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WORLDS APART: DOMESTIC SEARCH AND RESCUE AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

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Exercise Solo Flight

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EXERCISE *SOLO FLIGHT* – EXERCICE *SOLO FLIGHT*

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“La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale.”

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WORLDS APART: DOMESTIC SEARCH AND RESCUE AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

First, he quickly reviewed what he knew...Second, he considered what he did not know...he completed a rapid assessment of the situation – and he acted.

-General Charles C. Krulak, USMC

Canadian Armed Forces personnel face life and death situations daily, at home and abroad, while conducting operations. In June 2007, Captain Ryan Sheppard was part of a patrol in Afghanistan. The Canadian soldiers were out that day to be present, conduct reconnaissance, to demonstrate Canada's resolve in their sector. During the several kilometer walk to their pick-up point, the patrol was ambushed in an alleyway, bordered by high walls, caught without effective cover. Captain Sheppard withdrew several paces back down the alley, to safety behind another wall, but several of his troops were pinned down by a Taliban machine gun. Calling in support from two British Harrier jets on the Taliban position allowed the patrol to retreat unscathed, but it was close and Captain Sheppard recalls feeling resigned to becoming a casualty during the encounter.¹

Closer to home, in Sept 2004, the fishing vessel *Ryan's Commander* foundered in a vicious storm south of Newfoundland. The six men on board managed to call for help and escape into life rafts, but they were ill equipped for the cold water; worse, their raft was being rapidly blown toward dangerous rocks. A Search and Rescue (SAR) helicopter and aircraft were dispatched to their aid. In the treacherous conditions, one rescuer was injured and another nearly drowned, almost pulled down by the weight of 100 feet of steel cable that had accidentally detached from his helicopter. As the raft blew up on the rocks, other rescuers utilized ropes and mountain techniques to descend the eighty foot cliffs to save the lives of four of the men.² Sadly

¹ Ryan Sheppard, "Soldiers' Stories," *National Post*, 9 July 2011.

² Carolyn Matthews, *True Stories of Rescue and Survival* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2008), 144-159.

two men died in this real account of the challenges and dangers of Search and Rescue in Canada.³

These two vignettes, one from Kandahar and one from Newfoundland, took place on opposite sides of the world. Yet, there are similarities of purpose, risk, and emotion. By 2007 the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar province was working in Canada's area of responsibility. Using what is now known as the Comprehensive Approach (CA), they worked with multiple government departments and international organizations to establish security, the rule of law and to improve the lives of ordinary Afghans in the conflict zone. Likewise, the partnership of departments, agencies and volunteers that form Canada's domestic SAR system are called upon daily to undertake hazardous missions to assist Canadians in distress.

Despite being worlds apart, deployed CA security operations are fundamentally very similar to domestic SAR operations. Unlike CA operations in Afghanistan and Iraq that have drawn significant interest from external-to-government bodies, domestic SAR as a whole has unfortunately not benefitted from rigorous academic study or criticism. Since it can be shown that the domestic SAR system embodies the main principles of CA, critiques of deployed CA security operations can be beneficially applied to domestic SAR. This paper will demonstrate that SAR and deployed CA operations are fundamentally similar in order to leverage these criticisms to overcome the shortage of analysis of SAR. First, the fundamental attributes of the CA will be generalized from competing definitions of CA operations. Then, a description of Canada's domestic SAR system will demonstrate that it is built on these same fundamental attributes. Finally, some common criticisms of deployed CA security operations will be used to highlight areas of strength and weakness in Canada's SAR system.

³ The author was a member of 413 Search and Rescue Squadron at the time of the *Ryan's Commander* incident and has been employed in many posts at the tactical level of domestic SAR in Canada between 2001-2014.

