

Canadian
Forces
College

Collège
des
Forces
Canadiennes



YES, MINISTER : ‘CREEPING POLITICIZATION’ IN PUBLIC COMMUNICATION

Major Douglas MacNair

JCSP 44

Exercise Solo Flight

Disclaimer

Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do not represent Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used without written permission.

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2019.

PCEMI 44

Exercice Solo Flight

Avertissement

Les opinions exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

© Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2019.

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

JCSP 44 – PCEMI 44

2017 – 2019

EXERCISE *SOLO FLIGHT* – EXERCICE *SOLO FLIGHT***YES, MINISTER: “CREEPING POLITICIZATION”
IN PUBLIC COMMUNICATION**

By Major Douglas MacNair

“This paper was written by a candidate attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.”

« La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale. »

YES, MINISTER: “CREEPING POLITICIZATION” IN PUBLIC COMMUNICATION

On May 13, 2015 the head of Canada’s independent, non-partisan public service convened a meeting of Deputy-Ministers to “discuss ways to insulate public servants from intense pressure to be ‘promiscuously partisan’ instead of neutral in carrying out the government's agenda.”¹ Although this phenomenon was not new in 2015, it had reached a level under the Conservative Government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper that led the Clerk of the Privy Council and her Deputy Ministers to discuss the matter with the goal of utilizing the upcoming Fall election as an opportunity to “reset”² the functioning of the Public Service. The Privy Council Office (PCO) summarized the problem as being "characterized by integration of governance and campaigning, partisan-political staff as a third force in public administration, politicization of appointments to the senior public service, and expectation that public servants should be promiscuously partisan."³

It is a principal of Westminster systems of government that “a professional and non-partisan federal public sector is integral to our democracy.”⁴ However, in recent decades, changes in political communication, political marketing and the evolution of the “continuous campaign” have seen partisanship creep into what is supposed to be non-partisan public-sector activities. Furthermore, as this paper will demonstrate, there is also evidence that the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), a unique government institution, has

¹ "Top Bureaucrats Reviewed 'creeping Politicization' of Public Servants | CBC News," CBCnews, November 02, 2015, accessed April 12, 2019, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/top-bureaucrats-met-to-resist-partisanship-imposed-on-public-service-1.3294972>.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, "Values and Ethics Code for the Public Sector," Canada.ca, August 24, 2017, accessed April 12, 2019, <https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=25049>.

also been penetrated by this “creeping politicization”⁵. This should be particularly concerning for CAF leadership as potential adversaries such as Russia and China increasingly turn to information operations to undermine our operational effectiveness and advance their own interests by spreading disinformation⁶. Credibility is needed to counter the false claims and doubts sowed by adversaries. Indeed, NATO doctrine is explicit “credibility and trust are vital attributes and must be protected”⁷, this refers to trust and credibility with domestic audiences and international partners. This paper will demonstrate that as information becomes a more common domain for conflict, it is in the best interest of the Government of Canada (GoC) and the CAF to respect the principal of a non-partisan CAF in order to guard its internal integrity and credibility as a legitimate, non-partisan government institution. Participation in partisan political communication will aid current and future adversaries by eroding the confidence of the Canadian public and international allies as it undermines the institutional legitimacy of the non-partisan, professional military force.

Background

To understand the relationship and the ensuing dynamics between partisan political actors and the non-partisan public service, the institutional analysis framework developed by Richard Scott will be used. Scott’s framework is based on three pillars that provide

⁵ "Top Bureaucrats Reviewed 'creeping Politicization' of Public Servants | CBC News," CBCnews, November 02, 2015, accessed April 12, 2019, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/top-bureaucrats-met-to-resist-partisanship-imposed-on-public-service-1.3294972>.

⁶ “Disinformation” is the English literal translation of the Russian term “dezinformatsiya” (дезинформация), coined by the Soviet Communist Party to refer to deliberate falsehoods manufactured for the purpose of pushing certain propaganda lines or policy objectives abroad. See www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2019/01/04/disinformation-vs-misinformation-clearing-up-major-errors-in-the-debate/

⁷ NATO, “Military Policy on Strategic Communications – Revised Fourth Draft”, Unclassified, not released to the public, May 29, 2017, 5.

institutional order: regulative, normative, and the cultural/cognitive pillar⁸. Regulative elements emphasize rule setting and sanctioning, normative elements are based on values and norms that outline preferred and legitimate behaviours. The cultural/cognitive pillar involves shared conceptions and frames through which meaning is understood. Each of Scott's pillars provide "a different rationale for legitimacy, either by virtue of being legally sanctioned, morally authorized, or culturally supported."⁹ The idea of social institution is fundamental in the social sciences, "society is possible only if there is a degree of cohesiveness and predictability in its fundamental dynamics."¹⁰ This cohesiveness and predictability are often considered as the two pillars of social order and institutions are considered in many ways to formalize these two pillars as they consist of both rules and sanctions that govern behaviours, and ways of thinking and feeling that govern attitudes.¹¹ These behaviours and attitudes reinforce each other in maintaining the internal integrity of institutions.

