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CANADIAN ARMY REDUX: HOW TO ACHIEVE BETTER OUTCOMES WITHOUT ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

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Abstract

The Canadian Army has a long and proud martial history, and has always answered the nation's call when asked. However, it has not always had the best forces for the tasks the government has laid before it, and frequently the army is unable to deploy with a suitable amount of rapidity for political needs. Indeed, Canadian Special Operations Forces Command soldiers are frequently called upon to conduct jobs that are rightly the purview of the regular army due to their extremely high levels of readiness and the perceived inability of the army to get out the door in a timely manner. This paper asserts that the Canadian Army must re-organize its structure in order to optimize the way it both trains and fights in order to meet the demands of the modern security environment. After discussing Department of National Defence terminology, it will outline the current structure of the Canadian Army in order to set the stage for additional analysis of the problem set. A thorough dissection of the Competency, Authority, Responsibility model of command, originally authored by Professors Pigeau and McCann will then be furnished to the reader in an attempt to underline areas where command in the Canadian Army are left wanting. In order to uncover best practices for an operationally-focussed force, an examination of the structures of three of Canada's closest allies will then occur, namely Australia, The United States of America, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Once this examination is complete, it will become clear that there are a number of best practices that Canada is currently not party to and that should be adopted, though it will become equally clear that none of our closest allies have gotten their structure exactly right. Finally, a simplified and much-improved command structure will be proposed for Canada's Army.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Canada's Army has enjoyed a long history of success on the battlefields of the world. From humble beginnings as garrison artillery in Quebec and Kingston along with schools of infantry and cavalry, the Army has grown into a world renowned, professional, combat-tested force that is the envy of many. From the Northwest Rebellion of 1885, to the Boer War, the two cataclysmic world wars, Korea, peacekeeping, Afghanistan, Libya, and now Iraq, the Canadian Army has consistently provided the government and people of Canada the forces that were asked for, but not always the forces that were needed. When one looks at the current structure of the Canadian Army, on the surface there appear to be a number of inefficiencies and a large number of headquarters for a fairly small deployable element, potentially depriving the Government of Canada of the ability to conduct meaningful action at a time and place of its choosing. For this reason, the Canadian Army must re-organize the way that it trains and fights, with a view to improving outcomes where it counts: with victory on the battlefield.

Today, of the roughly 22,500 personnel in the Regular Force Canadian Army structure, just under 15,000 are in the field force, which includes the three Canadian Mechanized Brigade Groups (1, 2, and 5 CMBG) and the Canadian Combat Support Brigade.[1] On its face, having the remaining 7,500 uniformed personnel in the army organization seems relatively balanced from a tooth to tail ratio.[2] However, this does not expose the issue of where the Army's leadership is and what functions it is dedicated to. There are four Colonels in charge of the four brigades, and 25 Colonels who perform other functions in the Canadian Army.[3] Of the nine General Officers

[1] Defence Human Resource Information System.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Ibid.*

in the Army's structure,[4] none of them are wholly dedicated to the force generation and employment of the deployable army, which is both illogical and incongruent with the best practices of the armies of our closest allies.

While it can be argued that the one-star commanders of 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Canadian Divisions are champions for their respective brigades, in the current structure, they are actually all saddled with many conflicting priorities. Each division has 2-3 Primary Reserve Brigades (commanded by Primary Reserve Colonels with Regular Force Lieutenant-Colonel Chiefs of Staff), a division support group commanded by a Colonel, a division training centre commanded by a Lieutenant-Colonel, a Canadian Ranger Patrol Group under a Lieutenant-Colonel (3rd Canadian Division has two of these), and an intelligence company under a Major as direct reports. Additionally, 4th Canadian Division has Canadian Armed Forces Base Kingston (commanded by a Colonel) under command. In total, this gives each division commander 8-9 direct report units and formations, only one of which is a Regular Army Brigade. This problem is compounded by the fact that regular brigades tend to be seen as "being able to look after themselves" and so are not given the same amount of attention on a day-to-day basis as other direct-reports.

Additionally, almost every Division Commander has many other military organizations to whom they are responsible to provide support, but over whom they command no authority. In some cases, this is unavoidable, such as in Ontario where the one-star commander 4th Canadian Division has a support relationship with the two-star Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre, and 1st Canadian Division in Kingston, and the one-star Royal Military College of Canada (also in Kingston) and Canadian Forces College in Toronto.

[4] *Ibid.*

In other cases, it is the Canadian Army's Structure that imposes this burden on the division commanders. In the west, the Colonel in charge of the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre relies on support from 3rd Canadian Division and competes for training area usage with the Division's training centre, but reports to the two-star commander of the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre in Kingston, who receives support from 4th Canadian Division. Most interestingly, the Combat Training Centre in Gagetown is the primary user of all the land in the area as the individual training centre of excellence, but an entire separate formation, the 5th Canadian Division Support Group (also run by a full Colonel), working for a headquarters in Halifax, exists essentially to support the Combat Training Centre. Though there are technically other users of the Gagetown training area, such as Reservists and the other lodger units like the 2nd Battalion, the Royal Canadian Regiment (2 RCR), C Squadron, The Royal Canadian Dragoons (RCD), 4th Regiment (General Support), Royal Canadian Artillery (4 Regt (GS) RCA), and 4 Engineer Support Regiment (4 ESR), in practice they all de-conflict their training with the Combat Training Centre, and are frequently in direct support of individual training tasks.

The additional Gagetown wrinkle sees these units of the field force in an interesting chain of command relationship: 2 RCR works for 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (2 CMBG) in Petawawa, who works for 4th Canadian Division in Toronto and C Squadron works for the RCD in Petawawa (who works for 2 CMBG). 4(GS) Regt RCA and 4 ESR work for the Canadian Combat Support Brigade in Kingston, who in turn works for 5th Canadian Division in Halifax.

In summary, there are two full Colonels in Gagetown: one who commands most of the units there and works for a two-star general in Kingston. The other one owns the base facilities

and institutional support capacity and works for a one-star general in Halifax. Of the other lodger units, one of them works for a Colonel in Petawawa, one of them works for a Lieutenant-Colonel in Petawawa (who works for the aforementioned Colonel) and two of them work for a Colonel in Kingston, who works for the same one-star in Halifax as one of the two Colonels in Gagetown. It is hard to conceive of a more complex web of command relationships than currently exists in New Brunswick.

CHAPTER 2: A PRIMER ON DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE TERMINOLOGY

When it comes to operational outputs, the currency of the Canadian Armed Forces is Person Years (PYs), where on the civilian-side of the Department it is Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs). PYs and FTEs equate to the importance of a given programme, sub-departmental element, or unit. In an army context, if a Commander has personnel, she can do essentially anything. Yes, money, equipment, and ammunition are important, but there are many ways to get around of a lack of either, especially domestically. While a commanding officer can find creative ways to simulate operational environments for his soldiers, he cannot prepare soldiers he doesn't have for a deployment. Thus, PYs tell the story of the relative importance of a number of capabilities.

Upon examination of the Canadian Army's PYs, a few trends emerge. First (as already discussed), of the roughly 22,500 personnel in the regular army structure, about 15,000 are in deployable "field force" units, with 7,500 or so comprising the remainder of the army in schools, headquarters, and institutional support units.[5] This ratio of 70% "tooth" to 30% "tail" seems promising, and somewhat better than many other militaries experience. However, the second characteristic of Canadian Army PYs is that they are spread rather diffusely throughout the army. For example, while an infantry battalion in the First World War was established at over 1,000 soldiers, a Second World War Battalion was roughly 800, and deployed Canadian Battlegroups are anywhere from 750-1,350 personnel, no infantry battalion in Canada is established at more than 600 soldiers.[6] This is equally true of our armoured, artillery, and engineer regiments as it is for our service battalions, signals squadrons, field ambulances (who belong to Military Personnel

[5] *Ibid.*
[6] *Ibid.*

Command but work for and with the army), and tactical helicopter squadrons (who similarly are part of the Royal Canadian Air Force, but who exist to support the army).

Perhaps most strikingly, it is the number and size of the many headquarters in the army that stands out. Though the Royal Canadian Infantry Corps has enough personnel for seven or perhaps eight battalions at full strength and with the traditional range of capabilities, it has nine. However, this is not where the issue lies, and it is likely that the Canadian Army will deploy composite units on named operations for the foreseeable future. The real issue is that there are a profusion of headquarters with very few subordinates and very narrow tasks. In many places, where there used to be a single Lieutenant-Colonel Base Commander, there are now Commanding Officers of Base Operations, Base Personnel Support, and Base Technical Services: three Lieutenant-Colonels replacing one, and representing a positional jump in rank from senior Captain or junior Major[7] to a rank associated with the commanding officers of major combat units, key schools, and institutional support installations with over 1,000 employees, both military and civilian. While there is no formal differentiation between junior and senior Captains or majors in the Canadian rank structure as there are in some central and eastern European nations, in some trades the average time in rank for both Captains and Majors is a decade. Generally, a senior Captain is someone who is qualified on the Army Operations Course and in a job such as unit Adjutant, Operations Officer, or equivalent. Similarly, there are designated senior Major jobs (High range jobs in Canadian Army parlance), and senior Majors have usually completed the Joint Command and Staff Program or its international equivalent. This rank

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inflation in the institutional army has been a constant feature of the army's structure for the last two and a half decades, and is somewhat insidious. Though Lieutenant-Colonel is considered Executive minus one (EX-1) in civilian civil service parlance, with full Colonels considered the first true "executive" rank, unit commanders have far greater responsibilities than many officers their senior, including (of course) over the very life or death of their soldiers when deployed. It is indeed difficult to conceive of a more solemn responsibility.

While it is true that there are some positions that inherently require rank and experience without a large number of subordinates, these should, as a general rule, be relatively few in number, and rank-inflation should be guarded against. For example, the Canadian Army Staff College has 18 Lieutenant-Colonels out of a total staff of 92. This makes a certain amount of sense though, as 14 of 18 are instructors on the Army Operations Course, where the instructor rank is Lieutenant-Colonel, specifically because the Canadian Army wants senior, experienced, ideally post-unit command senior officers to teach Captains of potential the Formal Estimate, the Operational Planning Process, and how to command at the unit and formation level. Clearly, this mandate demands senior, experienced officers, but it also underlines how rare this requirement ought to be. However, there are eight Majors dedicated to teaching the 7-week Distributed Learning (DL) portion of this 18-week-long course, and a further 16 Majors in various staff positions. When these 24 Majors and 18 Lieutenant-Colonels are added to the Commandant (a Colonel), we see that approximately 47% of the College's staff are at the senior officer rank, which seems excessive.[8] This is especially true when examining certain positions.

