

Canadian
Forces
College

Collège
des
Forces
Canadiennes



POLICY SOLUTIONS THAT MITIGATE REPUTATIONAL RISK RAISED BY CANADIAN ARMED FORCES MEMBERS IN THE CIVILIAN DOMAIN

Major Michael E. Bennett

JCSP 44

Exercice Solo Flight

Disclaimer

Opinions expressed remain those of the author and do not represent Department of National Defence or Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used without written permission.

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2019.

PCEMI 44

Exercice Solo Flight

Avertissement

Les opinions exprimées n'engagent que leurs auteurs et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite.

© Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2019.

CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES

JCSP 44 – PCEMI 44
2017 – 2019EXERCISE *SOLO FLIGHT* – EXERCICE *SOLO FLIGHT***POLICY SOLUTIONS THAT MITIGATE REPUTATIONAL RISK RAISED BY
CANADIAN ARMED FORCES MEMBERS IN THE CIVILIAN DOMAIN**

By Major Michael E. Bennett

“This paper was written by a candidate attending the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one of the requirements of the Course of Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus contains facts and opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Canadian Department of National Defence. This paper may not be released, quoted or copied, except with the express permission of the Canadian Department of National Defence.”

« La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale. »

POLICY SOLUTIONS THAT MITIGATE REPUTATIONAL RISK RAISED BY CANADIAN ARMED FORCES MEMBERS IN THE CIVILIAN DOMAIN

“You can’t surge trust.”

Admiral William McRaven, Commander SOCOM, quoting a mantra of the SOF community¹

Introduction

In 1993, Shidane Arone, a teenaged non-combatant detainee, was murdered by Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) members in Somalia.² The events that followed Arone’s death led to the greatest realization of reputational risk³ the CAF has experienced to date. The result of the awareness that CAF members’ reprehensible behavior occurred at the intersection of a military operation with the civilian domain was a public horrified by how their soldiers’ treated civilians. With confidence lost in the CAF, the Government of Canada called an inquiry.⁴ Since the nadir of the CAF reputation following the Somalia Affair in the 1990s, a great deal has been done to restore public confidence. Stemming from the inquiry, the CAF re-affirmed subordination to the body politic, re-organized the military and trained members to be ethical practitioners of the profession of arms.⁵

For the CAF, a reputational risk is the perception that the military is not able to act or is acting unethically or inappropriately. Negative perceptions of the CAF held within

¹ Stephen Horan. “Admiral William McRaven Praises ‘Fantastic’ Obama, Discusses Afghanistan.” *Defence Media Network*. 30 July 2012. <https://www.defensemianetwork.com/stories/mcraven-praises-fantastic-obama-discusses-afghanistan-and-non-kinetic-sof-operations/>

² David Bercuson. “Up from the ashes: the re-professionalization of the CF after the Somalia Affair.” *Canadian Military Journal*. Vol 9 No 3. 2009. 32

³ **Reputational risk** is defined in the business world as, “... the risk of possible damage to [the business’] brand and or reputation, and the associated risks to earnings, capital or liquidity arising from any association, action or inaction which could be perceived by stakeholders to be inappropriate, unethical or inconsistent with the [businesses] values and beliefs.” Deutsche Bank. “Reputational Risk Management,” last modified 22 January 2019. <https://www.db.com/cr/en/concrete-management-of-reputational-risks.htm>

⁴ David Bercuson. “Up from the ashes....” *Canadian Military Journal*. Vol 9 No 3. 2009. 32.

⁵ Ibid. 36-38

the civilian domain (the Government of Canada, Canadian population, partner organizations, businesses or foreign government/population in an area where CAF members are located) have the ability to impinge on the CAF by creating frictions in the conduct of operations or administrative dealings.

Most CAF interactions in the civilian domain are governed in some way by policy. Notably, the network of PA officers across the CAF guide and advise a highly educated senior leadership during interactions based on directives⁶ and a strategic plan.⁷ The PA mandate, however, does not normally cross into the area of CAF member individual engagements outside of the media. Operationally, most of the missions given to CAF in, Strong Secure Engaged (SSE), require face-to-face engagement in the civilian domain⁸ which flows into *Canadian Forces Joint Publication 01: Canadian Military Doctrine* (CFJP 01) that details numerous instances wherein CAF members must operate and engage with civilians.⁹ Administratively, the day to day conduct of defence that see Canadian military members interacting with civilians outside of the defence community are informed by orders and directives issued through the CAF/Department of National Defence (DND) (such as the Defence Administrative Orders and Directives – DAOD), and other government departments (OGD) policies.¹⁰

⁶ Canada. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. *Defence Administrative Orders and Directives 2008-0 Public Affairs Policy*. Last Modified 19 April 2017. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/defence-administrative-orders-directives/2000-series/2008/2008-0-public-affairs-policy.html>

⁷ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Stakeholder Engagement A National Strategic Plan 2017-2020*. Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs) and Director General Public Affairs. 8 February 2018.