Internal integrity is important to military forces as they represent the state institution with the power to both preserve the state by defeating its enemies, or to overthrow the state if they become disloyal.¹² In western democracies, military forces strive to demonstrate they are worthy of this trust by demonstrating a high degree of

⁸ W. Richard. Scott, *Institutions and Organizations: Ideas, Interests and Identities* (Los Angeles: Sage, 2014).

⁹ Walter W. Powell, "The New Institutionalism," *Web.Stanford.edu*, accessed May 4, 2019, <https://web.stanford.edu/group/song/papers/NewInstitutionalism.pdf>, 2.

¹⁰ Eric Ouellet and Pierre C. Pahlavi, "Institutional Analysis and Irregular Warfare: A Case Study of the French Army in Algeria 1954–1960," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 34, no. 6 (2011): , doi:10.1080/01402390.2011.561078, 3.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 3-4. Here Ouellet and Pahlavi borrow from Michael Hechter and Christine Horne, 'The Problem of Social Order', in Michael Hechter and Christine Horne (eds), *Theories of Social Order* (Palo Alto: Stanford UP 2003); and Dennis H. Wrong, *The Problem of Order* (New York: Free Press 1995).

¹² Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," *Armed Forces & Society* 23, no. 2 (1996):, doi:10.1177/0095327x9602300203, 149.

professionalism founded upon the principal of civilian control.¹³ This non-partisan commitment to civilian control is the basis for the CAF institutional legitimacy within both the Government of Canada and the broader Canadian society.

The internal integrity of an institution is never assured and must be protected as the institution is influenced by environmental forces beyond its control.¹⁴ According to Durkheim, institutions can only ensure their existence by serving a legitimate social function,¹⁵ therefore, institutions seek to preserve their legitimacy in the face of environmental pressures and will engage in substantial adaptation “only if the threat coming from the environment against its institutional legitimacy is perceived as presenting more risks to its survival than the risks associated with fundamentally upsetting its internal integrity.”¹⁶ It is from this basis that this paper will continue to examine why the public service at large and the Department of National Defence (DND) and the CAF is having difficulty adhering to its own Code of Values and Ethics which clearly states in section 3.1 that all “DND employees and CAF members shall uphold Canada’s parliamentary democracy and its institutions by: Carrying out their duty and their duties in accordance with legislation, policies and directives in a non-partisan and objective manner.”¹⁷ Is it because, as Durkheim suggests, environmental threats are perceived to pose a greater risk to public service and CAF institutional survival than the

¹³ *Ibid.*, 153.

¹⁴ Ouellet and Pahlavi, *Institutional Analysis and Irregular Warfare...*, 800.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 801.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ National Defence, "Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces Code of Values and Ethics," Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces Code of Values and Ethics - Canada.ca, April 03, 2019, accessed April 18, 2019, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/benefits-military/defence-ethics/policies-publications/code-value-ethics.html>.

risk associated with ignoring a core principal of its own Code of Values and Ethics? We will return to this question later.

The Auditor General of Ontario provides a useful definition of partisanship as “any activity that may be viewed as promoting the governing party’s political interests by fostering a positive impression of the government or a negative impression of any group or person critical of the government”.¹⁸ This definition will be applied against case studies of public service and CAF communication to determine if partisanship was present.

The “non-partisan” Public Service

Many observers have noted that the public service communication function is particularly vulnerable to this “creeping politicization” with noted academic Peter Aucoin going so far as to declare “the communications function of government has become the black hole of impartiality”. In the past, this may not have been cause for the same degree of concern it is now. However, as stated earlier, the use of information operations by various foreign actors have increased to new levels across areas such as trade, human rights, and sovereignty to name but a few. Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election¹⁹ is one example, and as former Canadian Ambassador to China David Mulroney noted "China does have a strategy for influencing public opinion and

¹⁸ Ted Glenn, *Professional Communications in the Public Sector: A Practical Guide* (Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press, 2014). 20-21.