For example, the DL Directing Staff (DS) Major positions were created when the DL overlapped with certain portions of the residency portion of the course, and were retained when

[8] DHRIS

that ceased to be the case. Similarly, the Operations Officer of this unit was raised to the rank of Major, presumably because there are many officers of high-rank present. However, given that many Captains serve as the Operations Officers of units up to ten times the size of the staff college, and with far greater complexity, one wonders if there is a practical justification for this. In other places, there also appears to be some rank creep. For example, three Lieutenant Colonels and six Majors in the Land Synthetic Environment cell, along with a further three Majors for the Army Simulation Centre as Military Authorities seems to be excessive, when junior Captains have performed the role of Military Authority successfully in western Canada.[9] Finally, the number of instructors leads to some questions. The Army Operations Course usually has between five and seven syndicates during the residency periods of its courses, which run from roughly April-June and September-December annually. As there is absolutely no overlap during any of the residency periods, one also questions the necessity of fourteen DS for half (or fewer) that number of syndicates. Even given the prudent necessity for some specialists in lectures or backup instructors, double the number of senior DS appears excessive.

When moving to examine the higher headquarters for the Army Staff College, the Canadian Doctrine and Training Centre Headquarters, there appear to be a significant number of senior officers that may be surplus to actual requirements. Working for the Major-General commanding this formation are three Colonels, 13 Lieutenant-Colonels, 46 Majors, and 28 Captains. When looking at this large, 127 PY headquarters, we again see some interesting trends. The 63 senior officers make up almost half of the strength of this organization[10]. Moreover, there are enough Lieutenant-Colonels to command two fighting brigades worth of

[9] In fact, when a junior Captain with three years trained experience replaced an old Major with 30 years' service, the simulation centre became massively more used and value-added to the lodger units in Edmonton, and indeed across the divisional area of responsibility. It would appear that experience does not always equal value.
[10] DHRIS

units, and almost double the number of Majors as there are Captains! Given that the working rank in Commonwealth Headquarters at all levels has been Captain for the duration of the 20th Century, Majors were senior staff officers, and Lieutenant-Colonels were unit commanders or the one or two most senior officers on a divisional-level (two-star) staff, the pyramid in CADTC headquarters appears to be almost inverted. Indeed, Captains now appear to be viewed in higher-level headquarters as a mere apprenticeship rank, in many cases, Majors are relatively low-level staffers, and the first level of staff authority appears to be Lieutenant-Colonel. Given that Captains, Majors, and Lieutenant-Colonels have positions of great authority in the field-force, it is both counter-intuitive and illogical that the opposite would be true in the slower-moving, static, institutional army.

This inverted pyramid is prevalent in other organizations: the Combat Training Centre Headquarters; at more than 100 personnel, is double the size of one of the three mechanized brigades, despite the routine nature of the training it conducts and its inherently static nature.[11]

[11] *Ibid.*

CHAPTER 3: THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE CANADIAN ARMY



Figure 3.1: The Current Structure of the Canadian Army

As alluded to above, the Canadian Army is composed of four divisions and a doctrine and training command. In governmental parlance, the Canadian Army Headquarters is a Level 1 organization, and the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Divisions, along with the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training System, are all Level 2 organizations. The four divisions are all roughly similar in structure, with regular and reserve field forces, an institutional support formation, a training

centre, and a ranger patrol group (or two). They attempt to be roughly geographical, and are partially successful in three out of four cases. Generally, everything army from the Lakehead in western Ontario to the west coast of Vancouver belongs to 3rd Canadian Division, everything in Ontario (with the exception of the Lakehead region) belongs to 4th Canadian Division, and the province of Quebec is the purview of the 2nd Canadian Division. 5th Canadian Division is responsible for the four Atlantic provinces, but also commands a Kingston-based combat support brigade that has three units in Ontario and two in New Brunswick. It also has the dubious distinction of having more regular army soldiers not under its command in the east than it is responsible for.

The Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre is headquartered in Kingston, Ontario, but has subordinate formations and units across the country. These include the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre in Wainwright, Alberta, the Canadian Army Command and Staff College in Kingston, the Combat Training Centre in Gagetown, New Brunswick and two direct-report units: the Peace Support Training Centre in Kingston, and the Canadian Army Trials and Evaluations Unit in Gagetown. CMTC is responsible for high-readiness collective training and has a budget that is usually triple that of a mechanized brigade group, but it only has 192 personnel on its permanent staff, meaning it requires augmentation of usually over 1000 personnel in order to conduct any meaningful collective training. CMTC also has a subordinate detachment (under a Lieutenant-Colonel) in Kingston. CTC has five subordinate schools in Gagetown, one in Kingston, and one in Borden, Ontario. CACSC, in addition to running both regular and reserve versions of the Army's staff course (known as the Army Operations Course), is also the centre of excellence for professional development.

CADTC is also the only Level 2 organization commanded by a two-star general, who is deputized as the Army Training Authority (ATA) by the Commander of the Army. In this guise, Commander CADTC exercises an effective veto over the activities of all the Canadian Army force generating divisions. In the words of one brigade commander: "The Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre sees the field force as a source of candidates, instructors, and support staff for the individual and collective training it runs on behalf of the army when it should probably see us as the customer."[12] Commander CADTC has the final authority on what individual and collective training priorities are, which means that he can re-allocate personnel and equipment to his formation priorities with limited consultation of the force-generators. This imbalance of power frequently leads to situations where platoon and troop-level leadership destined to deploy on named operations was pulled from their signature collective-training event in western Canada to support individual training in Gagetown. This intuitively indicates one of two things: either the Canadian Army spends too long conducting collective training, so leadership can be pulled from certification exercises to support individual training because they are already at an acceptable deployment standard; or individual training takes too long and requires too much staff augmentation.

There is also another potential narrative: that the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre Headquarters, despite its large size and 175 PYs, has not effectively de-conflicted individual and collective training – this forces deployable units to either send their soldiers on career individual training courses to qualify them, thus depriving the soldiers of operational experience and the units of (presumably) quality soldiers and leaders, or to (frequently) preventing good soldiers from attending courses that will make them eligible for promotion in

[12] Brigadier-General David Anderson in 2013, discussions with the author. With permission.

order to ensure they are available to deploy on named expeditionary operations (which is, after all, the Canadian Army's *raison d'etre*). This problem, long the bug-bear of the army's three deployable brigades, has not been resolved to date, possibly because no senior leadership at the general officer level speaks solely for the field force. Given that 1, 2, and 5 CMBG are the source of the vast majority of augmentee instructors and a plurality of students, there is a certain logic in allowing them a greater voice in the de-confliction of courses, along with the collective recognition of the primacy of operations. Though this specific problem is widely recognized within the operational army, it cannot gain traction amongst the myriad competing priorities because it doesn't have a champion on Army Council (Composed of all General Officers in the army structure, along with the Army Sergeant-Major).

CHAPTER 4: THE PIGEAU/MCCANN MODEL OF COMMAND

In the early 21st Centruy, Canadian defence research scientists Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann developed a new model for the consideration of command in a military context, but that also had potentially wider applications. In developing their model, they first looked at Canadian, NATO, and other definitions of command to see if they were fit for purpose. After some research and testing through historical case studies, they decided it was not. Specifically, the NATO definition came under scrutiny because it did not include human factors. During the course of their research, they determined that a new definition of command was required in order to centre it around the humans who actually practised command, rather than the more ephemeral and "Borg-like" institutional military machines. This new definition, it was hoped, would facilitate the development of scientific hypotheses that were both testable and relevant.[13] They determined that NATO definitions of command and control were overly lengthy, circular, and redundant, with the definition of "Command and Control" simply being a longer re-statement of the control definition.[14]

After much deliberation, they settled on the following definition of command: "*The creative expression of human will necessary to accomplish the mission."*[15] This definition acknowledged that attributes such as leadership, vision, courage, self-confidence, judgement, initiative, honour, responsibility, and human will. In their contention, responsibility and willpower are two uniquely human characteristics, and therefore underline that command is a

[13] Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann. "Re-Conceptualizing Command and Control." Powerpoint presentation given to JCSP, 27 November 2015, Slide 3.
[14] *Ibid*., Slide 4.
[15] *Ibid*., Slide 4.

uniquely human endeavour. This definition of command is essentially neutral, and does not define what "good command" is, or "what right looks like" for potential commanders.[16]

This definition defines what command is: essentially a framework to determine courses of action for the resolution of problems or conflicts. Acceptable courses of action must have three characteristics: first, they must conform to the military law in a given state; second, they must adhere to the professional standards of a given military in order to be valid; and lastly, they must meet societal ethical norms. In Canada's case, military lay is derived from two separate groups of statutes: first, the Geneva Conventions and other international laws that Canada is party to, and the National Defence Act, which includes the military justice system and the many rules and regulations affecting members of the Canadian Armed Forces and employees of the Department of National Defence. In Canada, military professional standards include individual and collective training, professional development, and professional military education. The standards vary by rank and trade, but they have a unifying rigour that serves as a deterrent to unethical decision-making. In the Canadian military, our ethical norms are comprised as what Canadian society finds acceptable (commonly called the Globe and Mail test), along with an additional military treatise on ethics: Indeed, defence ethics training is a mandatory annual event for all military personnel in Canada.[17] This is appropriate, as the Canadian Armed Forces are the sole arbiters of the use of force internationally on behalf of the Canadian state.

When examining the total solution space for a given mission, Professors Pigeau and McCann identify that a mission may be conducted in a professional or unprofessional manner,

[16] *Ibid*., slide 5-6.
[17] *Ibid*., slide 6.

completed legally or illegally, and be executed in an ethical or unethical manner.[18] It becomes very clear that while this is the total solution space, there is far less room to manoeuvre for Canadian leaders. While success is imperative in any military operation as we are literally the force of last resort for the Government of Canada, there is a very real expectation that successful Canadian military operations must be conducted legally, ethically, and professionally. While this leaves much less room for a Canadian commander to manoeuvre, it is the only way the Canadian people would ever accept the Canadian use of force on any international mission. This drives Pigeau and McCann to refine their definition of effective command to the following: "*The creative and purposeful exercise of legitimate authority to accomplish the mission legally, professionally and ethically.*"[19] This is consistent with the Canadian Armed Forces' Capstone manual titled: *The Profession of Arms*. Though the legality, professionalism, and solid ethical foundation of the CAF can be taken as a given, this is not always the case in other militaries. For this reason, their refined definition of command can be used internationally.

