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RUSSIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE USE OF FORCE

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Exercise Solo Flight

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RUSSIA, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE USE OF FORCE

INTRODUCTION

The impact and significance of security is very much at the forefront of European integrated defense efforts. For example the Ukrainian Crimea region and the Eurozone on relations between some of the European Union's three principal member states, England, France and Germany as well as their individual influence and roles within the European Union is being tested. The Crimea crisis and Eurozone have revealed and intensified longer-term developments in present-day European politics with the emergence of a merged defense approach. As a result, it appears as though Europe's defense approach might be entering a new era. ¹

The purpose of this essay will be to analyze Russia's projection of force in regards to the Crimea region and the emergence of an integrated defense within the European Union. Also, an examination will be made vis-à-vis the ability and effectiveness of this new impetuous to an integrated defense in the EU. Moreover, a discussion on how the EU is able to deter Russia's recent aggression despite the fact that Russia invariably possess an impressive conventional and nuclear force. Additionally, the general elements of European national power, a short historical overview, its interests, and use of force in world affairs will be discussed specific to the Crimea Crisis. Lastly, using the DIME model, an analysis will be made in order to examine how Russia projects itself regionally and globally. ²

¹ Krotz, Ulrich, and Richard Maher. "Europe's crises and the EU's 'big three'." *West European Politics* 39, no. 5 (2016). P. 1053.

² Pinder, John, and Simon Usherwood. "The EU and the rest of Europe." In *The European Union: A Very Short Introduction*, edited by John Pinder and Simon Usherwood. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. P. 112.

HISTORY OF EUROPEAN NATIONAL POWER

Many Factors can hinder the emergence of an integrated defense within Europe. The historic evolution of regional identity has changed substantially over the last few decades. Some institutions, such as NATO and the European Union, have acted based on humanitarian justifications for using military force during a given crisis beyond their own regional boundaries. For example, Operation Allied Force in Kosovo and Operation Artemis in the DRC.³

Many historical and contemporary integrated alliances exist and contribute to the overall European defense in present day. For example, some of these alliances include the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Western European Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and Collective Security Treaty Organization.

While arms proliferation, sub-state extremism, transnational crime state capacity are prominent issues that affect Europe, the most relevant and salient issues in the twenty-first century may shift away from strategic influences such as climate change and migrate to strategic security. For example, most of the refugees arriving in Europe are categorized as those individual fleeing civil war and unrest. Europe is now dealing with the second-order effects of migration. They are also dealing with climate change that has undermined agriculture and increase competition for water and food resources. More recently, Europe has been face with the Crimea Crisis that appears once again to have shifted the focus to security.⁴

³ Pinder, John, and Simon Usherwood. "The EU and the rest of Europe." In *The European Union: A Very Short Introduction*, edited by John Pinder and Simon Usherwood. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. P. 112.

⁴ Werz, Michael, and Max Hoffman. "Europes twenty-first century challenge: climate change, migration and security." *European View* 15, no. 1 (2016). P. 145.

THE CRIMEA CRISIS AND EUROPEAN NATIONAL POWER

From a historical perspective and to a great extent in present day, France, Germany and England has had an enduring effect within the Eurozone. In fact, these nations have evolved and continued to be great military powers, as well as economic. Moreover, there are many suggestions that they will continue to emerge now and into the future as the most influential major powers in the region.⁵

In general, the Eurozone security management remains mostly unaffected except for the growing tension presented in Eastern Ukraine. Tensions in this region have resulted in influencing important identity divisions. A salient concern in this regard is the increasing gap between Crimea in Eastern Ukraine and the Eurozone.⁶ The tensions in the Crimea region have progressively increased to an important level in part due to the development of a so called Russian super-power that has re-emerged. This is seemingly an attempt by Russia to attempt a potential return to its former posture during the Soviet Union era. A returning Russia and a distracted Eurozone raises the question of how Russia may hinder the common security management of the region.