¹⁹ Brad Heath, "A Mountain of Evidence Points in One Direction: Russia Sought to Sway the 2016 US Election," *USA Today*, August 03, 2018, accessed May 11, 2019, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/08/03/russian-us-election-interference-donald-trump/878910002/>.

political opinion in other countries on issues that are important to China".²⁰ However, the example that best underscores the need for a non-partisan public sector is the recent resignation of Canada's former Clerk of the Privy Council, Michael Wernick.

Wernick stirred controversy when appearing before a parliamentary committee and making comments perceived as partisan by opposition members of parliament (MPs) as he defended his role in what the media labelled the SNC-Lavalin Affair. This led to opposition MPs to call for his resignation:

The Clerk of the Privy Council has put himself in a completely untenable situation as a non-partisan public servant. He is now a central figure in a serious political controversy. I've written to the Prime Minister calling for his resignation.²¹

Wernick's own resignation letter to the Prime Minister supports the critical importance of a non-partisan public service in a new climate of increased information operations:

One of the key roles of the Privy Council Office is to be ready to assist whichever government Canadians elect in October...It is now apparent that there is no path for me to have a relationship of mutual trust and respect with the leaders of the Opposition parties ... Therefore, I wish to relinquish these roles before the election. It is essential that Canadians continue to see their world-leading public service as non-partisan and there to provide excellent services to Canadians and the governments they elect...Furthermore, it is essential that during the writ period the clerk be seen by all political parties as an impartial arbiter of whether serious foreign interference has occurred.²²

In his letter to the Prime Minister, Wernick lands squarely upon why the public service must be non-partisan and must also be perceived as non-partisan in this new reality of

²⁰ Mike Blanchfield, "Beware Effects of China's 'united Front' in Canada: Former Envoy," CTVNews, December 08, 2017, accessed May 11, 2019, <http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/beware-effects-of-china-s-united-front-in-canada-former-envoy-1.3712754>.

²¹ "'There Is No Path for Me': Michael Wernick to Step down as Clerk of the Privy Council | CBC News," CBC news, March 18, 2019, accessed May 11, 2019, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/wernick-election-panel-snc-1.5060834>.

²² *Ibid.*

increased influence activities. The smooth functioning of a Westminster democracy requires an opposition to hold the government to account and that opposition could, at the drop of a writ, form the next government. Therefore, the opposition must have confidence that the public service is non-partisan, particularly in an age where the public service is now called upon to further safeguard our elections from foreign interference. Indeed, this relatively new responsibility of actively safeguarding federal elections from foreign interference is not unlike the duty charged to the CAF to protect the country against foreign adversaries. Such responsibilities require institutions to have a high level of institutional integrity with all Canadians regardless of their political leanings.

The resignation of Wernick is not the only evidence of partisanship in the public service. Several Canadian academics have studied the matter since the phenomenon of partisanship entering government communication was alleged to have increased under the leadership of the Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper. According to a journalist in Ottawa's Parliamentary Press Gallery, "in 2006, when Harper took over, he set about imposing his will on an Ottawa bureaucratic and media establishment that was largely hostile to him."²³ Stephen Maher goes on to point out that Harper exerted his will by "subjecting those departmental communications people to political control."²⁴ Harper implemented centralized control of the government communications function with all communications activities being vetted through the office of the Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Communications and Consultations), an organization that almost tripled in

²³ Province Opinion, "Stephen Maher: Stephen Harper's PR Obsession Is Fostering Paranoia and Paralysis in Public Service," *The Province*, December 02, 2011, accessed May 12, 2019, <https://theprovince.com/opinion/stephen-maher-stephen-harpers-pr-obsession-is-fostering-paranoia-and-paralysis-in-public-service>.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

size between 2001 and 2009.²⁵ Furthermore, the number of Information Services employees in the federal public service increased to 3,824, up from the 3,118 when Harper took office.²⁶ Donald Savoie wrote in 2013 that “Three things now dominate the agenda of a senior manager in Ottawa: the interdepartmental process; communications, as politics and governing have merged; and dealing with crisis.”²⁷ Of these three priorities, at least two are responsible for an increase in the number of federal public servants who play the role of what Savoie calls “spin doctor”; communications and dealing with crisis.²⁸ Furthermore, Savoie has succinctly identified the root of the problem for public service communicators, the fusing of politics and governing.