The professors then contend that, within their accepted definition, almost anyone can find themselves in a leadership position, and that command is NOT limited to designated commanders. This contention provided the academics with a new challenge – namely, if anyone can be thrust into a command situation, than what are the dimensions of command?[20] This question led to process that derived three key components of command: Competency, authority, and responsibility.[21] In a military context, competency has many facets. First, there is physical competence – regardless of branch of service or specific roles, all commanders are thrust into some of the most demanding circumstances, so a reasonable level of physical fitness and

[18] *Ibid.*, slide 7.
[19] *Ibid*., slide 11.
[20] *Ibid*., slide 12.
[21] *Ibid*., slide 13.

endurance is important for every leader. However, it must also be accepted that some military occupations and operational situations will require a higher level of physical fitness. For example, a special operations leader must have an extremely high level of physical fitness to perform both her tasks and to be accepted by her tribe, and there are fewer demands and expectations on logisticians or other support trades. Second, intellectual competence plays a key role. Despite the contention of some, leadership in combat is no simple matter, and is probably one of the most intellectually demanding situations that exist for the human condition – this is why a preponderance of history's great captains were extraordinarily intelligent, as demonstrated by their successes both on and off the field of battle. Additionally, a high degree of intelligence is required for those who lead the institution in order to chart its course and ensure its continued development. In fact, it is difficult to think of a leadership position in the military that would not require intelligence.

Pigeau and McCann were also adamant that emotional competency was important to the exercise of command. Having the sensitivity to understand other people's motivations, hopes, fears, and desires is key to success and overall competence. This is important not only with one's friends; but also equally with one's adversaries. War is probably the single most human event there is, and people are inherently emotional creatures. While what is known as emotional intelligence (or EQ) doesn't square with the stereotypical stern-jawed, chisel-faced commander, some of the most powerful leaders in history got to where they were through their understanding of the human condition and those around them. Interpersonal competence is the second component of this aspect of command. Someone who can leverage their emotional intelligence to interact appropriately with peers, superiors, and subordinates can become truly powerful through moral suasion alone.

The second element of command is authority. This is divided into two components by Pigeau and McCann: legal authority, and personal authority.[22] In a Canadian military context, legal authority is straight-forward: it is derived from the crown through the National Defence Act, the Queen's Regulations and Orders, and various other statutes. Legal authority is typified by command appointments at the unit and formation level, and is tied to specific positions. Personal authority is something else entirely, and can be tied very closely to competency in most military settings. Personal authority is typified by the ability of a leader to inspire based on shared hardships, personal example, clearly demonstrated professional competence, or a combination of many factors. To underline the difference between the two, a brigade commander in the Canadian Army has an extremely large amount of legal authority over all 4,500 or so of his subordinates while he holds that position. He has many levers of power and trappings of office, such as an aide-de-camp, a variety of vehicles to transport him, a large office with a secretary, and a huge amount of combat power at his fingertips. Once he leaves that position (frequently upon promotion), the vast majority of those visible signs of power disappear, along with his legal right to exercise authority over the thousands of soldiers in that formation. However, a truly great commander will leave a mark on his former charges, and his personal authority will remain very real for a very long time with all those he left a positive impression on.

Finally, there is responsibility, both extrinsic and intrinsic.[23] Extrinsic responsibility is that responsibility given to a commander and her organization by legal fiat. Continuing the brigade example, a formation commander is responsible for the combat effectiveness, discipline, training, and professional development of those in his charge, along with the responsible

[22] *Ibid*., slide 13.
[23] *Ibid*., slide 13.

stewardship of his resources. Intrinsic responsibility is linked to the military ethos and general Canadian values. Pigeau and McCann give the example of Romeo Dallaire in Rawanda as a commander who has a high amount of intrinsic responsibility, but limited extrinsic responsibility.[24] As the UN military mission commander and a Canadian, Dallaire felt responsible for the safety and security of Rawandan civilians. However, with his restrictive mandate and limited resources, he was not in a position to prevent the massacre of hundreds of thousands of civilians, something which haunts him to this day.

The Competency, Authority, Responsibility Model then translates into a three-dimensional graph, with competency ranging from low to high on the vertical axis, and responsibility and authority running from low to high on the two horizontal axes (see figure). This general figure illustrates what they call the Balanced Command Envelope, an ideal, natural progression over a leader's career from an initial job that has relatively low competency requirements and commensurately low responsibility, to progression along all three axes in a relatively balanced manner: as competence increases, it is rewarded with gradual increases in both authority and responsibility through actual promotion in rank and appointments of increasing importance.

[24] Ibid., slide 15.



Figure 4.1: Balanced Command Envelope

A good example of this is a young combat arms officer. At the front end of her career, she is given command of a troop or platoon. This is a small organization of 15-40 soldiers and zero to eight armoured fighting vehicles of various types. Additionally, she has a sub-unit operations officer (Battle Captain or LAV Captain), a second-in-command (also a captain), and an officer commanding (a major). Upon completion of this first command job, she can expect promotion to Captain and employment as an instructor at one of the army's many schools or as a junior staff officer in a formation headquarters. In both cases, she will enjoy close supervision from both senior Captains and Majors to continue her development, followed by five months at the Canadian Army Staff College to complete the Army Operations Course. Upon return to her unit, she will then be a battle captain or second-in-command (depending on trade), before taking a senior captain job such as unit adjutant or operations officer. So far, we see a natural

progression whereas experience, education, and competence improve, responsibility continues to increase, as does authority.

Upon promotion to Major, officers either assume command of a sub-unit (such as a company or squadron of around 120 soldiers) right away, or they fill an entry-level major job on a base or at a formation. After successful sub-unit command is usually a year in Toronto at the Canadian Forces College to attend the Joint Command and Staff Programme, followed by one to four years of high-range Major employment before promotion to Lieutenant-Colonel. In the Canadian Army, high-range positions include (but are not limited to) jobs such as G3 (chief of operations) for one of the Army's three manoeuvre brigades, executive assistant to a general officer, and force development at the army or armed forces level. Once promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel, she can expect another staff position before assuming command of a unit. Once unit command is complete, then a high-range Lieutenant-Colonel job such as division G3, Executive Assistant to the Army Commander, or G33 (Current Operations) for the Army, then promotion to Colonel is almost a certainty. After a year or two in a Colonel staff job (almost always in Ottawa), then another year at the Canadian Forces College for the National Security Programme, then Command of a Brigade. After that, promotion to Brigadier-General and ascension to the highest levels of authority and responsibility in the military is essentially a certainty. Generals lead the institution. The career path as described above is a perfect example of Pigeau and McCann's idea of balanced command, but not every officer enjoys such a blessed career path. What then of them?

Looking deeper into the Competency, Authority, Responsibility model, there are a number of different areas on the spectrum of legal and ethical command where a commander or

someone in a command situation can call. In addition to minimal (balanced) command and maximal (balanced) command, there is dangerous command and ineffectual command. Minimal (balanced) command is that first job on the balanced spectrum, where competency is lower (usually due to inexperience) and authority and responsibility are commensurately low. Maximal (balanced) command is on the high end of the balanced command spectrum due to competence, authority, and responsibility all being high. Dangerous command is a situation where competency is high, but either authority or responsibility (or both) are low. Ineffectual command occurs when either competency or authority is low, but responsibility is high. When looking at the current structure of the Canadian Army and her closest allies, careful attention will be paid to areas where ineffectual command may exist. This is due to the fact that ineffectual command is either a problem of poor succession planning, which is easily fixed by replacing the commander, or where the command or staff position is not given the authority to match the responsibilities of the position, which is a far more difficult problem to solve, for it is structural.

Authority/Responsibility Surface



Figure 4.2: Authority/Responsibility Surface



Figure 4.3: Adding Competency

CHAPTER 5: AUSTRALIAN ARMY STRUCTURE



Figure 5.1: Australian Army Structure

Australia has long been one of Canada's closest military allies. Moreover, they share a distinguished military history, especially during the last 100 days of the First World War. During that time, known as the Amiens campaign in some circles, the Canadian and Australian Corps served side-by-side at the head of the Allied armies from all nations. Their unique, de-centralized command styles and fighting spirit earned them the collective title of "Shock Army of the British Empire." Indeed the Canadians and Australians advanced further and faster against the Germans than anyone had during the entire course of the war. In the opinion of many, it was this "AUSCAN"[25] advance more than anything that convinced the Germans to sue for peace. Today, Canada and Australia are similar in size, population composition, GDP, and military. The countries differ primarily in the fact that, while Canada has a larger population and GDP, Australia spends a larger amount of money on defence and has a more capable military, especially in the maritime and air domains. This is due, at least in part, to the fact that Canada

[25] Australian-Canadian…a term I made up just now.

has the world's greatest military power as its southern neighbour and no nearby adversaries (except perhaps in the arctic). On the other hand, Australia is the most powerful true democracy in its region, and lives in an area that is full of potential and actual adversary states. In the words of some, Australia is to New Zealand as The United States of America is to Canada. This is perhaps the reason that Australia has a largely bi-partisan defence policy, and Canada is unlikely to achieve this laudable (some would say essential) goal in the near term.

As this study is examining the Canadian Army's structure, and there are few nations as close in composition and defence forces to Canada as Australia, there is a great deal of value in examining how the Australian Army is structured. There are many similarities: like Canada, the Australian Army is commanded by a Lieutenant-General, and is around 20,000 soldiers strong. Australia also has three symmetrical manoeuvre brigades and a combat support brigade.[26] Australia's manoeuvre brigades are very similar to Canada's, but they have two infantry battalions per brigade to Canada's three, a signal regiment each to Canada's signal squadrons, and their armoured regiments are now completely symmetrical, unlike Canada's. Australia has five reserve manoeuvre brigades to Canada's ten, and has three regional force surveillance battalions to Canada's five ranger patrol groups.[27]

There are some noticeable differences: in the field force, Australia has a combat aviation brigade in their army, but this is akin to the Royal Canadian Air Force's 1 Wing (tactical aviation), so Canada has a similar capability, but resident in a different service. However, in addition to utility and medium to heavy lift helicopters, the Australians also have Tiger attack helicopters, which gives the third dimension of the Australian land force a punch that 1 Wing

[26] "Order of Battle." *Australian Army Website,* 7 May 2018. https://www.army.gov.au/our-people/order-of-battle-0.
[27] *Ibid.*

very clearly lacks.[28] The Australian Army also has the 17th Combat Service Support Brigade, composed of four medical battalions, a military police battalion, three force support battalions, and a signal squadron.[29] Again, the Canadian Army can call on similar capabilities: Canada also has three field ambulances and the 1st Canadian Field Hospital, but these belong to Health Services Command, much as the Military Police Regiments, of which there are four, belong to Military Police Command. Both the Health Services and Military Police organizations report to Military Personnel Command, a separate Level 1 (three-star) command, on par with influence in Ottawa to the Canadian Army.

