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## CANADA – CHINA : UTOPIAN ASPIRATION TO HARD REALITY CHECK

Major Jung-Kwon Seo

**JCSP 44**

***Exercise Solo Flight***

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## CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

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2017 – 2019EXERCISE *SOLO FLIGHT* – EXERCICE *SOLO FLIGHT***CANADA – CHINA : UTOPIAN ASPIRATION TO HARD REALITY CHECK**

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## CANADA – CHINA : UTOPIAN ASPIRATION TO HARD REALITY CHECK

### INTRODUCTION

Prétendre que le monde soit en paix aujourd'hui par l'absence d'un conflit armé est illusoire. La guerre commerciale entre les deux grandes puissances mondiales est incontestablement existante et nous la ressentons collatéralement et profondément au Canada. L'état des affaires mondiales a été secoué le 18 octobre 2017 à l'ouverture du 19<sup>e</sup> Congrès national du Parti communiste chinois où son dirigeant livrait une déclaration tonnante visant à « assurer une 'victoire décisive' dans la construction d'une société modérément prospère 'à tous égards' et viser le grand succès du socialisme aux 'caractéristiques chinoises' pour une nouvelle ère »<sup>1</sup>. Le tout est authentifié par la consolidation du pouvoir trinitaire de Xi Jinping en supprimant les limites du mandat présidentiel pour les aligner à celles du Secrétaire-général du Parti communiste chinois (PCC).<sup>2</sup> Le pays des « pandas »<sup>3</sup>, estimé pour son potentiel d'affaire, présentait jusqu'à ce point une lueur d'espoir de rapprochement avec l'Occident. Or, en affirmant aussi solennellement son ambition hégémonique aux « caractéristiques chinoises » dans la région et le reste du monde, la Chine a certes mis au défi le statut « d'autorité humaine » des États-Unis, son rival matériel et idéologique, et les principes du libéralisme occidental.<sup>4</sup> Alors que les acteurs occidentaux s'empressent de répondre à cette nouvelle

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<sup>1</sup> Full text of Xi Jinping's report at 19th CPC National Congress, China Daily, sur internet: [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content\\_34115212.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content_34115212.htm), consulté le 14 mai 19.

<sup>2</sup> Health, Timothy R. *The Consolidation of Political Power in China Under Xi Jinping*, sur internet: [https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT500/CT503/RAND\\_CT503.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT500/CT503/RAND_CT503.pdf), consulté le 23 mai 19.

<sup>3</sup> Mulrone, David, *Middle Power, Middle Kingdom*, 2015, chap 13. Ce terme réfère à la diplomatie du panda, considérée comme l'un des seuls symboles du « *soft power* » du régime par son trait attrayant et unique.

<sup>4</sup> Xuetong, Yan. *Chinese Values vs. Liberalism: What Ideology Will Shape the International Normative Order?* Sur internet: <https://academic.oup.com/cjip/article/11/1/1/4844055#112389927>.

tournure, menaçant la déconstruction du fondement du système démocratique mondial et la sécurité de ses sociétés, la position du Canada semble avoir très peu bougée jusqu'aux récentes confrontations commerciales et juridiques de la Chine.

L'incompatibilité du régime chinois face aux valeurs occidentales concernant l'exploitation cybernétique telle que l'espionnage industrielle incluant l'atteinte à la propriété intellectuelle, le libre-marché et le respect des droits humains est pourtant bien documenté. En plus, l'intégration agressive de la Chine dans la réalité canadienne est exposée de plus en plus dans la littérature *mainstream* des experts en matière de sécurité et médiatique. Ne serait-il pas enfin le temps de dévoiler l'agenda réel de ce régime comminatoire ? Il est utopique d'espérer qu'il est possible de maintenir une saine relation où seules les idées traditionnelles et unidirectionnelles peuvent donner des résultats dans la poursuite des objectifs nationaux canadiens. Toutefois, l'inertie ou l'inaction du gouvernement canadien face aux percées troublantes de la PCC amène à poser de sérieuses questions sur l'efficacité dans la coordination des politiques des affaires étrangères, de sécurité et de défense canadiennes face aux réelles menaces contemporaines. Le but de cet essai est donc de valider le besoin critique et pressante de mettre en œuvre une stratégie canadienne pangouvernementale propre à la hausse du pouvoir aux « caractéristiques chinoises » et surtout aux perturbations subversives du PCC.