For a number of reasons, Russia is a formidable player both at the regional and global level in terms of its positioning within Europe. As previously discussed, this influence is

⁵ Krotz, Ulrich, and Richard Maher. "Europe's crises and the EU's 'big three'." *West European Politics* 39, no. 5 (2016). P. 1053.

⁶ Pinder, John, and Simon Usherwood. "The EU and the rest of Europe." In *The European Union: A Very Short Introduction*, edited by John Pinder and Simon Usherwood. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. P. 112.

connected intimately with an internal drive for a return of a Russian presence regionally and globally. How Russia relates to its neighbors, how they react to its posturing, how the US and other NATO partners relate to one and other all play a significant role.⁷

Recently Russia has been much more hostile, affirming its position in a territorial dispute in the Ukraine. It has postured an expanding military presence, and continues to take an uncompromising approach both nationally and internationally.⁸

In recent history, Russia has instigated an important campaign to expand and strengthen its grasp in the Crimea region. This was realized by activities such as the use of land based armed forces to advance on the region. This operation can also be further exemplified by the regular presence in regional adjacent waters. For example, Russia's military has conducted many naval patrols in the region further projecting power and influence using important naval assets.⁹

Considering the important economic influence Russia has on the region as well as having an extremely large, capable and important military power, Russia remains one of the most powerful entities in the world and more specifically as a regional authority in Crimea.

It is anticipated that by using elements of soft and hard power Russia will be able to continue to project power in the region without difficulty. Its International objectives in relation

⁷ Mearsheimer, J. "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault." *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 5 (2014). P. 77.

⁸ Roberts, Kari. "Understanding Putin: The politics of identity and geopolitics in Russian foreign policy discourse." *International Journal* 72, no. 1 (2017). P. 28.

⁹ Mankoff, Jeffery. "Russia's Latest Land Grab: How Putin Won Crimea and Lost Ukraine." *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 3 (2014). P. 60.

to the Crimea Region is expected to continue and form a large part of their internal foreign policy activities.

Over the last few years disputes in the Crimea seem to be ongoing and will probably continue to generate new security pressures within the Ukraine and by extension all of Europe. Russia's national power will undoubtedly be the single most influential factor when trying to predict the future course of both the conflict in the Crimea and the overall security stability in Europe.

USE OF FORCE AND THE CRIMEA CRISIS

The use of force in world affairs has evolved to a point that raises questions as to its relevance and efficacy. Many authors actually believe that the notion of use of forces is a strategy that is no longer efficient to the point of being obsolete. Some of the research in this area actually challenges the "conventional wisdom that violent resistance against conventionally superior adversaries is the most effective way for resistance groups to achieve policy goals".¹⁰ In its place, it is argued that nonviolent confrontation is a more effective substitute that can be just as effective when challenging democratic and non-democratic opponents. It is further argued that it may in fact be more effective than the use of force or violent methods.

The security stability in response to Russian aggression seems to rely heavily on its collective ability to establish deterrence. Central to the discussion on deterrence in relation to

¹⁰ Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. "How Civil Resistance Works." P. 13.

Russian actions is the fact that Nuclear powers such as France may in fact be of paramount importance. Furthermore, the French re-integration in NATO, and a clear pursuit of its own defense policies, continuing to rest in large part on nuclear deterrence. While it is evident that France cannot offensively compete with Russia on nuclear force, they would nevertheless be expected to retaliate. This fact alone could be one of the main factors slowing Russia's true desire to take hold of anything outside of the Crimea region.

