligence and Terrorism.*” Survival. 58:3, 23-30, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2016.1186974. Pg. 25.

⁴⁰ “Sense” here is used as an Operational Function form. Shield, Sustain etc.

⁴¹ Despite funding a large part of the Galileo program, the UK will also be excluded from participating in this EU intelligence gathering/collection system; a significant loss indeed.

⁴² With apologies to Clausewitz

the UK will likely have to navigate their security objectives through compromise or adoption of various EU sector policies. Adopting security principles to match with various EU social program standards may become a reality if the UK felt their security relationship with the EU was paramount.⁴³ However, even if a *Global Britain*⁴⁴ were to adopt the multitude of concessions for them to be able to participate in EU security constructs,⁴⁵ the level of involvement would likely be non- or low-influence partnerships on policy or operations.⁴⁶ It is very unlikely the UK would attempt to recreate its full security relationship with the EU. The UK might opt to find an alternate relationship with the EU in a way not yet seen, or they would have to stake greater influential effort upon its participation through the EU-NATO Strategic Partnership.

This reinforcement of the UK into NATO security structures should not be surprising as NATO has, since its beginning, enjoyed a preeminent status in Europe. EU security constructs have many times been constrained by the UK as it has curtailed EU security initiatives that might have supplanted NATO policies or structures.⁴⁷ This effort was done out of fear that new EU policies might interfere with UK foreign policy and specifically the Special Relationship that the UK has with the US. It is, again, ironic that Brexit, and the historical challenge of EU authority, specifically risks this well-defended special relationship, due to a loss of influence within the EU. The result could be a short-

⁴³ Richard G. Whitman (2017) “*Avoiding a Hard Brexit in Foreign Policy*” *Survival*, 59:6, 47-54, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2017.1399724. Pg. 48.

⁴⁴ Whitman uses the term *Global Britain* as the “...shorthand for post-Brexit foreign policy but with little articulation of proposals for its ambition or the degree to which it diverges from current policy.”

⁴⁵ Such as the CSDP.

⁴⁶ Richard G. Whitman (2017) “*Avoiding a Hard Brexit in Foreign Policy*” *Survival*, 59:6, 47-54, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2017.1399724. Pg. 49.

⁴⁷ Ragnar Weilandt (2019) “*Will Brexit Change the EU’s Foreign Policy?*” *Survival*, 61:2, 143-166, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2019.1589093 Pg. 144.

term UK boon for NATO in terms of troops, funding and support to operations that might have been allocated to EU efforts. However, with the loss of the UK's spirited value in maintaining primacy of NATO in Europe gone,⁴⁸ the special relationship with the US is, again, also risked.⁴⁹

As one of few EU countries⁵⁰ that possesses a full logistical and military response capability,⁵¹ Britain's contribution to EU security would likely shift to purely NATO affairs, and would reduce considerably the potential EU ability to respond.⁵² However, the UK's desire to remain European⁵³ is a cornerstone of their foreign policy and rhetoric, which forces them to investigate new and perhaps bolster current bilateral security agreements with EU nations.⁵⁴

Retaining security influence through bilateral agreements such as the Lancaster House Treaties is another effort that could impact upon NATO. These agreements focus upon capabilities that provide security, but also provide specific operational level capability that could be used internationally and outside of Europe, with a nod to counter-terrorism. Although there might be parallels of these agreements to EU CSDP or the

⁴⁸ Through veto and interference within EU.

⁴⁹ Ragnar Weilandt (2019) "*Will Brexit Change the EU's Foreign Policy?*" *Survival*, 61:2, 143-166, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2019.1589093 Pg. 147.

⁵⁰ France, Germany being the others.

⁵¹ Such as strategic and maritime lift, intelligence and ISTAR networks, with nuclear response capabilities.

⁵² Although there are EU claims that the UK does not necessarily contribute greatly to EU operations.

Ragnar Weilandt (2019) "*Will Brexit Change the EU's Foreign Policy?*" *Survival*, 61:2, 143-166, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2019.1589093 Pg. 159.

⁵³ Distinguishing the difference between EU and European often blurs the lines, but in this case, the UK recognizes that a secure Europe logically results in a secure UK, with or without EU security means.

⁵⁴ Ragnar Weilandt (2019) "*Will Brexit Change the EU's Foreign Policy?*" *Survival*, 61:2, 143-166, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2019.1589093 Pg. 159.