⁸ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Strong Secure Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*. Minister of National Defence. 2017. 106.

⁹ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Canadian Forces Joint Publication 01: Canadian Military Doctrine*. Ottawa: Joint Doctrine Branch. 2009. 2-2, 2-6,3-4, 3-6, 4-4, 5-6, 5-7, 6-4, 6-6, 6-8 – 6-13.

¹⁰ Canada. National Defence Policies and Standards website. Last modified 19 March 2019. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards.html>

From a reputational risk perspective, CAF policy does not delve into how these wide ranging and sometimes complex engagements in the civilian domain are coordinated or conducted, just that they must happen and which office is responsible, usually it is a command responsibility. Preparedness for engagements that are not coordinated (such as an overseas deployment), is done to a standard decided upon by the commander responsible. Effectively, the CAF has a patchwork of deliberate, bespoke and ad hoc engagement solutions created by a lack of a central policy wherein responsibility is held for engagement within the civilian domain. This lack of policy coherence creates gaps in the knowledge needed to select prepare and train our personnel to function in what is clearly a domain of fundamental importance to the CAF. Gaps that serve to exacerbate the reputational risk faced by the CAF as individual members interact with civilians without effective preparation. Mitigation of the reputational risk raised by Canadian Armed Forces members interacting in the civilian domain can be achieved by developing an overarching governing policy to ensure coherence among the interactions.

This paper will first review the requirements under current policies for interfacing with the civilian domain and associated risks. Next, the identified risks will be assessed by the types of interaction and reputational risk that currently exist. Finally, policy solutions, measured against risk theories, will be presented to close identified gaps and mitigate reputational risks.

Civilian Domain Engagement Policy Requirements and Associated Risks

CFJP 01 frames engagement in the civilian domain in terms of military ethos requiring,

“...the subordination of the armed forces to civilian control and the rule of law... [but] ...defines the profession of arms as a distinct calling and rejects any notion that service in the CF is equivalent to employment in other areas of Canadian society.”¹¹

For senior CAF leadership interactions in the civilian domain are characterized by the requirements of modern democratic civil-military relationship¹² wherein direction comes from the superior civilian authority. Other CAF members are bound by the National Defence Act (NDA) which requires orders and directions to come from the chain of command culminating with the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).¹³ The inculcated ethos and NDA effectively create a legal and psychological demarcation with the civilian dimension for CAF members. This necessary separation is further reinforced with restrictions such as CAF not being allowed to collect information on Canadians¹⁴ nor be in a position to compete with private business.¹⁵

CAF policy documents are rife with the requirement for face-to-face engagement with civilians. A close examination of the missions from SSE in Table 1 shows the breadth of engagement required in the civilian domain.¹⁶ This engagement requirement is reflected in the Canadian Forces Joint Publications (CFJP) series with *CFJP 01*, detailing a hierarchy of doctrine (figure 1)¹⁷ that shows publications dedicated to, “Whole of

¹¹ Canada. Department of National Defence. *CFJP 01: Canadian Military Doctrine*. ... 2009. 4-4.

¹² Jan Angstrom. “The changing norms of civil and military and civil-military relations theory.” *Small Wars & Insurgencies*. Vol. 24 no. 2 2013. 225.

¹³ National Defence Act, R.S.C., c. N-5 (1985) Part II 18(2)

¹⁴ Canada. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. *Defence Administrative Orders and Directives 8002-0 Counter Intelligence*. Last Modified 02 June 2017. Paragraph 3.4

¹⁵ Canada. Department of National Defence. B-GS-055-000/AG-001 Provision of Services Manual. Ottawa: Director Financial Policy and Procedures. 24 November 1999. 5-6.

¹⁶ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Strong Secure Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy*. Minister of National Defence. 2017. 106.

¹⁷ Canada. Department of National Defence. *CFJP 01: Canadian Military Doctrine*. ... 2009. 1A1.

Government and Domestic Operations” – *CFJP 9.0*¹⁸ and *CFJP 3-2*¹⁹ respectively. Even in the *CFJP 4.0 Joint Logistics* and the three subordinate supporting publications (Sea, Land and Air logistics not shown in figure 1)²⁰ detail a requirement for liaison and civil engagement.




Figure 1. -- Hierarchy of CF Doctrine
 Source: *CFJP 01: Canadian Military Doctrine*.

¹⁸ Canada. Department of National Defence. (CFJP 9.0) B-GG-005-004/AF-023 *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War*. Chief of the Defence Staff. 1999.