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“Clausewitz believes cunning ruses are the weapon of the weak; for Sun Tzu they are the weapon of choice. Clausewitz thinks spies untrustworthy and intelligence reports unreliable; Sun Tzu finds them indispensable. Clausewitz is the father of “conventional” war; Sun Tzu is the father of “unconventional” war... or whatever we’re calling it these days”.

- Sean McFate

### **PARADIGM SHIFT OF WARFARE**

The essay started with a bold statement, although it may have seemed silly or bluntly at best, that we are indeed at war, regardless of its form. For those who embrace the conventional realm of war making, that could have sound somewhat ridiculous. However, those inclined to be “unconventional thinkers” would not shy away from such claim given today’s realities in the global security environment. “War versus peace is enshrined in the Laws of Armed Conflict, the writings of Clausewitz, and conventional war theory.”<sup>5</sup> Traditionally, for war to be war, all instruments of national power had to be entangled in an interstate confrontation where the mightiest military display would determine the decisive victory for one side. This explains why Clausewitzian like-minded policymakers are much likely to suffer a “strategic atrophy” when it comes to institutionalize the concept of modern warfare into our respective national security, intelligence and defence apparatus today, resulting in the inability to win ‘wars’.<sup>6</sup> Simply put, it is DIME minus M (DIE) that dictates the outcome of future conflicts.

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<sup>5</sup> McFate, Sean. *The New Rules of War, Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder: Strategic Atrophy*.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

In the next sub-sections, key concepts and findings are presented, which are all relevant in understanding the attitude and behaviours of the asserted rival for the West. It is important to note that the real adversary consists mainly of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rather than China as a nation and its people. It is after all the CCP's objective to upset the current balance of power and the international system through direct asymmetrical actions. These measures and tactics are heritably driven by Sun Tzu's *Art of War*, *The Thirty-Six Stratagems* by an ancient unknown author<sup>7</sup> or *The Book of Swindles* by Zhang Yingyu from the Wanli period<sup>8</sup>. They all share a common idea of cultivating deception by avoiding blood which is fundamentally discordant with the Western approach of advocating upfront and 'bloody' transparency.

“The real problem is the [West] is playing Chess while China is playing Go”

- Sean McFate

### **1.1. Conventional warfare is irrelevant against PCC threats**

The main takeaway from Dr. McFate's new rules of war is that the world may not see another total war encompassing the use of military forces in achieving a decisive victory in the foreseeable future.<sup>9</sup> Why an organization such as the CCP would engage into an armed conflict in the first place? There is simply too much at stake while the CCP's goal is ensuring the prosperity of the Party.<sup>10</sup> There is no enticement for the CCP

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<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, Annex: The Thirty-Six Ancient Chinese Stratagems for War.

<sup>8</sup> Book review, retrieved from: <https://cup.columbia.edu/book/the-book-of-swindles/9780231178631>

<sup>9</sup> McFate, Sean. *The New Rules of War, Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder: Rule 1: Conventional War is Dead.*

<sup>10</sup> Asen, Eric. *China is Not Interested in War with America*, 24 Apr 19, retrieved from: <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/china-not-interested-war-america-54042>

to use its military power at high cost, tying it up into an opened battlespace, when it can achieve its strategic objectives using covert means that are way cheaper, faster and stealthier. The idea that China poses an imminent military threat against powerful States is a misconception led by faulty assumptions caused mainly by experts turning back to what they know, projecting battles that would resemble to World War II.<sup>11</sup> However, the competing issue for most NATO countries like Canada is that, as middle powers, they need to keep alliances relevant. By doing so, allied nations are pressured to deliver successful defence programs that are measured by the level of spending which translates into acquiring technologically advanced, heavy and powerful platforms. This is particularly due by the necessity of deterring the emergence of other CCP alike powers, such as Russia, Iran and North Korea military growth which remains defence priorities in the West and consequently hinders the ability to shift away from the conventional way of thinking, planning and countering irregular threats.