Comprehensive Approach Defined

No single definition of the CA to security operations is universally accepted in Canada. Canadian military doctrine defines the CA as the "...principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular situation. It includes all actors that may affect the conduct of operations within a joint operating area."⁴ These actors would include coalition militaries, other Canadian government departments and agencies, entities of other national governments, international organizations such as the UN or NATO, and civil society or non-governmental agencies. The intent of the CA, according to Canadian doctrine, is to ensure that all elements of national power, coalition partners, regional organizations, international institutions, and civil society organizations are working "...within a unifying theme to consider and to address the full range of influences and factors in a destabilized environment."⁵ Lieutenant General Andrew Leslie, Commander of the Army from 2006 to 2009, provides an alternative definition. In his view, CA has "...diplomatic, defence, development, and commercial resources, aligned with those of numerous other agencies, coordinated through an integrated campaign plan...[resulting in] greater mission effectiveness."⁶ Due to the differences between these two, other definitions will be required to draw generalizations.

NATO does not provide a formal definition of Comprehensive Approach, but utilizes the term to explain how nations' military forces are to be used in concert with other instruments of national power. NATO dictates that military forces will not operate in isolation, but will act as part of a collective strategy that harmonizes NATO operations with the efforts of international

⁴ Department of National Defence, G-GJ-005-000/FP-001, *Canadian Forces Joint Publication 01: Canadian Military Doctrine* (Ottawa: DND Canada, 2011), GL-2.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 6-12.

⁶ Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, Peter Gizewski, Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Rostek, "Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Canadian Forces Operations," *Canadian Military Journal* 9, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 11.

organizations and NGOs.⁷ The United States definition of the CA to deployed security operations “...integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the [United States Government], and to the extent possible, the [host nation], international organizations, NGOs, multinational partners, and private-sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.”⁸ The United Kingdom has replaced the term ‘comprehensive’ with the term ‘integrated’ to denote the tighter relationship they have achieved amongst their national level government departments. For them, the integrated approach utilizes “...strong political leadership and collaboration across departments to ensure the UK’s national power is coherently applied...within a broader multinational response, involving many actors including allies, international organisations and non-governmental organisations.”⁹ In such multinational situations, the UK integrated approach is built on principles of proactive engagement between participating entities prior to deployment, shared understanding of issues and solutions, outcome-based thinking to create cohesion and coherence and collaborative work practices.¹⁰ Three prominent members, and the NATO alliance itself, are all thus using different definitions for what is ostensibly the same idea.

Problematic as this may seem, there are several key components to each of these definitions that can be used to extract the fundamental attributes for a comprehensive approach operation. Each definition requires a broad range of participants. The definitions provide very expansive examples of whence those ‘actors’ originate: government departments, including more

⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *NATO Standard AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine*, Version 1, (Brussels: NATO Standardization Office, 2017), 1-6.

⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, JP3-07 Stability (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), I-20.

⁹ Ministry of Defence, *Shaping a Stable World: the Military Contribution* JDP 05 (London: Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2016), 61.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 62.

than just military or defense, civil society organizations, employees of the private sector, partner States and international institutions such as the United Nations and Red Cross.

Second, several of the definitions attempt to proscribe a geographic region for CA operations, indicating that a generalized comprehensive approach model requires a similar defined boundary. Within military doctrine the term Area of Operations has a precise definition that delimits a particular time and space for military actions, usually assigning responsibility for that geographic region to a particular commander.

Finally, each definition describes some level of coordination, collaboration, coherence or integration and many require that participants' activities are governed by formal processes. A difference of degree is evident in the level or amount of collaboration expected amongst the actors. Thus, it is apparent that a continuum of cooperation must exist. This continuum would have at its lesser extent the United States' 'extent possible', with Canada's 'a unifying theme' somewhere in the middle and finally the UK and General Leslie's 'integrated' at the maximum.

Though there will be no attempt here to provide a new definition of CA operations, this short examination reveals four main principles. Clearly any CA operation must allow for a broad range of actors, originating from within government, the military, and from civilian institutions. Any CA operation must have a defined boundary, likely geographically delineated. The participants in any CA operation must have a common understanding of the situation they face. Finally, the level of cooperation amongst participants must be agreed and fall somewhere between 'extent possible' and 'integrated.'