¹⁹ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Canadian Forces Joint Publication 3-2: Domestic Operations*. Chief of the Defence Staff. 2009.

²⁰ Canada. Department of National Defence. *Canadian Forces Joint Publication 4.0: Support*. Ottawa: Joint Doctrine Branch. 6 October 2016. 1-3, 1-4, 2-2, 2-8, 6-6, 6-9, 7-10: Canada. Department of National Defence. *Canadian Forces Joint Publication 4-1.2: Air Movement 2nd Edition*. Ottawa: Joint Doctrine Branch. 2016. 2-9, 2C-1, 6-2: Canada. Department of National Defence. *Movement Support Sea*. Chief of the Defence Staff. 2003. 2-3, 2-4, 2B-1, 3-2, 4-4.

Table 1 – Civilian Engagement Requirement of SSE Missions

SSE Assigned CAF Core Mission		Civilian Engagement
1	Detect, deter and defend against threats to or attacks on Canada.	YES. Canadian OGD partners.
2	Detect, deter and defend against threats to or attacks on North America in partnership with the United States, including through NORAD.	LOW. Primarily Military to Military.
3	Lead and/or contribute forces to NATO and coalition efforts to deter and defeat adversaries, including terrorists, to support global stability.	SOME. Primarily Military to Military. Potential for Canadian OGD and Foreign Governments.
4	Lead and/or contribute to international peace operations and stabilization missions with the United Nations, NATO and other multilateral partners.	YES. Canadian OGD and Foreign Governments.
5	Engage in capacity building to support the security of other nations and their ability to contribute to security abroad.	YES. Canadian OGD, NGO and Foreign Governments.
6	Provide assistance to civil authorities and law enforcement, including counter-terrorism, in support of national security and the security of Canadians abroad.	YES. Canadian OGD, Provincial and municipal police forces, NGO and Foreign Governments.
7	Provide assistance to civil authorities and non-governmental partners in responding to international and domestic disasters or major emergencies.	YES. Canadian OGD, Provincial/Municipal Emergency Management Offices, NGO and Foreign Governments.
8	Conduct search and rescue operations.	YES. Canadian OGD partners, Provincial/Municipal Emergency Management Offices/police forces, NGO and Foreign Governments.

Engagements in the civilian domain are often shaped by the DAODs which provide directives to DND civilian employees and orders to CAF members.²¹ A good example is how obtaining the services of civilian contractors to repair DND infrastructure (real property) once fell to Base Commanders but is now the purview of ADM Infrastructure and Environment (ADM(IE)) with assigned CAF Real Property Operations (RP Ops) units per DAOD 1000-11 within which,

²¹ Canada. *Defence Administrative Orders and Directives*. Last modified 01 March 2017. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/defence-administrative-orders-directives.html> .

The DM [Deputy Minister of National Defence] and the CDS assign functional authority to the ADM(IE) to develop and issue DAODs in the following functional areas of infrastructure and environment management:

- a. real property and immovables life cycle;*
- b. environmental protection and stewardship; and*
- c. aboriginal issues.²²*

Real property matters include allowing OGDs and civilian entities use of DND facilities and arranging for CAF entities to use non-DND property both of which see daily engagement in the civilian domain.

From a reputational risk standpoint, CAF members have thousands of required touch point events into the civilian domain, at multiple levels, each day. Each event has a positive, neutral or negative effect on the reputation of the CAF. The conduct of each event is bound commonly by the ethos of the Canadian profession of arms and the codes of behavior inculcated from basic training onward.²³ As training progresses the awareness of the civil domain varies.

Before deploying on operations, CAF members are often briefed and instructed on local customs and legal mores to ensure operational effectiveness. This training also serves to avoid embarrassing situations.²⁴ Officers deploying of foreign assignments often obtain training from Global Affairs Canada.²⁵ Otherwise, only a small percentage of Canadian Army (CA) members become specialized civilian liaison officers.²⁶ While the

²² DAOD 1000-11, Policy Framework for infrastructure and Environment Management. Last Modified 30 March 2017. 3.1. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/defence-administrative-orders-directives/1000-series/1000/1000-11-policy-framework-infrastructure-environment-management.html>

²³ Canada. Department of National Defence. *CFJP 01: Canadian Military Doctrine*. ... 2009. 4-4.

²⁴ Howard G. Coombs. "25 Years after Somalia: How it Changed Canadian Armed Forces Preparations for Operations." *Canadian Military Journal*. Vol 9 No 3. 2009. 42-44.

²⁵ Lieutenant Colonel Warren Smith, deployed as a CAF liaison officer in the Middle East, conversation with author, 8 March 2019.