On top of all of these separate resident capabilities, the Australian Army also owns the two-star Special Operations Command. Though the Canadian Special Operations Command (CANSOFCOM) is also a two-star headquarters of approximately the same size, it is considered a Level 1 headquarters and thus reports directly to the Chief of Defence Staff. Additionally, the 1st Australian Division Headquarters, a potential Combined Joint Integrated Headquarters for deployed operations (CJITF), while the similar Canadian Capability (1st Canadian Division Headquarters) is resident in the Canadian Joint operations Command (CJOC). The Royal Military College of Australia also belongs to the Army, whereas the Royal Military College of Canada belongs to the Canadian Defence Academy, another two-star Level 1 headquarters. Finally, the Australian Army has a university training brigade, with subordinate university training regiments at six different Australian universities.[30] There is no Canadian equivalent to this structure anywhere in the Department of National Defence, but this is very similar to the American military's Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program. Now that the general

[28] *Ibid.*
[29] *Ibid.*
[30] *Ibid.*

similarities and differences have been identified, we are able to examine the actual structure of the Australian Army, and how it differs at each level from the Canadian Army. This will also allow for an examination as to why the differences exist.

Underneath the three-star Australian Army Headquarters, there are four direct-reports, three Major-Generals commanding 1st Australian Division, Forces Command, and Special Operations Command, and a Lieutenant-Colonel in charge of the Australian Army Cadets. 1st Australian Division is the force employer for all deployed operations, and can potentially act as a deployed multinational or CJITF headquarters on operations if required. Commander, 1st Australian Division has direct command of five subordinate units on an enduring basis: the Colonel who acts as Commander, Landing Forces, the 1st Signal Regiment (with a Lieutenant-Colonel in Charge), the Combat Training Centre (with a Colonel as Commander), the 2nd/30th Training Group (Lieutenant-Colonel) and the 39th Operational Support Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel). Commander, Landing Forces has 2nd Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (2 RAR) under permanent command.[31] This high-readiness unit is an amphibious battalion able to embark on the Royal Australian Navy's fleet of amphibious ships and sail anywhere in the world in relatively short order. This is a strategic asset that Canada most certainly lacks. The 1st Signal Regiment and 39th Operational Support Battalion exist to support the division headquarters and division support troops when employed. Canada mirrors this capability with the Canadian Joint Signals Regiment, a CJOC unit (as is 1st Canadian Division Headquarters), but does not have a permanently established combat service support capability. Additionally, 1st Canadian Division Headquarters has no permanently assigned subordinate units. The Combat Training Centre is a collective training establishment in the vein

[31] *Ibid.*

of the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre, which in Canada is subordinate to the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre, responsible for all individual and collective training, along with professional development. The 2nd/30th Training Group conducts high-level simulation exercises, which is similar to a Kingston-based offshoot of CMTC, which is also commanded by a Lieutenant-Colonel. Both these organizations belong to 1st Australian Division in support of its commander's ability to certify attached units for expeditionary operations.

Special Operations Command encompasses the Special Air Service Regiment (akin to Canada's Joint Task Force Two), 1st and 2nd Commando Regiments (akin to the Canadian Special Operations Regiment), the Special Operations Training & Education Centre (similar to the Canadian Special Operations Training Centre), the Parachute Training Centre (similar to the Canadian Army Advanced Warfare Centre), and the Special Operations Logistics Squadron and Special Operations Engineer Regiment, for which there are no Canadian counterparts.[32] CANSOFCOM does have the advantage of independence and the independent aviation capability represented by 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron which the Australian command lacks.

The final two-star headquarters is fairly gargantuan by any army's standard. Forces Command, the Australian Army's force generator has no fewer than 13 direct-report subordinate headquarters.[33] These include another two-star headquarters, 2nd Division, which commands the five reserve brigades, the university training brigade, the Regional Force Surveillance Group, and separate signal and artillery regiments. Forces Command also encompasses all three manoeuvre brigades, the aviation brigade, the combat support brigade, and the aviation brigade.

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[32] *Ibid.*
[33] *Ibid.*

Additionally, it owns all of the individual training and professional development institutions in the Australian Army, including the Royal Military College of Australia, the Combined Arms training Centre, the Army Logistic Training Centre, the Army Aviation Training Centre, the Defence Command Support Training Centre, and the Army Knowledge Group.[34] Therefore, under this single, two-star headquarters, we see a Major-General, Seven Brigadiers (Brigadier-Generals in Canadian parlance), and five full-Colonels. His two-star subordinate has a further six Brigadiers, one Colonel, and two Lieutenant-Colonel commanding officers under his authority. This puts a total of between 15 and 17 Canadian general officer equivalents in a single two-star headquarters. For comparison, there are nine general officers in the entire Canadian Army structure. However, this is misleading, as brigade commanders in Canada, along with the commanders of formations such as the Combat Training Centre and the Canadian Army Command and Staff College were Brigadier-Generals until 1997, where they were all reduced in rank as a cost saving-measure. Still, the appropriate balance is probably somewhere between the two extremes.

In comparison to the Australian Army Commander's four direct-reports, three of whom are Major-Generals, the Commander of the Canadian Army has five direct-reports, four Brigadier-Generals and one Major-General. The big differences are in responsibilities. Whereas in Canada, the one-stars each have a regular brigade, two-three reserve "brigades" (they are frequently less than 1/5 the size of a regular brigade), a division support group, a ranger patrol group, and a division training centre, the two-star is responsible for almost all individual and collective training along with professional development. In Australia, special forces fall under the army, this is not the case in Canada, and it will not become the case, so this can be

[34] *Ibid.*

discounted from the analysis. Similarly, the Canadian Cadet Programme is administered by the Chief of Reserves and Cadets, so this can also be safely discounted.

What remains are two subordinate commands: one for force generation, and one for force employment. As the force employer, 1st Australian Division owns the high-readiness, amphibious capability of the regular Australian Army, divisional troops, and the collective training capability of the Australian Army to aid the Commander of the 1st Division in his certification of forces for deployment on expeditionary operations. There is a great deal of logic in this, as it makes the Australian Army very responsive to any immediate crises in the Asia-Pacific region. This capability proved especially useful in East Timor in the late 20th and early 21st Centuries. Canada has no permanently-identified high-readiness units. The Non-Combatant Evacuation Battalion Group (in reality a company and a unit headquarters) is on a theoretical five days' notice to move, but this has never been tested. Canada's major land force contributions, the Line of Operations three brigade (minus) and Line of Operations four battalion task force are both on a 90 days to operational theatre plan, which frequently causes the Government of Canada to resort to special operations forces, which are held at far higher readiness, for tasks that could be accomplished by regular army soldiers. This unduly stresses the finite resource that our special operations forces is designed to be, so it behooves the army to pick up a greater share of the burden by being something that the Government of Canada is more willing to employ for contingency operations.

In Australia, Forces Command owns the field force, the individual training system, the professional development institutions, and the entirety of the reserve force. Like Canada, these four silos of excellence are spread diffusely over the sparsely-populated territory. While mobile,

deployable elements such as the army's six brigades can easily be controlled by a remote headquarters, as is the case at the divisional and corps level in the US and British armies respectively, static elements are better controlled by a headquarters a little closer to home. As Australian Forces Command has sway over four separate solitudes, it is of necessity a house divided, just as the four force-generating Canadian divisions are. Australia definitely has some lessons for Canada with respect to readiness and deployability, but has probably not found the optimal structure with their current division of labour.

With respect to reserve forces, the Australian Army is again significantly different than the Canadian Army. The Aussies have five brigades to Canada's ten, but the number of units that populate their formations are significantly smaller. In Canada, there has been a long tradition of preserving units of the Primary Reserve (or militia), regardless of their actual strength, primarily because of an attachment to past accomplishments. In many ways, this sentimentalism is admirable, but it comes with a large operational cost. To put things in perspective, Canada has 19 Primary Reserve armoured "regiments," and over 50 infantry "Battalions." Combined, these forces, on paper, muster far fewer total soldiers than the three regular army armoured regiments and nine infantry battalions. Conversely, the Australian Army has a mere three reserve armoured regiments, and two independent reserve squadrons, and 13 infantry battalions. These reserve units approximate their regular counterparts far more closely than in Canada, where a reserve "unit" frequently has fewer than 100 personnel, which compares somewhat unfavourably to the 500-600 soldiers in a regular unit. This creates a great deal of efficiency, unity of command, effectiveness, and has an additional effect of unifying splintered loyalties. It is something Canada should look to emulate.

Something that Australia does not have is a unified training command like the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre. In fact, Australia has deliberately separated command of its individual and collective training elements under two separate, two-star headquarters. This is something that Canada should examine more closely.

CHAPTER 6: THE STRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY



Figure 6.1: The Structure of the United States Army

Though at almost half a million soldiers in its regular component, the United States Army is roughly 20 times the size of Canada's Army, it is useful to examine its structure because Canada is such a close ally. In fact, with five Canadian general officer positions embedded in the U.S. Army structure directly, along with 31 other senior officers, Canada is probably more closely aligned with the U.S. Army than with any other. Because most Canadian soldiers will work with our American allies over the course of their career, and most Canadian Army senior leaders will actually be embedded in the American military structure for an entire posting (the likelihood of which increases with each promotion: fully 20% of Canada's general and flag officers live and work outside of Canada), there is probably a natural tendency to look to the

United States for best-practices – after all, soldiers of any rank are frequently prisoners of their own experiences.

The United States Army is commanded by a four-star general (the Chief of Staff of the Army, or CSA), and his deputy is also a four-star (the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army). The Army then has three subordinate, four-star commands: U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM); U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC); and U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC).[35] FORSCOM, is the force-generator of the army. In the words of the Americans, its mission is the following: "FORSCOM trains, mobilizes, deploys, sustains, transforms, and reconstitutes assigned conventional forces, providing relevant and ready land power to combatant commanders."[36] TRADOC "…recruits, trains, and educates the Army's Soldiers; develops leaders; supports training in units; develops doctrine; establishes standards; and builds the future Army."[37] Finally, AMC is responsible for the development and acquisition of new technologies for the army, along with logistics support.[38]

In terms of force employment, the U.S. Army has ten separate Army Service Component Commands embedded in the six American joint Combatant Commands. These are all three or four-star commands, and they form the Land Component Command (LCC) for any operations in their superior combatant command's area of operational responsibility. These commands are U.S. Army Africa (USARAF, three-star), U.S. Army Central (USARCENT, three-star), U.S. Army North (USARNORTH, three-star), U.S. Army South (USARSO, three-star), U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR, three-star), U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC, four-star), U.S. Army Special

[35] "Army Command Structure." *United States Army Website*, 7 May 2018. https://www.army.mil/info/organization/.
[36] *Ibid.*
[37] *Ibid.*
[38] *Ibid.*

Operations Command (USASOC, three-star), Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC, three-star), U.S. Army Space and Missile Defence Command/Army Forces Strategic Command (USASMDC/ARSTRAT, three-star), and U.S. Army Cyber Command (USARCYBER, three-star).[39]

In addition to the army force generating commands and army service component commands, the U.S. Army has 13 direct reporting units, ranging in size from brigade (Colonel) to command (Lieutenant-General).[40] Many of the functions of these direct-reporting units are replicated at the Canadian Armed forces such as medical, military police, and service academies, so they will not be examined at any great length.