## **1.2. Grey (Gray) Zone**

As previously mentioned, the idea of a military implication in States' conflict resolution has become irrelevant. Over the years, the CPP has privileged the enlargement of the blurred line between peace and war. Dr. McFate argues that both war and peace always coexist.<sup>12</sup> The Grey zone is a geopolitical condition sought by the CCP where its freedom of action increases proportionally with the expansion of this uncertain and undefined area in the spectrum of conflict. The Grey zone is barely, if any, regulated, allowing the CCP to lesser the narrative in any situation of rising tension in order to

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<sup>11</sup> McFate, Sean. *The New Rules of War, Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder: Strategic Atrophy*.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, Rule 3: There is no Such Thing as War or Peace – Both Coexist, Always.



command a higher threshold of escalation toward war from other nations. “Governments cannot not respond if they talk of their jurisdiction being attacked. But if they use the language of peacetime, even if the peace is a dirty one, the threshold will be higher.”<sup>13</sup>

The CPP’s actions to extend the Grey Zone is observed in the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative and the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. They are unified under the concept of a ‘Peaceful Rise’, which is an attempt by China to be ‘accepted’ as a responsible nation, emphasising on soft power. Because it was perceived controversial by the rest of the world in accordance with the theory of hegemonic stability and that of offensive realism in international relation, it resulted in the replacement of the term to ‘Peaceful Development’.<sup>14</sup> An example of the emphasis on hard power is the implementation of the Three Warfares Strategy where the CCP influences its international and domestic perception while advancing its national interest and aiming to compromise its opponents' ability to respond through public opinion, psychological and legal warfares.<sup>15</sup> In such, arbitrarily building artificial islands from scratch in the disputed South China Sea has not shaped the same perceptions and legal implications as if the CCP would have taken over from a sovereign territory or water. “The Three Warfares Strategy succeeds because it is war disguised as peace. To the West, the South China Sea looks paradoxically like a ‘nonwar war’, and that’s how China

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<sup>13</sup> Raine, John. *War or Peace? Understanding the Grey Zone*, 03 Apr 19, Retrieved from: <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/04/understanding-the-grey-zone>.

<sup>14</sup> Pathak, Sriparna. *The “Peace” on China’s Peaceful Rise*, 15 Oct 15, retrieved from: <https://www.e-ir.info/2015/10/15/the-peace-in-chinas-peaceful-rise/>.

<sup>15</sup> Wibawa, Tasha. *China’s National Security and the ‘Three Warfares’: How Beijing decides Who or What to Target*, retrieved from: <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-02-26/chinas-three-warfares-how-does-beijing-decide-who-or-what-to/10825448>.

wants it.”<sup>16</sup> Policymakers shaping national security strategies attempt to apply as elastic a definition of the threat as possible, while ensuring that such strategies still meet conventional, standing defence obligations as well. But given the incremental growth of designated threats, this is not sustainable.<sup>17</sup>

### 1.3. Shadow Warfare

What exactly are those designated threats? They are CCP’s specific active measures to induce, seduce and exploit foreign States governing bodies and influent people by building leverage points so it can wield when needed to advance its interests.<sup>18</sup> The modern characteristics of the ‘Shadow Warfare’ which enable a deeper and cloaked offensive is the digital revolution. Dr. McFate argues that the “shadow war is powerful because it weaponizes information in an information age” where “plausible deniability is more decisive than fire power”.<sup>19</sup> Forms of action could be “extrajudicial kidnappings, harassment, and forced extraditions; economic dominance and theft; distortion of information presented in the media and institutions or financial support to prominent politicians and individuals”<sup>20</sup>. The United Front is the perfect weapon for the CCP as it

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<sup>16</sup> McFate, Sean. *The New Rules of War, Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder: Rule 3: There is no Such Thing as War or Peace – Both Coexist, Always*.

<sup>17</sup> Raine, John, *War or Peace? Understanding the Grey Zone*, 03 Apr 19, retrieved from: <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/04/understanding-the-grey-zone>.

<sup>18</sup> Kenney, Carolyn., Max Bergmann, James Lamond. *Understanding and Combating Russian and Chinese Influence Operations*, 28 Feb 19, retrieved from: <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2019/02/28/466669/understanding-combating-russian-chinese-influence-operations/>.