²⁶ Howard G. Coombs. "... Canadian Armed Forces Preparations ..." ... Vol 9 No 3. 2009. 44.

training described serves to create positive effects on the CAF reputation, the instances that have a negative reputational effect still occur and, unless the event makes it into the public eye, it is often difficult to identify or address. More importantly, without a central authority responsible for the CAF interface with the civil domain, the lessons learned to prevent negative occurrences and requirement for education and training are rarely formally identified and can be repeated.

A simple example of how a small error can put the CAF into an extra legal position and have potential for a significant reputational blow was the unintentional support given to the RCMP in 2013 during shale gas protests in New Brunswick.²⁷ While there was no CAF mention in the media, a local RCMP official sought the use of a DND parking lot from a local CAF commander as they had a lot of vehicles coming in and needed a few more parking spots. The CAF commander allowed the parking of RCMP vehicles without a proper provision of service so did not realize the equipment was being surged in for a large police response. The next morning, the RCMP staged the police response to the shale gas protest from the DND parking lot. Essentially, the support to the RCMP morphed from a simple administrative provision of service into an operational Class 2 Assistance to Law Enforcement Agency (ALEA) due to the disturbance of the peace. An ALEA requiring approval from the Operational Level Commander. In this instance it may have been possible to tie the CAF to a police response toward a protesting indigenous group. Should this have occurred it would create an unnecessary black eye for the CAF and put the police actions in legal jeopardy due to the unapproved CAF

²⁷ Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. "RCMP, protesters withdraw after shale gas clash in Rexton." CBC News Online. Last updated 17 October 2013. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/new-brunswick/rcmp-protesters-withdraw-after-shale-gas-clash-in-rexton-1.2100703>

involvement, all over a simple error in the civilian domain attributable to a lack of training. The friction between the CAF and RCMP was resolved over a matter of days with leadership engagement.²⁸

While the ALEA event described above occurred on a CA establishment, it could well have been on a Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) or Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) establishment. Who then within each organisation is responsible for handling such an event? Ultimately the commanding officer. Who is responsible to ensure personnel conducting the interface know what to do? Again, the commanding officer. The knowledge and doctrine exist within the CAF to train personnel for instances wherein complexity of the engagement within the civilian domain warrants a higher level of understanding. For a busy commanding officer, the information required will not be found in one place or within one branch. Under these circumstances, CAF wastes resources repairing damaged relationships and assuaging tainted opinions once the reputational risks have been realized.

Understanding and Assessing CAF Reputational Risk

To better understand the nature of the risk posed and frame the depth and breadth of CAF engagement in the civilian domain a typology of engagement types is needed. The typology of CAF engagement in the civilian domain can then be used with the CAF risk assessment methodology to gain an understanding of reputational risk to the CAF. The CAF touch points with the civilian domain can be characterized by the level (high, mid, low) and nature (deliberate and routine) of the engagement.

²⁸ Details of the event were relayed to the author during the incident from the Commander of Joint Task Force Atlantic who at the time was the Operational Commander. Currently, Commander Canadian Joint Operations Command is the Operational Level Commander for Class 3 and Class 2 ALEA.

High-level engagements are typically conducted by general officer/flag officer (GOFO) ranks that often see planned strategic engagement programs or high level community engagement. Mid-level engagements are typified by experienced military members engaged in operational level mission related functions or sustained administrative functions. Low level engagements are the normal business of the military that require civilian contact. Deliberate engagements in the civilian domain are planned and fall under CAF orders or are controlled by directives of some sort which may or may not involve preparation of personnel. Routine engagements are directed by guidance, may have a local plan but usually do not include training for members on how to conduct engagements beyond what every CAF member receives. Table 2 shows four types of engagement described by engagement level and nature.

Table 2 – Typology of CAF Engagement in the Civilian Domain

Name	Engagement Level	Engagement Nature	Description
Type 1	High	Deliberate & Routine	A GOFO formation commander engaged in a community. Senior staff officer with foreign officials in operational area. Execution of strategic engagement such as MINDS ²⁹ .
Type 2	Mid-level	Deliberate	Engagement to support SSE missions or government functions. Examples are, Defence Attaché and the Military Liaison to Government of Canada Operations Centre. ³⁰
Type 3	Mid-level	Routine	A Commanding Officer conducting community engagement. RP Ops engaging with contractors. Maintaining host nation sustainment to deployed force.
Type 4	Low	Routine	A flight crew overnighing in a foreign country. A Quartermaster making a purchase from a local business. Driver buying fuel.

A catastrophic reputational risk event such as occurred with the Somalia Affair is unlikely due to the inculcated changes in CAF structure and member ethos. Other events that rise to the public eye are monitored, measured and acted on by the PA branch.