Principles of SAR

Domestic SAR in Canada shares these same four founding principles. Domestic SAR in Canada is delivered via a system of cooperating organizations – the SAR 'actors' - that together are responsible for providing this service to Canadians. These organizations come from all levels

of government, the private sector, and volunteer groups. In 1976, the Minister of National Defence was appointed Lead Minister for Search and Rescue responsible for the coordination of the National SAR Program (NSP).¹¹ The federal departments with responsibilities to the NSP include Defence, Parks, Environment, Transport, Fisheries and Oceans, and Public Safety. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), representing Defence and Fisheries respectively, make up the bulk of the federal contribution. The federal level is responsible for aeronautical and maritime SAR cases, for the coordination of such cases and for the effective operation of the national SAR system. The provinces and territories are responsible for land-based SAR cases. They fulfill their responsibilities through their provincial police forces and provincial emergency management agencies.

The Civil Air Search and Rescue Association (CASARA), the Search and Rescue Volunteer Association of Canada (SARVAC), and the Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary (CGA) are volunteer organizations that contribute to SAR cases originating in the air, on land, and on the water. Companies conducting offshore resource extraction in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia contribute private SAR helicopters dedicated to their activities. In British Columbia several volunteer mountain rescue groups contribute a unique and irreplaceable skill. All of these organizations work together to achieve the National SAR Objective of preventing loss of life and preventing injury through SAR alerting, responding and prevention activities.¹² Canada's SAR forces have established cooperation agreements with neighbouring countries, notably the United

¹¹ Defence R&D Canada, *Canadian National Search and Rescue Literature Review: Canadian National Search and Rescue Policy* (Winnipeg: Defence R&D Canada – Centre for Operational Research and Analysis, 2012), 25.

¹² Department of National Defence/Canadian Coast Guard (DND/CCG), B-GA-209-001/FP-001 – DFO 5449, *Canadian Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual* (Ottawa: DND/CCG Canada, Revised September 2014), Vol 1, 1.01.

States and members of the Arctic Council, to facilitate sharing of information and resources for SAR cases and to create forums to improve integration through meetings and exercises.¹³

The combined activities of these diverse groups make up the NSP. CAF and CCG SAR activities are integrated into the NSP through the Canadian Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (CAMSAR) which is a publication issued jointly by the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Commissioner of the Coast Guard.¹⁴ The first few sections of CAMSAR briefly discuss such topics as the legal basis for the provision of SAR services, the division of responsibilities, and the organization of the operational SAR system. The remaining hundreds of pages are devoted to standard operating procedures on topics such as coordination and investigation of SAR cases, search planning theory and reports and returns. The bulk of the content is tactical in nature.

Internationally, there is no single organizing body for Search and Rescue. The International Maritime Organization (IMO), the International Civilian Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the International COSPAS-SARSAT program are primarily responsible for setting standards and assigning responsibilities for SAR globally. These bodies have created Canada's SAR Region of Responsibility (SRR) which stretches from the mid-Atlantic to several hundred kilometers west of the British Columbia coast and from the Canada-United States border to the geographic North Pole.

This large SRR is split into three sub-regions, each with a Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) staffed with Coast Guard and Air Force SAR mission coordinators. The JRCCs are responsible for the successful conclusion of all SAR cases of federal responsibility. They are

¹³ Arctic Council, *Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic* (Tromso, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2011), Article 9.