The use of nonviolence confrontation is generally defined as a non combatant centered technique used to wage conflict through "social, psychological, economic, and political means without the threat or use of violence".¹¹ This technique includes acts of passivity, acts of action, or in a majority of cases, a mixture of both. Various researchers have identified hundreds of nonviolent techniques to include figurative protests, economic embargoes, employment strikes, political and social disobedience, and nonviolent intervention. The proposed argument here is that "nonviolent struggle takes place outside traditional political channels, making it distinct from other nonviolent political processes such as lobbying, electioneering, and legislating". Some research involving comparative analysis has found that non-violent resistance has the likelihood of being more effective overall when compared to violent means, in the end realizing similar strategic objectives.¹²

The counter argument to this however, is the notion that military power provides a degree of security that underlies many of the conflicts worldwide. In other words, use of non-violent

¹¹ Stephan, Maria J., and Erica Chenoweth. "Why Civil Resistance Works." P. 302

¹² Stephan, Maria J., and Erica Chenoweth. "Why Civil Resistance Works." P. 302.

techniques may have more traction in present day however should military powers diminish to a point that creates a weakness, this form of use of force may return as a vulnerability. From this aspect, notwithstanding the effectiveness of non-violent methods, the role of military and more specifically nuclear offensive capabilities is likely to persist in order to balance power in world politics especially when examining the Russian posturing in the Crimea region.

The use of force in the Crimea by Russia, while mostly unopposed is backed with the prospect of military might to the highest degree. In essence, Russia is a nuclear world power with a highly capable military arsenal that would deter most nations from even slowing them down in their attempt to annex new territory in the Ukraine. Similarly, the Eurozone in the face of this reality has responded using soft approaches relying on international pressure and soft military presence in the region. In this case it appear that Russia's military power still provides a degree of influence that underlies many of the conflict worldwide. In other words, use of non-violent techniques may have more traction in present day as mentioned earlier but not without the ability or perception of being able to use force. I think that while influence activities play an important role in the Eurozone vis-à-vis the Crimea crisis the requirement to have military forces to act or at the very least deter activities posed by Russia remains relevant and primordial.

RUSSIAN NATIONAL POWER DIME ANALYSIS

Russia's capability and abilities to project power in the Crimea region can be analyzed using the essentials of national power through Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic means also known as the DIME analysis. Furthermore, many characteristics of the DIME can demonstrate Russia's ability to exert power and influence in the Crimea region. Influence and

ability to project power in this region can be captured bearing in mind elements of the DIME in order to examine Russia's national power at large. The DIME model involves four distinct elements and is shown below using the former and newer proposed model.




Figure 1: Traditional and suggested DIME concepts (Liles, 2009)

Russia has progressively grown the capability to project influence in the Crimea region. Traditionally Russia was able to use 'hard' and 'soft' power in order to shape other nations using elements of appeal and attraction. Soft power can be defined as a non-coercive approach to projecting influence.¹³ Some of the fundamental elements of soft power include those found within the diplomatic realm, specifically; culture, political values, and foreign policies. Essentially, soft power is the ability for a country to get other countries to desire the same things it aims to achieve.

¹³ Nye, J., S. (2008). Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*.

Most of the DIME elements deal with some form of ability to project power for instance Russia's ability to project power and influence in the region. For example, the Diplomatic line of National Power relates to the efforts of diplomatic engagement, and intuitively the discipline of diplomacy. In this case, Russia can be seen as a soft power based on the type of diplomatic actions they utilise to influence other countries in order to increase strategic advantage in the area. The Diplomatic element of DIME is further defined as the king of power that centres on three main properties: its culture, its political values, and its foreign policies.¹⁴ These characteristics are of course reliant on the positive aspects they can hope to project. For example, the positive aspects in these areas would need to demonstrate that the political values, foreign policies, and culture are desirable. In essence, only those aspect that are perceive as positive could be useful when projecting power. As a result, many of the Diplomatic properties do not reflect positively when we look at Russia's track record on human rights, democratic processes, and foreign policies.¹⁵ The Crimea dispute in this case could be highlighted by positive aspects such as assisted aid in the region and new modernisations such as the development of important infrastructure, and securing sea passages. This in turn could eventually assist Russia in gaining legitimacy in the region. In a similar way, the element of Information within the DIME concept can also play an important part in regards to Russia's capacity to project power in the Crimea region.¹⁶

The Information element within the DIME analysis is an area that examines the ability for a country to share knowledge and information with others. For the Crimea region, Russia

¹⁴ Kem, Jack D. "Understanding the Operational Environment: The Expansion of DIME." *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin* 33, no. 2 (Apr, 2007). P. 49.