²⁹ Canada. Department of National Defence. Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS). Last updated 17 May 2019. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/programs/minds.html>

³⁰ Canada. Public Safety Canada. Government Operations Centre (GOC). Last updated 14 July 2016. <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/mrgnc-mngmnt/rspndng-mrgnc-vnts/gvrnmnt-prtns-cntr-en.aspx>

Assessment of the reputational risk events that fall below the media realization threshold events is not done on a pan-CAF basis especially regarding interactions within Canada where little research has been done.³¹ Table 3 details a risk matrix designed for assessing the likelihood of a reputational risk event occurring has been modified from *CFJP 5-2 Risk Management*³² and will be used to assess the types of CAF engagement in the civilian domain.

Table 3 – CAF Reputational Risk Event Occurrence Assessment Matrix (RREOAM)

Risk Assessment Matrix						
Severity		Probability				
		Unlikely (A)	Seldom (B)	Occasional (C)	Likely (D)	Frequent (E)
Catastrophic	I	M	H	H	E	E
Critical	II	L	M	H	H	E
Marginal	III	L	L	M	M	H
Negligible	IV	L	L	L	L	M
Key and Definitions:						
Extremely High Risk		Severe effect on CAF reputation - loss of public/political confidence.				
High Risk		Degradation of CAF reputation - action needed to restore partner confidence.				
Moderate Risk		Degradation of CAF reputation - frictions impinge on CAF effectiveness.				
Low Risk		Little or no impact on CAF reputation.				
Catastrophic severity		Risk realization brings loss of political/public support.				
Critical severity		Risk realization causes a degradation or loss of political/partner support.				
Marginal severity		Risk realization sees sustained cooling of relations with civilian partners.				
Negligible severity		Little or no sustained negative reputational effects.				
Frequent probability		Interface with civilians occurs continuously on a daily basis.				
Likely probability		Interface with civilians occurs routinely and regularly.				
Occasional probability		Interface with civilians occurs sporadically.				
Seldom probability		Interface with civilians occurs intermittently without specific frequency.				
Unlikely probability		Interface with civilians occurs very rarely but not impossible.				

Type 1 engagements are characterised by GOFOs interfacing at a routine frequency in the civilian domain among influencers and political operators. Realization of

³¹ Johanu Botha. *Two Floods, a Wildfire, and a Hurricane: The Role of the Canadian Armed Forces in Emergency Management*. PhD Thesis, Carleton University. Ottawa, Ontario. 2018. 52.

³² Canada. Department of National Defence. (CFJP 5.0) B-GJ-005-502/FP-000 *Risk Management For CF Operations*. Ottawa: Joint Doctrine Branch. 2007. Annex A.

reputational risk at this level will easily see a cooling of relations and potential for degradation of support to the CAF. For example, an offended senior foreign official may restrict CAF movements curbing planned operations. Type 1 engagements present a moderate to high risk to CAF reputation.

Type 2 engagements have a daily contact with mid to high level actors in the civilian domain. Should a reputational risk event manifest during a Type 2 engagement a negative impact on relations with partners can be realized with a low likelihood of causing a loss of support to CAF. Type 2 engagements have the greatest potential for a high risk occurrence. Such a case occurred when liaison officers reported negative perceptions of CAF activity in Northern regions spurring the development of a DAOD to ensure positive control engagement in the Arctic AOR preventing violation of treaty agreements by the defence team.³³

Type 3 engagements have a mix of routine and sporadic interactions with civilians. The level of interactions present a potential for a cooling of relations depending on the level of engagement and nature of the realised reputational risk. A contractor may choosing to avoid future defence contracts or a local NGO refraining from interfacing with CAF members if a meeting with the CO goes poorly are potential outcomes.

Type 4 engagements occur daily from a CAF perspective, however, for civilians, the touch points are intermittent or occur sporadically. The level of engagement generally doesn't allow for a higher level negative effect if an interaction goes poorly. For example, a hotel owner may choose not to host CAF members causing administrative friction when

³³ DAOD 8007-0, Notification of DND and CAF Activities Within the Joint Task Force (North) Area of Responsibility. Last Modified 02 June 2017. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/defence-administrative-orders-directives/8000-series/8007/8007-0-notification-dnd-cf-activities-within-joint-task-force-north-area-responsibility.html>

re-booking but is unlikely to have a lingering effect on CAF reputation so that it impairs function.