FORSCOM is composed of over 750,000 Active Duty (regular), Reserve, and National Guard soldiers.[41] The U.S. Army Reserve are national troops, while National Guardsmen are state troops until mobilized by the Secretary of Defence. There is no such distinction in Canada. The key formations belonging to FORSCOM are I Corps in Joint Base Lewis McChord, Washington State, III Corps in Fort Hood, Texas, and XVIII Airborne Corps in Fort Bragg, North Carolina. All three corps are commanded by Lieutenant-Generals. Interestingly, there is a Canadian Brigadier-General as the Deputy Commanding General – Support at I Corps, and another one-star general as the Deputy Commanding General – Operations at XVIII Airborne Corps. I Corps is composed of one permanently-assigned mechanized (Stryker) division, an Expeditionary Sustainment command and two brigades of corps troops. III Corps has four heavy mechanized divisions and eight brigades of corps troops, making it the home of much of the U.S. Army's heavy capabilities. XVIII Airborne Corps has an airborne division (parachute), an air

[39] *Ibid.*
[40] *Ibid.*
[41] https://www.forscom.army.mil/(S(nbuj05x2tzow14eab2nhwqgy))/Pages/About

assault division (helicopter-mobile), a mountain division (light), and a mechanized division, along with eight brigades of corps troops. Together, these nine divisions represent the bulk of the U.S. Army's fighting strength, though there are an additional two divisions and a number of separate brigades permanently assigned to the army service component commands around the world.

Additionally, FORSCOM owns the Fort Irwin National Training Centre and the Joint Readiness Training Centre in Fort Polk, Louisiana.[42] These are collective training centres similar in mandate to the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre, with three key differences: They are both commanded by one-star generals who have successfully led fighting brigades, the commanders of the training centres are also the certification authorities for declaring units operationally ready to deploy, and finally these two formations report to the force generator of the U.S. Army, FORSCOM, not the institutional training and education command, TRADOC.

TRADOC is responsible for all U.S. Army recruiting, individual training, professional military education, force development, doctrine development, and high-level collective training for divisions and corps in synthetic environments. It has a total of 47,542 employees, including 34,300 military personnel and 13,100 civilians.[43] TRADOC has 2,412 locations world-wide, and trains or educates 572,500 students annually, which is a number greater than the combined strength of the British, German, and French armies twice over.[44] It recruits 133,000 soldiers

[42] http://www.jrtc-polk.army.mil/cg.html
[43] Townsend, Stephen J. "TRADOC: Designing and Building the Future Army." Powerpoint presentation on assumption of command, 2 March 2018, 5.
[44] *Ibid.*, 5-6

annually, along with 27,800 civilian employees every year.[45] Like everything else in the U.S. Army, it is a massive institution in its own right.

The Commanding General of TRADOC is a four-star, with a three-star deputy commander/chief of staff, and three deputy chiefs of staff at the Major-General rank. Two three-stars, three two-stars, two Colonels, and one civilian academic organization serve as direct reports to the commanding general. In what TRADOC terms the design realm, these include the Army Capabilities Integration Centre (Lieutenant-General), Asymmetric Warfare Group (Colonel), Rapid Equipping Force (Colonel), and TRADOC Analysis Centre (civilian). In the improve realm, a three-star general commands the Combined Arms Centre, which includes eight subordinate two-star centres of excellence. When TRADOC speaks of acquire, it means personnel, not equipment. To that end, there is a two-star recruiting command with six subordinate recruiting brigades, and a two-star cadet command, composed of eight Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) brigades and the 104th training division. The ROTC program is an officer production measure, and there is an ROTC presence on almost every large American university campus. Lastly, there is a Major-General commanding the U.S. Army Centre for IMT.

By far the largest sub-element of TRADOC is the Combined Arms Centre, headquartered in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This includes the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College, its School of Advanced Military Studies, the Mission Command Centre of Excellence, the Manoeuvre Centre of Excellence (with the Armour and Infantry Schools), Fires Centre of Excellence (with the Artillery and Air Defence Artillery Schools), Aviation Centre of Excellence, Cyber Centre of Excellence (with the Cyber and Signal Schools), Intelligence Centre of Excellence, Manoeuvre Support Centre of Excellence (with Engineer, CBRN, and MP

[45] *Ibid*, 5.

Schools), and Sustainment Centre of Excellence (with the Ordnance, Transport, SSI, and Quartermaster schools under command), and the U.S. Army Sergeants-Major Academy.[46]

The Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre has some similarities with this organization: it has the remit to develop and promulgate doctrine, it commands the army's staff college, and it commands the army's individual training schools. They serve as the respective centres of excellence for their various branches and corps, though there are far fewer trades the Canadian Army is responsible for than its American counterpart. Here, the similarities end though. CADTC has nothing to do with recruiting, university training, or professional military education beyond the Captain rank level, these are all the realm of either the Canadian Defence Academy or Military Personnel Command. Unlike the Americans, where the commander responsible for force-generation is also the one who commands the collective training centres, this is not the case in Canada. Instead, Canada's centres of excellence are owned by our version of TRADOC, which is not in keeping with the best practices of our closest allies.

[46] *Ibid*., 3.

CHAPTER 7: THE STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH ARMY



Figure 7.1: The Structure of the British Army

Though the regular component of the British Army was recently cut from an original strength of 100,000, it is still almost four times the size of the Canadian Army at approximately 82,000 all ranks. The commander of the British Army, known as the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), is a four-star general, as is his deputy (the DCGS). The British Army is then sub-divided into two subordinate elements, the Field Army and Home Command, both Led by Lieutenant-Generals. Additionally, Headquarters Allied Rapid Reaction Corps is always commanded by a British three-star general. The Field Army is comprised of the 1st Division, the 3rd Division, Force Troops Command, and the Joint Helicopter Command. Home Command is composed of Headquarters London District, Headquarters Regional Command, the Army Recruiting Training

Division, the Army Personnel Centre, and the Sandhurst Group. All nine of these elements are commanded by Major-Generals.[47]

As already indicated, the Field Army has four subordinate formations. What the British Army terms the Reaction Force, or very high readiness regular soldiers is contained primarily in the 3rd Division, 16 Air Assault Brigade.[48] Subordinate to 3rd Division are three symmetrical armoured infantry brigades, 1st, 12th, and 20th and 101 Logistic Brigade. Each of the three manoeuvre brigades has a tank regiment, an armoured cavalry regiment, two armoured infantry battalions (mounted in the Warrior mechanized infantry fighting vehicle), and a heavy protected mobility battalion (in wheeled vehicles).[49] Logistics, medical, artillery, engineering, and other support for these formations would come out of Forces Command on an as-needed basis. These forces in being are ready to fight as a formed division on a single rotation basis, or provide the first three rotations for an enduring deployment of brigade size. Within the Reaction Force, all combat functions are carried out by full-time soldiers, but certain elements of 101 Logistic Brigade and 16 Air Assault Brigade are reservists, though not high readiness elements for obvious reasons.

The Adaptable Force is commanded by 1st Division, and is comprised of seven infantry brigades and one logistics brigade. The Adaptable Force is responsible for rotations four and five of an enduring, brigade-sized combat operation, standing commitments to Cyprus, Brunei, the Falklands, and State Ceremonial and Public Duties. In addition, they are the primary force for international defence engagement, and a firm base for aid to the civil power in the United

[47] https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/
[48] United Kingdom. British Army. *Transforming the British Army: An Update – July 2013.* (London: Crown Copyright, July 2013), 5.
[49] *Ibid.*, 7.

Kingdom.[50] 1st Division is mandated to maintain a balance of capabilities, including one light cavalry regiment, two light protected mobility infantry battalions, and three light infantry battalions either for named operations or held in readiness for international contingencies. The purpose of the seven brigade headquarters is twofold: first, they will all attain knowledge on a specific region of the world and specialize on operations there, and second, they will become points of engagement, firm base functions, and local land component commands for domestic operations.[51] 1st Division is also a total force division, in that it fully integrates regular and reserve units in each brigade. Every reserve unit is integrated with a regular unit of similar capabilities.

Force Troops command contains the preponderance of combat support and combat service support capabilities of the British Army in eight brigades and a Security Assistance Group. Force Troops contains artillery, engineer, logistics, medical, military police, signal, intelligence, electronic warfare, target acquisition, and unmanned aerial systems, all in separate, specialist brigades. As with the Adaptable Force, every brigade is a mixture of regular units paired with a number of reserve units. In all, the Field Army has 22 brigades, 11 of which are capable of manoeuvre. In addition, it has two deployable division headquarters. However, the over-specialization of fifty-percent of its subordinate formations is somewhat questionable, and smacks of empire building. The UK is the only modern western army going in this direction. In the United States and many continental European nations, all combat functions have permanently been integrated at the battalion level, and in Canada and Australia, they are all integrated in the brigade. The UK was set up like this, and this regression is somewhat curious and without real precedent.

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[50] *Ibid*., 8.
[51] *Ibid*., 8.

Commander Home Command has five two-star subordinate formations: Headquarters London District, Headquarters Regional Command, Army Recruiting Training Division, Army Personnel Centre, and the Sandhurst Group.[52] London District is primarily concerned with Public Duties, or the popular ceremonial activities that regularly occur in the capital city and seat of the Throne. Headquarters Regional Command is primarily concerned with providing real life support and control of British stations and garrisons in the home islands. Additionally, it is responsible to command the enduring military commitments in Nepal and Brunei. The Army Recruiting Training Division is similar to the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre in that it is responsible for both individual and collective training, including overseas training institutions such as the British Army Training Unit Suffield. Additionally (and as its name suggests), it is responsible for recruiting for the entire army. The Army Personnel Centre is the human resources arm of the service, and also holds personnel records. The Sandhurst Group is responsible for all officer initial training. Unlike the Royal Military College of Canada or the United States Military Academy, Sandhurst is not a degree granting institution. Instead, it is a purely military institution, and over the 42 week programme, it inculcates the values of the British officer corps, along with an appreciation for leadership, military history, and tactics.