The term “permanent campaign” was popularized by Sidney Blumenthal in 1982, however, it was Professor Hugh Heclo who defined the term in a way that captures its current significance.²⁹ According to Heclo, the permanent campaign is a “nonstop process seeking to manipulate sources of public approval to engage in the act of governing itself”³⁰ in other words, Savoie’s merging of “politics and government”. This phenomenon has found its way to Canada as Canadian political parties have taken lessons from their American colleagues to the South³¹. Governing parties seek to use the powers of political office to their advantage and to manage the political risk that governing and

²⁵ *Ibid.*, The organization increased from 35 to 95 during that time period.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Donald J. Savoie, *Whatever Happened to the Music Teacher?: How Government Decides and Why* (Montréal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2014). 212.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 213.

²⁹ Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, *The Permanent Campaign and Its Future* (Washington, D.C: American Enterprise Institute, 2000). 219.

³⁰ Scott McClellan, *What Happened Inside the Bush White House and Washington’s Culture of Deception* (Public Affairs, 2009). 62.

³¹ David Myers Updated: September 13, "Harper's Conservatives Follow, in Lock-Step, the US Right Wing's Dirty Playbook," *Vancouver Sun*, September 13, 2010, accessed May 12, 2019, <https://vancouversun.com/news/community-blogs/harpers-conservatives-follow-in-lock-step-the-us-right-wings-dirty-playbook>.

policy and decision-making pose. Savoie refers to this as “avoiding sin” or “managing blame avoidance”³² and public service communicators have been drawn into this process because, as Savoie notes, in Ottawa it is “better not to sin than to ask for forgiveness”.³³

Savoie also points out that:

In the era of permanent election campaigns, access to information, and the new media, the avoidance of sin is even more important than in years past...politics, politicians and public servants remain joined at the hip. Any administrative matter, however trivial, can be turned into a hot political issue, casting the government in a negative light.”³⁴

Savoie notes that “policy making relies less and less on objective advice provided by public servants. It has become a matter of political opinion and has merged with communication.”³⁵ He also points out that this atmosphere has led some ambitious public servants to sense an opportunity to advance their careers by protecting the government’s political interests in lieu of their traditional role of offering non-partisan advice.³⁶

In 1963, the Glassco Commission rejected the “philosophy of the public relations man” in government by concluding that “the objective of being ‘well and favourably known’, so legitimate in competitive business, forms no part of public information policies of departments”,³⁷ clearly, much has changed since the Glassco Commission did its work. As Savoie noted, the new era of permanent election campaigns, access to information, and the new media is largely to blame for the current reality in government

³² Donald J. Savoie, *Whatever Happened to the Music Teacher?...225.*

³³ *Ibid.*, 224.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 225.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 240.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 225.

³⁷ David C.G. Brown, PhD, "The Administrative Dilemmas of Government Communications," Canadian Political Science Association 2012 Annual Conference, June 13, 2012, , <https://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2012/Brown-DCG.pdf>. 4.

communications, but there is more to consider. Although the Glassco Commission may have rejected the idea of the GoC engaging in public relations activities due to a “residual distaste” of government wartime propaganda activities conducted during WW II³⁸, the national unity crisis that emerged following the election of the Parti Québécois in November 1976 led the federal government to engage in a variety of communications activities ranging from normal media engagements to paid advertising to promote Canadian national unity and to hold the country together as the Quebec referendum approached.³⁹ It is beyond the scope of this essay to condone or condemn these actions, however, they did have a significant impact on the communications function in the Canadian federal public service as communicators engaged feverishly in activities to promote a federal policy agenda during a heated political period. This example indicates that there are circumstances where the work of exempt political staff who put forward policy with Ministers and public servants will overlap in a manner that may well be in the public interest. However, a healthy balance between politics and administration that reinforces institutional integrity must always be maintained. This does not exclude collaboration as political vision becomes policy, as Thomas Axworthy noted ““Partisans bring creativity; public servants provide perspective. The political arm makes things move; bureaucratic routines prevent errors””.⁴⁰

The CAF communication and policy advice function

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 4.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁴⁰ Charles Conteh, *Canadian Public Administration in the 21st Century* (Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis, 2014). 72.