Plotting the four types of engagement against the RREOAM, seen in table 4, shows how a moderate to high level reputational of risk exists for the CAF in many of the face-to-face interactions that occur within the civilian domain. In a normal risk management process the next phase would be to develop controls (mitigate) and make risk decisions.³⁴ Depending on the nature and type of engagement in the civilian domain there are varying degrees of mitigation or acceptance of reputational risk by responsible commanders. Aside from the operational/administrative frictions and reputational restoration efforts, this lack of pan-CAF cohesion for reputational risk solutions also presents other risks to the CAF. Categorization of risks into three types as described by Kaplan and Mikes will better enable the assessment of factors complicating reputational risk to the CAF.

Table 4 – CAF Engagement Typology Applied to RREOAM

Risk Assessment Matrix					
Severity	Probability				
	A	B	C	D	E
I	Yellow	Orange	Orange	Red	Red
II	Grey	Yellow	Orange	Orange	Red
III	Grey	Grey	Yellow	Yellow	Orange
IV	Grey	Grey	Grey	Grey	Yellow

Type 1

Type 2

Type 3

Type 4

³⁴ Canada. Department of National Defence. (CFJP 5.0) B-GJ-005-502/FP-000 *Risk Management For CF Operations*. Ottawa: Joint Doctrine Branch. 2007. 3-2.

Category I – Preventable Risks. These risks arising from within the organization are controllable and provide no benefit from taking them on. Such risks should be eliminated or avoided via rules-based compliance. The unethical actions of CAF members causing the Somalia Affair in an example. Such actions are avoided through training and perpetrators of similar acts are disciplined or removed from the CAF.³⁵

Category II – Strategy Risks. Such risks are not inherently undesirable due to the perceived benefit. Most CAF engagement in the civilian domain fits here as such engagements are needed to accomplish missions assigned to the CAF. In this case reducing the probability of occurrence is the aim.³⁶

Category III – External Risks. By definition, these risks arise external to the organization, beyond influence or control. Natural disasters are an obvious fit in this category. Political change can be an example for militaries that remain subordinate to the body politic. In such cases, identification of the risk and mitigation of the effects are in order as they cannot be prevented.³⁷

Reduction of the probability for realization of reputation risk presented by CAF member face-to-face engagements in the civilian domain has some obvious solutions. Educating and exercising members on how to conduct engagements are two such resolutions. With a mixture of ways and means being utilized across the CAF to achieve these solutions a preventable risk arises – loss of corporate knowledge. Not all the education and exercise solutions being employed through the CAF are anchored in doctrine or the military education system. What an outgoing commander sees as an

³⁵ Robert S. Kaplan, Anette Mikes. “Managing Risks: A New Framework.” *Harvard Business Review*. June 2012. <https://hbr.org/2012/06/managing-risks-a-new-framework?autocomplete=true>

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

excellent civilian engagement training package may be seen by the incoming as exorbitant and end it. One posting season later, the ‘excellent civilian engagement training package’ fades from memory. Eliminating the risk of loss of corporate knowledge only requires application of the current training development doctrine. Deciding how that will happen across the breadth of the CAF becomes a challenge without a strategic level guiding policy.

External risks also arise from realized reputational risk from military threats and the civilian domain. Rapidly evolving global communications systems are bringing social media facilitated “information warfare” to the public discourse in the civilian domain. A CAF member who finds themselves on the wrong side of a “social justice warrior” may unintentionally provide ammunition for their cause.³⁸ Foreign powers, operating in the cyber domain, are attacking Canada daily.³⁹ Stealing secrets is not the only objective with sowing discord to “upend the domestic affairs of a nation” becoming a more prominent aim.⁴⁰ This aspect of hybrid warfare, “exploits our civil-military governance tradition”⁴¹ making the negative perception of the CAF created by multiple reputational risk events an exploitable resource for hostile entities. The PA Branch are actively identifying and mitigating negative effects of any discord created.⁴² However, the PA Branch is not

³⁸ William Davies. Everything Is War and Nothing is True. The New York Times. 23 February 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/23/opinion/sunday/war-brexid-border-wall.html>

³⁹ Brigadier General Jay Janzen. Lecture to Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia. 8 May 2019. With permission.

⁴⁰ Molly K. McKew. “The Gerasimov Doctrine.” *Politico Magazine*. 8 September 2017. Accessed 30 May 2019. <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/05/gerasimov-doctrine-russia-foreign-policy-215538>

⁴¹ Jean-Christophe Boucher. *Hybrid Warfare and Civil Military Relations*. Canadian Global Affairs Institute. Calgary, Alberta. December 2017. 1.

⁴² Brigadier General Jay Janzen. Lecture ... 8 May 2019. With permission.

responsible for the entirety of the CAFs engagement within the civilian domain making a complete solution more of a policy challenge.