Once again, in the British Army, we see that there is a dedicated commander of all field forces, to ensure proper force generation of elements for expeditionary operations. Though there are some awkward elements of the British Army structure, many of these can be attributed to the long history of the many arms and regiments within the United Kingdom. Perhaps more than any other army in the ABCANZ alliance, the British are prisoners of their past.

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[52] *Ibid.*

CHAPTER 8: BEST PRACTICES

After review of the Canadian Army's current structure, and comparing it with the American, Australian, and British examples, it is clear that there is no consensus on the best, most efficient way to lead and administer an army. It is equally clear that there are some best practices that are common to most of our key allies, and that Canada would do well to emulate. Most glaringly, Canada lacks a commander of the field forces akin to the Commanding General of FORSCOM in America, Commander Field Army in Britain, or the Commander of Forces Command in Australia (although the latter has an unusually large remit).

It is equally clear that having deployable commands or headquarters capable of employing soldiers on expeditionary operations is desirable, perhaps essential. The American model of a number of standing LCCs at the three and four star level, spread throughout the world, with a number of other Corps and Division headquarters that are attachable to them when necessary, even if scaled, is probably not achievable by Canada (or most other nations). The British model of two deployable division headquarters, both with responsibilities to command the Reaction Force and Adaptive Force while in the UK, seems a model of efficiency and potential operational output.

The Australian model of 1st Division Headquarters being a standing Land Component Command with a small number of very high readiness forces on an enduring basis, along with all the collective training infrastructure and the ability to command anything up to a division worth of soldiers, is interesting and is optimized for expeditionary operations. Indeed, it has been proven effective and responsive. The problem with the Australian structure is not the operational side, but rather the trade-off the Australians had to make in order to enable their 1st Division

Headquarters. Namely, their Forces Command has 13 direct report subordinate headquarters, including another two-star headquarters that commands an additional nine direct report units and formations.

When we look at Canada's current high-readiness formation headquarters, 1st Canadian Division, we see that it is not manned or equipped to operate as a division headquarters, nor does it have key enablers such as signals or logistic support assigned to it. As it works for the Canadian Joint Operations Command, it now has only peripheral army-to-army relations with its most-likely flanking and higher formations, and it is now further removed from the force elements it will eventually (potentially) command. While conceived as a truly joint headquarters, able to exercise command and control over Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Air Force, and Royal Canadian Navy assets, in practice it will likely only ever have army units to command, with perhaps some tactical aviation (which is an army asset in all other five-eyes nations). This is due to the fact that the navy has created an enduring Maritime Component Command for CJOC in Maritime Forces Atlantic Headquarters, and the air force has re-structured so that the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) at 1 Canadian Air Division serves as an Air Component Command element for all deployed air force task forces. 1st Canadian Division has therefore become an anomaly, and does not appear to add a lot of value to the execution of operations by the Canadian Armed Forces.

When we look at command of regular army field forces, we again see a difference between Canada and her key allies. The Americans have FORSCOM, which commands all field force and collective training elements not already deployed in an active theatre of operations.

The British have the Field Army, which commands all field force formations, both high-readiness and lower-readiness. In their almost wholly regular army 3rd Division, they have a robust, ready, and deployable conventional force with three manoeuvre brigade headquarters, a support brigade, and a division headquarters unencumbered by any other responsibilities domestically. 1st Division, while integrated into the command and control of the many regional brigades, also does not have any domestic remits and is capable of deployment if required. Additionally, while the regional brigades have both regular and reserve units, the reserve units are actually fewer in number than the regulars, and exist to augment them. All reserve units are commanded by regular formation headquarters. The primary issue with the British Army appears to be tribalism, in that many enabling capabilities that are regularly held at the unit or brigade level have all been moved to separate brigades.

Individual and collective training institutions are all under the Army Recruiting Training Division, as in Canada. The primary difference is that in the UK, this two-star headquarters is one of nine formations commanded by Major-Generals, with two three-star formations above them before getting to the army level. In Canada, the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training System is the only two-star command, all four of his Level 2 peers are Brigadier-Generals. This makes for an automatic and noticeable power imbalance.

In Australia, Forces Command Headquarters commands all six separate regular army brigades, all individual training and professional development units, and the two-star 2nd Division Headquarters, which commands the five reserve brigades, the university training brigade, and the Regional Force Surveillance Group. This immense span of control means that, while the Australian Army is optimized for effective force employment with its lean 1st Division

and Special Operations Forces structure, the trade-off is that literally everything else in the army is commanded by the only remaining Level 2 headquarters. This makes the many competing institutional, regular, reserve, and other demands on the four regional Canadian division headquarters seem fairly reasonable by comparison. However, we see some key themes: regular and reserve forces have separate commanders (even if the reserve commander then reports to the same headquarters as the regular commanders), meaning that, at the Australian Army level, only one of three Level 2 headquarters deals with reserves, institutional support, and individual training. This bias towards operations is an asset for the Australians, and is noticeably absent in Canada, where none of the five Level 2 commanders are focused solely on either operations or the needs of the operationally-employable portions of the Canadian Army.

CHAPTER 9: OPTIMIZING CANADA'S ARMY FOR OPERATIONS

The Canadian Army is over-headquartered, and the headquarters in many instances don't command the right things. Given the massive territory of Canada, have geographically distinct headquarters for both span of control and domestic operations makes a good deal of sense, but what they command is probably not ideal and there are too many headquarters.

When looking at the four divisions and the training command that house the bulk of Canada's regular army, there are some noticeable disparities. 2nd Canadian Division has around 5,600 Regular soldiers and control of a single province, albeit the second most populous. 3rd Canadian Division has just under 6,000 regulars, but its span of control covers the four western provinces, the elements of the Canadian Army (including the Canadian Rangers) in the three northern territories, and the army's reserves and infrastructure at the Lakehead in northern Ontario. With almost 40% of Canada's population, Ontario is a giant in confederation. Accordingly, 4th Division, responsible for most of the army in Ontario, has a large number of regular army soldiers, at around 6,000 full-timers. Rounding out the Canadian Army's regional commands is 5th Canadian Division, covering the four smallest provinces by population in the Atlantic region. At a relatively paltry 2,000 regulars, 5th Canadian Division is the smallest of the four divisions by two orders of magnitude. Lastly, the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre has around 2,300 full-time soldiers, but double the number of full Colonels, Lieutenant-Colonels, and Majors as any of the Canadian Army's four divisions.[53]

Going back to first principles and accepting that the Canadian Army is a fighting force whose purpose is to fight and win Canada's wars, we can come to a number of deductions. First,

[53] DHRIS.

the field force, currently composed of the three fighting brigades and one combat support brigade, is inherently mobile. It is specifically designed to deploy to austere environments overseas. Second, the field force lacks a champion on Army Council. There is not a single general officer who speaks for the field force on this august body, and this is directly contrary to the way three of our closest allies conduct the institutional business of running an army – this alone should give Canada pause for thought. Third, both the individual training system units and the army's institutional support elements are essentially tied to terrain: for example, Canadian Armed Forces Base Shilo is going to worry about taking care of business in Shilo, and nowhere else. Given this fact, any reorganization should consider geographic proximity for commanders at all levels. In addition, there is currently a distinct lack of balance between the Canadian Army's four Level 2 headquarters: three divisions are roughly symmetrical in size and function (2^{nd}, 3^{rd}, and 4^{th} Divisions), one division is roughly 1/3 the size of others (5^{th} Division), and one formation has about the same number of regulars as the tiniest division, but twice the number of senior officers as any other formation (the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre).

Finally, while command ranks have been trending downwards (such as the reduction in rank of brigade commanders from Brigadier-General to Colonel), staff ranks have been increasing. For example, in 2003, a brigade headquarters had two Majors, a G3 (operations, plans, and training) and a G4 (combat service support) with a third, the G6 (signals) dual-hatted as the Commanding Officer of the signal squadron that supported the headquarters. Today, the same brigade headquarters, commanding what is generally a smaller formation, has a Lieutenant-Colonel Chief of Staff and at least 6-7 Majors on its permanent establishment – this number of senior officers grows significantly when a brigade headquarters is "operationalized" and deployed into a field environment – sometimes by more than double. What's worse is that, if

deployed on an expeditionary operation, literally every position of significance receives a bump in rank. This sees the commander as a Brigadier-General once again, but he receives a full Colonel as his deputy, and all of his department heads, along with his advisors, see an increase in rank to Lieutenant-Colonel. To underline this trend, when the author was deployed to Kandahar, Afghanistan as a tank squadron battle captain, the Task Force Kandahar Headquarters (based on Headquarters, 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group and commanding a brigade-sized element) had no fewer than 13 Lieutenant-Colonels on staff and about 30 Majors.

While counter-insurgency campaigns are undoubtedly complex, the answer may not always be "more staff officers." In fact, some argue that a large, complex headquarters with many senior officers may create a situation where decision-making is more difficult. As an additional problem, the stated intent of the army's senior leaders to create a "command centric" environment, and the process of staff-inflation has a directly contrary effect. When the G3 of a brigade is a Major and one level down, most commanding officers are Lieutenant-Colonels, there is an automatic advantage to the commander over the staff officer through demonstrable seniority. Similarly, when a company, squadron, or battery commander is a Major and a unit operations officer is a Captain, there is a similar benefit. There is still a Colonel (or Brigadier-General) to overrule the Lieutenant-Colonel commanders, and a Lieutenant-Colonel commanding officer to overrule the Majors, but the staff principle for operations at each level is demonstrably junior to the commanders of the subordinate units and sub-units. This is good, as it underlines the responsibility and authority of the commanders. However, this dynamic completely changes when the staff principle becomes a peer to the commander one level down. This is why, while commanders may be the easiest and most obvious targets when examining rank inflation, it is actually on formation staffs where rank inflation is both most prevalent and

insidious. From a purely monetary perspective, the overall cost of a brigade with a single Brigadier-General and two senior staff officers is far less expensive than a similar formation commanded by a Colonel with nine of more senior staff officers (or close to 50 when deployed). Staff rank inflation is something that should both be more closely observed and guarded against if at all possible.

CHAPTER 10: THE FIX



Now that we have both examined the flaws in the Canadian Army and the methods Canada's key allies use to organize their forces, it is time to delve into another possible structure for Canada's land forces. First, structure at the divisional level warrants further examination.