<sup>19</sup> McFate, Sean. *The New Rules of War, Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder: Rule 9: Shadow Wars Will Dominate*.

<sup>20</sup> Smith, Graeme, *China: Magic Weapons and ‘Plausible Deniability’*, 01 May 18, retrieved from: [https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/05/01/china\\_magic\\_weapons\\_and\\_plausible\\_deniability\\_113394.html](https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/05/01/china_magic_weapons_and_plausible_deniability_113394.html).

allows all sort of plausible deniability and it is well lively here in Canada in open sight, but somehow its activities went unremarked.

For many years, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) publicly warned about risks associated with the United Front activities in Canada but gained little traction in the political sphere.<sup>21</sup> In May 2018, CSIS published its first public report<sup>22</sup> called *Rethinking Security: China and the Strategic Rivalry* presenting numerous accounts of CCP's United Front activities within Western nations to “incorporate co-opting elites, information management, persuasion, as well as accessing strategic information and resources. It has also frequently been a means of facilitating espionage”<sup>23</sup>. However, the report lacks exposure of cases where Canadian targets have been compromised. In a recently published book called *Claws of the Panda: Beijing's Campaign of Influence and Intimidation in Canada*, Jonathan Manthorpe fiercely establishes facts of 150 years of Canada-China relationship. He exposes all publicly available reports and testimonies of incidents relating to CCP's interference from the moment both nations opened diplomatic relations in 1970<sup>24</sup> to the CCP's first foreign investment experience<sup>25</sup> to CCP strategies to gain information power in Canada and to

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<sup>21</sup> Manthorpe, Jonathan. *Claws of the Panda: Beijing's Campaign of Influence and Intimidation in Canada*, 2019, Introduction.

<sup>22</sup> Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *Rethinking Security: China and the Strategic Rivalry*, retrieved from: <https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/isis-scrs/documents/publications/CSIS-Academic-Outreach-China-report-May-2018-en.pdf>.

<sup>23</sup> Manthorpe, Jonathan. *United Front Main 'Soft-Power' Tool for China's Governing Communist Party*, 21 Mar 19, retrieved from: <https://ipolitics.ca/2019/03/21/united-front-main-soft-power-tool-for-chinas-governing-communist-party/>.

<sup>24</sup> Manthorpe, Jonathan. *Claws of the Panda: Beijing's Campaign of Influence and Intimidation in Canada* Chap 5, 2019. Controversy behind the life of Paul Lin who was an advisor to Pierre Trudeau in the establishment of diplomatic relations between Canada and China.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, Chap 6. One of the ten founding companies and financiers of the Canada China Trade Council formed in 1978 was the China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) who became the first investment experiment in foreign investment by a CCP owned company by acquiring 50 percent of a

intimidation tactics toward Canadian of Chinese heritage and Chinese dissidents. They are compelling incidents demonstrating how Canada lacks a clear understanding of CCP's capabilities and more broadly its inability to counter "shadow" State and its warriors.

#### **1.4. Partial conclusion**

Based on the *modus operandi* with "Chinese characteristics" described above, the CCP supports the use of non-military instruments of power to propel its "hard" climb to dominance and paradoxically uses its military force to operate within the limits of peace and war producing a euphemistic evaluation of the power relationship. The CCP exploits blind spots in the international system by manoeuvring within the confines of the legal and regulatory framework to advance the party's interests. CCP's attempts to influence Canadian politicians and policies, while trying to identify dissidents and steal scientific technology clearly demonstrates Canada's vulnerable position that warrants a comprehensive review on the effectiveness in the coordination of foreign affairs, security, intelligence and defense policies.

### **CANADIAN POLICY INSTRUMENTS**

The definition of a nation's foreign policy, inspired by H.J. Morghentau, is "both an expression of its international intentions and a roadmap for achieving its national interests beyond its borders. A country's international interests are highly dependent on its internal affairs and domestic policies, as well as its historical and geographic position

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paper mill owned by Power Corporation Canada. The transaction was facilitated by the founding Chairman himself, Paul Desmarais.

and culture”<sup>26</sup>. Canadian interests and values haven’t changed. Iterations in Canada’s foreign policy over time was ultimately driven by the necessity to incline toward either the internationalist, transatlantist or continentalist view while projecting itself through either a bilateralism or multilateralism approach.<sup>27</sup> Canada’s security and defence policies must be in line with the foreign affairs policy by integrating the most relevant threats to enhance Canada’s freedom of actions in achieving its national objectives both at home and abroad. The ultimate question resides whether Canadian policy instruments are agile enough to contain current threats of the CCP as described in the previous section.