Reputational Risk Policy Solutions for the CAF

Resolution of identified reputational risks can be realized by applying guidance from the civilian domain on reputational risk. Eccles, Newquist and Schatz propose the first step for an organization to assess, manage and resolve reputational risk is to put one person in charge.⁴³ For the CAF, the person in charge is currently the CDS with authority to identify a Level 0 or Level 1⁴⁴ entity to have jurisdiction over the civilian domain-CAF interface for both operational and administrative matters – a functional authority (FA).⁴⁵ With a FA established, policy can be developed to ensure the resolution of the other determinates of reputational risk:

- Reputation-reality gap. The extent to which the CAF reputation does not match the true organizational character.⁴⁶
- Changing external beliefs and expectations. Beliefs of stakeholders about the CAF change widening the reputation-reality gap.⁴⁷
- Weak internal coordination. One part of the CAF creates expectations that cannot be met by another.⁴⁸

Since the Somalia Affair the CAF reputation has been rebuilt and jealously guarded. The Northern Area DAOD⁴⁹ is an example of this. There are other areas of

⁴³ Robert G. Eccles, Scott C. Newquist, Roland Schatz. “Reputation and Its Risks.” *Harvard Business Review*. February 2007. Last accessed 8 May 2018. <https://hbr.org/2007/02/reputation-and-its-risks>

⁴⁴ Canada. Department of National Defence. (CFJP 1.0) B-GL-005-100/FP-001 *Canadian Forces Joint Publication 1.0: Military Personnel Management Doctrine*. Ottawa: Director General Military Personnel. June 2008. 3-1.

⁴⁵ Ibid. 3-1.

⁴⁶ Robert G. Eccles, ... “Reputation and Its Risks.” ... February 2007. Last accessed 8 May 2018.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ DAOD 8007-0, Notification ... CAF Activities ... Joint Task Force (North) ... Last Modified 02 June 2017.

Canada with similar sensitivities the FA could address. A coherent CAF wide policy, guiding members conduct during individual engagements in the civilian domain, will ensure the reputation-reality gap is not unnecessarily widened.

With hybrid warfare creating negative reputational effects domestically and abroad the requirement to prepare CAF members to shield the organizational reputation is more important than ever. Synchronization of activities between the operational and administrative areas that reinforce and actively protect CAF reputation by maintaining awareness on the civilian domain can be achieved by the FA.

The risk of conflicting behaviors exacerbating reputational risk can be substantially mitigated with an effective scaled training program raised by the FA. A sailor obtaining stores in a foreign port, a pilot in the Arctic or a soldier engaging with a provincial official all require the same basic understanding of liaison and how to act when in the civilian domain. The incorporation of Gender-Based Analysis Plus in to the CAF beginning with a simple online course is an example of how it can be done.⁵⁰

Confirming coherence across all extant CAF policies should be another matter for the FA to address. This will serve to improve all determinates of reputational risk for the CAF and enable commanders at all levels to be more successful managing engagement in the civilian domain and more effective achieving the missions assigned to the CAF.

Conclusion

A solid ethical and behavioral foundation serves as the first line of defence for the CAF reputation but such protection is incomplete. The PA Branch offers yeoman service

⁵⁰ Canada. Department of National Defence. Backgrounder: Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+). Last modified 7 June 2017. <http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/news/gender-based-analysis-plus.asp?wbdisable=true>

responding to reputational threats in the media but does not completely protect the CAF from realized reputational risks. The final piece of the CAF reputational shield falls to commanders at all levels conducting the mission achieving work that requires face-to-face engagement within the civilian domain. We equip them to defend Canada why not properly arm them to defend the reputation of the CAF? Swiftly identifying a FA responsible for the CAF interface with the civilian domain permit development of an overarching governing policy allowing synchronization of training and engagement conduct to enable the resolution of the determinates of reputational risk.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Angstrom, Jan. "The changing norms of civil and military and civil-military relations theory." *Small Wars & Insurgencies*. Vol. 24 no. 2 2013. 224-236.
- Bercuson, David. "Up from the ashes: The re-professionalization of the Canadian Forces after the Somalia Affair." *Canadian Military Journal*. Vol 9 No 3. 2009. 31-39.
- Botha, Johanu. *Two Floods, a Wildfire, and a Hurricane: The Role of the Canadian Armed Forces in Emergency Management*. PhD Thesis, Carleton University. Ottawa, Ontario. 2018.
- Boucher, Jean-Christophe. *Hybrid Warfare and Civil Military Relations*. Canadian Global Affairs Institute. Calgary, Alberta. December 2017.
- Coombs, Howard G. "25 Years after Somalia: How it Changed Canadian Armed Forces Preparations for Operations." *Canadian Military Journal*. Vol 9 No 3. 2009. 35-46.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Backgrounder: Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+)*. Last modified 7 June 2017. <http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/canada-defence-policy/news/gender-based-analysis-plus.asp?wbdisable=true>
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *B-GS-055-000/AG-001 Provision of Services Manual*. Ottawa: Director Financial Policy and Procedures. 24 November 1999.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *(CFJP 01) B-GJ-005-000/FP-001 Canadian Forces Joint Publication 01: Canadian Military Doctrine*. Ottawa: Joint Doctrine Branch. 2009.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *(CFJP 1.0) B-GL-005-100/FP-001 Canadian Forces Joint Publication 1.0: Military Personnel Management Doctrine*. Ottawa: Director General Military Personnel. June 2008.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *(CFJP 3-2) B-GJ-005-302/FP-001 Canadian Forces Joint Publication 3-2: Domestic Operations*. Chief of the Defence Staff. 2009.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *(CFJP 4.0) B-GL-005-400/FP001 Canadian Forces Joint Publication 4.0: Support*. Ottawa: Joint Doctrine Branch. 6 October 2016.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *(CFJP 4-1.1) B-GJ-005-404/FP-010 Movement Support Sea*. Chief of the Defence Staff. 2003.