¹⁴ Department of National Defence/Canadian Coast Guard (DND/CGC), B-GA-209-001/FP-001 – DFO 5449, *Canadian Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual* (Ottawa: DND/CCG Canada, Revised September 2014), Vol 1, C-0.03(E).

also the single point of contact for provinces and territories to request federal assistance in SAR cases of provincial responsibility. They assign military and Coast Guard resources to SAR cases, activate volunteer organizations when necessary, and respond to requests for assistance from provinces and from international neighbours. JRCCs are resourced and authorized to contract civilian aircraft and vessels to assist in SAR cases. In this way, JRCCs are the focal point for operational SAR. They have the resources, authority, and network to fulfil the planning and coordination functions for SAR cases, thereby creating cohesion and unity of effort throughout the operational system. Combined, the three JRCCs respond to over 9000 cases per year in Canada.¹⁵

Illuminating the domestic SAR system through the aforementioned four principles of CA demonstrates that SAR has the required characteristics to be considered comparable to deployed CA security operations. Domestic SAR services are provided by an integrated web of organizations from government, the private sector and volunteers. The CAF and Coast Guard contributions are only two components of the overall system, but they represent the most well-resourced and the only full-time SAR forces. At the international level, SAR is, in many respects, loosely governed by low standards and non-binding recommendations.

The area of operations for domestic SAR is clearly geographically defined, just as for deployed CA security operations. The SRR though, due to Canada's sheer size and varied topography and climate, divided into several sub-regions. This subdivision does not reduce the correlation between domestic SAR and deployed CA security operations because it serves as a tool to efficiently allocate responsibility to lower level organizations which are subsequently required to provide mutual support during operations.

¹⁵ Department of National Defense, *Quadrennial SAR Review* (Ottawa: DND Canada 2013), 11.

The CAMSAR manual focuses on the techniques and procedures of searching for and rescuing people in distress. It is the primary tactical level manual for CAF, Coast Guard, CASARA and CGA SAR participants, but it is not extensively used by others. Nonetheless, because it is used by JRCCs in their central role, the CAMSAR has come to influence procedures and standardize terminology across all of Canada's SAR service providers, thereby facilitating interagency cooperation and ensuring a common approach to SAR operations.

SAR services in Canada are coordinated between different organizations, and across federal and provincial departments, regardless of jurisdiction. The legislation and international obligations that establish the requirement for SAR services clearly lay out which agency is responsible for responding to distress in any given scenario.¹⁶ With all participants knowledgeable about such responsibilities, and with the JRCCs fulfilling their coordination role, the result is that when multiple agencies are working together on a case, it is clearly understood which agency is responsible for the outcome and which agencies are supporting efforts toward that outcome. The result is a high degree of cooperation and cohesion, falling nearer to the 'integrated' end of the aforementioned spectrum.

In summary then, the Canadian domestic SAR system inherently reflects the four core principles of CA operations. SAR has a wide variety of actors and agencies from all levels of government, the private sector and volunteers working together toward a common goal. In responding to distress incidents, these agencies utilize the capacity and expertise of the JRCCs to ensure coordination of efforts and to maximize their opportunity to successfully resolve the case.

¹⁶ For example, the Chicago Convention and SOLAS convention, require Canada to provide SAR services to aircraft and ships in Canada's SRR respectively. The Oceans Act, 1996 empowers the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans to fulfill those requirements.

Critiques of CA applicable to SAR

Comparisons between Canadian domestic SAR and deployed CA security operations are therefore appropriate since SAR is such a solid example of the generalized comprehensive operation as described above. Despite being one of six core missions for the Canadian Forces, SAR has not received significant attention from domestic oversight bodies.¹⁷ Only two official reviews of domestic SAR have been published since 1993. In 2013 the Minister of National Defence launched the Quadrennial SAR Review (QSR) with the objective “...to provide a comprehensive perspective of Canada’s National SAR Program, with a view to enhancing integration and alignment to ensure a seamless system for Canadians.”¹⁸ Despite the lofty sounding title, the QSR was completed in less than eight months by a small team at NSS and is based upon a survey and a single DND-sponsored discussion forum. The second report, also from 2013, by the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) examined SAR with sufficient scope to include Transport Canada, DND and DFO. Both reports concluded that Canada’s SAR system serves Canadians well but there is room for improvement in several areas. Since domestic SAR correlates so strongly with the principles of CA operations, the discussions that follow apply critiques of deployed CA security operations to domestic SAR to highlight areas of strength and weakness. The areas to be examined are organization and governance, resourcing, training, and strategy and policy.