## **2.1. Foreign Affairs Policy**

For many years and due to the lack of governmental direction, foreign affairs experts voiced the need for Canada to focus on Asia, particularly on the effects of a rapidly growing China. “Components of an effective foreign policy normally include strategies for protecting national security, promoting trade and economic interests, and playing a role on the global stage [and] it should cohere with domestic policy and advance national interests.”<sup>28</sup> However, as pointed out by Mark Randolph from the *Canadian Global Affairs Institute* in early 2019, there are series of discontinuities between these objectives and how Canada integrates emerging global challenges in the policy narrative. Even back in 2014, Wendy Dobson from the *School of Public Policy* argued that Canada needed a white paper on Asia which implied “the need for a strategic

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<sup>26</sup> Mank, Randolph. *Does Canada Needs a Foreign Policy Review?*, Jan 2019, retrieved from: [https://www.cgai.ca/does\\_canada\\_need\\_a\\_foreign\\_policy\\_review](https://www.cgai.ca/does_canada_need_a_foreign_policy_review).

<sup>27</sup> Mank, Randolph. *Does Canada Needs a Foreign Policy Review?*, Jan 2019, retrieved from: [https://www.cgai.ca/does\\_canada\\_need\\_a\\_foreign\\_policy\\_review..](https://www.cgai.ca/does_canada_need_a_foreign_policy_review..)

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

framework to replace the ad hoc, warm and cool politics of the past few years”. She prioritized the necessity to raise a Canada’s geopolitical profile, to develop the Canada brand and to liberalize trade and investment.<sup>29</sup> Back in late 2018, Grant Duckworth from the *Canadian International Council* raised the need for a “Made-in-Canada China Strategy” stating that “learning to understand China’s strategic advantages and vulnerabilities may also lead to the identification of partnership opportunities which are aligned with Canada’s national interests and future policy aspirations”.<sup>30</sup> Public diplomacy or pressure has certainly worked. As result, the Global Affairs Canada’s (GAC) narrative toward China has evolved within the past two reporting cycles. According to GAC Departmental Result Report for 2017-18, Canada conducted “25 high-level visits to China where 11 bilateral commitments were reached”<sup>31</sup> without offering further details though<sup>32</sup>. These visits were not assigned to any strategy nor action plan. However, GAC Departmental Plan for 2019-20 states that it will “advance a comprehensive engagement with China” while strengthening extant engagements with other Asian nations with the implementation of *Canada-Asia Advantage* outreach

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<sup>29</sup> Dobson, Wendy. *The Middle Power and the Middle Kingdom: Securing Canada’s place in the New China-U.S. Economic and Strategic World Order*, Apr 14, retrieved from: <https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/dobson-china-communique.pdf>.

<sup>30</sup> Duckworth, Grant. *A Made-in-Canada China Strategy for 2018?*, 10 Sep 18, retrieved from: <https://thecic.org/en/a-made-in-canada-china-strategy-for-2018/>.

<sup>31</sup> Government of Canada, *Global Affairs Canada: Departmental Result Report 2017-18*, retrieved from: [https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/publications/plans/drr-rrm/drr-rrm\\_1718.aspx?lang=eng](https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/publications/plans/drr-rrm/drr-rrm_1718.aspx?lang=eng).

<sup>32</sup> *Canada and China sign no-hacking agreement to protect trade secrets*, CBC News, 26 Jun 17, retrieved from: <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-china-no-hacking-agreement-1.4178177>. Among the bilateral commitments in 2017, "The two sides agreed that neither country's government would conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors".

strategy.<sup>33</sup> That must be the first time GAC pronounces a narrative that is coherent to today's reality regarding China and Asia.