To reiterate, none of the Canadian Army's Level 2 headquarters serve as a champion for the field forces, three divisions are roughly symmetrical, one is much smaller, and one is equally tiny in personnel, but holds a disproportionate number of senior officers and influence on the army, though it has no operational remit. Firstly, the three manoeuvre brigades, along with the Canadian Combat Support Brigade, should all be concentrated under a single, two-star division

headquarters. Though the brigades are geographically distinct, they exist to deploy internationally and train all across the country on a regular basis. In fact, having all four brigades under a single headquarters would mirror what the Americans do with their various corps headquarters (which tend to have geographically dispersed division headquarters) and FORSCOM, along with the British practice of grouping deployable formation headquarters under similarly deployable division headquarters. In addition, in keeping with American and Australian practice, the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre should also be placed under command of this new headquarters to give the deployable force-employer and force-generator the appropriate amount of influence over the deploying elements.

Second, the one-star, institutional division headquarters should be reduced to three from the current four through the elimination of the additional division headquarters in Halifax, Nova Scotia, and those responsibilities being assumed by the current, slightly smaller 2nd Division Headquarters in Montreal. Individual training units or formations, reserve formations, and institutional support elements in their respective geographic regions should all be subordinate to these three regional headquarters, and they should retain their responsibilities to the Canadian Joint Operations Command for domestic operations. In addition, they should all be standardized so that their respective headquarters are identical in size and structure, which is not currently the case.

If the collective training centre goes to the new division headquarters that is the champion of the field force and individual training centres become the responsibility of the regional divisions, it begs the question of what is to be done with the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre. Quite simply, it should be dismantled and the PYs from this headquarters

should be used for the support of other priorities. The Commander of the Canadian Army should rightly be the Army Training Authority, and should receive the Colonel filling the current Chief of Staff, Army Training Authority (along with his staff) at Army Headquarters in Ottawa to fulfill this role as the Army G7.

The Commandant of the Canadian Army Staff College should be elevated in rank to Brigadier-General from Colonel (which was his former rank until the rank reductions of 1997), and he should be given the responsibilities for force development and concept development in addition to his current remits for professional development and staff-training for Captains. The Commandant of the Staff College should be designated a Level 2 commander, giving him a voice on Army Council and solidifying the importance of professional military education in the structure of the Canadian Army. However, in order to execute these dual functions of force development and training, the staff college should receive two full Colonel billets to act as Chief of Force Development and Concepts and Chief Instructor. Once this is accomplished, the staff college could be examined for efficiencies in staffing, as it currently appears to have surplus capacity at the Major and Lieutenant-Colonel level. The savings in PYs from the closure of the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre, along with 5th Canadian Division, could be used to staff the new division headquarters for the field force.

The current structure of the Canadian Army Reserve is wasteful, illogical, and quite frankly unaffordable in the current fiscal environment. None of Canada's current reserve brigades or units are anywhere near their theoretical size, and the sheer number of units is laughable. It is a truism to say that if a regular army infantry battalion of 600 soldiers has a Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding Officer, a Regimental Sergeant Major, and five or six Majors

and Master Warrant Officers to command the various companies, than a reserve unit of perhaps 100 members of the militia will have a similar number of senior leaders, even though there is nothing for them to command. In Britain, members of the reserves do not command beyond the unit level because they are not suitable for anything beyond regimental service based on their limited experience as part-time soldiers. Canada needs to follow this model, reducing all the company, squadron, and battery-sized "regiments" to their proper status as sub-units in a larger organization. While regimental history does not need to be erased, these smaller elements need to see a commensurate reduction in rank for their commanders in order to eliminate bloat. The ten reserve brigades need to be reduced in number to six, with one brigade serving Atlantic Canada (from two), one in Quebec (from two), two in Ontario (from three), one in the Prairie Provinces (from two), and one in British Columbia.

The nature of the Primary Reserves is such that they are expected to force-generate individual augmentees, sub-units, and sub-sub-units such as platoons and troops for force employment by regular army leaders on named operations. That they currently fail to regularly meet these relatively simple force-generation goals is a testament to the ineffective leadership in the current organization. Through no fault of their own, senior leaders in the Primary Reserve are drawn in many directions by civilian employment, family issues, the myriad regimental loyalties, and lack of experience. The easiest (and probably best) solution to this problem is have officers of the Regular Army command these formations, and to have full-time staffs as opposed to the current mix of full and part time staff of reserve brigades. The professionalization of these formation headquarters and the reduction in their number will both serve both Canada's part time soldiers and her desired operational outputs well.

Internal to the new, six brigade structure, regimental affiliations could be preserved by reducing the official size of the average unit from a battalion or regiment to a squadron or company. For every three to five sub-units, one unit headquarters could be created, drawing from across the brigade for leadership. Regular Support Captains and Warrant Officers could work at these unit headquarters, along with senior reservist leadership. This change would easily free-up enough full-time staff to thoroughly professionalize the six remaining reserve brigade headquarters, much to the advantage of the part time soldiers serving throughout the organization. While this might cause some consternation in senior reservist circles, it nests well in the Canadian Armed Forces journey, where there should no longer be any distinction between Regular Force and Primary Reserve components, rather the distinction for members will be between full-time and part-time service, and full-time un-restricted, full-time restricted, and part-time restricted service. Under this structure, the professionalization of senior headquarters for reservists is almost inevitable, as only the most qualified people for each job will actually get them. As members will be able to move seamlessly between full and part time service, it will be relatively easy for a part-time soldier to compete for a full-time position of greater authority should they wish it. This would also align the Canadian Army reserves with the part-time personnel in the Royal Canadian Navy and Royal Canadian Air Force, who either serve as augmentees under Regular Force command, or who command at lower rank levels indicative of their actual amount of responsibility held, rather than aspirational goals or nods to the heroic past.

A single standard for all ranks will also necessitate an adjustment as to how officers in the Primary Reserve are recruited. Currently, the majority join as undergraduate students, are commissioned in a matter of weeks, and are considered fully qualified in one or two summers'

total training. As standards between the two components are brought in line, this will have to change. Ideally, part-time soldiers would all join as Non Commissioned Members and serve in that capacity until graduation from university. At this point, the best could be offered a path to officer training and an eventual commission once standards are met. Part-time officers who remained members of the part-time military community exclusively could expect to achieve the maximum rank of Lieutenant-Colonel over the course of their career if they did not opt for full-time employment during any portion of their career. In this capacity, they would have the responsibility for a real unit of several hundred soldiers, ably supported by a small cadre of full-time staff – this is a far cry from the units of 40 to 150 soldiers on paper that members of the primary reserve can currently expect to command.

In the regular army, at the unit and formation level, the field force is already largely structurally sound. However, the institutional army needs to make some adjustments in order to create a sustainable, logical structure. Within the support structure of the Canadian Army, the structure of the relatively new Divisional Support Groups has largely proved a failure. Bringing each of them in closer alignment to the former Area Support Groups would be an excellent start. Under this structure, local commanders would be empowered, with base commanders at the Lieutenant-Colonel rank re-established in Edmonton, Wainwright, Petawawa, and Valcartier. The new Divisional Support Groups (or Brigades), while still commanded by a Colonel, would have all bases and detachments in their respective division areas, along with any individual training schools. The exception would be in Gagetown, where the Commander of the Combat Training Centre could retain command over the diverse group of schools including the Armour, Artillery, Infantry, Engineer, and Tactics Schools, the 5th Canadian Division Training Centre, along with the Land Force Trials and Evaluations Unit and a Lieutenant-Colonel Base

Commander. The Commander of the 2nd Canadian Division Support Group would have the base in Valcartier, along with the 2nd Canadian Division Training Centre, and detachments in Montreal, St. Jean, Farnham, and the Atlantic Provinces.

The Commander of Canadian Armed Forces Base Kingston would retain his current authorities, and would gain responsibility for both the Canadian Forces School of Communications and Electronics and the Peace Support Training Centre. The 4th Canadian Division Support Group would command the base in Petawawa, the 4th Division Training Centre in Meaford, the Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers School, and detachments in Toronto and London, Ontario. The Canadian Army Advanced Warfare unit could probably be eliminated as a Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding Officer, with the parachute function remaining under a Major and the Arctic and Mountain responsibilities being transferred back to the 3rd Canadian Division Training Centre in Wainwright, where they both resided until the early 2000s (and where they are proximal to both mountains and arctic-like conditions).

The 3rd Canadian Division Support Group would have command of Canadian Armed Forces Bases Edmonton, Wainwright, Suffield, and Shilo, detachments in Calgary and Chilliwack, the 3rd Canadian Division Training Centre (with the Mountain and Arctic training specialities), and potentially Canadian Armed Forces Station Dundurn should the Royal Canadian Air Force wish to relinquish control (they have indicated a desire to do just this in the past).

This re-organization would see the Commander Combat Training Centre go to eight direct report units in a single location instead of ten units in four locations in two provinces (which are also separated by a third province), the 2nd Canadian Division Support Group go to

seven direct reports (five of them Majors) from one base in the current construct. 4th Canadian Division Support Group would grow to nine direct reports (three of them Majors) from one, and they would all be in the same province, close enough for the Commander to make a day trip to any of them. The 3rd Canadian Division Support Group would grow to seven or eight direct reports from its current three (with two to three of those being Majors). This would take the current, diffuse control in the division support group structure and concentrate it in the power of local commanders to ensure responsiveness to the full-time and part-time field force. In addition, it would give an important individual training and standards function to all the division support group commanders, who, generally being accomplished combat arms officers, are very-well positioned to supervise the commanding officers supporting the vital baseline training of the army, both full and part-time. This would also allow for a commensurate reduction in the size of the Combat Training Centre Headquarters (currently slightly larger than double the size of a brigade headquarters in garrison), as the individual training responsibility for the Canadian Army would be pushed back up to Army Headquarters where it will get the attention it deserves, instead of being the purview of one of the 30 Colonels in the current structure of the army.

Though the field-forces are already optimized for deployment, staff inflation has hit brigades, coalition headquarters, and even units fairly hard, especially when they are deployed on expeditionary operations. While the commanders of 1, 2, and 5 Brigades should all be elevated to Brigadier-General once again, the ranks of their respective staffs should decrease. Within a brigade, there are now really three solitudes: operations, support, and personnel administration. Accordingly, each brigade headquarters should have three Majors: a G3 (operations, plans, intelligence, training, tasks, air, aviation, equipment, and everything else), a G4 (maintenance, supply, transport, movement, foods, et cetera), and G1 (personnel administration, honours and

awards, discipline, et cetera). Of the three Majors, the G3 should be *primus inter pares* (first among equals, this is already common practice), and the COS should be eliminated, with the G3 fulfilling that role. Within each of the primary directorates, the branch principals should have a number of senior and junior Captains to supervise the specific sub-directorates. This is common practice in both the United Kingdom and America, where there are usually two senior Majors (and perhaps one or two junior Majors) on any given brigade staff, and brings Canada back to pre-2006 practice.