Former CDS, General Rick Hillier once famously said of the CAF that "We are not the Public Service of Canada. We are not just another department. We are the Canadian Forces and our job is to be able to kill people."⁴¹ Hillier's observation that the CAF is unique amongst government entities has not protected it from the same "creeping politicization" that has afflicted the public service. The bifurcated DND and CAF is the largest federal department, both in terms of employees and size of budget, therefore, it can be a lightning rod for controversy in political Ottawa. Defence procurement is a constant headache for governments, particularly as the cost of defence technology continues to rise. Personnel issues ranging from pay and benefits to sexual assault and harassment dominate headlines about the CAF. In Savoie's world of "avoiding sin", it is difficult for an entity the size of the DND/CAF, charged as it is with a complex mandate, to stay out of the crosshairs of political and media criticism. Furthermore, as a bifurcated department, the CAF communications function is inextricably entwined with the public service. DND/CAF communications are led by the Assistant-Deputy Minister (Public Affairs) (ADM (PA)), a civilian who answers to both the Deputy Minister and the CDS. This ADM (PA) also coordinates interdepartmentally and with central government agencies that control and coordinate government communications. The extent to which partisan communication has entered the DND/CAF communication's function varies depending on the type of issue. Infrastructure and procurement are as affected as any other federal department and perhaps more so due to their politically charged nature. Military operations such as those conducted in Afghanistan were impacted, but to a lesser

⁴¹ Bruce Champion-Smith and Les Whittington, "Hillier Brought Candour to Role," *Thestar.com*, April 16, 2008, accessed May 26, 2019, http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2008/04/16/hillier_brought_candour_to_role.html.

extent as war by its very caustic and toxic nature is not conducive to “spin”. Two specific recent events have raised questions about the institutional integrity of the CAF; the fighter-jet capability-gap and the charges levelled, then stayed against Vice-Admiral Mark Norman. Both incidents are alleged by some defence analysts to represent government attempts “to circumvent established processes to meet their partisan interests.”⁴²

In the case of the fighter-jet replacement, the allegations are that the current Liberal Government has implemented partisan measures to protect an “poorly-conceived”⁴³ campaign promise to not purchase the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and that the government has gone to great lengths to protect its position. Included in this is the allegation that the GoC has ignored advice from experts and that senior DND officials have supported the government narrative. The MLI report quotes media sources as saying:

The Liberal government is intent on buying Super Hornet fighter jets, according to multiple sources. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s cabinet reportedly discussed the issue last week, and while no formal decision was taken, one top-level official said: “They have made up their minds and are working on the right narrative to support it.”⁴⁴

Furthermore, the GoC imposed “gag-orders” on those working on the project and defence contractors involved to stifle leaks and subsequent criticism.⁴⁵

⁴² "Assessing the Damage from Canada's Fighter Replacement Fiasco," Macdonald, May 06, 2019, , accessed May 20, 2019, <https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/assessing-damage-canadas-fighter-replacement-fiasco-new-mli-report/>. 2.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 2.

The real facts behind the charges against Vice-Admiral Norman are not known but have been the subject of much media and political speculation resulting in calls for public enquiries and the resignation of the CDS. While we do not know the facts behind the charges, we do know the incident has harmed the institutional integrity of the CAF as the current popular allegation is that Vice-Admiral Norman was unfairly dismissed from his post to support a political desire for retribution. Richard Shimooka has inferred that the dismissal of, and charges against Vice-Admiral Norman were far more effective than any gag-order in demonstrating the government's will to avoid criticism of its partisan activities.⁴⁶

This paper has raised issues within the public service and the CAF that are governed by Scott's regulatory pillar. Both the public service and the CAF have a code of ethics and values that demands non-partisan behaviour; however, we see that this regulated behaviour has been supplanted by a "normative" belief that it is acceptable to engage in, or at least support, partisan activity in the current environment. The reasons for this are likely complex and merit further study for the CAF as most academic inquiry focuses on the public service. However, given the preeminent principal of civilian control of the military and the extent to which this is inculcated in military officers, we should not be completely surprised that military leaders are willing to follow the lead of partisan political actors. Also, senior appointments in the public service and the CAF are overseen by the political level and it is human nature to wish to curry favour with those who can further your career. Also, the DND/CAF has experienced decades of boom and bust funding cycles; the GoC is literally the "hand that feeds" the vital financial resources