Organization and Governance

The organization and governance of CA operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has been found wanting. Most critiques point to the lack of a top level entity responsible for coordinating and ensuring coherence amongst the efforts of the various departments participating in CA operations. Such an entity would be tasked with ensuring strategic CA policy is implemented

¹⁷ Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy* (Ottawa: National Defence, 2013), 3.

¹⁸ Department of National Defense, *Quadrennial SAR Review ...*, 4.

across affected departments and would lead reconstruction and stabilization missions.¹⁹ Furthermore, for this coordinating body to be effective it cannot be a paper tiger – that is, it must be sufficiently resourced and empowered to compel participating departments to fully implement their assigned portion of the CA workload.²⁰ The lack of a top level entity has resulted in bureaucratic turf wars, decreasing overall CA effectiveness.²¹ This is a lesson that domestic SAR must heed. As LM SAR, MND is responsible for the overall effectiveness of the NSP, but is not empowered to compel the other departments' compliance. The LM SAR is assisted in fulfilling this coordination function by the National Search and Rescue Secretariat (NSS) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Search and Rescue (ICSAR). The NSS was transferred to Public Safety Canada in 2015 and ICSAR has not met in many years.²² Domestic SAR then is in the same position as CA operations in lacking a credible top-level coordinating entity.

Despite this, the Auditor General concluded that the CAF and CG are able to adequately respond to SAR cases of federal responsibility. The reason for this seeming contradiction lies in the proactive posture of tactical level SAR responders to provide assistance as rapidly as possible and to only worry about secondary issues – such as jurisdiction and financial responsibility – after the fact. This proactive nature is only evident when it fails. For example in January 2012 teenager Burton Winters perished in the Labrador wilderness and CAF SAR authorities,

¹⁹ Robert Egnell, “Civil-Military coordination for operational effectiveness: Toward a Measured Approach,” in *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 24, no. 2(2013): 245.

²⁰ Janine Davidson, “Making Government Work: Pragmatic Priorities for Interagency Coordination,” in *Orbis* 53, no 3 (2009): 434.

²¹ M.J. Williams, “Empire Lite Revisited: NATO, the Comprehensive Approach and State-building in Afghanistan,” in *International Peacekeeping* 18, no 1 (2011): 70.

²² Government of Canada, “Backgrounder – Search and Rescue Canada,” (Archived Content), last modified 24 July 2015, <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-en.do?nid=1006719>.

shouldered significant responsibility for failing to closely monitor a case that was legally a provincial responsibility.²³

Strategic policy needs to be implemented through a concept of operations, a military term that describes the various efforts and objectives that, when met, amount to accomplishing the mission. For CA practitioners, such a concept of operations needs to be developed by experienced people from the myriad departments and agencies involved in order to clearly describe who is responsible for what and how.²⁴ Then, to actually craft the tactical plans during a CA mission, General Leslie calls for tools to facilitate collaborative planning which are accessible by all organizations participating in the CA effort and willingness by those organizations to consider higher order effects of CA projects.²⁵ At the international level, to a limited extent, SAR is presently in a better position than CA security operations. ICAO and IMO oblige signatory states to provide minimum levels of SAR service and are working, in the wake of the disappearance of flight MH370, at the regional level to harmonize and integrate SAR services, though the effort is far from complete. Domestically, the CAMSAR manual represents Canada's SAR tactical operations manual and is used extensively by CG and CAF personnel. CAMSAR is non-binding upon the other NSP participants. The JRCCs utilize a collaborative SAR mission planning software suite that enables real time sharing of information across the country to any authorized person, though this feature is little-used in practice as there are few people trained in the software outside the JRCC. Furthermore, the software is old and fragile, and the Auditor General concluded that it is "...near the breaking point."²⁶ SAR then can be judged

²³ Bailey White, "5 years after death of Burton Winters, timeline unclear for search and rescue inquiry," *CBC News*, 1 February 2017.