## 2.2. National Security & Intelligence

Including the *National Security Green Paper 2016*, the current national security framework is mainly focussed on threats surrounding terrorism and radicalization to violence.<sup>34</sup> Although it is heavy in intelligence area treating modern cyber threats, the framework needs to integrate all elements of threats originating not only from non-state actors but from powerful States such as Russia and the CCP. That being said, as of June 2017, the *National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) Act* is enacted mandating a non-partisan review of “the legislative, regulatory, policy, administrative, and financial framework for national security and intelligence”.<sup>35</sup> According to NSICOP steering outline, the security area relates to all threats to security of Canada as defined in the *CSIS Act* while the intelligence area involves the use of clandestine, covert or privileged sources or methods affecting the rights of Canadians or where there are significant risks to the government.<sup>36</sup> This endeavour is an important step in modernizing the national security apparatus by addressing existing policy and structural gaps, especially for cases relating to CCP's espionage and foreign influence

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<sup>33</sup> Government of Canada, *Global Affairs Canada: Departmental Plan 2019-20*, retrieved from: [https://international.gc.ca/gac-amc/assets/pdfs/publications/plans/dp-pm/dp-pm\\_1920\\_en.pdf?\\_ga=2.254319821.439938031.1559593178-182442400.1531283463](https://international.gc.ca/gac-amc/assets/pdfs/publications/plans/dp-pm/dp-pm_1920_en.pdf?_ga=2.254319821.439938031.1559593178-182442400.1531283463).

<sup>34</sup> Government of Canada, *Our Security, Our Rights: National Security Green Paper, 2016*, retrieved from: <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/ntnl-scrt-grn-ppr-2016-bckgrndr/ntnl-scrt-grn-ppr-2016-bckgrndr-en.pdf>.

<sup>35</sup> National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, *Annual Report 2018*, 09 Apr 19, p.7-8, retrieved from: <http://www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2019-04-09/intro-fr.html>

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p.13.

and cyber threats<sup>37</sup>. The National Security and Intelligence Community is currently comprised of eight federal organizations entirely dedicated or in large part on security and/or intelligence supported by nine other federal partners contributing to those activities.<sup>38</sup> Under the NSICOP, the whole Community is united under the same goal and that is what Canada needs to face the challenges of one of its most important economic partner but at the same its prime security threats.

### **2.3. Defence Policy**

The *Strong, Secure, Engage (SSE)*, Canada's Defence Policy was developed "without the umbrella of an overall foreign policy review to provide context".<sup>39</sup> However, SSE is a comprehensive document where modern and future security environments have been integrated during the policy review. SSE is a valuable and adapted defence framework that suits its purpose and supports the achievement of Canadian national objectives. One area of the policy that merits a swift attention to better leverage a Canadian approach towards China is the domain of the Defence Diplomacy through active Global Defence Engagement activities. Canada needs to strengthen all its alliances such as the Five-Eyes, NORAD and NATO allies while forming new ties within the ASEAN community.<sup>40</sup> Most importantly, the Military Diplomacy needs to be upheld

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<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p.26-28.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p.20-21. Core Members: NSIA, CSE, CSIS, RCMP, DND/CAF, GAC, CBSA, ITAC

<sup>39</sup> Mank, Randolph. *Does Canada Need a Foreign Policy Review?*, Jan 2019, retrieved from: [https://www.cgai.ca/does\\_canada\\_need\\_a\\_foreign\\_policy\\_review](https://www.cgai.ca/does_canada_need_a_foreign_policy_review).

<sup>40</sup> SSE Defence Policy, p.90-92



through the Canadian Defence Attaché Office<sup>41</sup> in Beijing to keep situational awareness current while maintaining beneficial dialogue for both nations.

“When I say “trying very hard”, I don't mean to diminish the efforts by all the institutions that I consider tools in the China tool box; but as a country, we don't have a strategy for China and we are not focused enough”

- Sarah Kutulakos, Executive Director of the Canada China Business Council

“The Chinese Communist Party wakes up every day and thinks about how it can stay in power. That is its only objective all day, every day, and that will not change.”

- James Manicom, Centre for International Governance Innovation

### **CANADA'S “ONE” STRATEGY TOWARD CHINA**

Canada is in vital need to shift its view and approach toward PCC's hegemonic ambition by leveraging the Asian regional dynamics. However, it needs the political will and most notably the public support to do so. Providentially, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development embarked on a year long study of Canada's engagement in East Asia to address those issues. On November 2018, during the 42<sup>nd</sup> Parliament, 1<sup>st</sup> Session, the Committee presented its 20<sup>th</sup> Report with substantial findings and nine forceful recommendations that could be set as the underlying basis in the development of a first Canada's “One” Strategy toward China.