EDA, there is no formal connection to them, and likely never will be for as long as the aggregate of EU and British foreign policies retain the same objectives.⁵⁵

This is in line with the UK's traditional blocking of creation of EU foreign security structures in support of NATO, whereupon the creation of a Franco-British Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) might supplant EU calls for a European Army⁵⁶ through removal of one of its largest supporters, France. France has traditionally kept its foreign and military affairs separate from EU, and is now warming to NATO following an absence of approximately 40 years. France's involvement with the UK through this bilateral agreement outside of the EU might provide the post-Brexit UK the EU-influence punch it seeks to retain its previously relevant status with the US in NATO affairs.⁵⁷

The Cost of Exiting

As described before, the UK is a leading partner in NATO, not only in terms of the provision of leadership and resources, but they also lead by example in terms of budgeting beyond the agreed 2% of GDP for defence budgets,⁵⁸ beaten only by the US in fiscal and materiel terms.⁵⁹ Austerity measures introduced earlier this decade saw an overall decline in defence budgets, which meant that the UK would have had to eliminate certain operational capabilities and reduce its participation in operations such as

⁵⁵ Ragnar Weilandt (2019) "Will Brexit Change the EU's Foreign Policy?" *Survival*, 61:2, 143-166, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2019.1589093 Pg. 161.

⁵⁶ De la Baume, Maia and Herszenhorn, David. Politico SPRL. 14 November 2018. <https://www.politico.eu/article/angela-merkel-emmanuel-macron-eu-army-to-complement-nato/> accessed 10 May 2019.

⁵⁷ Ragnar Weilandt (2019) "Will Brexit Change the EU's Foreign Policy?" *Survival*, 61:2, 143-166, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2019.1589093 Pg. 157.

⁵⁸ The US budget and contribution to NATO is significantly higher, but the UK comparison to EU contributions demonstrates that they are a clear leader.

⁵⁹ David Hastings Dunn & Mark Webber (2016) "The UK, the European Union and NATO: Brexit's unintended consequences", *Global Affairs*, 2:5, 471-480, DOI: 10.1080/23340460.2017.1294465. Pg. 4.

Afghanistan. Russia's annexation of the Ukraine and sabre-rattling in the Baltics reversed this fiscal trend, and re-focused the UK to NATO collective defence security focused on Eastern Europe, but outside of EU security constructs.⁶⁰ As the UK had for decades concentrated upon the primacy of NATO to deliver this defence against threats from the East, it also became clear that they intended reinforcing their commitments to NATO, even in advance of Brexit.

There were UK efforts that simultaneously supported in smaller measures the EU security constructs, as long as the objectives of the construct were focused upon security within Europe and not beyond its borders.⁶¹ However, the overall UK commitment of its defence forces has been, and is expected to continue to support the primacy of NATO over any other agreement. Although recent pressures upon the reduced UK economy have proportionately reduced its contribution to defence, NATO remains the greater recipient of new budgets over the EU. Certainly after Brexit, funds dedicated to the EU will shrink drastically, despite the rhetoric of a 'European Britain' that feigns interest in new EU security efforts.⁶² Even if Britain was legitimately interested in EU security constructs, their contributions would be dedicated to only what NATO and the EU would need to share, and prized by the UK, such as intelligence sharing and cyber space coordination efforts. Through these methods, and through NATO, the UK could hope to retain its influence in particular sectors of European security.⁶³

⁶⁰ Ibid. Pg. 5.

⁶¹ Ragnar Weilandt (2019) "*Will Brexit Change the EU's Foreign Policy?*" *Survival*, 61:2, 143-166, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2019.1589093 Pg. 162.

⁶² David Hastings Dunn & Mark Webber (2016) "*The UK, the European Union and NATO: Brexit's unintended consequences*", *Global Affairs*, 2:5, 471-480, DOI: [10.1080/23340460.2017.1294465](https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2017.1294465). Pg. 6.

⁶³ Richard G. Whitman (2017) "*Avoiding a Hard Brexit in Foreign Policy*" *Survival*, 59:6, 47-54, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2017.1399724. Pg. 53.

NATO Remains, but Change is Coming

The UK's Brexit security challenge has evolved. The original security migrant threat that motivated Brexit supporters was an unsupported factor which duped some voters into their support, and is not a determining factor in how Brexit impacts NATO. It is clear that the greatest NATO security loss due to Brexit will be the loss of a British voice in specific EU security affairs, and its resulting loss of influence with the US. It is also clear that EU members, by necessity, will continue to support NATO vice a purely European solution. The calls for a greater EU-focused force will no longer be constrained, or foiled, by an absent UK. NATO policy makers will also have to deal with an emerging EU security thrust that will attempt to push NATO towards a European focus, vice the Atlantic slant that was mutually preferred by the US and UK.

Although the fiscal support of NATO would retain the UK as a significant member of the organization, the US, as the largest and most influential NATO member, could relegate the UK, due to its self-inflicted status loss with EU members. The loss of intelligence sharing potential would be significant. The UK alternative of creating separate bi-lateral security agreements with different EU members could expand this influence and perhaps retain the standing that the UK risks losing with Brexit. Overall, the impact of Brexit upon NATO is not trivial, and will over the long term, serve as the time marker for the beginning of a power tilt within NATO away from an Atlantic slant to a European lean.

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