²⁴ Janine Davidson, "Operationalizing the Comprehensive Approach: The Military as 'Enabler...'" *Small Wars Journal Blog Post*, 18 February 2009.

²⁵ Leslie, *Developing a Comprehensive Approach...*, 13.

²⁶ Office of the Auditor General of Canada, *Report of the Auditor General of Canada – Spring 2013*, (Ottawa: OAG 2013), Chapter 7, 18.

to be in a better position than CA security operations in implementing a concept of operations across partner organizations but that implementation is incomplete and in danger of failing due to obsolete tools and inadequate training penetration.

Domestic SAR and CA security operations are at opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of their participants' proclivity to remain focused on achieving their stated objectives. A common criticism of CA operations is that field operations wander from those activities that directly support the objective as lower level operators implement 'nice to have' projects. This has led to the critique that CA operations must focus on the essential portions of non-security operations to avoid mission creep and ensure operational coherence with the overall development strategy.²⁷ Domestic SAR operations suffer from the opposite problem: despite an objective to the contrary, SAR service providers focus almost exclusively on response to distress incidents and fail to conduct prevention activities as stated in the National SAR Objective. The CAMSAR mentions that prevention is a critical activity, but the QSR observed that prevention activities were not clearly delineated and consequently often become secondary to response efforts. Importantly, the review highlighted that prevention activities should be coordinated across the NSP partnership.²⁸

In the area of organization and governance then, the application of CA critiques to domestic SAR provides a revelation that there is a requirement for a top-level, empowered coordinating body. For SAR, this requirement could be met with a new entity or through empowerment of NSS. Finally, CA critiques demonstrate that SAR organizations need to expand their activities to fulfill all portions of the national SAR objective by finding ways to fulfill their prevention mandate.

²⁷ Christian Leuprecht, "Conclusion," in *Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach* (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011), 245.

²⁸ Department of National Defense, *Quadrennial SAR Review ...*,14.

Resources and Support

The resourcing models for deployed CA security operations are significantly different from that of domestic SAR operations. The former relies upon partnerships of nations and organizations to contribute the necessary components to make a security operation successful under a CA model whereas the latter consists exclusively of intra-national agencies. The individual methods states use to resource the agencies they deploy to CA security operations affects the nature of the relationship amongst those agencies and between similar agencies of participating nations.

Many critiques of deployed CA security operations cite problems with the relationship between the military and other government departments and between the military and NGOs. When the military provides ‘support’ there is a tendency for military commanders to utilize military resources to accomplish tasks seen by the military as necessary, but for which civilian actors are unable or unwilling to accomplish. This results in the militarization of diplomacy and development activities, often simply because military organizations possess both the funding and manpower necessary to get the job done. Consequently, development activities undertaken by the military tend to serve short-term military purposes, instead of long term community purposes.²⁹ This suggests, according to Lieutenant General Leslie, that efforts by the military to lead deployed CA security operations cannot succeed.³⁰

This same risk of ‘militarization’ exists for Canada’s domestic SAR system. The Royal Canadian Air Force is the most visible and widespread symbol of SAR in Canada, due primarily to the central role played by JRCC staff that are most often seen in the media during cases of high interest. The Air Force’s budget, capabilities and risk acceptance level far exceed that of all

²⁹ Leuprecht, “Conclusion”..., 241.

³⁰ Leslie, “Developing a Comprehensive Approach ...”, 17.

NSP partners.³¹ If NSS, now a part of Public Safety, were to evolve into an empowered organization, it is possible that DND would become a larger and more well-resourced organization subjugated to a smaller civilian organization for SAR purposes. SAR practitioners then would do well to heed the experience of deployed CA operations and take steps to ensure that military SAR commanders are prepared to properly implement their supporting role.