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

required to maintain a functioning national defence apparatus, therefore, DND/CAF leaders may feel obligated to “go along to get along” in the hopes that their behaviour results in equipment purchases, needed policy decisions and funding allocations. However, this pragmatic approach must be weighed against the social science theory upon which institutional integrity is built and maintained. In an environment where credibility is needed to counter-balance false allegations, institutions must have a relationship built on trust with their publics. Military and public service leaders are not politicians and should avoid being drawn into the world of political communication and marketing. Institutions build trust by demonstrating they can be held to account. As former U.S. Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Brent Colburn recently said:

“Military public affairs is, and should be, fundamentally different from political communications...political communications is about winning elections—while military public affairs is, at its core, about accountability.”⁴⁷

This accountability ranges from what we do with large budget we are allocated, to how we care for the personnel under our command and it represents a staggering degree of responsibility. The credibility and integrity we have developed over time is perishable and can be impacted by a large scandal, or a thousand small ones.

⁴⁷ "Dust Off The Podium," Modern War Institute, April 22, 2019, accessed May 20, 2019, <https://mwi.usma.edu/dust-off-podium/>.

Bibliography

- "Assessing the Damage from Canada's Fighter Replacement Fiasco." Macdonald. May 06, 2019. Accessed May 20, 2019. <https://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/assessing-damage-canadas-fighter-replacement-fiasco-new-mli-report/>.
- From Max Weber: *Essays in Sociology*, edited by H. H. Gerth, C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.
- Aucoin, Peter. "New Political Governance in Westminster Systems: Impartial Public Administration and Management Performance at Risk." *Governance* 25, no. 2 (2012): 177-99. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0491.2012.01569.x.
- Brown, David C.G., PhD. "The Administrative Dilemmas of Government Communications." Canadian Political Science Association 2012 Annual Conference, June 13, 2012, 1-20. <https://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2012/Brown-DCG.pdf>.
- Clegg, Stewart, and James Russell Bailey. *International Encyclopedia of Organization Studies*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2007.
- Conteh, Charles. *Canadian Public Administration in the 21st Century*. Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis, 2014.
- Cornelissen, Joep P., Rodolphe Durand, Peer C. Fiss, John C. Lammers, and Eero Vaara. "Putting Communication Front and Center in Institutional Theory and Analysis." *Academy of Management Review* 40, no. 1 (2015): 10-27. doi:10.5465/amr.2014.0381.
- Defence, National. "Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces Code of Values and Ethics." Department of National Defence and Canadian Forces Code of Values and Ethics - Canada.ca. April 03, 2019. Accessed April 15, 2019. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/benefits-military/defence-ethics/policies-publications/code-value-ethics.html>.
- "Dust Off The Podium." Modern War Institute. April 22, 2019. Accessed April 25, 2019. <https://mwi.usma.edu/dust-off-podium/>.
- Feaver, Peter D. "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control." *Armed Forces & Society* 23, no. 2 (1996): 149-78. doi:10.1177/0095327x9602300203.
- Glenn, Ted. *Professional Communications in the Public Sector: A Practical Guide*. Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press, 2014.
- Government of Canada, Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy. Ottawa: Queen in Right of Canada, 2017.
- Griffith, Andrew. "Resetting Citizenship and Multiculturalism." *Optimum Online* 43, no. 2 (June 2013): 1. <http://search.ebscohost.com.cafvl.idm.oclc.org/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=90544813&site=ehost-live&scope=site>.

- Mann, Thomas E., and Norman J. Ornstein. *The Permanent Campaign and Its Future*. Washington, D.C: American Enterprise Institute, 2000.
- Marland, Alex. "Above and below the Line: Strategic Communications and Media Management in Canadian Governments." *Canadian Public Administration* 60, no. 3 (2017): 417-37. doi:10.1111/capa.12222.
- McClellan, Scott. *What Happened Inside the Bush White House and Washingtons Culture of Deception*. Public Affairs, 2009.
- Ouellet, Eric, and Pierre C. Pahlavi. "Institutional Analysis and Irregular Warfare: A Case Study of the French Army in Algeria 1954–1960." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 34, no. 6 (2011): 799-824. doi:10.1080/01402390.2011.561078.
- Pahlavi, Pierre C., and Eric Ouellet. "Institutional Analysis and Irregular Warfare: Israel Defense Forces during the 33-Day War of 2006." *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 23, no. 1 (2012): 32-55. doi:10.1080/09592318.2012.632854.
- Savoie, Donald J. *Whatever Happened to the Music Teacher?: How Government Decides and Why*. Montréal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2014.
- Scott, W. Richard. *Institutions and Organizations: Ideas, Interests and Identities*. Los Angeles: Sage, 2014.