- Canada. Department of National Defence. (CFJP 4-1.2) B-GJ-025-401-/FP201 *Canadian Forces Joint Publication 4-1.2: Air Movement 2nd Edition*. Ottawa: Joint Doctrine Branch. 2016.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. (CFJP 5.0) B-GJ-005-502/FP-000 *Risk Management For CF Operations*. Ottawa: Joint Doctrine Branch. 2007.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. (CFJP 9.0) B-GG-005-004/AF-023 *Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War*. Chief of the Defence Staff. 1999.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS)*. Last updated 17 May 2019. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/programs/minds.html>
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Stakeholder Engagement A National Strategic Plan 2017-2020*. Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs) and Director General Public Affairs. 8 February 2018.
- Canada. Department of National Defence. *Strong Secure Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy*. Minister of National Defence. 2017.
- Canada. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. *Defence Administrative Orders and Directives 2008-0 Public Affairs Policy*. Last Modified 19 April 2017. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/defence-administrative-orders-directives/2000-series/2008/2008-0-public-affairs-policy.html>
- Canada. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. *Defence Administrative Orders and Directives 8002-0 Counter Intelligence*. Last Modified 02 June 2017. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/defence-administrative-orders-directives/8000-series/8002/8002-0-counter-intelligence.html>
- Canada. National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. *Defence Administrative Orders and Directives 8007-0 Notification of DND and CAF Activities Within the Joint Task Force (North) Area of Responsibility*. Last Modified 02 June 2017. <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/policies-standards/defence-administrative-orders-directives/8000-series/8007/8007-0-notification-dnd-cf-activities-within-joint-task-force-north-area-responsibility.html>
- Canada. Public Safety Canada. *Government Operations Centre (GOC)*. Last updated 14 July 2016. <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/mrgnc-mngmnt/rspndng-mrgnc-vnts/gvrnmnt-prtns-cntr-en.aspx>

- Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. "RCMP, protesters withdraw after shale gas clash in Rexton." *CBC News Online*. Last updated 17 October 2013.
<https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/new-brunswick/rcmp-protesters-withdraw-after-shale-gas-clash-in-rexton-1.2100703>
- Davies, William. "Everything Is War and Nothing is True." *The New York Times*. 23 February 2019. Accessed 22 May 2019.
<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/23/opinion/sunday/war-brexit-border-wall.html>
- Deutsche Bank. *Reputational Risk Management*. Last modified 22 January 2019.
<https://www.db.com/cr/en/concrete-management-of-reputational-risks.htm>
- Eccles, Robert G., Scott C. Newquist, Roland Schatz. "Reputation and Its Risks." *Harvard Business Review*. February 2007. Last accessed 8 May 2018.
<https://hbr.org/2007/02/reputation-and-its-risks>
- Horan, Stephen. "Admiral William McRaven Praises 'Fantastic' Obama, Discusses Afghanistan." *Defence Media Network*. 30 July 2012.
<https://www.defensemmedianetwork.com/stories/mcraven-praises-fantastic-obama-discusses-afghanistan-and-non-kinetic-sof-operations/>
- Janzen, Brigadier General Jay. Lecture to Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia. 8 May 2019. With permission.
- Kaplan, Robert S. & Anette Mikes. "Managing Risks: A New Framework." *Harvard Business Review*. June 2012. <https://hbr.org/2012/06/managing-risks-a-new-framework?autocomplete=true>
- McKew, Molly K.. "The Gerasimov Doctrine." *Politico Magazine*. 8 September 2017. Accessed 30 May 2019.
<https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/05/gerasimov-doctrine-russia-foreign-policy-215538>