Likewise, all military members in conflict zones need to be aware that their civilian counterparts from other government departments are often deployed without the benefit of the same level of training, health care, logistical and administrative support, or safety equipment.³² This impacts an individuals' performance. For example, the threat environment is a structural disincentive to volunteer for deployment, and a disincentive to accept risk once deployed, because it may void one's life insurance.³³ Though SAR practitioners are often faced with dangerous weather conditions, deployed CA security operators often face an armed, hostile force opposed to their efforts. On this point, domestic SAR is ahead of deployed CA security operators. The CASARA, CG Auxiliary and SARVAC volunteers who participate in SAR missions have insurance coverage, free of charge, under various policies to cover liability and injury.³⁴ Employees of all levels of government benefit from significant support in terms of insurance, health care and indemnification.

³¹ In 2016 DND spent \$72.7 million on SAR operations and dedicated over 600 full time personnel to the SAR mission. DFO reported an expenditure of \$31.1 million on SAR, excluding the cost of vessel operations in FY15/16. Department of National Defense, *Departmental Performance Report 2015-16*, (Ottawa: DND 2016), 55 and Fisheries and Oceans Canada, *Departmental Performance Report 2015-2016*, (Ottawa: DFO, 2016), 57.

³² Davidson, "Operationalizing the Comprehensive,..."

³³ Canadian Life and Health Assurance Association, "A Guide to Life Insurance," last accessed 1 May 2017, <http://clhia.uberflip.com/i/199380-a-guide-to-life-insurance/0?>

³⁴ Civil Air Search and Rescue Association (CASARA) National Policy Manual, (n.p., 2007), A-100. Other organizations mentioned have similar insurance policy arrangements.

Consequently, participants in domestic SAR operations, unlike some civilian CA participants, do not suffer from a lack of personal support. On this issue, the comparison to domestic SAR reveals that the critique is correct and personal support to civilians deployed to CA operations is necessary. Domestic SAR should heed the criticism of CA, especially in the event that NSS becomes more empowered, and have procedures in place to ensure the support provided to other departments is actually supportive.

Strategy and Policy

One of the major findings of analysis of the results of CA security operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is the lack of coherent supporting policy both within contributing nations and amongst coalition nations. At the top level there is a need for national strategies against which each state allocates capabilities, responsibilities and resources.³⁵ CA critiques highlight the need for "...integrated, agreed-upon, whole-of-government doctrine and concepts of operation..." to avoid the impact of incoherent top level policy.³⁶ For any given deployed CA operation, application of those concepts should yield realistic objectives for the operation.³⁷ There also needs to be flexible and efficient resourcing processes to facilitate timely delivery of projects once operations commence. For Canadian operations in Afghanistan, this lack of strategic policy has resulted in development decisions being made according to the whims of a 'lead' department's individual strategy.³⁸ The overall goal of this necessary structure is to link strategic objectives to programs and resource allocations in a coherent fashion within the agencies forming a nation's contribution to a deployed CA security effort.³⁹ The consequence of not

³⁵ Davidson, "Making Government Work:....", 429.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 427.

³⁷ Wilton Park, "Operationalising the Comprehensive Approach," Conference Report, April 2012, 3.

³⁸ Ann Fitz-Gerald and Don Macnamara, "Comprehensive Security Requires Comprehensive Structures – How Comprehensive Can We Get?," in *Strategic Studies Working Group Papers*, Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, (March 2012), 7.

³⁹ Davidson, "Making Government Work:....", 428.

creating these policies and processes is more of the same: friction between agencies and operations that are disconnected from any overarching policy or objective.

SAR similarly lacks a top level strategic guidance document to thoroughly describe the roles and responsibilities of each participant in the NSP. The Spring 2013 Report of the Auditor General of Canada found that "...there is [no national SAR policy], nor an overall federal policy, planning framework, clear statement of expectations for federal SAR services...."⁴⁰ Importantly, the audit concluded that this complete lack of strategic documentation means the LM SAR, CAF and CG are not able to "...adequately oversee search and rescue activities."⁴¹ Further, the Auditor General was particularly critical of the NSS for their inability to coordinate creation of such documents despite that task being assigned them in 1986. That Canada, working internally, has failed to create policy, strategy, and assessment documentation for domestic SAR for such a prolonged period indicates that creating such documentation is more difficult than anticipated for some unexplained reason. This fact should serve as a warning to those CA practitioners hoping to create coherent policy for their efforts: the process might be harder and longer than expected. Nonetheless, the criticism is applicable to both SAR and deployed CA operations: a coherent policy framework is a prerequisite for success. Most importantly, the critiques of CA as applied to SAR reinforce the importance and imperative of creating a national level policy and strategic framework for SAR.