Lastly, consideration should be given to the creation of Brigade Support Battalions in the three manoeuvre brigades to provide the combat support function found in the infantry battalions of the army. These units commanded by either a combat arms, Signal, or Intelligence officer, would encompass the current Signal Squadron (and the attendant brigade headquarters support function), the resident intelligence company, and other formation-level add-ons such as air defence, influence activities, and additional enablers. If enacted, these units could fall-in on the current architecture of the existing signal squadrons, bringing additional organizational expertise and a valuable diversity of operational experience to a number of disparate, small units with limited experience in command, making the entire brigade team stronger. The Lieutenant-Colonel Chief of Staff position currently in the staff structure could likely be used more beneficially commanding several hundred combat support troops than running a staff, especially once trimmed down to a more appropriate size.

At the Division level, we should see the process repeated, but with three Lieutenant-Colonels as the G3, G4, and G1, again with the G3 being *primus inter pares*. Given the static nature of the divisions, a Chief of Staff is probably not required, and that Colonel

position would be better employed commanding one of the reserve brigades. As for what those one star commanders would be responsible for, in the east, 2nd Canadian Division would have the Combat Training Centre, 2nd Canadian Division Support Group, the Quebec reserve brigade, the Atlantic reserve brigade, and both the Quebec and Atlantic Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups. The latter two commands would benefit from full time (Regular Force in current parlance) Commanding Officers, instead of reservists as is current practice. The 4th Canadian Division (the army of Ontario) would retain Canadian Armed Forces Base Kingston, the 4th Canadian Division Support Group, the two reserve brigades in Ontario, and the Ontario ranger patrol group. 3rd Canadian Division would have the 3rd Canadian Division Support Group, the prairie reserve brigade, the British Columbia reserve brigade, and both the 1st Canadian Ranger Patrol Group in the three territories and the 4th Canadian Ranger Patrol Group in the Prairies and the West Coast.

Lastly, the new 5th Canadian Division Headquarters, perhaps based in Edmonton, would command both the field force and the collective training centre. This would see this newly resurrected formation commanding the three manoeuvre brigades, all under one-star generals, the Canadian Combat Support Brigade under a Colonel, and the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre, also under a Colonel. Using the title 5th Canadian Division has many advantages: 1st Canadian Division is already taken by a CJOC unit, and 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Divisions are already being used as well. In addition, the Australians, British, and Americans all already have 1st Divisions (the U.S. Army actually has three first divisions: 1st Infantry, 1st Cavalry, and 1st Armoured). The British have a 3rd Division as well, and the Americans have many divisions with many numbers, but none of our closest allies have a 5th Division, which is useful for reasons of differentiation. As this headquarters would have both force generation and force employment

responsibilities, including the potential to act as a deployed division headquarters, it would, of necessity, have a structure that is slightly different from the other Level 2 headquarters in the army.

First, the new staff triarchy would remain intact with the new, deployable 5th Canadian Division: three Lieutenant-Colonels would be the key advisors operations, support, and personnel, just as the other three divisions are structured. However, there would be two key additions: two small tiger teams, both headed by Colonels, with the mandate to act as force generators and force enablers.[54] Titled *Task Force Amiens* and *Task Force Scheldt*[55], each group would be roughly ten personnel strong, and would exist to train the manoeuvre brigades for employment on expeditionary operations. Much like the Operations Groups at the U.S. Army's Manoeuvre Centre for Excellence, these small elements would work in close cooperation with Commander 5th Canadian Division and their paired brigade commanders to optimize the high-readiness training experience for the assigned formation. These organizations would be comprised of experts, experienced in working at the formation level, who could both effectively plan and mentor the current occupants of various key jobs within the organization. On mobilization, if the brigade headquarters were deploying, then the supporting task force could become the Chief of Staff National and supporting elements for Canadian reach-back. If a single unit from the brigade deployed, then the tiger team could become the national command element. If the 5th Canadian Division Headquarters deployed, than one of the tiger teams could form the genesis of a rear party and help prepare any subsequent rotation.

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[54] The credit for this idea goes to **Major Cole Peterson** of the **PPCLI**, who first mentioned it to the author during informal discussions in 2013 and 2014. It has great merit, and is *Shanghaied* without remorse.

[55] A nod to great Canadian military accomplishments during those two campaigns in the First and Second World Wars.

The Canadian Combat Support Brigade would move its headquarters from Kingston to Gagetown, where the preponderance of its subordinate units and soldiers live and work. Because of geographic proximity, it would make sense to transfer command of the 2nd Battalion, the Royal Canadian Regiment from 2nd Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group to the Gagetown-based brigade headquarters, once again providing a local commanding officer with a geographically co-located superior instead of one located two provinces away as is currently the case.

At the level of the Canadian Army Headquarters, some additional staff horsepower is, and will continue to be, required due to Level 1 headquarters institutional requirements. Currently, the Army Staff has a three-star commander, a two-star deputy, and two full-time one-stars, Chief of Staff Army Operations and Chief of Staff Army Strategy. With force development and concepts going to the newly-enlarged (and up-ranked) Canadian Army Command and Staff College, the number of general officers in Army Headquarters can safely be reduced by one. The remaining one-star, perhaps titled Brigadier-General, General Staff (or BGGS in a nod to the traditions of the Canadian Corps from the First World War), would ultimately be responsible for running the staff on behalf of the Commander and Deputy Commander, Canadian Army. As a foot on the ground, she would enable her two superiors to focus on communication "up and out," and the heavy travel responsibilities as a result of their many and varied responsibilities. The BGGS would have four Colonels as direct reports: the Army G3, G4, G1, and G7 (or Director Army Training). The Director of Land Requirements (or DLR) would report directly to the Deputy Commander, Canadian Army (DCCA). This staff deflation sees an increase in the capability and responsibility of the Army Staff with the addition of the responsibilities of the Army Training Authority.

CONCLUSION

The Canadian Army is a venerable institution, but it suffers from a number of structural weaknesses that detract from its overall operational outputs and effectiveness as an institution. In the current structure of the army, there is no champion for the field force (our *raison d'etre*), power is spread diffusely, and many commanders have extraordinarily wide spans of control spanning provinces when there are perfectly suitable headquarters co-located with the units these far-flung commanders are purportedly in charge of. In the current structure of the Canadian Army, Regular Force (full-time) Colonels command 12 formations or equivalent – there are another 18 full-Colonels who are in staff positions. Similarly, there are 41 recognizable commanding officer billets at the Lieutenant-Colonel level, with an additional 12 "commanding officer" jobs that were formerly staff positions serviced by senior Captains or junior Majors. If these positions are included, then there are 53 commanding officer jobs in the army, but they are not nearly of the same quality as sub-unit commander opportunities that feed into them as officers progress. In the current model, many hundreds of Majors will get excellent command opportunities at that rank level, only to be faced with bleak developmental prospects at the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, unless one is lucky enough to secure command of one of the few regiments or battalions.

In the current state of affairs, Colonels are also starved for meaningful command opportunities in the army. There are 12 formation or equivalent commands in the Canadian Army as it sits right now. However, 18 Colonels of the 30 currently in the army structure do not command anything, and many of the formations available are fairly hollow in that they do not have responsibilities commensurate with their status. For example, in the current army design, 2

and 5 Canadian Division Support Groups essentially command a single base, with a few tiny detachments elsewhere and no responsibility for training of any sort. In addition, they frequently find themselves reporting to commanders in different provinces, and working at odds with peers on the same installation (a good example of this is the current situation in Gagetown, where the base commander works for a superior in Halifax, and the Combat Training Centre Commander works for a boss in Kingston).

Under the proposed reset, Commanding Officer positions at the Lieutenant-Colonel rank-level would grow to between 49 and 52 meaningful command positions from the current 41 CO jobs of consequence. The elimination of the 12 spurious command jobs (Base Operations, Administration, and Technical Services) and the addition of the remaining four Canadian Ranger Patrol Groups and re-establishment of bases in Edmonton, Wainwright, Petawawa, Valcartier, and Gagetown will make the army more effective at producing operational outputs. Additionally, it will provide experienced Lieutenant-Colonels selected for command and with experience running large and complex sub-units with truly meaningful employment that will allow them to grow professionally, prepare them for greater responsibility, and contribute meaningfully to the Canadian Army.

Formation commanders and equivalents would grow from 12 under the current construct to 16, three of whom would be Brigadier-Generals (the Mechanized Brigade Groups) and the balance being Colonels. However, the number of Colonels in the Regular Force Canadian Army structure would drop from 30 to 22, and the actual number of formations in the army would be reduced, with four Primary Reserve brigade headquarters eliminated. Moreover, the idea of part-time formation command would be eliminated, as would the fairly common practice of

subordinate units reporting to superiors thousands of kilometers away. In fact, the only formation that would suffer this traditionally Canadian "tyranny of geography" to any real extent would be the new, larger 5th Canadian Division, home to the field force of the army under this new structure.

As discussed earlier, this key piece of re-organization would give the army's raison d'etre a powerful voice, increasing general officer representation from zero to four, including the only Major-General amongst the Level 2 commanders. While the headquarters, if based in Edmonton, would be a great distance from its subordinate brigades in Petawawa, Valcartier, and Gagetown, all of these formations are not tied to the terrain where they live and train on a daily basis. They all regularly deploy to western Canada for collective training events anyway, and similar dispersion is faced by American Corps headquarters and their subordinate divisions, an appropriate comparison for Canada based on differences in size of the two armies. For example, while III Corps and its eight brigades of corps troops is based in Fort Hood, Texas along with 1st Cavalry Division, 1st Armoured Division is in El Paso, Texas, 1st Infantry Division is in Fort Riley, Kansas, and 4th Infantry Division is in Fort Carson, Colorado. Similarly, XVIII Airborne Corps is co-located with the 82nd Airborne Division and corps troops in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, but has the 101st Air Assault Division in Kentucky, the 10th Mountain Division in New York State, and the 3rd Infantry Division in Georgia. The biggest advantage of headquartering the field force in the west is the proximity to one of its three manoeuvre brigades in a city with room to absorb additional military presence and the fact that it will also be in the vicinity of the best collective training areas in Canada – both are huge benefits.

While the other three divisions will all shrink in their proportion of full-time military personnel, they will be responsible for all of the Canadian Army's 18,000 reservists, 5,500 Canadian Rangers, and the majority of the 5,500 civilian personnel that make the army whole. Moreover, this paper has demonstrated that by eliminating some inefficient and wasteful command structures and better use of the existing command architecture, the army can actually improve outcomes both on the field of battle and within the institution. Using the model of the optimized army outlined in this paper, the Canadian Army can retain the links to local communities, provincial governments, and domestic operations arm of the Canadian Joint Operations Command (all that is good about the current system) while getting better where it really counts. It is for this reason that the process of change should begin as soon as is practicable.

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