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<sup>41</sup> 1258-3-016, ADM(RS), *Evaluation of the Global Engagement/Military Diplomacy*, May 18, retrieved from: <https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/dnd-mdn/documents/reports/2018/reports-pubs-audit-eval/1258-3-016-evaluation-global-engagement-military-diplomacy-en.pdf>.

The striking aspect of this report is that the Committee integrated the most recent Chinese ambitious narrative from the 19<sup>th</sup> CPP National Congress, its capabilities but also its vulnerabilities enabling the focus on areas that are conducive for cooperation. China has become more assertive but it “doesn't have any appetite for war... because it can achieve everything it wants incrementally”<sup>42</sup>. From trade liberalization, to environmental protection, to counter-terrorism, there are few areas where cooperation with East Asia cannot help advance Canada's foreign policy objectives. Even in areas where both nations disagree, Canada is better placed to succeed when it engages effectively with the region. Canadian engagement in the region is effective but it believes more can, and should, be done. Recognizing China's weaknesses is paramount. China ranks 90th on the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index, it lacks many of the advantages of developed economies. China's ongoing efforts to reduce corruption and need to increase environmental protections are important focal points. The vulnerability of China's governance is also pointed out. “The CCP must actively enforce the political stability of the country as Chinese society views the regime as both a practical tool of coercion and a symbol of strength.” Without this unifying view, the country risks destabilizing and undermining the government's domestic legitimacy. Canada's relations with China, however, should not rest solely on economic ties. From peacekeeping and counter-terrorism, to combating climate change and promoting trade liberalization globally, there are numerous areas where Canada and China share enough common

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<sup>42</sup> House of Commons Canada, *Canada's Engagement with East Asia: Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development*, 42<sup>nd</sup> Parliament, 1<sup>st</sup> Session, Nov 18, p.8, retrieved from: <https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/42-1/FAAE/report-20/>.

interest to be effective partners. Even critics of the Chinese government generally agree that engaging with China is a necessity.<sup>43</sup>

The narrative is clearly much assertive to what Canada should stand for while opening opportunities for further engagements. As promulgated by Kevin Rudd, former Prime Minister of Australia and Student of China, future relations are predicated *Toward a New Framework of Constructive Realism for a Common Purpose*. He advocates that contested areas in relations be acknowledged as difficulties without derailing the entire relationship while these deep realist elements be matched by constructive engagement where true progress is possible. The constructive realism approach must be integrated in bilateral, regional and global relations.<sup>44</sup> The Standing Committee's recommendations seem to embrace this approach and should be the starting baseline while incorporating future security and intelligence recommendations from NSICOP review.

## CONCLUSION

This paper aimed at providing a decisive position why Canada is in need to develop and implement a “whole of government” Canadian Strategy toward China's asserted ambitions. The first part of this essay argued the critical necessity to shift from the western traditional way of thinking to what it is considered unconventional, asymmetrical or irregular concept in waging resolution of differences. This view allows policy and decision makers to grasp the fundamental differences of how world is seen

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<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p.10.

<sup>44</sup> Rudd, Kevin. *U.S.– China 21: The Future of U.S.– China Relations Under Xi Jinping*, Summary Report, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School, Apr 15, p.26-27, retrieved from: <https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf>

from a more “oriental” point of view. The second part confirmed the gaps within Canada’s system of tools and what are the areas that need an exhaustive review to better align with national objectives. And lastly, it was established how vital is for Canada to adopt a much adapted approach for future relations with China.

China rise is inevitable. It will be the predominant player in the world and ultimately be presented as a major partner for Canada. Whether Canada is currently stalled on a crossroad, in a dilemma between economic interests and promoting values, it is up to Canada to ensure how this relation will look like in the future. This is only achievable through a Strategic direction from the government unifying the effort and the vigilance of all institutions from private, public and academic sectors. Only then, Canada will stand firm on its core values while increasing engagement in all areas for cooperation.

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