Training

As the concepts that are now known as the CA evolved during the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, it became clear that specialized training for such an operation is required. Analysis now shows that such training is required for all agencies, military members included. Training is

⁴⁰ Office of the Auditor General of Canada, *Report of the Auditor General of Canada – Spring 2013*, (Ottawa: OAG 2013), Chapter 7, 23.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, Chapter 7, 26.

required for civilian agencies, certainly because they do not have a culture of deployed operations to draw upon, but also because all agencies need to learn how to work in an integrated manner while deployed.⁴² Furthermore, like most militaries, the civilian agencies playing a role in deployed CA security operations need to create professional education programs for personnel who are staffed to fulfill those deployed roles.⁴³ The purpose of this education and training is to develop civil-military staffs that are familiar with each other and with the strategy to be employed. Once deployed, these staff will display more cohesion, be more resilient and more effective. At the tactical level, the training curriculum delivered to Coast Guard and Air Force members has not been questioned. However, both agencies have problems training sufficient numbers of personnel to keep the domestic SAR system healthy and the Air Force has been criticized for an inability to generate a sufficient number of dedicated training flights. JRCCs have likewise been criticized for insufficient manning levels and a lack of continuation training.⁴⁴ Though the lesson for SAR is lower magnitude, CA critiques do underscore the importance of meaningful combined training which is offered for consideration by SAR practitioners.

Conclusion

General Krulak's fictional account of the three block war, penned in 1999, was intended to describe his vision of the necessary skills for Marines in the post-Cold War era. Those attributes – knowledge, analytical ability, and initiative – are derived from the nature of counter insurgency operations, security operations, or any of the myriad monikers that exist to describe civil-military activities in a conflict zone. The nature of civil-military operations in domestic SAR is roughly equivalent.

⁴² Davidson, "Making Government Work:...", 437.

⁴³ Leuprecht, "Conclusion," ..., 244.

⁴⁴ Office of the Auditor General, *Report...*, 2, 11.

It is not surprising then to find that domestic SAR operations fit a generalized concept of deployed CA operations. This generalized concept, derived from examination of various definitions of ‘CA,’ shows that all such operations require actors from various government agencies, in a defined area of operations, working from a common understanding in a cooperative manner to achieve the mission objectives. That Canada’s domestic SAR system demonstrates these same attributes is likewise not surprising. Consequently, the many available analyses of CA security operations can be used to shine a light on areas for improvement in domestic SAR which has received much less scholarly attention. This comparison reveals that domestic SAR is, or is in danger of, displaying some of the major shortcomings of deployed CA operations. Specifically, the Canadian domestic SAR system lacks not only a coherent top-level policy framework but also a top-level coordinating body empowered to enforce compliance with such a policy framework. For the time being, as NSS is not empowered, there is little danger of ‘militarization’ of SAR; however, should NSS begin to assert control over SAR at the federal level, military SAR leaders will need to strike the right balance in the DND-NSS relationship. Conversely, CA security practitioners would do well to observe the success the SAR system has had at integrating across various levels of government and with civilian volunteers. Though support and training are not perfect, there is some evidence that supporting aspects like insurance are beneficial in creating efficient operations with civilian agencies.

Domestic SAR operations and deployed CA security operations then are not that different. To be sure, the environments in which they are conducted are different, but the generalized structure they embody are highly similar. Operations in Newfoundland and Afghanistan then are not as far apart as geography alone would indicate.

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