¹⁵ Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States*, Chapter 1, Section 9, Page I-12-I-14.

¹⁶ Davidson, Lisa. "Analysing the Characteristics of Middle Power Cyber Capability." *Academic Conferences International Limited*, 06, 2017. P.569

would arguably need to include strategic assistance to address security in the region, as well as education and information on infrastructure development.

The military characteristic of national power for Russia are summarized by its ability to use military forces and weaponry effectively. In regards to the power it can apply in the region, Russia's military might is seen as more than capable and very much an area of influence that overwhelms most regional nation states within the Eurozone. Russia's Military efforts and effectiveness is extremely high and could arguably be the most influential of all the DIME elements.¹⁷

The economic element of DIME encompasses the amount of economic influence a given nation could have on an international scale. Furthermore, it will also involves the amount of influence that is projected around the world in areas such as economic aid initiatives and its own currency within the world market. In Russia's case, the reach and influence that exist on the international stage is far reaching and extremely complex. Also, Russia's economic importance in Europe especially in the area of natural resources makes it an important and relied upon player. As such, its ability to use economics to project power in the Crimea region is substantial.¹⁸

CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding the some of the economic success and continued prosperity in the European region, real and troubling security challenges remain. Regional clashes still appear to

¹⁷ Davidson, Lisa. "Analysing the Characteristics of Middle Power Cyber Capability." Academic Conferences International Limited, 06, 2017. P.571

¹⁸ Nye, J., S. (2008). Public Diplomacy and Soft Power. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616(1).

exist in various places notably in the Crimea Region. During recent years disputes in the Crimea seem to be ongoing and will undoubtedly continue to generate new security realities. Russia's national power will assuredly be the most significant factor when trying to predict the future course of both the conflict in the Crimea and by extension the Eurozone security apparatus.

It is predictable that by carefully using elements of both soft and hard power that Russia will be able to project power in the region effortlessly now and into the future. Its transnational objectives in relation to the Crimea region is expected to persist and form a salient part of their internal foreign policy activities. The integrated defense in the EU and ability to collectively provide deterrence to these aggressions appears to be passive in many regards. Also, some elements of non-polarity in the Eurozone would indeed limit their ability to exert Power. As a result, the ability to affect the behavior of Russia may continue to be challenging and perhaps hinges on the perceived ability to use maximum military force, that being nuclear military arsenal. In this case, the use of a combined hard power and Soft power will be salient in juggling the power struggle in a volatile region.¹⁹

In conclusion, the purpose of this essay will be to analyze Russia's projection of force in regards to the Crimea region and the emergence of an integrated defense within the European Union. Also, an examination was made in regards to the ability and effectiveness of this new impetuous to an integrated defense within the EU. Moreover, a discussion on how the EU is able to deter Russia's recent aggression despite the fact that Russia invariably possess an impressive conventional and nuclear force was made. Additionally, the general fundamentals of European

¹⁹ Haas, Richard. "The Age of Nonpolarity." *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 3 (May/June 2008). P. 44.

national power, a short historical overview, its interests, and use of force in world affairs was discussed specific to the Crimea Crisis. Finally, using the DIME model, an analysis was made in order to examine how Russia projects itself regionally, globally, and the degree to which these objectives can be achieved.²⁰

²⁰ Pinder, John, and Simon Usherwood. "The EU and the rest of Europe." In *The European Union: A Very Short Introduction*, edited by John Pinder and Simon Usherwood. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. P. 112.

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